Colinares vs Pp GR No 182748

In homicide, whether consummated, frustrated, or attempted, self-defense requires (1)

that the person whom the offender killed or injured committed unlawful aggression; (2)
that the offender employed means that is reasonably necessary to prevent or repel the
unlawful aggression; and (3) that the person defending himself did not act with sufficient
provocation.[5]

Unlawful aggression contemplates an actual, sudden, and unexpected attack or an

imminent danger of such attack. A mere threatening or intimidating attitude is not
enough. The victim must attack the accused with actual physical force or with a
weapon.[

The main element of attempted or frustrated homicide is the accuseds intent to take his
victims life. The prosecution has to prove this clearly and convincingly to exclude every
possible doubt regarding homicidal intent.[9] And the intent to kill is often inferred from,
among other things, the means the offender used and the nature, location, and number
of wounds he inflicted on his victim.[

Here, Arnel struck Rufino on the head with a huge stone. The blow was so forceful that
it knocked Rufino out. Considering the great size of his weapon, the impact it produced,
and the location of the wounds that Arnel inflicted on his victim, the Court is convinced
that he intended to kill him.

The Court is inclined, however, to hold Arnel guilty only of attempted, not frustrated,
homicide. In Palaganas v. People,[11] we ruled that when the accused intended to kill
his victim, as shown by his use of a deadly weapon and the wounds he inflicted, but the
victim did not die because of timely medical assistance, the crime is frustrated murder
or frustrated homicide. If the victims wounds are not fatal, the crime is only attempted
murder or attempted homicide

Thus, the Court finds Arnel liable only for attempted homicide and entitled to the
mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender.

But, the Court finds Arnel guilty only of the lesser crime of attempted homicide and
holds that the maximum of the penalty imposed on him should be lowered to
imprisonment of four months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to two years and four
months of prision correccional, as maximum. With this new penalty, it would be but fair
to allow him the right to apply for probation upon remand of the case to the RTC.
Baxinela vs PP 149652

Unlawful aggression contemplates an actual, sudden and unexpected attack on the life
and limb of a person or an imminent danger thereof, and not merely a threatening or
intimidating attitude. The attack must be real, or at least imminent. Mere belief by a
person of an impending attack would not be sufficient. As the evidence shows, there
was no imminent threat that necessitated shooting. In fact, it was Baxinela who was the
aggressor when he grabbed Lajos shoulder and started questioning him. And when Lajo
was shot, it appears that he was just turning around to face Baxinela and, quite
possibly, reaching for his wallet. None of these acts could conceivably be deemed as
unlawful aggression on the part of Lajo.

PP vs Juarigue

According to the facts established by the evidence and found by the learned trial court in this case,
when the deceased sat by the side of defendant and appellant on the same bench, near the door of
the barrio chapel and placed his hand on the upper portion of her right thigh, without her consent,
the said chapel was lighted with electric lights, and there were already several people, about ten of
them, inside the chapel, including her own father and the barrio lieutenant and other dignitaries of
the organization; and under the circumstances, there was and there could be no possibility of her
being raped. And when she gave Amado Capina a thrust at the base of the left side of his neck,
inflicting upon him a mortal wound 4 1/2 inches deep, causing his death a few moments later, the
means employed by her in the defense of her honor was evidently excessive; and under the facts
and circumstances of the case, she cannot be legally declared completely exempt from criminal
liability.

But the fact that defendant and appellant immediately and voluntarily and unconditionally
surrendered to the barrio lieutenant in said chapel, admitting having stabbed the deceased,
immediately after the incident, and agreed to go to her house shortly thereafter and to remain there
subject to the order of the said barrio lieutenant, an agent of the authorities (United States vs.
Fortaleza, 12 Phil., 472); and the further fact that she had acted in the immediate vindication of a
grave offense committed against her a few moments before, and upon such provocation as to
produce passion and obfuscation, or temporary loss of reason and self-control, should be
considered as mitigating circumstances in her favor (People vs. Parana, 64 Phil., 331; People vs.
Sakam, 61 Phil., 27; United States vs. Arribas, 1 Phil., 86).

Defendant and appellant further claims that she had not intended to kill the deceased but merely
wanted to punish his offending hand with her knife, as shown by the fact that she inflicted upon him
only one single wound. And this is another mitigating circumstance which should be considered in
her favor (United States vs. Brobst, 14 Phil., 310; United States vs. Diaz, 15 Phil., 123).

The claim of the prosecution, sustained by the learned trial court, that the offense was committed by
the defendant and appellant, with the aggravating circumstance that the killing was done in a place
dedicated to religious worship, cannot be legally sustained; as there is no evidence to show that the
defendant and appellant had murder in her heart when she entered the chapel that fatal night.
Avelina is not a criminal by nature. She happened to kill under the greatest provocation. She is a
God-fearing young woman, typical of our country girls, who still possess the consolation of religious
hope in a world where so many others have hopelessly lost the faith of their elders and now drifting
away they know not where.

PP vs LARA