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Let me start by thanking Kristina Madsen and Gerhard Thonhauser for having invited me to
come here and talk today, and for having come up with the great topic for this conference. I
am sure that all who are here now share the view that the late nineteenth and early twentieth
century indeed was an extremely exciting time in Austria and in Vienna in particular.
Der Sinn der Welt mu auserhalb ihrer liegen. In der Welt ist alles wie es ist und geschieht
alles wie es geschieht; es gibt in ihr keinen Wert und wenn es ihn gbe, so htte es keinen
Wert.
Wenn es einen Wert gibt, der Wert hat, so mu er auserhalb alles Geschehens und So-Seins
Was es nicht-zufllig macht, kann nicht in der Welt liegen; denn sonst wre dies wieder
zufllig.
Darum kann es auch keinen Stze der Ethik geben. Stze knnen nichts Hheres ausdrcken.
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Es ist klar, da sich die Ethik nicht aussprechen lt.
These peculiar sentenses stemming from the latter part of Tractatus Logico-Philosohicus (or
between Kiekegaard and Wittgensteins early understanding of his work, which Allan Janik
and Stephen Toulmin unfold in their book Wittgensteins Vienna from 1973, namely that
faith or belief or as Janik and Toulmin frase it Kierkegaard made the separation of the
sphere of facts from that of values an absolute one. (Janik/ Toulmin, 1973, p.161)Hence the
claim is that Tractatus is an exposition of this strong division, at once giving full legitimacy to
the language of science and facts, while at the same time keeping the window open to that
which this language cannot entail, because it does not belong to this world. This unsayable
which seems indeed to be the most important question in life yet one which, in Tractarian
vein can neither be rightfully stated nor rightfully answered: Die Lsung des Rtzel des
Lebens in Raum und Zeit liegt auerhalb von Raum und Zeit. ( 6.4312) and Es gibt
allerdings Unaussprechliches. Dies zeigt sich, es ist das Mystische. ( 6.522), thus radically
the outset and form the gereral outline of this paper. However, before we get too deep into the
question thus posed, let me return to the beginning and make some more general
introductory remarks.
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I have been invited here today to talk about Wittgenstein and Kierkegaard. As the title
reveals, I intend to talk about both the influence that Kierkegaard may have had on
illuminate some complex aspects of the Kierkegaardian opus. The latter will come to take up
the lesser space, and will merely hint at some of the ideas that my daily work with these two
The question of whether and if, and if, how so Kiekegaards writings may or may not have had
an impact on Wittgensteins thinking is of interest to us, so I believe, in the sense that it may
hint at some aspects of Wittgensteins thoughts which might otherwise remain hidden or
obscure.
So, the first task must be to say something about a possible Kierkegaardian influence on
Wittgenstein. This task, however straight forward it may appear, has a number of dubious
traits to it. Firstly, we know that Wittgenstein did indeed read Kierkegaard, although we do
not know of all the works by him that Wittgenstein was in contact with. The problem of this
fact is what kind of significanse we attribute to it. There has been a relatively recent trent (Jon
Steward, Jamie Turnbull, Bruce Kirmsee and others) running over the past decade at least
of becoming very intimate with the contemporary era of a thinker, not least in relation to who
this person read, whom he was in contact with, stood in opposition to, etc. This reseach is very
valuable in terms of assessing more accurately the context from which a kind of thinking
sprang, but the question is in relation to philosophy how do we make good use of such
helps us to place thoughts that can be difficult to get a grasp of otherwise, it makes the strains
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of originality take on a different awe, but does it in any final sense, philosophically, explain the
thoughts to us? I suppose the fear might be that we should come to think it possible by way of
text. This is where I have my reservations. Hence, I will make an attempt, based on other
researchers whose work has been much more involved in this task of tracing possible
Kierkegaardian aspects of Wittgensteins writings, yet at the same time I will do so with the
Wittgenstein developed and necessarily came to be just what they came to be. Another,
smaller reservation is that, of course, knowing that someone has very likely read something, is
by no means the same as knowing what that person made of it. This is almost boring in its
base observation, but it is clear that we can read things with very different mindsets and are
quite capable, at least this goes for me of reading something and making surprisingly little of
it. Thus, the most interesting aspect of what Wittgenstein thought of Kierkegaard is
presumably, on this understanding anyway, to detect ways in which it may be seen to surface
The idea to juxtapose the two gentlemen or investigate a possible kierkegaardian influence on
Wittgenstein is by no means new, and often times the question of religiosity has been at the
heart of such readings whether directly or more indirectly, by e.g. focusing on the question
of the unsayable and nonsense as is the case withJames Conant, D.Z. Phillips, Daniel Hutto
The most prominent monographs published on the two to date are Charles Creegans
Wittgenstein and Kierkegaard: Religion, Individuality, and Philosophical Method from 1989, to
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the best on my knowledge also the first monograph published on the two thinkers, Mariele
Nientieds Kierkegaard und Wittgenstein: Hineintauschen in das Wahre from 2003, and Genia
Religion from 2007. Of the three, Genia Schnbaumsfeld provides perhaps the most
contact with Kierkegaards writings. This knowledge is gathered from a series of different
sources ranging from Wittgensteins own remarks in his notebooks with both direct
references to Kierkegaard and indirect thematic and conceptual references, journal entries by
recollections of conversations that have been written down by his former students and
friends primarily by Norman Malcolm, M. OConnor Drury, and O.K. Bouwsma, and
knowledge of the fact that Wittgenstein in 1914 donated part of his inheritance to the editor
of the Austrian magazine Der Brenner, Ludwig von Ficker, for him to destribute between
artists in need of his own choice (Schnbaumsfeld, 2007, p. 14; Monk, 1990, pp. 106 110)
the only condition being that Ficker should keep a designated portion of the money for his
own publication (Monk, 1990, p. 108). One of the beneficiaries that Ficker chose was the
German writer Theodor von Haecker who at this time was publishing translations into
p. 14). These translations appeared in Der Brenner between 1913 and 1921, and during this
period of time, Wittgenstein received from 1914 onwards all the publications that the
Genia Schnbausfeld argues that it is likely that Wittgenstein was familiarized with
Kierkegaard at an early age, since, reportedly, he was the favorite writer of Wittgensteins
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(Hamburg:Rowohlt,1979),30/ Schnbaumsfeld, p. 14). However, apart from Wittgensteins
possible reading of Der Brenner, the first direct mentioning of Kierkegaard, falls in a letter
sent from Wittgensteins sister, Hermine, on December 20th 1917 while Wittgenstein was
kept as a prisoner of war in an Italian POW camp. The letter testifies to the fact that
Wittgenstein had written to his sister, asking her to send him some books by Kierkegaard.
From Hermines letter we know that she mailed him a number of volumes by Kierkegaard,
one of which was The Seducers Diary, but the rest of which are unfortunately not mentioned
by titles (Schbaumsfeld, 2007, p. 14 15). After the war, direct references to Kierkegaard
appear in some letter-correspondences between Wittgenstein and his friends Paul Engelmann
and Ludwig Hnsel (Schnbaumsfeld, p. 17), and in 1922 Wittgenstein mentions Kierkegaard
in relation to a dream he had had with the following remark: During the whole time I kept
thinking about Kierkegaard and that my condition is fear and trembling. (Schbaumsfeld,
2007, p. 26/ Licht und Schatten 13.1.1922) A decade or so later, Kierkegaard is mentioned by
Der Mensch hat den Trieb, gegen die Grenzen der Sprache anzurennen. Denken sie z.B. an das
Erstaunen, da etwas existiert. Das Erstaunen kann nicht in die Form einer Frage ausgedrckt
werden, und es gibt auch gar keine Antwort. Alles, was wir sagen mgen, kann a priori nur
Unsinn sein. Trotzdem rennen wir gegen die Grenzen der Sprache an. Dieses anrennen hat
auch Kierkegaard gesehen und es sogar ganz hnlich (als Anrennen gegen das Paradoxon)
bezeichnet. Dieses Anrennen gegen die Grenze der Sprache ist die Ethik. (Waismann, 1965, p.
12)
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It is worth noticing here, how paradox, which in Kierkegaard relates to faith (or that God
became man amongst us, in time), is understood as the expression of that which is non-
factual, and hence cannot find the expression in language, i.e. the countering of knowledge
and faith.
Kierkegaards writings and this has made me even more anxious than I was already.
From 1938 we also have some lecture notes, taken by one of Wittgensteins students, known
Das Christentum sagt unter anderm, glaube ich, da alle guten Lehren nichts ntzen. Man
Da alle Weisheit kalt ist; und da man mit ihr das Leben so wenig in Ordnung bringen kann,
Eine gute Lehre nmlich mu einen nicht ergreifen; man kann ihr folgen wie einer Vorschrift
der Arztes. Aber hier mu man von etwas ergriffen und umgedreht werden. (D.h., so
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Weisheit ist Leidenschaftslos. Dagegen nennt Kierkegaard den Glauben eine Leidenschaft.
It is interesting with this emphasis on something catching a hold of you and turning you
around, i.e., one is put through faith to a different position in life; being turned to life
differently. And, once again, the antagonism of knowledge and faith or here Lehre/ Weisheit
After his death in 1951, a number of memoirs published by Wittgensteins friends and
acquaintances saw the day of light. As mentioned earlier, most notably those by Drury,
Kierkegaard was by far the most profound thinker of the last century. Kierkegaard was a
2007, p. 18).
If nothing else, this quote makes clear that Wittgenstein held Kierkegaard in high esteem, and
Wittgensteins remarks. Many more examples could be given on different ways in which
Kierkegaardian thoughts make their appearance in Wittgensteins, but I think the above is
You may be wondering now about what books by Kierkegaard Wittgenstein actually read.
Hustwit and others, this is the general picture that I have come up with: We know from a
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unscientific Postscript (Malcolm, 1966, p. 71), Glebe-Mller argues that he must have also been
familiar with The Instant, and Schnbaumsfeld that he must have read Fear and Trembling,
Lifes Way is referenced to by Hustwit as having been the outset for Wittgensteins
explanation of Kierkegaard to one of his students. Judging on what was published by Theodor
Haeker between 1913 and 1921 in Der Brenner, it is also plausible that he was familiar with
some of Prefaces, the discourse At a Graveside from Three Discourses on Imagined Occasions,
the discourse The Thorn in the Flesh from Four Upbuilding Discourses, A Critique of the
Present Age, andsome journal entries from 1835 and 1836 (Schnbaumsfeld, 2007, p. 14).
Some arguments are stronger than others in terms of assessing what Wittgenstein had read
by Kierkegaard, but it seems plausible, judging on the subjects that he brings up in different
remarks that he had a fairly brought contact with Kierkegaards works. A very surprising
remark by H.D.P. Lee is the following: (Wittgenstein) told me that he learned Danish in order
to be able to read Kierkegaard in the original, and clearly had a great admiration for him,
though I never remember him speaking about him in detail. (Schnbaumsfeld, 2007, p. 22/ H.
Now, whatever we may know about Wittgensteins having or not having read this or that by
Kierkegaard, it is clear, as I also indicated at the outset of this paper, that what must be of
main interest to us is how these readings manifest themselves in Wittgensteins own thinking.
Some examples have been given above, of course, but let us now turn back to the question
that was briefly outlined in the beginning the question of a division between faith and
knowledge or facts and values, and how this thought seems to be a recurrent concern of
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WISSEN UND GLAUBEN
Cambridge, the lecture had no title but has since been published in the The Philosophical
Review in 1965 (vol. 74), bearing simply the title A Lecture on Ethics. Although I wish
eventually to return to the quote with which I started, taken from the Tractatus, I will first
draw out some main points from this later speech, granted that it seems to more clearly
pronounce some of the assumptions present in the Tractatus, and since its specific topic is
that of ethics which brings us closer to the question of how we may trace a Kierkegaardian
influence on just this aspect of Wittgensteins thinking. It has been argued that the speech
and I am inclined to agree with this view, although I am not blind to possible differences.
In A Lecture on Ethics Wittgenstein takes his point of departure in this thought: he does not
want half heartedly to talk about something for an hour, such as logic, which could never be
understood even fragmentarily in such a space of time. Therefore he choses to talk about
something which he finds to be of general interest and which, presumably, can be talked
about in the course of an hour (LE, p. 4). I mention this because it seems to me important that
he makes this distinction and also thereby makes it clear that ethics is no science, which one
could half-haphazardly try to get a grasp of in a short amount of time. Ethics, then, is of a
different sort. Wittgenstein tries to make the listener see what may be meant by ethics and
concludes that what is common to all propositions that we should like to call ethical is that
they ascribe absolute value to certain words: typically words such as good, right,
valuable, figuring in such sentences as: ethics is the enquiry into what is valuable, or, into
what is really important, or () into the meaning of life. What he means by this is that,
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whereas these words normally only have a relative sense, they are now endowed with an
absolute one. A relative sense of these words would be, e.g., this is a good cake or this is a
valuable car or, this is the right way to the opera. In all these cases good, right, and
valuable are relative to a pre-given standard (LE, p.5). We know how to determine whether
or not some way is the right one to the opera namely by making sure that it is the best way
to arrive by car or the fastest way or whatever standard we may instate in other words, the
truth or falsity of such statements is measurable by facts, since they merely state facts
(granted that Wittgenstein has quite a wide conception of facts here). He says: Now what I
wish to contend is that, although all judgments of relative value can be shown to be mere
statements of facts, no statement of fact can ever be, or imply, a judgment of absolute value.
(LE, p. 6, indeed, almost recalling Hume here).Unlike these relative senses, what the subject of
ethics is pointing to is to use these words as if they had absolute sense to live a good life,
thus, means to live life in such a way that by any thinkable standard it would be the best one,
that it is logically necessary that it should be so, whence it expresses absolute value. Now,
what Wittgenstein says is that such sense is senseless, because our words will only express
factsand no fact can be absolute (LE, p.7). Yet, he asks, what have all of us who, like myself,
are still tempted to use such expressions as absolute good, absolute value etc., what have
we in mind and what do we try to express? To answer this question, Wittgenstein gives some
personal examples, and these examples can only be personal, he claims, of situations in which
he would be inclined to use such expressions. One of the examples he provides us with is the
following: when I have it, I wonder at the existence of the world. Roughly speaking
Wittgenstein concludes by saying that what distinguishes this kind of wonder is that its
wonder is not one that has the opportunity of putting something else in its place to that on
which it wonders imagining the non-existence of the world is not a possibility to us and
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therefore, he says, wonder of this sort is one in which the world is experienced as a miracle.
I.e., it is seen in an entirely different manner, and not as something, which could be the object
of scientific investigation (LE, p.11), since if it were to be considered as such it would lose that
which made it miraculous in the first place a miracle, if viewed as such, is not something that
has not yet been given its place in science, but is an entirely different experience of conceiving
of something. However, it is also not something that our language can express meaningfully.
What his investigation of ethics amounts to, is that we cannot express what we should like to
when talking such that our effort charges against the boundaries of language by trying to go
beyond the world, beyond significant language (LE, p. 11), and yet, it is said to be a
Immediately following this Lecture on Ethics we are introduced to some notes on talks with
Wittgenstein which was quoted above. The central point is that Wittgenstein here mentions
Kierkegaard as someone who saw the same inclination to run against the boundaries of
Alles, was wir sagen mgen, kann a priori nur Unsinn sein. Trotzdem rennen wir gegen die
Grenzen der Sprache an. Dieses anrennen hat auch Kierkegaard gesehen und es sogar ganz
hnlich (als Anrennen gegen das Paradoxon) bezeichnet. Dieses Anrennen gegen die Grenze
Now, if we recall the interpretation that I mentioned at the outset of this paper, namely that
made by Janik and Toulmin in their work Wittgensteins Vienna, then we may consider how to
make sense of all this if we grant them that what Wittgenstein was up to was not merely to
pave the way for a liberation of language from all nonsense, but likewise to make impossible
all ill-founded attempts at justifying some stale understanding of values. By insisting that all
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sentences can only have the same value Alle Stze sind gleichwertig, and that the meaning of
the world, if there is a such, can only lie outside the world, Der Sinn der Welt mu auserhalb
ihrer liegen, it is made impossible to argue for any theory of ethics in which something
could be expressed as having absolute value. What I would like to argue is that this can also be
expressed thus that there is an incessable divide between knowlege and faith (wissen und
glauben), and that, when it comes to faith, no teaching or doctrine will ever suffice, because
indeed there is no-thing as such to be taught. This kind of reading is also exersiced by M. Jamie
Ferreira (Ferreira, 1994, pp. 29 44), when she argues, with Cora Diamond and James Conant,
argues that the nonsense that Wittgenstein talks about in the latter part of Tractatus, as well
as in the Lecture on Ethics, cannot be meant to point to a some-thing which we are just
incapable of saying what happens on the contrary is that the manner of pondering this
question is turned around to the one asking or the one having the experience of wondering
at the existence of the world, as Wittgenstein does in the above referenced lecture (cf. also
what he says explicitly to Waismann in 1930). Because one thing is that nothing meaningful
as in the formulation of a theory can ever be said in this respect, another is that the human
being has a strong inclination to ask thus (think here also of the manner in which Kant opens
Let us return for a moment to the reading proposed to us by Janik and Toulmin. What
differentiates their reading of the early Wittgenstein from other readings until that time, is
among other things that it considers a strong influence from the tradition from Kant, which
according to Janik and Toulmin was radicalized with Kierkegaards distinction between
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The process which Kant had set in motion by distinguishing the speculative and the
practical functions of reason, and which Schopenhauer kept moving by separating the world
reason from anything that pertains to the meaning of life. Beyond this, for anyone who wanted
to produce teachings, there would be only one recourse: to devote himself to the writing of
parables expressing the points of view of those who had found the meaning of life in their own
Their argument is further, and this is indeed the main thrust of the book, that these thoughts
had been incorporated into contemporary, late nineteenth, early twentieth century Viennese
and musicians (many of whom frequented the Wittgenstein home in . Gasse) took to a
radical rooting out of old stale ideas of values and beauty embodied in the empty pompous
art of the fading monarchy; and people having lost faith, whence all that remained of values
and art were but empty shells. What these artists broadly speaking aimed at was clean air,
less bullshit, less fake foundations and justifications, combined with the very latest
discoveries in science and the striving to include new areas into the scientific realm such as
the work of Freud, e.g. In other words to separate facts and values. One prominent
contemporary critic, whom Wittgenstein was quite fond of was Karl Kraus, who published his
own magazine; Die Fackel (the one that eventually inspired von Ficker to make his Der
Brenner). What is said to be characteristic of his style and approach is exactly satire, irony, the
style of writing in aphorisms etc., that is, a manner of expression which does not directly state
a critique, but makes a such apparent through ridicule and irony and exposition of the
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This contemporary trend makes it a bit easier to see, perhaps, how a Kierkegaardian influence
can be traced, and what vacuum Kierkegaardian thought could be hoped to help fill. It is thus
about time that we take a look at what Kierkegaard expresses in relation to this perceived
distinction between facts and value or between knowledge and faith. I have decided to draw
on the exposition that we meet in Concluding unscientific Postscript, under the pseudonym
Johannes Climacus.
faith, it may be said to be the very central theme of the Postscript. Especially if we turn the
division a bit, and thereby make it visible that the question regarding faith has a radically
different point of departure than that concerned with knowledge and objectivity. It is namely
not so that the question of faith or subjectivity can merely be the object of objectivity, but
rather, that subjectively, one speaks about the subject and subjectivity and see, the
subjectivity itself is the case in point (CUP, 129). Thus, the inquirer must all the time beware
so as not to turn the point of view, and suddenly come to see it from that estranged objective
perspective in which no human being can live, as it is said. As you all know, there are many
layers in this starting point, not least a critique of the so-called speculative approach, but that
is not the most important aspect to us here. What is important is that subjectivity and
objectivity understood in this manner are not merely two different aspects of the same thing,
nor the exposition of the thought that something can be known or understood from these two
different perspectives. No, the claim is radical, and it argues but it does argue that only
subjectivity can bring us in any relation to those questions which are of the utmost
importance to us in life, the questions about our own existence, the ethico-religious questions.
The idea is that through knowledge and objectivity, we can only ever approach these
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questions by approximation, i.e., we may believe that for every little new thing we discover in
the world, or for every new way of looking at certain things, we come a little bit closer to the
truth. Yet this conception of truth, to Climacus, is pure illusion. We may come closer to
knowing this or that fact about the animal kingdom and so on and so forth, but this kind of
knowledge will never, in all its unfathomable accumulation, bring us any closer to
understanding or knowing how to relate to the question of our own existence. Only
subjectively, because we as real human beings are infinitely interested in our own existence,
can we ask the question of our own existence, of faith etc. Now, it is easy to see how Janik and
Toulmin, and perhaps also Wittgenstein as is strongly suggested at the end of the Tractatus
could read this as a total separation of reason from anything that pertains to the meaning of
life. However, it seems to me pivotal that reason or knowledge for that matter does not stand
outside or opposed to the equation it is exactly through reason that we encounter, almost in
a Kantian vein, the need to relate to questions, which cannot be meaningfully stated nor
When subjectivity is truth, the definition of truth must also contain in itself an expression of
the antithesis to objectivity, a momento of that fork in the road, and this expression will at the
same time indicate the resilience of the inwardness. Here is such a definition of truth: An
objective uncertainty, held fast through appropriation with the most passionate inwardness, is
the truth, the highest truth there is for an existing person. At the point where the road swings
off (and where that is cannot be stated objectively, since it is precisely subjectivity), objective
knowledge is suspended. Objectively he then has only uncertainty, but this is exactly what
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What is held fast here is not something other than the objective uncertainty, and therefore
truth can never be stated as a proposition as indeed, also Wittgenstein insists both in the
Tractatus and A Lecture on Ethics propositions talk only the language of objectivity, but
where the view is turned around, and it is not a matter of an object of knowledge but
ourselves in our existence that we contemplate (ask about), then the utmost that we can
achieve is the objective uncertainty pertaining to our own questioning and even this is in
some sense stating too much. The subjective to which we turn in this uncertainty is not
speaks when he says that I wonder at the existence of the world. Objectively this wonder
cannot be given any sense, because what is the question when we ask thus is not one of big
bang theories and the like, the question is exactly one of experiencing the world as a miracle,
and that is an entirely different attitude. Yet, it is realized through this limitation, through the
holding fast of this objective uncertainty, that what we wish to know can never be imparted to
us by means of that which holds us there, indeed that this that can never become a that. Now
this leads me to the next qualification of the same objective uncertainty, namely that of faith. A
few lines after the above quoted text from the CUP, Climacus continues:
But the definition of truth stated above is a paraphrasing of faith. Without risk, no faith. Faith
is the contradiction between the infinite passion of inwardness and the objective uncertainty.
If I am able to apprehend God objectively, I do not have faith; but because I cannot do this, I
must have faith, I must continually see to it that I hold fast the objective uncertainty, see to it
that in the objective uncertainty I am out on 70,000 fathoms of water and still have faith.
(CUP, p. 204)
If we compare this to what Wittgenstein says in the Tractatus, namely that anything that has
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value or gives value lies outside the world, then it may be an immediate objection that to
Kierkegaard, in this case Climacus, what is important is that we are existing human beings and
that any value only has value because it is important to us here hence, that value, through us
comes to exist in the world. However, on second thought, this is perhaps saying too much.
Whereas it is the case that the human being, according to Anti-Climacus anyway, is said to be
a synthesis of the eternal and the temporal, the infinite and the finite and so on, and that
therefore it must be assumed that the eternal and infinite, that which lends value to all else,
cannot merely lie outside the world, it is perhaps the case that this is a very legitimate way of
putting it. Here is a possibility of how we may think it; every aspect of the infinite, the eternal
etc. in some sense pertains to faith, i.e., the objective uncertainty held fast in infinite passion.
Thus, the existing human being is merely existing and holds fast to no-thing, to uncertainty,
but in this holding fast we are minded toward the question of existence in a way that
transcends this existence as when Wittgenstein says die Ethik ist transcendental i.e., any
claim to stating something as having more value than other statements, transcends what we
are able to do with language, it bounces against the paradox, and yet it bounces. But this
bouncing lends no answers the risk is to bounce, and find no answers, and still have faith.
And language lends us no answer, and no way of stating these questions without them
A relevant question to me might very well be, why do you focus on this perceived divide
between knowledge and faith rather than focusing on the unsayable or the ineffable (as other
commentators do, cf. the ones that I mentioned at the outset)? My insistence on knowledge
and faith, over and above the unsayable is related to the idea that whereas Wittgenstein does
get rid of this idea of the unsayable or ineffable, already in a talk to Waismann in 1930 about
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Schlicks ethics i.e., only about one year after giving A Lecture on Ethics Wittgenstein
says the following: Die Reden der Religion sind auch kein Gleichnis; denn sonst mte man es
auch in Prosa sagen knnen. Anrennen gegen die Grenze der Sprache? Die Sprache ist ja kein
Kfig. (Waismann, 1965, p.14)., however, the question concerning the relation between
knowledge and faith arguably prevails. Although it changes character, and comes to reflect the
relative interdependence of the two, which, as I have argued above, we likewise find espoused
in the Postscript.
Now, what I wish to suggest, is that there is something in knowledge too which is
relativized by this conception of faith not merely that it is accidental, as Wittgenstein indeed
also holds in his early Tractarian view, but that knowing in any manner at all likewise
requires a certain, or perhaps exactly uncertain, kind of faith. This lies implicit in Climacus
view, insofaras objective uncertainty also questions knowledge itself, making it relative to
something other, which we cannot know. It is my contention that some aspect of faith in
knowledge is likewise to be found in Wittgensteins late writings, most explicitly in what has
posthumously been collectedin the work known as ber Gewiheit. In these remarks
Wittgenstein deals with the problem of what we mean when we use such phrases as I am
certain that or I am sure that or I cannot doubt that, and what is a common denominator
is that, whereas we can be more or less accurate in our usage of such phrases, when we
investigate what is meant by them, in the end we will arrive at a point in which we have to
content ourselves by saying that is the way we use them. Thus implicit in any certain
how we go about saying something. It is clear that this idea of faith is quite a different one
than what Kierkegaard, or Climacus has in mind it is a kind of faith which is related to
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practice, not to a subjective relating to that we are here in this existence and have to do
something with it. And yet, there are similarities. It is a question, in both instances of how we
relate to something, and the primary concern is for us to know how to move on (as a matter of
faith and a matter of fact) and this is, indeed, at stake in both instances. Faith here is thus
put forth in that sense of faith which holds fast to the uncertainty, that one can never in a final
sense overcome it if one could, as Climacus says, then there would be no faith.
Now, as promised, I will end my talk by returning to Kierkegaard via Wittgenstein. If we hold
on to the idea that any theorizing about ethics can only go wrong, because it inherently will be
an attempt at placing oneself outside or above the world, then it seems that the method by
which one choses to talk of such matters becomes of the utmost importance. Their methods of
writing is exactly something, which poses a peculiar problem to any reader of both
Kierkegaard and Wittgenstein, as already Charles Creegan pointed out in his book from 1989,
and this may be related back to their resistance to making a theory or a doctrine.
One way in which Kierkegaard does this, I argue, is by constantly turning the readers view
around letting different aspects of the same problem come into view, yet in such a way that
ones gaze is never forced to remain fixed in one particular way. Recalling what I said above
about knowledge and faith, this is a manner of keeping the objective uncertainty always in
play, thus hindering an actual theory of that which he wants to bring into view, namely the
moment of faith in all human involvement. Most abundantly in the remarks posthumously
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the idea of Aspektwechsel. The idea is used by Wittgenstein in a variety of ways to
demonstrate that we have the ability to see something different in the same. But not only that,
he claims that it is only when suddenly seeing the same as something else, that we realize we
were seeing an aspect in the first place. Wenn nicht der Wechsel des Aspekts vorlge, so gbe
es nur einer Auffassung, nicht ein so oder so sehen. (BPP, 436) While this is of course related
to seeing, what I wish to suggest is that this may be a useful way of considering Kierkegaards
writings, because also in his manner of writing it is a constant challenge to the reader that the
same is presented always anew, hence making the reader realize that there was a way of
This seeing the same as something else or seeing something different in the same, may call to
mind the idea of faith as being that of seeing from an entirely different perspective, i.e. not
laying claim to an objective certainty but realizing that one is capable of being minded
towards the same in a different manner. Thus, one in one sense sees the same in pondering
existence, and yet sees it as something entirely different. What is important is that
Wittgenstein holds that seeing something differently also entail relating to it in a different
manner we would need to speak of it differently too, e.g. Now, if eventually there is no way
of talking about matters of faith in such a way that the spoken can be made into a theory, and
yet we still wish to speak, then making the same continuously stand out in new ways is a
possibility of changing the way in which we are able to position ourselves in relation to our
faith.
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Though their points of departure are so very different, Wittgensteins that of language,
and Kierkegaards that of the question of existence, it seems to me, that they meet in a strong
resistance to building theories, and that this is for both of them related to a fundamental
problem of knowing and having faith (or indeed what we mean by it when we employ such
words). Neither the early nor the late Wittgenstein saw it possible to view language and the
world from without, but only from within, but the later Wittgenstein, perhaps related to the
realization that knowledge and faith are not as totally separated as he had first anticipated,
stakes out language in a much more nuanced, complex, and finally indefinable way than he
had done earlier. What I hope to have suggested is that this move, whether or not inspired by
Kierkegaard, reflects to an even greater extend the common battlefield between knowledge
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