MALA IN SE V.

MALA PROHIBITA

February 16, 1935

G.R. No.

L-42288 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee, vs. CORNELIO BAYONA,
defendant-appellant.

The facts are as follows: The defendant, who was a special agent of the Philippine Constabulary,
contends that he stopped his automobile in front of the municipal building of Pilar for the purpose of
delivering to Major Agdamag a revolver that the defendant had taken that day from one Tomas de Martin,
who had no license therefor; that he did not know there was a polling place near where he parked his
motor car; that he was sixty-three meters from the electoral college when the revolver was taken from him
by Jose E. Desiderio, a representative of the Secretary of the Interior. The evidence shows, however, that
the defendant was only ten or twelve meters from the polling place when he was found standing near his
automobile with a revolver in his belt, and that the municipal building could not be seen from the polling
place; that the defendant was at the time employed as a chauffeur by a senator for that district, and that
he had been sent to Pontevedra, a municipality adjoining Pilar. The defendant did not arrest Tomas de
Martin, nor does it appear that he caused him to be prosecuted. Tomas de Martin was not called as a
witness in this case. Furthermore there is one other fact of record which completely discredits the
testimony of the defendant. Major Agdamag, to whom the defendant claims he intended to deliver the
revolver, was not the provincial commander of Capiz, but an officer sent from Cebu to Capiz for the
purpose of supervising the elections in that province; and taking into consideration the intelligence of the
defendant and the nature of his employment.

Issue: Whether or not appellants intent should be taken into consideration in the instant case.

Held: No. Appeal is denied. The court does not believe that appellant did not know the location of the
polling place in question. The law which the defendant violated is a statutory provision, and the intent with
which he violated it is immaterial. The act prohibited by the Election Law was complete. The intention to
intimidate the voters or to interfere otherwise with the election is not made an essential element of the
offense. The rule is that in acts mala in se there must be a criminal intent, but in those mala prohibita it is
sufficient if the prohibited act was intentionally done.

Care must be exercised in distinguishing the difference between the intent to commit the crime and the
intent to perpetrate the act. (U.S. vs. Go Chico, 14 Phil. 128.)

The rule is that in acts mala in se there must be a criminal intent, but in those mala prohibita it is
sufficient if the prohibited act was intentionally done. "Care must be exercised in distinguishing
the difference between the intent to commit the crime and the intent to perpetrate the act. * * *"
(U. S. vs. Go Chico, 14 Phil, 128.) "While it is true that, as a rule and on principles of abstract
justice, men are not and should not be held criminally responsible for acts committed by them
without guilty knowledge and criminal or at least evil intent (Bishop's New Crim. Law, vol. I, sec.
286), the courts have always recognized the .power of the legislature, on grounds of public
policy and compelled by necessity, 'the great master of things', to forbid in a limited class of
cases the doing of certain acts, and to make their commission criminal without regard to the
intent of the doer. (U. S. vs. Go Chico, 14 Phil., 128; U. S. vs. Ah Chong, 15 Phil., 488.) In such
cases no judicial authority has the power to require, in the enforcement of the law, such
knowledge or motive to be shown." (U. S. vs. Siy Cong Bieng and Co Kong, 30 Phil., 577.)
US vs. Go Chico (14 Phil 133)

Facts: On or about the 4th day of August, 1908, appellant Go Chicodisplayed in one of the windows and
one of the show cases of his store in No. 89 Calle Rosario, Manila, a number of medallions, in the form of
a small button, upon which were printed the miniature faces of Emilio Aguinaldo and the flag or banner or
device used during the late insurrection in the Phil. Islands to designate and identify those in armed
insurrection against the United States.

On the day previous to the one set forth above, the appellant had purchased the said medallion sold at a
public sale under the authority of the sheriff of the city of Manila. On the day in question,
the appellant was arranging his stock of goods for the purpose of displaying them to the public, and in
doing so, he placed the medallions in his showcase and on one of the windows of his store.
The appellantwas ignorant of any law against the display of such medallions and had consequently no
corrupt intention. The facts stated above are admitted. The appellant has two propositions for his
acquittal: first is that before a conviction can be had, a criminal intent upon the part of the accused must
be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Second is that the prohibition of law is directed against the use of
identical banners, devices or emblems actually used during the Philippine insurrection by those in armed
rebellion against the United States.

Issue: Whether or not criminal intent is necessary in crimes punishable by special laws.

Held: The court ruled that the act alone, irrespective of its motive, constitutes the crime. The words used
during the late insurrection in the Philippine Islands to designate or identify those in armed rebellion
against the United States mean not only the identical flags actually used in the insurrection, but any flag
which is of that type. The description refers not to a particular flag, but to a type of flag. The literal
interpretation of a statute may lead to an absurdity, or evidently fail to give the real intent of the
legislature.

CRIMINAL LIABILITY

PEOPLE V. ILAGAN
 THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 75369. November 26, 1990.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. FERNANDO ILIGAN y JAMITO, EDMUNDO

ASIS y ILIGAN and JUAN MACANDOG (at large), Defendants, FERNANDO ILIGAN y JAMITO and
EDMUNDO ASIS y ILIGAN, Defendants-Appellants.

The Solicitor General for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Cesar R. Canonizado, for Defendants-Appellants.

SYLLABUS

1. REMEDIAL LAW; APPEAL; THROWS THE CASE OPEN FOR A COMPLETE REVIEW OF ALL
ERRORS AS MAY BE IMPUTABLE TO THE TRIAL COURT. While the factual findings of the
trial court are generally given due respect by the appellate court, an appeal of a criminal case
throws it open for a complete review of all errors, by commission or omission, as may be
imputable to the trial court. (People v. Valerio, Jr., L-4116, February 25, 1982, 112 SCRA 208,
231) In this instance, the lower court erred in finding that the maceration of one half of the head of
the victim was also caused by Iligan for the evidence on record point to a different conclusion. We
are convinced beyond peradventure that indeed, after Quiones, Jr. had fallen from the bolo-
hacking perpetrated by Iligan, he was run over by a vehicle. This finding, however, does not in
any way exonerate Iligan from liability for the death of Quiones, Jr.

2. CRIMINAL LAW; LIABILITY; REQUISITES THEREOF, PRESENT IN THE CASE AT BAR.

Under Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code, criminal liability shall be incurred "by any person
committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that which he
intended." Based on the doctrine that "el que es causa de la causa es causa del mal causado"
(he who is the cause of the cause is the cause of the evil caused), (People v. Ural, G.R. No. L-
30801, March 27, 1974, 56 SCRA 138, 144) the essential requisites of Article 4 are: (a) that an
intentional felony has been committed, and (b) that the wrong done to the aggrieved party be the
direct, natural and logical consequence of the felony committed by the offender. (People v.
Mananquil, L-35574, September 28, 1984, 132 SCRA 196, 207). We hold that these requisites
are present in this case.

3. ID.; ID.; PROXIMATE LEGAL CAUSE, DEFINED. The intentional felony committed was the
hacking of the head of Quiones, Jr. by Iligan. That it was considered as superficial by the
physician who autopsied Quiones is beside the point. What is material is that by the instrument
used in hacking Quiones, Jr. and the location of the wound, the assault was meant not only to
immobilize the victim but to do away with him as it was directed at a vital and delicate part of the
body: the head. (See: People v. Diana, 32 Phil. 344 [1915]). The hacking incident happened on
the national highway where vehicles are expected to pass any moment. One such vehicle passed
seconds later when Lukban and Zaldy Asis, running scared and having barely negotiated the
distance of around 200 meters, heard shouts of people. Quiones, Jr., weakened by the hacking
blow which sent him to the cemented highway, was run over by a vehicle. Under these
circumstances, we hold that while Iligans hacking of Quiones, Jr.s head might not have been
the direct cause, it was the proximate cause of the latters death. Proximate legal cause is defined
as "that acting first and producing the injury, either immediately or by setting other events in
motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each having a close causal
connection with its immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately effecting the
injury as a natural and probable result of the cause which first acted, under such circumstances
that the person responsible for the first event should, as an ordinarily prudent and intelligent
person, have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that an injury to
some person might probably result therefrom. (Urbano v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No.
72964, January 7, 1988, 157 SCRA 1 quoting Vda. De Bataclan v. Medina, 102 Phil. 181). In
other words, the sequence of events from Iligans assault on him to the time Quiones, Jr. was
run over by a vehicle is, considering the very short span of time between them, one unbroken
chain of events. Having triggered such events, Iligan cannot escape liability.

4. ID.; ALIBI; NOT CONSIDERED WHEN ACCUSED IS POSITIVELY IDENTIFIED BY

WITNESSES. We agree with the lower court that the defense of alibi cannot turn the tide in
favor of Iligan because he was positively seen at the scene of the crime and identified by the
prosecution witnesses. (People v. Pineda, G.R. No. 72400, January 15, 1988, 157 SCRA 71).

5. ID.; AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES; TREACHERY AND EVIDENT PREMEDITATION,

WRONGLY APPRECIATED IN THE CASE AT BAR. But we disagree with the lower court with
regards to its findings on the aggravating circumstances of treachery and evident premeditation.
Treachery has been appreciated by the lower court in view of the suddenness of the attack on the
group of Quiones, Jr. Suddenness of such attack, however, does not by itself show treachery.
(People v. Gadiano, L-31818, July 30, 1982, 115 SCRA 559) There must be evidence that the
mode of attack was consciously adopted by the appellant to make it impossible or hard for the
person attacked to defend himself. (People v. Crisostomo, L-32243, April 15, 1988, 160 SCRA
47). In this case, the hacking of Edmundo Asis by Iligan followed by the chasing of the trio by the
group of Iligan was a warning to the deceased and his companions of the hostile attitude of the
appellants. The group of Quiones, Jr. was therefore placed on guard for any subsequent attacks
against them. (People v. Mercado, L-33492, March 30, 1988, 159 SCRA 455). The requisites
necessary to appreciate evident premeditation have likewise not been met in this case. Thus, the
prosecution failed to prove all of the following: (a) the time when the accused determined to
commit the crime; (b) an act manifestly indicating that the accused had clung to their
determination to commit the crime; and (c) the lapse of sufficient length of time between the
determination and execution to allow him to reflect upon the consequences of his act. (People v.
Batas, G.R. Nos. 84277-78, August 2, 1989, 176 SCRA 46).

6. ID.; CONSPIRACY; NOT SUFFICIENTLY CONSTITUTED BY MERE KNOWLEDGE,

ACQUIESCENCE OR APPROVAL OF THE ACT WITHOUT COOPERATION OR AGREEMENT
TO COOPERATE NOR BY MERE PRESENCE AT THE SCENE OF THE CRIME. Absent any
qualifying circumstances, Iligan must be held liable only for homicide. Again, contrary to the lower
courts finding, proof beyond reasonable doubt has not been established to hold Edmundo Asis
liable as Iligans co-conspirator. Edmundo Asis did not take any active part in the infliction of the
wound on the head of Quiones, Jr., which led to his running over by a vehicle and consequent
death. As earlier pointed out, the testimony that he was carrying a stone at the scene of the crime
hardly merits credibility being uncorroborated and coming from an undeniably biased witness.
Having been the companion of Iligan, Edmundo Asis must have known of the formers criminal
intent but mere knowledge, acquiescense or approval of the act without cooperation or
agreement to cooperate, is not enough to constitute one a party to a conspiracy. There must be
intentional participation in the act with a view to the furtherance of the common design and
purpose. (People v. Izon, 104 Phil. 690 [1958]) Such being the case, his mere presence at the
scene of the crime did not make him a co-conspirator, a co-principal or an accomplice to the
assault perpetrated by Iligan. (Orobio v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 57519, September 13, 1988,
165 SCRA 316) Edmundo Asis therefore deserves exoneration.

7. ID.; HOMICIDE; PENALTY; ABSENT ANY MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE AND APPLYING

THE INDETERMINATE SENTENCE LAW. There being no mitigating circumstance, the
 penalty imposable on Iligan is reclusion temporal medium (Arts. 249 and 64, Revised Penal
Code). Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the proper penalty is that within the range of
prision mayor as minimum and reclusion temporal medium as maximum. We find insufficient
proof to warrant the award of P256,960 for the victims unrealized income and therefore, the
same is disallowed.

n this appeal, uncle and nephew, Fernando Iligan and Edmundo Asis, seek a reversal of the decision of the
then Court of First Instance of Camarines Norte, Branch II 1 convicting them of the crime of murder and
sentencing them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the heirs of Esmeraldo
Quiones, Jr. in the amounts of P30,000 for the latters death and P256,960 representing the victims
unrealized income.

On October 21, 1980, the following information for murder was filed against Fernando Iligan, Edmundo Asis
and Juan Macandog: chanrob les.co m.ph : virtual l aw lib rary

"That on or about 3:00 a.m., August 4, 1980, at sitio Lico II, barangay Sto. Domingo, municipality of
Vinzons, province of Camarines Norte, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the
above named accused, conspiring and mutually helping one another, with treachery and evident
premeditation, one of the accused Fernando Iligan armed with a bolo (sinampalok) and with deliberate
intent to kill, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, gang up and in a sudden unexpected
manner, hacked Esmeraldo Quiones, Jr., on his face, thus causing fatal injuries on the latters face which
resulted to (sic) the death of said Esmeraldo Quiones.

"CONTRARY TO LAW." cralaw virt ua1aw lib ra ry

Juan Macandog was never apprehended and he remains at large. At their arraignment on January 12, 1981
Fernando Iligan and Edmundo Asis pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. Thereafter, the prosecution
presented the following version of the commission of the crime. chan roble s.com.p h : virt ual law li bra ry

At around 2:00 oclock in the morning of August 4, 1980, Esmeraldo Quiones, Jr. and his companions,
Zaldy Asis and Felix Lukban, were walking home from barangay Sto. Domingo, Vinzons, Camarines Norte
after attending a barrio fiesta dance. In front of the ricemill of a certain Almadrones, they met the accused
Fernando Iligan, his nephew, Edmundo Asis, and Juan Macandog. Edmundo Asis pushed ("winahi") them
aside thereby prompting Zaldy Asis to box him. 2 Felix Lukban quickly told the group of the accused that
they had no desire to fight. 3 Fernando Iligan, upon seeing his nephew fall, drew from his back a bolo and
hacked Zaldy Asis but missed. Terrified, the trio ran pursued by the three accused. They ran for about half
an hour, passing by the house of Quiones, Jr. They stopped running only upon seeing that they were no
longer being chased. After resting for a short while, Quiones, Jr. invited the two to accompany him to his
house so that he could change to his working clothes and report for work as a bus conductor. 4

While the trio were walking towards the house of Quiones, Jr., the three accused suddenly emerged on the
roadside and without a word, Fernando Iligan hacked Quiones, Jr. with his bolo hitting him on the forehead
and causing him to fall down. 5 Horrified, Felix Lukban and Zaldy Asis fled to a distance of 200 meters, but
returned walking after they heard shouts of people. Zaldy Asis specifically heard someone shout "May nadale
na." 6

On the spot where Quiones, Jr. was hacked, Zaldy Asis and Felix Lukban saw him already dead with his
head busted. 7 They helped the brother of Quiones, Jr. in carrying him to their house. 8

That same day, August 4, 1980, the body of Quiones, Jr. was autopsied at the Funeraria Belmonte in Labo,
Camarines Norte by the municipal health officer, Dr. Marcelito E. Abas. The postmortem examination report
which is found at the back of the death certificate reveals that Esmeraldo Quiones, Jr., who was 21 years
old when he died, sustained the following injuries: jg c:chan roble s.com. ph
"1. Shock and massive cerebral hemorrhages due to multiple fracture of the entire half of the frontal left,
temporal, parietal and occipital bone of the head, with massive maceration of the brain tissue.

"2. Other findings Incised wound at the right eyebrow, medial aspect measuring about 4 cms. in length,
0.5 cm. in width and 0.5 cm. in depth, abrasion on the left shoulder and right side of the neck." 9

The death certificate also indicates that Quiones, Jr. died of "shock and massive cerebral hemorrhages due
to a vehicular accident." cralaw virtua1aw l ibra ry

The defendants denied having perpetrated the crime. They alleged that they were in their respective houses
at the time the crime was committed. chan robles law lib rary

Accused Fernando Iligan testified that at around midnight of August 4, 1980, he left his house to fetch his
visitors at the dance hall. 10 Along the way, he met his nephew, Edmundo Asis, whom he presumed was
drunk. He invited his nephew to accompany him to the dance hall. However, they were not able to reach
their destination because Edmundo was boxed by somebody whom he (Edmundo) sideswiped. 11 Instead,
Fernando Iligan brought his nephew home. 12 On their way, they were overtaken by Juliano Mendoza whom
Fernando Iligan invited to his house to help him cook. 13 After bringing his nephew home, Fernando Iligan
and Juliano Mendoza proceeded to Iligans house and arrived there between 1:30 and 2:00 oclock in the
morning of the same day. 14

Edmundo Asis corroborated Iligans testimony. He testified that while they were walking in front of the
Almadrones ricemill, he sideswiped someone whom he did not recognize because there were several persons
around. He said, "Sorry, pare" but the person to whom he addressed his apology boxed him on his left face.
He fell down and Iligan helped him. Later, Iligan accompanied him to his home in Lico II. 15 After Iligan and
Juliano Mendoza had left his house, he slept and woke up at 7:00 oclock the following morning. 16

The defense made capital of the testimony of prosecution witness Dr. Abas to the effect that Quiones, Jr.
died because of a vehicular accident. In ruling out said theory, however, the lower court, in its decision of
May 7, 1986, said: jgc:chanro bles. com.ph

"The accused, to augment their alibi, have pointed to this Court that the Certificate of Death have shown
that the victims death was caused by a vehicular accident. To this, notwithstanding, the Court cannot give
credit for some reasons. First, the fact of the alleged vehicular accident has not been fully established.
Second, Esmeraldo Quiones, Sr., (the) father of the victim, testified that Dr. Abas told him that if his son
was hacked by a bolo on the face and then run over the entire head by a vehicles tire, then that hacking on
the face could not be visibly seen on the head (t.s.n., pp. 16-17, October 13, 1981) Third, Exhibit 2 (the
photograph of the victim taken immediately after his body had been brought home) is a hard evidence. It
will attestly (sic) show that the entire head was not crushed by any vehicle. On the contrary, it shows that
only half of the face and head, was damaged with the wound starting on a sharp edge horizontally. There
are contusions and abrasions on the upper left shoulder and on the neck while the body downwards has
none of it, while on the right forehead there is another wound caused by a sharp instrument. Therefore, it is
simple, that if the victim was run over by a vehicle, the other half portion of his head and downward part of
his body must have been likewise seriously damaged, which there are none." 17

The lower court also found that Iligans group conspired to kill anyone or all members of the group of the
victim to vindicate the boxing on the face of Edmundo Asis. It appreciated the aggravating circumstances of
evident premeditation and treachery and accordingly convicted Iligan and Edmundo Asis of the crime of
murder and imposed on them the aforementioned penalty.

Iligan and Edmundo Asis interposed this appeal professing innocence of the crime for which they were
convicted. For the second time, they attributed Quiones, Jr.s death to a vehicular accident.
No eyewitnesses were presented to prove that Quiones, Jr. was run over by a vehicle. The defense relies
on the testimony of Dr. Abas, a prosecution witness, who swore that the multiple fracture on the head of
Quiones, Jr. was caused by a vehicular accident 18 which opinion was earlier put in writing by the same
witness in the postmortem examination. Dr. Abas justified his conclusion by what he considered as tire
marks on the victims left shoulder and the right side of his neck. 19 He also testified that the incised wound
located at the victims right eyebrow could have been caused by a sharp bolo but it was so superficial that it
could not have caused the victims death. 20

Circumstantial evidence on record indeed point to the veracity of the actual occurrence of the vehicular
mishap. One such evidence is the testimony of prosecution witness Zaldy Asis that when he helped bring
home the body of Quiones, Jr., he told the victims father, Esmeraldo Quiones, Sr. that "before Esmeraldo
Quiones (Jr.) was run over by a vehicle, he was hacked by Fernando Iligan." 21 When asked why he
mentioned an automobile, Zaldy Asis said that he did not notice any vehicle around but he mentioned it
"because his (Quiones, Jr.) head was busted." 22 It is therefore not farfetched to conclude that Zaldy Asis
had actual knowledge of said accident but for understandable reasons he declined to declare it in court.
Defense witness Marciano Mago, the barangay captain of Sto. Domingo, also testified that when he went to
the scene of the crime, he saw bits of the brain of the victim scattered across the road where he also saw
tire marks. 23

For its part, the prosecution, through the victims father, presented evidence to the effect that Iligan
authored the maceration of half of the victims head. Quiones, Sr. testified that from their house, which
was about five meters away from the road, he saw Fernando Iligan holding a "sinampalok" as he, together
with Edmundo Asis and Juan Macandog, chased someone. During the second time that he saw the three
accused, he heard Iligan say, "Dali, ayos na yan." 24 Hence, the lower court concluded that the victims
head was "chopped" resulting in the splattering of his brain all over the place. 25 It should be emphasized,
however, that the testimony came from a biased witness and it was uncorroborated.

While the factual findings of the trial court are generally given due respect by the appellate court, an appeal
of a criminal case throws it open for a complete review of all errors, by commission or omission, as may be
imputable to the trial court. 26 In this instance, the lower court erred in finding that the maceration of one
half of the head of the victim was also caused by Iligan for the evidence on record point to a different
conclusion. We are convinced beyond peradventure that indeed, after Quiones, Jr. had fallen from the bolo-
hacking perpetrated by Iligan, he was run over by a vehicle. This finding, however, does not in any way
exonerate Iligan from liability for the death of Quiones, Jr.chan robles. com : virtual law l ib rary

Under Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code, criminal liability shall be incurred "by any person committing a
felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended." Based on the
doctrine that "el que es causa de la causa es causa del mal causado" (he who is the cause of the cause is
the cause of the evil caused), 27 the essential requisites of Article 4 are: (a) that an intentional felony has
been committed, and (b) that the wrong done to the aggrieved party be the direct, natural and logical
consequence of the felony committed by the offender. 28 We hold that these requisites are present in this
case.

The intentional felony committed was the hacking of the head of Quiones, Jr. by Iligan. That it was
considered as superficial by the physician who autopsied Quiones is beside the point. What is material is
that by the instrument used in hacking Quiones, Jr. and the location of the wound, the assault was meant
not only to immobilize the victim but to do away with him as it was directed at a vital and delicate part of
the body: the head. 29

The hacking incident happened on the national highway 30 where vehicles are expected to pass any
moment. One such vehicle passed seconds later when Lukban and Zaldy Asis, running scared and having
barely negotiated the distance of around 200 meters, heard shouts of people. Quiones, Jr., weakened by
the hacking blow which sent him to the cemented highway, was run over by a vehicle.
Under these circumstances, we hold that while Iligans hacking of Quiones, Jr.s head might not have been
the direct cause, it was the proximate cause of the latters death. Proximate legal cause is defined as "that
acting first and producing the injury, either immediately or by setting other events in motion, all constituting
a natural and continuous chain of events, each having a close causal connection with its immediate
predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural and probable result of
the cause which first acted, under such circumstances that the person responsible for the first event should,
as an ordinarily prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act
or default that an injury to some person might probably result therefrom." 31 In other words, the sequence
of events from Iligans assault on him to the time Quiones, Jr. was run over by a vehicle is, considering the
very short span of time between them, one unbroken chain of events. Having triggered such events, Iligan
cannot escape liability. chan robles law lib rary

We agree with the lower court that the defense of alibi cannot turn the tide in favor of Iligan because he was
positively seen at the scene of the crime and identified by the prosecution witnesses. 32

But we disagree with the lower court with regards to its findings on the aggravating circumstances of
treachery and evident premeditation. Treachery has been appreciated by the lower court in view of the
suddenness of the attack on the group of Quiones, Jr. Suddenness of such attack, however, does not by
itself show treachery. 33 There must be evidence that the mode of attack was consciously adopted by the
appellant to make it impossible or hard for the person attacked to defend himself. 34 In this case, the
hacking of Edmundo Asis by Iligan followed by the chasing of the trio by the group of Iligan was a warning
to the deceased and his companions of the hostile attitude of the appellants. The group of Quiones, Jr. was
therefore placed on guard for any subsequent attacks against them. 35

The requisites necessary to appreciate evident premeditation have likewise not been met in this case. Thus,
the prosecution failed to prove all of the following: (a) the time when the accused determined to commit the
crime; (b) an act manifestly indicating that the accused had clung to their determination to commit the
crime; and (c) the lapse of sufficient length of time between the determination and execution to allow him to
reflect upon the consequences of his act. 36

Absent any qualifying circumstances, Iligan must be held liable only for homicide. Again, contrary to the
lower courts finding, proof beyond reasonable doubt has not been established to hold Edmundo Asis liable
as Iligans co-conspirator. Edmundo Asis did not take any active part in the infliction of the wound on the
head of Quiones, Jr., which led to his running over by a vehicle and consequent death. As earlier pointed
out, the testimony that he was carrying a stone at the scene of the crime hardly merits credibility being
uncorroborated and coming from an undeniably biased witness. Having been the companion of Iligan,
Edmundo Asis must have known of the formers criminal intent but mere knowledge, acquiescense or
approval of the act without cooperation or agreement to cooperate, is not enough to constitute one a party
to a conspiracy. There must be intentional participation in the act with a view to the furtherance of the
common design and purpose. 37 Such being the case, his mere presence at the scene of the crime did not
make him a co-conspirator, a co-principal or an accomplice to the assault perpetrated by Iligan. 38
Edmundo Asis therefore deserves exoneration.

There being no mitigating circumstance, the penalty imposable on Iligan is reclusion temporal medium (Arts.
249 and 64, Revised Penal Code). Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the proper penalty is that
within the range of prision mayor as minimum and reclusion temporal medium as maximum. We find
insufficient proof to warrant the award of P256,960 for the victims unrealized income and therefore, the
same is disallowed.c ralawnad

WHEREFORE, appellant Fernando Iligan y Jamito is hereby convicted of the crime of homicide for which he is
imposed the indeterminate penalty of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum to
fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal medium as maximum and he
shall indemnify the heirs of Esmeraldo Quiones, Jr. in the amount of fifty thousand pesos (P50,000).
Appellant Edmundo Asis is hereby acquitted of the crime charged against him. Costs against appellant
Iligan.

SO ORDERED.

Gutierrez, Jr and Bidin, JJ., concur.

Feliciano, J., is on leave.

PEOPLE V ILAGAN GR NO. 75369 NOVEMBER 26, 1190 PETITONERS/PROSECUTORS:

People of the Philippines RESPONDENTS/DEFENDANTS: Fernando Ilagan y Jamito, Edmundo Asis y

Ilagan, and Juan Macandog

TOPIC:

Wrongful done be different from what was intended

TERMS: Proximate legal cause- that acting first and producing the injury, either immediately or by
setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each having a
close causal connection with its immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately effecting
the injury as a natural and probable result of the cause which first acted, under such circumstances that
the person responsible for the first event should, as an ordinarily prudent and intelligent person, have
reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that an injury to some person might
probably result therefrom. LAWS/PROVISIONS:

Article 4, Par. 1 of the RPC: Criminal liability shall be incurred: o By any person committing a felony
although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended

FACTS:

August 4, 1980 After a barrio fiesta in Vinzons, Camarines Norte, Edmundo pushed aside the group of
Esmeraldo Quinones, Jr., Zaldi Asis, and Felix Lukban, and even prompted Zaldi to box. Fernando
brought out his bolo when he saw Edmundo on the ground, hacked Zaldi but missed. The group of
Quinones was then pursued by the three accused.

Upon seeing they were no longer being chased, Quinones invited the other two to his house so that he
could change to his working clothes as a bus conductor.

While the trio were walking along a national highway towards the victims house, the three accused
suddenly emerged on the road side. That was the time when Fernando hacked Quinones, Jr. on his face,
causing fatal injuries on the latters face which resulted in his death.

The accused denied having perpetrated the crime and stated that they were on their respective houses
when the crime occurred.

The lower court found that Iligans group conspired to kill anyone or all members of the group of the
victim to vindicate the boxing on the face of Edmundo. Fernando and Edmundo were then charged with
the crime of murder with aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation and treachery.

ISSUES:
 WON Fernando could be absolved of his criminal liability given that the victim was subsequently run
over by a vehicle

RULING:

1 st issue: Denied.

Based on the doctrine: el que es causa de la causa es causa del mal causado (he who is the cause of
the cause is the cause of the evil caused), the essential requisites of Article 4 are: (a) that an intentional
felony has been committed, and (b) that the wrong done to the aggrieved party be the direct, natural and
logical consequence of the felony committed by the offender. These requisites are present in this case.
The intentional felony was the hacking by Fernando.

The second requisite was also met. Given that the incident happened on a national highway where
vehicles are expected to pass, Fernandos hacking of Quinoness head was the proximate, might not be
direct, cause of the latters death. The sequence of events from Fernandos assault to the time Quinones
was run over by a vehicle is one unbroken chain of events. With that said, it did not really matter if he
directly caused Quinoness death or if he actually meant it. Having triggered such events, Iligan cannot
escape liability even though the autopsy indicated that the death was caused by a vehicular accident.

Since treachery and evident premeditation were not established, the lower courts charge for Fernando
was modified from murder to homicide.

However, it was not clearly established that Edmundo took any direct part in the hacking incident since
mere knowledge/approval of the act without cooperation is not enough to charge him a co-principal.
Therefore, he deserved exoneration.

PEOPLE V. MANANQUIL

People v. Mananquil
GR No L-35574, Sep 28, 1994, Cuevas, J.

FACTS

Prosecutions version
o 1965 Mar 6: At about 11pm, Valentina Manananquil went to the NAWASA Building at
Pasay City, where her husband was working as a security guard
o She had just purchased 10 centavos worth of gasoline from the Esso Gasoline Station at
Taft Avenue. She placed the gasoline in a coffee bottle
o She was angry at her husband, Elias Day, because the latter had burned her clothing,
was maintaining a mistress, and had been taking all the food from their house
o Upon reaching the NAWASA Building, she knocked at the door
o Immediately after the door was opened, Elias Day shouted at his wife and castigated her,
saying PUTA BUGUIAN LAKAW GALIGAON
o The appellant, tired of hearing the victim, then got the bottle of gasoline and poured the
contents thereof on the face of the victim
o Then, she got a matchbox and set the polo shirt of the victim aflame
Defenses version
o Taking with her an empty bottle of Hemo, she left for a nearby gasoline station and
bought ten centavos worth of gasoline, intending to use the same to clean her shoes,
which she needed for church the next day
 o Then she remembered that her husband needed gasoline for his lighter so she dropped
by his place of work
o She saw her husband inside a building of the NAWASA standing by the window
o She entered and knocked at the wooden door. Elias opened the door, but when he saw
his wife he shouted at her.
o She told him that she had brought him fluid for his lighter, but Elias, who was drunk,
cursed her PUTA BUGUIAN LAKAW GALIGAON. This shouting continued despite her
telling him that she had come just to bring the gasoline that he wanted
o She trembled and became dizzy. She was beside herself and did not know that she was
sprinkling the gasoline on her husbands face.
o She was tired and dizzy and had to sit down for a while. Then she remembered her
grandson who was alone in the house so she went home, leaving her husband who was
walking to and fro and not paying attention to her
o She went to bed but could not sleep. She returned to NAWASA to apologize to her
husband, but, upon arriving, saw that police officers were present
o An officer pulled her aside, asked her if she was Eliass wife
o When she said yes, officer accused her of setting her husband on firean accusation
she denied
o The police took her to the headquarters, prepared a written statement which she was
made to sign upon a promise that she would be released if she signed it

ISSUES/HELD

WON appellants extrajudicial confession was voluntarily given YES

WON burns sustained by victim contributed to cause pneumonia which was the cause of the victims
death YES

RATIONALE

Court found appellants aforesaid assertions a mere pretense to flimsy to be accepted as true,
no error in the trial courts pronouncement that the appellants sworn statement was voluntarily
given by her
Contrary to her claim, she knew and understood Tagalog even though she was not a Tagala as
she had stayed in Manila continuously for 14 years
her total indifference and seemingly unperturbed concern over the fate that had befallen the
victim supports the theory that she has murder in her heart and meant to do harm to her
husband
Mananquil claimed that victims pneumonia, from which he died, was caused by the alcohol which
he was drunk on that night. But as testified by a doctor, taking alcohol cannot cause pneumonia
Pneumonia was complication of the burns sustained
While accepting pneumonia as the immediate cause of death, the court held on to state that this
could not have resulted had not the victim suffered from second-degree burns
 Quinto v. Andres

G.R. No. 155791 March 16, 2005

Lessons Applicable: Proximate cause, EX to Every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable.

Laws Applicable:

FACTS:
November 13, 1995 7:30 am: Edison Garcia, 11 year-old and Grade 4 elementary school pupil,
and his playmate, Wilson Quinto saw Dante Andres and Randyver Pacheco by the mouth of a
drainage culvert.
Andres and Pacheco invited Wilson to go fishing with them inside the drainage culvert. Wilson
agreed while Garcia seeing that it was dark inside, opted to remain seated in a grassy area about
two meters from the entrance of the drainage system
Only Pacheco had a flashlight. Pacheco, who was holding a fish, came out of the drainage
system and left without saying a word. Then, Andres came out, went back inside, and emerged
again carrying Wilson who was already dead. He laid his body down in the grassy area.
Garcia, shocked, fled from the scene. Andres went to the house of Melba Quinto, Wilsons
mother, and informed her that her son had died. They rushed to the drainage culvert. Wilson was
buried without any complaints filed.
November 28, 1995: National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) took the sworn statements of
Pacheco, Garcia and Quinto
Pacheco alleged that he had never been to the drainage system catching fish with Andres and
Wilson
Dr. Dominic Aguda of the NBIs autopsy showed that the cause death is drowning with traumatic
head injuries as contributory
NBI filed a criminal complaint for homicide against Andres and Pacheco with the RTC
Dr. Dominic Aguda testified that Wilson could have fallen, and that the occipital portion of his
head could have hit a blunt object, That the 14x7-centimeter hematoma at the back of Wilsons
head could have rendered the him unconscious so he drowned. The 4x3-centimeter abrasion on
the right side of Wilsons face could have also been caused by rubbing against a concrete wall or
pavement, or by contact with a rough surface. He also stated that the trachea region was full of
mud, but that there was no sign of strangulation.
RTC: granted demurer to evidence on the ground of insufficiency of evidence
CA: Affirmed RTC

ISSUE: W/N Acquittal in criminal case bars a civil action where the judgment of acquittal holds that the
accused did not commit the criminal acts imputed to them

HELD: YES. petition is DENIED

Every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable.
o The civil liability of such person established in Articles 100, 102 and 103 of the Revised Penal Code
includes restitution, reparation of the damage caused, and indemnification for consequential damages
GR: When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising
from the offense charged shall be deemed instituted with the criminal action
EX: the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately or institutes the
civil action prior to the criminal action
With the implied institution of the civil action in the criminal action, the two actions are merged into
one composite proceeding, with the criminal action predominating the civil.
The prime purpose of the criminal action is to punish the offender in order to deter him and others
from committing the same or similar offense, to isolate him from society, to reform and rehabilitate
him or, in general, to maintain social order.
The sole purpose of the civil action is the restitution, reparation or indemnification of the private
offended party for the damage or injury he sustained by reason of the delictual or felonious act of
the accused
o While the prosecution must prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt for the crime
charged, it is required to prove the cause of action of the private complainant against the accused for
damages and/or restitution.
o Insofar as the civil aspect of the case is concerned, the prosecution or the private complainant is
burdened to adduce preponderance of evidence or superior weight of evidence. failed
That the deceased fell or slipped cannot be totally foreclosed because even Garcia testified that the
drainage culvert was dark, and that he himself was so afraid that he refused to join respondents Andres
and Pacheco inside
failed to adduce proof of any ill-motive on the part of either respondent to kill the deceased before or after
the latter was invited to join them in fishing
GR: The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the extinction of the civil action.
EX: civil action based on delict shall be deemed extinguished if there is a finding in a final judgment in the
civil action that the act or omission from where the civil liability may arise does not exist
a person committing a felony is criminally liable for all the natural and logical consequences
resulting therefrom although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended
o Natural - an occurrence in the ordinary course of human life or events
o Logical - a rational connection between the act of the accused and the resulting injury or damage
The felony committed must be the proximate cause of the resulting injury
o Proximate cause
cause which in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by an efficient intervening cause, produces the
injury, and without which the result would not have occurred
acting first and producing the injury, either immediately, or by setting other events in motion, all constituting
a natural and continuous chain of events, each having a close causal connection with its immediate
predecessor
o There must be a relation of cause and effect,
cause = felonious act of the offender
effect = resultant injuries and/or death of the victim.
The cause and effect relationship is not altered or changed because of the
o pre-existing conditions
pathological condition of the victim
predisposition of the offended party
physical condition of the offended party
o concomitant or concurrent conditions
negligence or fault of the doctors
conditions supervening the felonious act
tetanus
pulmonary infection
gangrene
not the proximate cause of the resulting injury when:
1. there is an active force that intervened between the felony committed and the resulting injury, and the
active force is a distinct act or fact absolutely foreign from the felonious act of the accused; or
2. the resulting injury is due to the intentional act of the victim
The offender is criminally liable for the death of the victim if his delictual act caused, accelerated
or contributed to the death of the victim.
the prosecution was burdened to prove the corpus delicti which consists of two things:
1. first, the criminal act - objective
2. second, defendants agency in the commission of the act - subjective element of crimes
In homicide (by dolo) and in murder cases, the prosecution is burdened to prove:
1. the death of the party alleged to be dead
2. that the death was produced by the criminal act of some other than the deceased and was not the result
of accident, natural cause or suicide
3. that defendant committed the criminal act or was in some way criminally responsible for the act which
produced the death

MELBA QUINTO VS. DANTE ANDRES and RANDYVER PACHECO

G.R. No. 155791. March 16, 2005

Facts: An Information was filed with the Regional Trial Court that the accused D ante Andres and
Randyver Pacheco, conspiring, confederating, and helping one ano ther, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully, and feloniously attack, assault, and maul Wilson Quinto inside a culvert where the three were
fishing, causing W ilson Quinto to drown and die. The respondents filed a demurer to evidence which the
trial court granted on the ground of insufficiency of evidence. It also hel d that it could not hold the
respondents liable for damages because of the absen ce of preponderant evidence to prove their liability
for Wilson s death. The petitio ner appealed the order to the Court of Appeals insofar as the civil aspect
of th e case was concerned.

The CA ruled that the acquittal in this case is not merely based on reasonable doubt but rather on a
finding that the accused-appellees di d not commit the criminal acts complained of. Thus, pursuant to the
above rule a nd settled jurisprudence, any civil action ex delicto cannot prosper. Acquittal in a criminal
action bars the civil action arising therefrom where the judgment of acquittal holds that the accused did
not commit the criminal acts imputed to them. Issue: Whether or not the extinction of respondent it the
extinction of their civil liability. s criminal liability carries with Held: When a criminal action is instituted, the
civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged shall be deemed instituted wit
h the criminal action unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserve s the right to institute it
separately or institutes the civil action prior to t he criminal action. The prime purpose of the criminal
action is to punish the offender in order to d eter him and others from committing the same or similar
offense, to isolate him from society, to reform and rehabilitate him or, in general, to maintain social order.
The sole purpose of the civil action is the restitution, reparation or in demnification of the private offended
party for the damage or injury he sustaine d by reason of the delictual or felonious act of the accused.
The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the extinction of the civil action. However, the civil
action based on delict shall be deemed extingui shed if there is a finding in a final judgment in the criminal
action that the a ct or omission from where the civil liability may arise does not exist. In this case, the
petitioner failed to adduce proof of any ill-motive on the part of eit her respondent to kill the deceased and
as held by the the trial court and the C A, the prosecution failed to adduce preponderant evidence to
prove the facts on which the civil liability of the respondents rest, i.e., that the petitioner has a cause of
action against the respondents for damages.

PEOPLE v. QUIANZON / G.R. No. 42607 / September 28, 1935

FACTS:Juan Quianzon, after being fed up with Andres Aribuabo applied a firebrand on his abdomen. He
died after 10 days. Three witnesses corroborated to facts and Quianzon also owned up to his act.The trial
court charged Quianzon of homicide. His counsel argued that it shouldonly be convicted serious physical
injuries as Aribuabo died because of his carelessness and his disobedience to his doctors.

ISSUE: Whether Quianzon committed homicide.

RULING:The Supreme Court said that Quianzons contention was without merit. The doctor even said
that it was difficult if the victim would survive or not. His act was the direct cause of the victims death

The SC held that Quianzon was guilty of murder with additional mitigating circumstance because of his
admission to the crime
Urbano v. IAC

Facts:

On October 23, 1980, petitioner Filomeno Urbano was on his way to his ricefield. He found the place
where he stored palay flooded with water coming from the irrigation canal. Urbano went to the elevated
portion to see what happened, and there he saw Marcelino Javier and Emilio Efre cutting grass. Javier
admitted that he was the one who opened the canal. A quarrel ensued, and Urbano hit Javier on the right
palm with his bolo, and again on the leg with the back of the bolo. On October 27, 1980, Urbano and
Javier had an amicable settlement. Urbano paid P700 for the medical expenses of Javier. On November
14, 1980, Urbano was rushed to the hospital where he had lockjaw and convulsions. The doctor found the
condition to be caused by tetanus toxin which infected the healing wound in his palm. He died the
following day. Urbano was charged with homicide and was found guilty both by the trial court and on
appeal by the Court of Appeals. Urbano filed a motion for new trial based on the affidavit of the Barangay
Captain who stated that he saw the deceased catching fish in the shallow irrigation canals on November
5. The motion was denied; hence, this petition.

Issue:

Whether the wound inflicted by Urbano to Javier was the proximate cause of the latters death

Held:

A satisfactory definition of proximate cause is... "that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence,
unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not
have occurred."And more comprehensively, "the proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing
the injury, either immediately or by setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous
chain of events, each having a close causal connection with its immediate predecessor, the final event in
the chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the cause which first acted,
under such circumstances that the person responsible for the first event should, as an ordinarily prudent
and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that an injury
to some person might probably result therefrom."

If the wound of Javier inflicted by the appellant was already infected by tetanus germs at the time, it is
more medically probable that Javier should have been infected with only a mild cause of tetanus because
the symptoms of tetanus appeared on the 22nd dayafter the hacking incident or more than 14 days after
the infliction of the wound. Therefore, the onset time should have been more than six days. Javier,
however, died on the second day from theonset time. The more credible conclusion is that at the time
Javier's wound was inflicted by the appellant, the severe form of tetanus that killed him was not yet
present. Consequently, Javier's wound could have been infected with tetanus after the hacking incident.
Considering the circumstance surrounding Javier's death, his wound could have been infected by tetanus
2 or 3 or a few but not 20 to 22 days before he died.

The rule is that the death of the victim must be the direct, natural, and logical consequence of the wounds
inflicted upon him by the accused. And since we are dealing with a criminal conviction, the proof that the
accused caused the victim's death must convince a rational mind beyond reasonable doubt. The medical
findings, however, lead us to a distinct possibility that the infection of the wound by tetanus was an
efficient intervening cause later or between the time Javier was wounded to the time of his death. The
infection was, therefore, distinct and foreign to the crime.
There is a likelihood that the wound was but the remote cause and its subsequent infection, for failure to
take necessary precautions, with tetanus may have been the proximate cause of Javier's death with
which the petitioner had nothing to do. "A prior and remote cause cannot be made the be of an action if
such remote cause did nothing more than furnish the condition or give rise to the occasion by which the
injury was made possible, if there intervened between such prior or remote cause and the injury a distinct,
successive, unrelated, and efficient cause of the injury, even though such injury would not have
happened but for such condition or occasion. If no danger existed in the condition except because of the
independent cause, such condition was not the proximate cause. And if an independent negligent act or
defective condition sets into operation the instances which result in injury because of the prior defective
condition, such subsequent act or condition is the proximate cause."

IMPOSSIBLE CRIMES

INTOD VS. CA

G.R. No. 103119 October 21, 1992

Lessons Applicable:

Laws Applicable:

FACTS:
February 4, 1979: Sulpicio Intod, Jorge Pangasian, Santos Tubio and Avelino Daligdig went to
Salvador Mandaya's house and asked him to go with them to the house of Bernardina
Palangpangan. Thereafter, they had a meeting with Aniceto Dumalagan who told Mandaya that he
wanted Palangpangan to be killed because of a land dispute between them and that Mandaya should
accompany them. Otherwise, he would also be killed.
February 4, 1979 10:00 pm: All of them armed arrived at Palangpangan's house and fired at
Palangpangan's bedroom but there was no one in the room.
RTC: convicted Intod of attempted murder based on the testimony of the witness

ISSUE: W/N Intod is guilty attempted murder since it is an impossible crime under Art. 4 (2)

HELD: YES. petition is hereby GRANTED, the decision of respondent Court of Appeals holding Petitioner
guilty of Attempted Murder is hereby MODIFIED. sentences him to suffer the penalty of six (6) months of
arresto mayor, together with the accessory penalties provided by the law, and to pay the costs

Art. 4(2). CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY. Criminal Responsibility shall be incurred:

xxx xxx xxx
2. By any person performing an act which would be an offense against persons or property, were it not for
the inherent impossibility of its accomplishment or on account of the employment of inadequate or
ineffectual means.
Petitioner contends that, Palangpangan's absence from her room on the night he and his companions
riddled it with bullets made the crime inherently impossible.
The Revised Penal Code, inspired by the Positivist School, recognizes in the offender his formidability
to punish criminal tendencies in Art. 4(2)
Legal impossibility occurs where the intended acts, even if completed, would not amount to a crime
Legal impossibility would apply to those circumstances where
1. the motive, desire and expectation is to perform an act in violation of the law
2. there is intention to perform the physical act
3. there is a performance of the intended physical act
4. the consequence resulting from the intended act does not amount to a crime
o Ex: The impossibility of killing a person already dead
Factual impossibility occurs when extraneous circumstances unknown to the actor or beyond his
control prevent the consummation of the intended crime this case
o Ex: man who puts his hand in the coat pocket of another with the intention to steal the latter's wallet
and finds the pocket empty
United States: where the offense sought to be committed is factually impossible or accomplishment -
attempt to commit a crime; legally impossible of accomplishment - cannot be held liable for any crime

Intod vs. CA, 215 SCRA 52

Facts: Sulpicio Intod and 3 other men went to Salvador Mandayas house to ask him to go with them to
the house of Bernardina Palangpangan. The group had a meeting with Aniceto Dumalagan who told
Mandaya that he wanted Palangpangan to be killed because of a land dispute between them and that
Mandaya should accompany the 4 men otherwise he would also be killed. At 10:00 p.m. of that same
day, Intod and companions, all armed with firearms arrived at Palangpangans house. Thereafter,
petitioner fired at the said room. It turned out the Palangpangan was in another city and her home was
then occupied by her son-in-law and his family. No one was in the room when the accused fired. No one
was hit by the gunfire. The RTC convicted Intod of attempted murder. Petitioner Intod seeks a
modification of the judgment on the ground that he is only liable for an impossible crime {Art. 4(2)}.
Petitioner contends that, Palangpangan's absence from her room on the night he and his companions
riddled it with bullets made the crime inherently impossible. On the other hand, Respondent People of the
Philippines argues that the crime was not impossible instead the facts were sufficient to constitute an
attempt and to convict Intod for attempted murder. Respondent likewise alleged that there was
intent. Further, In its Comment to the Petition, respondent pointed out that xxx. The crime of murder was
not consummated, not because of the inherent impossibility of its accomplishment (Art 4(2), RPC), but
due to a cause of accident other that petitioners and his co-accuseds own spontaneous desistance (Art.
3) Palangpangan did not sleep at her house at that time. Had it not been for this fact, the crime is
possible, m not impossible.

Issue: Is petitioner is liable only for an impossible crime?

Held: Under Article 4(2) of the RPC, the act performed by the offender cannot produce an offense against
person or property because: 1) the commission of the offense is inherently impossible of accomplishment;
or 2) the means employed is either a) inadequate or b) ineffectual.
To be impossible under this clause, the act intended by the offender must be by its nature one impossible
of accomplishment. There must be either 1) legal impossibility, or 2) physical impossibility of
accomplishing the intended act in order to qualify the act as an impossible crime.

Legal impossibility occurs where the intended act, even if completewould not amount to a crime. Thus:
legal impossibility would apply to those circumstances where 1) the motive, desire and expectation is to
perform an act in violation of the law; 2) there is intention to perform the physical act; 3) there is a
performance of the intended physical act; and 4) the consequence resulting from the intended act does
not amount to a crime. The impossibility of killing a person already dead falls in this category.

On the other had, factual impossibility occurs when extraneous circumstances unknown to the actor or
beyond his control prevent the consummation of the intended crime. One example is the man who puts
his hand in the cot pocket of another with the intention to steal the latters wallet and finds the pocket
empty.

The case at bar belongs to this category. Petitioner shoots the place where he thought his victim would
be, although in reality, the victim was not present in said place and thus, the petitioner failed to
accomplish his end.

The factual situation in the case at bar presents a physical impossibility which render the intended crime
impossible of accomplishment. And under Article 4, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code, such is
sufficient to make the act an impossible crime.