CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II

SPEEDY DISPOSITION OF CASES

Article III, Section 16

All person shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-
judicial, or administrative bodies.

The implementation depends ultimately of the Supreme Court.

In the case of Vector Shipping Corporation v. Macasa, which involved the claims of the
heirs of those who died when the vessel MV Dona Paz sank more than twenty years, the
Supreme Court repudiated the petitioners' ruse and declared -
Lastly, we cannot turn our blind eye to the gruesome maritime tragedy
which is now a dark page in our nation's history. We commiserate with all the
victims, particularly with the Macasas who were denied justice for almost two
decades in this case. To accept petitioners submission that this Court, along
with the RTC and the CA, should submit the review by the Department of
National Defense of the BMI findings, would, in effect, limit the courts
jurisdiction to expeditiously try hear and decide cases filed before them. It
would not only prolong the Macasas agony but would result in yet another
tragedy at the expense of speedy justice. This, we cannot allow.

Article VIII, Section 5(3) provides that the Supreme Court expressly permitted to temporarily
assign a judge from one station to another when the public interest so requires, as when there is
necessity for a less occupied judge to help a busier colleague in another district.

In, Article VIII, Section 5(5), it is required Supreme court to promulgate rules that shall provide a
simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all
courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights.

In Article VIII, Section 15(1), all cases or matters filed after must be decided or resolved within
twenty-four months from date of submission for the Supreme Court, and, unless reduced by the
Supreme Court, twelve months for all lower collegiate courts, and three months for all other
lower courts.

(2) A case or matter shall be deemed submitted for decision or resolution upon the filing of the
last pending, brief, or memorandum required by the Rules of Court or by the court itself.

(3) Upon the expiration of the corresponding period, a certification to this effect signed by the
Chief Justice or the presiding judge shall forthwith be issued and a copy thereof attached to the
record of the case or matter, and served upon the parties. The certification shall state why a
decision or resolution has not been rendered or issued within said period.

(4) Despite the expiration of the applicable mandatory period, the court, without prejudice to
such responsibility as may have been incurred in consequence thereof, shall decide or resolve the
case or matter submitted thereto for determination, without further delay.

General Principle: Rules prescribing the time within which certain acts must be done, or certain
proceedings taken, are considered absolutely indispensable to the prevention of needless delays
and the orderly and speedy discharge of judicial business. By their very nature, these rules are
regarded mandatory (Gachon vs. Devera, GR No. 116695, June 20, 1997)

The constitutional right to a speedy disposition of cases is not limited to the accused in
criminal proceedings but extends to all parties in all cases, including civil and administrative
cases, and in all proceedings, including judicial and quasi-judicial hearings. Hence, under the
Constitution, any party to a case may demand expeditious action by all officials who are tasked
with the administration of justice. (Roquero v. Chancellor of UP-Manila, GR No. 181851, March
2010)

However, the concept of speedy disposition is a relative term and must necessarily be a
flexible concept. A mere mathematical reckoning of the time involved is not sufficient. In
applying the Constitutional guarantee, particular regard must be taken of the facts and
circumstances of each case.

The right to a speedy disposition of a case, like the right to speedy trial, is deemed
violated only when the proceedings are attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive
delays, or when unjustified postponements of the trial are asked for and secured, or when
without cause or justifiable motive a long period of time is allowed to elapse without the
party having his case tried. To determine whether the right has been violated, the following
factors may be considered: (1) the length of the delay; (2) the reasons for such delay; (3) the
assertion or failure to assert such right by the accused; and (4) the prejudice caused by the
delay. (Yulo v. People, GR No. 142762, March 2006)

Rules for Determining Delay:

1. Fixed-Time Period Rule there is considered delay if proper resolution of a case is not
done within a specified time period.
2. Demand Waiver Rule a defendant is considered to have waived any consideration to
speedy trial for any period prior to which he has not demanded trial. A prior demand is a
necessary condition to the consideration for the speedy trial right

Dismissal based on the denial of the right to speedy trial amounts to an acquittal. ( Acevedo v.
Sarmiento)
 In Coscolluela v. Sandiganbayan, the respondent court argued that the delay in proceedings
could be excused by the fact that the case had to undergone careful review and revision through
the different level of the Ombudsman before it is finally approved, in addition to the steady
stream of cases which it had to resolve. The Court noted though that the preliminary
investigation proceedings were terminated only on May 21, 2009, or almost eight years after
filing of the complaint upon approval of the resolution and the information which was prepared
six years earlier on March 27, 2003, about two years after the complaint was filed. The Court
acquitted in this case because of the violation of their right to speedy disposition of case. The
Court further declared that records show that they could not have urged the speedy resolution of
their case because they were unaware that the investigation against them was still on-going. They
were only informed of the March 27, 2003 Resolution and Information against them only after
the lapse of six (6) long years, or when they received a copy of the latter after its filing with the
SB on June 19, 2009. In this regard, they could have reasonably assumed that the proceedings
against them have already been terminated. This serves as a plausible reason as to why
petitioners never followed-up on the case altogether.