Constitutional Provision

Section 13, Article III of the 1987 Constitution states:

SECTION 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by
reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be
bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided
by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required.

The pivotal question is: How should We construe the term "punishable" under the
provisions above-quoted?

In Our mind, the term "punishable" should refer to prescribed, not imposable, penalty.
People v. Temporada,[24] which was even cited by petitioner, perceptibly distinguished
these two concepts:
The RPC provides for an initial penalty as a general prescription for the felonies
defined therein which consists of a range of period of time. This is what is
referred to as the "prescribed penalty." For instance, under Article 249 of the
RPC, the prescribed penalty for homicide is reclusion temporal which ranges
from 12 years and 1 day to 20 years of imprisonment. Further, the Code provides
for attending or modifying circumstances which when present in the commission
of a felony affects the computation of the penalty to be imposed on a convict. This
penalty, as thus modified, is referred to as the "imposable penalty." In the case of
homicide which is committed with one ordinary aggravating circumstance and no
mitigating circumstances, the imposable penalty under the RPC shall be the
prescribed penalty in its maximum period. From this imposable penalty, the court
chooses a single fixed penalty (also called a straight penalty) which is the
"penalty actually imposed" on a convict, i.e., the prison term he has to serve.[

Section 1

160 Phil. 750

FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-31665, August 06, 1975
LEONARDO ALMEDA, PETITIONER, VS. HON. ONOFRE A. VILLALUZ, IN
HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE CIRCUIT CRIMINAL
COURT, SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT, PASIG, RIZAL, AND HON.
GREGORIO PINEDA, CITY FISCAL OF PASAY CITY, RESPONDENTS.

DECISION
CASTRO, J.:

In this jurisdiction, the accused, as of right, is entitled to bail prior to conviction except
when he is charged with a capital offense and the evidence of guilt is strong. This right is
guaranteed by the Constitution,[2] and may not be denied even where the accused has
previously escaped detention,[3] or by reason of his prior absconding.[4]

In order to safeguard the right of an accused to bail, the Constitution further provides that
"excessive bail shall not be required." This is logical because the imposition of an
unreasonable bail may negate the very right itself. We have thus held that "where
conditions imposed upon a defendant seeking bail would amount to a refusal thereof and
render nugatory the constitutional right to bail, we will not hesitate to exercise our
supervisory powers to provide the required remedy."[5]

Coming to the issue at hand, the amount fixed for bail, while reasonable if considered in
terms of surety or property bonds, may be excessive if demanded in the form of cash. A
surety or property bond does not require an actual financial outlay on the part of the
bondsman or the property owner, and in the case of the bondsman the bond may be
obtained by the accused upon the payment of a relatively small premium. Only the
reputation or credit standing of the bondsman or the expectancy of the price at which the
property can be sold, is placed in the hands of the court to guarantee the production of the
body of the accused at the various proceedings leading to his conviction or acquittal.
Upon the other hand, the posting of a cash bond would entail a transfer of assets into the
possession of the court, and its procurement could work untold hardship on the part of the
accused as to have the effect of altogether denying him his constitutional right to bail.

399 Phil. 1
SECOND DIVISION
A.M. No. MTJ-00-1320, November 22, 2000
ANTONIO M. BANGAYAN, COMPLAINANT, VS. JUDGE JIMMY R.
BUTACAN, RESPONDENT.

DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:

Under the present rules, a hearing is required in granting bail whether it is a matter of
right or discretion.[11] A motion to reduce the amount of bail likewise requires a hearing
before it is granted in order to afford the prosecution the chance to oppose it.

Right to bail of AFP or Military personel

In Domingo vs. Minister of National Defense,[8] the Court en banc, speaking through
Mr. Justice Vasquez, held:
"The petitioner is a person subject to military law facing charges before a general
court-martial, and his release from confinement pending the trial of the charges
against him is a matter that lies largely in the discretion of the military authorities.
They are undeniably in a better position to appreciate the gravity of said charges
and the feasibility and advisability of releasing him or relaxing the terms of his
confinement pending the trial and disposition of the case filed against him."

Section 2

226 Phil. 75
EN BANC
G.R. No. 62100, May 30, 1986
RICARDO L. MANOTOC, JR., PETITIONER, VS. THE COURT OF APPEALS,
HONS. SERAFIN E. CAMILON AND RICARDO L. PRONOVE, JR., AS JUDGES
OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF RIZAL, PASIG BRANCHES, THE
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, THE SECURITIES & EXCHANGE
COMMISSION, HON. EDMUNDO M. REYES, AS COMMISSIONER OF
IMMIGRATION, AND THE CHIEF OF THE AVIATION SECURITY COMMAND
(AVSECOM), RESPONDENTS.

DECISION
FERNAN, J.:

"The effect of a recognizance or bail bond, when fully executed or filed of record, and the
prisoner released thereunder, is to transfer the custody of the accused from the public
officials who have him in their charge to keepers of his own selection. Such custody has
been regarded merely as a continuation of the original imprisonment. The sureties
become invested with full authority over the person of the principal and have the right to
prevent the principal from leaving the state."[

SEC. 3. No release or transfer except on court order or bail.-No person under

detention by legal process shall be released or transferred except upon order of the
court or when he is admitted to bail.

669 Phil. 32

FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 175457, July 06, 2011
RUPERTO A. AMBIL, JR., PETITIONER, VS. SANDIGANBAYAN AND PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.

Indubitably, the power to order the release or transfer of a person under detention by legal
process is vested in the court, not in the provincial government, much less the governor.
Section 7, Article 114 of the Rules of Court, as amended, reiterates that:

"No person charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion

perpetua or life imprisonment, when evidence of guilt is strong, shall be admitted
to bail regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution."

401 Phil. 514

THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 135045, December 15, 2000
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, VS. HON. IRENEO GAKO, JR.
(PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, 7 TH JUDICIAL
REGION, BRANCH 5, CEBU CITY) AND VICENTE GO, RESPONDENTS.

DECISION
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:
Thus, we laid down the duties of a judge in case an application for bail is filed, viz:

"(1) Notify the prosecutor of the hearing for bail or require him to submit his
recommendation;

(2) Conduct a hearing of the application for bail regardless of whether or not the
prosecution refuses to present evidence to show that the guilt of the accused is
strong for the purpose of enabling the court to exercise its discretion;

(3) Decide whether the evidence of guilt of the accused is strong based on the
summary of evidence of the prosecution; (Italics supplied)

(4) If the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge the accused upon the
approval of the bail bond. Otherwise, petition should be denied."[22]

We have consistently held that when bail is discretionary, a hearing, whether summary or
otherwise in the discretion of the court, should first be conducted to determine the
existence of strong evidence or lack of it, against the accused to enable the judge to make
an intelligent assessment of the evidence presented by the parties.[16]
A summary hearing is defined as "such brief and speedy method of receiving and
considering the evidence of guilt as is practicable and consistent with the purpose of
hearing which is merely to determine the weight of evidence for the purposes of bail. On
such hearing, the court does not sit to try the merits or to enter into any nice inquiry as to
the weight that ought to be allowed to the evidence for or against the accused, nor will it
speculate on the outcome of the trial or on what further evidence may be therein offered
and admitted. The course of inquiry may be left to the discretion of the court which may
confine itself to receiving such evidence as has reference to substantial matters, avoiding
unnecessary examination and cross examination".[17]

385 Phil. 208

THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 134504, March 17, 2000
JOSELITO V. NARCISO, PETITIONER, VS. FLOR MARIE STA. ROMANA-
CRUZ, RESPONDENT.

DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
When the penalty prescribed by law is death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, a
hearing must be conducted by the trial judge before bail can be granted to the accused.
Absent such hearing, the order granting bail is void for having been issued with grave
abuse of discretion.

Stressing in Basco v. Rapatalo[8] that the judge had the duty to determine whether the
evidence of guilt was strong, the Court held:
"When the grant of bail is discretionary, the prosecution has the burden of
showing that the evidence of guilt against the accused is strong. However, the
determination of whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong, being a matter of
judicial discretion, remains with the judge. 'This discretion by the very nature of
things, may rightly be exercised only after the evidence is submitted to the court
at the hearing. Since the discretion is directed to the weight of the evidence and
since evidence cannot properly be weighed if not duly exhibited or produced
before the court, it is obvious that a proper exercise of judicial discretion requires
 that the evidence of guilt be submitted to the court, the petitioner having the right
of cross examination and to introduce his own evidence in rebuttal.'

Concerned Citizens v. Elma,[12] the Court ruled:

"It is true that the weight of the evidence adduced is addressed to the sound
discretion of the court. However, such discretion may only be exercised after the
hearing called to ascertain the degree of guilt of the accused for the purpose of
determining whether or not he should be granted liberty."

People v. Dacudao,[16] which ruled:

"x x x A private prosecutor in a criminal case has no authority to act for the
People of the Philippines before this Court. It is the Government's counsel, the
Solicitor General who appears in criminal cases or incidents before the Supreme
Court. At the very least, the Provincial Fiscal himself, with the conformity of the
Solicitor General, should have raised the issue (of whether or not the prosecution
was deprived of procedural due process on account of the grant of bail to the
accused without any hearing on the motion for bail) before us, instead of the
private prosecutor with the conformity of the Assistant Provincial Fiscal of Cebu."
He also cites Republic v. Partisala[17] which held as follows:
"We make it known that only the Solicitor General can bring or defend actions on
behalf of the Republic of the Philippines. Henceforth actions filed in the name of
the Republic of the Philippines if not initiated by the Solicitor General will be
summarily dismissed."
Citing the "ends of substantial justice," People v. Calo,[18] however, provided an
exception to the above doctrines in this manner:
"While the rule is, as held by the Court of Appeals, only the Solicitor General may
bring or defend actions on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines, or represent
the People or the State in criminal proceedings pending in this Court and the
Court of Appeals (Republic vs. Partisala, 118 SCRA 320 [1982]), the ends of
substantial justice would be better served, and the issues in this action could be
determined in a more just, speedy and inexpensive manner, by entertaining the
petition at bar. As an offended party in a criminal case, private petitioner has
sufficient personality and a valid grievance against Judge Adao's order granting
bail to the alleged murderers of his (private petitioner's) father.

"In Paredes vs. Gopengco, 29 SCRA 688 (1969), this Court ruled that the
offended parties in criminal cases have sufficient interest and personality as
"person(s) aggrieved" to file the special civil action of prohibition and certiorari
under Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 65 in line with the underlying spirit of the liberal
construction of the Rules of Court in order to promote their object, thus:
 'Furthermore, as offended parties in the pending criminal case before
petitioner judge, it cannot be gainsaid that respondents have sufficient
interest and personality as 'person(s) aggrieved' by petitioner judge's ruling
on his non-disqualification to file the special civil action under sections 1
and 2 of Rule 65. Recently, in line with the underlying spirit of a liberal
construction of the Rules of Court in order to promote their object, as
against the literal interpretation of Rule 110, section 2, we held, overruling
the implication of an earlier case, that a widow possesses the right as an
offended party to file a criminal complaint for the murder of her deceased
husband.'" (Id., p. 699)
The ends of substantial justice indeed require the affirmation of the appellate court's
ruling on this point. Clearly, the assailed Order of Judge Santiago was issued in grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. A void order is no order at all.[19] It
cannot confer any right or be the source of any relief. This Court is not merely a court of
law; it is likewise a court of justice.

bail may increased

G.R. No. L-1771, December 04, 1947

SY GUAN (ALIAS LIM HONG), PETITIONER, VS. RAFAEL AMPARO, JUDGE
OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA, RESPONDENT.

DECISION
TUASON, J.:
79 Phil. 690

The existence of high degree of probability that the defendant will abscond confers upon
the court no greater discretion than to increase the bond to such an amount as would
reasonably tend to assure the presence of the defendant when it is wanted, such amount to
be subject, of course, to the other provision of the same section and paragraph cited, that
excessive bail shall not be required."

242 Phil. 234

FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-37707, March 09, 1988
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS.
MARIQUITA J. CAPARAS, ACCUSED. MABINI INSURANCE & FIDELITY
CO., INC., BONDSMEN-APPELLANT.

DECISION
GANCAYCO, J.

The petition is devoid of merit.

Upon the assumption of the obligation of bail, the sureties become in law the jailers of
their principal.[4] Their custody of the prisoner is the continuance of the original
imprisonment and though they cannot actually confine him they are subrogated to all the
rights and means which the government possesses to make their control effective. In a
long line of decisions it has been held that it is the bonding company's responsibility to
produce the accused before the court whenever required. Failure to so produce is
undisputably a complete breach of guaranty.[5]

In case of the surety's breach, the forfeiture of the bail follows. Section 15, Rule 114[6]
lays down the rule for forfeiture of bail, thus:
"When the appearance of the defendant is required by the court, his sureties shall
be notified to produce him before the court on a given date. If the defendant fails
to appear as required, the bond is declared forfeited and the bondsmen are given
thirty (30) days within which to produce their principal and to show cause why a
judgment should not be rendered against them for the amount of their bond.
Within the said period of thirty (30) days, the bondsmen, (a) must produce the
body of their principal or give the reason for its non-production; and (b) must
explain satisfactorily why the defendant did not appear before the court when first
required to do so. Failing in these two requisites, a judgment shall be rendered
against the bondsmen."