A close scrutiny of the records of this case reveals that the evidence presented by
TIJING vs. CA
(facial similarity to prove kinship)
Petitioners EDGARDO A. TIJING and BIENVENIDA R. TIJING are husband
and wife. They have six children. The youngest is Edgardo Tijing, Jr., who was born on
April 27, 1989, at the clinic of midwife and registered nurse Lourdes Vasquez in Sta.
Ana, Manila. Petitioner Bienvenida served as the laundrywoman of private respondent
ANGELITA DIAMANTE.
According to Bienvenida in August 1989, Angelita went to her house to fetch her
for an urgent laundry job. Since Bienvenida was on her way to do some marketing, she
asked Angelita to wait until she returned. She also left her four-month old son, Edgardo,
Jr., under the care of Angelita as she usually let Angelita take care of the child while
Bienvenida was doing laundry.
When Bienvenida returned from the market, Angelita and Edgardo, Jr., were
gone. Bienvenida forthwith proceeded to Angelitas house, but did not find them
there. Angelitas maid told Bienvenida that her employer went out for a stroll and told
Bienvenida to come back later. She returned to Angelitas house after three days, only
to discover that Angelita had moved to another place. Bienvenida then complained to
her barangay chairman and also to the police.
Bienvenida and her husband looked for their missing son in other
places. Notwithstanding their serious efforts, they saw no traces of his whereabouts.
Four years later or in October 1993, Bienvenida read in a tabloid about the death
of Tomas Lopez, allegedly the common-law husband of Angelita, and whose remains
were lying in state in Hagonoy, Bulacan. Bienvenida went to Hagonoy, Bulacan, where
she allegedly saw her son Edgardo, Jr., for the first time after four years. She claims
that the boy, who was pointed out to her by Benjamin Lopez, a brother of the late
Tomas Lopez, was already named John Thomas Lopez. [1] She avers that Angelita
refused to return to her the boy despite her demand to do so.
Bienvenida and Edgardo filed their petition for habeas corpus with the trial court in
order to recover their son. To substantiate their petition, petitioners presented two
witnesses. The first witness, Vasquez, testified that she assisted in the delivery of one
Edgardo Tijing, Jr. on April 27, 1989. The second witness, Benjamin Lopez, declared
that his brother, the late Tomas Lopez, could not have possibly fathered John Thomas
Lopez as the latter was sterile
For her part, Angelita claimed that she is the natural mother of the child. She
asserts that at age 42, she gave birth to John Thomas Lopez on April 27, 1989,
RTC: concluded that since Angelita and her common-law husband could not
have children, the alleged birth of John Thomas Lopez is an impossibility. The trial court
also held that the minor and Bienvenida showed strong facial similarity. Accordingly, it
ruled that Edgardo Tijing, Jr., and John Thomas Lopez are one and the same person
who is the natural child of petitioners.
CA: Reversed
ISSUE: Whether or not kinship may be proven be facial similarity. YES
HELD: (Edgardo is the son of bienvenida)
Bienvenida is sufficient to establish that John Thomas Lopez is actually her missing
son, Edgardo Tijing, Jr.
XXX
Fourth, the trial court observed several times that when the child and Bienvenida
were both in court, the two had strong similarities in their faces, eyes, eyebrows and
head shapes. Resemblance between a minor and his alleged parent is competent and
material evidence to establish parentage. [18] Needless to stress, the trial courts
conclusion should be given high respect, it having had the opportunity to observe the
physical appearances of the minor and petitioner concerned.
Xxx
(discussion on DNA)
A final note. Parentage will still be resolved using conventional methods unless
we adopt the modern and scientific ways available. Fortunately, we have now the
facility and expertise in using DNA test[19] for identification and parentage testing. The
University of the Philippines Natural Science Research Institute (UP-NSRI) DNA
Analysis Laboratory has now the capability to conduct DNA typing using short tandem
repeat (STR) analysis. The analysis is based on the fact that the DNA of a child/person
has two (2) copies, one copy from the mother and the other from the father. The DNA
from the mother, the alleged father and child are analyzed to establish parentage. [20] Of
course, being a novel scientific technique, the use of DNA test as evidence is still open
to challenge.[21] Eventually, as the appropriate case comes, courts should not hesitate
to rule on the admissibility of DNA evidence. For it was said, that courts should apply
the results of science when competently obtained in aid of situations presented, since
to reject said result is to deny progress.[22] Though it is not necessary in this case to
resort to DNA testing, in future it would be useful to all concerned in the prompt
resolution of parentage and identity issues.
PP v. RONNIE RULLEPA y GUINTO
(appearance to establish age)
Ronnie Rullepa y Guinto (Rullepa), a houseboy, was charged and found guilty
with Rape of Cyra May (then only three and a half years old) before (RTC).
The crime committed by accused-appellant is statutory rape.
The two elements of statutory rape are (1) that the accused had carnal knowledge
of a woman, and (2) that the woman is below twelve years of age.
The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.
Furthermore, the victims age may constitute a qualifying circumstance,
warranting the imposition of the death sentence. The same Article states:
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed when
the victim is x x x a child below seven (7) years old.
The victim and her mother testified that she was only three years old at the time of
the rape. However, the prosecution did not offer the victims certificate of live birth or
similar authentic documents in evidence.
Finding for the prosecution, the RTC rendered judgment finding Rullepa guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of rape and accordingly sentenced him to death. The case
was placed for automatic review of the Supreme Court
ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court erred in imposing the supreme penalty of death
upon Rullepa when the age of the victim was only evidenced by appearance. NO
HELD: A persons appearance, where relevant, is admissible as object evidence, the
same being addressed to the senses of the court. As to the weight to accord such
appearance, especially in rape cases, the Court in People v. Pruna laid down the
guideline.
A persons appearance, as evidence of age (for example, of infancy, or of being
under the age of consent to intercourse), is usually regarded as relevant; and, if so,
the tribunal may properly observe the person brought before it.
There can be no question, therefore, as to the admissibility of a persons
appearance in determining his or her age. As to the weight to accord such appearance,
especially in rape cases, Pruna laid down guideline no. 3, which is again reproduced
hereunder:
3. If the certificate of live birth or authentic document is shown to have been lost or
destroyed or otherwise unavailable, the testimony, if clear and credible, of the victims
mother or a member of the family either by affinity or consanguinity who is qualified to
testify on matters respecting pedigree such as the exact age or date of birth of the
offended party pursuant to Section 40, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence shall be
sufficient under the following circumstances:
a. If the victim is alleged to be below 3 years of age and what is sought to be proved is
that she is less than 7 years old;
b. If the victim is alleged to be below 7 years of age and what is sought to be proved is
that she is less than 12 years old;
c. If the victim is alleged to be below 12 years of age and what is sought to be proved is
that she is less than 18 years old.
Under the above guideline, the testimony of a relative with respect to the age of
the victim is sufficient to constitute proof beyond reasonable doubt in cases (a), (b) and
(c) above. In such cases, the disparity between the allegation and the proof of age is so
great that the court can easily determine from the appearance of the victim the veracity
of the testimony. The appearance corroborates the relatives testimony.
As the alleged age approaches the age sought to be proved, the persons
appearance, as object evidence of her age, loses probative value. Doubt as to her true
age becomes greater and such doubt must be resolved in favor of the accused.
In the present case, the prosecution did not offer the victims certificate of live birth
or similar authentic documents in evidence. The victim and her mother, however,
testified that she was only three years old at the time of the rape.
Because of the vast disparity between the alleged age (three years old) and the
age sought to be proved (below twelve years), the trial court would have had no
difficulty ascertaining the victims age from her appearance. No reasonable doubt,
therefore, exists that the second element of statutory rape, i.e., that the victim was
below twelve years of age at the time of the commission of the offense, is present.
Whether the victim was below seven years old, however, is another matter. Here,
reasonable doubt exists. A mature three and a half-year old can easily be mistaken for
an underdeveloped seven-year old. The appearance of the victim, as object evidence,
cannot be accorded much weight and, following Pruna, the testimony of the mother is,
by itself, insufficient.
As it has not been established with moral certainty that Cyra May was below
seven years old at the time of the commission of the offense, accused-appellant cannot
be sentenced to suffer the death penalty. Only the penalty of reclusion perpetua can be
imposed upon him.
People vs Ulzoron
(Absence of marks of physical Violence)
FACTS: Samuel Ulzoron was charged with rape with the use of a deadly weapon.
(Samuel grabbed her wrists and locked them with one hand behind her back
with the other drawing his bolo and pointing it at her neck. She struggled to free herself
from his hold but was so intimidated with the bolo that she could not shout for help; she
lost her strength eventually. After she weakened, he dragged her some forty (40)
meters away to the bushes and tall grasses. He forced her to lie down; then he
mounted her. He laid his bolo beside him, pinned her arms with one hand, and with the
other, loosened the buttons of her dress. Emily could only struggle in vain until he
ripped off her dress and panties. He opened the zipper of his pants and then inserted
his penis to her vagina. He copulated with her for about fifteen (15) minutes. She did
everything to disengage herself from the sexual imbroglio but her efforts proved no
match to his strength.)
On the strength of the testimony of the complaining witness Emily Gabo, the
trial court convicted the accused. It found the latters testimony straightforward and
credible.
Appellant faults the trial court for convicting him on the basis of his defense.
He argues that the undisputed facts and circumstances made it more likely that Emily
was involved in an adulterous relationship with him.
He claims, for instance, that there was absolutely nothing to support the
victims claim of struggle, and that while he allegedly dragged her forty (40) meters
away before assaulting her sexually, the examining physician could not conclude that
physical force was actually inflicted since she did not sustain any physical injuries.
ISSUE1: W/N accused-appellants guilt was sufficiently established
HELD1: Contrary to accused-appellants claim that he was convicted because of his
weak defense, his conviction was actually founded on the overwhelming evidence of
the prosecution.
The term dragged should not indeed be taken in the meaning understood by
appellant as dragged along on the ground. When asked on cross-examination by the
defense counsel to describe how she and appellant travelled at (sic) forty (40) meters
distance, she said, He was holding my hands and at the same time he is (sic) pushing
me forward. This testimony adequately explains the absence of injuries in her body. At
any rate, it is not necessary for the commission of rape that there be marks of physical
violence on the victims body. While Emily repeatedly mentioned her struggles to be
released from his grasp, such efforts need not always result in physical
injuries. Besides, they did not refer to the circumstances when she was being dragged
by the accused, but to the circumstances when he initially grabbed her hands, when he
was on top of her, when he was undressing her, and when she was exerting efforts to
disengage herself from the sexual anchorage.
The circumstances of force and intimidation attending the instant case were
manifested clearly not only in the victims testimony but also in the physical evidence
presented during the trial consisting of her torn dress and underwear as well as the
medico-legal report. Such pieces of evidence indeed are more eloquent than a hundred
witnesses. The fact of carnal knowledge is not disputed. It was positively established
through the offended partys own testimony and corroborated by that of her examining
physician.
Moreover, the conduct of the complaining witness immediately following the
assault clearly established the truth of her charge that she was raped by accused-
appellant.
ABALOS vs. CA
(absence of gun powder)
Delfin Abalos was charged with murder for the killing of Liberato Damias. [1] The
Information alleged that the accused, using an unlicensed firearm, with intent to kill,
employing treachery and taking advantage of superior strength, shot and killed Liberato
Damias on the night of 27 January 1993
Veronica Bukatao (girlfriend of the deceased) narrated that on that night, Liberato
visited her at around 7 o'clock. As she was entertaining him at the balcony of their
house she noticed petitioner walking back and forth in front of their house. He was just
about four (4) meters or so away from them. As she was ill at ease with petitioners
conspicuous demeanor below, she asked Liberato to transfer to their sala where they
could continue talking. When they moved inside, Liberato sat near the entrance of the
house with his left side towards the door with Veronica sitting in front of him. The
positions of Liberato and Veronica and their proximity to one another could have
heightened Delfin's animosity that he suddenly appeared at the door and in a semi-
kneeling position shot Liberato on his left side. Veronica positively identified petitioner
Delfin Abalos as he scurried away since the sala of her house was adequately lit by a
kerosene lamp and he was only one (1) meter away from them when he pulled the
trigger.
RTC: It found petitioner guilty of murder. However, the aggravating circumstance
of use of an unlicensed firearm was not appreciated as the weapon was never
recovered.
CA: homicide.
Contention of the accused: the appellate court erred in finding him guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of homicide. He argues that he had a solid alibi (he was at the
tobacco field) to prove his innocence and that the paraffin test yielded negative for
powder burns on his hand, hence confirming that he never fired the shot that killed
Liberato.
ISSUE: W/N the guilt of the accused proved beyond reasonable doubt.
HELD: Anent the paraffin test, it is true that it produced a negative result but such
fact does not ipso facto merit Delfins acquittal. This Court acknowledges that the
absence of powder burns in a suspects hand is not conclusive proof that he has not
fired a gun. In fact, the traces of nitrates can easily be removed by the simple act of
washing ones hand.
Caballes vs. CA
(Search of moving vehicles)
[At] about 9:15 p.m. of June 28, 1989, Sgt. Victorino Noceja and Pat. Alex de
Castro, while on a routine patrol in Barangay Sampalucan, Pagsanjan, Laguna, spotted
a passenger jeep unusually covered with "kakawati" leaves.
Suspecting that the jeep was loaded with smuggled goods, the two police
officers flagged down the vehicle. The jeep was driven by appellant. When asked what
was loaded on the jeep, he did not answer; he appeared pale and nervous.
With appellant's consent, the police officers checked the cargo and they
discovered bundles of 3.08 mm aluminum/galvanized conductor wires exclusively
owned by National Power Corporation (NPC). Thereafter, appellant and the vehicle with
the high-voltage wires were brought to the Pagsanjan Police Station.
As his last straw of argument, the accused questions the constitutionality of
the search and validity of his arrest on the ground that no warrant was issued to that
effect.
ISSUE: whether the evidence taken from the warrantless search is admissible against
the appellant.
HELD: The conviction or acquittal of petitioner hinges primarily on the validity of the
warrantless search and seizure made by the police officers, and the admissibility of the
evidence obtained by virtue thereof.
Search of moving vehicle - Highly regulated by the government, the vehicle's
inherent mobility reduces expectation of privacy especially when its transit in public
thoroughfares furnishes a highly reasonable suspicion amounting to probable cause
that the occupant committed a criminal activity. 15 Thus, the rules governing search and
seizure have over the years been steadily liberalized whenever a moving vehicle is the
object of the search on the basis of practicality. This is so considering that before a
warrant could be obtained, the place, things and persons to be searched must be
described to the satisfaction of the issuing judge a requirement which borders on the
impossible in the case of smuggling effected by the use of a moving vehicle that can
transport contraband from one place to another with impunity. We might add that a
warrantless search of a moving vehicle is justified on the ground that it is not
practicable to secure a warrant because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the
locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought. 16 Searches without warrant
of automobiles is also allowed for the purpose of preventing violations of smuggling or
immigration laws, provided such searches are made at borders or 'constructive borders'
like checkpoints near the boundary lines of the State.17
 The mere mobility of these vehicles, however, does not give the police officers
unlimited discretion to conduct indiscriminate searches without warrants if made within
the interior of the territory and in the absence of probable cause. 18 Still and all, the
important thing is that there was probable cause to conduct the warrantless search,
which must still be present in such a case.
Although the term eludes exact definition, probable cause signifies a
reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in
themselves to warrant a cautious man's belief that the person accused is guilty of the
offense with which he is charged; or the existence of such facts and circumstances
which could lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has
been committed and that the items, articles or objects sought in connection with said
offense or subject to seizure and destruction by law is in the place to be searched.The
required probable cause that will justify a warrantless search and seizure is not
determined by a fixed formula but is resolved according to the facts of each case.
One such form of search of moving vehicles is the "stop-and-search" without
warrant at military or police checkpoints which has been declared to be not illegal per
se, for as long as it is warranted by the exigencies of public order and conducted in a
way least intrusive to motorists. A checkpoint may either be a mere routine inspection
or it may involve an extensive search.
Routine inspections are not regarded as violative of an individual's right
against unreasonable search. The search which is normally permissible in this instance
is limited to the following instances: (1) where the officer merely draws aside the curtain
of a vacant vehicle which is parked on the public fair grounds; (2) simply looks into a
vehicle; (3) flashes a light therein without opening the car's doors; 26 (4) where the
occupants are not subjected to a physical or body search; 27 (5) where the inspection of
the vehicles is limited to a visual search or visual inspection; 28 and (6) where the routine
check is conducted in a fixed area.29
None of the foregoing circumstances is obtaining in the case at bar. The police
officers did not merely conduct a visual search or visual inspection of herein petitioner's
vehicle. They had to reach inside the vehicle, lift the kakawati leaves and look inside
the sacks before they were able to see the cable wires. It cannot be considered a
simple routine check.
On the other hand, when a vehicle is stopped and subjected to an extensive
search, such a warrantless search would be constitutionally permissible only if the
officers conducting the search have reasonable or probable cause to believe, before
the search, that either the motorist is a law-offender or they will find the instrumentality
or evidence pertaining to a crime in the vehicle to be searched. 31
In the case at bar, the vehicle of the petitioner was flagged down because the
police officers who were on routine patrol became suspicious when they saw that the
back of the vehicle was covered with kakawati leaves which, according to them, was
unusual and uncommon.
We hold that the fact that the vehicle looked suspicious simply because it is
not common for such to be covered with kakawati leaves does not constitute "probable
cause" as would justify the conduct of a search without a warrant.
In addition, the police authorities do not claim to have received any
confidential report or tipped information that petitioner was carrying stolen cable wires
in his vehicle which could otherwise have sustained their suspicion. Our jurisprudence
is replete with cases where tipped information has become a sufficient probable cause
to effect a warrantless search and seizure. Unfortunately, none exists in this case.
accused Rudy Caballes is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime charged.
MUSTANG LUMBER, INC VS. CA
(Search of moving vehicles)
FACTS: On 1 April 1990, acting on an information that a huge stockpile of narra
flitches, shorts, and slabs were seen inside the lumberyard of the petitioner in
Valenzuela, Metro Manila, the SAID organized a team of foresters and policemen and
sent it to conduct surveillance at the said lumberyard. In the course thereof, the team
members saw coming out from the lumberyard the petitioner's truck, with Plate No.
CCK-322, loaded with lauan and almaciga lumber of assorted sizes and dimensions.
Since the driver could not produce the required invoices and transport documents, the
team seized the truck together with its cargo and impounded them at the DENR
compound at Visayas Avenue, Quezon City.1 The team was not able to gain entry into
the premises because of the refusal of the owner.
On 3 April 1990, RTC Valenzuela issued a search warrant. On same day, the team
seized from the lumberyard narra shorts, trimmings and slabs, narra lumber, and
various species of lumber and shorts.
On 4 April 1990, team returned to lumberyard and placed under administrative seizure
(owner retains physical possession of seized articles, only an inventory is taken) the
remaining lumber because Mustang Lumber failed to produce required documents
upon demand. Upon recommendation of SAID Chief Robles, DENR Sec Factoran
suspended Mustang Lumbers permit and confiscated in favor of the govt the seized
articles.
Mustang Lumber filed for a TRO against Factoran and Robles, and questioned the
validity of the April 1 and 4 seizure.
ISSUES: a) WON the search and seizure on April 1 was valid.
HELD: Yes. It was duly established that on 1 April 1990, the petitioner's truck with
Plate No. CCK-322 was coming out from the petitioner's lumberyard loaded with lauan
and almaciga lumber of different sizes and dimensions which were not accompanied
with the required invoices and transport documents. The seizure of such truck and its
cargo was a valid exercise of the power vested upon a forest officer or employee by
Section 80 of P.D. No. 705, as amended by P.D. No. 1775. Then, too, as correctly held
by the trial court and the Court of Appeals in the FIRST CIVIL CASE, the search was
conducted on a moving vehicle. Such a search could be lawfully conducted without a
search warrant.
Search of a moving vehicle is one of the five doctrinally accepted exceptions to the
constitutional mandate 34 that no search or seizure shall be made except by virtue of a
warrant issued by a judge after personally determining the existence of probable cause.
The other exceptions are (3) search as an incident to a lawful arrest, (2) seizure of
evidence in plain view, (3) customs searches, and (4) consented warrantless search.
PEOPLE v. BALINGAN
(Checkpoints)
On August 1988, the Narcotics Division of the Baguio City police received a
telephone call from an unnamed male informant, alleging that petitioner Balingan is
going to Manila with a bag full of marijuana.
Acting on such information, police officer Obrera conducted surveillance of
petitioner in different places, such as her house and at bus stations around the city.
Upon receiving information that petitioner boarded a Dangwa Bus, Obrera
immediately went to the terminal to confirm the said report. He boarded the bus and
saw petitioner carrying a gray maleta. A prior checkpoint along Kennon Road was set-
up by the police in order to apprehend petitioner. Upon arrival at the checkpoint, the
bus stopped and yielded to the police officers. Obrera announced a routine check on
petitioner, but petitioner did not respond. The police officers then grabbed the bag in
the overhead compartment of petitioner Balingan and opened it. Just as they
suspected, they found approximately 3 kilos of marijuana.
The police officers then requested Balingan to go with them to the police
station. However, the petitioner resisted and bit one of the police officers. Eventually,
after thirty minutes, they were able to pull Balingan out of the bus and brought her to
the Baguio City Police Station and locked her up in jail.
ISSUE Whether or not there was sufficient probable cause for the police officers to
believe that she was then and there committing a crime so as to justify the warrantless
search and seizure of the bag
HELD: Yes.
We also find no merit in appellant's argument that the marijuana flowering tops
should be excluded as evidence, they being the products of an alleged illegal
warrantless search. The search and seizure in the case at bench happened in a
moving, public vehicle.
Search and seizure must be supported by a valid warrant is not an absolute
rule. There are at least three (3) well-recognized exceptions thereto. These are: [1] a
search incidental to an arrest, [2] a search of a moving vehicle, and [3] seizure of
evidence in plain view (emphasis supplied). The circumstances of the case clearly
show that the search in question was made as regards a moving vehicle. Therefore, a
valid warrant was not necessary to effect the search on appellant and his co-accused.
Unquestionably, the warrantless search in the case at bench is not bereft of a
probable cause. The Baguio INP Narcotics Intelligence Division received an information
that appellant was going to transport marijuana in a bag to Manila. Their surveillance
operations revealed that appellant, whose movements had been previously monitored
by the Narcotics Division boarded a Dangwa bus bound for Manila carrying a
suspicious looking gray luggage bag. When the moving, public bus was stopped, her
bag, upon inspection, yielded marijuana. Under those circumstances, the warrantless
search of appellant's bag was not illegal.
People vs. Johnson
(Routine Airport Procedures)
Accused-appellant Leila Reyes Johnson was, at the time of the incident, 58 years
old, a widow, and a resident of Ocean Side, California, U.S.A.
On June 16, 1998, she arrived in the Philippines to visit her sons family in
Calamba, Laguna. She was due to fly back to the United States on July 26.
At around 7:30 p.m. of that day, Olivia Ramirez was on duty as a lady frisker at
Gate 16 of the NAIA departure area.
When she frisked accused-appellant Leila Johnson, a departing passenger bound
for the United States, she felt something hard on the latters abdominal area. Upon
inquiry, Mrs. Johnson explained she needed to wear two panty girdles as she had just
undergone an operation as a result of an ectopic pregnancy.
Not satisfied with the explanation, Ramirez reported the matter to her superior,
saying that she does not believe that it is just a panty. She was directed to take
accused-appellant to the nearest womens room for inspection.
Ramirez then asked her to bring out the thing under her girdle. Accused-appellant
brought out three plastic packs, which Ramirez then turned over to her superior, outside
the womens room.[9]
The confiscated packs were found to be shabu.[10]
Accused-appellant claims that she was arrested and detained in gross violation of
her constitutional rights. She argues that the shabu confiscated from her is inadmissible
against her because she was forced to affix her signature on the plastic bags while she
was detained at the 1st RASO office, without the assistance of counsel and without
having been informed of her constitutional rights. Hence, she argues, the
methamphetamine hydrochloride, or shabu, should have been excluded from the
evidence.[17]
ISSUE: admissibility of the seized illegal drugs at the airport
HELD: The methamphetamine hydrochloride seized from her during the routine frisk at
the airport was acquired legitimately pursuant to airport security procedures.
Persons may lose the protection of the search and seizure clause by exposure of
their persons or property to the public in a manner reflecting a lack of subjective
expectation of privacy, which expectation society is prepared to recognize as
reasonable.[19]
Such recognition is implicit in airport security procedures. With increased concern
over airplane hijacking and terrorism has come increased security at the nations
airports. Passengers attempting to board an aircraft routinely pass through metal
detectors; their carry-on baggage as well as checked luggage are routinely subjected to
x-ray scans. Should these procedures suggest the presence of suspicious objects,
physical searches are conducted to determine what the objects are. There is little
question that such searches are reasonable, given their minimal intrusiveness, the
gravity of the safety interests involved, and the reduced privacy expectations
associated with airline travel. Indeed, travelers are often notified through airport public
address systems, signs, and notices in their airline tickets that they are subject to
search and, if any prohibited materials or substances are found, such would be subject
to seizure. These announcements place passengers on notice that ordinary
constitutional protections against warrantless searches and seizures do not apply to
routine airport procedures.
The packs of methamphetamine hydrochloride having thus been obtained through
a valid warrantless search, they are admissible in evidence against the accused-
appellant herein. Corollarily, her subsequent arrest, although likewise without warrant,
was justified since it was effected upon the discovery and recovery of shabu in her
person in flagrante delicto.
PEOPLE vs ASPIRAS
(seizure of evidence in plain view)
On December 26, 1994, Sr. Inspector Valdez of Paraaque Philippine National
Police Drug Enforcement Unit received a telephone call, informing him that a certain
alias Rolly, later identified as accused-appellant Rolando Aspiras,
of Tambo Paraaque was peddling prohibited drugs.
Upon such information, Sr. Insp. Valdez constituted PO3 Jose Soreta, Police
Aides (P/A) Abelardo Soto and Jerry Sabino to conduct a surveillance operation on
Rolando Aspiras. On the same day, surveillance was conducted at J. Puyat Compound
where the house of the suspected peddler was located.
Afterwards, the surveillance team went back to the police station and planned a
buy-bust operation. On December 27, 1994, at around 7 in the evening, P/A
Jerry Sabino acted as the poseur-buyer while PO3 Soreta, P/A Soto and Crisanto Cruz
positioned themselves approximately ten meters away from Aspiras house.
When Sabino called for Aspiras, alias Bukol went out and inquired
what Sabino wanted. Sabino related to San Lorenzo that he wanted to score or buy
marijuana for P50.00 pesos. Sabino then gave to San Lorenzo the marked 5 pieces of
ten peso bills worth P50.00.
Upon receipt of such amount, San Lorenzo entered Aspiras house. Soon
after, Aspiras came out and asked Sabino if he was the one who wanted to score.
When Sabino confirmed, Aspiras handed five (5) pieces of aluminum foils. Upon
verifying its contents as marijuana, Sabino signaled his companions to make the arrest.
When Aspiras saw the rest of Sabinos companions, he rushed inside his house
and the police team sought after him. Thereat, the marked money was recovered
from Aspiras while PO3 Soreta seized two bricks of marijuana flower tops wrapped in
plastic bag under a table. Afterwards, Aspiras and San Lorenzo were brought to the
headquarters and the marijuana flower tops were sent to the NBI for examination.
Charges were then filed against Aspiras and San Lorenzo for violation of Sections 4
and 8 of R.A. 6425, as amended.
RTC: rendered its judgment convicting accused-appellant Aspiras and
accused San Lorenzo of selling marijuana. With respect to the charge of possessing
prohibited drugs under Section 8 thereof, accused San Lorenzo was acquitted while
accused-appellant Aspiras was convicted.
In this appeal, accused-appellant Aspiras questions the existence of the buy-bust
operation, imputes ill-motive on the police officers and asserts that the evidence against
him is planted.
ISSUE:Is the evidence presented before the trial court sufficient to warrant
accused-appellants conviction?
HELD: While the conviction of accused-appellant in selling prohibited drugs is
warranted, accused-appellant should be liable only for such crime and his acquittal for
possessing two bricks of marijuana flower tops is called for.
It appears that the police officers justification for the seizure of the prohibited
drugs was rooted from the fact that the intrusion and search was pursuant to accused-
appellants lawful arrest after selling marijuana to a member of the buy-bust team. A
search incident to a lawful arrest is limited to the person of one arrested and the
premises within his immediate control. [15]
Under the plain view doctrine, unlawful objects within the plain view of an officer
who has the right to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure and may
be presented in evidence.[16] Nonetheless, the seizure of evidence in plain view must
comply with the following elements: (a) a prior valid intrusion based on the
valid warrantless arrest in which the police are legally present in the pursuit of their
official duties; (b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who had the
right to be where they are; (c) the evidence must be immediately apparent; and (d) plain
view justified mere seizure of evidence without further search. [17]
The record shows that the two bricks of marijuana flower tops were recovered
under the table, wrapped in a plastic bag.
While it is true that the police officers had prior justification for intrusion, permitting
a warrantless seizure of any piece of evidence incriminating an accused, nonetheless,
applying the plain view doctrine, such must be limited to those evidence that the police
officer came across inadvertently.
The prosecution failed to show whether or not the plastic bag was transparent that
would prove beyond reasonable doubt that the plain view of such plastic bag would
readily disclose that its contents are marijuana. In our criminal justice system, the
overriding consideration is not whether the court doubts the innocence of the accused
but whether it entertains a reasonable doubt as to his guilt. If the inculpatory facts and
circumstances are capable of two or more explanations, one of which is consistent with
the innocence of the accused and the other consistent with his guilt, then the evidence
does not fulfill the test of moral certainty and is not sufficient to support a
conviction.[21] Corollarily, the two bricks of marijuana are inadmissible in evidence
against accused-appellant.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. QUE MING KHA
(Plain View) (Facts: go to the last paragraph)
Go further argued that the search made on the van was illegal and therefore the
shabu discovered from that search is inadmissible as evidence. We do not agree.
The Constitution proscribes search and seizure without a judicial warrant and any
evidence obtained without such warrant is inadmissible for any purpose in any
proceeding. The rule is, however, not absolute. Search and seizure may be made
without a warrant and the evidence obtained therefrom may be admissible in the
following instances: (1) search incident to a lawful arrest; (2) search of a moving motor
vehicle; (3) search in violation of customs laws; (4) seizure of evidence in plain
view; (5) when the accused himself waives his right against unreasonable searches
and seizures.[22] The search made in the case at bar falls under the fourth
exception. We held in People vs. Doria:[23]
Objects falling in plain view of an officer who has a right to be in a position to have that
view are subject to seizure even without a search warrant and may be introduced in
evidence. The 'plain view' doctrine applies when the following requisites concur: (a) the
law enforcement officer in search of the evidence has a prior justification for an
intrusion or is in a position from which he can view a particular area; (b) the discovery of
evidence in plain view is inadvertent; (c) it is immediately apparent to the officer that the
item he observes may be evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise subject to
seizure. The law enforcement officer must lawfully make an initial intrusion or properly
be in a position from which he can particularly view the area. In the course of such
lawful intrusion, he came inadvertently across a piece of evidence incriminating the
accused. The object must be open to eye and hand and its discovery inadvertent.
The facts show that while the van was traversing Don Antonio Avenue in Quezon
City, it accidentally hit a seven-year old ambulant vendor. The van stopped and the
owner got off to bring the boy to the hospital. A police officer who witnessed the
accident approached the van to apprehend the driver for reckless imprudence. As he
stood near the van, he saw through the lightly tinted window of the van several sacks
placed at the back of the van. One of the sacks was open, revealing several plastic
bags containing white crystalline substance which the police suspected to be
shabu. Clearly, the prohibited substance was within the plain view of the police officer
who was in a position to be near the van at the time. The substance is therefore not a
product of an illegal search and not inadmissible as evidence.
PEOPLE vs. VALDEZ
(plain view)
SPO3 Marcelo Tipay, testified that at around 10:15 a.m. of September 24, 1996,
he received a tip from an unnamed informer about the presence of a marijuana
plantation, allegedly owned by appellant Abe Valdez. The prohibited plants were
allegedly planted close to appellant's hut. Police Inspector Alejandro R. Parungao, then
formed a reaction team from his operatives to verify the report.
At approximately 5:00 o'clock A.M. the following day, said police team,
accompanied by their informer, left for the site where the marijuana plants were
allegedly being grown. The police operatives arrived at the place pinpointed by their
informant. The police found appellant alone in his nipa hut. They, then, proceeded to
look around the area where appellant had his kaingin and saw seven (7) five-foot high,
flowering marijuana plants in two rows, approximately 25 meters from appellant's
hut.[5]PO2 Balut asked appellant who owned the prohibited plants and, according to
Balut, the latter admitted that they were his. [6] The police uprooted the seven marijuana
plants. The police took photos of appellant standing beside the cannabis
plants.[8] Appellant was then arrested.
Appellant contends that there was unlawful search. First, the records show that
the law enforcers had more than ample time to secure a search warrant. Second, that
the marijuana plants were found in an unfenced lot does not remove appellant from the
mantle of protection against unreasonable searches and seizures.
The Office of the Solicitor General argues that the records clearly show that there
was no search made by the police team, in the first place. The OSG points out that the
marijuana plants in question were grown in an unfenced lot and as each grew about
five (5) feet tall, they were visible from afar, and were, in fact, immediately spotted by
the police officers when they reached the site. The seized marijuana plants were, thus,
in plain view of the police officers. The instant case must, therefore, be treated as a
warrantless lawful search under the "plain view" doctrine
ISSUE: (1) Was the search and seizure of the marijuana plants in the
present case lawful?
(2) Were the seized plants admissible in evidence against the accused?
HELD: NO.
The Constitution lays down the general rule that a search and seizure must be
carried on the strength of a judicial warrant. Otherwise, the search and seizure is
deemed "unreasonable." Evidence procured on the occasion of an unreasonable
search and seizure is deemed tainted for being the proverbial fruit of a poisonous tree
and should be excluded.[32]Such evidence shall be inadmissible in evidence for any
purpose in any proceeding.[33]
In the instant case, there was no search warrant issued by a judge after personal
determination of the existence of probable cause. From the declarations of the police
officers themselves, it is clear that they had at least one (1) day to obtain a warrant to
search appellant's farm. Their informant had revealed his name to them. The place
where the cannabis plants were planted was pinpointed. From the information in their
possession, they could have convinced a judge that there was probable cause to justify
the issuance of a warrant. But they did not. Instead, they uprooted the plants and
apprehended the accused on the excuse that the trip was a good six hours and
inconvenient to them. We need not underscore that the protection against illegal search
and seizure is constitutionally mandated and only under specific instances are searches
allowed without warrants.[34] The mantle of protection extended by the Bill of Rights
covers both innocent and guilty alike against any form of high-handedness of law
enforcers, regardless of the praiseworthiness of their intentions.
We find no reason to subscribe to Solicitor General's contention that we apply the
"plain view" doctrine. For the doctrine to apply, the following elements must be present:
(a) a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the
police are legally present in the pursuit of their official duties;
(b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who have the
right to be where they are; and
(c) the evidence must be immediately apparent; and
(d) plain view justified mere seizure of evidence without further search. [35]
In the instant case, recall that PO2 Balut testified that they first located the
marijuana plants before appellant was arrested without a warrant. [36] Hence, there was
no valid warrantless arrest which preceded the search of appellant's premises. Note
further that the police team was dispatched to appellant's kaingin precisely to search for
and uproot the prohibited flora. The seizure of evidence in "plain view" applies only
where the police officer is not searching for evidence against the accused, but
inadvertently comes across an incriminating object. [37] Clearly, their discovery of the
cannabis plants was not inadvertent. We also note the testimony of SPO2 Tipay that
upon arriving at the area, they first had to "look around the area" before they could spot
the illegal plants.[38] Patently, the seized marijuana plants were not "immediately
apparent" and a "further search" was needed. In sum, the marijuana plants in question
were not in "plain view" or "open to eye and hand." The "plain view" doctrine, thus,
cannot be made to apply.
Nor can we sustain the trial court's conclusion that just because the marijuana
plants were found in an unfenced lot, appellant could not invoke the protection afforded
by the Charter against unreasonable searches by agents of the State. The right against
unreasonable searches and seizures is the immunity of one's person, which includes
his residence, his papers, and other possessions. [39] The guarantee refers to "the right
of personal security"[40] of the individual. As appellant correctly points out, what is
sought to be protected against the State's unlawful intrusion are persons, not
places.[41] To conclude otherwise would not only mean swimming against the stream, it
would also lead to the absurd logic that for a person to be immune against
unreasonable searches and seizures, he must be in his home or office, within a fenced
yard or a private place. The Bill of Rights belongs as much to the person in the street as
to the individual in the sanctuary of his bedroom.
We therefore hold, with respect to the first issue, that the confiscated plants were
evidently obtained during an illegal search and seizure. As to the second issue, which
involves the admissibility of the marijuana plants as evidence for the prosecution, we
find that said plants cannot, as products of an unlawful search and seizure, be used as
evidence against appellant.They are fruits of the proverbial poisoned tree. It was,
therefore, a reversible error on the part of the court a quo to have admitted and relied
upon the seized marijuana plants as evidence to convict appellant.
PEOPLE vs. ANTONIO C. ESTELLA
(plain view)
Prior to November 20, 1996, a warrant was issued for the conduct of a search and
seizure in the residence of appellant at Purok Yakal, Barangay Baloganon, Masinloc,
Zambales.
In the morning of November 20, 1996, Senior Police Officer 1 (SPO1) Antonio Bulor[o]n
et.al enforced the search warrant. Barangay Captain Barnaceha accompanied the
police officers to the place mentioned in the search warrant.
On their way to Purok Yakal, SPO1 Buloron saw appellant sitting on a rocking chair
located about two (2) meters away from a hut owned by Narding Estella, brother of
appellant, and being rented by appellants live-in partner, named Eva. They approached
appellant and introduced themselves as police officers. They showed appellant the
search warrant and explained the contents to him. SPO1 Buloron asked appellant if
indeed he had in his possession prohibited drug and if so, to surrender the same so he
would deserve a lesser penalty.
While inside the hut, appellant surrendered to the team two cans containing dried
marijuana fruiting tops. One can contained twenty (20) bricks of fruiting tops. The team
searched the hut in the presence of appellant and his live-in partner. They found a
plastic container under the kitchen table, which contained four (4) big bricks of dried
marijuana leaves and a .38 caliber revolver with four live ammunitions.The team seized
the prohibited drug, the revolver and ammunitions. The team seized and signed a
receipt for the seized items. Barangay Captain Barnachea and SPO1 Edgar Bermudez
of the Masinloc Police Station also signed the receipt as witnesses. SPO1 Buloron and
his companions arrested appellant and brought him to San Marcelino, Zambales.
Appellant claims that the hut,[14] which was searched by the police and where the
subject marijuana was recovered, does not belong to him. He points to another
house[15] as his real residence. To support his claim, he presents a document [16] that
shows that the subject hut was sold to his brother Leonardo C. Estella by one Odilon
Eclarinal. The OSG, on the other hand, argues that just because appellant has another
house in a place away from the hut that was searched does not necessarily mean that
the hut is not occupied by him or under his full control. [17] The prosecution cites the
testimony of Rey Barnachea, the barangay captain of that place, to show that the hut in
question belongs to appellant.
ISSUE: Whether or not the search and seizure was valid.
HELD: No. The OSG argues that [e]ven assuming that appellant was not the occupant
of the hut, the fact remains that he voluntarily surrendered the marijuana to the police
officers. After appellant had surrendered the prohibited stuff, the police had a right to
arrest him even without a warrant and to conduct a search of the immediate vicinity of
the arrestee for weapons and other unlawful objects as an incident to the lawful
arrest.[31]
The above argument assumes that the prosecution was able to prove that
appellant had voluntarily surrendered the marijuana to the police officers. As earlier
adverted to, there is no convincing proof that he indeed surrendered the prohibited
drug, whether voluntarily or otherwise. In fact, the testimony of Prosecution Witness
Barnachea clouds rather than clarifies the prosecutions story.
Given this backdrop, the police authorities cannot claim that the search was
incident to a lawful arrest. Such a search presupposes a lawful or valid arrest and can
only be invoked through Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure, which we quote:
SEC. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful - A peace officer or a private person may,
without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe
based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested
has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined
while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement
to another.
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) above, the person arrested without a
warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail and shall be
proceeded against in accordance with Section 7 Rule 112.
Never was it proven that appellant, who was the person to be arrested, was in
possession of the subject prohibited drug during the search. It follows, therefore, that
there was no way of knowing if he had committed or was actually committing an offense
in the presence of the arresting officers. Without that knowledge, there could have been
no search incident to a lawful arrest.
Assuming arguendo that appellant was indeed committing an offense in the
presence of the arresting officers, and that the arrest without a warrant was lawful, it still
cannot be said that the search conducted was within the confines of the law. Searches
and seizures incident to lawful arrests are governed by Section 12, Rule 126 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which reads:
Section 12. Search incident to lawful arrest. A person lawfully arrested may be
searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may have been used or constitute
proof in the commission of an offense without a search warrant.
However, the scope of the search should be limited to the area within which the
person to be arrested can reach for a weapon or for evidence that he or she can
destroy.[32] The prevailing rule is that the arresting officer may take from the arrested
individual any money or property found upon the latters person -- that which was used
in the commission of the crime or was the fruit of the crime, or which may provide the
prisoner with the means of committing violence or escaping, or which may be used in
evidence in the trial of the case
The purpose of the exception is to protect the arresting officer from being harmed
by the person being arrested, who might be armed with a concealed weapon, and to
prevent the latter from destroying evidence within reach. The exception, therefore,
should not be strained beyond what is needed to serve its purpose. [36]
In the case before us, searched was the entire hut, which cannot be said to have
been within appellants immediate control. Thus, the search exceeded the bounds of
that which may be considered to be incident to a lawful arrest.
PEOPLE vs. ARMANDO COMPACION
(Consented Search)
Acting on a confidential tip supplied by a police informant that accused-appellant
Armando S. Compacion was growing and cultivating marijuana plants, SPO1 Gilbert L.
Linda and SPO2 Basilio Sarong conducted a surveillance of the residence of accused-
appellant who was then the barangay captain of barangay Bagonbon, San Carlos City,
Negros Occidental on July 9, 1995. During the said surveillance, they saw two (2) tall
plants in the backyard of the accused-appellant which they suspected to be marijuana
plants.[4]
SPO1 Linda and SPO2 Sarong reported the result of their surveillance and a team
was formed immediately.
On July 12, 1995, the team applied for a search warrant with the office of
Executive Judge Bernardo Ponferrada in Bacolod City. However, Judge Ponferrada
informed them that he did not have territorial jurisdiction over the matter. [5] The team
then left Bacolod City for San Carlos City. They arrived there around six-thirty in the
evening, then went to the house of Executive Judge Roberto S. Javellana to secure a
search warrant. They were not able to do so because it was nighttime and office hours
were obviously over. They were told by the judge to go back in the morning. [6]
Nonetheless, the team proceeded to barangay Bagonbon and arrived at the
residence of accused-appellant in the early morning of July 13, 1995. SPO4 Villamor
knocked at the gate and called out for the accused-appellant. The prosecution
contends that the accused-appellant opened the gate and permitted them to come
in. He was immediately asked by SPO4 Villamor about the suspected marijuana plants
and he admitted that he planted and cultivated the same for the use of his wife who
was suffering from migraine. SPO4 Villamor then told him that he would be charged for
violation of Section 9 of R.A. No. 6425 and informed him of his constitutional rights. The
operatives then uprooted the suspected marijuana plants. SPO1 Linda conducted an
initial field test of the plants by using the Narcotics Drug Identification Kit. The test
yielded a positive result.[7]
On his part, accused-appellant .he heard somebody knocking outside his
house. He went down bringing with him a flashlight. After he opened the gate, four (4)
persons who he thought were members of the military, entered the premises then went
inside the house. . One of the four men told him to sit in the living room. Some of the
men went upstairs while the others went around the house. None of them asked for his
permission to search his house and the premises.
ISSUE:
HELD: The relevant constitutional provisions are found in Sections 2 and 3 [2],
Article III of the 1987 Constitution which read as follows:
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose shall be inviolable
Sec. 3. xxx
(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
Said constitutional provisions are safeguards against reckless, malicious and
unreasonable invasion of privacy and liberty.
A search and seizure, therefore, must be carried out through or with a judicial
warrant; otherwise, such search and seizure becomes unreasonable within the
meaning of the constitutional provision.Evidence secured thereby, i.e., the fruits of the
search and seizure, will be inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any proceeding.
The requirement that a warrant must be obtained from the proper judicial authority
prior to the conduct of a search and seizure is, however, not absolute. There are
several instances when the law recognizes exceptions, such as when the owner of the
premises consents or voluntarily submits to a search; when the owner of the premises
waives his right against such incursion; when the search is incidental to a lawful
arrest; when it is made on vessels and aircraft for violation of customs laws: when it is
made on automobiles for the purpose of preventing violations of smuggling or
immigration laws; when it involves prohibited articles in plain view; when it involves a
stop and frisk situation; when the search is under exigent and emergency
circumstances; or in cases of inspection of buildings and other premises for the
enforcement of fire, sanitary and building regulations. In these instances, a search may
be validly made even without a warrant.
In the instant case, the search and seizure conducted by the composite team in
the house of accused-appellant was not authorized by a search warrant. It does not
appear either that the situation falls under any of the above mentioned
cases. Consequently, accused-appellants right against unreasonable search and
seizure was clearly violated.
It is extant from the records that accused-appellant did not consent to the
warrantless search and seizure conducted. While the right to be secure from
unreasonable search and seizure may, like every right, be waived either expressly or
impliedly,[27] such waiver must constitute a valid waiver made voluntarily, knowingly and
intelligently. The act of the accused-appellant in allowing the members of the military to
enter his premises and his consequent silence during the unreasonable search and
seizure could not be construed as voluntary submission or an implied acquiescence to
warrantless search and seizure especially so when members of the raiding team were
intimidatingly numerous and heavily armed. His implied acquiescence, if any, could not
have been more than mere passive conformity given under coercive or intimidating
circumstances and is, thus, considered no consent at all within the purview of the
constitutional guarantee. Consequently, herein accused-appellants lack of objection to
the search and seizure is not tantamount to a waiver of his constitutional right or a
voluntary submission to the warrantless search and seizure. [28] The case of People v.
Burgos,[29] is instructive. In Burgos, the Court ruled that the accused is not to be
presumed to have waived the unlawful search simply because he failed to object.
There, we held:
xxx To constitute a waiver, it must appear first that the right exists; secondly, that the
person involved had knowledge, actual or constructive, of the existence of such a right;
and lastly, that said person had an actual intention to relinquish the right (Pasion Vda.
De Garcia v. Locsin, 65 Phil. 689). The fact that the accused failed to object to the entry
into his house does not amount to a permission to make a search therein (Magoncia v.
Palacio, 80 Phil. 770). As pointed out by Justice Laurel in the case of Pasion Vda. De
Garcia v. Locsin (supra);
xxx xxx xxx
x x x As the constitutional guaranty is not dependent upon any affirmative act of the
citizen, the courts do not place the citizen in the position of either contesting an officers
authority by force, or waiving his constitutional rights; but instead they hold that a
peaceful submission to a search or seizure is not a consent or an invitation thereto, but
is merely a demonstration of regard for the supremacy of the law.
We apply the rule that: courts indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver of
fundamental constitutional rights and that we do not presume acquiescence in the loss
of fundamental rights.
THE PEOPLE vs. JERRY TING UY
(search incidental to a lawful arrest)
Appellant Jerry Ting Uy, a Taiwanese national, was charged on July 24, 1998 for
violating the Dangerous Drugs Act.
The record shows that at around 3:30 in the afternoon of July 21, 1998, a
Chinese-Filipino police informant went to the Western Police headquarters in Ermita to
inform the police officers that a certain Jerry Ting Uy was engaged in illegal drug
activities in Sta. Cruz, Manila. PO3 Chico asked the police informant to contact
appellant and to negotiate with him for the purchase of shabu. The police informant
called up appellant at about 5 oclock in the afternoon, and they agreed that appellant
would deliver half a kilo of shabu to the informant for P200,000.00 at 6:30 in the
evening of that same day.
Police officers, led by SPO2 Rodolfo Rival, then planned a buy-bust operation for
the entrapment of appellant. Eight genuine P500.00 bills, marked with the letter C, were
prepared. These marked P500.00 bills were then placed at the top and at the bottom of
four bundles of bogus money. The police designated PO3 Chico to be the poseur-
buyer.
At around 6 oclock in the evening, 13 police officers left the police station and
proceeded to the designated meeting place. Ten minutes later, appellant arrived on
board a green Mitsubishi Lancer. Appellant stopped in front of the police informant and
PO3 Chico, rolled down the window of his car, and talked to the police informant in
Chinese. The police informant then told PO3 Chico to board appellants car. PO3 Chico
slid into the front passenger seat while the police informant sat at the backseat of the
car.
Appellant then asked for the payment of half a kilo of shabu. PO3 Chico handed
the marked money to appellant. Appellant reached down under his seat, took a plastic
bag and gave it to PO3 Chico. When PO3 Chico opened the plastic bag, he saw a
transparent plastic bag containing substance which he suspected to be shabu.
At this point, PO3 Chico introduced himself as a police officer and immediately
arrested appellant. PO3 Chico then retrieved the marked money from appellants
lap. Thereafter, PO3 Chico inspected the space underneath the drivers seat and found
three more plastic bags containing suspected shabu. After Chicos arrest of appellant,
SPO2 Rival arrived and informed appellant of his constitutional rights. Appellant was
then brought to the WPD headquarters.
Appellants contention: that the shabu seized from him is inadmissible in evidence
ISSUE:
HELD: Appellant was arrested by virtue of a buy-bust operation conducted by the
Drug Enforcement Unit of the Western Police District. A buy-bust operation is a form of
entrapment whereby ways and means are resorted to for the purpose of trapping and
capturing lawbreakers in the execution of their criminal plans. It is a procedure or
operation sanctioned by law and which has consistently proven itself to be an effective
method of apprehending drug peddlers. Thus, unless there is a clear and convincing
evidence that the members of the buy-bust team were inspired by improper motives or
were not properly performing their duties, their testimony on the operation deserves full
faith and credit
In this case, the evidence shows that it was the police informant who initially
contacted and arranged a drug deal with appellant. At the pre-arranged meeting, the
informant was accompanied by PO3 Chico, who posed as a buyer of shabu. PO3 Chico
handed marked money to appellant as payment for half a kilo of shabu. Appellant was
then arrested when he handed a plastic bag containing shabu to PO3 Chico.
In the same vein, appellants contention that the 1,510.8 grams of shabu seized
from him is inadmissible in evidence must also be rejected. The Constitution generally
proscribes searches and seizures without judicial warrant. Any evidence obtained
without such warrant is inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding (Sections 2 and
3(2), Article III). The rule is not absolute, however. Searches and seizures may be
made without warrant and the evidence obtained therefrom may be admissible in the
following instances: (1) the search was incident to a lawful arrest; (2) the search is of a
moving motor vehicle; (3) the search concerns violation of customs laws; (4) the seizure
of evidence in plain view; and (5) when the accused himself waives his right against
unreasonable searches and seizures (People vs. Doria, 301 SCRA 668 [1999]).
Clearly, the search made by the police officers in the instant case was incidental
to a lawful arrest. Section 13, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
explicitly states that a person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous
weapons or anything which may have been used or constitute proof in the commission
of an offense without a search warrant. Undoubtedly, appellant was lawfully arrested,
caught as he was in flagrante delicto as a result of a buy-bust operation conducted by
police officers.
A buy-bust operation is vastly different from an ordinary arrest. In lawful arrests in
the course of a buy-bust operation, it becomes both the duty and the right of the
apprehending officers to conduct a warrantless search not only on the person of the
accused but also in the permissible area within his reach, i.e., that point which is within
the effective control of the person arrested, or that which may furnish him the means of
committing violence or of escaping (People vs. Cueno, 298 SCRA 621 [1998]). In other
words, a warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest may extend beyond the person
of the one arrested to include the premises or surroundings under his immediate
control. In this case, the three plastic bags containing a total of 1,500 grams of shabu
were seized inside the car where appellant himself was arrested.
PEOPLE vs. FERDINAND GUENO
(incidental to a lawful search)
On January 25, 1995, an asset accompanied P01 AVELINO CAMANTIGUE
and pointed to the house of the accused FERDINAND CUENO. Upon instructions of
their commanding officer, PO1 CAMANTIGUE together with SPO1 AQUILINO
SARMIENTO and P02 EDWIN MOJICA conducted surveillance operations on the
alleged drug pushing activities of accused FERDINAND GUENO at around 9:30 in the
morning of January 26, 1995. P01 CAMANTIGUE who posed as a newspaper vendor
observed from a distance of 15 meters from the store of FERDIE CUENO that a person
was handing money to said accused and FERDIE in turn gave something to the person
who immediately inserted the same in his pocket. CAMANTIGUE allegedly overheard
FERDIE saying: 'hindi ka lugi sa halagang P20.00 at iyan ay malakas.' At that time
SARMIENTO and MOJICA passed by CAMANTIGUE who removed his cap as a signal
that the sale was already consummated. After this, the group returned to their station,
and reported the result of their surveillance to their commanding officer who instructed
them to apply for a search warrant.
"On January 30, 1995, a search warrant was issued. Said search warrant
ordered the search of the premises of one PETER DOE alias FERDIE and the seizure
of dried marijuana leaves allegedly in the possession of aforesaid person.
"After the search warrant was issued, the team hatched a plan that a buy-bust
operation be conducted on the accused first before the implementation of the search
warrant. It was agreed that P01 CAMANTIGUE will be accompanied by their informant
who will introduce the former to FERDIE as a user who is interested in buying
marijuana.
At about 3:30 that same afternoon, a team of policemen together with their informant,
proceeded to where accused resides. Upon arrival thereat, as planned, the informant
introduced CAMANTIGUE to FERDIE as a user who wants to buy marijuana. FERDIE
at that time was standing by the door of his store which is just an extension of the
house where he was staying.
The marijuana worth P150.00 was handed to CAMANTIGUE. He then removed his cap
as a signal to his companions that the sale has been consummated. SPO1
SARMIENTO, P02 MOJICA and his companions approached them and they identified
themselves as policemen. They then arrested FERDIE.
FLORY (wife) was asked to go out of the store, and the policemen announced to the
couple that they had with them a search warrant for the search and seizure of
marijuana in the premises of both accused. Before the raiders proceeded to search the
house of the accused, they called for barangay officials in the area to witness the
conduct of the search.
Inside the bedroom of the accused, SPO1 SARMIENTO found a balikbayan
box which contained dirty clothes, a brick of dried flowering tops of marijuana wrapped
in a newspaper and twenty one (21) plastic tea bags containing dried flowering tops of
marijuana together with rolling papers.
Appellant would question his conviction in Criminal Case No. 38-
95(possession and control of a prohibited drug) allegedly because of the illegality of the
search made in his house.
ISSUE:
HELD: The arrest of appellant has been made in the course of a buy-bust
operation, thus, in flagrante delicto.
A buy-bust operation - a form of entrapment which has repeatedly been
accepted to be a valid means of arresting violators of the Dangerous Drugs Law [15] - is
far variant from an ordinary arrest. In lawful arrests, it becomes both the duty and the
right of the apprehending officers to conduct a warrantless search not only on the
person of the suspect but also in the permissible area within his reach, i.e., that point
which is within the effective control of the person arrested, or that which may furnish
him with the means of committing violence or of escaping.
PEOPLE vs. EUGENIO CATAN,
(incident to a lawful arrest)
The facts follow: On 8 April 1989, the Special Action Team, NARCOM, headed
by Lt. Maximo Valiente, decided to conduct a "buy-bust" operation. A team of
operatives was dispatched to the place at around 10:30 to 11:45 a.m. on said date.
Two (2) members of the team, acting as poseur-buyers, sought out Appellant at the
said address. Inside the latter's house, they negotiated for the purchase of 300 grams
of marijuana worth P450.00.
In the meantime, the other members of the team positioned themselves
outside. Crisostomo and Bascuna gave the amount of P500.00 to Appellant.
Soon after receiving the marijuana from Appellant, Crisostomo and Bascuna
went out of the house and gave a pre-arranged signal to their companions who were
waiting outside. The other team members rushed inside the house and arrested
Appellant. Appellant, however, was able to pass the marked bills to a companion inside
the house who was able to escape during the commotion that ensued. The marked bills
were never recovered.
Immediately thereafter, the NARCOM team conducted a search of the premises in the
presence of barangay official, Jess Abundo, a certain Mrs. Catan, the house owner,
and Appellant finding more marijuanas.
ISSUE:
HELD: Appellant's assertion that he was illegally arrested and that the search of his
premises was likewise illegal is not well taken. Appellant was arrested in flagrante
delicto in the act of selling and delivering marijuana to the poseur-buyers. His case
therefore falls under the category of a valid warrantless arrest (Sec. 5, Rule 113, 1985
Rules on Criminal Procedure).
The subsequent search of his house which immediately followed yielding other
incriminating evidence, and which became the basis of his conviction for possession of
a prohibited drug, was a search contemporaneously made and as an incident to a valid
warrantless arrest in the immediate vicinity where the arrest was made. That is a
recognized exception to the general rule that any search and seizure must be
supported by a valid warrant. The inclusion of the seized items, therefore, as evidence
for the prosecution, was in conformity with the provision on lawful searches.
THE PEOPLE vs. NILO SOLAYAO
(stop and frisk)
Accused-appellant Nilo Solayao was charged with the crime of illegal possession
of firearm and ammunition.
SPO3 Jose Nio, narrated that at about 9:00 o'clock in the evening of July 9, 1992,
with 2 CAFGU members, he went to Barangay Caulangohan, Caibiran, Biliran. They
were to conduct an intelligence patrol as required of them by their intelligence officer to
verify reports on the presence of armed persons roaming around the barangays of
Caibiran. They met the group of accused-appellant Nilo Solaya. The former became
suspicious when they observed that the latter were drunk and that accused-appellant
himself was wearing a camouflage uniform or a jungle suit.
Police Officer Nio told accused-appellant not to run away and introduced himself
as "PC," after which he seized the dried coconut leaves which the latter was carrying
and found wrapped in it a 49-inch long homemade firearm locally known as
"latong." When he asked accused-appellant who issued him a license to carry said
firearm or whether he was connected with the military or any intelligence group, the
latter answered that he had no permission to possess the same. Thereupon, SPO3 Nio
confiscated the firearm and turned him over to the custody of the policeman of Caibiran
who subsequently investigated him and charged him with illegal possession of
firearm.[4]
Accused-appellant argued that the trial court erred in admitting the subject firearm
in evidence as it was the product of an unlawful warrantless search. He maintained that
the search made on his person violated his constitutional right to be secure in his
person and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures.
Hence, the search being unlawful, the homemade firearm confiscated from him is
inadmissible in evidence for being "the fruit of the poisonous tree." [11] As such, the
prosecution's case must necessarily fail and the accused-appellant acquitted.
ISSUE:
HELD: The circumstances in this case are similar to those obtaining in Posadas v.
Court of Appeals[15] where this Court held that "at the time the peace officers identified
themselves and apprehended the petitioner as he attempted to flee, they did not know
that he had committed, or was actually committing the offense of illegal possession of
firearm and ammunitions. They just suspected that he was hiding something in the buri
bag. They did not know what its contents were. The said circumstances did not justify
an arrest without a warrant."
This Court, nevertheless, ruled that the search and seizure in the Posadas case
brought about by the suspicious conduct of Posadas himself can be likened to a "stop
and frisk" situation. There was a probable cause to conduct a search even before an
arrest could be made.
In the present case, after SPO3 Nino told accused-appellant not to run away, the
former identified himself as a government agent. [16] The peace officers did not know
that he had committed, or was actually committing, the offense of illegal possession of
firearm. Tasked with verifying the report that there were armed men roaming around in
the barangays surrounding Caibiran, their attention was understandably drawn to the
group that had aroused their suspicion. They could not have known that the object
wrapped in coconut leaves which accused-appellant was carrying hid a firearm.
As with Posadas, the case at bar constitutes an instance where a search and
seizure may be effected without first making an arrest. There was justifiable cause to
"stop and frisk" accused-appellant when his companions fled upon seeing the
government agents. Under the circumstances, the government agents could not
possibly have procured a search warrant first.
Thus, there was no violation of the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable
searches and seizures. Nor was there error on the part of the trial court when it
admitted the homemade firearm as evidence.
People of the Philippines vs Mikael Malmstedt
(Stop and frisk)
Accused Mikael Malmstedt, a tourist Swedish national went to a bus stop in
Sagada to catch the first available trip to Baguio City. From Baguio City, accused
planned to take a late afternoon trip to Angeles City, then proceed to Manila to catch
his flight out of the country, scheduled on 13 May 1989. From Sagada, accused took a
Skyline bus.
At about 8: 00 o'clock in the morning of that same day (11 May 1989), Captain
Alen Vasco, the Commanding Officer of the First Regional Command (NARCOM)
stationed at Camp Dangwa, ordered his men to set up a temporary checkpoint at
Kilometer 14, Acop, Tublay, Mountain Province, for the purpose of checking all vehicles
coming from the Cordillera Region. The order to establish a checkpoint in the said area
was prompted by persistent reports that vehicles coming from Sagada were
transporting marijuana and other prohibited drugs. Moreover, information was received
by the Commanding Officer of NARCOM, that same morning, that a Caucasian coming
from Sagada had in his possession prohibited drugs.2
The group set up a checkpoint at the designated area at about 10:00 o'clock in
the morning and inspected all vehicles coming from the Cordillera Region.
At about 1:30 o'clock in the afternoon, the bus where accused was riding was
stopped. Sgt. Fider and CIC Galutan boarded the bus and announced that they were
members of the NARCOM and that they would conduct an inspection. The two (2)
NARCOM officers started their inspection from the front going towards the rear of the
bus. Accused who was the sole foreigner riding the bus was seated at the rear thereof.
During the inspection, CIC Galutan noticed a bulge on accused's waist.
Suspecting the bulge on accused's waist to be a gun, the officer asked for accused's
passport and other identification papers. When accused failed to comply, the officer
required him to bring out whatever it was that was bulging on his waist. The bulging
object turned out to be a pouch bag and when accused opened the same bag, as
ordered, the officer noticed four (4) suspicious-looking objects wrapped in brown
packing tape, prompting the officer to open one of the wrapped objects. The wrapped
objects turned out to contain hashish, a derivative of marijuana.
Thereafter, accused was invited outside the bus for questioning. But before he alighted
from the bus, accused stopped to get two (2) travelling bags from the luggage carrier.
Upon stepping out of the bus, the officers got the bags and opened them. A teddy bear
was found in each bag. Feeling the teddy bears, the officer noticed that there were
bulges inside the same which did not feel like foam stuffing. It was only after the officers
had opened the bags that accused finally presented his passport.
Accused was then brought to the headquarters of the NARCOM at Camp Dangwa, La
Trinidad, Benguet for further investigation. At the investigation room, the officers
opened the teddy bears and they were found to also contain hashish.
Seeking the reversal of the decision of the trial court finding him guilty of the crime
charged, accused argues that the search of his personal effects was illegal because it
was made without a search warrant and, therefore, the prohibited drugs which were
discovered during the illegal search are not admissible as evidence against him.
ISSUE
HELD: It must be observed that, at first, the NARCOM officers merely conducted a
routine check of the bus (where accused was riding) and the passengers therein, and
no extensive search was initially made. It was only when one of the officers noticed a
bulge on the waist of accused, during the course of the inspection, that accused was
required to present his passport. The failure of accused to present his identification
papers, when ordered to do so, only managed to arouse the suspicion of the officer that
accused was trying to hide his identity. For is it not a regular norm for an innocent man,
who has nothing to hide from the authorities, to readily present his identification papers
when required to do so?
The receipt of information by NARCOM that a Caucasian coming from Sagada
had prohibited drugs in his possession, plus the suspicious failure of the accused to
produce his passport, taken together as a whole, led the NARCOM officers to
reasonably believe that the accused was trying to hide something illegal from the
authorities. From these circumstances arose a probable cause which justified the
warrantless search that was made on the personal effects of the accused. In other
words, the acts of the NARCOM officers in requiring the accused to open his pouch bag
and in opening one of the wrapped objects found inside said bag (which was
discovered to contain hashish) as well as the two (2) travelling bags containing two (2)
teddy bears with hashish stuffed inside them, were prompted by accused's own attempt
to hide his identity by refusing to present his passport, and by the information received
by the NARCOM that a Caucasian coming from Sagada had prohibited drugs in his
possession. To deprive the NARCOM agents of the ability and facility to act
accordingly, including, to search even without warrant, in the light of such
circumstances, would be to sanction impotence and ineffectiveness in law enforcement,
to the detriment of society.
Manalili v CA
(stop and frisk)
At about 2:10 PM on April 11, 1988, Police Anti-Narcotics Unit of Kalookan City
conducted surveillance along A. Mabini Street, in front of the Kalookan City Cemetery.
This was done after receiving information that drug addicts were roaming around said
area.
Upon reaching the cemetery, the policemen chanced upon a male person, the
petitioner, in front of the cemetery who appeared high on drugs. The petitioner had
reddish eyes and was walking in a swaying manner.
Petitioner was trying to avoid the policemen, but the officers were able to introduce
themselves and asked him what he was holding in his hands. Petitioner resisted.
Policeman Espiritu asked him if he could see what the petitioner had in his hands. The
petitioner showed his wallet and allowed the officer to examine it. Policeman Espiritu
found suspected crushed marijuana residue inside. He kept the wallet and its marijuana
contents and took petitioner to headquarters to be further investigated.
The suspected marijuana was sent to the NBI Forensic Chemistry Section for analysis.
Issue: Whether or not the search and seizure of the suspected marijuana is
unreasonable, and hence inadmissible as evidence.
Held: Stop-and-frisk has already been adopted as another exception to the general rule
against a search without a warrant. In Posadas vs. Court of Appeals ,[24] the Court held
that there are many instances where a search and seizure can be effected without
necessarily being preceded by an arrest, one of which is stop-and-frisk. In said case,
members of the Integrated National Police of Davao stopped petitioner, who was
carrying a buri bag and acting suspiciously. They found inside petitioners bag one .38-
cal. revolver with two rounds of live ammunition, two live ammunitions for a .22-cal. gun
and a tear gas grenade. In upholding the legality of the search, the Court said that to
require the police officers to search the bag only after they had obtained a search
warrant might prove to be useless, futile and much too late under the circumstances. In
such a situation, it was reasonable for a police officer to stop a suspicious individual
briefly in order to determine his identity or to maintain the status quo while obtaining
more information, rather than to simply shrug his shoulders and allow a crime to occur.
In the case at hand, Patrolman Espiritu and his companions observed during their
surveillance that appellant had red eyes and was wobbling like a drunk along the
Caloocan City Cemetery, which according to police information was a popular hangout
of drug addicts. From his experience as a member of the Anti-Narcotics Unit of the
Caloocan City Police, such suspicious behavior was characteristic of drug addicts who
were high. The policemen therefore had sufficient reason to stop petitioner to
investigate if he was actually high on drugs.
PEOPLE vs.ROLANDO DE GRACIA
(Under exigent and emergency cirmustances)
The incidents involved in this case took place at the height of the coup d' etat staged in
December, 1989 by ultra-rightist elements headed by the Reform the Armed Forces
Movement-Soldiers of the Filipino People (RAM-SFP) against the Government.
Accused-appellant Rolando de Gracia was charged in two separate informations for
illegal possession of ammunition and explosives in furtherance of rebellion.
The records show that in the early morning of December 1, 1989, Maj. Efren Soria of
the Intelligence Division, National Capital Region Defense Command, was on board a
brown Toyota car conducting a surveillance of the Eurocar Sales Office located at
Epifanio de los Santos Avenue in Quezon City, together with his team composed of
Sgt. Crispin Sagario, M/Sgt. Ramon Briones, S/Sgt. Henry Aquino, one S/Sgt. Simon
and a Sgt. Ramos. The surveillance, which actually started on the night of November
30, 1989 at around 10:00 P.M., was conducted pursuant to an intelligence report
received by the division that said establishment was being occupied by elements of the
RAM-SFP as a communication command post.
Sgt. Crispin Sagario, the driver of the car, parked the vehicle around ten to fifteen
meters away from the Eurocar building near P. Tuazon Street, S/Sgt. Henry Aquino had
earlier alighted from the car to conduct his surveillance on foot. A crowd was then
gathered near the Eurocar office watching the on-going bombardment near Camp
Aguinaldo. After a while, a group of five men disengaged themselves from the crowd
and walked towards the car of the surveillance team. At that moment, Maj. Soria, who
was then seated in front, saw the approaching group and immediately ordered Sgt.
Sagario to start the car and leave the area. As they passed by the group, then only six
meters away, the latter pointed to them, drew their guns and fired at the team, which
attack resulted in the wounding of Sgt. Sagario on the right thigh. Nobody in the
surveillance team was able to retaliate because they sought cover inside the car and
they were afraid that civilians or bystanders might be caught in the cross-fire.
As a consequence, at around 6:30 A.M. of December 5, 1989, a searching team
composed of F/Lt. Virgilio Babao as team leader, M/Sgt. Lacdao, Sgt. Magallion, Sgt.
Patricio Pacatang, and elements of the 16th Infantry Battalion under one Col. delos
Santos raided the Eurocar Sales Office. They were able to find and confiscate six
cartons of M-16 ammunition, five bundles of C-4 dynamites, M-shells of different
calibers, and "molotov" bombs inside one of the rooms belonging to a certain Col.
Matillano which is located at the right portion of the building. Sgt. Oscar Obenia, the first
one to enter the Eurocar building, saw appellant De Gracia inside the office of Col.
Matillano, holding a C-4 and suspiciously peeping through a door. De Gracia was the
only person then present inside the room. A uniform with the nametag of Col. Matillano
was also found. As a result of the raid, the team arrested appellant, as well as Soprieso
Verbo and Roberto Jimena who were janitors at the Eurocar building. They were then
made to sign an inventory, written in Tagalog, of the explosives and ammunition
confiscated by the raiding team. No search warrant was secured by the raiding team
because, according to them, at that time there was so much disorder considering that
the nearby Camp Aguinaldo was being mopped up by the rebel forces and there was
simultaneous firing within the vicinity of the Eurocar office, aside from the fact that the
courts were consequently closed. The group was able to confirm later that the owner of
Eurocar office is a certain Mr. Gutierrez and that appellant is supposedly a "boy"
therein.
HELD: II. The next question that may be asked is whether or not there was a valid
search and seizure in this case.
It is admitted that the military operatives who raided the Eurocar Sales Office were not
armed with a search warrant at that time. 15 The raid was actually precipitated by
intelligence reports that said office was being used as headquarters by the
RAM. 16 Prior to the raid, there was a surveillance conducted on the premises wherein
the surveillance team was fired at by a group of men coming from the Eurocar building.
When the military operatives raided the place, the occupants thereof refused to open
the door despite requests for them to do so, thereby compelling the former to break into
the office. 17 The Eurocar Sales Office is obviously not a gun store and it is definitely
not an armory or arsenal which are the usual depositories for explosives and
ammunition. It is primarily and solely engaged in the sale of automobiles. The presence
of an unusual quantity of high-powered firearms and explosives could not be justifiably
or even colorably explained. In addition, there was general chaos and disorder at that
time because of simultaneous and intense firing within the vicinity of the office and in
the nearby Camp Aguinaldo which was under attack by rebel forces. 18 The courts in
the surrounding areas were obviously closed and, for that matter, the building and
houses therein were deserted.
Under the foregoing circumstances, it is our considered opinion that the instant case
falls under one of the exceptions to the prohibition against a warrantless search. In the
first place, the military operatives, taking into account the facts obtaining in this case,
had reasonable ground to believe that a crime was being committed. There was
consequently more than sufficient probable cause to warrant their action. Furthermore,
under the situation then prevailing, the raiding team had no opportunity to apply for and
secure a search warrant from the courts. The trial judge himself manifested that on
December 5, 1989 when the raid was conducted, his court was closed. 19 Under such
urgency and exigency of the moment, a search warrant could lawfully be dispensed
with.
HIZON, et. al. Vs.COURT OF APPEALS
(Searches of vessel)
The accused crew members and fishermen of F/B Robinson owned by First Fishermen
Fishing Industries, Inc., represented by Richard Hizon were apprehended by SPO3
Romulo Enriquez, and the members of the Task Force BantayDagat for allegedly
fishing in the shoreline of coastal waters of Puerto Princesa, Palawan, with the use of
obnoxious or poisonous substance (sodium cyanide), of more or less one (1) ton of
assorted live fishes. Such acts constitute an offense of Illegal Fishing with the use of
obnoxious or poisonous substance penalized under PD No. 704, the Fisheries Decree
of 1975. A day following the arrest, random samples of fish from the fish cage of F/B
Robinson were gathered for laboratory examination. The specimens were brought to
the NBI sub-office to determine the method of catching the same for record or
evidentiary purposes. The NBI Forensic Chemist conducted two tests on the fish
samples and found that they contained sodium cyanide.
The trial court convicted the petitioners of the offense charged and CA affirmed the
decision, hence this petition.
ISSUE: Whether the fish specimen, which yielded a positive result to the test of the
presence of sodium cyanide, are admissible being illegally seized on the occasion of
warrantless search and arrest.
RULING: On the first issue, the court sustained the warrantless arrest and therefore
the evidence obtained was admissible.
Our Constitution proscribes search and seizure and the arrest of persons without a
judicial warrant. As a general rule, any evidence obtained without a judicial warrant is
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. The rule is, however, subject to certain
exceptions. Some of these are: (1) a search incident to a lawful of arrest; (2) seizure of
evidence in plain view; (3) search of a moving motor vehicle; and (4) search in violation
of customs laws.
Search and seizure without search warrant of vessels and aircrafts for violations of
customs laws have been the traditional exception to the constitutional requirement of a
search warrant. It is rooted on the recognition that a vessel and an aircraft, like motor
vehicles, can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the search
warrant must be sought and secured. Yielding to this reality, judicial authorities have
not required a search warrant of vessels and aircrafts before their search and seizure
can be constitutionally effected.
The same exception ought to apply to seizures of fishing vessels and boats breaching
our fishery laws. These vessels are normally powered by high-speed motors that
enable them to elude arresting ships of the Philippine Navy, the Coast Guard and other
government authorities enforcing our fishery laws.
We thus hold as valid the warrantless search on the F/B Robinson, a fishing boat
suspected of having engaged in illegal fishing. The fish and other evidence seized in
the course of the search were properly admitted by the trial court. Moreover, petitioners
failed to raise the issue during trial and hence, waived
their right to question any irregularity that may have attended the said search and
seizure.