EN BANC

G.R. No. 213847, August 18, 2015

JUAN PONCE ENRILE, PETITIONER, VS. SANDIGANBAYAN
(THIRD DIVISION), AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
RESPONDENTS.

DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
The decision whether to detain or release an accused before and during trial is ultimately
an incident of the judicial power to hear and determine his criminal case. The strength of
the Prosecutions case, albeit a good measure of the accuseds propensity for flight or for
causing harm to the public, is subsidiary to the primary objective of bail, which is to
ensure that the accused appears at trial.[1]

Bail protects the right of the accused to due process and to be presumed innocent

In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is
proved.[18] The presumption of innocence is rooted in the guarantee of due process, and
is safeguarded by the constitutional right to be released on bail,[19] and further binds the
court to wait until after trial to impose any punishment on the accused.[20]

It is worthy to note that bail is not granted to prevent the accused from committing
additional crimes.[21] The purpose of bail is to guarantee the appearance of the accused
at the trial, or whenever so required by the trial court. The amount of bail should be high
enough to assure the presence of the accused when so required, but it should be no higher
than is reasonably calculated to fulfill this purpose.[22] Thus, bail acts as a reconciling
mechanism to accommodate both the accuseds interest in his provisional liberty before
or during the trial, and the societys interest in assuring the accuseds presence at trial.
[23]

Bail may be granted as a matter of right or of discretion

The general rule is, therefore, that any person, before being convicted of any criminal
offense, shall be bailable, unless he is charged with a capital offense, or with an offense
punishable with reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, and the evidence of his guilt is
strong. Hence, from the moment he is placed under arrest, or is detained or restrained by
the officers of the law, he can claim the guarantee of his provisional liberty under the Bill
of Rights, and he retains his right to bail unless he is charged with a capital offense, or
with an offense punishable with reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, and the
evidence of his guilt is strong.[26] Once it has been established that the evidence of guilt
is strong, no right to bail shall be recognized.[27]

Admission to bail in offenses punished

by death, or life imprisonment, or reclusion
perpetua is subject to judicial discretion

Concerned Citizens v. Elma,[30] such discretion may be exercised only after the hearing
called to ascertain the degree of guilt of the accused for the purpose of whether or not he
should be granted provisional liberty. It is axiomatic, therefore, that bail cannot be
allowed when its grant is a matter of discretion on the part of the trial court unless there
has been a hearing with notice to the Prosecution.[31]

In resolving bail applications of the accused who is charged with a capital offense, or an
offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, the trial judge is expected
to comply with the guidelines outlined in Cortes v. Catral,[34] to wit:
1. In all cases, whether bail is a matter of right or of discretion, notify the
prosecutor of the hearing of the application for bail or require him to
submit his recommendation (Section 18, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court,
as amended);

2. Where bail is a matter of discretion, conduct a hearing of the application

for bail regardless of whether or not the prosecution refuses to present
evidence to show that the guilt of the accused is strong for the purpose of
enabling the court to exercise its sound discretion; (Section 7 and 8, supra)

3. Decide whether the guilt of the accused is strong based on the summary of
evidence of the prosecution;

4. If the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge the accused upon the
approval of the bailbond (Section 19, supra) Otherwise petition should be
denied.

poor health justifies admission to bail

the Court is guided by the earlier mentioned principal purpose of bail, which is to
guarantee the appearance of the accused at the trial, or whenever so required by the court.
The Court is further mindful of the Philippines responsibility in the international
community arising from the national commitment under the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights to:
x x x uphold the fundamental human rights as well as value the worth and dignity
of every person. This commitment is enshrined in Section II, Article II of our
Constitution which provides: The State values the dignity of every human person
and guarantees full respect for human rights. The Philippines, therefore, has
the responsibility of protecting and promoting the right of every person to
liberty and due process, ensuring that those detained or arrested can
participate in the proceedings before a court, to enable it to decide without
delay on the legality of the detention and order their release if justified. In
other words, the Philippine authorities are under obligation to make
available to every person under detention such remedies which safeguard
their fundamental right to liberty. These remedies include the right to be
admitted to bail.[38]
This national commitment to uphold the fundamental human rights as well as value the
worth and dignity of every person has authorized the grant of bail not only to those
charged in criminal proceedings but also to extraditees upon a clear and convincing
showing: (1) that the detainee will not be a flight risk or a danger to the community; and
(2) that there exist special, humanitarian and compelling circumstances.[39]

SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 213104, July 29, 2015
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, VS. PO1 CYRIL A.
DE GRACIA, RESPONDENT.

DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:

An accused charged with a crime punishable by reclusion perpetua may still be granted
bail

The accused was charged with the crime of murder, which carries with it the penalty of
reclusion perpetua, hence, a non-bailable offense. From the standpoint of a layman, an
accused indicted for a "non-bailable offense" cannot be granted bail prior to his
conviction. Such interpretation, however, is technically inaccurate.

Under Section 13, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, those charged with offenses
punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, are not entitled to bail
before conviction. A reading of the provision reveals that bail shall only be denied when
the evidence of guilt for the offense punishable by reclusion perpetua is strong.
Necessarily, in all other instances, bail must be granted before the conviction of the
accused. The right to bail flows from the presumption of innocence in favor of every
accused who should not be subjected to the loss of freedom as thereafter he would be
entitled to acquittal, unless his guilt be proved beyond reasonable doubt.[16] Evidently,
despite being charged with a non-bailable offense, an accused can still possibly acquire
bail.

Conversely, if the evidence of guilt is strong, then the accused cannot enjoy provisional
liberty before his conviction. There is nothing unreasonable in denying the right to bail to
one charged with an offense punishable with reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is
strong, as it is likely that the accused, rather than await the outcome of the proceeding
against him with a penalty demanding a lifetime of incarceration, would be tempted to
flee the jurisdiction.

The determination of whether the evidence of guilt is strong, in this regard, is a matter of
judicial discretion. By judicial discretion, the law mandates the determination of whether
proof is evident or the presumption of guilt is strong. "Proof evident" or "Evident proof in
this connection has been held to make clear, strong evidence which leads a well-guarded
dispassionate judgment to the conclusion that the offense has been committed as charged,
that accused is the guilty agent, and that he will probably be punished capitally if the law
is administered. "Presumption great" exists when the circumstances testified to are such
that the inference of guilt naturally to be drawn therefrom is strong, clear, and convincing
to an unbiased judgment and excludes all reasonable probability of any other conclusion.
[17]

629 Phil. 587

THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 189122, March 17, 2010
JOSE ANTONIO LEVISTE, PETITIONER, VS. THE COURT OF
APPEALS AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENTS.

DECISION
CORONA, J.:
Bail, the security given by an accused who is in the custody of the law for his release to
guarantee his appearance before any court as may be required,[1] is the answer of the
criminal justice system to a vexing question: what is to be done with the accused, whose
guilt has not yet been proven, in the "dubious interval," often years long, between arrest
and final adjudication?[2] Bail acts as a reconciling mechanism to accommodate both the
accused's interest in pretrial liberty and society's interest in assuring the accused's
presence at trial.[3]
Upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death,
reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, the accused who has been sentenced to prison
must typically begin serving time immediately unless, on application, he is admitted to
bail.[4] An accused not released on bail is incarcerated before an appellate court confirms
that his conviction is legal and proper. An erroneously convicted accused who is denied
bail loses his liberty to pay a debt to society he has never owed.[5] Even if the conviction
is subsequently affirmed, however, the accused's interest in bail pending appeal includes
freedom pending judicial review, opportunity to efficiently prepare his case and
avoidance of potential hardships of prison.[6] On the other hand, society has a
compelling interest in protecting itself by swiftly incarcerating an individual who is found
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of a crime serious enough to warrant prison time.[7]
Other recognized societal interests in the denial of bail pending appeal include the
prevention of the accused's flight from court custody, the protection of the community
from potential danger and the avoidance of delay in punishment.[8] Under what
circumstances an accused may obtain bail pending appeal, then, is a delicate balance
between the interests of society and those of the accused.[9]

Our rules authorize the proper courts to exercise discretion in the grant of bail pending
appeal to those convicted by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by
death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. In the exercise of that discretion, the
proper courts are to be guided by the fundamental principle that the allowance of bail
pending appeal should be exercised not with laxity but with grave caution and only
for strong reasons, considering that the accused has been in fact convicted by the trial
court.[10]

Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court provides:

Sec. 5. Bail, when discretionary. -- Upon conviction by the Regional Trial

Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life
imprisonment, admission to bail is discretionary. The application for bail may
be filed and acted upon by the trial court despite the filing of a notice of appeal,
provided it has not transmitted the original record to the appellate court. However,
if the decision of the trial court convicting the accused changed the nature of the
offense from non-bailable to bailable, the application for bail can only be filed
with and resolved by the appellate court.

Should the court grant the application, the accused may be allowed to continue on
provisional liberty during the pendency of the appeal under the same bail subject
to the consent of the bondsman.

If the penalty imposed by the trial court is imprisonment exceeding six (6) years,
the accused shall be denied bail, or his bail shall be cancelled upon a showing by
the prosecution, with notice to the accused, of the following or other similar
circumstances:
 (a) That he is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or has
committed the crime aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration;
(b) That he has previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded
sentence, or violated the conditions of his bail without a valid justification;
(c) That he committed the offense while under probation, parole, or
conditional pardon;
(d) That the circumstances of his case indicate the probability of flight if
released on bail; or
(e) That there is undue risk that he may commit another crime during the
pendency of the appeal.

Retired Court of Appeals Justice Oscar M. Herrera, another authority in remedial law, is
of the same thinking:

Bail is either a matter of right or of discretion. It is a matter of right when the

offense charged is not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment. On the other hand, upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of
an offense not punishable death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, bail
becomes a matter of discretion.

Similarly, if the court imposed a penalty of imprisonment exceeding six (6)

years then bail is a matter of discretion, except when any of the enumerated
circumstances under paragraph 3 of Section 5, Rule 114 is present then bail
shall be denied.[25] (emphasis supplied)

What is Judicial Discretion?

judicial discretion has been defined as "choice."[28] Choice occurs where, between "two
alternatives or among a possibly infinite number (of options)," there is "more than one
possible outcome, with the selection of the outcome left to the decision maker."[29] On
the other hand, the establishment of a clearly defined rule of action is the end of
discretion.[30] Thus, by severely clipping the appellate court's discretion and relegating
that tribunal to a mere fact-finding body in applications for bail pending appeal in all
instances where the penalty imposed by the trial court on the appellant is imprisonment
exceeding six years, petitioner's theory effectively renders nugatory the provision that
"upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death,
reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, admission to bail is discretionary."

After conviction by the trial court, the presumption of innocence terminates and,
accordingly, the constitutional right to bail ends.[46] From then on, the grant of bail is
subject to judicial discretion. At the risk of being repetitious, such discretion must be
exercised with grave caution and only for strong reasons. Considering that the accused
was in fact convicted by the trial court, allowance of bail pending appeal should be
guided by a stringent-standards approach. This judicial disposition finds strong support in
 the history and evolution of the rules on bail and the language of Section 5, Rule 114 of
the Rules of Court. It is likewise consistent with the trial court's initial determination that
the accused should be in prison. Furthermore, letting the accused out on bail despite his
conviction may destroy the deterrent effect of our criminal laws. This is especially
germane to bail pending appeal because long delays often separate sentencing in the trial
court and appellate review. In addition, at the post-conviction stage, the accused faces a
certain prison sentence and thus may be more likely to flee regardless of bail bonds or
other release conditions. Finally, permitting bail too freely in spite of conviction invites
frivolous and time-wasting appeals which will make a mockery of our criminal justice
system and court processes.

guidelines if convicted and with a pending appeal

Court en banc lays down the following policies concerning the effectivity of the bail of
the accused, to wit:

1) When an accused is charged with an offense which under the law existing at the time
of its commission and at the time of the application for bail is punishable by a penalty
lower than reclusion perpetua and is out on bail, and after trial is convicted by the trial
court of the offense charged or of a lesser offense than that charged in the complaint or
information, he may be allowed to remain free on his original bail pending the resolution
of his appeal, unless the proper court directs otherwise pursuant to Rule 114, Sec. 2 (a) of
the Rules of Court, as amended;

2) When an accused is charged with a capital offense or an offense which under the
law at the time of its commission and at the time of the application for bail is
punishable by reclusion perpetua and is out on bail, and after trial is convicted by
the trial court of a lesser offense than that charged in the complaint or information,
the same rule set forth in the preceding paragraph shall be applied;

3) When an accused is charged with a capital offense or an offense which under the law at
the time of its commission and at the time of the application for bail is punishable by
reclusion perpetua and is out on bail and after trial is convicted by the trial court of the
offense charged, his bond shall be cancelled and the accused shall be placed in
confinement pending resolution of his appeal.

As to criminal cases covered under the third rule abovecited, which are now pending
appeal before his Court where the accused is still on provisional liberty, the following
rules are laid down:

1) This Court shall order the bondsman to surrender the accused within ten (10) days
from notice to the court of origin. The bondsman thereupon, shall inform this Court of the
fact of surrender, after which, the cancellation of the bond shall be ordered by this Court;

2) The RTC shall order the transmittal of the accused to the National Bureau of Prisons
thru the Philippine National Police as the accused shall remain under confinement
pending resolution of his appeal;

3) If the accused-appellant is not surrendered within the aforesaid period of ten (10) days,
his bond shall be forfeited and an order of arrest shall be issued by this Court. The appeal
taken by the accused shall also be dismissed under Section 8, Rule 124 of the Revised
Rules of Court as he shall be deemed to have jumped his bail. (emphasis supplied)

Thus, in Villanueva v. Judge Buaya,[14] therein respondent judge was held

administratively liable for gross ignorance of the law for granting an exparte motion for
bail without conducting a hearing. Stressing the necessity of bail hearing, this
Court pronounced that:

The Court has always stressed the indispensable nature of a bail hearing in
petitions for bail. Where bail is a matter of discretion, the grant or the denial of
bail hinges on the issue of whether or not the evidence on the guilt of the accused
is strong and the determination of whether or not the evidence is strong is a matter
of judicial discretion which remains with the judge. In order for the judge to
properly exercise this discretion, he must first conduct a hearing to determine
whether the evidence of guilt is strong. This discretion lies not in the
determination of whether or not a hearing should be held, but in the appreciation
and evaluation of the weight of the prosecution's evidence of guilt against the
accused.
In any event, whether bail is a matter of right or discretion, a hearing for a petition
for bail is required in order for the court to consider the guidelines set forth in
Section 9, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court in fixing the amount of bail. This Court
has repeatedly held in past cases that even if the prosecution fails to adduce
evidence in opposition to an application for bail of an accused, the court may still
require the prosecution to answer questions in order to ascertain, not only the
strength of the State's evidence, but also the adequacy of the amount of bail.[15]

How to construe the term punishable?

the term "punishable" should refer to prescribed, not imposable, penalty.EN BANC
G.R. Nos. 216007-09, December 08, 2015
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, VS. LUZVIMINDA
S. VALDEZ AND THE SANDIGANBAYAN (FIFTH DIVISION),
RESPONDENTS.

DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
 What if the accused is charged with an offense punished by capital punishment and
convicted with homicide, and he appeal his conviction, would be bail a matter of
discretion or right?

see, 334 Phil. 253

THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 114350, January 16, 1997
JOSE T. OBOSA, PETITIONER, VS. COURT OF APPEALS
ANDPEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:

EPILOGUE

In sum, we rule that bail cannot be granted as a matter of right even after an accused, who
is charged with a capital offense, appeals his conviction for a non-capital crime. Courts
must exercise utmost caution in deciding applications for bail considering that the
accused on appeal may still be convicted of the original capital offense charged and that
thus the risk attendant to jumping bail still subsists. In fact, trial courts would be well
advised to leave the matter of bail, after conviction for a lesser crime than the capital
offense originally charged, to the appellate court's sound discretion.

We also hold that the trial court had failed to exercise the degree of discretion and caution
required under and mandated by our statutes and rules, for, aside from being too hasty in
granting bail immediately after promulgation of judgment, and acting without jurisdiction
in approving the bailbond, it inexplicably ignored the undeniable fact of petitioner's
previous escape from legal confinement as well as his prior convictions.

A matter of discretion in bail if the offense is punished by capital offense viz to the evidence
Basco vs. Rapatalo:[102]
When the grant of bail is discretionary, the prosecution has the burden of
showing that the evidence of guilt against the accused is strong. However, the
determination of whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong, being a
matter of judicial discretion, remains with the judge. This discretion by the
very nature of things, may rightly be exercised only after the evidence is
submitted to the court at the hearing. Since the discretion is directed to the
weight of the evidence and since evidence cannot properly be weighed if not
duly exhibited or produced before the court, it is obvious that a proper
exercise of judicial discretion requires that the evidence of guilt be submitted
to the court, the petitioner having the right of cross-examination and to introduce
his own evidence in rebuttal.[103]