G.R. No. 143424.

August 8, 2001]

AMEN-AMEN vs. COURT OF APPEALS, et al.

THIRD DIVISION

Gentlemen:

Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court dated AUG 8 2001.

G.R. No. 143424 (Danilo Amen-Amen, petitioner vs. Court of Appeals, National Labor
Relations Commission (Fifth Division) Toyota Davao City, Inc./Duratrak Corp., et al.,
respondents.)

Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court seeking reversal of the March 7, 2000 Resolution 1 Rollo, p. 23 of the Court of
Appeals 2 Sixth Division composed of J. Oswaldo D. Agcaoili, ponente;with JJ. Ma. Alicia Austria Martinez
(chairman) and Wenceslao I. Agnir, Jr. (member), both of whom concurred. in CA-CR SP No. 57291, which
reads:

"For non-compliance with Section 11, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, the petition is considered as NOT FILED and is, accordingly,
DISMISSED."

Likewise assailed is the appellate courts May 5, 2000 Resolution 3 Rollo, p. 32.denying
reconsideration.

On May 22, 1998, Danilo Amen-Amen (hereinafter referred to as petitioner) filed a

complaint for illegal suspension and dismissal, separation pay, 13th month pay, performance
incentive pay and sick leave pay against Toyota Davao City, Inc./Duratrak Corp. and/or Jose A.
Lim, III, President (hereinafter referred to as respondents) before the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC), Regional Arbitration Branch No. XI in Davao City. After the usual
conciliation proceedings and submission of position papers, Labor Arbiter Miriam A. Libron-
Barroso rendered a decision dated January 18, 1999, disposing as follows:

"WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered:

a) Declaring the dismissal and suspension of complainant

illegal;

b) Directing respondents Toyota Davao City, Inc./Duratrak

Corp. and/or Jose A. Lim III, Pres. to jointly and severally pay
complainant the total amount of Four Hundred Forty Three
Thousand Eighty Seven pesos and 83/100 (P443,087.83)
representing 1998 13th month pay, service incentive leave pay,
separation pay and backwages;
 c) Ordering the above-named respondents to jointly and
severally pay complainant his performance incentive and sick leave
benefits to be determined during the execution stage; and

d) Dismissing the claim for damages for lack of merit."

Respondents seasonably appealed the decision to the NLRCs Fifth Division in Cagayan
de Oro City. Subsequently, the NLRC reversed the appealed decision, ruling that petitioners
dismissal from employment was for a just cause and with due process of law in a Resolution
dated June 30, 1999, 4 Rollo, pp. 51-58. the dispositive portion of which reads:

"WHEREFORE, the appeal is Granted and the appealed decision is

Vacated and Set Aside, except the portion thereof awarding month pay and service
incentive leave pay to complainant which is affirmed. In lieu thereof, a new
judgment is rendered dismissing the instant case for lack of merit, subject to the
qualification heretofore explained."

Petitioners motion to reconsider the above Resolution was denied by the NLRC in a
Resolution dated November 23, 1999. 5 Rollo, pp. 60-61.

Consequently, petitioner elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals via a Petition for
Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. The petition was filed on February 4, 2000. As
mentioned at the outset, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for non-compliance with
Section 11, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

Hence, this petition.

To our mind, the sole issue is whether the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the
appeal on the ground of lack of explanation of service by registered mail.

The answer is in the negative.

It is not disputed that petitioners Petition for Certiorari filed in the Court of Appeals did
not contain an explanation why resort was made to other modes of service of the petition to the
parties concerned. In the exercise of its discretion granted under Section 11 of Rule 13, which we
quote:

"Sec. 11. Priorities in modes of service and filing. Whenever

practicable, the service and filing of pleadings and other papers shall be done
personally. Except with respect to papers emanating from the court, a resort to
other modes must be accompanied by a written explanation why the service or
filing was not done personally. A violation of this rule may be cause to consider
the paper as not filed."

The Court of Appeals considered the same as not having been filed and dismissed the
petition outright. Pursuant to the above-quoted section, service and filing of pleadings and other
papers must, whenever practicable, be done personally. To underscore the mandatory nature of
this rule requiring personal service whenever practicable, said section gives the court the
discretion to consider a pleading or paper as not filed if the other modes of service or filing were
resorted to and no written explanation was made as to why personal service was not done in the
first place." 6Solar Team Entertainment, Inc. vs. Ricafort, 293 SCRA 661 (1998). Evidently, personal
service and filing are preferred to expedite action or resolution on a pleading and minimize, if
not eliminate, delays likely to be incurred if service or filing is done by mail, considering the
unreliability of the postal service.

Petitioner claims that his failure to indicate an explanation was due to honest mistake
and/or oversight; and that labor cases should be spared from strict compliance with technical
rules of procedure. We are not persuaded.

This Court in the case of Solar Team Entertainment, Inc. vs. Ricafort 7 Supra., noting that
it has been several months since the 1997. Rules of Civil Procedure took effect, where in the
interim, the Court has generally accommodated parties and counsel who failed to comply with
the requirement of a written explanation, contained the following directive:

"x x x, for the guidance of the Bench and Bar, strictest compliance with
Section 11 of Rule 13 is mandated one month from promulgation of this
decision." 8 See p. 670.

The petition for certiorari without the written explanation was filed on February 4, 2000,
that is, three (3) years after the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure took effect on July 1, 1997; and
two (2) years after the promulgation of the Solar case in 1998. Clearly, there is no excuse for its
non-compliance, especially, not on mere reliance on the liberal construction of rules. We adhere
to the pronouncement in the Solar case that, "if motions to expunge or strike out pleadings for
violation of Section 11 of Rule 13 were to be indiscriminately resolved under Section 6 of Rule
1 9Section 6, Rule 1, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Construction. These Rules shall be liberally construed in
order to promote their objective of securing a just, speedy, and inexpensive disposition of every action and
proceeding. " or as in this case, under the general "protection to labor clauses in the Constitution,
"then Section 11 would become meaningless and its sound purpose negated. 10 See p. 669.

WHEREFORE, the resolutions of the Court of Appeals dated March 7, 2000 and May 5,
2000 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Very truly yours,

(Sgd.) JULIETA Y.
CARREON

Clerk of Court