RULE 114: BAIL
help shape public policy and in the light of the important role of the Senate in maintaining
G.R. No. 179817 June 27, 2008
ANTONIO F. TRILLANES IV, petitioner, vs. HON. OSCAR PIMENTEL, SR., IN HIS CAPACITY
AS PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT- BRANCH 148, MAKATI CITY; GEN.
HERMOGENES ESPERON, VICE ADM. ROGELIO I. CALUNSAG, MGEN. BENJAMIN DOLORFINO,
AND LT. COL. LUCIARDO OBEA, respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
At the wee hours of July 27, 2003, a group of more than 300 heavily armed soldiers led by junior
officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) stormed into the Oakwood Premier
Apartments in Makati City and publicly demanded the resignation of the President and key national
officials.
Later in the day, President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo issued Proclamation No. 427 and General Order
No. 4 declaring a state of rebellion and calling out the Armed Forces to suppress the rebellion. 1 A
series of negotiations quelled the teeming tension and eventually resolved the impasse with the
surrender of the militant soldiers that evening.
In the aftermath of this eventful episode dubbed as the "Oakwood Incident," petitioner Antonio F.
Trillanes IV was charged, along with his comrades, with coup detat defined under Article 134-A of
the Revised Penal Code before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati. The case was docketed as
Criminal Case No. 03-2784, "People v. Capt. Milo D. Maestrecampo, et al."
Close to four years later, petitioner, who has remained in detention, 2 threw his hat in the political
arena and won a seat in the Senate with a six-year term commencing at noon on June 30, 2007.3
Before the commencement of his term or on June 22, 2007, petitioner filed with the RTC, Makati
City, Branch 148, an "Omnibus Motion for Leave of Court to be Allowed to Attend Senate Sessions
and Related Requests"4 (Omnibus Motion). Among his requests were:
(a) To be allowed to go to the Senate to attend all official functions of the Senate (whether
at the Senate or elsewhere) particularly when the Senate is in session, and to attend the
regular and plenary sessions of the Senate, committee hearings, committee meetings,
consultations, investigations and hearings in aid of legislation, caucuses, staff meetings,
etc., which are normally held at the Senate of the Philippines located at the GSIS Financial
Center, Pasay City (usually from Mondays to Thursdays from 8:00 a.m. to 7:00 p.m.);
(b) To be allowed to set up a working area at his place of detention at the Marine Brig,
Marine Barracks Manila, Fort Bonifacio, Taguig City, with a personal desktop computer
and the appropriate communications equipment (i.e., a telephone line and internet
access) in order that he may be able to work there when there are no sessions, meetings
or hearings at the Senate or when the Senate is not in session. The costs of setting up the
said working area and the related equipment and utility costs can be charged against the
budget/allocation of the Office of the accused from the Senate;
(c) To be allowed to receive members of his staff at the said working area at his place of
detention at the Marine Brig, Marine Barracks Manila, Fort Bonifacio, Taguig City, at
reasonable times of the day particularly during working days for purposes of meetings,
briefings, consultations and/or coordination, so that the latter may be able to assists (sic)
him in the performance and discharge of his duties as a Senator of the Republic;
(d) To be allowed to give interviews and to air his comments, reactions and/or opinions
to the press or the media regarding the important issues affecting the country and the
public while at the Senate or elsewhere in the performance of his duties as Senator to
the system of checks and balance between the three (3) co-equal branches of
Government;
(e) With prior notice to the Honorable Court and to the accused and his custodians, to be
allowed to receive, on Tuesdays and Fridays, reporters and other members of the media
who may wish to interview him and/or to get his comments, reactions and/or opinion at
his place of confinement at the Marine Brig, Marine Barracks Manila, Fort Bonifacio,
Taguig City, particularly when there are no sessions, meetings or hearings at the Senate
or when the Senate is not in session; and
(f) To be allowed to attend the organizational meeting and election of officers of the
Senate and related activities scheduled in the morning (9:00 or 10:00 a.m.) of 23 July
2007 at the Senate of the Philippines located at the GSIS Financial Center, Pasay City. 5
By Order of July 25, 2007,6 the trial court denied all the requests in the Omnibus Motion. Petitioner
moved for reconsideration in which he waived his requests in paragraphs (b), (c) and (f) to thus
trim them down to three.7 The trial court just the same denied the motion by Order of September 18,
2007.8
Hence, the present petition for certiorari to set aside the two Orders of the trial court, and for
prohibition and mandamus to (i) enjoin respondents from banning the Senate staff, resource persons
and guests from meeting with him or transacting business with him in his capacity as Senator; and
(ii) direct respondents to allow him access to the Senate staff, resource persons and guests and
permit him to attend all sessions and official functions of the Senate. Petitioner preliminarily prayed
for the maintenance of the status quo ante of having been able hitherto to convene his staff, resource
persons and guests9 at the Marine Brig.
Impleaded as co-respondents of Judge Oscar Pimentel, Sr. are AFP Chief of Staff, Gen. Hermogenes
Esperon (Esperon); Philippine Navys Flag Officer-in-Command, Vice Admiral Rogelio Calunsag;
Philippine Marines Commandant, Major Gen. Benjamin Dolorfino; and Marine Barracks Manila
Commanding Officer, Lt. Col. Luciardo Obea (Obea).
Petitioner later manifested, in his Reply of February 26, 2008, that he has, since November 30, 2007,
been in the custody of the Philippine National Police (PNP) Custodial Center following the foiled
take-over of the Manila Peninsula Hotel10 the day before or on November 29, 2007.
Such change in circumstances thus dictates the discontinuation of the action as against the above-
named military officers-respondents. The issues raised in relation to them had ceased to present a
justiciable controversy, so that a determination thereof would be without practical value and use.
Meanwhile, against those not made parties to the case, petitioner cannot ask for reliefs from this
Court.11 Petitioner did not, by way of substitution, implead the police officers currently exercising
custodial responsibility over him; and he did not satisfactorily show that they have adopted or
continued the assailed actions of the former custodians. 12
Petitioner reiterates the following grounds which mirror those previously raised in his Motion for
Reconsideration filed with the trial court:
I.
THE JURISPRUDENCE CITED BY THE HONORABLE COURT A QUO IS CLEARLY
INAPPLICABLE TO THE INSTANT CASE BECAUSE OF THE FOLLOWING REASONS:
A.
UNLIKE IN THIS CASE, THE ACCUSED IN THE JALOSJOS CASE WAS ALREADY
CONVICTED AT THE TIME HE FILED HIS MOTION. IN THE INSTANT CASE,
 ACCUSED/PETITIONER HAS NOT BEEN CONVICTED AND, THEREFORE, STILL
ENJOYS THE PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE;
B.
THE ACCUSED IN THE JALOJOS (SIC) CASE WAS CHARGED WITH TWO (2)
COUNTS OF STATUTORY RAPE AND SIX (6) COUNTS OF ACTS OF
LASCIVIOUSNESS, CRIMES INVOLVING MORAL TURPITUDE. HEREIN
ACCUSED/PETITIONER IS CHARGED WITH THE OFFENSE OF "COUP DETAT",
A CHARGE WHICH IS COMMONLY REGARDED AS A POLITICAL OFFENSE;
C.
THE ACCUSED IN THE JALOSJOS CASE ATTEMPTED TO FLEE PRIOR TO BEING
ARRESTED. THE ACCUSED/ PETITIONER VOLUNTARILY SURRENDERED TO
THE AUTHORITIES AND AGREED TO TAKE RESPONSIBILITY FOR HIS ACTS AT
OAKWOOD;
II.
GEN. ESPERON DID NOT OVERRULE THE RECOMMENDATION OF THE MARINE BRIGS
COMMANDING OFFICER TO ALLOW PETITIONER TO ATTEND THE SENATE SESSIONS;
III.
ACCUSED/PETITIONER SUBMITS THAT THE FACT THAT THE PEOPLE, IN THEIR
SOVEREIGN CAPACITY, ELECTED HIM TO THE POSITION OF SENATOR OF THE
REPUBLIC PROVIDES THE PROPER LEGAL JUSTIFICATION TO ALLOW HIM TO WORK
AND SERVE HIS MANDATE AS A SENATOR;
- AND -
IV.
MOREOVER, THERE ARE ENOUGH PRECEDENTS TO ALLOW LIBERAL TREATMENT OF
DETENTION PRISONERS WHO ARE HELD WITHOUT BAIL AS IN THE CASE OF FORMER
PRESIDENT JOSEPH "ERAP" ESTRADA AND FORMER ARMM GOV. NUR MISUARI. 13
The petition is bereft of merit.
In attempting to strike a distinction between his case and that of Jalosjos, petitioner chiefly points
out that former Rep. Romeo Jalosjos (Jalosjos) was already convicted, albeit his conviction was
pending appeal, when he filed a motion similar to petitioners Omnibus Motion, whereas he
(petitioner) is a mere detention prisoner. He asserts that he continues to enjoy civil and political
rights since the presumption of innocence is still in his favor.
Further, petitioner illustrates that Jalosjos was charged with crimes involving moral turpitude, i.e.,
two counts of statutory rape and six counts of acts of lasciviousness, whereas he is indicted for coup
detat which is regarded as a "political offense."
Furthermore, petitioner justifies in his favor the presence of noble causes in expressing legitimate
grievances against the rampant and institutionalized practice of graft and corruption in the AFP.
In sum, petitioners first ground posits that there is a world of difference between his case and that
of Jalosjos respecting the type of offense involved, the stage of filing of the motion, and other
circumstances which demonstrate the inapplicability of Jalosjos.14
A plain reading of. Jalosjos suggests otherwise, however.
The distinctions cited by petitioner were not elemental in the pronouncement in Jalosjos that
election to Congress is not a reasonable classification in criminal law enforcement as the functions
and duties of the office are not substantial distinctions which lift one from the class of prisoners
interrupted in their freedom and restricted in liberty of movement.15
It cannot be gainsaid that a person charged with a crime is taken into custody for purposes of the
administration of justice. No less than the Constitution provides:
All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when
evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be
released on recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be
impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive
bail shall not be required.16 (Underscoring supplied)
The Rules also state that no person charged with a capital offense, 17 or an offense punishable by
reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be admitted to bail when evidence of guilt is strong,
regardless of the stage of the criminal action.18
That the cited provisions apply equally to rape and coup detat cases, both being punishable by
reclusion perpetua,19 is beyond cavil. Within the class of offenses covered by the stated range of
imposable penalties, there is clearly no distinction as to the political complexion of or moral
turpitude involved in the crime charged.
In the present case, it is uncontroverted that petitioners application for bail and for release on
recognizance was denied.20 The determination that the evidence of guilt is strong, whether
ascertained in a hearing of an application for bail21 or imported from a trial courts judgment of
conviction,22 justifies the detention of an accused as a valid curtailment of his right to provisional
liberty. This accentuates the proviso that the denial of the right to bail in such cases is "regardless of
the stage of the criminal action." Such justification for confinement with its underlying rationale of
public self-defense23 applies equally to detention prisoners like petitioner or convicted prisoners-
appellants like Jalosjos.
As the Court observed in Alejano v. Cabuay,24 it is impractical to draw a line between convicted
prisoners and pre-trial detainees for the purpose of maintaining jail security; and while pre-trial
detainees do not forfeit their constitutional rights upon confinement, the fact of their detention
makes their rights more limited than those of the public.
The Court was more emphatic in People v. Hon. Maceda:25
As a matter of law, when a person indicted for an offense is arrested, he is deemed placed
under the custody of the law. He is placed in actual restraint of liberty in jail so that he
may be bound to answer for the commission of the offense. He must be detained in jail
during the pendency of the case against him, unless he is authorized by the court to be
released on bail or on recognizance. Let it be stressed that all prisoners whether under
preventive detention or serving final sentence can not practice their profession nor
engage in any business or occupation, or hold office, elective or appointive, while in
detention. This is a necessary consequence of arrest and detention. 26 (Underscoring
supplied)
These inherent limitations, however, must be taken into account only to the extent that confinement
restrains the power of locomotion or actual physical movement. It bears noting that in Jalosjos,
which was decided en banc one month after Maceda, the Court recognized that the accused could
somehow accomplish legislative results.27
The trial court thus correctly concluded that the presumption of innocence does not carry with it the
full enjoyment of civil and political rights.
Petitioner is similarly situated with Jalosjos with respect to the application of the presumption of
innocence during the period material to the resolution of their respective motions. The Court in
Jalosjos did not mention that the presumption of innocence no longer operates in favor of the
accused pending the review on appeal of the judgment of conviction. The rule stands that until a
promulgation of final conviction is made, the constitutional mandate of presumption of innocence
prevails.28
In addition to the inherent restraints, the Court notes that petitioner neither denied nor disputed his
agreeing to a consensus with the prosecution that media access to him should cease after his
proclamation by the Commission on Elections.29
Petitioner goes on to allege that unlike Jalosjos who attempted to evade trial, he is not a flight risk
since he voluntarily surrendered to the proper authorities and such can be proven by the numerous
times he was allowed to travel outside his place of detention.
Subsequent events reveal the contrary, however. The assailed Orders augured well when on
November 29, 2007 petitioner went past security detail for some reason and proceeded from the
courtroom to a posh hotel to issue certain statements. The account, dubbed this time as the "Manila
Pen Incident,"30 proves that petitioners argument bites the dust. The risk that he would escape
ceased to be neither remote nor nil as, in fact, the cause for foreboding became real.
Moreover, circumstances indicating probability of flight find relevance as a factor in ascertaining the
reasonable amount of bail and in canceling a discretionary grant of bail. 31 In cases involving non-
bailable offenses, what is controlling is the determination of whether the evidence of guilt is strong.
Once it is established that it is so, bail shall be denied as it is neither a matter of right nor of
discretion.32
Petitioner cannot find solace in Montano v. Ocampo33 to buttress his plea for leeway because unlike
petitioner, the therein petitioner, then Senator Justiniano Montano, who was charged with multiple
murder and multiple frustrated murder,34 was able to rebut the strong evidence for the prosecution.
Notatu dignum is this Courts pronouncement therein that "if denial of bail is authorized in capital
cases, it is only on the theory that the proof being strong, the defendant would flee, if he has the
opportunity, rather than face the verdict of the jury."35 At the time Montano was indicted, when only
capital offenses were non-bailable where evidence of guilt is strong,36 the Court noted the obvious
reason that "one who faces a probable death sentence has a particularly strong temptation to flee."37
Petitioners petition for bail having earlier been denied, he cannot rely on Montano to reiterate his
requests which are akin to bailing him out.
Second, petitioner posits that, contrary to the trial courts findings, Esperon did not overrule Obeas
recommendation to allow him to attend Senate sessions. Petitioner cites the Comment 38 of Obea
that he interposed no objection to such request but recommended that he be transported by the
Senate Sergeant-at-Arms with adequate Senate security. And petitioner faults the trial court for
deeming that Esperon, despite professing non-obstruction to the performance of petitioners duties,
flatly rejected all his requests, when what Esperon only disallowed was the setting up of a political
office inside a military installation owing to AFPs apolitical nature.39
The effective management of the detention facility has been recognized as a valid objective that may
justify the imposition of conditions and restrictions of pre-trial detention.40 The officer with
custodial responsibility over a detainee may undertake such reasonable measures as may be
necessary to secure the safety and prevent the escape of the detainee. 41 Nevertheless, while the
comments of the detention officers provide guidance on security concerns, they are not binding on
the trial court in the same manner that pleadings are not impositions upon a court.
Third, petitioner posits that his election provides the legal justification to allow him to serve his
mandate, after the people, in their sovereign capacity, elected him as Senator. He argues that
denying his Omnibus Motion is tantamount to removing him from office, depriving the people of
proper representation, denying the peoples will, repudiating the peoples choice, and overruling the
mandate of the people.
Petitioners contention hinges on the doctrine in administrative law that "a public official can not be
removed for administrative misconduct committed during a prior term, since his re-election to
office operates as a condonation of the officers previous misconduct to the extent of cutting off the
right to remove him therefor."42
The assertion is unavailing. The case against petitioner is not administrative in nature. And there is
no "prior term" to speak of. In a plethora of cases, 43 the Court categorically held that the doctrine of
condonation does not apply to criminal cases. Election, or more precisely, re-election to office, does
not obliterate a criminal charge. Petitioners electoral victory only signifies pertinently that when
the voters elected him to the Senate, "they did so with full awareness of the limitations on his
freedom of action [and] x x x with the knowledge that he could achieve only such legislative results
which he could accomplish within the confines of prison."44
In once more debunking the disenfranchisement argument, 45 it is opportune to wipe out the
lingering misimpression that the call of duty conferred by the voice of the people is louder than the
litany of lawful restraints articulated in the Constitution and echoed by jurisprudence. The apparent
discord may be harmonized by the overarching tenet that the mandate of the people yields to the
Constitution which the people themselves ordained to govern all under the rule of law.
The performance of legitimate and even essential duties by public officers has never been
an excuse to free a person validly in prison. The duties imposed by the "mandate of the
people" are multifarious. The accused-appellant asserts that the duty to legislate ranks
highest in the hierarchy of government. The accused-appellant is only one of 250
members of the House of Representatives, not to mention the 24 members of the Senate,
charged with the duties of legislation. Congress continues to function well in the physical
absence of one or a few of its members. x x x Never has the call of a particular duty lifted a
prisoner into a different classification from those others who are validly restrained by
law.46 (Underscoring supplied)
Lastly, petitioner pleads for the same liberal treatment accorded certain detention prisoners who
have also been charged with non-bailable offenses, like former President Joseph Estrada and former
Governor Nur Misuari who were allowed to attend "social functions." Finding no rhyme and reason
in the denial of the more serious request to perform the duties of a Senator, petitioner harps on an
alleged violation of the equal protection clause.
In arguing against maintaining double standards in the treatment of detention prisoners, petitioner
expressly admits that he intentionally did not seek preferential treatment in the form of being
placed under Senate custody or house arrest,47 yet he at the same time, gripes about the granting of
house arrest to others.
Emergency or compelling temporary leaves from imprisonment are allowed to all prisoners, at the
discretion of the authorities or upon court orders. 48 That this discretion was gravely abused,
petitioner failed to establish. In fact, the trial court previously allowed petitioner to register as a
voter in December 2006, file his certificate of candidacy in February 2007, cast his vote on May 14,
2007, be proclaimed as senator-elect, and take his oath of office49 on June 29, 2007. In a seeming
attempt to bind or twist the hands of the trial court lest it be accused of taking a complete turn-
around,50 petitioner largely banks on these prior grants to him and insists on unending concessions
and blanket authorizations.
Petitioners position fails. On the generality and permanence of his requests alone, petitioners case
fails to compare with the species of allowable leaves. Jaloslos succinctly expounds:
x x x Allowing accused-appellant to attend congressional sessions and committee
meetings for five (5) days or more in a week will virtually make him a free man with all
the privileges appurtenant to his position. Such an aberrant situation not only elevates
accused-appellants status to that of a special class, it also would be a mockery of the
purposes of the correction system.51
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
 A.M. No. RTJ- 03-1767 March 28, 2003
ROSALIA DOCENA-CASPE, complainant, vs. JUDGE ARNULFO O. BUGTAS, Regional Trial
Court, Branch II, Borongan, Eastern Samar, respondent.
RESOLUTION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
The refusal or failure of the prosecution to adduce evidence or to interpose objection to a petition
for bail will not dispense with the conduct of a bail hearing. 1 Neither may reliance to a previous
order granting bail justify the absence of a hearing in a subsequent petition for bail, 2 more so where
said order relied upon was issued without hearing and while the accused was at large. 3
The instant administrative case for gross ignorance of the law and incompetence against respondent
judge stemmed from a murder case filed against accused Celso Docil and Juan Docil for the death of
Lucio Docena. In her sworn complaint, complainant alleged that on September 3, 1993, Judge
Gorgonio T. Alvarez of the Municipal Trial Court of Taft, Eastern Samar, conducted a preliminary
investigation on the said murder case, and thereafter issued the corresponding warrants of arrest.
No bail was recommended for the two (2) accused who were at large since the commission of the
offense on August 29, 1993.
Complainant further stated that the information for murder was filed with the Regional Trial Court
of Borongan, Eastern Samar, Branch II, then presided by Judge Paterno T. Alvarez. The latter
allegedly granted a P60,000.00 bailbond each to both accused without conducting a hearing, and
while the two were at large. Meanwhile, accused Celso Docil was apprehended on June 4, 2000.
Subsequently, Provincial Prosecutor Vicente Catudio filed before the Regional Trial Court of
Borongan, Eastern Samar, Branch II, now presided by respondent Judge Arnulfo O. Bugtas, a motion
praying that an alias warrant of arrest be issued for the other accused, Juan Docil; and that both
accused be denied bail. Said motion was granted by the respondent Judge. Thereafter, accused Celso
Docil filed a motion for reconsideration praying that he be allowed to post bail on the grounds that
(1) he is entitled to bail as a matter of right because he is charged with murder allegedly committed
at the time when the imposition of the death penalty was suspended by the Constitution; and that
(2) both the investigating Judge and the First Assistant Prosecutor recommended P60,000.00 bail
for his temporary liberty.
On August 11, 2000, the respondent Judge denied said motion.4 He explained that notwithstanding
the suspension of the imposition of the death penalty at the time the accused committed the offense,
bail for the crime of murder remains to be a matter of discretion. He cited Section 13, Article III, of
the Constitution which explicitly provides that "(a)ll persons, except those charged with offenses
punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall before conviction, be
bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law." The
respondent Judge added that contrary to the accuseds claim, there is nothing in the records which
show that bail was recommended for his temporary liberty.
Accused Celso Docil filed a motion for reconsideration reiterating his previous contentions. Then, he
filed a manifestation pointing out that on page 49 of the records is an order granting him and his co-
accused the recommended bail of P60,000.00. The court gave the prosecution five (5) days within
which to file a comment to the accuseds motion for reconsideration but the former failed to do so.
On January 15, 2001, the respondent Judge issued a Resolution granting the said motion for
reconsideration on the basis of a previous order granting bail to the accused.5 He ratiocinated that
on page 49 of the records, there indeed appears a final and executory order dated July 22, 1994
issued by his predecessor, Judge Paterno T. Alvarez granting bail of P60,000.00 to the accused,
hence, the inevitable recourse is to grant bail to accused Celso Docil.
On August 16, 2001, the complainant filed the instant administrative case against the respondent
Judge for granting bail to accused Celso Docil without conducting a bail hearing.
In his Comment,6 the respondent insisted that he committed no gross ignorance of the law or
incompetence. He contended that the prosecution is estopped from objecting to the grant of bail to
accused Celso Docil because it questioned the said order issued by his predecessor Judge only on
February 4, 2000, or after six (6) years from the issuance thereof on July 22, 1994. He added that
despite the five-day period given to the prosecution, it failed to file a comment to the motion for
reconsideration of the accused, warranting the presumption that it has no objection to the accuseds
petition for bail.
On the basis of its evaluation, the Office of the Court Administrator recommended that the instant
case be re-docketed as a regular administrative matter and that respondent Judge be fined in an
amount equivalent to one (1) month salary, with a warning that the commission of the same or
similar acts in the future will be dealt with more severely. 7
In a Resolution dated February 6, 2002, the Court required the parties to manifest whether they are
submitting the case for resolution on the basis of the pleadings filed. 8 On April 24, 2002, the
respondent Judge manifested his conformity to the said Resolution. 9 The complainants
manifestation, on the other hand, was dispensed with by the Court.
Jurisprudence is replete with decisions on the procedural necessity of a hearing, whether summary
or otherwise, relative to the grant of bail especially in cases involving offenses punishable by death,
reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, where bail is a matter of discretion. 10 Under the present
rules, a hearing is required in granting bail whether it is a matter of right or discretion. 11 It must be
stressed that the grant or the denial of bail in cases where bail is a matter of discretion hinges on the
issue of whether or not the evidence on the guilt of the accused is strong, and the determination of
whether or not the evidence is strong is a matter of judicial discretion which remains with the judge.
In order for the latter to properly exercise his discretion, he must first conduct a hearing to
determine whether the evidence of guilt is strong.12
In Santos v. Ofilada,13 it was held that the failure to raise or the absence of an objection on the part of
the prosecution in an application for bail does not dispense with the requirement of a bail hearing.
Thus
Even the alleged failure of the prosecution to interpose an objection to the granting of bail
to the accused will not justify such grant without hearing. This Court has uniformly ruled
that even if the prosecution refuses to adduce evidence or fails to interpose any objection
to the motion for bail, it is still mandatory for the court to conduct a hearing or ask
searching and clarificatory questions from which it may infer the strength of the evidence
of guilt, or lack of it, against the accused. Where the prosecutor refuses to adduce
evidence in opposition to the application to grant and fix bail, the court may ask the
prosecution such questions as would ascertain the strength of the States evidence or
judge the adequacy of the amount of the bail. Irrespective of respondent judges opinion
that the evidence of guilt against the accused is not strong, the law and settled
jurisprudence demand that a hearing be conducted before bail may be fixed for the
temporary release of the accused, if bail is at all justified.
Thus, although the provincial prosecutor had interposed no objection to the grant of bail
to the accused, the respondent judge therein should nevertheless have set the petition for
bail for hearing and diligently ascertain from the prosecution whether the latter was not
in fact contesting the bail application. In addition, a hearing was also necessary for the
court to take into consideration the guidelines set forth in the then Section 6, Rule 114 of
the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure for the fixing of the amount of the bail. Only after
respondent judge had satisfied himself that these requirements have been met could he
then proceed to rule on whether or not to grant bail.
Clearly therefore, the respondent Judge cannot seek refuge on the alleged belated objection of the
prosecution to the order dated July 22, 1994 issued by his predecessor, Judge Paterno T. Alvarez;
nor on the prosecutions failure to file a comment to the accuseds motion for reconsideration of the
August 11, 2000 order denying the application for bail.

It is certainly erroneous for the respondent to rely on the order of Judge Paterno T. Alvarez. As a
responsible judge, he should have looked into the real and hard facts of the case before him and
ascertained personally whether the evidence of guilt is strong.14 To make things worse, respondent
Judge relied on the said July 22, 1994 order despite the fact that the same appears to have been
issued by his predecessor Judge also without a hearing and while the accused was at large. In
addition to the requirement of a mandatory bail hearing, respondent judge should have known the
basic rule that the right to bail can only be availed of by a person who is in custody of the law or
otherwise deprived of his liberty and it would be premature, not to say incongruous, to file a
petition for bail for someone whose freedom has yet to be curtailed. 15
In Basco v. Rapatalo,16 the Court laid down the following rules which outlined the duties of a judge in
case an application for bail is filed:
(1) Notify the prosecutor of the hearing of the application for bail or require him to
submit his recommendation;
(2) Conduct a hearing of the application for bail regardless of whether or not the
prosecution refuses to present evidence to show that the guilt of the accused is strong for
the purpose of enabling the court to exercise its discretion;
(3) Decide whether the evidence of guilt of the accused is strong based on the summary of
evidence of the prosecution;
(4) If the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge the accused upon the approval of the
bailbond. Otherwise, petition should be denied.
Based on the above-cited procedure and requirements, after the hearing, the courts order granting
or refusing bail must contain a summary of the evidence for the prosecution.17 A summary is defined
as a comprehensive and usually brief abstract or digest of a text or statement. Based on the
summary of evidence, the judge formulates his own conclusion on whether such evidence is strong
enough to indicate the guilt of the accused.18
In the instant case, it appears that when the respondent judge initially granted the prosecutions
motion praying that the accused be denied bail, no hearing was conducted. Irrespective of his
opinion on the strength or weakness of evidence of the accuseds guilt, he should have conducted a
hearing and thereafter made a summary of the evidence for the prosecution. The importance of a
bail hearing and a summary of evidence cannot be downplayed, these are considered aspects of
procedural due process for both the prosecution and the defense; its absence will invalidate the
grant or denial of bail.19
The indispensable nature of a bail hearing in petitions for bail has always been ardently and
indefatigably stressed by the Court. The Code of Judicial Conduct enjoins judges to be faithful to the
law and maintain professional competence. A judge is called upon to exhibit more than just a
cursory acquaintance with statutes and procedural rules; it is imperative that he be conversant with
basic legal principles and be aware of well-settled authoritative doctrines. He should strive for
excellence exceeded only by his passion for truth, to the end that he be the personification of justice
and the Rule of Law.20
In Dericto v. Bautista,21 the Court imposed a fine of P5,000.00 on the respondent Judge for granting
bail without conducting a bail hearing. We explained therein that although the Rules of Court
authorize the investigating judge to determine the amount of bail, such authority does not include
the outright granting of bail without a preliminary hearing on the matter, more so in cases where
the crime charged is punishable with death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment. And while it
may be true that the determination of whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong is a matter of
judicial discretion, this discretion lies not in the determination of whether or not a hearing should
be held, but in the appreciation and evaluation of the weight of the prosecutions evidence of guilt
against the accused.
In Goodman v. De La Victoria,22 the erring Judge was found guilty of serious misconduct in office and
ordered to pay a fine of P5,000.00 for failing to conduct a bail hearing in the manner required by
law. It was held that the brief inquiry conducted by the said Judge before granting bail did not
constitute the hearing mandated by law, for such proceeding did not elicit evidence from the
prosecution to guide respondent in the proper determination of the petition.
In Marzan-Gelacio v. Flores,23 the Court sustained the recommendation of the OCA to impose the
penalty of fine in the amount of P10,000.00 on the erring judge for granting bail without hearing to
the accused in a rape case.
In Cabatingan, Sr. v. Arcueno,24 the Court imposed the penalty of fine of 15,000.00 on the
investigating Judge for denying bail on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. In said case, the accused
was arrested in the municipality presided by the respondent judge. The Court ruled that the latter
had the authority to grant bail and to order the release of the accused, even if the records of the case
had been transmitted for review to the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor. The Court further noted
therein that the respondent Judge was previously found guilty of gross ignorance of the law and
ordered to pay a fine of P5,000.00, when without a hearing, he granted bail to an accused charged
with a capital offense.
In the following cases, the Court imposed a P20,000.00 fine on the Judges found to be grossly
ignorant of the rules and procedures in granting or denying bail, to wit:
(1) Manonggiring v. Ibrahim,25 where the respondent Judge, in violation of Rule 114,
Section 17(b), of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, granted bail to the accused in
a criminal case which was then pending with another branch involving an offense
punishable by reclusion perpetua to death;
(2) Panganiban v. Cupin-Tesorero,26 where the erring Municipal Trial Court Judge who
conducted the preliminary investigation granted bail to the accused (a) without
jurisdiction and in violation of Rule 114, Section 17a, of the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure, the corresponding Information against the accused being pending with the
Regional Trial Court; (b) without notice to the prosecutor of the request to approve the
bail bond in violation of Rule 114, Section 18; and (c) without conducting a bail hearing;
(3) Tabao v. Barataman,27 and Comia v. Antona,28 where the Judges concerned entertained
an application for bail even though the court had not yet acquired jurisdiction over the
person of the accused.
(4) Layola v. Gabo, Jr.,29 where a Regional Trial Court Judge granted bail in a murder case
without the requisite bail hearing.
The record shows that this is not the first administrative case of the respondent Judge. In a decision
promulgated on April 17, 2001, in RTJ-01-1627, he was found guilty of gross inefficiency for failure
to resolve a civil case within the three-month reglementary period and consequently ordered to pay
a fine of P5,000.00. For this second infraction, respondent Judge deserves a heavier penalty.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, respondent Judge Arnulfo O. Bugtas is ordered to pay a
FINE in the amount of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) and STERNLY WARNED that a
repetition of the same or similar acts shall be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
 G.R. No. 135045 December 15, 2000
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HON. IRENEO GAKO, JR. (Presiding Judge of the
Regional Trial Court, 7th Judicial Region, Branch 5, Cebu City) and VICENTE GO, respondents.
DECISION
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:
Before us is an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45, Rules of Court of the Resolution1 of public
respondent Court of Appeals (Former Third Special Division) dated August 12, 1998 in CA-G.R. SP
No. 47142, entitled "PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES versus HON. IRENEO GAKO, JR. ET. AL.,"
dismissing the petition of the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), herein petitioner.
This instant petition stems from a murder case filed against private respondent Vicente Go (Go) and
two co-accused Sonny Herodias (Herodias) and Leopoldo dela Pea (de la Pea). The victim, Rafael
Galan, Sr. (Galan, Sr.), was shot dead on June 25, 1991.
Judge Priscila S. Agana (Judge Agana) originally presided over the criminal case subject of this
petition. The prosecution sought to inhibit said judge for her alleged collusion with the accused
when she repeatedly sustained the objections of the defense every time the prosecution attempted
to establish the conspiracy to kill the victim. Judge Agana denied the motion to inhibit and dismissed
the case with prejudice on the ground that the rights of the accused to a speedy trial were violated.
The prosecution challenged the dismissal in the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 32954.
In its Decision dated April 18, 1994, the Court of Appeals set aside the order of dismissal, granted
the inhibition of the judge, and ordered the re-raffle of the case. The decision of the Court of Appeals
gained finality when this Court dismissed the appeal of private respondent Go and co-accused
Herodias in a Minute Resolution dated June 26, 1995. The criminal case was thus set for retrial. A
series of delays beset the case when the judges to whom the case was raffled inhibited themselves.
The case was finally presided over by public respondent Judge Ireneo Gako, Jr (Judge Gako, Jr.).
With the foregoing events as backdrop, the pertinent facts that led to the filing of this instant
petition are as follows:
On July 3, 1991, de la Pea executed an Extra-judicial Confession implicating therein Herodias and
Go in the conspiracy to kill and murder the victim.
On July 9, 1991, an Information was filed against the three accused namely, de la Pea, Herodias and
Go, charging them with the murder of Galan, Sr. and the case was docketed as Criminal Case No.
CBU-22474. Judge Godardo Jacinto,2 then the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu
City, issued a Warrant of Arrest against the accused.
On July 22, 1991 an Urgent Motion to Confine private respondent Go in a hospital was filed.
On August 2, 1991, the hearing on said motion was conducted with the prosecution reserving its
right to cross-examine Dr. Gonzales.
On August 6, 1991 an Order was issued to confine private respondent Go in a hospital without the
prosecution having cross-examined Dr. Gonzales on his medical report.
On July 15, 1992, a hearing was conducted where de la Pea was presented as a witness for the
prosecution. Presiding Judge Agana sustained the objections of the defense counsels each time that
the prosecution attempted to establish the conspiracy to kill the victim. The prosecution filed a
motion to inhibit Judge Agana, which motion was denied.
On November 20, 1992, the Information against Go and Herodias was dismissed with prejudice on
the ground that their right to a speedy trial had been violated, leaving de la Pea to face trial.
The prosecution then challenged the Order of Dismissal with Prejudice before the Court of Appeals
in CA-GR SP No. 32954. In its Decision dated April 18, 1994, the Court of Appeals annulled and set
aside the Order of Dismissal, ordered the inhibition of Judge Agana, and ordered the raffle of the
case to another branch. With the dismissal of the appeal of private respondent Go and co-accused
Herodias by this Court in a Minute Resolution dated June 26, 1995, the criminal case was set anew
for trial.
The case was re-raffled to RTC-17 and on October 28, 1996, an Alias Warrant of Arrest was issued
against private respondent Go and co-accused Herodias.
On February 2, 1997, Dr. Matig-a, the physician of Go, filed a Clinical Summary on the illness of Go
and on February 13, 1997 Go filed a Petition for Bail.
On March 7, 1997 and March 10, 1997, the prosecution presented de la Pea who was acquitted in
1993. De la Pea testified on matters which he was not allowed by then presiding Judge Agana to
testify on.
On March 21, 1997, a Manifestation on the Confinement of private respondent Vicente Go was filed
urging his arrest because he was out of the intensive care unit.
The motion of the prosecution to transfer the criminal case to a Special Heinous Crimes Court was
denied by then presiding Judge Jesus de la Pea (Judge de la Pea). The case was finally assigned to
Branch 5 with public respondent Judge Gako, Jr. as presiding judge.
On September 16 and 17, 1997, the hearing was resumed, now presided by public respondent Judge
Gako, Jr.
On September 26, 1997, an Urgent Motion to Enforce the Alias Warrant of Arrest was filed praying
for the arrest of private respondent Go first before his Clinical Summary Report could be heard.
On November 10, 1997, public respondent Judge Gako, Jr. issued an Order granting the Petition for
Bail of private respondent Go.
On November 11, 1997, the prosecution filed a Vehement Motion to Inhibit public respondent Judge
Gako, Jr. due to his alleged delay in resolving the incidents in connection with the arrest of private
respondent Go.
On November 12, 1992, the prosecution moved for the reconsideration of the Order of the court
dated November 10, 1997, the order which granted bail to private respondent Go.
On November 14, 1997, a Supplemental Motion to Inhibit public respondent Judge Gako, Jr. was filed
by the counsel of the offended party because Judge Gako, Jr. allegedly pre-judged the evidence of the
prosecution without carefully evaluating why it is short of the requirement to sustain a verdict of
life imprisonment.
On November 15, 1997, a Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration was filed from the Order dated
November 10, 1997 because the transcripts were allegedly not read.
On December 1, 1997, a Motion for the Issuance of Subpoena Duces Tecum to produce the records of
Dr. Matig-a was filed to determine if the medical findings on private respondent Go were not
exaggerated to prevent his arrest.
On December 11, 1997, public respondent Judge Gako, Jr. issued an Order in which he denied the
prosecutions Manifestation dated March 21, 1997 on the confinement of private respondent Go, and
the Urgent Motion to Enforce the Alias Warrant of Arrest dated September 26, 1997 against private
respondent Go.
On January 20, 1998, public respondent Judge Gako, Jr. issued an Order denying the: (1) Motion for
Reconsideration of the Order dated November 10, 1997; (2) Motion to Inhibit; and (3) Supplemental
Motion to Inhibit the Presiding Judge. The prosecution received this order on February 10, 1998.
On March 20, 1998, private complainant Guadalupe Galan (Galan), the widow of the victim, filed a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 471460 before
public respondent Court of Appeals. The petition sought to annul or set aside the orders of public
respondent Judge Gako, Jr. and then acting Presiding Judge de la Pea, to wit:
a) Order dated May 23, 1997, which set aside the earlier order of the court that granted the re-raffle
of this case to a heinous crime court upon the defenses motion for reconsideration.
b) Order dated November 10, 1997, the dispositive portion of which reads:
"WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the court hereby grants bail to accused Vicente Go which is
fixed at 50,000.00, after taking into consideration, and this fact has not been disputed, that said
accused is presently confined in the hospital and is suffering from the following ailments:
a) Ischemic Heart Disease, S/P Coronary Angiogram, Single Vessel Disease, LAD, Chronic Stable
Angina;
b) Essential Hypertension;
c) NIDDM
d) Hypercholesterolemia; and
e) Respiratory Tract Infection
And, as per clerical summary report of Dr. Generoso Matiga, dated February 4, 1997, the
confinement of accused Go in prison will cause his disease to terminate fatally.
xxx
c) Order dated December 11, 1997, the dispositive portion of which reads:
"WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Manifestation dated March 3, 1997 and the Motion to
Enforce the Alias Warrant of Arrest are hereby denied for want of merit. Besides the accused was
already released on bail and the issue on the enforcement of the Alias Warrants of Arrest is already
moot and academic.
d) Order dated January 20, 1998, the dispositive portion of which reads:
"WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Omnibus Motions for Reconsideration on the order of
the court granting Bail to accused Vicente Go with Supplemental pleading, xxx and thirdly, to
disqualify the herein Presiding Judge, are hereby denied for lack of merit. xxx"3
The petition was signed by the counsel of private complainant, Atty. Antonio Guerrero with the
conformity of Vidal Gella, Prosecutor I of the Office of the City Prosecutor of Cebu City.
On March 26, 1998, public respondent Court of Appeals (Special Third Division) issued a Resolution
dismissing the said petition on these grounds: (1) that the petition was not filed by the Solicitor
General in behalf of the People of the Philippines; and (2) that the certification on non-forum
shopping was signed by counsel for petitioner Galan, not by petitioner herself.4
On April 14, 1998, private complainant Galan, through counsel, filed a Motion for Reconsideration of
said Resolution indicating that petitioner OSG was going to adopt her petition. On the same date,
petitioner OSG manifested before public respondent Court of Appeals that it was joining private
complainant Galan in her petition and was adopting her petition as its own.
On June 18, 1998, the Court of Appeals issued a resolution that denied said motion for
reconsideration of private complainant Galan on the ground that the certification on non-forum
shopping was not signed by therein petitioner Galan. The Court of Appeals also reasoned that "the
fact that the OSG joined petitioner Galan in her petition did not cure the above deficiency".5
Petitioner OSG received copy of the resolution on June 29, 1998.
On August 3, 1998 petitioner OSG filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
with the Court of Appeals docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 47142.
On August 12, 1998, said petition of petitioner OSG was dismissed by public respondent Court of
Appeals, the pertinent portions of the resolution read:
"The Court notes that said petition is practically a reproduction of the petition earlier filed by
complainant Guadalupe Galan, which was dismissed on March 26, 1998. The dismissal was
reaffirmed by the Court in its resolution dated June 18, 1998, copy of which was received by the OSG
on June 29, 1998.
Instead of seeking, on time, the amendment of the first petition or a review of the resolution
dismissing it, the OSG has come to this Court through the instant petition which not only raises the
same matters ventilated in the same petition but also was filed beyond the 60-day period prescribed
in Section 4, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition dated July 17, 1998, is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED."
In seeking the allowance of this instant petition, petitioner OSG relies upon the following grounds:
I. PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT GIVING DUE COURSE TO
THE SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION OF (sic) CERTIORARI FILED BY PETITIONER DOCKETED AS
CA-G.R. SP NO. 47142.
II. PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT SAID SPECIAL
CIVIL ACTION WAS FILED BEYOND THE SIXTY-DAY PERIOD PRESCRIBED IN SECTION 4,
RULE 65 OF THE 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE.
III.PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT TOUCHING ON THE
MERITS OF THE SAID PETITION.7
Public respondent Court of Appeals correctly ruled that there was sufficient ground to dismiss the
petition filed by private complainant Galan since it was her counsel who signed the certificate on
non-forum shopping and not private complainant herself. The petition clearly failed to comply with
the requirement imposed by Section 1, Rule 658 , in relation to Section 3, Rule 469 of the 1997 Rules
of Court. We also agree with the Court of Appeals, that the mere fact that petitioner OSG manifested
that it was adopting the petition of therein petitioner Galan did not cure the defective petition
considering that the certificate on non-forum shopping was still not signed by petitioner Galan but
by her counsel. The manifestation of petitioner OSG also did not contain a certification on non-forum
shopping. By the time that petitioner OSG filed its petition for certiorari in behalf of the People of the
Philippines on August 3, 1998, the dismissal of the petition of private complainant Galan had already
been reaffirmed and the 60-day period for petitioner OSG to file its petition had already lapsed.
In dismissing the petition of petitioner OSG, public respondent Court of Appeals pointed out that
private complainant Galan had no legal standing to file the petition before it because "only the
Solicitor General can represent the People before this Court (Court of Appeals) and the Supreme
Court".10 On this point, we differ.
In the recent case of Narciso vs. Romana-Cruz11 , we reiterated the doctrine enunciated in People vs.
Calo12 that:
"While the rule is, as held by the Court of Appeals, only the Solicitor General may bring or defend
actions on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines, or represent the People or the State in criminal
proceeding pending in this Court and the Court of Appeals (Republic vs. Partisala, 118 SCRA 320
[1982]), the ends of substantial justice would be better served, and the issues in this action could be
determined in a more just, speedy and inexpensive manner, by entertaining the petition at bar. As
an offended party in a criminal case, private petitioner has sufficient personality and a valid
grievance against Judge Adaos order granting bail to the alleged murderers of his (private
petitioners) father.
In Paredes vs. Gopengco, 29 SCRA 688 (1969), this Court ruled that the offended parties in criminal
cases have sufficient interest and personality as "person(s) aggrieved" to file the special civil action
of prohibition and certiorari under Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 65 in line with the underlying spirit of
the liberal construction of the Rules of Court in order to promote their object, thus:
Furthermore, as offended parties in the pending criminal case before petitioner judge, it cannot be
gainsaid that respondents have sufficient interest and personality as person(s) aggrieved by
petitioner judges ruling on his non-disqualification to file the special civil action under sections 1
and 2 of Rule 65. Recently in line with the underlying spirit of a liberal construction of the Rules of
Court in order to promote their object, as against the literal application of Rule 110, section 2, we
held, overruling the implication of an earlier case, that a widow possesses the right as an offended
party to file a criminal complaint for the murder of her deceased husband. (Id., p. 699)"13
Hence, private complainant Galan had sufficient interest and personality as the aggrieved party14 in
a criminal case to file the special civil action for certiorari before public respondent Court of
Appeals. The proper ground therefore for dismissing her petition is the fact that it was her counsel
who signed the certificate on non-forum shopping and not herself as petitioner.
Petitioner OSG submits that assuming that the petition for certiorari it filed with public respondent
Court of Appeals was filed out of time, nonetheless the following issues raised in said petition
warranted resolution:
I. WHETHER OR NOT THE ORDER DATED NOVEMBER 10, 1997 GRANTING BAIL IS
PROPER WITHOUT EXPRESSING THE COURTS FINDING THAT THE EVIDENCE OF GUILT
OF THE ACCUSED IS NOT STRONG.
II. WHETHER OR NOT PRIVATE RESPONDENT VICENTE GO IS CONSIDERED UNDER
LEGAL CUSTODY AS OF NOVEMBER 20, 1992 UNTIL THE PRESENT BECAUSE OF HIS
HOSPITAL CONFINEMENT BY ORDER OF THE COURT DATED AUGUST 6, 1991.
III. WHETHER OR NOT IT IS NECESSARY THAT CRIMINAL CASE NO. CBU-22474 SHOULD
BE TRIED BY THE SPECIAL HEINOUS CRIMES COURT NOTWITHSTANDING THAT THE
MURDER WAS COMMITTED IN 1991 BEFORE THE PASSAGE OF THE LAW CREATING
THESE SPECIAL COURTS.
This instant petition also seeks to set aside the following orders: (1) Order dated May 23, 1997
which set aside the earlier order of the trial court that granted the re-raffle of this case to a heinous
crime court upon the motion for reconsideration of the defense; (2) Order dated November 10, 1997
that granted the bail of accused Go in the amount of P 50,000.00; (3) Order dated December 11,
1997 denying the Motion to Enforce the Alias Warrants of arrest; and (4) Order dated January 20,
1998 denying the Omnibus Motions for Reconsideration of the order of the court granting bail to
accused Go and ruling against the disqualification of respondent Judge Gako, Jr.
While the petition of private complainant Galan was indeed defective in form and the petition of
petitioner OSG was demonstrably filed beyond the 60-day period, we however resolve to grant this
petition in part in view of the primordial interest of substantial justice.
The just cited issues in the petition before public respondent Court of Appeals presented
extenuating circumstances that should have compelled the latter to pass upon the merits of said
petition. In a number of cases,15 we have set aside the strict application of procedural technicalities
in the higher interest of justice. As we shall show hereunder, the issues raised by petitioner OSG
deserve disposition to avoid a miscarriage of justice and to end the streaks of delay which have
saddled the criminal case subject of this petition.
First, the assailed Order dated November 10, 1997 granting bail is legally infirm for failing to
conform with the requirement that in cases when the granting of bail is not a matter of right, a
hearing for that purpose must first be conducted. Section 13, Article III of the Constitution provides
the instances when bail is a matter of right or discretionary, to wit:
"All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of
guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on
recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required."
Section 7, Article 114 of the Rules of Court, as amended, reiterates that:
"No person charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, when evidence of guilt is strong, shall be admitted to bail regardless of the stage of
the criminal prosecution."
Based on the foregoing, bail is not a matter of right with respect to persons charged with a crime the
penalty for which is reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment, or death, when the evidence of guilt is
strong. Private respondent Go, accused in the criminal case, was charged with murder in 1991,
before the passage of RA 7659, the law that re-imposed the death penalty. Murder then was a crime
punishable by reclusion perpetua. Thus, accused Gos right to bail is merely discretionary.
We have consistently held that when bail is discretionary, a hearing, whether summary or otherwise
in the discretion of the court, should first be conducted to determine the existence of strong
evidence or lack of it, against the accused to enable the judge to make an intelligent assessment of
the evidence presented by the parties.16 A summary hearing is defined as "such brief and speedy
method of receiving and considering the evidence of guilt as is practicable and consistent with the
purpose of hearing which is merely to determine the weight of evidence for the purposes of bail. On
such hearing, the court does not sit to try the merits or to enter into any nice inquiry as to the
weight that ought to be allowed to the evidence for or against the accused, nor will it speculate on
the outcome of the trial or on what further evidence may be therein offered and admitted. The
course of inquiry may be left to the discretion of the court which may confine itself to receiving such
evidence as has reference to substantial matters, avoiding unnecessary examination and cross
examination".17
It is inconceivable how Judge Gako, Jr. could have appreciated the strength or weakness of the
evidence of guilt of the accused when he did not even bother to hear the prosecution. The reliance of
Judge Gako, Jr. on the "voluminous records" of the case simply does not suffice. As judge, he was
mandated to conduct a hearing on the petition for bail of the accused since he knew that the crime
charged is one that carries a penalty of reclusion perpetua, and in that hearing, the prosecution is
entitled to present its evidence. It is worth stressing that the prosecution is equally entitled to due
process.18
Another compelling reason why a hearing of a petition for bail is necessary is to determine the
amount of bail based on the guidelines set forth in Section 6, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court.19
Without the required hearing, the bail granted to accused Go in the amount of P 50,000.00 is
undoubtedly arbitrary and without basis.
Second, the order granting bail issued by Judge Gako, Jr. merely made a conclusion without a
summary of the evidence, a substantive and formal defect that voids the grant of bail. Well settled is
the rule that after the hearing, whether the bail is granted or denied, the presiding judge is
mandated to prepare a summary of the evidence for the prosecution. A summary is defined as "a
comprehensive and usually brief abstract or digest of a text or statement".20 Based on the summary
of evidence, the judge formulates his own conclusion on whether such evidence is strong enough to
indicate the guilt of the accused. The importance of a summary cannot be downplayed, it is
considered an aspect of procedural due process for both the prosecution and the defense; its
absence will invalidate the grant or denial of bail.21
Thus, we laid down the duties of a judge in case an application for bail is filed, viz:
"(1) Notify the prosecutor of the hearing for bail or require him to submit his
recommendation;
(2) Conduct a hearing of the application for bail regardless of whether or not the
prosecution refuses to present evidence to show that the guilt of the accused is strong for
the purpose of enabling the court to exercise its discretion;
(3) Decide whether the evidence of guilt of the accused is strong based on the summary of
evidence of the prosecution; (Italics supplied)
(4) If the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge the accused upon the approval of the
bail bond. Otherwise, petition should be denied."22
In dispensing with the required hearing for bail, Judge Gako, Jr. pointed out in the assailed order that
the accused was confined in the hospital, was suffering from a number of ailments and that the
eventual confinement of accused Go in prison will allegedly "cause his disease to terminate
fatally".23 The irregularity in the grant of bail however is not attenuated since respondent judges
findings were based on the summary clinical report of Dr. Matiga dated February 4, 1997 while the
order granting bail was issued on November 10, 1997. It could not therefore be reasonably assumed
that the actual state of health of accused Go could still be accurately reflected by the said medical
report when nine months had already passed from the time that said medical report was prepared.
It was therefore clear error for Judge Gako, Jr. to depend solely on the dated medical report in
granting bail when the defense failed to present a more recent one that would convincingly raise
strong grounds to apprehend that the imprisonment of the accused would endanger his life.
Petitioner OSG advances the theory that the accused, private respondent Go, is not entitled to bail
because he was allegedly not under the custody of the law at the time that he applied for bail.
Petitioner OSG anchors this theory on the following arguments: that the August 6, 1991order
commanding the confinement of accused Go in the hospital was void because the prosecution was
not able to cross-examine the doctor who prepared the medical report pertaining to the accused
illnesses; that when the Information in this case was ordered dismissed with prejudice on
November 20, 1992 by then presiding Judge Agana, accused Go was bodily released from his
confinement; that at that point, the trial court had lost its jurisdiction over the person of the
accused; that before the dismissal with prejudice was voided by the Court of Appeals, accused
traveled extensively abroad; that when the case was re-raffled and finally presided by Judge Gako,
Jr. accused continued to be confined in the hospital on the strength of the allegedly void order of
confinement dated August 6, 1991; that Judge Gako, Jr. refused to enforce the alias warrant of arrest
on the ground that the order of confinement was still in effect; and that accused Go voluntarily
admitted himself to the hospital, hence was not yet deprived of his liberty at the time that he applied
for bail.
We must first correct the perception that the trial court was ousted of its jurisdiction over the
person of accused Go after Judge Agana erroneously dismissed the case and upon the refusal of
Judge Gako, Jr. to enforce the alias warrant of arrest during the re-trial of the case. Applicable to this
issue is the basic principle that the jurisdiction of a court, whether in criminal or civil cases, once it
attaches cannot be ousted by subsequent happenings or events although of a character which would
have prevented jurisdiction from attaching in the first instance; and it retains jurisdiction until it
finally disposes of the case.24
Prior to the dismissal of the case by Judge Agana, the court had already acquired its jurisdiction over
accused Go when he was duly arraigned on December 11, 1991.25 The fact that this Court affirmed
the decision of the Court of Appeals that voided the order dismissing the criminal case with
prejudice is a clear declaration that the jurisdiction of the trial court over the criminal case and over
the person of the accused continued to subsist. With the nullification of the dismissal of the case, it
then became explicit that the court should have tried the case to its end. The case was ordered
remanded and re-raffled because the inhibition of then presiding Judge Agana was granted, in no
way was the jurisdiction of the trial court over the case and over the person of the accused ever
placed in doubt.
We now discuss the theory of petitioner OSG that the right of accused Go to bail did not accrue
because he was not under the custody of the law or deprived of his liberty. Petitioner OSG rests this
claim on the allegations that accused Go voluntarily admitted himself to the hospital during the re-
trial of the case and that Judge Gako, Jr. refused to enforce the alias warrant of arrest as evidenced
by the questioned Order dated December 11, 1997.
By the very definition of bail in Section 1, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court26 , the person applying for
bail must be in the custody of the law. A person is considered to be in the custody of the law (a)
when he is arrested either by virtue of a warrant of arrest issued pursuant to Section 6, Rule 112, or
even without a warrant under Section 5, Rule 113 in relation to Section 7, Rule 112 of the Revised
Rules of Court, or (b) when he has voluntarily submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court by
surrendering to the proper authorities.27
We do not agree with petitioner OSG that accused Go was not in custody of the law at the time that
he applied for bail. In the same assailed order, Judge Gako, Jr. explained his refusal to enforce the
alias warrant of arrest in this manner:
"Secondly, the movant wanted this court to order the arrest of the accused in view of the Alias
Warrant of Arrest issued by Acting Judge Andres Garalza, Jr. on October 28, 1996. For the
information of the movant, there is another Alias Warrant of Arrest issued by Judge Jose Burgos on
May 27, 1996 after he denied the Investigation Report submitted by the Office of the Cebu City
Prosecutor which recommended the dismissal of the case against Vicente Go.
The court believes honestly that these two (2) Alias Warrants of Arrest were improvidently issued
because at that time the Warrant of Arrest issued by then Judge Godardo Jacinto on July 9, 1991 was
still valid and subsisting. In fact it was this latter Warrant of Arrest that handed to this court
jurisdiction over the person of the accused Go.
The Alias Warrant of Arrest issued by Judge Burgos has no legal basis not only because the Warrant
of Arrest issued by Judge Jacinto is still valid and subsisting but also for the fact that it was issued as
an aftermath of the courts denial of the Reinvestigation Report of the Office of the Cebu City
Prosecutor which recommended the dismissal of Gos case. Under Section 6, Rule 112 of the 1985
Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended, the Regional Trial Court may issue a warrant of arrest
after a preliminary investigation, not after reinvestigation when one was already was (sic) issued.
Likewise, the Alias Warrant of Arrest issued by Judge Garalza, which came about five months (5)
later, had no legal basis, firstly, because there was already an Alias Warrant of Arrest issued by
Judge Burgos on May 27, 1996, secondly, the Warrant of Arrest issued by Judge Jacinto on July 9,
1991 is still valid and subsisting. But what appears more funny is the Alias Warrant of Arrest issued
by Judge Garalza against accused Go who was at that time lawfully confined in the hospital pursuant
to an Order of the court, dated August 6, 1991. When Judge Garalza issued said alias (sic) Warrant of
Arrest, there was no showing that accused Go had escaped, or refused to obey a lawful Order of the
court.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Manifestation, dated March 21, 1997, and the Motion to
Enforce the Alias Warrant of Arrest are hereby denied for want of merit. Besides, the accused was
already released on bail and the issue on the enforcement of the Alias Warrants of Arrest is already
moot and academic."28
As pointed out by Judge Gako, Jr., accused Go had already been arrested on the basis of a warrant of
arrest issued by Judge Jacinto on July 9, 1991 which gave the trial court jurisdiction over the
accused. As mentioned earlier, accused Go was duly arraigned before the case was erroneously
dismissed. From the time that accused Go was arrested, he was already deprived of his liberty and
was in the custody of the law. At the re-trial of the case, accused Gos confinement in the hospital
was by virtue of a court order dated August 6, 1991; the restraint on the freedom of accused Go is
evident. There was therefore no more need to enforce the alias warrant of arrest since accused Go
was still under the custody of the law, and there being no evidence that accused Go had escaped or
refused to obey a lawful order of the court. At this point, the setting aside of the questioned order
dated December 11, 1997 that denied the enforcement of the alias warrant of arrest against accused
Go has become moot and academic with the provisional freedom of accused Go after his bail was
erroneously granted by Judge Gako, Jr.
We however find merit in the argument of petitioner OSG that the order dated August 6, 1991
authorizing the confinement of accused Go in the hospital was, in the words of petitioner OSG, a
"continuing one and built-in license for the accused to automatically confine himself as many times
as he likes".1wphi1 It may be true that said order subsisted for it was never quashed, but at the re-
trial of the case, the prosecution through its motion to enforce the alias warrant of arrest dated
September 26, 1997 had already put in issue the health of the accused. Yet, Judge Gako, Jr. in an
Order dated December 11, 1997 justified the confinement of accused Go in the hospital on the basis
of the August 6, 1991 order of confinement.
The prosecution vigorously objected to the confinement of accused Go in the hospital, questioning
the alleged ill health of the accused. Judge Gako, Jr. was called upon to rule on this matter and
instead of ascertaining the true state of health of said accused, Judge Gako, Jr. instead inexplicably
relied on a court order authorizing the confinement of accused Go in the hospital, an order that was
issued six years ago. The proper course of action in this case should have been to recall the order of
confinement and to order the detention of accused Go until the defense could prove through
competent evidence that the imprisonment of said accused would imperil his health. The order to
arrest accused Go in such case would be the consequence of the recall of the order of confinement,
not for the purpose of placing him under the custody of the law since to repeat, he already was
under the custody of the law.
As discussed earlier, accused Go is currently already out on bail,29 the granting of which is void for
want of a hearing and summary of evidence. In cases when the grant of bail is void, this Court will
not hesitate to set aside the order granting bail and order that the accused be recommitted to jail
pending his application for bail,30 as this Court now holds in the case at bar.
As to the issue of whether or not public respondent Judge Gako, Jr. should be inhibited on the
ground of partiality, the relevant provision to consider is Section 1, Rule 137 of the Rules of Court, it
provides:
"SECTION 1. Disqualification of judges.No judge or judicial officer shall sit in any case in which he,
or his wife or child, is pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise, or in which he is
related to either party within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity, or to counsel within the
fourth degree, computed according to the rules of civil law, or in which he has been executor,
administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel, or in which he has presided in any inferior court when
his ruling or decision is the subject of review, without the written consent of all parties in interest,
signed by them and entered upon the records.
A judge, may in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself from sitting in a case, for just
or valid reasons other than those mentioned above."
The ground of partiality is not one of the grounds enumerated in the first paragraph of the just
quoted provision that would per se disqualify a judge from sitting in a case. Jurisprudence is clear
that partiality is a recognized ground for the voluntary inhibition of the judge under the second
paragraph of Section 1, Rule 137.31 In this case, Judge Gako, Jr. has already ruled in the assailed
Order dated January 20, 1998 that he will not inhibit himself.
To overturn the ruling of Judge Gako, Jr. and rule for his disqualification, there must be clear and
convincing evidence to prove the charge of partiality. Material to this issue are the following
parameters we have set in disqualifying a judge: mere suspicion that a judge was partial to a party is
not enough; that there should be adequate evidence to prove the charge; that there must be showing
that the judge had an interest, personal or otherwise, in the prosecution of the case at bar; and that
to be disqualifying, the bias and prejudice must be shown to have stemmed from an extra-judicial
source and result in an opinion on the merits on some basis other than what the judge learned from
his participation in the case.32
Petitioner OSG accuses Judge Gako, Jr. of partiality supposedly shown by the grant of bail without a
hearing and the alleged suppression of the hearing on the Clinical Summary Report of the accused.
Again, to successfully disqualify a judge on the ground of bias or partiality, there must be concrete
proof that a judge has a personal interest in the case and his bias is shown to have stemmed from an
extra-judicial source. This precept springs from the presumption that a judge shall decide on the
merits of a case with an unclouded vision of its facts.33 Thus, we have held that an erroneous ruling
on the grant of bail alone does not constitute evidence of bias.34 Likewise, respondent judges
reliance on the order of confinement even if erroneous is not sufficient to point to a conclusion that
he was manifestly partial to the defense. To allow the disqualification of a judge on the mere
allegation of partiality with nothing more would open the floodgates to forum shopping.35
Corollary to the foregoing, we do not find well taken the recommendation of petitioner OSG that the
criminal case be raffled to a Special Heinous Crimes Court. Even petitioner OSG concededly
recognizes that Supreme Court Administrative Order No. 51-96 dated May 3, 1996 creating the
Special Heinous Crimes Court provides that: "All cases covered by this order where trial has already
been commenced shall continue to be heard by the branches to which these were originally
assigned". Supreme Court Administrative Order No. 104-96 dated October 21, 1996 which amended
Supreme Court Administrative Order No. 51-96, also contains a similar provision, to wit: "Where
trial has already begun, the same shall continue to be heard by the respective branches to which
they have been originally assigned. For purposes hereof, a criminal case is considered begun when
the accused or any of them has already been arraigned; in a civil case, it is when pre-trial has
already been conducted and a pre-trial order issued."
We thus see no cogent reason to set aside the order dated May 23, 1997 that denied the transfer of
Criminal Case No. CBU-22474 to a Special Heinous Crimes Court when the trial of the case has
already begun and when the crime for which the accused is being charged with occurred prior to the
creation of the Special Heinous Crimes Court. Furthermore, there are no extraordinary
circumstances that would compel this Court to exercise its power under the Constitution to order a
change of venue or place of trial.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the assailed resolution of public respondent Court of
Appeals dated August 12, 1998 is SET ASIDE. The order dated November 10, 1997 of the trial court
in Criminal Case No. CBU-22474 is SET ASIDE for being void in so far as it grants bail to the accused
and the accused is ordered recommitted to jail pending the hearing on the bail application. The
order dated May 23, 1997 denying the re-raffle of Criminal Case No. CBU-22474 to a Special Heinous
Crimes Court and the resolution dated January 20, 1997 ruling against the inhibition of presiding
Judge Ireneo Gako, Jr. are hereby AFFIRMED. The court a quo is ordered to proceed with dispatch in
the disposition of this case.
SO ORDERED.