MALIGAYA VS. ATTY.

DONORILLA

Atty. Antonio G. Doronilla, Jr. of the Judge Advocate Generals Service is before us on a charge of
unethical conduct for having uttered a falsehood in open court during a hearing of Civil Case No. Q-99-
38778.

Civil Case No. Q-99-38778 was an action for damages filed by complainant Renato M. Maligaya, a doctor
and retired colonel of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, against several military officers for whom
Atty. Doronilla stood as counsel. At one point during the February 19, 2002 hearing of the case, Atty.
Doronilla said:

And another matter, Your Honor. I was appearing in other cases he [complainant Maligaya] filed before
against the same defendants. We had an agreement that if we withdraw the case against him, he will
also withdraw all the cases. So, with that understanding, he even retired and he is now receiving
pension. (emphasis supplied)

Considering this to be of some consequence, presiding Judge Reynaldo B. Daway asked a number of
clarificatory questions and thereafter ordered Atty. Doronilla to put his statements in writing and file the
appropriate pleading. Weeks passed but Atty. Doronilla submitted no such pleading or anything else to
substantiate his averments.

On April 29, 2002, Maligaya filed a complaint against Atty. Doronilla in the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) Commission on Bar Discipline. The complaint, which charged Atty. Doronilla with
misleading the court through misrepresentation of facts resulting [in] obstruction of justice, was
referred to a commissioner for investigation. Complainant swore before the investigating commissioner
that he had never entered into any agreement to withdraw his lawsuits. Atty. Doronilla, who took up the
larger part of two hearings to present evidence and explain his side, admitted several times that there
was, in fact, no such agreement. Later he explained

in his memorandum that his main concern was to settle the case amicably among comrades in arms
without going to trial and insisted that there was no proof of his having violated the Code of
Professional Responsibility or the lawyers oath. He pointed out, in addition, that his false statement (or,
as he put it, his alleged acts of falsity) had no effect on the continuance of the case and therefore caused
no actual prejudice to complainant.
In due time, investigating commissioner Lydia A. Navarro submitted a report and recommendation
finding Atty. Doronilla guilty of purposely stating a falsehood in violation of Canon 10, Rule 10.01 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility and recommending that he be suspended from the government
military service as legal officer for a period of three months. This was adopted and approved in toto by
the IBP Board of Governors on August 30, 2003.

There is a strong public interest involved in requiring lawyers who, as officers of the court, participate in
the dispensation of justice, to behave at all times in a manner consistent with truth and honor. The
common caricature that lawyers by and large do not feel compelled to speak the truth and to act
honestly should not become a common reality. To this end, Canon 10 and Rule 10.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility state:

CANON 10 A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS, AND GOOD FAITH TO THE COURT.

Rule 10.01 A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; nor shall he
mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice.

By stating untruthfully in open court that complainant had agreed to withdraw his lawsuits, Atty.
Doronilla breached these peremptory tenets of ethical conduct. Not only that, he violated the lawyers
oath to do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court, of which Canon 10 and Rule 10.01 are
but restatements. His act infringed on every lawyers duty to never seek to mislead the judge or any
judicial officer by an artifice or false statement of fact or law.

Atty. Doronillas unethical conduct was compounded, moreover, by his obstinate refusal to acknowledge
the impropriety of what he had done. From the very beginning of this administrative case, Atty.
Doronilla maintained the untenable position that he had done nothing wrong in the hearing of Civil Case
No. Q-99-38778. He persisted in doing so even after having admitted that he had, in that hearing,
spoken of an agreement that did not in truth exist. Rather than express remorse for that regrettable
incident, Atty. Doronilla resorted to an ill-conceived attempt to evade responsibility, professing that the
falsehood had not been meant for the information of Judge Daway but only as a sort of question to
complainant regarding a pending proposal to settle the case.
The explanation submitted by Atty. Doronilla, remarkable only for its speciousness, cannot absolve
him. If anything, it leads us to suspect an unseemly readiness on his part to obfuscate plain facts for the
unworthy purpose of escaping his just deserts. There is in his favor, though, a presumption of good
faith which keeps us from treating the incongruity of his proffered excuse as an indication of
mendacity. Besides, in the light of his avowal that his only aim was to settle the case amicably among
comrades in arms without going to trial, perhaps it is not unreasonable to assume that what he really
meant to say was that he had intended the misrepresentation as a gambit to get the proposed
agreement on the table, as it were. But even if that had been so, it would have been no justification for
speaking falsely in court. There is nothing in the duty of a lawyer to foster peace among disputants that,
in any way, makes it necessary under any circumstances for counsel to state as a fact that which is not
true. A lawyers duty to the court to employ only such means as are consistent with truth and
honor forbids recourse to such a tactic. Thus, even as we give Atty. Doronilla the benefit of the doubt
and accept as true his avowed objective of getting the parties to settle the case amicably, we must call
him to account for resorting to falsehood as a means to that end.

Atty. Doronillas offense is within the ambit of Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, which in part
declares:

A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court
for any deceit x x x or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to
practice x x x.

The suspension referred to in the foregoing provision means only suspension from the practice of
law. For this reason, we disagree with the IBPs recommendation for Atty. Doronillas suspension from
the government military service. After all, the only purpose of this administrative case is to determine
Atty. Doronillas liability as a member of the legal profession, not his liability as a legal officer in the
military service. Thus, it would be improper for us to order, as a penalty for his breach of

legal ethics and the lawyers oath, his suspension from employment in the Judge Advocate Generals
Service. Of course, suspension from employment as a military legal officer may well follow as a
consequence of his suspension from the practice of law but that should not be reason for us to impose
it as a penalty for his professional misconduct. We would be going beyond the purpose of this
proceeding were we to do so. Therefore, we shall treat the IBPs recommendation as one for suspension
from the practice of law.

At any rate, we are not inclined to adopt the IBPs recommendation on the duration of Atty. Doronillas
suspension. We need to consider a few circumstances that mitigate his liability somewhat. First, we give
him credit for exhibiting enough candor to admit, during the investigation, the falsity of the statement
he had made in Judge Daways courtroom. Second, the absence of material damage to complainant may
also be considered as a mitigating circumstance. And finally, since this is Atty. Doronillas first offense, he
is entitled to some measure of forbearance.

Nonetheless, his unrepentant attitude throughout the conduct of this administrative case tells us that a
mere slap on the wrist is definitely not enough. Atty. Doronilla, it seems, needs time away from the
practice of law to recognize his error and to purge himself of the misbegotten notion that an effort to
compromise justifies the sacrifice of truthfulness in court.

WHEREFORE, Atty. Antonio G. Doronilla, Jr. is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for TWO
MONTHS. He is WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar misconduct shall be dealt with more
severely. Let a copy of this Resolution be attached to his personal record and copies furnished the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Office of the Court Administrator, the Chief-of-Staff of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines and the Commanding General of the AFP Judge Advocate Generals Service.

MANUEL S. SEBASTIAN VS. ATTY. AMILY BAJAR

The Case

On 18 October 1991, Manuel S. Sebastian (complainant) filed a disbarment complaint against Atty. Emily
A. Bajar (respondent) for "obstructing, disobeying, resisting, rebelling, and impeding final decisions of
Regional Trial Courts, the Court of Appeals and of the Honorable Supreme Court, and also for submitting
those final decisions for the review and reversal of the DARAB, an administrative body, and for
contemptuous acts and dilatory tactics."

The Facts

Complainant alleged the following:

1. Respondent is a lawyer of the Bureau of Agrarian Legal Assistance (BALA) of the Department of
Agrarian Reform who represented Fernando Tanlioco (Tanlioco) in numerous cases which raised the
same issues. Tanlioco is an agricultural lessee of a land owned by complainants spouse and sister-in-law
(landowners). The landowners filed an Ejectment case against Tanlioco on the basis of a conversion
order of the land use from agricultural to residential. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) rendered judgment
ordering Tanliocos ejectment subject to the payment of disturbance compensation. The RTCs judgment
was affirmed by the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court.

2. Respondent, as Tanliocos counsel, filed another case for Specific Performance to produce the
conversion order. The RTC dismissed the complaint due to res judicata and lack of cause of action.

3. Respondent filed a case for Maintenance of Possession with the Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board. The case raised the same issues of conversion and disturbance compensation.

4. Respondent has violated Rule 10.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility since she misused the
rules of procedure through forum-shopping to obstruct the administration of justice.

On 18 November 1991, the Court issued a resolution requiring respondent to comment on the
complaint lodged against her.

After a second Motion for Extension of Time to Submit Comment, respondent submitted her Comment
alleging the following:

1. Complainant is not the real party-in-interest. He is also not authorized to prosecute the disbarment
suit.

2. Respondent has fulfilled allegiance to the "Attorneys Oath" and performed duties in accordance with
Section 20 of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court.

3. Respondents client, Tanlioco, merely availed of all legal remedies to obtain benefits secured for him
by law.

On 10 March 1992, complainant filed his Reply. Complainant alleged that respondent did not confront
the issues of her disbarment squarely but raised issues that were decided upon with finality by the
courts.

On 25 March 1992, the Court issued a Resolution requiring respondent to file a Rejoinder within 10 days
from notice.

On 3 June 1992, complainant filed a Manifestation dated 2 June 1992 stating that respondent failed to
comply with the 25 March 1992 Court Resolution to file a Rejoinder.

On 7 October 1992, the Court ordered respondent to show cause why she should not be subjected to
disciplinary action for failure to comply with the Courts 25 March 1992 Resolution. The Court also
required respondent to Comment on the complainants 2 June 1992 Manifestation.

On 3 February 1993, respondent filed a Manifestation alleging that she had substantially complied with
the Courts orders relative to her defenses. She advised the Court that she had transferred to the Public
Attorneys Office and since she was no longer a "BALA lawyer," the cases involved in this proceeding had
become moot and academic.

On 1 March 1993, the Court issued a Resolution stating that the administrative case against respondent
"has not been mooted and nothing set out in her Manifestation excuses her failure to obey this Courts
Resolutions of 25 March 1992 and 7 October 1992." The Court had also resolved to impose a fine
of P500 or imprisonment of five days and to require respondent to comply with the 25 March 1992 and
7 October 1992 Resolutions.

On 24 August 1993, complainant filed a Manifestation stating that respondent had not complied with
the Courts orders.

On 29 September 1993, the Court issued a Resolution ordering the arrest of respondent for detention at
the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) for five days. The Court reiterated that respondent should
comply with the 25 March 1992 and 7 October 1992 Resolutions.

On 20 October 1993, the NBI arrested respondent. The NBI detained respondent for five days and
released her on 25 October 1993.

On 10 November 1993, the Court issued a Resolution referring the case to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for hearing and decision.

On 11 November 1993, respondent filed a Rejoinder. Respondent claimed that complainant had no legal
personality to file this case. Respondent also alleged that she was merely protecting the interest of
Tanlioco as she was sworn to do so in her oath of office. Respondent contended that "she had
comported herself as [an] officer of the court, at the risk of being disciplined by the latter if only to
impart truth and justice."

On 22 November 1995, Investigating Commissioner Plaridel C. Jose (Investigating Commissioner Jose)

submitted his report and recommendation to the IBP. Investigating Commissioner Jose enumerated
respondents violations of the Code of Professional Responsibility that rendered her unfit to continue
the practice of law:

1. Respondent appealed a case for purposes of delay which amounted to an obstruction of justice.

2. Respondent abused her right of recourse to the courts. The duplication or multiplication of suits
should be avoided, and respondents acts were tantamount to forum-shopping which is a reprehensible
manipulation of court processes and proceedings.

3. Respondent uttered disrespectful language and shouted at everybody during the hearing on 25 May
1995. The want of intention is not an excuse for the disrespectful language used.

On 4 October 1996, the IBP transmitted to the Court a copy of IBP Resolution No. XII-96-149 dated 30
March 1996. The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved Investigating Commissioner Joses
recommendation that respondent be "suspended indefinitely from the practice of law for Unethical
Practices and attitude showing her propensity and incorrigible character to violate the basic tenets and
requirements of the Code of Professional Responsibility rendering her unfit to continue in the practice of
law." Governor Angel R. Gonzales recommended her "outright disbarment."

In its 20 January 1997 Resolution, the Court noted the IBP Resolution suspending respondent
indefinitely.

On 13 April 1999, the Court issued a Resolution directing the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) to
circularize the resolution of the IBP dated 30 March 1996 suspending respondent indefinitely from the
practice of law.

On 7 June 1999, the OCA, through Court Administrator Alfredo L. Benipayo, issued Circular No. 30-99
informing all courts that respondent had been suspended indefinitely.

On 30 January 2003, respondent filed a Motion to Consider the Case Closed and Terminated.
Respondent apologized for her demeanor and prayed that the suspension be lifted.

On 16 June 2003, the Court issued a Resolution referring the case to the IBP for report and
recommendation.

On 29 August 2003, Investigating Commissioner Demaree J.B. Raval (Investigating Commissioner Raval)
conducted a hearing. Respondent claimed that she did not receive any notice of the OCAs Circular on
her indefinite suspension. Respondent alleged that the Court Resolution which she received merely
noted the IBPs Resolution on her indefinite suspension. Respondent claimed that she only knew of the
suspension when she filed an application for a judicial position in Mandaluyong City.

In the hearing, respondent admitted that she continued to practice law as a Prosecutor in Mandaluyong
City despite her suspension because she believed that a notation by the Court in the 20 January 1997
Resolution did not mean an implementation of the IBPs Resolution on her indefinite suspension.

Due to the absence of complainant and his counsel, another hearing was held on 19 September 2003.
Complainants counsel asserted that respondent had been practicing law in the midst of her suspension
and this constituted a violation of the suspension order which she wanted to be lifted. Investigating
Commissioner Raval asked respondent to present a valid ground to lift the suspension
order. Respondent requested that her detention for five days at the NBI be converted into a five-year
suspension, one year for every day of detention such that she would have served five years of indefinite
suspension.

Investigating Commissioner Raval then directed the parties to file simultaneously their Verified Position
Papers.

In his Position Paper and Comment, complainant posited that respondents motion did not state valid
grounds to convince the Court to lift the suspension order. Complainant stated that by continuing to
practice law, "she is flaunting her defiance of the Supreme Court by showing that she can hoodwink
another branch of government."Complainant also prayed for respondents disbarment due to the
gravity of her offense.

In respondents Position Paper, she reiterated that complainant is not the real party-in-interest since the
property that was litigated was owned by complainants wife. She asserted that she never betrayed her
clients cause, she was never unfaithful to her oath, and it was complainant who filed this case for
harassment. Respondent prayed that the case be considered closed and terminated due to lack of merit.

Respondent also sent a letter to Investigating Commissioner Raval and attached a copy of a Resolution
in a Preliminary Investigation case which she handled. Respondent contended that in this Preliminary
Investigation case, she recommended its dismissal because the offended party was not the real party-in-
interest.

Respondent insisted that complainant did not have the personality to file the disbarment complaint
against her; hence, it should have been dismissed outright.

After the parties filed their position papers, the IBP Board of Governors issued Resolution No. XVI-2004-
229 dated 16 April 2004. The IBP adopted Investigating Commissioner Ravals Report and
Recommendation that respondent be disbarred for her "manifest flagrant misconduct in disobeying the
SC Order of her Indefinite Suspension."

As culled from the records, the Court had merely noted IBP Resolution No. XII-96-149 which
recommended respondents indefinite suspension. "The term noted means that the Court has merely
taken cognizance of the existence of an act or declaration, without exercising a judicious deliberation or
rendering a decision on the matter it does not imply agreement or approval." Hence, the penalty of
indefinite suspension imposed by the IBP Board of Governors has not attained finality. Section 12 of
Rule 139-B provides:

Section 12. Review and Decision by the Board of Governors.

xxx

(b) If the Board, by the vote of a majority of its total membership, determines that the respondent
should be suspended from the practice of law or disbarred, it shall issue a resolution setting forth its
findings and recommendations which, together with the whole record of the case, shall forthwith be
transmitted to the Supreme Court for final action. (Emphasis supplied)

Necessarily, the Court will now give its "final action" on this complaint.

The Ruling of the Court

After a careful review of the records, the Court finds the evidence on record sufficient to support the
IBPs findings. However, the Court disagrees with the penalty imposed on respondent.
Administrative proceedings against lawyers are sui generis and they belong to a class of their own. They
are neither civil nor criminal actions but rather investigations by the Court into the conduct of its
officer. They involve no private interest and afford no redress for private grievance.

A disciplinary action against a lawyer is intended to protect the administration of justice from the
misconduct of its officers. This Court requires that its officers shall be competent, honorable, and
reliable men in whom the public may repose confidence. "Lawyers must at all times faithfully perform
their duties to society, to the bar, to the courts, and to their clients. Their conduct must always reflect
the values and norms of the legal profession as embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility. On
these considerations, the Court may disbar or suspend lawyers for any professional or private
misconduct showing them to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity, and good demeanor or
to be unworthy to continue as officers of the Court."

Clear preponderant evidence is necessary to justify the imposition of the penalty in disbarment or
suspension proceedings.

The evidence presented shows that respondent failed to comply with the Courts lawful orders in two
instances:

1. In the 25 March 1992 Court Resolution, respondent was required to file a rejoinder within 10 days
from notice. However, she only submitted the rejoinder on 11 November 1993 after she was detained at
the NBI for five days for failure to heed the Courts order.

2. In the 7 October 1992 Court Resolution, respondent was required to comment on complainants
manifestation. She instead submitted a manifestation on 3 February 1993 or almost four months
thereafter. In her manifestation, respondent alleged that she had substantially complied with the
Courts orders. However, the Court in its 1 March 1993 Resolution stated that nothing set out in
respondents manifestation excused her failure to obey the Courts Resolutions.

These acts constitute willful disobedience of the lawful orders of this Court, which under Section 27,
Rule 138 of the Rules of Court is in itself a sufficient cause for suspension or disbarment. Respondents
cavalier attitude in repeatedly ignoring the orders of the Supreme Court constitutes utter disrespect to
the judicial institution. Respondents conduct indicates a high degree of irresponsibility. A Courts
Resolution is "not to be construed as a mere request, nor should it be complied with partially,
inadequately, or selectively." Respondents obstinate refusal to comply with the Courts orders "not only
betrays a recalcitrant flaw in her character; it also underscores her disrespect of the Courts lawful
orders which is only too deserving of reproof."

Lawyers are called upon to obey court orders and processes and respondents deference is underscored
by the fact that willful disregard thereof will subject the lawyer not only to punishment for contempt but
to disciplinary sanctions as well. In fact, graver responsibility is imposed upon a lawyer than any other to
uphold the integrity of the courts and to show respect to their processes.
Respondents failure to comply with the Courts directive to file a Rejoinder and to file a Comment also
constitutes gross misconduct. The Court defined gross misconduct as "any inexcusable, shameful,
flagrant, or unlawful conduct on the part of the person concerned in the administration of justice which
is prejudicial to the rights of the parties or to the right determination of a cause." It is a "conduct that is
generally motivated by a premeditated, obstinate, or intentional purpose."

In Bernal Jr. v. Fernandez, the Court held that failure to comply with the Courts directive to comment on
a letter-complaint constitutes gross misconduct and insubordination, or disrespect. In Cuizon v.
Macalino, a lawyers failure to comply with the Courts Resolutions requiring him to file his comment
was one of the infractions that merited his disbarment.

Furthermore, respondents defenses are untenable. Firstly, respondent contends that complainant is not
the real party-in-interest since the property that was litigated was owned by complainants wife. The
Court is not persuaded with this defense.

The procedural requirement observed in ordinary civil proceedings that only the real party-in-interest
must initiate the suit does not apply in disbarment cases. In fact, the person who called the attention of
the court to a lawyers misconduct "is in no sense a party, and generally has no interest in the
outcome." "A compromise or withdrawal of charges does not terminate an administrative complaint
against a lawyer."

In Heck v. Santos, the Court held that "any interested person or the court motu proprio may initiate
disciplinary proceedings." The right to institute disbarment proceedings is not confined to clients nor is it
necessary that the person complaining suffered injury from the alleged wrongdoing. Disbarment
proceedings are matters of public interest and the only basis for the judgment is the proof or failure of
proof of the charges.

Secondly, respondent avers that she merely availed of all the legal remedies for her client. In Suzuki v.
Tiamson, the Court enunciated that "while lawyers owe their entire devotion to the interest of their
clients and zeal in the defense of their clients rights, they should not forget that they are first and
foremost, officers of the court, bound to exert every effort to assist in the speedy and efficient
administration of justice." Respondents act of filing cases with identical issues in other venues despite
the final ruling which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court is beyond the bounds
of the law. "To permit lawyers to resort to unscrupulous practices for the protection of the supposed
rights of their clients is to defeat one of the purposes of the state the administration of justice."

Respondent abused her right of recourse to the courts. Respondent, acting as Tanliocos counsel, filed
cases for Specific Performance and Maintenance of Possession despite the finality of the decision in the
Ejectment case which involves the same issues. The Court held that "an important factor in determining
the existence of forum-shopping is the vexation caused to the courts and the parties-litigants by the
filing of similar cases to claim substantially the same reliefs. Indeed, "while a lawyer owes fidelity to the
cause of his client, it should not be at the expense of truth and administration of justice."
Canon 19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility mandates lawyers to represent their clients with
zeal but within the bounds of the law. It is evident from the records that respondent filed other cases to
thwart the execution of the final judgment in the Ejectment case. Clearly, respondent violated the
proscription in Canon 19.

The penalty of suspension or disbarment is meted out in clear cases of misconduct that seriously affect
the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the court. In this case, respondent has shown
her great propensity to disregard court orders. Respondents acts of wantonly disobeying her duties as
an officer of the court show an utter disrespect for the Court and the legal profession. However, the
Court will not disbar a lawyer if it finds that a lesser penalty will suffice to accomplish the desired end.

Respondents acts constitute gross misconduct and willful disobedience of lawful orders of a superior
court. Respondent also violated Canon 19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Her suspension is
consequently warranted.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Emily A. Bajar is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period
ofTHREE YEARS effective from notice, with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar
acts will be dealt with more severely.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant to be appended to respondents
personal record as an attorney, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Department of Justice, and all
courts in the country for their information and guidance.

EDGAR PEREA VS. ATTY. RUBEN ALMADRO

Before the Court is a complaint for disbarment filed by Edgar O. Perea against Atty. Ruben Almadro for
gross neglect of his duties as lawyer of herein complainant.

Complainant narrates: Respondent was his counsel before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City
(Branch 99) where he (complainant Perea) is being charged with the crime of Frustrated Homicide. On
February 26, 1996, the said RTC issued an order granting Atty. Almadros motion for leave to file
demurrer to evidence within ten (10) days from said date. All the while, complainant thought that
respondent filed said demurrer and the case against him dismissed. It was only sometime in 1999 that
complainant learned that Atty. Almadro failed to file any demurrer. The trial court ordered the herein
complainant to present evidence in his defense. Later, a warrant was issued for his arrest prompting him
to surrender to the court and post bail. Complainant suffered financially and emotionally due to
respondents neglect of his duties. Respondent has not attended any of his hearings which led
complainant to plead with respondent to withdraw formally as his counsel so he could hire another
lawyer. Because of Atty. Almadros neglect, complainant is now facing the loss of his freedom and
livelihood.

Respondent filed three motions for extension of time to file comment. On November 13, 2000, the
Court resolved to grant the said motions with a warning that no further extensions shall be granted. On
November 17, 2000, respondent, through the law firm Sua and Alambra, filed a Manifestation and
Motion that respondent has not yet received a copy of the complaint hence it asked the Court to order
the complainant to furnish them a copy.

On December 20, 2000, respondent through said law firm submitted an Answer to the complaint,
contending that: two days after the RTC granted the manifestation of defense to file motion for leave to
file demurrer to evidence, he had finished the draft of the motion and the accompanying pleading which
he stored in a magnetic computer diskette intended for editing prior to its submission in court; a few
days before the deadline, herein respondent tried to retrieve the draft from the diskette but said drafts
were nowhere to be found despite efforts to retrieve them; this led him to believe that the drafts must
have been finalized and the edited versions accordingly filed since it is his practice to expunge from the
diskette drafts that were already finalized and acted upon; meanwhile, the presiding judge of the RTC
retired, as a consequence, actions on pending cases were held in abeyance; moreover, communications
with the herein complainant had become rarer; thereafter, towards the end of 1997 up to the next five
months of 1998, respondent was preoccupied with the congressional elections in Biliran where he ran
and subsequently lost; then he was offered a position at the Philippine Stock Exchange as head of the
Compliance and Surveillance Division which he accepted; his time and attention was spent in the
performance of his demanding job at the PSE as well as in the preparation of his testimony before the
Senate Blue Ribbon Committee in connection with the BW scam; anent the case of herein complainant,
he offered on several occasions to withdraw as one of the defense counsel of the complainant even to
the extent of offering to return his acceptance fee which the latter however refused; it is not true that
complainant pleaded with respondent to withdraw as his counsel, the truth being that it was
complainant who refused to let go of respondent as his counsel; also, while he is a counsel of
complainant in the criminal case before the RTC, he was merely a collaborating counsel, the lead
counsel being Atty. Solomon Villanueva; finally, he was actually mulling over the possible procedural
steps to take with regard to complainants case when he received instead, a copy of the present
complaint.

On February 28, 2001, the Court issued a Resolution referring the case to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines for investigation, report and recommendation.

On June 13, 2001, the IBP through Commissioner Renato G. Cunanan submitted its report, pertinent
portions of which are quoted verbatim:

We are not convinced about the truth of respondents affirmative allegations. It is clear that he as well as
his counsels are lying. First off, the manifestation with motion filed by respondents counsels, Sua and
Alambra is incredibly unbelievable. In fact, to be blunt about it, respondents counsels were clearly lying
when they manifested that the respondent has yet to receive a copy of the complaint... This is an
outrageous lie. The respondents three (3) motions never once mentioned that he had not received copy
of the complaint. In fact, in his second motion for further extension of time to file comment, Atty.
Almadro CLEARLY stated in the second paragraph thereof that:
He is in the process of reviewing an initial draft of said comment and will need said period of ten (10)
days to complete and finalize the draft.

From the afore-quoted portion of Mr. Almadros manifestation and motion, it is obvious he already had a
copy of the complaint. The manifestation and motion filed on his behalf by Attys. Sua and Alambra with
the Honorable Supreme Court is a brazen and deliberate misrepresentation which deserves an
uncompromising and vigorous condemnation.

The respondent claims he is in solo practice. How then can he honestly claim that when he could not
find the draft of his demurrer in the magnetic computer diskette where he allegedly stored it, he was led
to believe that the drafts must have been finalized and the edited versions thereof accordingly filed. This
allegation is pure unadulterated garbage. All Mr. Almadro had to do was check his case folder to see if a
demurrer had indeed been filed. As a solo practitioner like this representation, we can only surmise that
logically, nothing happens or goes down in Mr. Almadros office without his knowledge and
indispensable participation. If so, how could he have been led to believe anything? To be sure, he would
have read and signed the demurrer before it was accordingly filed. Being a solo practitioner no one else
could have signed that demurrer. And does Mr. Almadro expect anyone to believe that after finishing
the draft (in his computer) he would not even bother to print a hard copy for him to read, edit and
correct without having to do so from his computer monitor?

Incidentally, this representation verified the records of the complainants criminal case before RTC-
Branch 99, Quezon City. We came upon an Order of the incumbent presiding judge declaring the
respondent herein in contempt of court for repeatedly failing to submit an explanation as ordered by
the court.

The undersigned is convinced that Atty. Ruben L. Almadros actuations reveal not only serious neglect or
indifference to his duties as a lawyer but more gravely his open disrespect for the court and the
authority it represents.

We wish to put on record our extreme DISPLEASURE at the behavior of respondent Atty. Ruben L.
Almadro. We strongly recommend that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for two (2)
years and that he be fined Ten Thousand (PhP10,000.00) Pesos. We likewise recommend strongly that
Attys. Sua and Alambra be ordered to explain why they should not be held in contempt for deliberately
foisting a deliberate falsehood and misrepresentation on the Honorable Supreme Court by declaring
that their client had not received a copy of the complaint when such was not true. By their
misrepresentation the afore-named counsels have exhibited contemptible disrespect not only for the
Court but also the authority it represents.

The report was adopted and approved by the Board of Governors of the IBP Commission on Bar
Discipline with some modifications thus:

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this
Resolution/Decision as Annex A; and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on
record and the applicable laws and rules, with modification, and considering that Atty. Ruben L.
Almadros actuations reveal not only serious neglect or indifference to his duties as a lawyer but more
gravely his open disrespect for the court and the authority it represent. Respondent is hereby
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) year and FINED for Ten Thousand (P 10,000.00) Pesos.
Likewise, Atty. Sua and Atty. Alambra are ordered to explain why they should not be held in contempt
for deliberately foisting a deliberate falsehood and misrepresentation.

Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration on September 11, 2002, this time in his own behalf, of
the above quoted IBP Board Resolution. This was denied on October 19, 2002.

We are in full accord with the findings and recommendation of the IBP.

As clearly stated in the Code of Professional Responsibility -

CANON 18 --- A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence.

Rule 18.03 --- A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and his negligence in connection
therewith shall render him liable.

Rule 18.04 --- A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall respond within a
reasonable time to the clients request for information.

It is plain from the records that respondent lawyer failed to submit a demurrer to evidence for which he
had earlier asked permission from the trial court and which his client, herein complainant was relying
on. More than that, he failed to contact his client and to apprise the latter about the developments of
the case leaving complainant completely surprised and without any protection when years later, he
received summons from the trial court asking him to present evidence in his defense and, not long after,
the trial court issued a warrant for his arrest.

In the recent case of Sps. Galen et al. vs. Atty. Paguirigan the Court is explicit in its pronouncement that:

An attorney is bound to protect his clients interest to the best of his ability and with utmost diligence. A
failure to file brief for his client certainly constitutes inexcusable negligence on his part. The respondent
has indeed committed a serious lapse in the duty owed by him to his client as well as to the Court not to
delay litigation and to aid in the speedy administration of justice.

xxx xxx xxx

A lawyer is expected to be familiar with these rudiments of law and procedure and anyone who acquires
his service is entitled to not just competent service but also whole-hearted devotion to his clients cause.
It is the duty of a lawyer to serve his client with competence and diligence and he should exert his best
efforts to protect within the bounds of law the interest of his client. A lawyer should never neglect a
legal matter entrusted to him, otherwise his negligence in fulfilling his duty will render him liable for
disciplinary action.
In other cases, the Court also held that while a lawyer may decline a person to become his client for
valid reasons, once he agrees to take up the cause of a client, he begins to owe fidelity to such cause
and must always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him. As a lawyer, he must serve the
client with competence and diligence, and champion the latters cause with wholehearted fidelity, care
and devotion. Indeed, he owes entire devotion to the interest of his client, warm zeal in the
maintenance and defense of his clients rights, and the exertion of his utmost learning and ability to the
end that nothing be taken or withheld from his client, save by the rules of law legally applied. His client
is entitled to the benefit of any and every remedy and defense that is authorized by the law of the land
and he may expect his lawyer to assert every such remedy or defense.

Respondents negligence is compounded by his attempt to have this tribunal believe the story of how his
draft, stored in a magnetic diskette, mysteriously disappeared and how the absence of such file in his
diskette led him to believe that the same was already filed in court. In his Answer, he even tried to
depict himself as a conscientious lawyer by stating that he was actually mulling on the procedural steps
he would undertake regarding complainants case when instead he received a copy of this complaint for
disbarment. Such story, as observed by the IBP, is not only outrageous but is contemptuous as it makes
a mockery of the Court.

Again, the Code of Professional Responsibility is explicit on this matter:

CANON 10--- A lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court.

Rule 10.01 ---A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; nor shall he
mislead or allow the court to be misled by any artifice.

In Benguet Electric Cooperative, Inc. vs Atty. Flores, the Court, aside from citing Canon 10 above stated
that a lawyer must be a disciple of truth. Indeed, it cannot be stressed enough how important it is for a
lawyer as an officer of the court to observe honesty at all times, especially before the courts.

Respondent would have this Court believe a very preposterous story of how his draft disappeared, all
the time avoiding the simple fact that he failed to submit the necessary pleading before the trial court.
Such behavior cannot be countenanced and deserves stern penalty therefor.

The act of the IBP in requiring Atty. Kenton Sua and Atty. Alan Alambra to show cause why they should
not be held in contempt of court for deliberate falsehood and misrepresentation in the preparation of
the Answer for herein respondent is appropriate. Records reveal that both Attys. Sua and Alambra have
filed their joint Explanation.

WHEREFORE, finding respondent Atty. Ruben Almadro guilty of serious neglect of his duties as a lawyer
and of open disrespect for the court and the authority it represents, as embodied in Canon 18, Rules
18.03 and 18.04 and Canon 10, Rule 10.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, he is SUSPENDED
from the practice of law for one (1) year and FINED in the amount of Ten Thousand (P10,000.00) Pesos,
with a WARNING that any or similar acts of dishonesty would be dealt with more severely.
Let a copy of the Resolution be attached to the personal records of Atty. Alambra in the Office of the Bar
Confidant and copies be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) and all the courts in the
country for their information and guidance.

Let the records of herein case be remanded to the Office of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for
further action on the contempt proceedings against Atty. Kenton Sua and Atty. Alan Alambra

ATTY. BONIFACIO BARANDON VS. EDWIN FERRER

This administrative case concerns a lawyer who is claimed to have hurled invectives upon another
lawyer and filed a baseless suit against him.

The Facts and the Case

On January 11, 2001 complainant Atty. Bonifacio T. Barandon, Jr. filed a complaint-affidavit[1] with the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) seeking the disbarment,
suspension from the practice of law, or imposition of appropriate disciplinary action against respondent
Atty. Edwin Z. Ferrer, Sr. for the following offenses:

1. On November 22, 2000 Atty. Ferrer, as plaintiffs counsel in Civil Case 7040, filed a reply with
opposition to motion to dismiss that contained abusive, offensive, and improper language which
insinuated that Atty. Barandon presented a falsified document in court.

2. Atty. Ferrer filed a fabricated charge against Atty. Barandon in Civil Case 7040 for alleged falsification
of public document when the document allegedly falsified was a notarized document executed on
February 23, 1994, at a date when Atty. Barandon was not yet a lawyer nor was assigned
in Camarines Norte. The latter was not even a signatory to the document.

3. On December 19, 2000, at the courtroom of Municipal Trial Court (MTC) Daet before the start of
hearing, Atty. Ferrer, evidently drunk, threatened
Atty. Barandon saying, Laban kung laban, patayan kung patayan, kasama ang lahat ng pamilya. Wala na
palang magaling na abogado sa Camarines Norte, angabogado na rito ay mga taga-
Camarines Sur, umuwi na kayo sa Camarines Sur, hindi kayo taga-rito.
4. Atty. Ferrer made his accusation of falsification of public document without bothering to check the
copy with the Office of the Clerk of Court and, with gross ignorance of the law, failed to consider that a
notarized document is presumed to be genuine and authentic until proven otherwise.

5. The Court had warned Atty. Ferrer in his first disbarment case against repeating his unethical act; yet
he faces a disbarment charge for sexual harassment of an office secretary of the IBP Chapter
in Camarines Norte; a related criminal case for acts of lasciviousness; and criminal cases for libel and
grave threats that Atty. Barandon filed against him. In October 2000, Atty. Ferrer asked
Atty. Barandon to falsify the daily time record of his son who worked with the Commission on
Settlement of Land Problems, Department of Justice. When Atty. Barandon declined,
Atty. Ferrer repeatedly harassed him with inflammatory language.

Atty. Ferrer raised the following defenses in his answer with motion to dismiss:

1. Instead of having the alleged forged document submitted for examination, Atty. Barandon filed
charges of libel and grave threats against him. These charges came about because Atty. Ferrers clients
filed a case for falsification of public document against Atty. Barandon.

2. The offended party in the falsification case, Imelda Palatolon, vouchsafed that her thumbmark in the
waiver document had been falsified.

3. At the time Atty. Ferrer allegedly uttered the threatening remarks against Atty. Barandon, the
MTC Daet was already in session. It was improbable that the court did not take steps to stop, admonish,
or cite Atty. Ferrer in direct contempt for his behavior.

4. Atty. Barandon presented no evidence in support of his allegations that Atty. Ferrer was drunk on
December 19, 2000 and that he degraded the law profession. The latter had received various citations
that speak well of his character.

5. The cases of libel and grave threats that Atty. Barandon filed against Atty. Ferrer were still
pending. Their mere filing did not make the latter guilty of the charges. Atty. Barandon was forum
shopping when he filed this disbarment case since it referred to the same libel and grave threats subject
of the criminal cases.
In his reply affidavit, Atty. Barandon brought up a sixth ground for disbarment. He alleged that on
December 29, 2000 at about 1:30 p.m., while Atty. Ferrer was on board his sons taxi, it figured in a
collision with a tricycle, resulting in serious injuries to the tricycles passengers. But neither
Atty. Ferrer nor any of his co-passengers helped the victims and, during the police investigation, he
denied knowing the taxi driver and blamed the tricycle driver for being drunk. Atty. Ferrer also
prevented an eyewitness from reporting the accident to the authorities.

Atty. Barandon claimed that the falsification case against him had already been dismissed. He belittled
the citations Atty. Ferrer allegedly received. On the contrary, in its Resolution 00-1, the IBP-
Camarines Norte Chapter opposed his application to serve as judge of the MTC of
Mercedes, Camarines Sur, on the ground that he did not have the qualifications, integrity, intelligence,
industry and character of a trial judge and that he was facing a criminal charge for acts of lasciviousness
and a disbarment case filed by an employee of the same IBP chapter.

On October 10, 2001 Investigating Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan of the IBP-CBD submitted to this
Court a Report, recommending the suspension for two years of Atty.Ferrer. The Investigating
Commissioner found enough evidence on record to prove Atty. Ferrers violation of Canons 8.01 and 7.03
of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He attributed to Atty. Barandon, as counsel in Civil Case 7040,
the falsification of the plaintiffs affidavit despite the absence of evidence that the document had in fact
been falsified and that Atty. Barandon was a party to it. The Investigating Commissioner also found that
Atty. Ferrer uttered the threatening remarks imputed to him in the presence of other counsels, court
personnel, and litigants before the start of hearing.

On June 29, 2002 the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution XV-2002-225, adopting and approving
the Investigating Commissioners recommendation but reduced the penalty of suspension to only one
year.

Atty. Ferrer filed a motion for reconsideration but the Board denied it in its Resolution of October 19,
2002 on the ground that it had already endorsed the matter to the Supreme Court. On February 5, 2003,
however, the Court referred back the case to the IBP for resolution of Atty. Ferrers motion for
reconsideration. On May 22, 2008 the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner that denied Atty. Ferrers motion for
reconsideration.
On February 17, 2009, Atty. Ferrer filed a Comment on Board of Governors IBP Notice of Resolution
No. XVIII-2008. On August 12, 2009 the Court resolved to treat Atty. Ferrers comment as a petition for
review under Rule 139 of the Revised Rules of Court. Atty. Barandon filed his comment, reiterating his
arguments before the IBP. Further, he presented certified copies of orders issued by courts
in Camarines Norte that warned Atty. Ferrer against appearing in court drunk.

The Issues Presented

The issues presented in this case are:

1. Whether or not the IBP Board of Governors and the IBP Investigating Commissioner erred in finding
respondent Atty. Ferrer guilty of the charges against him; and

2. If in the affirmative, whether or not the penalty imposed on him is justified.

The Courts Ruling

We have examined the records of this case and find no reason to disagree with the findings and
recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors and the Investigating Commissioner.

The practice of law is a privilege given to lawyers who meet the high standards of legal proficiency and
morality. Any violation of these standards exposes the lawyer to administrative liability.

Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility commands all lawyers to conduct themselves with
courtesy, fairness and candor towards their fellow lawyers and avoid harassing tactics against opposing
counsel. Specifically, in Rule 8.01, the Code provides:

Rule 8.01. A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is abusive, offensive or
otherwise improper.
Atty. Ferrers actions do not measure up to this Canon. The evidence shows that he imputed to
Atty. Barandon the falsification of the Salaysay Affidavit of the plaintiff in Civil Case 7040. He made this
imputation with pure malice for he had no evidence that the affidavit had been falsified and that
Atty. Barandon authored the same.

Moreover, Atty. Ferrer could have aired his charge of falsification in a proper forum and without using
offensive and abusive language against a fellow lawyer. To quote portions of what he said in his reply
with motion to dismiss:

1. That the answer is fraught with grave and culpable misrepresentation and FALSIFICATION of
documents, committed to mislead this Honorable Court, but with concomitant grave responsibility of
counsel for Defendants, for distortion and serious misrepresentation to the court, for presenting a
grossly FALSIFIED document, in violation of his oath of office as a government employee and as member
of the Bar, for the reason, that, Plaintiff, IMELDA PALATOLON, has never executed the SALAYSAY
AFFIDAVIT, wherein her fingerprint has been falsified, in view whereof, hereby DENY the same including
the affirmative defenses, there being no knowledge or information to form a belief as to the truth of the
same, from pars. (1) to par. (15) which are all lies and mere fabrications, sufficient ground for
DISBARMENT of the one responsible for said falsification and distortions.

The Court has constantly reminded lawyers to use dignified language in their pleadings despite the
adversarial nature of our legal system.

Atty. Ferrer had likewise violated Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which enjoins
lawyers to uphold the dignity and integrity of the legal profession at all times. Rule 7.03 of the Code
provides:

Rule 7.03. A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflect on his fitness to practice law, nor
shall he, whether in public or private life behave in scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal
profession.

Several disinterested persons confirmed Atty. Ferrers drunken invectives at Atty. Barandon shortly
before the start of a court hearing. Atty. Ferrer did not present convincing evidence to support his denial
of this particular charge. He merely presented a certification from the police that its blotter for the day
did not report the threat he supposedly made. Atty. Barandon presented, however, the police blotter on
a subsequent date that recorded his complaint against Atty. Ferrer.

Atty. Ferrer said, Laban kung laban, patayan kung patayan, kasama ang lahat ng pamilya. Wala na palang
magaling na abogado sa Camarines Norte, ang abogado na rito ay mga taga-
Camarines Sur, umuwi na kayo sa Camarines Sur, hindi kayo taga-rito. Evidently, he uttered these with
intent to annoy, humiliate, incriminate, and discredit Atty. Barandon in the presence of lawyers, court
personnel, and litigants waiting for the start of hearing in court. These language is unbecoming a
member of the legal profession. The Court cannot countenance it.

Though a lawyers language may be forceful and emphatic, it should always be dignified and respectful,
befitting the dignity of the legal profession. The use of intemperate language and unkind ascriptions has
no place in the dignity of judicial forum. Atty. Ferrer ought to have realized that this sort of public
behavior can only bring down the legal profession in the public estimation and erode public respect for
it. Whatever moral righteousness Atty. Ferrer had was negated by the way he chose to express his
indignation.

Contrary to Atty. Ferrers allegation, the Court finds that he has been accorded due process.
The essence of due process is to be found in the reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit any
evidence one may have in support of ones defense. So long as the parties are given the opportunity to
explain their side, the requirements of due process are satisfactorily complied with. Here, the IBP
Investigating Commissioner gave Atty. Ferrer all the opportunities to file countless pleadings and refute
all the allegations of Atty. Barandon.

All lawyers should take heed that they are licensed officers of the courts who are mandated to maintain
the dignity of the legal profession, hence they must conduct themselves honorably and
fairly. Atty. Ferrers display of improper attitude, arrogance, misbehavior, and misconduct in the
performance of his duties both as a lawyer and officer of the court, before the public and the court, was
a patent transgression of the very ethics that lawyers are sworn to uphold.

ACCORDINGLY, the Court AFFIRMS the May 22, 2008 Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors in CBD
Case 01-809 and ORDERS the suspension of Atty. Edwin Z. Ferrer, Sr. from the practice of law for one
year effective upon his receipt of this Decision.
Let a copy of this Decision be entered in Atty. Ferrers personal record as an attorney with the Office of
the Bar Confidant and a copy of the same be served to the IBP and to the Office of the Court
Administrator for circulation to all the courts in the land.

JOHNNY NG VS. ATTY. BENJAMIN ALAR

Before the Court is Resolution No. XVII-2006-223 dated April 27, 2006 of the IBP Board of Governors, to
wit:

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, with modification, the
Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein
made part of this Resolution as Annex A; and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the
evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and considering Respondents propensity to resort
to undeserved language and disrespectful stance, Atty. Benjamin C. Alar is hereby REPRIMANDED with a
stern Warning that severe penalties will be imposed in case similar misconduct is again
committed. Likewise, the counter complaint against Atty. Jose Raulito E. Paras and Atty. Elvin Michael
Cruz is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.

A verified complaint dated February 15, 2005 was filed by Johnny Ng (complainant) against Atty.
Benjamin C. Alar (respondent) before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), Commission on Bar
Discipline (CBD), for Disbarment.

Complainant alleges that he is one of the respondents in a labor case with the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) docketed as NLRC NCR CA No. 040273-04, while respondent is the counsel for
complainants. The Labor Arbiter (LA) dismissed the complaint. On appeal, the NLRC rendered
a Decision affirming the decision of the LA.Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration with Motion
to Inhibit (MRMI), pertinent portions of which read:

x x x We cannot help suspecting that the decision under consideration was merely copied from the
pleadings of respondents-appellees with very slight modifications. But we cannot accept the suggestion,
made by some knowledgeable individuals, that the actual writer of the said decision is not at all
connected with the NLRC First Division.
x x x Why did the NLRC, First Division, uphold the Labor Arbiter in maintaining that the separation pay
should be only one half month per year of service? Is jurisprudence on this not clear enough, or is there
another reason known only to them?

x x x If this is not grave abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC, First Division, it is ignominious
ignorance of the law on the part of the commissioners concerned.

The NLRC wants proof from the complainants that the fire actually resulted in prosperity and not losses.
xxx Respondents failed to prove their claim of losses. And the Honorable Commissioners of the First
Division lost their ability to see these glaring facts.

x x x How much is the separation pay they should pay? One month per year of service and all of it to the
affected workers not to some people in the NLRC in part.

x x x They should have taken judicial notice of this prevalent practices of employers xxx. If the Honorable
Commissioners, of the First Division do not know this, they are indeed irrelevant to real life.

x x x we invite the Honorable Commissioners of the First Division to see for themselves the evidence
before them and not merely rely on their reviewers and on the word of their ponente. If they do this
honestly they cannot help seeing the truth. Yes, honesty on the part of the Commissioners concerned is
what is lacking, not the evidence. Unfair labor practice stares them in the face.

If labor arbiter Santos was cross-eyed in his findings of fact, the Honorable Commissioners of the First
Division are doubly so and with malice thrown in. If the workers indeed committed an illegal strike, how
come their only penalty is removing their tent? It is obvious that the Labor Arbiter and the Honorable
Commissioners know deep in their small hearts that there was no strike. This is the only reason for the
finding of illegal strike. Without this finding, they have no basis to remove the tent; they have to invent
that basis.
x x x The union in its Union Reply To The Position Paper Of Management and its Annexes has shown very
clearly that the so called strike is a myth. But Commissioner Dinopol opted to believe the myth instead
of the facts. He fixed his sights on the tent in front of the wall and closed his eyes to the open wide
passage way and gate beside it. His eyes, not the ingress and egress of the premises, are blocked by
something so thick he cannot see through it. His impaired vision cannot be trusted, no doubt about it.

Commissioner Dinopol has enshrined a novel rule on money claims. Whereas, before, the established
rule was, in cases of money claims the employer had the burden of proof of payment. Now it is the
other way around. x x x For lack of a better name we should call this new rule the Special Dinopol Rule.
But only retirable commissioners are authorized to apply this rule and only when the money claims
involved are substantial. When they are meager the ordinary rules apply.

x x x how Commissioner Dinopol is able to say that the pay slips proved that the sixteen (16) claimants
were already paid their service incentive leave pay. This finding is copied verbatim from the cross-eyed
decision of Labor Arbiter Santos x x x .

The evidence already on record proving that the alleged blocking of the ingress and egress is a myth
seem invisible to the impaired sight of Commissioner Dinopol. He needs more of it. x x x

Commissioner Dinopol by his decision under consideration (as ponente [of] the decision that he signed
and caused his co-commissioners in the First Division to sign) has shown great and irreparable
impartiality, grave abuse of discretion and ignorance of the law. He is a shame to the NLRC and should
not be allowed to have anything to do with the instant case any more. Commissioner Go
and Chairman Seeres, by negligence, are just as guilty as Dinopol but, since the NLRC rules prohibit the
inhibition of the entire division, Chairman Seeres should remain in the instant case and appoint two (2)
other commissioners from another division to sit with him and pass final judgment in the instant
case. (Emphasis supplied)

In his Answer with Counter-Complaint dated April 6, 2005, respondent Alar contends that the instant
complaint only intends to harass him and to influence the result of the cases between complainant and
the workers in the different fora where they are pending; that the Rules of Court/Code of Professional
Responsibility applies only suppletorily at the NLRC when the NLRC Rules of Procedure has no provision
on disciplinary matters for litigants and lawyers appearing before it; that Rule X of the NLRC Rules of
Procedure provides for adequate sanctions against misbehaving lawyers and litigants appearing in cases
before it; that the Rules of Court/Code of Professional Responsibility does not apply to lawyers
practicing at the NLRC, the latter not being a court; that LAs and NLRC Commissioners are not judges nor
justices and the Code of Judicial Conduct similarly do not apply to them, not being part of the
judiciary; and that the labor lawyers who are honestly and conscientiously practicing before the NLRC
and get paid on a contingent basis are entitled to some latitude of righteous anger when they get
cheated in their cases by reason of corruption and collusion by the cheats from the other sectors who
make their lives and the lives of their constituents miserable, with impunity, unlike lawyers for the
employers who get paid, win or lose, and therefore have no reason to feel aggrieved.

Attached to the Counter-Complaint is the affidavit of union president Marilyn Batan wherein it
is alleged that Attys. Paras and Cruz violated the Code of Professional Responsibility of lawyers in several
instances, such that while the labor case is pending before the NLRC, respondents Paras and Cruz filed a
new case against the laborers in the Office of the City Engineer of Quezon City (QC) to demolish the tent
of the workers, thus splitting the jurisdiction between the NLRC and the City Engineer's Office (CEO) of
QC which violates Canon 12, Rules 12.02 and 13.03; that although Ng signed the disbarment complaint
against Alar, respondents Parass and Cruzs office instigated the said complaint which violates Canon
8; that Ng's company did not pay income tax for the year 2000 allegedly for non-operation due to fire
and respondents consented to this act of the employer which violates Canon 19, Rule 19.02; and
that when the case started, there were more or less 100 complainants, but due to the acts of the
employer and the respondents, the number of complainants were reduced to almost half which violates
Canon 19, Rule 19-01, 19-02 and 19-03.

In Answer to the Counter-Complaint dated April 14, 2005, respondents Paras and Cruz alleged: At no
time did they file multiple actions arising from the same cause of action or brook interference in the
normal course of judicial proceedings; the reliefs sought before the CEO has nothing to do with the case
pending before the NLRC; the demolition of the nuisance and illegal structures is a cause of action
completely irrelevant and unrelated to the labor cases of complainant; the CEO was requested to
investigate certain nuisance structures located outside the employer's property, which consist of
shanties, tents, banners and other paraphernalia which hampered the free ingress to and egress out of
the employer's property and present clear and present hazards; the Office of the City Engineer found
the structures violative of pertinent DPWH and MMDA ordinances; the pendency of a labor case with
the NLRC is completely irrelevant since the holding of a strike, legal or not, did not validate or justify the
construction of illegal nuisance structures; the CEO proceeded to abate the nuisance structures
pursuant to its power to protect life, property and legal order; it was not their idea to file the
disbarment complaint against respondent Alar; they merely instructed their client on how to go about
filing the case, after having been served a copy of the derogatory MRMI; Canon 8 should not be
perceived as an excuse for lawyers to turn their backs on malicious acts done by their brother
lawyers; the complaint failed to mention that the only reason the number of complainants were
reduced is because of the amicable settlement they were able to reach with most of them; their
engagement for legal services is only for labor and litigation cases; at no time were they consulted
regarding the tax concerns of their client and therefore were never privy to the financial records of the
latter; at no time did they give advice regarding their client's tax concerns; respondent Alar's attempt at
a disbarment case against them is unwarranted, unjustified and obviously a mere retaliatory action on
his part.

The case, docketed as CBD Case No. 05-1434, was assigned by the IBP to Commissioner Patrick M. Velez
for investigation, report and recommendation. In his Report and Recommendation, the Investigating
Commissioner found respondent guilty of using improper and abusive language and recommended that
respondent be suspended for a period of not less than three months with a stern warning that more
severe penalty will be imposed in case similar misconduct is again committed.

On the other hand, the Investigating Commissioner did not find any actionable misconduct against
Attys. Paras and Cruz and therefore recommended that the Counter-Complaint
against them be dismissed for lack of merit.

Acting on the Report and Recommendation, the IBP Board of Governors issued the Resolution
hereinbefore quoted. While the Court agrees with the findings of the IBP, it does not agree that
respondent Alar deserves only a reprimand.

The Code of Professional Responsibility mandates:

CANON 8 A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and candor toward his professional
colleagues, and shall avoid harassing tactics against opposing counsel.

Rule 8.01 A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is abusive, offensive or
otherwise improper.

CANON 11 A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to judicial officers and
should insist on similar conduct by others.
Rule 11.03 A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing language or behavior before
the Courts.

Rule 11.04 A lawyer shall not attribute to a Judge motives not supported by the record or have no
materiality to the case.

The MRMI contains insults and diatribes against the NLRC, attacking both its moral and intellectual
integrity, replete with implied accusations of partiality, impropriety and lack of diligence. Respondent
used improper and offensive language in his pleadings that does not admit any justification.

In Lacurom v. Jacoba,[8] the Court ratiocinated as follows:

Well-recognized is the right of a lawyer, both as an officer of the court and as a citizen, to criticize in
properly respectful terms and through legitimate channels the acts of courts and judges.However, even
the most hardened judge would be scarred by the scurrilous attack made by the 30 July 2001 motion on
Judge Lacurom's Resolution. On its face, the Resolution presented the facts correctly and decided the
case according to supporting law and jurisprudence. Though a lawyer's language may be forceful and
emphatic, it should always be dignified and respectful, befitting the dignity of the legal profession. The
use of unnecessary language is proscribed if we are to promote high esteem in the courts and trust in
judicial administration.

In Uy v. Depasucat,[9] the Court held that a lawyer shall abstain from

scandalous, offensive or menacing language or behavior before the Courts.

It must be remembered that the language vehicle does not run short of expressions which are emphatic
but respectful, convincing but not derogatory, illuminating but not offensive. A lawyer's language should
be forceful but dignified, emphatic but respectful as befitting an advocate and in keeping with the
dignity of the legal profession.Submitting pleadings containing countless insults and diatribes against the
NLRC and attacking both its moral and intellectual integrity, hardly measures to the sobriety of speech
demanded of a lawyer.
Respondent's assertion that the NLRC not being a court, its commissioners, not being judges or justices
and therefore not part of the judiciary; and that consequently, the Code of Judicial Conduct does not
apply to them, is unavailing. In Lubiano v. Gordolla, the Court held that respondent became unmindful
of the fact that in addressing the NLRC, he nonetheless remained a member of the Bar, an oath-bound
servant of the law, whose first duty is not to his client but to the administration of justice and whose
conduct ought to be and must be scrupulously observant of law and ethics.

Respondents argument that labor practitioners are entitled to some latitude of righteous anger is
unavailing. It does not deter the Court from exercising its supervisory authority over lawyers who
misbehave or fail to live up to that standard expected of them as members of the Bar.

The Court held in Rheem of the Philippines v. Ferrer, thus:

2. What we have before us is not without precedent. Time and again, this Court has admonished and
punished, in varying degrees, members of the Bar for statements, disrespectful or irreverent,
acrimonious or defamatory, of this Court or the lower courts. Resort by an attorney in a motion for
reconsideration to words which may drag this Court down into disrepute, is frowned upon as neither
justified nor in the least necessary, because in order to call the attention of the court in a special way to
the essential points relied upon in his argument and to emphasize the force thereof, the many reasons
stated in the motion are sufficient, and such words superfluous. It is in this context that we must say
that just because Atty. Armonio thought best to focus the attention of this Court to the issue in the case
does not give him unbridled license in language. To be sure, lawyers may come up with various
methods, perhaps much more effective, in calling the Courts attention to the issues involved. The
language vehicle does not run short of expressions, emphatic but respectful, convincing but not
derogatory, illuminating but not offensive.

To be proscribed then is the use of unnecessary language which jeopardizes high esteem in courts,
creates or promotes distrust in judicial administration, or which could have the effect of harboring and
encouraging discontent which, in many cases, is the source of disorder, thus undermining the
foundation upon which rests that bulwark called judicial power to which those who are aggrieved turn
for protection and relief. Stability of judicial institutions suggests that the Bar stand firm on this precept.

The language here in question, respondents aver, was the result of overenthusiasm. It is but to repeat
an old idea when we say that enthusiasm, or even excess of it, is not really bad. In fact, the one or the
other is no less a virtue, if channeled in the right direction. However, it must be circumscribed within the
bounds of propriety and with due regard for the proper place of courts in our system of government.

Respondent has clearly violated Canons 8 and 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. His actions
erode the publics perception of the legal profession.

However, the penalty of reprimand with stern warning imposed by the IBP Board of Governors is not
proportionate to respondents violation of the Canons of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Thus,
he deserves a stiffer penalty of fine in the amount of P5,000.00.

Anent the Counter-Complaint filed against Attys. Paras and Cruz, the Court finds no reason to disturb
the following findings and recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner, as approved by the IBP
Board of Governors, to wit:

The Counter-complainant Batan failed to submit any position paper to substantiate its claims despite
sufficient opportunity to do so.

At any rate, it must be noted that the alleged case with the Office of the City Engineer really partakes of
a different cause of action, which has nothing to do with the NLRC case. The decision was made by the
city engineer. Respondents remedy should be to question that decision, not bring it to this Commission
which has no jurisdiction over it. We can not substitute our judgment for the proper courts who should
determine the propriety or sagacity of the city engineers action.

Furthermore, parties are not prohibited from availing themselves of remedies available in law
provided; these acts do not exceed the bounds of decency. In supporting the action against respondents
conduct, no such abuse may be gleaned. Indeed, it is the attorneys duty as an officer of the court to
defend a judge from unfounded criticism or groundless personal attack. This requires of him not only to
refrain from subjecting the judge to wild and groundless accusation but also to discourage other people
from so doing and to come to his defense when he is so subjected. By the very nature of his position a
judge lacks the power, outside of his court, to defend himself against unfounded criticism and clamor
and it is the attorney, and no other, who can better or more appropriately support the judiciary and the
incumbents of the judicial positions. (Agpalo, p. 143 citing People v. Carillo, 77 Phil. 572
(1946); Surigao Mineral Reservation Board v. Cloribel, 31 SCRA 1 (1970); see Cabansag v. Fernandez, 102
Phil. 152 (1957) Whether the disbarment complaint was filed by Ng or by his lawyers is therefore not of
great import, what is more apropos would be the contents of the complaint and whether the same is
sufficient to consider disciplinary sanctions.

Likewise, the tax case is a different matter altogether. Since the respondent lawyers have already stated
that they were not engaged as counsels to take care of their clients tax problems, then they cannot
be held accountable for the same. If any wrongdoing has been committed by complainant Ng, he should
answer for that and those lawyers who were responsible for such acts be held liable jointly. There is no
showing [that] attorneys Paras and Cruz were responsible for that tax fiasco.

Finally, while it may be true that Batans group has been greatly diminished from about 100 claimants to
less than half the number is not by itself an actionable misconduct. Lawyers are duty bound to foster
amicable settlement of cases; litigation and adversarial proceedings while a necessary part of the
practice is not encouraged, because it will save expenses and help unclogged [sic] the dockets. If the
compromise is fair then there is no reason to prevent the same. There is nothing in the counter-
complaint which shows that the compromise agreement and waivers executed appear to be unfair,
hence no reason to hold lawyers liable for the same. Besides, a compromise is as often the better part of
justice as prudence the part of valor and a lawyer who encourages compromise is no less the clients
champion in settlement out of court than he is the clients champion in the battle in court. (Curtis, The
Advocate: Voices in Court, 5 (1958); cited in Agpalos Legal Ethics, p. 86, 1980 ed.) What is therefore
respondent Alar[]s beef with the execution of these waivers if these were executed freely by his clients?

All told, we do not find anything actionable misconduct against Attorneys Paras and Cruz; hence the
dismissal of the counter-complaint against them is proper for absolute lack of merit.

ACCORDINGLY, we find respondent Atty. Benjamin C. Alar GUILTY of violation of Canons 8 and 11 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility. He is imposed a fine of P5,000.00 with STERN WARNING that a
repetition of the same or similar act in the future will be dealt with more severely.

The Counter-Complaint against Atty. Jose Raulito E. Paras and Atty. Elvin Michael Cruz is DISMISSED for
lack of merit.

ASEAN PACIFIC PLANNERS VS. CITY OF URDANETA

The instant petition seeks to set aside the Resolutions dated April 15, 2003 and February 4, 2004 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 76170.

This case stemmed from a Complaint for annulment of contracts with prayer for preliminary prohibitory
injunction and temporary restraining order filed by respondent Waldo C. Del Castillo, in his capacity as
taxpayer, against respondents City of Urdaneta and Ceferino J. Capalad doing business under the name
JJEFWA Builders, and petitioners Asean Pacific Planners (APP) represented by Ronilo G. Goco and Asean
Pacific Planners Construction and Development Corporation (APPCDC) represented by Cesar D. Goco.

Del Castillo alleged that then Urdaneta City Mayor Rodolfo E. Parayno entered into five contracts for the
preliminary design, construction and management of a four-storey twin cinema commercial center and
hotel involving a massive expenditure of public funds amounting to P250 million, funded by a loan from
the Philippine National Bank (PNB). For minimal work, the contractor was allegedly paid P95 million. Del
Castillo also claimed that all the contracts are void because the object is outside the commerce of
men. The object is a piece of land belonging to the public domain and which remains devoted to a public
purpose as a public elementary school. Additionally, he claimed that the contracts, from the feasibility
study to management and lease of the future building, are also void because they were all awarded
solely to the Goco family.

In their Answer, APP and APPCDC claimed that the contracts are valid. Urdaneta City Mayor Amadeo R.
Perez, Jr., who filed the citys Answer, joined in the defense and asserted that the contracts were
properly executed by then Mayor Parayno with prior authority from the Sangguniang
Panlungsod. Mayor Perez also stated that Del Castillo has no legal capacity to sue and that the complaint
states no cause of action. For respondent Ceferino J. Capalad, Atty. Oscar C. Sahagun filed an
Answer with compulsory counterclaim and motion to dismiss on the ground that Del Castillo has no legal
standing to sue.

Respondents Norberto M. Del Prado, Jesus A. Ordono and Aquilino Maguisa became parties to the case
when they jointly filed, also in their capacity as taxpayers, a Complaint-in-Intervention adopting the
allegations of Del Castillo.

After pre-trial, the Lazaro Law Firm entered its appearance as counsel for Urdaneta City and filed an
Omnibus Motion with prayer to (1) withdraw Urdaneta Citys Answer; (2) drop Urdaneta City as
defendant and be joined as plaintiff; (3) admit Urdaneta Citys complaint; and (4) conduct a new pre-
trial. Urdaneta City allegedly wanted to rectify its position and claimed that inadequate legal
representation caused its inability to file the necessary pleadings in representation of its interests.

In its Order dated September 11, 2002, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Urdaneta City, Pangasinan,
Branch 45, admitted the entry of appearance of the Lazaro Law Firm and granted the withdrawal of
appearance of the City Prosecutor. It also granted the prayer to drop the city as defendant and admitted
its complaint for consolidation with Del Castillos complaint, and directed the defendants to answer the
citys complaint.
In its February 14, 2003 Order, the RTC denied reconsideration of the September 11, 2002 Order. It also
granted Capalads motion to expunge all pleadings filed by Atty. Sahagun in his behalf. Capalad was
dropped as defendant, and his complaint filed by Atty. Jorito C. Peralta was admitted and consolidated
with the complaints of Del Castillo and Urdaneta City. The RTC also directed APP and APPCDC to answer
Capalads complaint.

Aggrieved, APP and APPCDC filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals. In its April 15,
2003 Resolution, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition on the following grounds: (1) defective
verification and certification of non-forum shopping, (2) failure of the petitioners to submit certified true
copies of the RTCs assailed orders as mere photocopies were submitted, and (3) lack of written
explanation why service of the petition to adverse parties was not personal. The Court of Appeals also
denied APP and APPCDCs motion for reconsideration in its February 4, 2004 Resolution.

Hence, this petition, which we treat as one for review on certiorari under Rule 45, the proper remedy to
assail the resolutions of the Court of Appeals.

Petitioners argue that:

I.

THE APPELLATE COURT PALPABLY ERRED AND GRAVELY ABUSED ITS JUDICIAL PREROGATIVES BY
SUMMARILY DISMISSING THE PETITION ON THE BASIS OF PROCEDURAL TECHNICALITIES DESPITE
SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE [THEREWITH]

II.

THE TRIAL COURT PALPABLY ERRED AND GRAVELY ABUSED ITS JUDICIAL PREROGATIVES BY
CAPRICIOUSLY

(a.) Entertaining the taxpayers suits of private respondents del Castillo, del Prado, Ordono and Maguisa
despite their clear lack of legal standing to file the same.

(b.) Allowing the entry of appearance of a private law firm to represent the City of Urdaneta despite the
clear statutory and jurisprudential prohibitions thereto.

(c.) Allowing Ceferino J. Capalad and the City of Urdaneta to switch sides, by permitting the withdrawal
of their respective answers and admitting their complaints as well as allowing the appearance of Atty.
Jorito C. Peralta to represent Capalad although Atty. Oscar C. Sahagun, his counsel of record, had not
withdrawn from the case, in gross violation of well settled rules and case law on the matter.

We first resolve whether the Court of Appeals erred in denying reconsideration of its April 15,
2003 Resolution despite APP and APPCDCs subsequent compliance.

Petitioners argue that the Court of Appeals should not have dismissed the petition on mere
technicalities since they have attached the proper documents in their motion for reconsideration and
substantially complied with the rules.
Respondent Urdaneta City maintains that the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed the petition because
Cesar Goco had no proof he was authorized to sign the certification of non-forum shopping in behalf of
APPCDC.

Indeed, Cesar Goco had no proof of his authority to sign the verification and certification of non-forum
shopping of the petition for certiorari filed with the Court of Appeals. Thus, the Court of Appeals is
allowed by the rules the discretion to dismiss the petition since only individuals vested with authority by
a valid board resolution may sign the certificate of non-forum shopping in behalf of a corporation. Proof
of said authority must be attached; otherwise, the petition is subject to dismissal.

However, it must be pointed out that in several cases, this Court had considered as substantial
compliance with the procedural requirements the submission in the motion for reconsideration of the
authority to sign the verification and certification, as in this case. The Court notes that the attachments
in the motion for reconsideration show that on March 5, 2003, the Board of Directors of APPCDC
authorized Cesar Goco to institute the petition before the Court of Appeals. On March 22, 2003, Ronilo
Goco doing business under the name APP, also appointed his father, Cesar Goco, as his attorney-in-fact
to file the petition. When the petition was filed on March 26, 2003 before the Court of Appeals, Cesar
Goco was duly authorized to sign the verification and certification except that the proof of his authority
was not submitted together with the petition.

Similarly, petitioners submitted in the motion for reconsideration certified true copies of the assailed
RTC orders and we may also consider the same as substantial compliance. Petitioners also included in
the motion for reconsideration their explanation that copies of the petition were personally served on
the Lazaro Law Firm and mailed to the RTC and Atty. Peralta because of distance. The affidavit of
service supported the explanation. Considering the substantial issues involved, it was thus error for the
appellate court to deny reinstatement of the petition.

Having discussed the procedural issues, we shall now proceed to address the substantive issues raised
by petitioners, rather than remand this case to the Court of Appeals. In our view, the issue, simply put,
is: Did the RTC err and commit grave abuse of discretion in (a) entertaining the taxpayers suits; (b)
allowing a private law firm to represent Urdaneta City; (c) allowing respondents Capalad
and Urdaneta City to switch from being defendants to becoming complainants; and (d) allowing
Capalads change of attorneys?

On the first point at issue, petitioners argue that a taxpayer may only sue where the act complained of
directly involves illegal disbursement of public funds derived from taxation. The allegation of
respondents Del Castillo, Del Prado, Ordono and Maguisa that the construction of the project is funded
by the PNB loan contradicts the claim regarding illegal disbursement since the funds are not directly
derived from taxation.

Respondents Del Castillo, Del Prado, Ordono and Maguisa counter that their personality to sue was not
raised by petitioners APP and APPCDC in their Answer and that this issue was not even discussed in the
RTCs assailed orders.
Petitioners contentions lack merit. The RTC properly allowed the taxpayers suits. In Public Interest
Center, Inc. v. Roxas, we held:

In the case of taxpayers suits, the party suing as a taxpayer must prove that he has sufficient interest in
preventing the illegal expenditure of money raised by taxation. Thus, taxpayers have been allowed to
sue where there is a claim that public funds are illegally disbursed or that public money is being
deflected to any improper purpose, or that public funds are wasted through the enforcement of an
invalid or unconstitutional law.

xxxx

Petitioners allegations in their Amended Complaint that the loan contracts entered into by the Republic
and NPC are serviced or paid through a disbursement of public funds are not disputed by respondents,
hence, they are invested with personality to institute the same.

Here, the allegation of taxpayers Del Castillo, Del Prado, Ordono and Maguisa that P95 million of
the P250 million PNB loan had already been paid for minimal work is sufficient allegation of
overpayment, of illegal disbursement, that invests them with personality to sue. Petitioners do not
dispute the allegation as they merely insist, albeit erroneously, that public funds are not involved. Under
Article 1953 of the Civil Code, the city acquired ownership of the money loaned from PNB, making the
money public fund. The city will have to pay the loan by revenues raised from local taxation or by its
internal revenue allotment.

In addition, APP and APPCDCs lack of objection in their Answer on the personality to sue of the four
complainants constitutes waiver to raise the objection under Section 1, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court.

On the second point, petitioners contend that only the City Prosecutor can represent Urdaneta City and
that law and jurisprudence prohibit the appearance of the Lazaro Law Firm as the citys counsel.

The Lazaro Law Firm, as the citys counsel, counters that the city was inutile defending its cause before
the RTC for lack of needed legal advice. The city has no legal officer and both City Prosecutor and
Provincial Legal Officer are busy. Practical considerations also dictate that the city and Mayor Perez must
have the same counsel since he faces related criminal cases. Citing Mancenido v. Court of Appeals, the
law firm states that hiring private counsel is proper where rigid adherence to the law on representation
would deprive a party of his right to redress a valid grievance.

We cannot agree with the Lazaro Law Firm. Its appearance as Urdaneta Citys counsel is against the law
as it provides expressly who should represent it. The City Prosecutor should continue to represent the
city.

Section 481(a) of the Local Government Code (LGC) of 1991 mandates the appointment of a city legal
officer. Under Section 481(b)(3)(i) of the LGC, the city legal officer is supposed to represent the city in all
civil actions, as in this case, and special proceedings wherein the city or any of its officials is a
party. In Ramos v. Court of Appeals, we cited that under Section 19 of Republic Act No. 5185, city
governments may already create the position of city legal officer to whom the function of the city fiscal
(now prosecutor) as legal adviser and officer for civil cases of the city shall be transferred. In the case
of Urdaneta City, however, the position of city legal officer is still vacant, although its charter was
enacted way back in 1998.

Because of such vacancy, the City Prosecutors appearance as counsel of Urdaneta City is proper. The
City Prosecutor remains as the citys legal adviser and officer for civil cases, a function that could not yet
be transferred to the city legal officer. Under the circumstances, the RTC should not have allowed the
entry of appearance of the Lazaro Law Firm vice the City Prosecutor. Notably, the citys Answer was
sworn to before the City Prosecutor by Mayor Perez. The City Prosecutor prepared the citys pre-trial
brief and represented the city in the pre-trial conference. No question was raised against the City
Prosecutors actions until the Lazaro Law Firm entered its appearance and claimed that the city lacked
adequate legal representation.

Moreover, the appearance of the Lazaro Law Firm as counsel for Urdaneta City is against the
law. Section 481(b)(3)(i) of the LGC provides when a special legal officer may be employed, that is, in
actions or proceedings where a component city or municipality is a party adverse to the provincial
government. But this case is not between Urdaneta City and the Province of Pangasinan. And we have
consistently held that a local government unit cannot be represented by private counsel as only public
officers may act for and in behalf of public entities and public funds should not be spent to hire private
lawyers. Pro bono representation in collaboration with the municipal attorney and prosecutor has not
even been allowed.

Neither is the law firms appearance justified under the instances listed in Mancenido when local
government officials can be represented by private counsel, such as when a claim for damages could
result in personal liability. No such claim against said officials was made in this case. Note that before it
joined the complainants, the city was the one sued, not its officials. That the firm represents Mayor
Perez in criminal cases, suits in his personal capacity, is of no moment.

On the third point, petitioners claim that Urdaneta City is estopped to reverse admissions in its Answer
that the contracts are valid and, in its pre-trial brief, that the execution of the contracts was in good
faith.

We disagree. The court may allow amendment of pleadings.

Section 5, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court pertinently provides that if evidence is objected to at the trial on
the ground that it is not within the issues raised by the pleadings, the court may allow the pleadings to
be amended and shall do so with liberality if the presentation of the merits of the action and the ends of
substantial justice will be subserved thereby. Objections need not even arise in this case since the Pre-
trial Order dated April 1, 2002 already defined as an issue whether the contracts are valid. Thus, what is
needed is presentation of the parties evidence on the issue. Any evidence of the city for or against the
validity of the contracts will be relevant and admissible. Note also that under Section 5, Rule 10,
necessary amendments to pleadings may be made to cause them to conform to the evidence.
In addition, despite Urdaneta Citys judicial admissions, the trial court is still given leeway to consider
other evidence to be presented for said admissions may not necessarily prevail over documentary
evidence, e.g., the contracts assailed. A partys testimony in open court may also override admissions in
the Answer.

As regards the RTCs order admitting Capalads complaint and dropping him as defendant, we find the
same in order. Capalad insists that Atty. Sahagun has no authority to represent him. Atty. Sahagun
claims otherwise. We note, however, that Atty. Sahagun represents petitioners who claim that the
contracts are valid. On the other hand, Capalad filed a complaint for annulment of the
contracts. Certainly, Atty. Sahagun cannot represent totally conflicting interests. Thus, we should
expunge all pleadings filed by Atty. Sahagun in behalf of Capalad.

Relatedly, we affirm the order of the RTC in allowing Capalads change of attorneys, if we can properly
call it as such, considering Capalads claim that Atty. Sahagun was never his attorney.

Before we close, notice is taken of the offensive language used by Attys. Oscar C. Sahagun and Antonio
B. Escalante in their pleadings before us and the Court of Appeals. They unfairly called the Court of
Appeals a court of technicalities for validly dismissing their defectively prepared petition. They also
accused the Court of Appeals of protecting, in their view, an incompetent judge. In explaining the
concededly strong language, Atty. Sahagun further indicted himself. He said that the Court of Appeals
dismissal of the case shows its impatience and readiness to punish petitioners for a perceived slight on
its dignity and such dismissal smacks of retaliation and does not augur for the cold neutrality and
impartiality demanded of the appellate court.

Accordingly, we impose upon Attys. Oscar C. Sahagun and Antonio B. Escalante a fine of P2,000 each
payable to this Court within ten days from notice and we remind them that they should observe and
maintain the respect due to the Court of Appeals and judicial officers; abstain from offensive language
before the courts; and not attribute to a Judge motives not supported by the record. Similar acts in the
future will be dealt with more severely.

WHEREFORE, we (1) GRANT the petition; (2) SET ASIDE the Resolutions dated April 15,
2003 and February 4, 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 76170; (3) DENY the entry of
appearance of the Lazaro Law Firm in Civil Case No. U-7388 and EXPUNGE all pleadings it filed as counsel
of Urdaneta City; (4) ORDER the City Prosecutor to represent Urdaneta City in Civil Case No. U-7388;
(5) AFFIRM the RTC in admitting the complaint of Capalad; and (6) PROHIBIT Atty. Oscar C. Sahagun from
representing Capalad and EXPUNGE all pleadings that he filed in behalf of Capalad.

Let the records of Civil Case No. U-7388 be remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.

Finally, we IMPOSE a fine of P2,000 each on Attys. Oscar C. Sahagun and Antonio B. Escalante for their
use of offensive language, payable to this Court within ten (10) days from receipt of this Decision.

The Case
This administrative case arose from a complaint filed on 22 October 2001 by
Judge Ubaldino A. Lacurom (Judge Lacurom), Pairing Judge, Regional Trial Court of CabanatuanCity,
Branch 30, against respondent-spouses Atty. Ellis F. Jacoba and Atty. Olivia Velasco-
Jacoba (respondents). Complainant charged respondents with violation of Rules 11.03,[1] 11.04,[2] and
19.01[3] of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

The Facts

The Jacoba-Velasco-Jacoba Law Firm is counsel for plaintiff Alejandro R. Veneracion (Veneracion) in a
civil case for unlawful detainer against defendant
Federico Barrientos (Barrientos).[4] The Municipal Trial Court of Cabanatuan City rendered judgment in
favor of Veneracion but Barrientos appealed to the Regional Trial Court. The case was raffled to Branch
30 where Judge Lacurom was sitting as pairing judge.

On 29 June 2001, Judge Lacurom issued a Resolution (Resolution) reversing the earlier judgments
rendered in favor of Veneracion.[5] The dispositive portion reads:

WHEREFORE, this Court hereby REVERSES its Decision dated December 22, 2000, as well as REVERSES
the Decision of the court a quo dated July 22, 1997.

Furthermore, the plaintiff-appellee Alejandro Veneracion is ordered to CEASE and DESIST from ejecting
the defendant-appellant Federico Barrientos from the 1,000 square meter homelot covered by TCT No.
T-75274, and the smaller area of one hundred forty-seven square meters, within the 1,000 sq.m.
covered by TCT No. T-78613, and the house thereon standing covered by Tax Declaration No. 02006-
01137, issued by the City Assessor of Cabanatuan City; and Barrientos is ordered to
pay Veneracion P10,000.00 for the house covered by Tax Declaration No. 02006-01137.

SO ORDERED.[6]
Veneracions counsel filed a Motion for Reconsideration (with Request for Inhibition)[7] dated 30 July
2001 (30 July 2001 motion), pertinent portions of which read:

II. PREFATORY STATEMENT

This RESOLUTION of REVERSAL is an ABHORRENT NULLITY as it is entirely DEVOID of factual and legal
basis. It is a Legal MONSTROSITY in the sense that the Honorable REGIONAL TRIAL COURT acted as if it
were the DARAB (Dept. of Agrarian Reform ADJUDICATION BOARD)! x x x HOW HORRIBLE and TERRIBLE!
The mistakes are very patent and glaring! x x x

xxxx

III. GROUNDS FOR RECONSIDERATION

1. The Honorable Pairing Court Presiding Judge ERRED in Peremptorily and Suddenly Reversing the
Findings of the Lower Court Judge and the Regular RTC Presiding Judge:

x x x The defendant filed a Motion for Reconsideration, and after a very questionable SHORT period of
time, came this STUNNING and SUDDEN REVERSAL. Without any legal or factual basis, the Hon. Pairing
Judge simply and peremptorily REVERSED two (2) decisions in favor of the plaintiff. This is highly
questionable, if not suspicious, hence, this Motion for Reconsideration.

xxxx

[The Resolution] assumes FACTS that have not been established and presumes FACTS not part of the
records of the case, all loaded in favor of the alleged TENANT. Clearly, the RESOLUTION is an INSULT to
the Judiciary and an ANACHRONISM in the Judicial Process. Need we say more?

xxxx
4. The Honorable Pairing Court Presiding Judge ERRED in Holding That the Defendant is Entitled to
a Homelot, and That the Residential LOT in Question is That Homelot:

THIS ERROR IS STUPENDOUS and a real BONER. Where did the Honorable PAIRING JUDGE base this
conclusion? x x x This HORRENDOUS MISTAKE must be corrected here and now!

xxxx

6. The Honorable Pairing Court Presiding Judge ERRED Grievously in Holding and Declaring that The
[court] A QUO Erroneously Took Cognizance of the Case and That It Had No Jurisdiction over the
Subject-Matter:

Another HORRIBLE ERROR! Even an average Law Student knows that JURISDICTION is determined by the
averments of the COMPLAINT and not by the averments in the answer! This is backed up by a Litany of
Cases!

xxxx

7. FINALLY, the Honorable Pairing Court Presiding Judge Ridiculously ERRED in Ordering the Defendant
To Pay P10,000.00 to the Plaintiff As Payment for Plaintiffs HOUSE:

THIS IS the Last STRAW, but it is also the Best ILLUSTRATION of the Manifold GLARING ERRORS
committed by the Hon. Pairing Court Judge.
xxxx

This Order of the Court for the plaintiff to sell his RESIDENTIAL HOUSE to the defendant for the
ridiculously LOW price of P10,000.00 best illustrates the Long Line of Faulty reasonings and ERRONEOUS
conclusions of the Hon. Pairing Court Presiding Judge. Like the proverbial MONSTER, the Monstrous
Resolution should be slain on sight![8]

The 30 July 2001 motion prayed that (1) Judge Lacurom inhibit himself in order to give plaintiff a fighting
chance and (2) the Resolution be reconsidered and set aside.[9]Atty. Olivia Velasco-Jacoba (Velasco-
Jacoba) signed the motion on behalf of the Jacoba-Velasco-Jacoba Law Firm.

On 6 August 2001, Judge Lacurom ordered Velasco-Jacoba to appear before his sala and explain why she
should not be held in contempt of court for the very disrespectful, insulting and humiliating contents of
the 30 July 2001 motion.[10] In her Explanation, Comments and Answer,[11] Velasco-Jacoba claimed
that His Honor knows beforehand who actually prepared the subject Motion; records will show that the
undersigned counsel did not actually or actively participate in this case.[12] Velasco-Jacobadisavowed
any conscious or deliberate intent to degrade the honor and integrity of the Honorable Court or to
detract in any form from the respect that is rightfully due all courts of justice.[13] She rationalized as
follows:

x x x at first blush, [the motion] really appears to contain some sardonic, strident and hard-striking
adjectives. And, if we are to pick such stringent words at random and bunch them together, side-by-side
x x x then collectively and certainly they present a cacophonic picture of total and utter disrespect. x x x

xxxx

We most respectfully submit that plaintiff & counsel did not just fire a staccato of incisive and hard-
hitting remarks, machine-gun style as to be called contumacious and contemptuous. They were just
articulating their feelings of shock, bewilderment and disbelief at the sudden reversal of their good
fortune, not driven by any desire to just cast aspersions at the Honorable Pairing judge. They must
believe that big monumental errors deserve equally big adjectives, no more no less. x x x The matters
involved were [neither] peripheral nor marginalized, and they had to call a spade a spade. x x x [14]
Nevertheless, Velasco-Jacoba expressed willingness to apologize for whatever mistake [they] may have
committed in a moment of unguarded discretion when [they] may have stepped on the line and gone
out of bounds. She also agreed to have the allegedly contemptuous phrases stricken off the record.[15]

On 13 September 2001, Judge Lacurom found Velasco-Jacoba guilty of contempt and penalized her with
imprisonment for five days and a fine of P1,000.[16]

Velasco-Jacoba moved for reconsideration of the 13 September 2001 order. She recounted that on her
way out of the house for an afternoon hearing, Atty. Ellis Jacoba (Jacoba) stopped her and
said O, pirmahan mo na ito kasi last day na, baka mahuli. (Sign this as it is due today, or it might not be
filed on time.) She signed the pleading handed to her without reading it, in trusting blind faith on her
husband of 35 years with whom she entrusted her whole life and future.[17] This pleading turned out to
be the 30 July 2001 motion which Jacoba drafted but could not sign because of his then suspension from
the practice of law.[18]

Velasco-Jacoba lamented that Judge Lacurom had found her guilty of contempt without conducting any
hearing. She accused Judge Lacurom of harboring a personal vendetta, ordering her imprisonment
despite her status as senior lady lawyer of the IBP Nueva Ecija Chapter, already a senior citizen, and a
grandmother many times over.[19]At any rate, she argued, Judge Lacurom should have inhibited himself
from the case out of delicadeza because [Veneracion] had already filed against him criminal cases before
the Office of the City Prosecutor of Cabanatuan City and before the Ombudsman.[20]

The records show that with the assistance of counsel Jacoba and the Jacoba-Velasco-Jacoba Law
Firm, Veneracion had executed an affidavit on 23 August 2001 accusing Judge Lacurom of knowingly
rendering unjust judgment through inexcusable negligence and ignorance[21] and violating

Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 (RA 3019).[22] The first charge became the subject of a
preliminary investigation[23] by the City Prosecutor of Cabanatuan City. On the second
charge, Veneracion set forth his allegations in a Complaint-Affidavit[24] filed on 28 August 2001 with the
Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon.
Judge Lacurom issued another order on 21 September 2001, this time directing Jacoba to explain why he
should not be held in contempt.[25] Jacoba complied by filing an Answer with Second Motion for
Inhibition, wherein he denied that he typed or prepared the 30 July 2001 motion. Against Velasco-
Jacobas statements implicating him, Jacobainvoked the marital privilege rule in
evidence.[26] Judge Lacurom later rendered a decision[27] finding Jacoba guilty of contempt of court
and sentencing him to pay a fine of P500.

On 22 October 2001, Judge Lacurom filed the present complaint against respondents before the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP).

Report and Recommendation of the IBP

Respondents did not file an answer and neither did they appear at the hearing set by IBP Commissioner
Atty. Lydia A. Navarro (IBP Commissioner Navarro) despite sufficient notice.[28]

IBP Commissioner Navarro, in her Report and Recommendation of 10 October 2002, recommended the
suspension of respondents from the practice of law for six months.[29]IBP Commissioner Navarro found
that respondents were prone to us[ing] offensive and derogatory remarks and phrases which amounted
to discourtesy and disrespect for authority.[30] Although the remarks were not directed at
Judge Lacurom personally, they were aimed at his position as a judge, which is a smack on the judiciary
system as a whole.[31]

The IBP Board of Governors (IBP Board) adopted IBP Commissioner Navarros Report and
Recommendation, except for the length of suspension which the IBP Board reduced to three
months.[32] On 10 December 2002, the IBP Board transmitted its recommendation to this Court,
together with the documents pertaining to the case.

Several days later, Velasco-Jacoba sought reconsideration of the IBP Board decision, thus:[33]
xxxx

3. For the information of the Honorable Commission, the present complaint of Judge Lacurom is sub
judice; the same issues involved in this case are raised before the Honorable Court of Appeals presently
pending in CA-G.R. SP No. 66973 for Certiorari and Mandatory Inhibition with TRO and Preliminary
Injunction x x x;

4. We filed an Administrative Case against Judge Lacurom before the Supreme Court involving the same
issues we raised in the aforementioned Certiorari case, which was dismissed by the Supreme Court for
being premature, in view of the pending Certiorari case before the Court of Appeals;

5. In like manner, out of respect and deference to the Court of Appeals, the present complaint should
likewise be dismissed and/or suspended pending resolution of the certiorari case by the Court of
Appeals.[34] (Emphasis supplied)

The Courts Ruling

On a preliminary note, we reject Velasco-Jacobas contention that the present complaint should be
considered sub judice in view of the petition for certiorari and mandatory inhibition with preliminary
injunction (petition for certiorari)[35] filed before the Court of Appeals.

The petition for certiorari, instituted by Veneracion and Velasco-Jacoba on 4 October 2001, seeks to
nullify the following orders issued by Judge Lacurom in Civil Case No. 2836: (1) the Orders dated 26
September 2001 and 9 November 2001 denying respondents respective motions for inhibition; and (2)
the 13 September 2001 Order which found Velasco-Jacoba guilty of contempt. The petitioners allege
that Judge Lacurom acted with grave abuse of discretion [amounting] to lack of jurisdiction, in violation
of express provisions of the law and applicable decisions of the Supreme Court.[36]

Plainly, the issue before us is respondents liability under the Code of Professional Responsibility. The
outcome of this case has no bearing on the resolution of the petition for certiorari, as there is neither
identity of issues nor causes of action.
Neither should the Courts dismissal of the administrative complaint against Judge Lacurom for being
premature impel us to dismiss this complaint. Judge Lacuroms orders in Civil Case No. 2836 could not be
the subject of an administrative complaint against him while a petition for certiorari assailing the same
orders is pending with an appellatecourt. Administrative remedies are neither alternative nor
cumulative to judicial review where such review is available to the aggrieved parties and the same has
not been resolved with finality. Until there is a final declaration that the challenged order or judgment is
manifestly erroneous, there will be no basis to conclude whether the judge is administratively liable.[37]

The respondents are situated differently within the factual setting of this case. The corresponding
implications of their actions also give rise to different liabilities. We first examine the charge against
Velasco-Jacoba.

There is no dispute that the genuine signature of Velasco-Jacoba appears on the 30 July 2001 motion.
Velasco-Jacobas responsibility as counsel is governed by Section 3, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court:

SEC. 3. Signature and address.Every pleading must be signed by the party or counsel representing him
x x x.

The signature of counsel constitutes a certificate by him that he has read the pleading, that to the best
of his knowledge, information, and belief there is good ground to support it, and that it is not interposed
for delay.

x x x Counsel who x x x signs a pleading in violation of this Rule, or alleges scandalous or indecent matter
therein x x x shall be subject to appropriate disciplinary action. (Emphasis supplied)

By signing the 30 July 2001 motion, Velasco-Jacoba in effect certified that she had read it, she knew it to
be meritorious, and it was not for the purpose of delaying the case. Her signature supplied the motion
with legal effect and elevated its status from a mere scrap of paper to that of a court document.

Velasco-Jacoba insists, however, that she signed the 30 July 2001 motion only because of her husbands
request but she did not know its contents beforehand. Apparently, this practice of signing each others
pleadings is a long-standing arrangement between the spouses. According to Velasco-Jacoba, [s]o
implicit is [their] trust for each other that this happens all the time. Through the years, [she] already lost
count of the number of pleadings prepared by one that is signed by the other.[38] By Velasco-
Jacobas own admission, therefore, she violated Section 3 of Rule 7. This violation is an act of falsehood
before the courts, which in itself is a ground

for subjecting her to disciplinary action, independent of any other ground arising from the contents of
the 30 July 2001 motion.[39]

We now consider the evidence as regards Jacoba. His name does not appear in the 30 July 2001 motion.
He asserts the inadmissibility of Velasco-Jacobas statement pointing to him as the author of the motion.

The Court cannot easily let Jacoba off the hook. Firstly, his Answer with Second Motion for Inhibition did
not contain a denial of his wifes account. Instead, Jacoba impliedly admitted authorship of the motion
by stating that he trained his guns and fired at the errors which he perceived and believed to be gigantic
and monumental.[40]

Secondly, we find Velasco-Jacobas version of the facts more plausible, for two reasons: (1) her reaction
to the events was immediate and spontaneous, unlike Jacobasdefense which was raised only after a
considerable time had elapsed from the eruption of the controversy; and (2) Jacoba had been
counsel of record for Veneracion in Civil Case No. 2836, supporting Velasco-Jacobas assertion that she
had not actually participate[d] in the prosecution of the case.

Moreover, Jacoba filed a Manifestation in Civil Case No. 2836, praying that Judge Lacurom await the
outcome of the petition for certiorari before deciding the contempt charge against him.[41] This petition
for certiorari anchors some of its arguments on the premise that the motion was, in
fact, Jacobas handiwork.[42]

The marital privilege rule, being a rule of evidence, may be waived by failure of the claimant to object
timely to its presentation or by any conduct that may be construed as implied consent.[43] This waiver
applies to Jacoba who impliedly admitted authorship of the 30 July 2001 motion.

The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:

Rule 11.03.A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing language or behavior before
the Courts.

Rule 11.04.A lawyer shall not attribute to a Judge motives not supported by the record or have no
materiality to the case.

No doubt, the language contained in the 30 July 2001 motion greatly exceeded the vigor required
of Jacoba to defend ably his clients cause. We recall his use of the following words and
phrases: abhorrent nullity, legal monstrosity, horrendous mistake, horrible error, boner, and an insult to
the judiciary and an anachronism in the judicial process. Even Velasco-Jacoba acknowledged that the
words created a cacophonic picture of total and utter disrespect.[44]

Respondents nonetheless try to exculpate themselves by saying that every remark in the 30 July 2001
motion was warranted. We disagree.

Well-recognized is the right of a lawyer, both as an officer of the court and as a citizen, to criticize in
properly respectful terms and through legitimate channels the acts of courts and judges.[45] However,
even the most hardened judge would be scarred by the scurrilous attack made by the 30 July 2001
motion on Judge Lacuroms Resolution. On its face, the Resolution presented the facts correctly and
decided the case according to supporting law and jurisprudence. Though a lawyers language may be
forceful and emphatic, it should always be dignified and respectful, befitting the dignity of the legal
profession.[46] The use of unnecessary language is proscribed if we are to promote high esteem in the
courts and trust in judicial administration.[47]

In maintaining the respect due to the courts, a lawyer is not merely enjoined to use dignified language
but also to pursue the clients cause through fair and honest means, thus:

Rule 19.01.A lawyer shall employ only fair and honest means to attain the lawful objectives of his client
and shall not present, participate in presenting or threaten to present unfounded criminal charges to
obtain an improper advantage in any case or proceeding.
Shortly after the filing of the 30 July 2001 motion but before its resolution, Jacoba assisted his client in
instituting two administrative cases against Judge Lacurom. As we have earlier noted, Civil Case No.
2836 was then pending before Judge Lacuroms sala. The Courts attention is drawn to the fact that the
timing of the filing of these administrative cases could very well raise the suspicion that the cases were
intended as leverage against Judge Lacurom.

Respondent spouses have both been the subject of administrative cases before this Court. In
Administrative Case No. 2594, we suspended Jacoba from the practice of law for a period of six months
because of his failure to file an action for the recovery of possession of property despite the lapse of two
and a half years from receipt by him of P550 which his client gave him as filing and sheriffs fees.[48] In
Administrative Case No. 5505, Jacoba was once again found remiss in his duties when he failed to file
the appellants brief, resulting in the dismissal of his clients appeal. We imposed the penalty of one year
suspension.[49]

As for Velasco-Jacoba, only recently this Court fined her P5,000 for appearing in barangay conciliation
proceedings on behalf of a party, knowing fully well the prohibition contained in Section 415 of the Local
Government Code.[50]

In these cases, the Court sternly warned respondents that a repetition of similar acts would merit a
stiffer penalty. Yet, here again we are faced with the question of whether respondents have conducted
themselves with the courtesy and candor required of them as members of the bar and officers of the
court. We find respondents to have fallen short of the mark.

WHEREFORE, we SUSPEND Atty. Ellis F. Jacoba from the practice of law for two (2) years effective upon
finality of this Decision. We also SUSPEND Atty. Olivia Velasco-Jacoba from the practice of law for two
(2) months effective upon finality of this Decision. We STERNLY WARN respondents that a repetition of
the same or similar infraction shall merit a more severe sanction.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be appended to respondents
personal records as attorneys; the Integrated Bar of the Philippines; and all courts in the country for
their information and guidance.
 EN BANC

RE : SUSPENSION OF ATTY. ADM. CASE No. 7006

ROGELIO Z. BAGABUYO, FORMER
SENIOR STATE PROSECUTOR Present:

PUNO, C.J.,
QUISUMBING,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ.
CARPIO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES,
AZCUNA,
TINGA,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
GARCIA,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA, and
REYES, JJ.

Promulgated:
October 9, 2007
X ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ X

DECISION
AZCUNA, J.:
 This administrative case stemmed from the events of the proceedings in
Crim. Case No. 5144, entitled People v. Luis Bucalon Plaza, heard before the sala
of Presiding Judge Jose Manuel P. Tan, Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Surigao City, Branch 29.

Crim. Case No. 5144 was originally raffled to the sala of Judge Floripinas C.
Buyser, RTC of Surigao City, Branch 30. In an Order dated March 14, 2002, Judge
Buyser denied the Demurrer to the Evidence of the accused, declaring that the
evidence thus presented by the prosecution was sufficient to prove the crime of
homicide and not the charge of murder. Consequently, the counsel for the defense
filed a Motion to Fix the Amount of Bail Bond. Respondent Atty. Rogelio Z.
Bagabuyo, then Senior State Prosecutor and the deputized prosecutor of the
case, objected thereto mainly on the ground that the original charge
of murder, punishable with reclusion perpetua, was not subject to bail under Sec.
4, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court.[1]

In an Order dated August 30, 2002,[2] Judge Buyser inhibited himself from
further trying the case because of the harsh insinuation of Senior Prosecutor
Rogelio Z. Bagabuyo that he lacks the cold neutrality of an impartial magistrate, by
allegedly suggesting the filing of the motion to fix the amount of bail bond
by counsel for the accused.

The case was transferred to Branch 29 of the RTC of Surigao City, presided
by Judge Jose Manuel P. Tan. In an Order dated November 12, 2002, Judge Tan
favorably resolved the Motion to Fix the Amount of Bail Bond, and fixed the
amount of the bond at P40,000.

Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration of the Order dated November

12, 2002, which motion was denied for lack of merit in an Order dated February
10, 2003. In October, 2003, respondent appealed from the Orders dated November
12, 2002 and February 10, 2003, to the Court of Appeals (CA).

Instead of availing himself only of judicial remedies, respondent caused the

publication of an article regarding the Order granting bail to the accused in
the August 18, 2003 issue of the Mindanao Gold Star Daily. The article,
entitled Senior prosecutor lambasts Surigao judge for allowing murder suspect to
bail out, reads:
 SENIOR state prosecutor has lashed at a judge in Surigao City for
allowing a murder suspect to go out on bail.

Senior state prosecutor Rogelio Bagabuyo lambasted Judge

Manuel Tan of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) Branch 29 based
in Surigao City for ruling on a motion that sought a bailbond
for Luis Plaza who stands charged with murdering a policeman . . . .

Plaza reportedly posted a P40-thousand bail bond.

Bagabuyo argued that the crime of murder is a non-bailable

offense. But Bagabuyo admitted that a judge could still opt to allow a
murder suspect to bail out in cases when the evidence of the prosecution
is weak.

But in this murder case, Bagabuyo said the judge who previously
handled it, Judge F[lori]pinas B[uy]ser, described the evidence to be
strong. B[uy]ser inhibited from the case for an unclear reason.

xxx

Bagabuyo said he would contest Tans decision before the Court of

Appeals and would file criminal and administrative charges
of certiorari against the judge.

Bagabuyuo said he was not afraid of being cited in contempt by

Judge Tan.

This is the only way that the public would know that there are
judges there who are displaying judicial arrogance. he said.[3]

In an Order dated August 21, 2003, the RTC of Surigao City, Branch 29,
directed respondent and the writer of the article, Mark Francisco of the Mindanao
Gold Star Daily, to appear in court on September 20, 2003 to explain why they
should not be cited for indirect contempt of court for the publication of the article
which degraded the court and its presiding judge with its lies and
misrepresentation.
 The said Order stated that contrary to the statements in the article, Judge
Buyser described the evidence for the prosecution as not strong, but sufficient to
prove the guilt of the accused only for homicide. Moreover, it was not true that
Judge Buyser inhibited himself from the case for an unclear reason. Judge Buyser,
in an Order dated August 30, 2002, declared in open court in the presence of
respondent that he was inhibiting himself from the case due to the harsh
insinuation of respondent that he lacked the cold neutrality of an impartial judge.

On the scheduled hearing of the contempt charge, Mark Francisco admitted

that the Mindanao Gold Star Daily caused the publication of the article. He
disclosed that respondent, in a press conference, stated that the crime of murder is
non-bailable. When asked by the trial court why he printed such lies, Mr. Francisco
answered that his only source was respondent.[4] Mr. Francisco clarified that in
the statement alleging that Judge Buyser inhibited himself from the case for an
unclear reason, the phrase for an unclear reason, was added by the newspapers
Executive Editor Herby S. Gomez.[5]

Respondent admitted that he caused the holding of the press conference, but
refused to answer whether he made the statements in the article until after he shall
have filed a motion to dismiss. For his refusal to answer, the trial court declared
him in contempt of court pursuant to Sec. 3, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court. [6] The
Courts Order dated September 30, 2003 reads:

ORDER
Mr. Mark Francisco for publishing this article which is a lie
clothed in half truth to give it a semblance of truth is hereby ordered to
pay a fine of P10,000. Prosecutor Bagabuyo, for obstinately refusing to
explain why he should not be cited for contempt and admitting that the
article published in the Mindanao Gold Star Daily on August 18, 2003
and quoted in the Order of this Court dated August 21, 2003 which is
contemptuous was caused by him to be published, is hereby adjudged to
have committed indirect contempt of Court pursuant to Section 3 of Rule
71 of the Rules of Court and he is hereby ordered to suffer the penalty of
30 days in jail. The BJMP is hereby ordered to arrest Prosecutor Rogelio
Z. Bagabuyo if he does not put up a bond of P100,000.00.

SO ORDERD.[7]
 Respondent posted the required bond and was released from the custody of
the law. He appealed the indirect contempt order to the CA.

Despite the citation of indirect contempt, respondent presented himself to the

media for interviews in Radio Station DXKS, and again attacked the integrity of
Judge Tan and the trial courts disposition in the proceedings of Crim. Case No.
5144.

In an Order dated October 20, 2003, the RTC of Surigao City, Branch 29,
required respondent to explain and to show cause within five days from receipt
thereof why he should not be held in contempt for his media interviews that
degraded the court and the presiding judge, and why he should not be suspended
from the practice of law for violating the Code of Professional Responsibility,
specifically Rule 11.05 of Canon 11[8] and Rule 13.02 of Canon 13.[9]

In the Order, the trial court stated that respondent was interviewed by Jun
Clergio, and that the interview was repeatedly aired on September 30, 2003 and in
his news program between 6:00 and 8:00 a.m. on October 1, 2003. He was also
interviewed by Tony Consing on October 1 and 2, 2003, between 8:00 and 9:00
a.m. in his radio program.In those radio interviews, respondent allegedly called
Judge Tan a judge who does not know the law, a liar, and a dictator who does not
accord due process to the people.

The hearing for the second contempt charge was set on December 4, 2003.

On November, 20, 2003, respondent filed an Urgent Motion for Extension of

Time to File Answer to Contempt alleging that he was saddled with work of equal
importance and needed ample time to answer the same. He also prayed for a bill of
particulars in order to properly prepare for his defense.

In an Order dated November 20, 2003, the trial court denied the motion. It
stated that a bill of particulars is not applicable in contempt proceedings, and that
respondentsactions and statements are detailed in the Order of October 20, 2003.

On the scheduled hearing of December 4, 2003 respondent neither appeared

in court nor informed the court of his absence. The trial court issued an Order
dated December 4, 2003 cancelling the hearing to give Prosecutor Bagabuyo all the
chances he asks for, and ordered him to appear on January 12, 2004 to explain in
writing or orally why he should not be cited in contempt of court pursuant to the
facts stated in the Order dated October 20, 2003. However, respondent did not
appear in the scheduled hearing of January 12, 2004.

On January 15, 2004, the trial court received respondents Answer

dated January 8, 2004. Respondent denied the charge that he sought to be
interviewed by radio station DXKS. He, however, stated that right after the hearing
of September 30, 2003, he was approached by someone who asked him to
comment on the Order issued in open court, and that his comment does not fall
within the concept of indirect contempt of court. He also admitted that he was
interviewed by his friend, Tony Consing, at the latters instance.He justified his
response during the interview as a simple exercise of his constitutional right
of freedom of speech and that it was not meant to offend or malign, and was
without malice.

On February 8, 2004, the trial court issued an Order, the dispositive portion
of which reads:
WHEREFORE, finding preponderant evidence that Prosecutor
Bagabuyo has grossly violated the Canons of the legal profession and
[is] guilty of grave professional misconduct, rendering him unfit to
continue to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities belonging to
the office of an attorney, he is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of
law.

Likewise, he is also found guilty of indirect contempt of court, for

which he is hereby ordered to suffer the penalty of IMPRISONMENT
for ninety (90) days to be served at the Surigao City Jail and to pay the
maximum fine of THIRTY THOUSAND PESOS (P30,000.00). Future
acts of contempt will be dealt with more severely.

Let copies of the relevant records be immediately forwarded to the

Supreme Court for automatic review and for further determination of
grounds for [the] disbarment of Prosecutor Rogelio Z. Bagabuyo.[10]

The trial court found respondents denials to be lame as the tape of his
interview on October 2, 2003, duly transcribed, showed disrespect of the court and
its officers, thus:
 TONY CONSING: Fiscal, nanglabay ang mga oras, nanglabay
ang gamayng panahon ang samad sa imong
kasingkasing nagpabilin pa ba ni. O ingnon nato
duna na bay pagbag-o sa imong huna-huna
karon?

(Fiscal, after the lapse of time, are you still hurt? Or have you not changed
your mind yet?)

BAGABUYO : Ang akong huna-huna kon aduna man ugaling pagbag-o

ang pagsiguro, ang mga Huwes nga dili
mahibalo sa balaod tangtangon pagka abogado,
mao kana.

(If my mind has changed at all, it is that I ensure that all judges who are
ignorant of the law should be disbarred. Thats it.)

xxx

BAGABUYO : Mao kana ang tinuod, Ton, ug kining akong guibatonan

karon nga hunahuna mahitungod nianang mga
Huwes nga dili kahibalo sa balaod, magkadugay
magkalami. Kada adlao nagatoon ako. Nagabasa
ako sa mga bag-ong jurisprudence ug sa atong
balaod aron sa pagsiguro gayod nga inigsang-at
unya nako sa kaso nga disbarmentniining di
mahibalo nga Huwes, sigurado gayod ako nga
katangtangan siya sa lisensiya . . . . Ang kini nga
Huwes nga dili mahibalo sa balaod,
pagatangtangon na, dili lamang sa pagka-Huwes
kon dili sa pagka-abogado. Tan-awa ra gyod
kining iyang gibuhat nga Order, Ton, ang iyang
pagkabakakon . . . .

(Thats true, Ton, and this conviction I have now about judges who are
ignorant of the law is made firmer by time. I
study everyday. I read new jurisprudence and the
law to insure that when I file the disbarment case
against this Judge who does not know his law, I
am certain that he loses his license. . . . This
judge who is ignorant of the law should not only
 be removed as a judge but should also be
disbarred. Just take a look at his Order, Ton,
and see what a liar he is . . . .)

xxx

BAGABUYO : Yes, nag-ingon ang iyang Order. . . . Ngano nga

nakaingon ako nga bakakon kini, nag-ingon nga
kini konong order given in open court, ang kalooy
sa dios, ang iyang order sa Korte wala siya mag-
ingon ug kantidad nga P100,000.00 nga bail
bond. . . .

(Yes, his Order said that . . . . Why did I say that he is a liar? It states that
this Order was given in open court, and in
Gods mercy, he did not state the amount
of P100,000.00 as bail bond. . . .)

BAGABUYO : Kay dili man lagi mahibalo sa balaod, ako

siyang gui-ingnan, Your Honor, I have the right to appeal. Mibalik
dayon, ug miingon siya, BJMP arrest Bagabuyo.

(Because he does not know the law, I said, Your

Honor, I have the right to appeal. Then he came
back and said, BJMP, arrest Bagabuyo.)

xxx

BAGABUYO : . . . P100,000.00 ang iyang guipapiyansa.

Naunsa na? Dinhi makita nimo ang iyang
pagka gross ignorance of the law. . . .

(He imposed a bail of P100,000.00. How come? This is where you will
see his gross ignorance of the law. . . . )

xxx

TONY CONSING : So karon, unsay plano nimo karon?

(So what is your plan now?)

BAGABUYO : Sumala sa akong gui-ingon moundang lang ako kon
matangtang na siya sa pagka abogado. . . .

(As I have said, I will only stop if he is already disbarred. . . .)

xxx

BAGABUYO : Nasuko siya niini kay hambugero kuno, pero angayan

niyang hibaw-an nga ang trabajo sa Huwes dili
ang pagtan-aw kon ang tawo hambugero . . . . Ug
ang akong gisulti mao lamang ang balaod nga
siya in fact at that time I said he is not
conversant of the law, with regards to the case of
murder. . . .

(He got angry because I was allegedly bragging but he should know that
it is not for a judge to determine if a person is a
braggart. . . .And what I said was based on the
law. In fact, at that time, I said he is not
conversant of the law, with regards to the case of
murder . . . .)

xxx

BAGABUYO : Ah, mi sit down sab ako, contempt ra ba kadto . . . . Mao

kana, pero unsa may iyang katuyoan ang iyang
katuyoan nga ipa-adto ako didto kay didto, iya
akong pakauwawan kay iya kong sikopon, iya
kong ipa-priso, pero kay di man lagi mahibalo sa
balaod, ang iyang gui orderan BJMP, intawon
por dios por Santo, Mr. Tan, pagbasa intawon ug
balaod, naunsa ka ba Mr. Tan? Unsa may imong
hunahuna nga kon ikaw Huwes, ikaw na ang
diktador, no way, no sir, ours is a democratic
country where all and everyone is entitled to due
process of law you did not accord me due process
of law . . . .

(I sat down. . . . Thats it. But what was his purpose? He made me come
in order to humiliate me because he wanted me
arrested, he wanted me imprisoned, but because
 he is ignorant of the law, he ordered the
BMJP. For Gods sake, Mr. Tan, whats wrong
with you, Mr. Tan? Please read the law. What is
your thinking? That when you are a judge, you
are also a dictator? No way, no sir, ours is a
democratic country where all and everyone is
entitled to due process of law you did not accord
me due process of law. . . .)

TONY CONSING: So mopasaka kang disbarment, malaumon kita nga

maaksiyonan kini, with all this problem sa Korte
Suprema.

(So you are filing a disbarment case? We hope that this be given action
with all the problems in the Supreme Court.)

BAGABUYO : Dili ako mabalaka niana kay usa ka truck ang

akong jurisprudence, nga ang mga Huwes nga di
mahibalo sa balaod pagatangtangon gayod sa
ilang pagka Huwes. . . . Apan unsa man intawon
ang balaod ang iyang gibasa niini nadunggan ko
nga kini kuno siya madjongero, mao bitaw
na, madjong ang iyang guitunan?

(I am not worried because I have a truckload of jurisprudence that judges

who are ignorant of the law must be removed
from the Bench. But what law has he been
reading? I heard that he is a
mahjong aficionado (mahjongero) and that is
why he is studying mahjong.[11]

The trial court concluded that respondent, as a member of the bar and an
officer of the court, is duty bound to uphold the dignity and authority of the court,
and should notpromote distrust in the administration of justice.

The trial court stated that it is empowered to suspend respondent from the
practice of law under Sec. 28, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court[12] for any of the
causes mentioned in Sec. 27[13] of the same Rule. Respondent was given the
opportunity to be heard, but he opted to be silent. Thus, it held that the requirement
of due process has been duly satisfied.

In accordance with the provisions of Sec. 29,[14] Rule 138 and Sec. 9,[15] Rule
139 of the Rules of Court, the RTC of Surigao City, Branch 29, transmitted to the
Office of the Bar Confidant the Statement of Facts of respondents suspension from
the practice of law, dated July 14, 2005, together with the order of suspension and
other relevant documents.

In its Report dated January 4, 2006, the Office of the Bar Confidant found
that the article in the August 18, 2003 issue of the Mindanao Gold Star Daily,
which maligned the integrity and independence of the court and its officers, and
respondents criticism of the trial courts Order dated November 12, 2002, which
was aired in radio station DXKS,both in connection with Crim. Case No. 5144,
constitute grave violation of oath of office by respondent. It stated that the
requirement of due process was complied with when respondent was given an
opportunity to be heard, but respondent chose to remain silent.

The Office of the Bar Confidant recommended the implementation of the

trial courts order of suspension dated February 8, 2004, and that respondent be
suspended from the practice of law for one year, with a stern warning that
the repetition of a similar offense will be dealt with more severely.

The Court approves the recommendation of the Office of the Bar

Confidant. It has been reiterated in Gonzaga v. Villanueva, Jr.[16] that:
A lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for any violation of his
oath, a patent disregard of his duties, or an odious deportment
unbecoming an attorney. Among the grounds enumerated in Section 27,
Rule 138 of the Rules of Court are deceit; malpractice; gross misconduct
in office; grossly immoral conduct; conviction of a crime involving
moral turpitude; any violation of the oath which he is required to take
before admission to the practice of law; willful disobedience of any
lawful order of a superior court; corrupt or willful appearance as an
attorney for a party to a case without authority to do so. The grounds are
not preclusive in nature even as they are broad enough as to cover
practically any kind of impropriety that a lawyer does or commits in his
professional career or in his private life. A lawyer must at no time be
wanting in probity and moral fiber which are not only conditions
 precedent to his entrance to the Bar, but are likewise essential demands
for his continued membership therein.

Lawyers are licensed officers of the courts who are empowered to appear,
prosecute and defend; and upon whom peculiar duties, responsibilities and
liabilities are devolved by law as a consequence.[17] Membership in the bar imposes
upon them certain obligations.[18] Canon 11 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility mandates a lawyer to observe and maintain the respect due to the
courts and to judicial officers and [he] should insist on similar conduct by
others. Rule 11.05 of Canon 11 states that a lawyer shall submit grievances against
a judge to the proper authorities only.

Respondent violated Rule 11.05 of Canon 11 when he admittedly caused the

holding of a press conference where he made statements against the Order
dated November 12, 2002 allowing the accused in Crim. Case No. 5144 to be
released on bail.

Respondent also violated Canon 11 when he indirectly stated that Judge Tan
was displaying judicial arrogance in the article entitled, Senior prosecutor lambasts
Surigaojudge for allowing murder suspect to bail out, which appeared in
the August 18, 2003 issue of the Mindanao Gold Star Daily. Respondents
statements in the article, which were made while Crim. Case No. 5144 was still
pending in court, also violated Rule 13.02 of Canon 13, which states that a lawyer
shall not make public statements in the media regarding a pending case tending to
arouse public opinion for or against a party.

In regard to the radio interview given to Tony Consing, respondent violated

Rule 11.05 of Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility for not
resorting to the proper authorities only for redress of his grievances against Judge
Tan. Respondent also violated Canon 11 for his disrespect of the court and its
officer when he stated that Judge Tan was ignorant of the law, that as a
mahjong aficionado, he was studying mahjong instead of studying the law, and
that he was a liar.
 Respondent also violated the Lawyers Oath, as he has sworn to conduct
[himself] as a lawyer according to the best of [his] knowledge and discretion with
all good fidelity as well to the courts as to [his] clients.

As a senior state prosecutor and officer of the court, respondent should have
set the example of observing and maintaining the respect due to the courts and to
judicial officers. Montecillo v. Gica[19] held:

It is the duty of the lawyer to maintain towards the courts a

respectful attitude. As an officer of the court, it is his duty to uphold the
dignity and authority of the court to which he owes fidelity, according to
the oath he has taken. Respect for the courts guarantees the stability of
our democratic institutions which, without such respect, would be resting
on a very shaky foundation.

The Court is not against lawyers raising grievances against erring judges but
the rules clearly provide for the proper venue and procedure for doing so, precisely
because respect for the institution must always be maintained.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, Atty. Rogelio Z. Bagabuyo is
found guilty of violating Rule 11.05, Canon 11 and Rule 13.02, Canon 13 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, and of violating the Lawyers Oath, for which
he is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) year effective upon
finality of this Decision, with a STERN WARNING that the repetition of a
similar offense shall be dealt with more severely.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant to
be appended to respondents personal record as an attorney, the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines, the Department of Justice, and all courts in the country for their
information and guidance.

No costs.

SO ORDERED