THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 138322. October 2, 2001]

GRACE J. GARCIA, a.k.a. GRACE J. GARCIA-RECIO, petitioner, vs.

REDERICK A. RECIO, respondent.

DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:

A divorce obtained abroad by an alien may be recognized in our jurisdiction, provided such
decree is valid according to the national law of the foreigner. However, the divorce decree and the
governing personal law of the alien spouse who obtained the divorce must be proven. Our courts
do not take judicial notice of foreign laws and judgments; hence, like any other facts, both the
divorce decree and the national law of the alien must be alleged and proven according to our law
on evidence.

The Case

Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to nullify the
January 7, 1999 Decision[1] and the March 24, 1999 Order[2] of the Regional Trial Court of
Cabanatuan City, Branch 28, in Civil Case No. 3026AF. The assailed Decision disposed as
follows:

WHEREFORE, this Court declares the marriage between Grace J. Garcia and
Rederick A. Recio solemnized on January 12, 1994 at Cabanatuan City as dissolved
and both parties can now remarry under existing and applicable laws to any and/or
both parties.[3]

The assailed Order denied reconsideration of the above-quoted Decision.

The Facts

Rederick A. Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson, an Australian citizen, in

Malabon, Rizal, on March 1, 1987.[4] They lived together as husband and wife in Australia. On
May 18, 1989, [5] a decree of divorce, purportedly dissolving the marriage, was issued by an
Australian family court.
 On June 26, 1992, respondent became an Australian citizen, as shown by a Certificate of
Australian Citizenship issued by the Australian government.[6] Petitioner -- a Filipina -- and
respondent were married on January 12, 1994 in Our Lady of Perpetual Help Church in Cabanatuan
City.[7] In their application for a marriage license, respondent was declared as single and Filipino.[8]
Starting October 22, 1995, petitioner and respondent lived separately without prior judicial
dissolution of their marriage. While the two were still in Australia, their conjugal assets were
divided on May 16, 1996, in accordance with their Statutory Declarations secured in Australia.[9]
On March 3, 1998, petitioner filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage[10] in
the court a quo, on the ground of bigamy -- respondent allegedly had a prior subsisting marriage
at the time he married her on January 12, 1994. She claimed that she learned of respondents
marriage to Editha Samson only in November, 1997.
In his Answer, respondent averred that, as far back as 1993, he had revealed to petitioner his
prior marriage and its subsequent dissolution.[11] He contended that his first marriage to an
Australian citizen had been validly dissolved by a divorce decree obtained in Australia in
1989;[12] thus, he was legally capacitated to marry petitioner in 1994.
On July 7, 1998 -- or about five years after the couples wedding and while the suit for the
declaration of nullity was pending -- respondent was able to secure a divorce decree from a family
court in Sydney, Australia because the marriage ha[d] irretrievably broken down.[13]
Respondent prayed in his Answer that the Complaint be dismissed on the ground that it stated
no cause of action.[14] The Office of the Solicitor General agreed with respondent.[15] The court
marked and admitted the documentary evidence of both parties.[16] After they submitted their
respective memoranda, the case was submitted for resolution.[17]
Thereafter, the trial court rendered the assailed Decision and Order.

Ruling of the Trial Court

The trial court declared the marriage dissolved on the ground that the divorce issued in
Australia was valid and recognized in the Philippines. It deemed the marriage ended, but not on
the basis of any defect in an essential element of the marriage; that is, respondents alleged lack of
legal capacity to remarry. Rather, it based its Decision on the divorce decree obtained by
respondent. The Australian divorce had ended the marriage; thus, there was no more marital union
to nullify or annul.
Hence, this Petition.[18]

Issues

Petitioner submits the following issues for our consideration:

1
The trial court gravely erred in finding that the divorce decree obtained in Australia by
the respondent ipso facto terminated his first marriage to Editha Samson thereby
capacitating him to contract a second marriage with the petitioner.
2

The failure of the respondent, who is now a naturalized Australian, to present a

certificate of legal capacity to marry constitutes absence of a substantial requisite
voiding the petitioners marriage to the respondent
3

The trial court seriously erred in the application of Art. 26 of the Family Code in this
case.
4

The trial court patently and grievously erred in disregarding Arts. 11, 13, 21, 35, 40,
52 and 53 of the Family Code as the applicable provisions in this case.
5

The trial court gravely erred in pronouncing that the divorce decree obtained by the
respondent in Australia ipso facto capacitated the parties to remarry, without first
securing a recognition of the judgment granting the divorce decree before our
courts.[19]

The Petition raises five issues, but for purposes of this Decision, we shall concentrate on two
pivotal ones: (1) whether the divorce between respondent and Editha Samson was proven, and (2)
whether respondent was proven to be legally capacitated to marry petitioner. Because of our ruling
on these two, there is no more necessity to take up the rest.

The Courts Ruling

The Petition is partly meritorious.

First Issue:
Proving the Divorce Between Respondent and Editha Samson

Petitioner assails the trial courts recognition of the divorce between respondent and Editha
Samson. Citing Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee,[20] petitioner argues that the divorce decree, like any
other foreign judgment, may be given recognition in this jurisdiction only upon proof of the
existence of (1) the foreign law allowing absolute divorce and (2) the alleged divorce decree
itself. She adds that respondent miserably failed to establish these elements.
Petitioner adds that, based on the first paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, marriages
solemnized abroad are governed by the law of the place where they were celebrated (the lex loci
celebrationis). In effect, the Code requires the presentation of the foreign law to show the
conformity of the marriage in question to the legal requirements of the place where the marriage
was performed.
At the outset, we lay the following basic legal principles as the take-off points for our
discussion. Philippine law does not provide for absolute divorce; hence, our courts cannot grant
it.[21] A marriage between two Filipinos cannot be dissolved even by a divorce obtained abroad,
because of Articles 15[22] and 17[23] of the Civil Code.[24] In mixed marriages involving a Filipino
and a foreigner, Article 26[25]of the Family Code allows the former to contract a subsequent
marriage in case the divorce is validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her
to remarry.[26] A divorce obtained abroad by a couple, who are both aliens, may be recognized in
the Philippines, provided it is consistent with their respective national laws.[27]
A comparison between marriage and divorce, as far as pleading and proof are concerned, can
be made. Van Dorn v. Romillo Jr. decrees that aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be
recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law.[28] Therefore,
before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our courts, the party pleading it must prove
the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it.[29] Presentation
solely of the divorce decree is insufficient.
Divorce as a Question of Fact
Petitioner insists that before a divorce decree can be admitted in evidence, it must first comply
with the registration requirements under Articles 11, 13 and 52 of the Family Code. These articles
read as follows:

ART. 11. Where a marriage license is required, each of the contracting parties shall
file separately a sworn application for such license with the proper local civil registrar
which shall specify the following:

xxxxxxxxx

(5) If previously married, how, when and where the previous marriage was dissolved
or annulled;

xxxxxxxxx

ART. 13. In case either of the contracting parties has been previously married, the
applicant shall be required to

ART. 13. In case either of the contracting parties has been previously married, the
applicant shall be required to furnish, instead of the birth or baptismal certificate
required in the last preceding article, the death certificate of the deceased spouse or
the judicial decree of the absolute divorce, or the judicial decree of annulment or
declaration of nullity of his or her previous marriage. x x x.

ART. 52. The judgment of annulment or of absolute nullity of the marriage, the
partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses, and the delivery of the
childrens presumptive legitimes shall be recorded in the appropriate civil registry and
registries of property; otherwise, the same shall not affect their persons.

Respondent, on the other hand, argues that the Australian divorce decree is a public document
-- a written official act of an Australian family court. Therefore, it requires no further proof of its
authenticity and due execution.
Respondent is getting ahead of himself. Before a foreign judgment is given presumptive
evidentiary value, the document must first be presented and admitted in evidence.[30] A divorce
obtained abroad is proven by the divorce decree itself. Indeed the best evidence of a judgment is
the judgment itself.[31] The decree purports to be a written act or record of an act of an official body
or tribunal of a foreign country.[32]
Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other hand, a writing or document may be
proven as a public or official record of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication or (2)
a copy thereof attested[33] by the officer having legal custody of the document. If the record is not
kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper
diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in
which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office. [34]
The divorce decree between respondent and Editha Samson appears to be an authentic one
issued by an Australian family court.[35] However, appearance is not sufficient; compliance with
the aforementioned rules on evidence must be demonstrated.
Fortunately for respondents cause, when the divorce decree of May 18, 1989 was submitted
in evidence, counsel for petitioner objected, not to its admissibility, but only to the fact that it had
not been registered in the Local Civil Registry of Cabanatuan City.[36] The trial court ruled that it
was admissible, subject to petitioners qualification.[37] Hence, it was admitted in evidence and
accorded weight by the judge. Indeed, petitioners failure to object properly rendered the divorce
decree admissible as a written act of the Family Court of Sydney, Australia.[38]
Compliance with the quoted articles (11, 13 and 52) of the Family Code is not necessary;
respondent was no longer bound by Philippine personal laws after he acquired Australian
citizenship in 1992.[39]Naturalization is the legal act of adopting an alien and clothing him with the
political and civil rights belonging to a citizen.[40] Naturalized citizens, freed from the protective
cloak of their former states, don the attires of their adoptive countries. By becoming an Australian,
respondent severed his allegiance to the Philippines and the vinculum juris that had tied him to
Philippine personal laws.
Burden of Proving Australian Law
Respondent contends that the burden to prove Australian divorce law falls upon petitioner,
because she is the party challenging the validity of a foreign judgment. He contends that petitioner
was satisfied with the original of the divorce decree and was cognizant of the marital laws of
Australia, because she had lived and worked in that country for quite a long time. Besides, the
Australian divorce law is allegedly known by Philippine courts; thus, judges may take judicial
notice of foreign laws in the exercise of sound discretion.
We are not persuaded. The burden of proof lies with the party who alleges the existence of a
fact or thing necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action.[41] In civil cases, plaintiffs have
the burden of proving the material allegations of the complaint when those are denied by the
answer; and defendants have the burden of proving the material allegations in their answer when
they introduce new matters.[42] Since the divorce was a defense raised by respondent, the burden of
proving the pertinent Australian law validating it falls squarely upon him.
It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign
laws.[43] Like any other facts, they must be alleged and proved. Australian marital laws are not
among those matters that judges are supposed to know by reason of their judicial function.[44] The
power of judicial notice must be exercised with caution, and every reasonable doubt upon the
subject should be resolved in the negative.

Second Issue: Respondents Legal Capacity to Remarry

Petitioner contends that, in view of the insufficient proof of the divorce, respondent was
legally incapacitated to marry her in 1994. Hence, she concludes that their marriage was void ab
initio.
Respondent replies that the Australian divorce decree, which was validly admitted in
evidence, adequately established his legal capacity to marry under Australian law.
Respondents contention is untenable. In its strict legal sense, divorce means the legal
dissolution of a lawful union for a cause arising after marriage. But divorces are of different
types. The two basic ones are (1) absolute divorce or a vinculo matrimonii and (2) limited divorce
or a mensa et thoro. The first kind terminates the marriage, while the second suspends it and leaves
the bond in full force.[45] There is no showing in the case at bar which type of divorce was procured
by respondent.
Respondent presented a decree nisi or an interlocutory decree -- a conditional or provisional
judgment of divorce. It is in effect the same as a separation from bed and board, although an
absolute divorce may follow after the lapse of the prescribed period during which no reconciliation
is effected.[46]
Even after the divorce becomes absolute, the court may under some foreign statutes and
practices, still restrict remarriage. Under some other jurisdictions, remarriage may be limited by
statute; thus, the guilty party in a divorce which was granted on the ground of adultery may be
prohibited from marrying again. The court may allow a remarriage only after proof of good
behavior.[47]
On its face, the herein Australian divorce decree contains a restriction that reads:
1. A party to a marriage who marries again before this decree becomes absolute (unless the other
party has died) commits the offence of bigamy.[48]
 This quotation bolsters our contention that the divorce obtained by respondent may have been
restricted. It did not absolutely establish his legal capacity to remarry according to his national
law. Hence, we find no basis for the ruling of the trial court, which erroneously assumed that the
Australian divorce ipso facto restored respondents capacity to remarry despite the paucity of
evidence on this matter.
We also reject the claim of respondent that the divorce decree raises a disputable presumption
or presumptive evidence as to his civil status based on Section 48, Rule 39[49] of the Rules of Court,
for the simple reason that no proof has been presented on the legal effects of the divorce decree
obtained under Australian laws.
Significance of the Certificate of Legal Capacity
Petitioner argues that the certificate of legal capacity required by Article 21 of the Family
Code was not submitted together with the application for a marriage license. According to her, its
absence is proof that respondent did not have legal capacity to remarry.
We clarify. To repeat, the legal capacity to contract marriage is determined by the national
law of the party concerned. The certificate mentioned in Article 21 of the Family Code would have
been sufficient to establish the legal capacity of respondent, had he duly presented it in court. A
duly authenticated and admitted certificate is prima facie evidence of legal capacity to marry on
the part of the alien applicant for a marriage license.[50]
As it is, however, there is absolutely no evidence that proves respondents legal capacity to
marry petitioner. A review of the records before this Court shows that only the following exhibits
were presented before the lower court: (1) for petitioner: (a) Exhibit A Complaint;[51] (b) Exhibit B
Certificate of Marriage Between Rederick A. Recio (Filipino-Australian) and Grace J. Garcia
(Filipino) on January 12, 1994 in Cabanatuan City, Nueva Ecija;[52] (c) Exhibit C Certificate of
Marriage Between Rederick A. Recio (Filipino) and Editha D. Samson (Australian) on March 1,
1987 in Malabon, Metro Manila;[53] (d) Exhibit D Office of the City Registrar of Cabanatuan City
Certification that no information of annulment between Rederick A. Recio and Editha D. Samson
was in its records;[54] and (e) Exhibit E Certificate of Australian Citizenship of Rederick A.
Recio;[55] (2) for respondent: (a) Exhibit 1 -- Amended Answer;[56] (b) Exhibit 2 Family Law Act
1975 Decree Nisi of Dissolution of Marriage in the Family Court of Australia;[57] (c) Exhibit 3
Certificate of Australian Citizenship of Rederick A. Recio;[58] (d) Exhibit 4 Decree Nisi of
Dissolution of Marriage in the Family Court of Australia Certificate;[59] and Exhibit 5 -- Statutory
Declaration of the Legal Separation Between Rederick A. Recio and Grace J. Garcia Recio since
October 22, 1995.[60]
Based on the above records, we cannot conclude that respondent, who was then a naturalized
Australian citizen, was legally capacitated to marry petitioner on January 12, 1994. We agree with
petitioners contention that the court a quo erred in finding that the divorce decree ipso facto clothed
respondent with the legal capacity to remarry without requiring him to adduce sufficient evidence
to show the Australian personal law governing his status; or at the very least, to prove his legal
capacity to contract the second marriage.
Neither can we grant petitioners prayer to declare her marriage to respondent null and void on
the ground of bigamy. After all, it may turn out that under Australian law, he was really capacitated
to marry petitioner as a direct result of the divorce decree. Hence, we believe that the most
judicious course is to remand this case to the trial court to receive evidence, if any, which show
petitioners legal capacity to marry petitioner. Failing in that, then the court a quo may declare a
nullity of the parties marriage on the ground of bigamy, there being already in evidence two
existing marriage certificates, which were both obtained in the Philippines, one in Malabon, Metro
Manila dated March 1, 1987 and the other, in Cabanatuan City dated January 12, 1994.
WHEREFORE, in the interest of orderly procedure and substantial justice, we REMAND the
case to the court a quo for the purpose of receiving evidence which conclusively show respondents
legal capacity to marry petitioner; and failing in that, of declaring the parties marriage void on the
ground of bigamy, as above discussed. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
 SECOND DIVISION

REPUBLIC OF THE G.R. No. 152577

PHILIPPINES, Present:
Petitioner,
PUNO,
Chairman,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CALLEJO, SR.,
- versus- TINGA, and
CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ.
Promulgated:
September 21, 2005
CRASUS L. IYOY,
R e s p o n d e n t.
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

In this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
petitioner Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Office of the Solicitor
General, prays for the reversal of the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV No. 62539, dated 30 July 2001,[1] affirming the Judgment of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Cebu City, Branch 22, in Civil Case No. CEB-20077, dated 30
October 1998,[2] declaring the marriage between respondent Crasus L. Iyoy and Fely
Ada Rosal-Iyoy null and void on the basis of Article 36 of the Family Code of the
Philippines.
The proceedings before the RTC commenced with the filing of a Complaint[3] for
declaration of nullity of marriage by respondent Crasus on 25 March 1997.
According to the said Complaint, respondent Crasus married Fely on 16 December
1961 at Bradford Memorial Church, Jones Avenue, Cebu City. As a result of their
union, they had five children Crasus, Jr., Daphne, Debbie, Calvert, and Carlos who
are now all of legal ages. After the celebration of their marriage, respondent Crasus
discovered that Fely was hot-tempered, a nagger and extravagant. In 1984, Fely left
the Philippines for the United States of America (U.S.A.), leaving all of their five
children, the youngest then being only six years old, to the care of respondent Crasus.
Barely a year after Fely left for the U.S.A., respondent Crasus received a letter from
her requesting that he sign the enclosed divorce papers; he disregarded the said
request. Sometime in 1985, respondent Crasus learned, through the letters sent by
Fely to their children, that Fely got married to an American, with whom she
eventually had a child. In 1987, Fely came back to the Philippines with her American
family, staying at Cebu Plaza Hotel in Cebu City. Respondent Crasus did not bother
to talk to Fely because he was afraid he might not be able to bear the sorrow and the
pain she had caused him. Fely returned to the Philippines several times more: in
1990, for the wedding of their eldest child, Crasus, Jr.; in 1992, for the brain
operation of their fourth child, Calvert; and in 1995, for unknown reasons. Fely
continued to live with her American family in New Jersey, U.S.A. She had been
openly using the surname of her American husband in the Philippines and in the
U.S.A. For the wedding of Crasus, Jr., Fely herself had invitations made in which
she was named as Mrs. Fely Ada Micklus. At the time the Complaint was filed, it
had been 13 years since Fely left and abandoned respondent Crasus, and there was
no more possibility of reconciliation between them. Respondent Crasus finally
alleged in his Complaint that Felys acts brought danger and dishonor to the family,
and clearly demonstrated her psychological incapacity to perform the essential
obligations of marriage. Such incapacity, being incurable and continuing, constitutes
a ground for declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36, in relation to Articles
68, 70, and 72, of the Family Code of the Philippines.

Fely filed her Answer and Counterclaim[4] with the RTC on 05 June 1997. She
asserted therein that she was already an American citizen since 1988 and was now

married to Stephen Micklus. While she admitted being previously married to

respondent Crasus and having five children with him, Fely refuted the other
allegations made by respondent Crasus in his Complaint. She explained that she was
no more hot-tempered than any normal person, and she may had been indignant at
respondent Crasus on certain occasions but it was because of the latters drunkenness,
womanizing, and lack of sincere effort to find employment and to contribute to the

maintenance of their household. She could not have been extravagant since the
family hardly had enough money for basic needs. Indeed, Fely left for abroad for
financial reasons as respondent Crasus had no job and what she was then earning as

the sole breadwinner in the Philippines was insufficient to support their family.
Although she left all of her children with respondent Crasus, she continued to
provide financial support to them, as well as, to respondent Crasus. Subsequently,

Fely was able to bring her children to the U.S.A., except for one, Calvert, who had
to stay behind for medical reasons. While she did file for divorce from respondent
Crasus, she denied having herself sent a letter to respondent Crasus requesting him

to sign the enclosed divorce papers. After securing a divorce from respondent
Crasus, Fely married her American husband and acquired American citizenship. She
argued that her marriage to her American husband was legal because now being an
American citizen, her status shall be governed by the law of her present nationality.

Fely also pointed out that respondent Crasus himself was presently living with
another woman who bore him a child. She also accused respondent Crasus of
misusing the amount of P90,000.00 which she advanced to him to finance the brain

operation of their son, Calvert. On the basis of the foregoing, Fely also prayed that
the RTC declare her marriage to respondent Crasus null and void; and that
respondent Crasus be ordered to pay to Fely the P90,000.00 she advanced to him,
with interest, plus, moral and exemplary damages, attorneys fees, and litigation
expenses.

After respondent Crasus and Fely had filed their respective Pre-Trial Briefs,[5] the
RTC afforded both parties the opportunity to present their evidence. Petitioner
Republic participated in the trial through the Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu.[6]

Respondent Crasus submitted the following pieces of evidence in support of his

Complaint: (1) his own testimony on 08 September 1997, in which he essentially
reiterated the allegations in his Complaint;[7] (2) the Certification, dated 13 April
1989, by the Health Department of Cebu City, on the recording of the Marriage
Contract between respondent Crasus and Fely in the Register of Deeds, such
marriage celebration taking place on 16 December 1961;[8] and (3) the invitation to
the wedding of Crasus, Jr., their eldest son, wherein Fely openly used her American
husbands surname, Micklus.[9]
Felys counsel filed a Notice,[10] and, later on, a Motion,[11] to take the deposition of
witnesses, namely, Fely and her children, Crasus, Jr. and Daphne, upon written
interrogatories, before the consular officers of the Philippines in New York and
California, U.S.A, where the said witnesses reside. Despite the Orders[12] and
Commissions[13]issued by the RTC to the Philippine Consuls of New York and
California, U.S.A., to take the depositions of the witnesses upon written
interrogatories, not a single deposition was ever submitted to the RTC. Taking into
account that it had been over a year since respondent Crasus had presented his
evidence and that Fely failed to exert effort to have the case progress, the RTC issued
an Order, dated 05 October 1998,[14] considering Fely to have waived her right to
present her evidence. The case was thus deemed submitted for decision.

Not long after, on 30 October 1998, the RTC promulgated its Judgment declaring
the marriage of respondent Crasus and Fely null and void ab initio, on the basis of
the following findings

The ground bearing defendants psychological incapacity deserves a

reasonable consideration. As observed, plaintiffs testimony is decidedly
credible. The Court finds that defendant had indeed exhibited unmistakable
signs of psychological incapacity to comply with her marital duties such as
striving for family unity, observing fidelity, mutual love, respect, help and
support. From the evidence presented, plaintiff adequately established that
the defendant practically abandoned him. She obtained a divorce decree in
the United States of America and married another man and has establish [sic]
another family of her own. Plaintiff is in an anomalous situation, wherein he
is married to a wife who is already married to another man in another country.

Defendants intolerable traits may not have been apparent or manifest

before the marriage, the FAMILY CODE nonetheless allows the annulment
of the marriage provided that these were eventually manifested after the
wedding. It appears to be the case in this instance.
 Certainly defendants posture being an irresponsible wife erringly
reveals her very low regard for that sacred and inviolable institution of
marriage which is the foundation of human society throughout the civilized
world. It is quite evident that the defendant is bereft of the mind, will and
heart to comply with her marital obligations, such incapacity was already
there at the time of the marriage in question is shown by defendants own
attitude towards her marriage to plaintiff.

In sum, the ground invoked by plaintiff which is defendants

psychological incapacity to comply with the essential marital obligations
which already existed at the time of the marriage in question has been
satisfactorily proven. The evidence in herein case establishes the
irresponsibility of defendant Fely Ada Rosal Iyoy, firmly.

Going over plaintiffs testimony which is decidedly credible, the Court

finds that the defendant had indeed exhibited unmistakable signs of such
psychological incapacity to comply with her marital obligations. These are
her excessive disposition to material things over and above the marital
stability. That such incapacity was already there at the time of the marriage
in question is shown by defendants own attitude towards her marriage to
plaintiff. And for these reasons there is a legal ground to declare the marriage
of plaintiff Crasus L. Iyoy and defendant Fely Ada Rosal Iyoy null and
void ab initio.[15]

Petitioner Republic, believing that the afore-quoted Judgment of the RTC was
contrary to law and evidence, filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals. The
appellate court, though, in its Decision, dated 30 July 2001, affirmed the appealed
Judgment of the RTC, finding no reversible error therein. It even offered additional
ratiocination for declaring the marriage between respondent Crasus and Fely null
and void, to wit

Defendant secured a divorce from plaintiff-appellee abroad, has

remarried, and is now permanently residing in the United States. Plaintiff-
appellee categorically stated this as one of his reasons for seeking the
declaration of nullity of their marriage

Article 26 of the Family Code provides:

 Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the
Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the country
where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also
be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles
35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.

WHERE A MARRIAGE BETWEEN A FILIPINO

CITIZEN AND A FOREIGNER IS VALIDLY
CELEBRATED AND A DIVORCE IS THEREAFTER
VALIDLY OBTAINED ABROAD BY THE ALIEN
SPOUSE CAPACITATING HIM OR HER TO REMARRY,
THE FILIPINO SPOUSE SHALL LIKEWISE HAVE
CAPACITY TO REMARRY UNDER PHILIPPINE LAW.

The rationale behind the second paragraph of the above-quoted

provision is to avoid the absurd and unjust situation of a Filipino citizen still
being married to his or her alien spouse, although the latter is no longer
married to the Filipino spouse because he or she has obtained a divorce
abroad. In the case at bench, the defendant has undoubtedly acquired her
American husbands citizenship and thus has become an alien as well. This
Court cannot see why the benefits of Art. 26 aforequoted can not be extended
to a Filipino citizen whose spouse eventually embraces another citizenship
and thus becomes herself an alien.

It would be the height of unfairness if, under these circumstances,

plaintiff would still be considered as married to defendant, given her total
incapacity to honor her marital covenants to the former. To condemn plaintiff
to remain shackled in a marriage that in truth and in fact does not exist and
to remain married to a spouse who is incapacitated to discharge essential
marital covenants, is verily to condemn him to a perpetual disadvantage
which this Court finds abhorrent and will not countenance. Justice dictates
that plaintiff be given relief by affirming the trial courts declaration of the
nullity of the marriage of the parties.[16]

After the Court of Appeals, in a Resolution, dated 08 March 2002,[17] denied

its Motion for Reconsideration, petitioner Republic filed the instant Petition before
this Court, based on the following arguments/grounds
 I. Abandonment by and sexual infidelity of respondents wife do
not per se constitute psychological incapacity.

II. The Court of Appeals has decided questions of substance not in

accord with law and jurisprudence considering that the Court of Appeals
committed serious errors of law in ruling that Article 26, paragraph 2 of the
Family Code is inapplicable to the case at bar.[18]

In his Comment[19] to the Petition, respondent Crasus maintained that Felys

psychological incapacity was clearly established after a full-blown trial, and that
paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code of the Philippines was indeed
applicable to the marriage of respondent Crasus and Fely, because the latter had
already become an American citizen. He further questioned the personality of
petitioner Republic, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, to institute
the instant Petition, because Article 48 of the Family Code of the Philippines
authorizes the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to the trial court, not the
Solicitor General, to intervene on behalf of the State, in proceedings for annulment
and declaration of nullity of marriages.

After having reviewed the records of this case and the applicable laws and
jurisprudence, this Court finds the instant Petition to be meritorious.

The totality of evidence presented during trial is insufficient to support

the finding of psychological incapacity of Fely.
 Article 36, concededly one of the more controversial provisions of the Family

Code of the Philippines, reads

ART. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the
celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential
marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity
becomes manifest only after its solemnization.

Issues most commonly arise as to what constitutes psychological incapacity. In a

series of cases, this Court laid down guidelines for determining its existence.

In Santos v. Court of Appeals,[20] the term psychological incapacity was defined, thus

. . . [P]sychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (not

physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly cognitive of the basic
marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the
parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family
Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect
and fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the
intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of psychological
incapacity to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage. This psychological condition must exist at the
time the marriage is celebrated[21]

The psychological incapacity must be characterized by

 (a) Gravity It must be grave or serious such that the party would be
incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in a marriage;
(b) Juridical Antecedence It must be rooted in the history of the party
antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only after
the marriage; and
(c) Incurability It must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure
would be beyond the means of the party involved.[22]

More definitive guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36

of the Family Code of the Philippines were handed down by this Court in Republic
v. Court of Appeals and Molina,[23] which, although quite lengthy, by its
significance, deserves to be reproduced below

(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to
the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and
continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is
rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity
of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire
Article on the Family, recognizing it as the foundation of the nation. It
decrees marriage as legally inviolable, thereby protecting it from dissolution
at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be protected
by the state.

The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the
family and emphasizes their permanence, inviolability and solidarity.

(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a)

medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently
proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the
Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological - not
physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The
evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was
mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have
known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have
given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity
need be given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under
the principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be
identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully
explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and
clinical psychologists.

(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of the

celebration of the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was
existing when the parties exchanged their I do's. The manifestation of the
illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have
attached at such moment, or prior thereto.

(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically

permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative
only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against
everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to
the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related
to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job

(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of
the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, mild
characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional
outbursts cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as
downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much
less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in
the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that
effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby
complying with the obligations essential to marriage.

(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by

Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as
well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and
their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated
in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.

(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial

Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or
decisive, should be given great respect by our courts

(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and
the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be
handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will
be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement
 or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along
with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification
within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted for
resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent
function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.[24]

A later case, Marcos v. Marcos,[25] further clarified that there is no

requirement that the defendant/respondent spouse should be personally examined by
a physician or psychologist as a condition sine qua non for the declaration of nullity
of marriage based on psychological incapacity. Such psychological incapacity,
however, must be established by the totality of the evidence presented during the
trial.

Using the guidelines established by the afore-mentioned jurisprudence, this

Court finds that the totality of evidence presented by respondent Crasus failed
miserably to establish the alleged psychological incapacity of his wife Fely;
therefore, there is no basis for declaring their marriage null and void under Article
36 of the Family Code of the Philippines.

The only substantial evidence presented by respondent Crasus before the RTC
was his testimony, which can be easily put into question for being self-serving, in
the absence of any other corroborating evidence. He submitted only two other pieces

of evidence: (1) the Certification on the recording with the Register of Deeds of the
Marriage Contract between respondent Crasus and Fely, such marriage being
celebrated on 16 December 1961; and (2) the invitation to the wedding of Crasus,
Jr., their eldest son, in which Fely used her American husbands surname. Even
considering the admissions made by Fely herself in her Answer to respondent

Crasuss Complaint filed with the RTC, the evidence is not enough to convince this
Court that Fely had such a grave mental illness that prevented her from assuming the
essential obligations of marriage.

It is worthy to emphasize that Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines

contemplates downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume
the basic marital obligations; not a mere refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less, ill
will, on the part of the errant spouse.[26] Irreconcilable differences, conflicting
personalities, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility, physical abuse, habitual
alcoholism, sexual infidelity or perversion, and abandonment, by themselves, also
do not warrant a finding of psychological incapacity under the said Article.[27]

As has already been stressed by this Court in previous cases, Article 36 is not to be
confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time the causes therefore
manifest themselves. It refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party

even before the celebration of marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as

to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial
bond one is about to assume.[28]

The evidence may have proven that Fely committed acts that hurt and embarrassed
respondent Crasus and the rest of the family. Her hot-temper, nagging, and
extravagance; her abandonment of respondent Crasus; her marriage to an American;
and even her flaunting of her American family and her American surname, may

indeed be manifestations of her alleged incapacity to comply with her marital

obligations; nonetheless, the root cause for such was not identified. If the root cause
of the incapacity was not identified, then it cannot be satisfactorily established as a

psychological or mental defect that is serious or grave; neither could it be proven to

be in existence at the time of celebration of the marriage; nor that it is incurable.
While the personal examination of Fely by a psychiatrist or psychologist is no longer
mandatory for the declaration of nullity of their marriage under Article 36 of the
Family Code of the Philippines, by virtue of this Courts ruling in Marcos v.
Marcos,[29] respondent Crasus must still have complied with the requirement laid
down in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina[30] that the root cause of the
incapacity be identified as a psychological illness and that its incapacitating nature
be fully explained.

In any case, any doubt shall be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage.[31] No
less than the Constitution of 1987 sets the policy to protect and strengthen the family

as the basic social institution and marriage as the foundation of the family.[32]

II
Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code of the Philippines is not
applicable to the case at bar.
 According to Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code of the Philippines

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly

celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise
have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.

As it is worded, Article 26, paragraph 2, refers to a special situation wherein

one of the couple getting married is a Filipino citizen and the other a foreigner at the
time the marriage was celebrated. By its plain and literal interpretation, the said

provision cannot be applied to the case of respondent Crasus and his wife Fely
because at the time Fely obtained her divorce, she was still a Filipino citizen.
Although the exact date was not established, Fely herself admitted in her Answer
filed before the RTC that she obtained a divorce from respondent Crasus sometime
after she left for the United States in 1984, after which she married her American
husband in 1985. In the same Answer, she alleged that she had been an American
citizen since 1988. At the time she filed for divorce, Fely was still a Filipino citizen,

and pursuant to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code of
the Philippines, she was still bound by Philippine laws on family rights and duties,
status, condition, and legal capacity, even when she was already living abroad.

Philippine laws, then and even until now, do not allow and recognize divorce
between Filipino spouses. Thus, Fely could not have validly obtained a divorce from
respondent Crasus.

III
 The Solicitor General is authorized to intervene, on behalf of the
Republic, in proceedings for annulment and declaration of nullity of
marriages.

Invoking Article 48 of the Family Code of the Philippines, respondent Crasus

argued that only the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to the RTC may intervene

on behalf of the State in proceedings for annulment or declaration of nullity of

marriages; hence, the Office of the Solicitor General had no personality to file the
instant Petition on behalf of the State. Article 48 provides

ART. 48. In all cases of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity

of marriage, the Court shall order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned
to it to appear on behalf of the State to take steps to prevent collusion between
the parties and to take care that the evidence is not fabricated or suppressed.

That Article 48 does not expressly mention the Solicitor General does not bar him
or his Office from intervening in proceedings for annulment or declaration of nullity

of marriages. Executive Order No. 292, otherwise known as the Administrative Code
of 1987, appoints the Solicitor General as the principal law officer and legal defender
of the Government.[33] His Office is tasked to represent the Government of the

Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities and its officials and agents in any
litigation, proceeding, investigation or matter requiring the services of lawyers. The
Office of the Solicitor General shall constitute the law office of the Government and,

as such, shall discharge duties requiring the services of lawyers.[34]

The intent of Article 48 of the Family Code of the Philippines is to ensure that the

interest of the State is represented and protected in proceedings for annulment and
declaration of nullity of marriages by preventing collusion between the parties, or
the fabrication or suppression of evidence; and, bearing in mind that the Solicitor

General is the principal law officer and legal defender of the land, then his
intervention in such proceedings could only serve and contribute to the realization
of such intent, rather than thwart it.

Furthermore, the general rule is that only the Solicitor General is authorized to bring
or defend actions on behalf of the People or the Republic of the Philippines once the
case is brought before this Court or the Court of Appeals.[35] While it is the
prosecuting attorney or fiscal who actively participates, on behalf of the State, in a
proceeding for annulment or declaration of nullity of marriage before the RTC, the

Office of the Solicitor General takes over when the case is elevated to the Court of
Appeals or this Court. Since it shall be eventually responsible for taking the case to
the appellate courts when circumstances demand, then it is only reasonable and

practical that even while the proceeding is still being held before the RTC, the Office
of the Solicitor General can already exercise supervision and control over the
conduct of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal therein to better guarantee the protection

of the interests of the State.

In fact, this Court had already recognized and affirmed the role of the Solicitor
General in several cases for annulment and declaration of nullity of marriages that

were appealed before it, summarized as follows in the case of Ancheta v. Ancheta[36]

In the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals [268 SCRA 198 (1997)], this
Court laid down the guidelines in the interpretation and application of Art.
48 of the Family Code, one of which concerns the role of the prosecuting
attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the State:

(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney

or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the
state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor
General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the
decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement
or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor
General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to
the court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the
date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court.
The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent function
of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095. [Id.,
at 213]

This Court in the case of Malcampo-Sin v. Sin [355 SCRA 285 (2001)]
reiterated its pronouncement in Republic v. Court of Appeals [Supra.]
regarding the role of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor
General to appear as counsel for the State[37]

Finally, the issuance of this Court of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of

Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages,[38] which became effective

on 15 March 2003, should dispel any other doubts of respondent Crasus as to the
authority of the Solicitor General to file the instant Petition on behalf of the State.
The Rule recognizes the authority of the Solicitor General to intervene and take part
in the proceedings for annulment and declaration of nullity of marriages before the
RTC and on appeal to higher courts. The pertinent provisions of the said Rule are

reproduced below

Sec. 5. Contents and form of petition.

(4) It shall be filed in six copies. The petitioner shall serve a copy of
the petition on the Office of the Solicitor General and the Office of the City
or Provincial Prosecutor, within five days from the date of its filing and
submit to the court proof of such service within the same period.

Sec. 18. Memoranda. The court may require the parties and the public
prosecutor, in consultation with the Office of the Solicitor General, to file
their respective memoranda in support of their claims within fifteen days
from the date the trial is terminated. It may require the Office of the Solicitor
General to file its own memorandum if the case is of significant interest to
the State. No other pleadings or papers may be submitted without leave of
court. After the lapse of the period herein provided, the case will be
considered submitted for decision, with or without the memoranda.

Sec. 19. Decision.

(2) The parties, including the Solicitor General and the public
prosecutor, shall be served with copies of the decision personally or by
registered mail. If the respondent summoned by publication failed to appear
in the action, the dispositive part of the decision shall be published once in a
newspaper of general circulation.

(3) The decision becomes final upon the expiration of fifteen days
from notice to the parties. Entry of judgment shall be made if no motion for
reconsideration or new trial, or appeal is filed by any of the parties, the public
prosecutor, or the Solicitor General.

Sec. 20. Appeal.

 (2) Notice of Appeal. An aggrieved party or the Solicitor General may
appeal from the decision by filing a Notice of Appeal within fifteen days
from notice of denial of the motion for reconsideration or new trial. The
appellant shall serve a copy of the notice of appeal on the adverse parties.

Given the foregoing, this Court arrives at a conclusion contrary to those of the RTC
and the Court of Appeals, and sustains the validity and existence of the marriage
between respondent Crasus and Fely. At most, Felys abandonment, sexual infidelity,

and bigamy, give respondent Crasus grounds to file for legal separation under Article
55 of the Family Code of the Philippines, but not for declaration of nullity of
marriage under Article 36 of the same Code. While this Court commiserates with
respondent Crasus for being continuously shackled to what is now a hopeless and
loveless marriage, this is one of those situations where neither law nor society can
provide the specific answer to every individual problem.[39]

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED and the assailed Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 62539, dated 30 July 2001, affirming the Judgment of
the RTC of Cebu City, Branch 22, in Civil Case No. CEB-20077, dated 30 October
1998, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The marriage of respondent Crasus L. Iyoy and Fely Ada Rosal-Iyoy remains valid

and subsisting.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 133743 February 6, 2007

EDGAR SAN LUIS, Petitioner,

vs.
FELICIDAD SAN LUIS, Respondent.

x ---------------------------------------------------- x

G.R. No. 134029 February 6, 2007

RODOLFO SAN LUIS, Petitioner,

vs.
FELICIDAD SAGALONGOS alias FELICIDAD SAN LUIS, Respondent.

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

Before us are consolidated petitions for review assailing the February 4, 1998 Decision 1 of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 52647, which reversed and set aside the September 12, 1995 2 and
January 31, 1996 3Resolutions of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 134 in SP. Proc.
No. M-3708; and its May 15, 1998 Resolution 4 denying petitioners motion for reconsideration.

The instant case involves the settlement of the estate of Felicisimo T. San Luis (Felicisimo), who
was the former governor of the Province of Laguna. During his lifetime, Felicisimo contracted three
marriages. His first marriage was with Virginia Sulit on March 17, 1942 out of which were born six
children, namely: Rodolfo, Mila, Edgar, Linda, Emilita and Manuel. On August 11, 1963, Virginia
predeceased Felicisimo.

Five years later, on May 1, 1968, Felicisimo married Merry Lee Corwin, with whom he had a son,
Tobias. However, on October 15, 1971, Merry Lee, an American citizen, filed a Complaint for
Divorce 5 before the Family Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii, United States of America
(U.S.A.), which issued a Decree Granting Absolute Divorce and Awarding Child Custody on
December 14, 1973. 6

On June 20, 1974, Felicisimo married respondent Felicidad San Luis, then surnamed Sagalongos,
before Rev. Fr. William Meyer, Minister of the United Presbyterian at Wilshire Boulevard, Los
Angeles, California, U.S.A. 7 He had no children with respondent but lived with her for 18 years from
the time of their marriage up to his death on December 18, 1992.

Thereafter, respondent sought the dissolution of their conjugal partnership assets and the settlement
of Felicisimos estate. On December 17, 1993, she filed a petition for letters of
administration 8 before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, docketed as SP. Proc. No. M-3708
which was raffled to Branch 146 thereof.
Respondent alleged that she is the widow of Felicisimo; that, at the time of his death, the decedent
was residing at 100 San Juanico Street, New Alabang Village, Alabang, Metro Manila; that the
decedents surviving heirs are respondent as legal spouse, his six children by his first marriage, and
son by his second marriage; that the decedent left real properties, both conjugal and exclusive,
valued at P30,304,178.00 more or less; that the decedent does not have any unpaid debts.
Respondent prayed that the conjugal partnership assets be liquidated and that letters of
administration be issued to her.

On February 4, 1994, petitioner Rodolfo San Luis, one of the children of Felicisimo by his first
marriage, filed a motion to dismiss 9 on the grounds of improper venue and failure to state a cause of
action. Rodolfo claimed that the petition for letters of administration should have been filed in the
Province of Laguna because this was Felicisimos place of residence prior to his death. He further
claimed that respondent has no legal personality to file the petition because she was only a mistress
of Felicisimo since the latter, at the time of his death, was still legally married to Merry Lee.

On February 15, 1994, Linda invoked the same grounds and joined her brother Rodolfo in seeking
the dismissal10 of the petition. On February 28, 1994, the trial court issued an Order 11 denying the
two motions to dismiss.

Unaware of the denial of the motions to dismiss, respondent filed on March 5, 1994 her
opposition 12 thereto. She submitted documentary evidence showing that while Felicisimo exercised
the powers of his public office in Laguna, he regularly went home to their house in New Alabang
Village, Alabang, Metro Manila which they bought sometime in 1982. Further, she presented the
decree of absolute divorce issued by the Family Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii to prove
that the marriage of Felicisimo to Merry Lee had already been dissolved. Thus, she claimed that
Felicisimo had the legal capacity to marry her by virtue of paragraph 2, 13 Article 26 of the Family
Code and the doctrine laid down in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. 14

Thereafter, Linda, Rodolfo and herein petitioner Edgar San Luis, separately filed motions for
reconsideration from the Order denying their motions to dismiss. 15 They asserted that paragraph 2,
Article 26 of the Family Code cannot be given retroactive effect to validate respondents bigamous
marriage with Felicisimo because this would impair vested rights in derogation of Article 256 16 of the
Family Code.

On April 21, 1994, Mila, another daughter of Felicisimo from his first marriage, filed a motion to
disqualify Acting Presiding Judge Anthony E. Santos from hearing the case.

On October 24, 1994, the trial court issued an Order 17 denying the motions for reconsideration. It
ruled that respondent, as widow of the decedent, possessed the legal standing to file the petition and
that venue was properly laid. Meanwhile, the motion for disqualification was deemed moot and
academic 18 because then Acting Presiding Judge Santos was substituted by Judge Salvador S.
Tensuan pending the resolution of said motion.

Mila filed a motion for inhibition 19 against Judge Tensuan on November 16, 1994. On even date,
Edgar also filed a motion for reconsideration 20 from the Order denying their motion for
reconsideration arguing that it does not state the facts and law on which it was based.

On November 25, 1994, Judge Tensuan issued an Order 21 granting the motion for inhibition. The
case was re-raffled to Branch 134 presided by Judge Paul T. Arcangel.

On April 24, 1995, 22 the trial court required the parties to submit their respective position papers on
the twin issues of venue and legal capacity of respondent to file the petition. On May 5, 1995, Edgar
manifested 23 that he is adopting the arguments and evidence set forth in his previous motion for
reconsideration as his position paper. Respondent and Rodolfo filed their position papers on June
14, 24 and June 20, 25 1995, respectively.

On September 12, 1995, the trial court dismissed the petition for letters of administration. It held that,
at the time of his death, Felicisimo was the duly elected governor and a resident of the Province of
Laguna. Hence, the petition should have been filed in Sta. Cruz, Laguna and not in Makati City. It
also ruled that respondent was without legal capacity to file the petition for letters of administration
because her marriage with Felicisimo was bigamous, thus, void ab initio. It found that the decree of
absolute divorce dissolving Felicisimos marriage to Merry Lee was not valid in the Philippines and
did not bind Felicisimo who was a Filipino citizen. It also ruled that paragraph 2, Article 26 of the
Family Code cannot be retroactively applied because it would impair the vested rights of Felicisimos
legitimate children.

Respondent moved for reconsideration 26 and for the disqualification 27 of Judge Arcangel but said
motions were denied. 28

Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals which reversed and set aside the orders of the trial
court in its assailed Decision dated February 4, 1998, the dispositive portion of which states:

WHEREFORE, the Orders dated September 12, 1995 and January 31, 1996 are hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE; the Orders dated February 28 and October 24, 1994 are
REINSTATED; and the records of the case is REMANDED to the trial court for further
proceedings. 29

The appellante court ruled that under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the term "place of
residence" of the decedent, for purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of his estate, refers to
the personal, actual or physical habitation, or actual residence or place of abode of a person as
distinguished from legal residence or domicile. It noted that although Felicisimo discharged his
functions as governor in Laguna, he actually resided in Alabang, Muntinlupa. Thus, the petition for
letters of administration was properly filed in Makati City.

The Court of Appeals also held that Felicisimo had legal capacity to marry respondent by virtue of
paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code and the rulings in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. 30 and Pilapil v.
Ibay-Somera. 31 It found that the marriage between Felicisimo and Merry Lee was validly dissolved
by virtue of the decree of absolute divorce issued by the Family Court of the First Circuit, State of
Hawaii. As a result, under paragraph 2, Article 26, Felicisimo was capacitated to contract a
subsequent marriage with respondent. Thus

With the well-known rule express mandate of paragraph 2, Article 26, of the Family Code of the
Philippines, the doctrines in Van Dorn, Pilapil, and the reason and philosophy behind the enactment
of E.O. No. 227, there is no justiciable reason to sustain the individual view sweeping
statement of Judge Arc[h]angel, that "Article 26, par. 2 of the Family Code, contravenes the basic
policy of our state against divorce in any form whatsoever." Indeed, courts cannot deny what the law
grants. All that the courts should do is to give force and effect to the express mandate of the law.
The foreign divorce having been obtained by the Foreigner on December 14, 1992,32 the Filipino
divorcee, "shall x x x have capacity to remarry under Philippine laws". For this reason, the marriage
between the deceased and petitioner should not be denominated as "a bigamous marriage.

Therefore, under Article 130 of the Family Code, the petitioner as the surviving spouse can institute
the judicial proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased. x x x 33
Edgar, Linda, and Rodolfo filed separate motions for reconsideration 34 which were denied by the
Court of Appeals.

On July 2, 1998, Edgar appealed to this Court via the instant petition for review on
certiorari. 35 Rodolfo later filed a manifestation and motion to adopt the said petition which was
granted. 36

In the instant consolidated petitions, Edgar and Rodolfo insist that the venue of the subject petition
for letters of administration was improperly laid because at the time of his death, Felicisimo was a
resident of Sta. Cruz, Laguna. They contend that pursuant to our rulings in Nuval v. Guray 37 and
Romualdez v. RTC, Br. 7, Tacloban City, 38 "residence" is synonymous with "domicile" which
denotes a fixed permanent residence to which when absent, one intends to return. They claim that a
person can only have one domicile at any given time. Since Felicisimo never changed his domicile,
the petition for letters of administration should have been filed in Sta. Cruz, Laguna.

Petitioners also contend that respondents marriage to Felicisimo was void and bigamous because it
was performed during the subsistence of the latters marriage to Merry Lee. They argue that
paragraph 2, Article 26 cannot be retroactively applied because it would impair vested rights and
ratify the void bigamous marriage. As such, respondent cannot be considered the surviving wife of
Felicisimo; hence, she has no legal capacity to file the petition for letters of administration.

The issues for resolution: (1) whether venue was properly laid, and (2) whether respondent has legal
capacity to file the subject petition for letters of administration.

The petition lacks merit.

Under Section 1, 39 Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition for letters of administration of the
estate of Felicisimo should be filed in the Regional Trial Court of the province "in which he resides at
the time of his death." In the case of Garcia Fule v. Court of Appeals, 40 we laid down the doctrinal
rule for determining the residence as contradistinguished from domicile of the decedent for
purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of his estate:

[T]he term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual residence" as distinguished from "legal residence
or domicile." This term "resides," like the terms "residing" and "residence," is elastic and should be
interpreted in the light of the object or purpose of the statute or rule in which it is employed. In the
application of venue statutes and rules Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court is of such
nature residence rather than domicile is the significant factor. Even where the statute uses the
word "domicile" still it is construed as meaning residence and not domicile in the technical sense.
Some cases make a distinction between the terms "residence" and "domicile" but as generally used
in statutes fixing venue, the terms are synonymous, and convey the same meaning as the term
"inhabitant." In other words, "resides" should be viewed or understood in its popular sense, meaning,
the personal, actual or physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place of abode. It signifies
physical presence in a place and actual stay thereat. In this popular sense, the term means merely
residence, that is, personal residence, not legal residence or domicile. Residence simply requires
bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given place, while domicile requires bodily presence in that
place and also an intention to make it ones domicile. No particular length of time of residence is
required though; however, the residence must be more than temporary. 41 (Emphasis supplied)

It is incorrect for petitioners to argue that "residence," for purposes of fixing the venue of the
settlement of the estate of Felicisimo, is synonymous with "domicile." The rulings in Nuval and
Romualdez are inapplicable to the instant case because they involve election cases. Needless to
say, there is a distinction between "residence" for purposes of election laws and "residence" for
purposes of fixing the venue of actions. In election cases, "residence" and "domicile" are treated as
synonymous terms, that is, the fixed permanent residence to which when absent, one has the
intention of returning. 42 However, for purposes of fixing venue under the Rules of Court, the
"residence" of a person is his personal, actual or physical habitation, or actual residence or place of
abode, which may not necessarily be his legal residence or domicile provided he resides therein with
continuity and consistency. 43 Hence, it is possible that a person may have his residence in one
place and domicile in another.

In the instant case, while petitioners established that Felicisimo was domiciled in Sta. Cruz, Laguna,
respondent proved that he also maintained a residence in Alabang, Muntinlupa from 1982 up to the
time of his death. Respondent submitted in evidence the Deed of Absolute Sale 44 dated January 5,
1983 showing that the deceased purchased the aforesaid property. She also presented billing
statements 45 from the Philippine Heart Center and Chinese General Hospital for the period August
to December 1992 indicating the address of Felicisimo at "100 San Juanico, Ayala Alabang,
Muntinlupa." Respondent also presented proof of membership of the deceased in the Ayala Alabang
Village Association 46 and Ayala Country Club, Inc., 47 letter-envelopes 48from 1988 to 1990 sent by
the deceaseds children to him at his Alabang address, and the deceaseds calling cards 49 stating
that his home/city address is at "100 San Juanico, Ayala Alabang Village, Muntinlupa" while his
office/provincial address is in "Provincial Capitol, Sta. Cruz, Laguna."

From the foregoing, we find that Felicisimo was a resident of Alabang, Muntinlupa for purposes of
fixing the venue of the settlement of his estate. Consequently, the subject petition for letters of
administration was validly filed in the Regional Trial Court 50 which has territorial jurisdiction over
Alabang, Muntinlupa. The subject petition was filed on December 17, 1993. At that time, Muntinlupa
was still a municipality and the branches of the Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Judicial
Region which had territorial jurisdiction over Muntinlupa were then seated in Makati City as per
Supreme Court Administrative Order No. 3. 51 Thus, the subject petition was validly filed before the
Regional Trial Court of Makati City.

Anent the issue of respondent Felicidads legal personality to file the petition for letters of
administration, we must first resolve the issue of whether a Filipino who is divorced by his alien
spouse abroad may validly remarry under the Civil Code, considering that Felicidads marriage to
Felicisimo was solemnized on June 20, 1974, or before the Family Code took effect on August 3,
1988. In resolving this issue, we need not retroactively apply the provisions of the Family Code,
particularly Art. 26, par. (2) considering that there is sufficient jurisprudential basis allowing us to rule
in the affirmative.

The case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. 52 involved a marriage between a foreigner and his Filipino wife,
which marriage was subsequently dissolved through a divorce obtained abroad by the latter.
Claiming that the divorce was not valid under Philippine law, the alien spouse alleged that his
interest in the properties from their conjugal partnership should be protected. The Court, however,
recognized the validity of the divorce and held that the alien spouse had no interest in the properties
acquired by the Filipino wife after the divorce. Thus:

In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the marriage from the
standards of American law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage. As stated by the Federal
Supreme Court of the United States in Atherton vs. Atherton, 45 L. Ed. 794, 799:

"The purpose and effect of a decree of divorce from the bond of matrimony by a competent
jurisdiction are to change the existing status or domestic relation of husband and wife, and to free
them both from the bond. The marriage tie, when thus severed as to one party, ceases to bind
either. A husband without a wife, or a wife without a husband, is unknown to the law. When the law
provides, in the nature of a penalty, that the guilty party shall not marry again, that party, as well as
the other, is still absolutely freed from the bond of the former marriage."

Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner. He
would have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioners husband entitled to exercise control
over conjugal assets. As he is bound by the Decision of his own countrys Court, which validly
exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he does not repudiate, he is estopped by his
own representation before said Court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property. 53

As to the effect of the divorce on the Filipino wife, the Court ruled that she should no longer be
considered married to the alien spouse. Further, she should not be required to perform her marital
duties and obligations. It held:

To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws, petitioner has to be
considered still married to private respondent and still subject to a wife's obligations under
Article 109, et. seq. of the Civil Code cannot be just. Petitioner should not be obliged to live
together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to private respondent. The latter
should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She should not
be discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be
served. 54 (Emphasis added)

This principle was thereafter applied in Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera 55 where the Court recognized the
validity of a divorce obtained abroad. In the said case, it was held that the alien spouse is not a
proper party in filing the adultery suit against his Filipino wife. The Court stated that "the severance
of the marital bond had the effect of dissociating the former spouses from each other, hence the
actuations of one would not affect or cast obloquy on the other." 56

Likewise, in Quita v. Court of Appeals, 57 the Court stated that where a Filipino is divorced by his
naturalized foreign spouse, the ruling in Van Dorn applies. 58 Although decided on December 22,
1998, the divorce in the said case was obtained in 1954 when the Civil Code provisions were still in
effect.

The significance of the Van Dorn case to the development of limited recognition of divorce in the
Philippines cannot be denied. The ruling has long been interpreted as severing marital ties between
parties in a mixed marriage and capacitating the Filipino spouse to remarry as a necessary
consequence of upholding the validity of a divorce obtained abroad by the alien spouse. In his
treatise, Dr. Arturo M. Tolentino cited Van Dorn stating that "if the foreigner obtains a valid foreign
divorce, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law." 59 In Garcia v.
Recio, 60 the Court likewise cited the aforementioned case in relation to Article 26. 61

In the recent case of Republic v. Orbecido III, 62 the historical background and legislative intent
behind paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code were discussed, to wit:

Brief Historical Background

On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon Aquino signed into law Executive Order No. 209, otherwise
known as the "Family Code," which took effect on August 3, 1988. Article 26 thereof states:

All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the country
where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except
those prohibited under Articles 35, 37, and 38.
On July 17, 1987, shortly after the signing of the original Family Code, Executive Order No. 227 was
likewise signed into law, amending Articles 26, 36, and 39 of the Family Code. A second paragraph
was added to Article 26. As so amended, it now provides:

ART. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the
country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country,
except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino
spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law. (Emphasis supplied)

xxxx
Legislative Intent

Records of the proceedings of the Family Code deliberations showed that the intent of Paragraph 2
of Article 26, according to Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a member of the Civil Code Revision
Committee, is to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien
spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse.

Interestingly, Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its origin to the 1985 case of Van Dorn v.
Romillo, Jr. TheVan Dorn case involved a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner.
The Court held therein that a divorce decree validly obtained by the alien spouse is valid in
the Philippines, and consequently, the Filipino spouse is capacitated to remarry under
Philippine law. 63 (Emphasis added)

As such, the Van Dorn case is sufficient basis in resolving a situation where a divorce is validly
obtained abroad by the alien spouse. With the enactment of the Family Code and paragraph 2,
Article 26 thereof, our lawmakers codified the law already established through judicial precedent. 1aw phi 1.net

Indeed, when the object of a marriage is defeated by rendering its continuance intolerable to one of
the parties and productive of no possible good to the community, relief in some way should be
obtainable. 64 Marriage, being a mutual and shared commitment between two parties, cannot
possibly be productive of any good to the society where one is considered released from the marital
bond while the other remains bound to it. Such is the state of affairs where the alien spouse obtains
a valid divorce abroad against the Filipino spouse, as in this case.

Petitioners cite Articles 15 65 and 17 66 of the Civil Code in stating that the divorce is void under
Philippine law insofar as Filipinos are concerned. However, in light of this Courts rulings in the cases
discussed above, the Filipino spouse should not be discriminated against in his own country if the
ends of justice are to be served. 67 In Alonzo v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 68 the Court stated:

But as has also been aptly observed, we test a law by its results; and likewise, we may add, by its
purposes. It is a cardinal rule that, in seeking the meaning of the law, the first concern of the judge
should be to discover in its provisions the intent of the lawmaker. Unquestionably, the law should
never be interpreted in such a way as to cause injustice as this is never within the legislative intent.
An indispensable part of that intent, in fact, for we presume the good motives of the legislature, is
to render justice.

Thus, we interpret and apply the law not independently of but in consonance with justice. Law and
justice are inseparable, and we must keep them so. To be sure, there are some laws that, while
generally valid, may seem arbitrary when applied in a particular case because of its peculiar
circumstances. In such a situation, we are not bound, because only of our nature and functions, to
apply them just the same, in slavish obedience to their language. What we do instead is find a
balance between the word and the will, that justice may be done even as the law is obeyed.

As judges, we are not automatons. We do not and must not unfeelingly apply the law as it is worded,
yielding like robots to the literal command without regard to its cause and consequence. "Courts are
apt to err by sticking too closely to the words of a law," so we are warned, by Justice Holmes again,
"where these words import a policy that goes beyond them."

xxxx

More than twenty centuries ago, Justinian defined justice "as the constant and perpetual wish to
render every one his due." That wish continues to motivate this Court when it assesses the facts and
the law in every case brought to it for decision. Justice is always an essential ingredient of its
decisions. Thus when the facts warrants, we interpret the law in a way that will render justice,
presuming that it was the intention of the lawmaker, to begin with, that the law be dispensed with
justice. 69

Applying the above doctrine in the instant case, the divorce decree allegedly obtained by Merry Lee
which absolutely allowed Felicisimo to remarry, would have vested Felicidad with the legal
personality to file the present petition as Felicisimos surviving spouse. However, the records show
that there is insufficient evidence to prove the validity of the divorce obtained by Merry Lee as well
as the marriage of respondent and Felicisimo under the laws of the U.S.A. In Garcia v. Recio, 70 the
Court laid down the specific guidelines for pleading and proving foreign law and divorce judgments.
It held that presentation solely of the divorce decree is insufficient and that proof of its authenticity
and due execution must be presented. Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, a writing or document
may be proven as a public or official record of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication or
(2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal custody of the document. If the record is not
kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper
diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in
which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office. 71

With regard to respondents marriage to Felicisimo allegedly solemnized in California, U.S.A., she
submitted photocopies of the Marriage Certificate and the annotated text 72 of the Family Law Act of
California which purportedly show that their marriage was done in accordance with the said law. As
stated in Garcia, however, the Court cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws as they must be
alleged and proved. 73

Therefore, this case should be remanded to the trial court for further reception of evidence on the
divorce decree obtained by Merry Lee and the marriage of respondent and Felicisimo.

Even assuming that Felicisimo was not capacitated to marry respondent in 1974, nevertheless, we
find that the latter has the legal personality to file the subject petition for letters of administration, as
she may be considered the co-owner of Felicisimo as regards the properties that were acquired
through their joint efforts during their cohabitation.

Section 6, 74 Rule 78 of the Rules of Court states that letters of administration may be granted to the
surviving spouse of the decedent. However, Section 2, Rule 79 thereof also provides in part:

SEC. 2. Contents of petition for letters of administration. A petition for letters of administration must
be filed by an interested person and must show, as far as known to the petitioner: x x x.
An "interested person" has been defined as one who would be benefited by the estate, such as an
heir, or one who has a claim against the estate, such as a creditor. The interest must be material
and direct, and not merely indirect or contingent. 75

In the instant case, respondent would qualify as an interested person who has a direct interest in the
estate of Felicisimo by virtue of their cohabitation, the existence of which was not denied by
petitioners. If she proves the validity of the divorce and Felicisimos capacity to remarry, but fails to
prove that her marriage with him was validly performed under the laws of the U.S.A., then she may
be considered as a co-owner under Article 144 76 of the Civil Code. This provision governs the
property relations between parties who live together as husband and wife without the benefit of
marriage, or their marriage is void from the beginning. It provides that the property acquired by either
or both of them through their work or industry or their wages and salaries shall be governed by the
rules on co-ownership. In a co-ownership, it is not necessary that the property be acquired through
their joint labor, efforts and industry. Any property acquired during the union is prima facie presumed
to have been obtained through their joint efforts. Hence, the portions belonging to the co-owners
shall be presumed equal, unless the contrary is proven. 77

Meanwhile, if respondent fails to prove the validity of both the divorce and the marriage, the
applicable provision would be Article 148 of the Family Code which has filled the hiatus in Article 144
of the Civil Code by expressly regulating the property relations of couples living together as husband
and wife but are incapacitated to marry. 78In Saguid v. Court of Appeals, 79 we held that even if the
cohabitation or the acquisition of property occurred before the Family Code took effect, Article 148
governs. 80 The Court described the property regime under this provision as follows:

The regime of limited co-ownership of property governing the union of parties who are not legally
capacitated to marry each other, but who nonetheless live together as husband and wife, applies to
properties acquired during said cohabitation in proportion to their respective contributions. Co-
ownership will only be up to the extent of the proven actual contribution of money, property or
industry. Absent proof of the extent thereof, their contributions and corresponding shares shall be
presumed to be equal.

In the cases of Agapay v. Palang, and Tumlos v. Fernandez, which involved the issue of co-
ownership of properties acquired by the parties to a bigamous marriage and an adulterous
relationship, respectively, we ruled that proof of actual contribution in the acquisition of the property
is essential. x x x

As in other civil cases, the burden of proof rests upon the party who, as determined by the pleadings
or the nature of the case, asserts an affirmative issue. Contentions must be proved by competent
evidence and reliance must be had on the strength of the partys own evidence and not upon the
weakness of the opponents defense. x x x81

In view of the foregoing, we find that respondents legal capacity to file the subject petition for letters
of administration may arise from her status as the surviving wife of Felicisimo or as his co-owner
under Article 144 of the Civil Code or Article 148 of the Family Code.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals reinstating and
affirming the February 28, 1994 Order of the Regional Trial Court which denied petitioners motion to
dismiss and its October 24, 1994 Order which dismissed petitioners motion for reconsideration is
AFFIRMED. Let this case be REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 167109 February 6, 2007

FELICITAS AMOR-CATALAN, Petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, MANILA, ORLANDO B. CATALAN and MEROPE E.
BRAGANZA, Respondents.

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

This petition for review assails the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 69875 dated
August 6, 2004, which reversed the Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dagupan City,
Branch 44, in Civil Case No. D-10636, declaring the marriage between respondents Orlando B.
Catalan and Merope E. Braganza void on the ground of bigamy, as well as the Resolution3 dated
January 27, 2005, which denied the motion for reconsideration.

Petitioner Felicitas Amor-Catalan married respondent Orlando on June 4, 1950 in Mabini,

Pangasinan.4Thereafter, they migrated to the United States of America and allegedly became
naturalized citizens thereof. After 38 years of marriage, Felicitas and Orlando divorced in April 1988.5

Two months after the divorce, or on June 16, 1988, Orlando married respondent Merope in
Calasiao, Pangasinan.6 Contending that said marriage was bigamous since Merope had a prior
subsisting marriage with Eusebio Bristol, petitioner filed a petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage with damages in the RTC of Dagupan City7 against Orlando and Merope.

Respondents filed a motion to dismiss8 on the ground of lack of cause of action as petitioner was
allegedly not a real party-in-interest, but it was denied.9 Trial on the merits ensued.

On October 10, 2000, the RTC rendered judgment in favor of the petitioner, the dispositive portion of
which reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is declared in favor of plaintiff Felicitas Amor Catalan and against
defendants Orlando B. Catalan and Merope E. Braganza, as follows:

1) The subsequent marriage of Merope Braganza with Orlando B. Catalan is declared null
and void ab initio;

2) The defendants are ordered jointly and severally to pay plaintiff by way of moral damages
the amount of P300,000.00, exemplary damages in the amount of P200,000.00 and
attorneys fees in the amount of P50,000.00, including costs of this suit; and

3) The donation in consideration of marriage is ordered revoked and the property donated is
ordered awarded to the heirs of Juliana Braganza.
Furnish copies of this Decision to Atty. Napoleon B. Arenas, Jr. and Atty. Nolan Evangelista.

SO ORDERED.10

Respondents appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals, which reversed the decision of the
RTC, thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby GRANT the appeal and consequently REVERSE
and SET ASIDE the appealed decision. We likewise DISMISS Civil Case No. D-10636, RTC, Branch
44, Dagupan City. No costs.

SO ORDERED.11

After the motion for reconsideration was denied, petitioner filed the instant petition for review raising
the following issues:

I.

WHETHER PETITIONER HAS THE REQUIRED STANDING IN COURT TO QUESTION THE

NULLITY OF THE MARRIAGE BETWEEN RESPONDENTS;

II.

WHETHER THE FAILURE OF THE COURT OF APPEALS TO DECLARE THE QUESTIONED

MARRIAGE VOID CONSTITUTES REVERSIBLE ERROR.12

Petitioner contends that the bigamous marriage of the respondents, which brought embarrassment
to her and her children, confers upon her an interest to seek judicial remedy to address her
grievances and to protect her family from further embarrassment and humiliation. She claims that
the Court of Appeals committed reversible error in not declaring the marriage void despite
overwhelming evidence and the state policy discouraging illegal and immoral marriages.13

The main issue to be resolved is whether petitioner has the personality to file a petition for the
declaration of nullity of marriage of the respondents on the ground of bigamy. However, this issue
may not be resolved without first determining the corollary factual issues of whether the petitioner
and respondent Orlando had indeed become naturalized American citizens and whether they had
actually been judicially granted a divorce decree.

While it is a settled rule that the Court is not a trier of facts and does not normally undertake the re-
examination of the evidence presented by the contending parties during the trial of the case,14 there
are, however, exceptions to this rule, like when the findings of facts of the RTC and the Court of
Appeals are conflicting, or when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on
which they are based.15

Both the RTC and the Court of Appeals found that petitioner and respondent Orlando were
naturalized American citizens and that they obtained a divorce decree in April 1988. However, after
a careful review of the records, we note that other than the allegations in the complaint and the
testimony during the trial, the records are bereft of competent evidence to prove their naturalization
and divorce.

The Court of Appeals therefore had no basis when it held:

In light of the allegations of Felicitas complaint and the documentary and testimonial evidence she
presented, we deem it undisputed that Orlando and Felicitas are American citizens and had this
citizenship status when they secured their divorce decree in April 1988. We are not therefore dealing
in this case with Filipino citizens whose marital status is governed by the Family Code and our Civil
Code, but with American citizens who secured their divorce in the U.S. and who are considered by
their national law to be free to contract another marriage. x x x16

Further, the Court of Appeals mistakenly considered the failure of the petitioner to refute or contest
the allegation in respondents brief, that she and respondent Orlando were American citizens at the
time they secured their divorce in April 1988, as sufficient to establish the fact of naturalization and
divorce.17 We note that it was the petitioner who alleged in her complaint that they acquired
American citizenship and that respondent Orlando obtained a judicial divorce decree.18 It is settled
rule that one who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it and mere allegation is not evidence.19

Divorce means the legal dissolution of a lawful union for a cause arising after marriage. But divorces
are of different types. The two basic ones are (1) absolute divorce or a vinculo matrimonii and (2)
limited divorce or a mensa et thoro. The first kind terminates the marriage, while the second
suspends it and leaves the bond in full force.20 A divorce obtained abroad by an alien may be
recognized in our jurisdiction, provided such decree is valid according to the national law of the
foreigner.21 However, before it can be recognized by our courts, the party pleading it must prove the
divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it, which must be proved
considering that our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws.22

Without the divorce decree and foreign law as part of the evidence, we cannot rule on the issue of
whether petitioner has the personality to file the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage. After
all, she may have the personality to file the petition if the divorce decree obtained was a limited
divorce or a mensa et thoro; or the foreign law may restrict remarriage even after the divorce decree
becomes absolute.23 In such case, the RTC would be correct to declare the marriage of the
respondents void for being bigamous, there being already in evidence two existing marriage
certificates, which were both obtained in the Philippines, one in Mabini, Pangasinan dated December
21, 1959 between Eusebio Bristol and respondent Merope,24 and the other, in Calasiao, Pangasinan
dated June 16, 1988 between the respondents.25

However, if there was indeed a divorce decree obtained and which, following the national law of
Orlando, does not restrict remarriage, the Court of Appeals would be correct in ruling that petitioner
has no legal personality to file a petition to declare the nullity of marriage, thus:

Freed from their existing marital bond, each of the former spouses no longer has any interest nor
should each have the personality to inquire into the marriage that the other might subsequently
contract. x x x Viewed from another perspective, Felicitas has no existing interest in Orlandos
subsequent marriage since the validity, as well as any defect or infirmity, of this subsequent
marriage will not affect the divorced status of Orlando and Felicitas. x x x26

True, under the New Civil Code which is the law in force at the time the respondents were married,
or even in the Family Code, there is no specific provision as to who can file a petition to declare the
nullity of marriage; however, only a party who can demonstrate "proper interest" can file the same. A
petition to declare the nullity of marriage, like any other actions, must be prosecuted or defended in
the name of the real party in interest27 and must be based on a cause of action.28 Thus, in Nial v.
Bayadog,29 the Court held that the children have the personality to file the petition to declare the
nullity of the marriage of their deceased father to their stepmother as it affects their successional
rights.
1awphi1.net
Significantly, Section 2(a) of The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages, which took effect on March 15, 2003, now specifically provides:

SECTION 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages.

(a) Who may file. A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely
by the husband or the wife.

xxxx

In fine, petitioners personality to file the petition to declare the nullity of marriage cannot be
ascertained because of the absence of the divorce decree and the foreign law allowing it. Hence, a
remand of the case to the trial court for reception of additional evidence is necessary to determine
whether respondent Orlando was granted a divorce decree and whether the foreign law which
granted the same allows or restricts remarriage. If it is proved that a valid divorce decree was
obtained and the same did not allow respondent Orlandos remarriage, then the trial court should
declare respondents marriage as bigamous and void ab initio but reduce the amount of moral
damages from P300,000.00 to P50,000.00 and exemplary damages from P200,000.00
to P25,000.00. On the contrary, if it is proved that a valid divorce decree was obtained which allowed
Orlando to remarry, then the trial court must dismiss the instant petition to declare nullity of marriage
on the ground that petitioner Felicitas Amor-Catalan lacks legal personality to file the same.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, let this case be REMANDED to the trial court for its proper
disposition. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

MARIA REBECCA G.R. No. 155635

MAKAPUGAY BAYOT,
Petitioner, Present:

- versus - QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson,

CARPIO MORALES,
THE HONORABLE COURT OF TINGA,
APPEALS and VICENTE VELASCO, JR., and
MADRIGAL BAYOT, BRION, JJ.
Respondents.
x-------------------------------------------x
MARIA REBECCA G.R. No. 163979
MAKAPUGAY BAYOT,
Petitioner,

- versus - Promulgated:
November 7, 2008
VICENTE MADRIGAL BAYOT,
Respondent.
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

VELASCO, JR., J.:

The Case

Before us are these two petitions interposed by petitioner Maria Rebecca

Makapugay Bayot impugning certain issuances handed out by the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 68187.

In the first, a petition for certiorari[1] under Rule 65 and docketed as G.R. No.
155635, Rebecca assails and seeks to nullify the April 30, 2002 Resolution [2] of the
CA, as reiterated in another Resolution of September 2, 2002,[3] granting a writ of
preliminary injunction in favor of private respondent Vicente Madrigal Bayot
staving off the trial courts grant of support pendente lite to Rebecca.

The second, a petition for review under Rule 45,[4] docketed G.R. No. 163979,
assails the March 25, 2004 Decision[5] of the CA, (1) dismissing Civil Case No. 01-
094, a suit for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage with application for support
commenced by Rebecca against Vicente before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in
Muntinlupa City; and (2) setting aside certain orders and a resolution issued by the
RTC in the said case.

Per its Resolution of August 11, 2004, the Court ordered the consolidation of
both cases.

The Facts

Vicente and Rebecca were married on April 20, 1979 in Sanctuario de San
Jose, Greenhills, Mandaluyong City. On its face, the Marriage
Certificate[6] identified Rebecca, then 26 years old, to be an American citizen[7] born
in Agaa, Guam, USA to Cesar Tanchiong Makapugay, American, and Helen Corn
Makapugay, American.

On November 27, 1982 in San Francisco, California, Rebecca gave birth to

Marie Josephine Alexandra or Alix. From then on, Vicente and Rebeccas marital
relationship seemed to have soured as the latter, sometime in 1996, initiated divorce
proceedings in the Dominican Republic. Before the Court of the First Instance of the
Judicial District of Santo Domingo, Rebecca personally appeared, while Vicente was
duly represented by counsel. On February 22, 1996, the Dominican court
issued Civil Decree No. 362/96,[8]ordering the dissolution of the couples marriage
and leaving them to remarry after completing the legal requirements, but giving
them joint custody and guardianship over Alix.Over a year later, the same court
would issue Civil Decree No. 406/97,[9] settling the couples property relations
pursuant to an Agreement[10] they executed on December 14, 1996. Said agreement
specifically stated that the conjugal property which they acquired during their
marriage consist[s] only of the real property and all the improvements and personal
properties therein contained at 502 Acacia Avenue, Alabang, Muntinlupa.[11]
 Meanwhile, on March 14, 1996, or less than a month from the issuance of
Civil Decree No. 362/96, Rebecca filed with the Makati City RTC a
petition[12] dated January 26, 1996, with attachments, for declaration of nullity of
marriage, docketed as Civil Case No. 96-378. Rebecca, however, later moved[13] and
secured approval[14] of the motion to withdraw the petition.

On May 29, 1996, Rebecca executed an Affidavit of

Acknowledgment[15] stating under oath that she is an American citizen; that, since
1993, she and Vicente have been living separately; and that she is carrying a child
not of Vicente.

On March 21, 2001, Rebecca filed another petition, this time before the
Muntinlupa City RTC, for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage[16] on the
ground of Vicentes alleged psychological incapacity. Docketed as Civil Case No.
01-094 and entitled as Maria Rebecca Makapugay Bayot v. Vicente Madrigal Bayot,
the petition was eventually raffled to Branch 256 of the court. In it, Rebecca also
sought the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains with application for
support pendente lite for her and Alix. Rebecca also prayed that Vicente be ordered
to pay a permanent monthly support for their daughter Alix in the amount of PhP
220,000.

On June 8, 2001, Vicente filed a Motion to Dismiss[17] on, inter alia, the
grounds of lack of cause of action and that the petition is barred by the prior
judgment of divorce.Earlier, on June 5, 2001, Rebecca filed and moved for the
allowance of her application for support pendente lite.

To the motion to dismiss, Rebecca interposed an opposition, insisting on her

Filipino citizenship, as affirmed by the Department of Justice (DOJ), and that,
therefore, there is no valid divorce to speak of.

Meanwhile, Vicente, who had in the interim contracted another marriage, and
Rebecca commenced several criminal complaints against each other. Specifically,
Vicente filed adultery and perjury complaints against Rebecca. Rebecca, on the other
hand, charged Vicente with bigamy and concubinage.

Ruling of the RTC on the Motion to Dismiss

 and Motion for Support Pendente Lite

On August 8, 2001, the RTC issued an Order[18] denying Vicentes motion to

dismiss Civil Case No. 01-094 and granting Rebeccas application for
support pendente lite, disposing as follows:

Wherefore, premises considered, the Motion to Dismiss filed by the

respondent is DENIED. Petitioners Application in Support of the Motion
for Support Pendente Lite is hereby GRANTED. Respondent is hereby
ordered to remit the amount of TWO HUNDRED AND TWENTY
THOUSAND PESOS (Php 220,000.00) a month to Petitioner as support
for the duration of the proceedings relative to the instant Petition.

SO ORDERED.[19]

The RTC declared, among other things, that the divorce judgment invoked by
Vicente as bar to the petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage is a
matter of defense best taken up during actual trial. As to the grant of
support pendente lite, the trial court held that a mere allegation of adultery against
Rebecca does not operate to preclude her from receiving legal support.

Following the denial[20] of his motion for reconsideration of the above August
8, 2001 RTC order, Vicente went to the CA on a petition for certiorari, with a prayer
for the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or writ of preliminary
injunction.[21] His petition was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 68187.

Grant of Writ of Preliminary Injunction by the CA

On January 9, 2002, the CA issued the desired TRO.[22] On April 30, 2002,
the appellate court granted, via a Resolution, the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction, the decretal portion of which reads:

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, pending final resolution of

the petition at bar, let the Writ of Preliminary Injunction be ISSUED in
this case, enjoining the respondent court from implementing the assailed
 Omnibus Order dated August 8, 2001 and the Order dated November 20,
2001, and from conducting further proceedings in Civil Case No. 01-094,
upon the posting of an injunction bond in the amount of P250,000.00.

SO ORDERED.[23]

Rebecca moved[24] but was denied reconsideration of the

aforementioned April 30, 2002 resolution. In the meantime, on May 20, 2002, the
preliminary injunctive writ[25] was issued. Rebecca also moved for reconsideration
of this issuance, but the CA, by Resolution dated September 2, 2002, denied her
motion.

The adverted CA resolutions of April 30, 2002 and September 2, 2002 are
presently being assailed in Rebeccas petition for certiorari, docketed under G.R. No.
155635.

Ruling of the CA

Pending resolution of G.R. No. 155635, the CA, by a Decision dated March
25, 2004, effectively dismissed Civil Case No. 01-094, and set aside incidental
orders the RTC issued in relation to the case. The fallo of the presently assailed CA
Decision reads:

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The

Omnibus Order dated August 8, 2001 and the Order dated November 20,
2001 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new one
entered DISMISSING Civil Case No. 01-094, for failure to state a cause
of action. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.[26]

To the CA, the RTC ought to have granted Vicentes motion to dismiss on the
basis of the following premises:

(1) As held in China Road and Bridge Corporation v. Court of Appeals, the
hypothetical-admission rule applies in determining whether a complaint or petition
states a cause of action.[27] Applying said rule in the light of the essential elements
of a cause of action,[28] Rebecca had no cause of action against Vicente for
declaration of nullity of marriage.

(2) Rebecca no longer had a legal right in this jurisdiction to have her marriage
with Vicente declared void, the union having previously been dissolved on February
22, 1996 by the foreign divorce decree she personally secured as an American
citizen. Pursuant to the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, such
divorce restored Vicentes capacity to contract another marriage.

(3) Rebeccas contention about the nullity of a divorce, she being a Filipino
citizen at the time the foreign divorce decree was rendered, was dubious. Her
allegation as to her alleged Filipino citizenship was also doubtful as it was not shown
that her father, at the time of her birth, was still a Filipino citizen. The Certification
of Birth of Rebecca issued by the Government of Guam also did not indicate the
nationality of her father.
(4) Rebecca was estopped from denying her American citizenship, having
professed to have that nationality status and having made representations to that
effect during momentous events of her life, such as: (a) during her marriage; (b)
when she applied for divorce; and (c) when she applied for and eventually secured
an American passport on January 18, 1995, or a little over a year before she initiated
the first but later withdrawn petition for nullity of her marriage (Civil Case No. 96-
378) on March 14, 1996.

(5) Assuming that she had dual citizenship, being born of a purportedly
Filipino father in Guam, USA which follows the jus soli principle, Rebeccas
representation and assertion about being an American citizen when she secured her
foreign divorce precluded her from denying her citizenship and impugning the
validity of the divorce.

Rebecca seasonably filed a motion for reconsideration of the above Decision,

but this recourse was denied in the equally assailed June 4,
2004 Resolution.[29] Hence, Rebeccas Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule
45, docketed under G.R. No. 163979.

The Issues
 In G.R. No. 155635, Rebecca raises four (4) assignments of errors as grounds
for the allowance of her petition, all of which converged on the proposition that the
CA erred in enjoining the implementation of the RTCs orders which would have
entitled her to support pending final resolution of Civil Case No. 01-094.

In G.R. No. 163979, Rebecca urges the reversal of the assailed CA decision
submitting as follows:
I

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT

MENTIONING AND NOT TAKING INTO CONSIDERATION IN ITS
APPRECIATION OF THE FACTS THE FACT OF PETITIONERS
FILIPINO CITIZENSHIP AS CATEGORICALLY STATED AND
ALLEGED IN HER PETITION BEFORE THE COURT A QUO.

II

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN RELYING ONLY

ON ANNEXES TO THE PETITION IN RESOLVING THE MATTERS
BROUGHT BEFORE IT.

III

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN FAILING TO

CONSIDER THAT RESPONDENT IS ESTOPPED FROM CLAIMING
THAT HIS MARRIAGE TO PETITIONER HAD ALREADY BEEN
DISSOLVED BY VIRTUE OF HIS SUBSEQUENT AND
CONCURRENT ACTS.

IV

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN RULING THAT

THERE WAS ABUSE OF DISCRETION ON THE PART OF THE
TRIAL COURT, MUCH LESS A GRAVE ABUSE.[30]

We shall first address the petition in G.R. No. 163979, its outcome being
determinative of the success or failure of the petition in G.R. No. 155635.
 Three legal premises need to be underscored at the outset. First, a divorce
obtained abroad by an alien married to a Philippine national may be recognized in
thePhilippines, provided the decree of divorce is valid according to the national law
of the foreigner.[31] Second, the reckoning point is not the citizenship of the divorcing
parties at birth or at the time of marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid
divorce is obtained abroad. And third, an absolute divorce secured by a Filipino
married to another Filipino is contrary to our concept of public policy and morality
and shall not be recognized in this jurisdiction.[32]

Given the foregoing perspective, the determinative issue tendered in G.R. No.
155635, i.e., the propriety of the granting of the motion to dismiss by the appellate
court, resolves itself into the questions of: first, whether petitioner Rebecca was a
Filipino citizen at the time the divorce judgment was rendered in the Dominican
Republic on February 22, 1996; and second, whether the judgment of divorce is valid
and, if so, what are its consequent legal effects?

The Courts Ruling

The petition is bereft of merit.

Rebecca an American Citizen in the Purview of This Case

There can be no serious dispute that Rebecca, at the time she applied for and
obtained her divorce from Vicente, was an American citizen and remains to be one,
absent proof of an effective repudiation of such citizenship. The following are
compelling circumstances indicative of her American citizenship: (1) she was born
in Agaa, Guam, USA; (2) the principle of jus soli is followed in this American
territory granting American citizenship to those who are born there; and (3) she was,
and may still be, a holder of an American passport.[33]

And as aptly found by the CA, Rebecca had consistently professed, asserted,
and represented herself as an American citizen, particularly: (1) during her marriage
as shown in the marriage certificate; (2) in the birth certificate of Alix; and (3) when
she secured the divorce from the Dominican Republic. Mention may be made of the
Affidavit of Acknowledgment[34] in which she stated being an American citizen.
 It is true that Rebecca had been issued by the Bureau of Immigration (Bureau)
of Identification (ID) Certificate No. RC 9778 and a Philippine Passport. On its face,
ID Certificate No. RC 9778 would tend to show that she has indeed been recognized
as a Filipino citizen. It cannot be over-emphasized, however, that such recognition
was given only on June 8, 2000 upon the affirmation by the Secretary of Justice of
Rebeccas recognition pursuant to the Order of Recognition issued by Bureau
Associate Commissioner Edgar L. Mendoza.

For clarity, we reproduce in full the contents of ID Certificate No. RC 9778:

To Whom It May Concern:

This is to certify that *MARIA REBECCA MAKAPUGAY

BAYOT* whose photograph and thumbprints are affixed hereto and
partially covered by the seal of this Office, and whose other particulars are
as follows:

Place of Birth: Guam, USA Date of Birth: March 5, 1953

Sex: female Civil Status: married Color of Hair: brown
Color of Eyes: brown Distinguishing marks on face: none

was r e c o g n i z e d as a citizen of the Philippines as per pursuant to

Article IV, Section 1, Paragraph 3 of the 1935 Constitution per order of
Recognition JBL 95-213 signed by Associate Commissioner Jose B.
Lopez dated October 6, 1995, and duly affirmed by Secretary of Justice
Artemio G. Tuquero in his 1st Indorsement dated June 8, 2000.

Issued for identification purposes only. NOT VALID for travel

purposes.

Given under my hand and seal this 11th day of October, 1995

(SGD) EDGAR L. MENDOZA

ASSO. COMMISSIONER

Official Receipt No. 5939988

issued at Manila
dated Oct. 10, 1995 for P 2,000
 From the text of ID Certificate No. RC 9778, the following material facts and
dates may be deduced: (1) Bureau Associate Commissioner Jose B. Lopez issued
the Order of Recognition on October 6, 1995; (2) the 1st Indorsement of Secretary
of Justice Artemio G. Tuquero affirming Rebeccas recognition as a Filipino citizen
was issued on June 8, 2000 or almost five years from the date of the order of
recognition; and (3) ID Certificate No. RC 9778 was purportedly issued on October
11, 1995 after the payment of the PhP 2,000 fee on October 10, 1995 per OR No.
5939988.

What begs the question is, however, how the above certificate could have been
issued by the Bureau on October 11, 1995 when the Secretary of Justice issued the
required affirmation only on June 8, 2000. No explanation was given for this patent
aberration. There seems to be no error with the date of the issuance of the
1st Indorsement by Secretary of Justice Tuquero as this Court takes judicial notice
that he was the Secretary of Justice from February 16, 2000 to January 22,
2001. There is, thus, a strong valid reason to conclude that the certificate in question
must be spurious.

Under extant immigration rules, applications for recognition of Filipino

citizenship require the affirmation by the DOJ of the Order of Recognition issued by
the Bureau.Under Executive Order No. 292, also known as the 1987 Administrative
Code, specifically in its Title III, Chapter 1, Sec. 3(6), it is the DOJ which is tasked
to provide immigration and naturalization regulatory services and implement the
laws governing citizenship and the admission and stay of aliens. Thus, the
confirmation by the DOJ of any Order of Recognition for Filipino citizenship issued
by the Bureau is required.

Pertinently, Bureau Law Instruction No. RBR-99-002[35] on Recognition as a

Filipino Citizen clearly provides:

The Bureau [of Immigration] through its Records Section shall

automatically furnish the Department of Justice an official copy of its
Order of Recognition within 72 days from its date of approval by the way
of indorsement for confirmation of the Order by the Secretary of Justice
pursuant to Executive Order No. 292. No Identification Certificate shall
be issued before the date of confirmation by the Secretary of
Justice and any Identification Certificate issued by the Bureau pursuant
 to an Order of Recognition shall prominently indicate thereon the date of
confirmation by the Secretary of Justice. (Emphasis ours.)

Not lost on the Court is the acquisition by Rebecca of her Philippine passport
only on June 13, 2000, or five days after then Secretary of Justice Tuquero issued
the 1stIndorsement confirming the order of recognition. It may be too much to
attribute to coincidence this unusual sequence of close events which, to us, clearly
suggests that prior to said affirmation or confirmation, Rebecca was not yet
recognized as a Filipino citizen. The same sequence would also imply that ID
Certificate No. RC 9778 could not have been issued in 1995, as Bureau Law
Instruction No. RBR-99-002 mandates that no identification certificate shall be
issued before the date of confirmation by the Secretary of Justice.Logically,
therefore, the affirmation or confirmation of Rebeccas recognition as a Filipino
citizen through the 1st Indorsement issued only on June 8, 2000 by Secretary of
Justice Tuquero corresponds to the eventual issuance of Rebeccas passport a few
days later, or on June 13, 2000 to be exact.

When Divorce Was Granted Rebecca, She Was not a

Filipino Citizen and Was not Yet Recognized as One

The Court can assume hypothetically that Rebecca is now a Filipino

citizen. But from the foregoing disquisition, it is indubitable that Rebecca did not
have that status of, or at least was not yet recognized as, a Filipino citizen when she
secured the February 22, 1996 judgment of divorce from the Dominican Republic.

The Court notes and at this juncture wishes to point out that Rebecca
voluntarily withdrew her original petition for declaration of nullity (Civil Case No.
96-378 of the Makati City RTC) obviously because she could not show proof of her
alleged Filipino citizenship then. In fact, a perusal of that petition shows that, while
bearing the dateJanuary 26, 1996, it was only filed with the RTC on March 14,
1996 or less than a month after Rebecca secured, on February 22, 1996, the foreign
divorce decree in question.Consequently, there was no mention about said divorce
in the petition. Significantly, the only documents appended as annexes to said
original petition were: the Vicente-Rebecca Marriage Contract (Annex A) and Birth
Certificate of Alix (Annex B). If indeed ID Certificate No. RC 9778 from the Bureau
was truly issued on October 11, 1995, is it not but logical to expect that this piece of
document be appended to form part of the petition, the question of her citizenship
being crucial to her case?

As may be noted, the petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage

under Civil Case No. 01-094, like the withdrawn first petition, also did not have the
ID Certificate from the Bureau as attachment. What were attached consisted of the
following material documents: Marriage Contract (Annex A) and Divorce Decree.
It was only through her Opposition (To Respondents Motion to Dismiss dated 31
May 2001)[36] did Rebecca attach as Annex C ID Certificate No. RC 9778.

At any rate, the CA was correct in holding that the RTC had sufficient basis
to dismiss the petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage as said petition,
taken together with Vicentes motion to dismiss and Rebeccas opposition to motion,
with their respective attachments, clearly made out a case of lack of cause of action,
which we will expound later.

Validity of Divorce Decree

Going to the second core issue, we find Civil Decree Nos. 362/96 and 406/97
valid.

First, at the time of the divorce, as above elucidated, Rebecca was still to be
recognized, assuming for argument that she was in fact later recognized, as a Filipino
citizen, but represented herself in public documents as an American citizen. At the
very least, she chose, before, during, and shortly after her divorce, her American
citizenship to govern her marital relationship. Second, she secured personally said
divorce as an American citizen, as is evident in the text of the Civil Decrees, which
pertinently declared:

IN THIS ACTION FOR DIVORCE in which the parties expressly submit

to the jurisdiction of this court, by reason of the existing incompatibility
of temperaments x x x. The parties MARIA REBECCA M. BAYOT, of
United States nationality, 42 years of age, married, domiciled and
 residing at 502 Acacia Ave., Ayala Alabang, Muntin Lupa, Philippines, x
x x, who personally appeared before this court, accompanied by DR.
JUAN ESTEBAN OLIVERO, attorney, x x x and VICENTE
MADRIGAL BAYOT, of Philippine nationality, of 43 years of age,
married and domiciled and residing at 502 Acacia Ave., Ayala Alabang,
Muntin Lupa, Filipino, appeared before this court represented by DR.
ALEJANDRO TORRENS, attorney, x x x, revalidated by special power
of attorney given the 19th of February of 1996, signed before the Notary
Public Enrico L. Espanol of the City of Manila, duly legalized and
authorizing him to subscribe all the acts concerning this
case.[37] (Emphasis ours.)

Third, being an American citizen, Rebecca was bound by the national laws of
the United States of America, a country which allows divorce. Fourth, the property
relations of Vicente and Rebecca were properly adjudicated through their
Agreement[38] executed on December 14, 1996 after Civil Decree No. 362/96 was
rendered on February 22, 1996, and duly affirmed by Civil Decree No. 406/97 issued
on March 4, 1997. Veritably, the foreign divorce secured by Rebecca was valid.

To be sure, the Court has taken stock of the holding in Garcia v. Recio that a
foreign divorce can be recognized here, provided the divorce decree is proven as a
fact and as valid under the national law of the alien spouse.[39] Be this as it may, the
fact that Rebecca was clearly an American citizen when she secured the divorce and
that divorce is recognized and allowed in any of the States of the Union,[40] the
presentation of a copy of foreign divorce decree duly authenticated by the foreign
court issuing said decree is, as here, sufficient.

It bears to stress that the existence of the divorce decree has not been denied,
but in fact admitted by both parties. And neither did they impeach the jurisdiction of
the divorce court nor challenge the validity of its proceedings on the ground of
collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of fact or law, albeit both appeared to have the
opportunity to do so. The same holds true with respect to the decree of partition of
their conjugal property. As this Court explained in Roehr v. Rodriguez:
Before our courts can give the effect of res judicata to a foreign judgment [of
divorce] x x x, it must be shown that the parties opposed to the judgment had been
 given ample opportunity to do so on grounds allowed under Rule 39, Section 50 of
the Rules of Court (now Rule 39, Section 48, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure), to
wit:

SEC. 50. Effect of foreign judgments.The effect of a judgment of a

tribunal of a foreign country, having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment
is as follows:

(a) In case of a judgment upon a specific thing, the judgment is

conclusive upon the title to the thing;

(b) In case of a judgment against a person, the judgment is presumptive

evidence of a right as between the parties and their successors in interest by
a subsequent title; but the judgment may be repelled by evidence of a want
of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake
of law or fact.

It is essential that there should be an opportunity to challenge the foreign

judgment, in order for the court in this jurisdiction to properly determine its
efficacy. In this jurisdiction, our Rules of Court clearly provide that with respect to
actions in personam, as distinguished from actions in rem, a foreign judgment
merely constitutes prima facie evidence of the justness of the claim of a party and,
as such, is subject to proof to the contrary.[41]

As the records show, Rebecca, assisted by counsel, personally secured the

foreign divorce while Vicente was duly represented by his counsel, a certain Dr.
Alejandro Torrens, in said proceedings. As things stand, the foreign divorce decrees
rendered and issued by the Dominican Republic court are valid and, consequently,
bind both Rebecca and Vicente.

Finally, the fact that Rebecca may have been duly recognized as a Filipino
citizen by force of the June 8, 2000 affirmation by Secretary of Justice Tuquero of
the October 6, 1995 Bureau Order of Recognition will not, standing alone, work to
nullify or invalidate the foreign divorce secured by Rebecca as an American citizen
on February 22, 1996. For as we stressed at the outset, in determining whether or not
a divorce secured abroad would come within the pale of the countrys policy against
absolute divorce, the reckoning point is the citizenship of the parties at the time a
valid divorce is obtained.[42]

Legal Effects of the Valid Divorce

 Given the validity and efficacy of divorce secured by Rebecca, the same shall
be given a res judicata effect in this jurisdiction. As an obvious result of the divorce
decree obtained, the marital vinculum between Rebecca and Vicente is considered
severed; they are both freed from the bond of matrimony. In plain language, Vicente
and Rebecca are no longer husband and wife to each other. As the divorce court
formally pronounced: [T]hat the marriage between MARIA REBECCA M. BAYOT
and VICENTE MADRIGAL BAYOT is hereby dissolved x x x leaving them free
to remarry after completing the legal requirements.[43]

Consequent to the dissolution of the marriage, Vicente could no longer be

subject to a husbands obligation under the Civil Code. He cannot, for instance, be
obliged to live with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to Rebecca.[44]

The divorce decree in question also brings into play the second paragraph of
Art. 26 of the Family Code, providing as follows:

Art. 26. x x x x

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is

validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by
the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse
shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law. (As amended
by E.O. 227)

In Republic v. Orbecido III, we spelled out the twin elements for the
applicability of the second paragraph of Art. 26, thus:
x x x [W]e state the twin elements for the application of Paragraph
2 of Article 26 as follows:
1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino
citizen and a foreigner; and
2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating
him or her to remarry.
The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time
of the celebration of the marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid
 divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to
remarry.[45]

Both elements obtain in the instant case. We need not belabor further the fact
of marriage of Vicente and Rebecca, their citizenship when they wed, and their
professed citizenship during the valid divorce proceedings.

Not to be overlooked of course is the fact that Civil Decree No. 406/97 and
the Agreement executed on December 14, 1996 bind both Rebecca and Vicente as
regards their property relations. The Agreement provided that the ex-couples
conjugal property consisted only their family home, thus:

9. That the parties stipulate that the conjugal property which they
acquired during their marriage consists only of the real property and
all the improvements and personal properties therein contained at 502
Acacia Avenue, Ayala Alabang, Muntinlupa, covered by TCT No. 168301
dated Feb. 7, 1990 issued by the Register of Deeds of Makati, Metro
Manila registered in the name of Vicente M. Bayot, married to Rebecca
M. Bayot, x x x.[46] (Emphasis ours.)

This property settlement embodied in the Agreement was affirmed by the

divorce court which, per its second divorce decree, Civil Decree No. 406/97 dated
March 4, 1997, ordered that, THIRD: That the agreement entered into between the
parties dated 14th day of December 1996 in Makati City, Philippines shall survive in
this Judgment of divorce by reference but not merged and that the parties are hereby
ordered and directed to comply with each and every provision of said
agreement.[47]

Rebecca has not repudiated the property settlement contained in the

Agreement. She is thus estopped by her representation before the divorce court from
asserting that her and Vicentes conjugal property was not limited to their family
home in Ayala Alabang.[48]

No Cause of Action in the Petition for Nullity of Marriage

 Upon the foregoing disquisitions, it is abundantly clear to the Court that
Rebecca lacks, under the premises, cause of action. Philippine Bank of
Communications v. Trazoexplains the concept and elements of a cause of action,
thus:

A cause of action is an act or omission of one party in violation of

the legal right of the other. A motion to dismiss based on lack
of cause of action hypothetically admits the truth of the allegations in the
complaint. The allegations in a complaint are sufficient to constitute
a cause of action against the defendants if, hypothetically admitting the
facts alleged, the court can render a valid judgment upon the same in
accordance with the prayer therein. A cause of action exists if the
following elements are present, namely: (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff
by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is created; (2) an
obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect or not to violate
such right; and (3) an act or omission on the part of such defendant
violative of the right of the plaintiff or constituting a breach of the
obligation of the defendant to the plaintiff for which the latter may
maintain an action for recovery of damages.[49]

One thing is clear from a perusal of Rebeccas underlying petition before the
RTC, Vicentes motion to dismiss and Rebeccas opposition thereof, with the
documentary evidence attached therein: The petitioner lacks a cause of action for
declaration of nullity of marriage, a suit which presupposes the existence of a
marriage.

To sustain a motion to dismiss for lack of cause of action, the movant must
show that the claim for relief does not exist rather than that a claim has been
defectively stated or is ambiguous, indefinite, or uncertain.[50] With the valid foreign
divorce secured by Rebecca, there is no more marital tie binding her to
Vicente. There is in fine no more marriage to be dissolved or nullified.

The Court to be sure does not lose sight of the legal obligation of Vicente and
Rebecca to support the needs of their daughter, Alix. The records do not clearly show
how he had discharged his duty, albeit Rebecca alleged that the support given had
been insufficient. At any rate, we do note that Alix, having been born on November
27, 1982, reached the majority age on November 27, 2000, or four months before
her mother initiated her petition for declaration of nullity. She would now be 26
years old. Hence, the issue of back support, which allegedly had been partly
shouldered by Rebecca, is best litigated in a separate civil action for
reimbursement. In this way, the actual figure for the support of Alix can be proved
as well as the earning capacity of both Vicente and Rebecca. The trial court can thus
determine what Vicente owes, if any, considering that support includes provisions
until the child concerned shall have finished her education.

Upon the foregoing considerations, the Court no longer need to delve into the
issue tendered in G.R. No. 155635, that is, Rebeccas right to support pendente
lite. As it were, her entitlement to that kind of support hinges on the tenability of her
petition under Civil Case No. 01-094 for declaration of nullity of marriage. The
dismissal of Civil Case No. 01-094 by the CA veritably removed any legal anchorage
for, and effectively mooted, the claim for support pendente lite.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari in G.R. No. 155635 is

hereby DISMISSED on the ground of mootness, while the petition for review
in G.R. No. 163979 is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. Accordingly, the March
25, 2004 Decision and June 4, 2004 Resolution of the CA in CA-G.R. SP No.
68187 are hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
Supreme Court
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

GERBERT R. CORPUZ, G.R. No. 186571

Petitioner,
Present:

CARPIO MORALES, J., Chairperson,

BRION,
- versus - BERSAMIN,
*ABAD, and

VILLARAMA, JR., JJ.

Promulgated:
DAISYLYN TIROL STO. August 11, 2010
TOMAS and The SOLICITOR
GENERAL,
Respondents. -- -
x--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

BRION, J.:

Before the Court is a direct appeal from the decision[1] of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Laoag City, Branch 11, elevated via a petition for review
on certiorari[2]under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court (present petition).

Petitioner Gerbert R. Corpuz was a former Filipino citizen who acquired

Canadian citizenship through naturalization on November 29, 2000.[3] On January
18, 2005, Gerbert married respondent Daisylyn T. Sto. Tomas, a Filipina,
in Pasig City.[4] Due to work and other professional commitments, Gerbert left
for Canada soon after the wedding. He returned to the Philippines sometime in April
2005 to surprise Daisylyn, but was shocked to discover that his wife was having an
affair with another man. Hurt and disappointed, Gerbert returned to Canada and filed
a petition for divorce. The Superior Court of
Justice, Windsor, Ontario, Canada granted Gerberts petition for divorce onDecember
8, 2005. The divorce decree took effect a month later, on January 8, 2006.[5]

Two years after the divorce, Gerbert has moved on and has found another
Filipina to love. Desirous of marrying his new Filipina fiance in the Philippines,
Gerbert went to the Pasig City Civil Registry Office and registered the Canadian
divorce decree on his and Daisylyns marriage certificate. Despite the registration of
the divorce decree, an official of the National Statistics Office (NSO) informed
Gerbert that the marriage between him and Daisylyn still subsists under Philippine
law; to be enforceable, the foreign divorce decree must first be judicially recognized
by a competent Philippine court, pursuant to NSO Circular No. 4, series of 1982.[6]

Accordingly, Gerbert filed a petition for judicial recognition of foreign

divorce and/or declaration of marriage as dissolved (petition) with the
RTC. Although summoned, Daisylyn did not file any responsive pleading but
submitted instead a notarized letter/manifestation to the trial court. She offered no
opposition to Gerberts petition and, in fact, alleged her desire to file a similar case
herself but was prevented by financial and personal circumstances. She, thus,
requested that she be considered as a party-in-interest with a similar prayer to
Gerberts.

In its October 30, 2008 decision,[7] the RTC denied Gerberts petition. The
RTC concluded that Gerbert was not the proper party to institute the action for
judicial recognition of the foreign divorce decree as he is a naturalized Canadian
citizen. It ruled that only the Filipino spouse can avail of the remedy, under the
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code,[8] in order for him or her to be
able to remarry under Philippine law.[9] Article 26 of the Family Code reads:

Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in

accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were
solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country,
except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and
38.
 Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is
validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad
by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino
spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.

This conclusion, the RTC stated, is consistent with the legislative intent behind the
enactment of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, as determined
by the Court in Republic v. Orbecido III;[10] the provision was enacted to avoid the
absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who,
after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse.[11]

THE PETITION

From the RTCs ruling,[12] Gerbert filed the present petition.[13]

Gerbert asserts that his petition before the RTC is essentially for declaratory
relief, similar to that filed in Orbecido; he, thus, similarly asks for a determination
of his rights under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code. Taking
into account the rationale behind the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code, he contends that the provision applies as well to the benefit of the alien
spouse. He claims that the RTC ruling unduly stretched the doctrine in Orbecido by
limiting the standing to file the petition only to the Filipino spouse an interpretation
he claims to be contrary to the essence of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code. He considers himself as a proper party, vested with sufficient legal
interest, to institute the case, as there is a possibility that he might be prosecuted for
bigamy if he marries his Filipina fiance in the Philippines since two marriage
certificates, involving him, would be on file with the Civil Registry Office. The
Office of the Solicitor General and Daisylyn, in their respective Comments, [14] both
support Gerberts position.

Essentially, the petition raises the issue of whether the second paragraph of Article
26 of the Family Code extends to aliens the right to petition a court of this
jurisdiction for the recognition of a foreign divorce decree.
THE COURTS RULING
The alien spouse can claim no right under
the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code as the substantive right it
establishes is in favor of the Filipino
spouse

The resolution of the issue requires a review of the legislative history and intent
behind the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code.

The Family Code recognizes only two types of defective marriages void [15] and
voidable[16] marriages. In both cases, the basis for the judicial declaration of absolute
nullity or annulment of the marriage exists before or at the time of the
marriage. Divorce, on the other hand, contemplates the dissolution of the lawful
union for cause arising after the marriage.[17] Our family laws do not recognize
absolute divorce between Filipino citizens.[18]
Recognizing the reality that divorce is a possibility in marriages between a
Filipino and an alien, President Corazon C. Aquino, in the exercise of her legislative
powers under the Freedom Constitution,[19] enacted Executive Order No. (EO) 227,
amending Article 26 of the Family Code to its present wording, as follows:

Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in

accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were
solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country,
except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and
38.

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is

validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad
by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino
spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.

Through the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, EO 227 effectively
incorporated into the law this Courts holding in Van Dorn v. Romillo,
Jr.[20] and Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera.[21] In both cases, the Court refused to acknowledge
the alien spouses assertion of marital rights after a foreign courts divorce decree
between the alien and the Filipino. The Court, thus, recognized that the foreign
divorce had already severed the marital bond between the spouses. The Court
reasoned in Van Dorn v. Romillo that:
 To maintain x x x that, under our laws, [the Filipino spouse] has to be
considered still married to [the alien spouse] and still subject to a
wife's obligations x x x cannot be just. [The Filipino spouse] should not
be obliged to live together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render
support to [the alien spouse]. The latter should not continue to be one of
her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She should not be
discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are to
be served.[22]

As the RTC correctly stated, the provision was included in the law to avoid
the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse
who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse. [23] The
legislative intent is for the benefit of the Filipino spouse, by clarifying his or her
marital status, settling the doubts created by the divorce decree. Essentially, the
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provided the Filipino spouse
a substantive right to have his or her marriage to the alien spouse considered
as dissolved, capacitating him or her to remarry.[24] Without the second paragraph
of Article 26 of the Family Code, the judicial recognition of the foreign decree of
divorce, whether in a proceeding instituted precisely for that purpose or as a related
issue in another proceeding, would be of no significance to the Filipino spouse since
our laws do not recognize divorce as a mode of severing the marital bond;[25] Article
17 of the Civil Code provides that the policy against absolute divorces cannot be
subverted by judgments promulgated in a foreign country. The inclusion of the
second paragraph in Article 26 of the Family Code provides the direct exception to
this rule and serves as basis for recognizing the dissolution of the marriage between
the Filipino spouse and his or her alien spouse.

Additionally, an action based on the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family

Code is not limited to the recognition of the foreign divorce decree. If the court finds
that the decree capacitated the alien spouse to remarry, the courts can declare that
the Filipino spouse is likewise capacitated to contract another marriage. No court in
this jurisdiction, however, can make a similar declaration for the alien spouse (other
than that already established by the decree), whose status and legal capacity are
generally governed by his national law.[26]
 Given the rationale and intent behind the enactment, and the purpose of the
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, the RTC was correct in limiting
the applicability of the provision for the benefit of the Filipino spouse. In other
words, only the Filipino spouse can invoke the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code; the alien spouse can claim no right under this provision.

The foreign divorce decree is presumptive

evidence of a right that clothes the party
with legal interest to petition for its
recognition in this jurisdiction

We qualify our above conclusion i.e., that the second paragraph of Article 26
of the Family Code bestows no rights in favor of aliens with the complementary
statement that this conclusion is not sufficient basis to dismiss Gerberts petition
before the RTC. In other words, the unavailability of the second paragraph of Article
26 of the Family Code to aliens does not necessarily strip Gerbert of legal interest to
petition the RTC for the recognition of his foreign divorce decree. The foreign
divorce decree itself, after its authenticity and conformity with the aliens national
law have been duly proven according to our rules of evidence, serves as a
presumptive evidence of right in favor of Gerbert, pursuant to Section 48, Rule 39
of the Rules of Court which provides for the effect of foreign judgments. This
Section states:

SEC. 48. Effect of foreign judgments or final orders.The effect of

a judgment or final order of a tribunal of a foreign country, having
jurisdiction to render the judgment or final order is as follows:

(a) In case of a judgment or final order upon a specific thing,

the judgment or final order is conclusive upon the title of the
thing; and

(b) In case of a judgment or final order against a person,

the judgment or final order is presumptive evidence of a
right as between the parties and their successors in
interest by a subsequent title.
 In either case, the judgment or final order may be repelled by
evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion,
fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.

To our mind, direct involvement or being the subject of the foreign judgment is
sufficient to clothe a party with the requisite interest to institute an action before our
courts for the recognition of the foreign judgment. In a divorce situation, we have
declared, no less, that the divorce obtained by an alien abroad may be recognized in
the Philippines, provided the divorce is valid according to his or her national law.[27]

The starting point in any recognition of a foreign divorce judgment is the

acknowledgment that our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign judgments and
laws. Justice Herrera explained that, as a rule, no sovereign is bound to give effect
within its dominion to a judgment rendered by a tribunal of another country. [28] This
means that the foreign judgment and its authenticity must be proven as facts under
our rules on evidence, together with the aliens applicable national law to show the
effect of the judgment on the alien himself or herself.[29] The recognition may be
made in an action instituted specifically for the purpose or in another action where a
party invokes the foreign decree as an integral aspect of his claim or defense.

In Gerberts case, since both the foreign divorce decree and the national law of
the alien, recognizing his or her capacity to obtain a divorce, purport to be official
acts of a sovereign authority, Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court comes into
play. This Section requires proof, either by (1) official publications or (2) copies
attested by the officer having legal custody of the documents. If the copies of official
records are not kept in the Philippines, these must be (a) accompanied by a certificate
issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service
stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by
the seal of his office.

The records show that Gerbert attached to his petition a copy of the divorce
decree, as well as the required certificates proving its authenticity,[30] but failed to
include a copy of the Canadian law on divorce.[31] Under this situation, we can, at
this point, simply dismiss the petition for insufficiency of supporting evidence,
unless we deem it more appropriate to remand the case to the RTC to determine
whether the divorce decree is consistent with the Canadian divorce law.
 We deem it more appropriate to take this latter course of action, given the
Article 26 interests that will be served and the Filipina wifes (Daisylyns) obvious
conformity with the petition. A remand, at the same time, will allow other interested
parties to oppose the foreign judgment and overcome a petitioners presumptive
evidence of a right by proving want of jurisdiction, want of notice to a party,
collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. Needless to state, every precaution
must be taken to ensure conformity with our laws before a recognition is made, as
the foreign judgment, once recognized, shall have the effect of res
judicata[32] between the parties, as provided in Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of
Court.[33]

In fact, more than the principle of comity that is served by the practice of
reciprocal recognition of foreign judgments between nations, the res judicata effect
of the foreign judgments of divorce serves as the deeper basis for extending judicial
recognition and for considering the alien spouse bound by its terms. This same
effect, as discussed above, will not obtain for the Filipino spouse were it not for the
substantive rule that the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provides.

Considerations beyond the recognition of

the foreign divorce decree
As a matter of housekeeping concern, we note that the Pasig City Civil
Registry Office has already recorded the divorce decree on Gerbert and
Daisylyns marriage certificate based on the mere presentation of the
decree.[34] We consider the recording to be legally improper; hence, the need to draw
attention of the bench and the bar to what had been done.

Article 407 of the Civil Code states that [a]cts, events and judicial decrees
concerning the civil status of persons shall be recorded in the civil register. The law
requires the entry in the civil registry of judicial decrees that produce legal
consequences touching upon a persons legal capacity and status, i.e., those affecting
all his personal qualities and relations, more or less permanent in nature, not
ordinarily terminable at his own will, such as his being legitimate or illegitimate,
or his being married or not.[35]
 A judgment of divorce is a judicial decree, although a foreign one, affecting a
persons legal capacity and status that must be recorded. In fact, Act No. 3753 or the
Law on Registry of Civil Status specifically requires the registration of divorce
decrees in the civil registry:

Sec. 1. Civil Register. A civil register is established for recording

the civil status of persons, in which shall be entered:

(a) births;
(b) deaths;
(c) marriages;
(d) annulments of marriages;
(e) divorces;
(f) legitimations;
(g) adoptions;
(h) acknowledgment of natural children;
(i) naturalization; and
(j) changes of name.

xxxx

Sec. 4. Civil Register Books. The local registrars shall keep and
preserve in their offices the following books, in which they shall,
respectively make the proper entries concerning the civil status of persons:

(1) Birth and death register;

(2) Marriage register, in which shall be entered not only the

marriages solemnized but also divorces and dissolved
marriages.

(3) Legitimation, acknowledgment, adoption, change of name and

naturalization register.

But while the law requires the entry of the divorce decree in the civil registry, the
law and the submission of the decree by themselves do not ipso facto authorize the
decreesregistration. The law should be read in relation with the requirement of a
judicial recognition of the foreign judgment before it can be given res
judicata effect. In the context of the present case, no judicial order as yet exists
recognizing the foreign divorce decree. Thus, the Pasig City Civil Registry Office
acted totally out of turn and without authority of law when it annotated the Canadian
divorce decree on Gerbert and Daisylyns marriage certificate, on the strength alone
of the foreign decree presented by Gerbert.

Evidently, the Pasig City Civil Registry Office was aware of the requirement
of a court recognition, as it cited NSO Circular No. 4, series of 1982,[36] and
Department of Justice Opinion No. 181, series of 1982[37] both of which required a
final order from a competent Philippine court before a foreign judgment, dissolving
a marriage, can be registered in the civil registry, but it, nonetheless, allowed the
registration of the decree. For being contrary to law, the registration of the foreign
divorce decree without the requisite judicial recognition is patently void and cannot
produce any legal effect.

Another point we wish to draw attention to is that the recognition that the RTC
may extend to the Canadian divorce decree does not, by itself, authorize
the cancellation of the entry in the civil registry. A petition for recognition of a
foreign judgment is not the proper proceeding, contemplated under the Rules of
Court, for the cancellation of entries in the civil registry.

Article 412 of the Civil Code declares that no entry in a civil register shall be
changed or corrected, without judicial order. The Rules of Court supplements Article
412 of the Civil Code by specifically providing for a special remedial proceeding by
which entries in the civil registry may be judicially cancelled or corrected. Rule 108
of the Rules of Court sets in detail the jurisdictional and procedural requirements
that must be complied with before a judgment, authorizing the cancellation or
correction, may be annotated in the civil registry. It also requires, among others, that
the verified petition must be filed with the RTC of the province where the
corresponding civil registry is located;[38] that the civil registrar and all persons who
have or claim any interest must be made parties to the proceedings;[39] and that the
time and place for hearing must be published in a newspaper of general
circulation.[40] As these basic jurisdictional requirements have not been met in the
present case, we cannot consider the petition Gerbert filed with the RTC as one filed
under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
We hasten to point out, however, that this ruling should not be construed as requiring
two separate proceedings for the registration of a foreign divorce decree in the civil
registry one for recognition of the foreign decree and another specifically for
cancellation of the entry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. The recognition of
the foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding itself, as the object
of special proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely
to establish the status or right of a party or a particular fact. Moreover, Rule 108 of
the Rules of Court can serve as the appropriate adversarial proceeding [41] by which
the applicability of the foreign judgment can be measured and tested in terms of
jurisdictional infirmities, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear
mistake of law or fact.

WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition for review on certiorari,

and REVERSE the October 30, 2008 decision of
the Regional Trial Court of Laoag City, Branch 11, as well as its February 17,
2009 order. We order the REMAND of the case to the trial court for further
proceedings in accordance with our ruling above. Let a copy of this Decision be
furnished the Civil Registrar General. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
Supreme Court
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

MEROPE ENRIQUEZ VDA. DE G. R. No. 183622

CATALAN,
Petitioner, Present:

CARPIO, J., Chairperson,

BRION,
PEREZ,
- versus - SERENO, and
REYES, JJ.

Promulgated:
LOUELLA A. CATALAN-LEE,
Respondent. February 8, 2012
x--------------------------------------------------x

RESOLUTION

SERENO, J.:
Before us is a Petition for Review assailing the Court of Appeals (CA)
Decision[1] and Resolution[2] regarding the issuance of letters of administration of
the intestate estate of Orlando B. Catalan.
The facts are as follows:
Orlando B. Catalan was a naturalized American citizen. After allegedly
obtaining a divorce in the United States from his first wife, Felicitas Amor, he
contracted a second marriage with petitioner herein.
On 18 November 2004, Orlando died intestate in the Philippines.
 Thereafter, on 28 February 2005, petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Dagupan City a Petition for the issuance of letters of administration for her
appointment as administratrix of the intestate estate of Orlando. The case was
docketed as Special Proceedings (Spec. Proc.) No. 228.
On 3 March 2005, while Spec. Proc. No. 228 was pending, respondent Louella
A. Catalan-Lee, one of the children of Orlando from his first marriage, filed a similar
petition with the RTC docketed as Spec. Proc. No. 232.
The two cases were subsequently consolidated.
Petitioner prayed for the dismissal of Spec. Proc. No. 232 on the ground of litis
pendentia, considering that Spec. Proc. No. 228 covering the same estate was already
pending.
On the other hand, respondent alleged that petitioner was not considered an
interested person qualified to file a petition for the issuance of letters of
administration of the estate of Orlando. In support of her contention, respondent
alleged that a criminal case for bigamy was filed against petitioner before Branch 54
of the RTC of Alaminos, Pangasinan, and docketed as Crim. Case No. 2699-A.
Apparently, Felicitas Amor filed a Complaint for bigamy, alleging that
petitioner contracted a second marriage to Orlando despite having been married to
one Eusebio Bristol on 12 December 1959.
On 6 August 1998, the RTC had acquitted petitioner of bigamy.[3] The trial
court ruled that since the deceased was a divorced American citizen, and since that
divorce was not recognized under Philippine jurisdiction, the marriage between him
and petitioner was not valid.
Furthermore, it took note of the action for declaration of nullity then pending
action with the trial court in Dagupan City filed by Felicitas Amor against the
deceased and petitioner. It considered the pending action to be a prejudicial question
in determining the guilt of petitioner for the crime of bigamy.
Finally, the trial court found that, in the first place, petitioner had never been
married to Eusebio Bristol.
On 26 June 2006, Branch 70 of the RTC of Burgos, Pangasinan dismissed the
Petition for the issuance of letters of administration filed by petitioner and granted
that of private respondent. Contrary to its findings in Crim. Case No. 2699-A, the
RTC held that the marriage between petitioner and Eusebio Bristol was valid and
subsisting when she married Orlando. Without expounding, it reasoned further that
her acquittal in the previous bigamy case was fatal to her cause. Thus, the trial court
held that petitioner was not an interested party who may file a petition for the
issuance of letters of administration.[4]
After the subsequent denial of her Motion for Reconsideration, petitioner
elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals (CA) via her Petition for Certiorari,
alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC in dismissing her Petition
for the issuance of letters of administration.
Petitioner reiterated before the CA that the Petition filed by respondent should
have been dismissed on the ground of litis pendentia. She also insisted that, while a
petition for letters of administration may have been filed by an uninterested person,
the defect was cured by the appearance of a real party-in-interest. Thus, she insisted
that, to determine who has a better right to administer the decedents properties, the
RTC should have first required the parties to present their evidence before it ruled
on the matter.
On 18 October 2007, the CA promulgated the assailed Decision. First, it held
that petitioner undertook the wrong remedy. She should have instead filed a petition
for review rather than a petition for certiorari. Nevertheless, since the Petition for
Certiorari was filed within the fifteen-day reglementary period for filing a petition
for review under Sec. 4 of Rule 43, the CA allowed the Petition and continued to
decide on the merits of the case. Thus, it ruled in this wise:
As to the issue of litis pendentia, we find it not applicable in the case.
For litis pendentia to be a ground for the dismissal of an action, there must be: (a)
identity of the parties or at least such as to represent the same interest in both
actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded
on the same acts, and (c) the identity in the two cases should be such that the
judgment which may be rendered in one would, regardless of which party is
successful, amount to res judicata in the other. A petition for letters of
administration is a special proceeding. A special proceeding is an application or
proceeding to establish the status or right of a party, or a particular fact. And, in
contrast to an ordinary civil action, a special proceeding involves no defendant or
respondent. The only party in this kind of proceeding is the petitioner of the
applicant. Considering its nature, a subsequent petition for letters of administration
can hardly be barred by a similar pending petition involving the estate of the same
decedent unless both petitions are filed by the same person. In the case at bar, the
petitioner was not a party to the petition filed by the private respondent, in the same
manner that the latter was not made a party to the petition filed by the former. The
first element of litis pendentia is wanting. The contention of the petitioner must
perforce fail.
 Moreover, to yield to the contention of the petitioner would render nugatory
the provision of the Rules requiring a petitioner for letters of administration to be
an interested party, inasmuch as any person, for that matter, regardless of whether
he has valid interest in the estate sought to be administered, could be appointed as
administrator for as long as he files his petition ahead of any other person, in
derogation of the rights of those specifically mentioned in the order of preference
in the appointment of administrator under Rule 78, Section 6 of the Revised Rules
of Court, which provides:
xxx xxx xxx
The petitioner, armed with a marriage certificate, filed her petition for letters
of administration. As a spouse, the petitioner would have been preferred to
administer the estate of Orlando B. Catalan. However, a marriage certificate, like
any other public document, is only prima facie evidence of the facts stated
therein. The fact that the petitioner had been charged with bigamy and was
acquitted has not been disputed by the petitioner. Bigamy is an illegal marriage
committed by contracting a second or subsequent marriage before the first marriage
has been dissolved or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively
dead by a judgment rendered in a proper proceedings. The deduction of the trial
court that the acquittal of the petitioner in the said case negates the validity of
her subsequent marriage with Orlando B. Catalan has not been disproved by
her. There was not even an attempt from the petitioner to deny the findings of
the trial court. There is therefore no basis for us to make a contrary finding. Thus,
not being an interested party and a stranger to the estate of Orlando B. Catalan, the
dismissal of her petition for letters of administration by the trial court is in place.
xxx xxx xxx
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DISMISSED for lack
of merit. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.[5] (Emphasis supplied)

Petitioner moved for a reconsideration of this Decision.[6] She alleged that the
reasoning of the CA was illogical in stating, on the one hand, that she was acquitted
of bigamy, while, on the other hand, still holding that her marriage with Orlando was
invalid. She insists that with her acquittal of the crime of bigamy, the marriage
enjoys the presumption of validity.
On 20 June 2008, the CA denied her motion.
Hence, this Petition.
At the outset, it seems that the RTC in the special proceedings failed to
appreciate the finding of the RTC in Crim. Case No. 2699-A that petitioner was
never married to Eusebio Bristol. Thus, the trial court concluded that, because
petitioner was acquitted of bigamy, it follows that the first marriage with Bristol still
existed and was valid. By failing to take note of the findings of fact on the
nonexistence of the marriage between petitioner and Bristol, both the RTC and CA
held that petitioner was not an interested party in the estate of Orlando.
Second, it is imperative to note that at the time the bigamy case in Crim. Case
No. 2699-A was dismissed, we had already ruled that under the principles of comity,
our jurisdiction recognizes a valid divorce obtained by a spouse of foreign
nationality. This doctrine was established as early as 1985 in Van Dorn v. Romillo,
Jr.[7] wherein we said:
It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of
the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute
divorces[,] the same being considered contrary to our concept of public policy and
morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be
recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their
national law. In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent
from the marriage from the standards of American law, under which divorce
dissolves the marriage. xxx

We reiterated this principle in Llorente v. Court of Appeals,[8] to wit:

In Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. we held that owing to the nationality principle
embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by
the policy against absolute divorces, the same being considered contrary to our
concept of public policy and morality. In the same case, the Court ruled that
aliens may obtain divorces abroad, provided they are valid according to their
national law.
Citing this landmark case, the Court held in Quita v. Court of Appeals,
that once proven that respondent was no longer a Filipino citizen when he
obtained the divorce from petitioner, the ruling in Van Dorn would become
applicable and petitioner could very well lose her right to inherit from him.
In Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera, we recognized the divorce obtained by the
respondent in his country, the Federal Republic of Germany. There, we stated that
divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines insofar as
respondent is concerned in view of the nationality principle in our civil law on
the status of persons.
For failing to apply these doctrines, the decision of the Court of Appeals
must be reversed. We hold that the divorce obtained by Lorenzo H. Llorente
from his first wife Paula was valid and recognized in this jurisdiction as a
matter of comity. xxx
 Nonetheless, the fact of divorce must still first be proven as we have
enunciated in Garcia v. Recio,[9] to wit:
Respondent is getting ahead of himself. Before a foreign judgment
is given presumptive evidentiary value, the document must first be
presented and admitted in evidence. A divorce obtained abroad is proven
by the divorce decree itself. Indeed the best evidence of a judgment is
the judgment itself. The decree purports to be a written act or record of
an act of an official body or tribunal of a foreign country.
Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other hand, a writing
or document may be proven as a public or official record of a foreign
country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested
by the officer having legal custody of the document. If the record is not
kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate
issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine
foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept
and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office.
The divorce decree between respondent and Editha Samson appears
to be an authentic one issued by an Australian family court. However,
appearance is not sufficient; compliance with the aforementioned rules
on evidence must be demonstrated.
Fortunately for respondent's cause, when the divorce decree of May
18, 1989 was submitted in evidence, counsel for petitioner objected, not
to its admissibility, but only to the fact that it had not been registered in
the Local Civil Registry of Cabanatuan City. The trial court ruled that it
was admissible, subject to petitioner's qualification. Hence, it was
admitted in evidence and accorded weight by the judge. Indeed,
petitioner's failure to object properly rendered the divorce decree
admissible as a written act of the Family Court of Sydney, Australia.
Compliance with the quoted articles (11, 13 and 52) of the Family
Code is not necessary; respondent was no longer bound by Philippine
personal laws after he acquired Australian citizenship in 1992.
Naturalization is the legal act of adopting an alien and clothing him with
the political and civil rights belonging to a citizen. Naturalized citizens,
freed from the protective cloak of their former states, don the attires of
their adoptive countries. By becoming an Australian, respondent severed
his allegiance to the Philippines and the vinculum juris that had tied him
to Philippine personal laws.
Burden of Proving Australian Law
 Respondent contends that the burden to prove Australian divorce
law falls upon petitioner, because she is the party challenging the validity
of a foreign judgment. He contends that petitioner was satisfied with the
original of the divorce decree and was cognizant of the marital laws of
Australia, because she had lived and worked in that country for quite a
long time. Besides, the Australian divorce law is allegedly known by
Philippine courts; thus, judges may take judicial notice of foreign laws in
the exercise of sound discretion.
We are not persuaded. The burden of proof lies with the party
who alleges the existence of a fact or thing necessary in the
prosecution or defense of an action. In civil cases, plaintiffs have the
burden of proving the material allegations of the complaint when
those are denied by the answer; and defendants have the burden of
proving the material allegations in their answer when they introduce
new matters. Since the divorce was a defense raised by respondent,
the burden of proving the pertinent Australian law validating it falls
squarely upon him.
It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that our courts cannot take
judicial notice of foreign laws. Like any other facts, they must be
alleged and proved. Australian marital laws are not among those
matters that judges are supposed to know by reason of their judicial
function. The power of judicial notice must be exercised with caution,
and every reasonable doubt upon the subject should be resolved in
the negative. (Emphasis supplied)

It appears that the trial court no longer required petitioner to prove the validity
of Orlandos divorce under the laws of the United States and the marriage between
petitioner and the deceased. Thus, there is a need to remand the proceedings to the
trial court for further reception of evidence to establish the fact of divorce.
Should petitioner prove the validity of the divorce and the subsequent
marriage, she has the preferential right to be issued the letters of administration over
the estate. Otherwise, letters of administration may be issued to respondent, who is
undisputedly the daughter or next of kin of the deceased, in accordance with Sec. 6
of Rule 78 of the Revised Rules of Court.
This is consistent with our ruling in San Luis v. San Luis,[10] in which we said:
Applying the above doctrine in the instant case, the divorce decree allegedly
obtained by Merry Lee which absolutely allowed Felicisimo to remarry, would
have vested Felicidad with the legal personality to file the present petition as
 Felicisimo's surviving spouse. However, the records show that there is
insufficient evidence to prove the validity of the divorce obtained by Merry
Lee as well as the marriage of respondent and Felicisimo under the laws of the
U.S.A. In Garcia v. Recio, the Court laid down the specific guidelines for pleading
and proving foreign law and divorce judgments. It held that presentation solely of
the divorce decree is insufficient and that proof of its authenticity and due execution
must be presented. Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, a writing or document
may be proven as a public or official record of a foreign country by either (1) an
official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal custody
of the document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a)
accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in
the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record
is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office.
With regard to respondent's marriage to Felicisimo allegedly solemnized in
California, U.S.A., she submitted photocopies of the Marriage Certificate and the
annotated text of the Family Law Act of California which purportedly show that
their marriage was done in accordance with the said law. As stated in Garcia,
however, the Court cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws as they must be
alleged and proved.
Therefore, this case should be remanded to the trial court for further
reception of evidence on the divorce decree obtained by Merry Lee and the
marriage of respondent and Felicisimo. (Emphasis supplied)

Thus, it is imperative for the trial court to first determine the validity of the
divorce to ascertain the rightful party to be issued the letters of administration over
the estate of Orlando B. Catalan.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is hereby PARTIALLY
GRANTED. The Decision dated 18 October 2007 and the Resolution dated 20 June
2008 of the Court of Appeals are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Let this
case be REMANDED to Branch 70 of the Regional Trial Court of Burgos,
Pangasinan for further proceedings in accordance with this Decision.
SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 196049 June 26, 2013

MINORU FUJIKI, PETITIONER,

vs.
MARIA PAZ GALELA MARINAY, SHINICHI MAEKARA, LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OF QUEZON
CITY, AND THE ADMINISTRATOR AND CIVIL REGISTRAR GENERAL OF THE NATIONAL
STATISTICS OFFICE,RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

This is a direct recourse to this Court from the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 107, Quezon City,
through a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court on a pure question of
law. The petition assails the Order1 dated 31 January 2011 of the RTC in Civil Case No. Q-11-68582
and its Resolution dated 2 March 2011 denying petitioners Motion for Reconsideration. The RTC
dismissed the petition for "Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or Decree of Absolute Nullity of
Marriage)" based on improper venue and the lack of personality of petitioner, Minoru Fujiki, to file the
petition.

The Facts

Petitioner Minoru Fujiki (Fujiki) is a Japanese national who married respondent Maria Paz Galela
Marinay (Marinay) in the Philippines2 on 23 January 2004. The marriage did not sit well with
petitioners parents. Thus, Fujiki could not bring his wife to Japan where he resides. Eventually, they
lost contact with each other.

In 2008, Marinay met another Japanese, Shinichi Maekara (Maekara). Without the first marriage
being dissolved, Marinay and Maekara were married on 15 May 2008 in Quezon City, Philippines.
Maekara brought Marinay to Japan. However, Marinay allegedly suffered physical abuse from
Maekara. She left Maekara and started to contact Fujiki.3

Fujiki and Marinay met in Japan and they were able to reestablish their relationship. In 2010, Fujiki
helped Marinay obtain a judgment from a family court in Japan which declared the marriage between
Marinay and Maekara void on the ground of bigamy.4 On 14 January 2011, Fujiki filed a petition in
the RTC entitled: "Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or Decree of Absolute Nullity of
Marriage)." Fujiki prayed that (1) the Japanese Family Court judgment be recognized; (2) that the
bigamous marriage between Marinay and Maekara be declared void ab initio under Articles 35(4)
and 41 of the Family Code of the Philippines;5 and (3) for the RTC to direct the Local Civil Registrar
of Quezon City to annotate the Japanese Family Court judgment on the Certificate of Marriage
between Marinay and Maekara and to endorse such annotation to the Office of the Administrator
and Civil Registrar General in the National Statistics Office (NSO).6
 The Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

A few days after the filing of the petition, the RTC immediately issued an Order dismissing the
petition and withdrawing the case from its active civil docket.7 The RTC cited the following provisions
of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC):

Sec. 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages.

(a) Who may file. A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely
by the husband or the wife.

xxxx

Sec. 4. Venue. The petition shall be filed in the Family Court of the province or city where the
petitioner or the respondent has been residing for at least six months prior to the date of filing, or in
the case of a non-resident respondent, where he may be found in the Philippines, at the election of
the petitioner. x x x

The RTC ruled, without further explanation, that the petition was in "gross violation" of the above
provisions. The trial court based its dismissal on Section 5(4) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC which
provides that "[f]ailure to comply with any of the preceding requirements may be a ground for
immediate dismissal of the petition."8 Apparently, the RTC took the view that only "the husband or
the wife," in this case either Maekara or Marinay, can file the petition to declare their marriage void,
and not Fujiki.

Fujiki moved that the Order be reconsidered. He argued that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC contemplated
ordinary civil actions for declaration of nullity and annulment of marriage. Thus, A.M. No. 02-11-10-
SC does not apply. A petition for recognition of foreign judgment is a special proceeding, which
"seeks to establish a status, a right or a particular fact,"9 and not a civil action which is "for the
enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong."10 In other words, the
petition in the RTC sought to establish (1) the status and concomitant rights of Fujiki and Marinay as
husband and wife and (2) the fact of the rendition of the Japanese Family Court judgment declaring
the marriage between Marinay and Maekara as void on the ground of bigamy. The petitioner
contended that the Japanese judgment was consistent with Article 35(4) of the Family Code of the
Philippines11on bigamy and was therefore entitled to recognition by Philippine courts.12

In any case, it was also Fujikis view that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applied only to void marriages under
Article 36 of the Family Code on the ground of psychological incapacity.13 Thus, Section 2(a) of A.M.
No. 02-11-10-SC provides that "a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages may be
filed solely by the husband or the wife." To apply Section 2(a) in bigamy would be absurd because
only the guilty parties would be permitted to sue. In the words of Fujiki, "[i]t is not, of course, difficult
to realize that the party interested in having a bigamous marriage declared a nullity would be the
husband in the prior, pre-existing marriage."14 Fujiki had material interest and therefore the
personality to nullify a bigamous marriage.

Fujiki argued that Rule 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry) of the Rules of
Court is applicable. Rule 108 is the "procedural implementation" of the Civil Register Law (Act No.
3753)15 in relation to Article 413 of the Civil Code.16 The Civil Register Law imposes a duty on the
"successful petitioner for divorce or annulment of marriage to send a copy of the final decree of the
court to the local registrar of the municipality where the dissolved or annulled marriage was
solemnized."17 Section 2 of Rule 108 provides that entries in the civil registry relating to "marriages,"
"judgments of annulments of marriage" and "judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning"
are subject to cancellation or correction.18 The petition in the RTC sought (among others) to annotate
the judgment of the Japanese Family Court on the certificate of marriage between Marinay and
Maekara.

Fujikis motion for reconsideration in the RTC also asserted that the trial court "gravely erred" when,
on its own, it dismissed the petition based on improper venue. Fujiki stated that the RTC may be
confusing the concept of venue with the concept of jurisdiction, because it is lack of jurisdiction
which allows a court to dismiss a case on its own. Fujiki cited Dacoycoy v. Intermediate Appellate
Court19 which held that the "trial court cannot pre-empt the defendants prerogative to object to the
improper laying of the venue by motu proprio dismissing the case."20Moreover, petitioner alleged that
the trial court should not have "immediately dismissed" the petition under Section 5 of A.M. No. 02-
11-10-SC because he substantially complied with the provision.

On 2 March 2011, the RTC resolved to deny petitioners motion for reconsideration. In its Resolution,
the RTC stated that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applies because the petitioner, in effect, prays for a
decree of absolute nullity of marriage.21 The trial court reiterated its two grounds for dismissal, i.e.
lack of personality to sue and improper venue under Sections 2(a) and 4 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.
The RTC considered Fujiki as a "third person"22 in the proceeding because he "is not the husband in
the decree of divorce issued by the Japanese Family Court, which he now seeks to be judicially
recognized, x x x."23 On the other hand, the RTC did not explain its ground of impropriety of venue. It
only said that "[a]lthough the Court cited Sec. 4 (Venue) x x x as a ground for dismissal of this case[,]
it should be taken together with the other ground cited by the Court x x x which is Sec. 2(a) x x x."24

The RTC further justified its motu proprio dismissal of the petition based on Braza v. The City Civil
Registrar of Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental.25 The Court in Braza ruled that "[i]n a special
proceeding for correction of entry under Rule 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the
Original Registry), the trial court has no jurisdiction to nullify marriages x x x."26 Braza emphasized
that the "validity of marriages as well as legitimacy and filiation can be questioned only in a direct
action seasonably filed by the proper party, and not through a collateral attack such as [a] petition
[for correction of entry] x x x."27

The RTC considered the petition as a collateral attack on the validity of marriage between Marinay
and Maekara. The trial court held that this is a "jurisdictional ground" to dismiss the
petition.28 Moreover, the verification and certification against forum shopping of the petition was not
authenticated as required under Section 529 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC. Hence, this also warranted the
"immediate dismissal" of the petition under the same provision.

The Manifestation and Motion of the Office of the Solicitor General and the Letters of Marinay
and Maekara

On 30 May 2011, the Court required respondents to file their comment on the petition for
review.30 The public respondents, the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City and the Administrator and
Civil Registrar General of the NSO, participated through the Office of the Solicitor General. Instead
of a comment, the Solicitor General filed a Manifestation and Motion.31

The Solicitor General agreed with the petition. He prayed that the RTCs "pronouncement that the
petitioner failed to comply with x x x A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC x x x be set aside" and that the case be
reinstated in the trial court for further proceedings.32 The Solicitor General argued that Fujiki, as the
spouse of the first marriage, is an injured party who can sue to declare the bigamous marriage
between Marinay and Maekara void. The Solicitor General cited Juliano-Llave v. Republic33 which
held that Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply in cases of bigamy. In Juliano-Llave,
this Court explained:

[t]he subsequent spouse may only be expected to take action if he or she had only discovered
during the connubial period that the marriage was bigamous, and especially if the conjugal bliss had
already vanished. Should parties in a subsequent marriage benefit from the bigamous marriage, it
would not be expected that they would file an action to declare the marriage void and thus, in such
circumstance, the "injured spouse" who should be given a legal remedy is the one in a subsisting
previous marriage. The latter is clearly the aggrieved party as the bigamous marriage not only
threatens the financial and the property ownership aspect of the prior marriage but most of all, it
causes an emotional burden to the prior spouse. The subsequent marriage will always be a reminder
of the infidelity of the spouse and the disregard of the prior marriage which sanctity is protected by
the Constitution.34

The Solicitor General contended that the petition to recognize the Japanese Family Court judgment
may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding.35 In Corpuz v. Santo Tomas,36 this Court held that "[t]he
recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding itself, as the object
of special proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely to establish the
status or right of a party or a particular fact."37 WhileCorpuz concerned a foreign divorce decree, in
the present case the Japanese Family Court judgment also affected the civil status of the parties,
especially Marinay, who is a Filipino citizen.

The Solicitor General asserted that Rule 108 of the Rules of Court is the procedure to record "[a]cts,
events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons" in the civil registry as required by
Article 407 of the Civil Code. In other words, "[t]he law requires the entry in the civil registry of
judicial decrees that produce legal consequences upon a persons legal capacity and status x x
x."38 The Japanese Family Court judgment directly bears on the civil status of a Filipino citizen and
should therefore be proven as a fact in a Rule 108 proceeding.

Moreover, the Solicitor General argued that there is no jurisdictional infirmity in assailing a void
marriage under Rule 108, citing De Castro v. De Castro39 and Nial v. Bayadog40 which declared that
"[t]he validity of a void marriage may be collaterally attacked."41

Marinay and Maekara individually sent letters to the Court to comply with the directive for them to
comment on the petition.42 Maekara wrote that Marinay concealed from him the fact that she was
previously married to Fujiki.43Maekara also denied that he inflicted any form of violence on
Marinay.44 On the other hand, Marinay wrote that she had no reason to oppose the petition.45 She
would like to maintain her silence for fear that anything she say might cause misunderstanding
between her and Fujiki.46

The Issues

Petitioner raises the following legal issues:

(1) Whether the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of
Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) is applicable.

(2) Whether a husband or wife of a prior marriage can file a petition to recognize a foreign
judgment nullifying the subsequent marriage between his or her spouse and a foreign citizen
on the ground of bigamy.
 (3) Whether the Regional Trial Court can recognize the foreign judgment in a proceeding for
cancellation or correction of entries in the Civil Registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court.

The Ruling of the Court

We grant the petition.

The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages
(A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) does not apply in a petition to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the
status of a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country. Moreover, in Juliano-
Llave v. Republic,47 this Court held that the rule in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC that only the husband or
wife can file a declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage "does not apply if the reason behind the
petition is bigamy."48

I.

For Philippine courts to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage where one
of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country, the petitioner only needs to prove the foreign judgment
as a fact under the Rules of Court. To be more specific, a copy of the foreign judgment may be
admitted in evidence and proven as a fact under Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule
39, Section 48(b) of the Rules of Court.49 Petitioner may prove the Japanese Family Court judgment
through (1) an official publication or (2) a certification or copy attested by the officer who has custody
of the judgment. If the office which has custody is in a foreign country such as Japan, the
certification may be made by the proper diplomatic or consular officer of the Philippine foreign
service in Japan and authenticated by the seal of office.50

To hold that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applies to a petition for recognition of foreign judgment would
mean that the trial court and the parties should follow its provisions, including the form and contents
of the petition,51 the service of summons,52 the investigation of the public prosecutor,53 the setting of
pre-trial,54 the trial55 and the judgment of the trial court.56 This is absurd because it will litigate the
case anew. It will defeat the purpose of recognizing foreign judgments, which is "to limit repetitive
litigation on claims and issues."57 The interpretation of the RTC is tantamount to relitigating the case
on the merits. In Mijares v. Raada,58 this Court explained that "[i]f every judgment of a foreign court
were reviewable on the merits, the plaintiff would be forced back on his/her original cause of action,
rendering immaterial the previously concluded litigation."59

A foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage affects the civil status, condition and legal
capacity of its parties. However, the effect of a foreign judgment is not automatic. To extend the
effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines, Philippine courts must determine if the foreign
judgment is consistent with domestic public policy and other mandatory laws.60 Article 15 of the Civil
Code provides that "[l]aws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal
capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad." This is
the rule of lex nationalii in private international law. Thus, the Philippine State may require, for
effectivity in the Philippines, recognition by Philippine courts of a foreign judgment affecting its
citizen, over whom it exercises personal jurisdiction relating to the status, condition and legal
capacity of such citizen.

A petition to recognize a foreign judgment declaring a marriage void does not require relitigation
under a Philippine court of the case as if it were a new petition for declaration of nullity of marriage.
Philippine courts cannot presume to know the foreign laws under which the foreign judgment was
rendered. They cannot substitute their judgment on the status, condition and legal capacity of the
foreign citizen who is under the jurisdiction of another state. Thus, Philippine courts can only
recognize the foreign judgment as a fact according to the rules of evidence.

Section 48(b), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides that a foreign judgment or final order against a
person creates a "presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and their successors in
interest by a subsequent title." Moreover, Section 48 of the Rules of Court states that "the judgment
or final order may be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party,
collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact." Thus, Philippine courts exercise limited review on
foreign judgments. Courts are not allowed to delve into the merits of a foreign judgment. Once a
foreign judgment is admitted and proven in a Philippine court, it can only be repelled on grounds
external to its merits, i.e. , "want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear
mistake of law or fact." The rule on limited review embodies the policy of efficiency and the
protection of party expectations,61 as well as respecting the jurisdiction of other states.62

Since 1922 in Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee,63 Philippine courts have recognized foreign divorce
decrees between a Filipino and a foreign citizen if they are successfully proven under the rules of
evidence.64 Divorce involves the dissolution of a marriage, but the recognition of a foreign divorce
decree does not involve the extended procedure under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC or the rules of
ordinary trial. While the Philippines does not have a divorce law, Philippine courts may, however,
recognize a foreign divorce decree under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, to
capacitate a Filipino citizen to remarry when his or her foreign spouse obtained a divorce decree
abroad.65

There is therefore no reason to disallow Fujiki to simply prove as a fact the Japanese Family Court
judgment nullifying the marriage between Marinay and Maekara on the ground of bigamy. While the
Philippines has no divorce law, the Japanese Family Court judgment is fully consistent with
Philippine public policy, as bigamous marriages are declared void from the beginning under Article
35(4) of the Family Code. Bigamy is a crime under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. Thus,
Fujiki can prove the existence of the Japanese Family Court judgment in accordance with Rule 132,
Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules of Court.

II.

Since the recognition of a foreign judgment only requires proof of fact of the judgment, it may be
made in a special proceeding for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry under Rule
108 of the Rules of Court. Rule 1, Section 3 of the Rules of Court provides that "[a] special
proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact."
Rule 108 creates a remedy to rectify facts of a persons life which are recorded by the State
pursuant to the Civil Register Law or Act No. 3753. These are facts of public consequence such as
birth, death or marriage,66 which the State has an interest in recording. As noted by the Solicitor
General, in Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas this Court declared that "[t]he recognition of the foreign divorce
decree may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding itself, as the object of special proceedings (such as
that in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely to establish the status or right of a party or a
particular fact."67

Rule 108, Section 1 of the Rules of Court states:

Sec. 1. Who may file petition. Any person interested in any act, event, order or
decree concerning the civil status of persons which has been recorded in the civil
register, may file a verified petition for the cancellation or correction of any entry relating thereto,
with the Regional Trial Court of the province where the corresponding civil registry is located.
(Emphasis supplied)
Fujiki has the personality to file a petition to recognize the Japanese Family Court judgment nullifying
the marriage between Marinay and Maekara on the ground of bigamy because the judgment
concerns his civil status as married to Marinay. For the same reason he has the personality to file a
petition under Rule 108 to cancel the entry of marriage between Marinay and Maekara in the civil
registry on the basis of the decree of the Japanese Family Court.

There is no doubt that the prior spouse has a personal and material interest in maintaining the
integrity of the marriage he contracted and the property relations arising from it. There is also no
doubt that he is interested in the cancellation of an entry of a bigamous marriage in the civil registry,
which compromises the public record of his marriage. The interest derives from the substantive right
of the spouse not only to preserve (or dissolve, in limited instances68) his most intimate human
relation, but also to protect his property interests that arise by operation of law the moment he
contracts marriage.69 These property interests in marriage include the right to be supported "in
keeping with the financial capacity of the family"70 and preserving the property regime of the
marriage.71

Property rights are already substantive rights protected by the Constitution,72 but a spouses right in
a marriage extends further to relational rights recognized under Title III ("Rights and Obligations
between Husband and Wife") of the Family Code.73 A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC cannot "diminish,
increase, or modify" the substantive right of the spouse to maintain the integrity of his marriage.74 In
any case, Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC preserves this substantive right by limiting the
personality to sue to the husband or the wife of the union recognized by law.

Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not preclude a spouse of a subsisting marriage to
question the validity of a subsequent marriage on the ground of bigamy. On the contrary, when
Section 2(a) states that "[a] petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be
filed solely by the husband or the wife"75it refers to the husband or the wife of the subsisting
marriage. Under Article 35(4) of the Family Code, bigamous marriages are void from the beginning.
Thus, the parties in a bigamous marriage are neither the husband nor the wife under the law. The
husband or the wife of the prior subsisting marriage is the one who has the personality to file a
petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage under Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-
SC.

Article 35(4) of the Family Code, which declares bigamous marriages void from the beginning, is the
civil aspect of Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code,76 which penalizes bigamy. Bigamy is a public
crime. Thus, anyone can initiate prosecution for bigamy because any citizen has an interest in the
prosecution and prevention of crimes.77If anyone can file a criminal action which leads to the
declaration of nullity of a bigamous marriage,78 there is more reason to confer personality to sue on
the husband or the wife of a subsisting marriage. The prior spouse does not only share in the public
interest of prosecuting and preventing crimes, he is also personally interested in the purely civil
aspect of protecting his marriage.

When the right of the spouse to protect his marriage is violated, the spouse is clearly an injured party
and is therefore interested in the judgment of the suit.79 Juliano-Llave ruled that the prior spouse "is
clearly the aggrieved party as the bigamous marriage not only threatens the financial and the
property ownership aspect of the prior marriage but most of all, it causes an emotional burden to the
prior spouse."80 Being a real party in interest, the prior spouse is entitled to sue in order to declare a
bigamous marriage void. For this purpose, he can petition a court to recognize a foreign judgment
nullifying the bigamous marriage and judicially declare as a fact that such judgment is effective in the
Philippines. Once established, there should be no more impediment to cancel the entry of the
bigamous marriage in the civil registry.
 III.

In Braza v. The City Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental, this Court held that a
"trial court has no jurisdiction to nullify marriages" in a special proceeding for cancellation or
correction of entry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.81 Thus, the "validity of marriage[] x x x can
be questioned only in a direct action" to nullify the marriage.82 The RTC relied on Braza in dismissing
the petition for recognition of foreign judgment as a collateral attack on the marriage between
Marinay and Maekara.

Braza is not applicable because Braza does not involve a recognition of a foreign judgment nullifying
a bigamous marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of the foreign country.

To be sure, a petition for correction or cancellation of an entry in the civil registry cannot substitute
for an action to invalidate a marriage. A direct action is necessary to prevent circumvention of the
substantive and procedural safeguards of marriage under the Family Code, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
and other related laws. Among these safeguards are the requirement of proving the limited grounds
for the dissolution of marriage,83 support pendente lite of the spouses and children,84 the liquidation,
partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses,85 and the investigation of the public
prosecutor to determine collusion.86 A direct action for declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage
is also necessary to prevent circumvention of the jurisdiction of the Family Courts under the Family
Courts Act of 1997 (Republic Act No. 8369), as a petition for cancellation or correction of entries in
the civil registry may be filed in the Regional Trial Court "where the corresponding civil registry is
located."87 In other words, a Filipino citizen cannot dissolve his marriage by the mere expedient of
changing his entry of marriage in the civil registry.

However, this does not apply in a petition for correction or cancellation of a civil registry entry based
on the recognition of a foreign judgment annulling a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of
the foreign country. There is neither circumvention of the substantive and procedural safeguards of
marriage under Philippine law, nor of the jurisdiction of Family Courts under R.A. No. 8369. A
recognition of a foreign judgment is not an action to nullify a marriage. It is an action for Philippine
courts to recognize the effectivity of a foreign judgment, which presupposes a case which was
already tried and decided under foreign law. The procedure in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not
apply in a petition to recognize a foreign judgment annulling a bigamous marriage where one of the
parties is a citizen of the foreign country. Neither can R.A. No. 8369 define the jurisdiction of the
foreign court.

Article 26 of the Family Code confers jurisdiction on Philippine courts to extend the effect of a foreign
divorce decree to a Filipino spouse without undergoing trial to determine the validity of the
dissolution of the marriage. The second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provides that
"[w]here a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino
spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law." InRepublic v. Orbecido,88 this Court
recognized the legislative intent of the second paragraph of Article 26 which is "to avoid the absurd
situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a
divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse"89 under the laws of his or her country. The
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code only authorizes Philippine courts to adopt the
effects of a foreign divorce decree precisely because the Philippines does not allow divorce.
Philippine courts cannot try the case on the merits because it is tantamount to trying a case for
divorce.

The second paragraph of Article 26 is only a corrective measure to address the anomaly that results
from a marriage between a Filipino, whose laws do not allow divorce, and a foreign citizen, whose
laws allow divorce. The anomaly consists in the Filipino spouse being tied to the marriage while the
foreign spouse is free to marry under the laws of his or her country. The correction is made by
extending in the Philippines the effect of the foreign divorce decree, which is already effective in the
country where it was rendered. The second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code is based on
this Courts decision in Van Dorn v. Romillo90 which declared that the Filipino spouse "should not be
discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be served."91

The principle in Article 26 of the Family Code applies in a marriage between a Filipino and a foreign
citizen who obtains a foreign judgment nullifying the marriage on the ground of bigamy. The Filipino
spouse may file a petition abroad to declare the marriage void on the ground of bigamy. The
principle in the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code applies because the foreign
spouse, after the foreign judgment nullifying the marriage, is capacitated to remarry under the laws
of his or her country. If the foreign judgment is not recognized in the Philippines, the Filipino spouse
will be discriminatedthe foreign spouse can remarry while the Filipino spouse cannot remarry.

Under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, Philippine courts are empowered to
correct a situation where the Filipino spouse is still tied to the marriage while the foreign spouse is
free to marry. Moreover, notwithstanding Article 26 of the Family Code, Philippine courts already
have jurisdiction to extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines to the extent that the
foreign judgment does not contravene domestic public policy. A critical difference between the case
of a foreign divorce decree and a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is that bigamy, as
a ground for the nullity of marriage, is fully consistent with Philippine public policy as expressed in
Article 35(4) of the Family Code and Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. The Filipino spouse has
the option to undergo full trial by filing a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage under A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC, but this is not the only remedy available to him or her. Philippine courts have
jurisdiction to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage, without prejudice to a
criminal prosecution for bigamy.

In the recognition of foreign judgments, Philippine courts are incompetent to substitute their
judgment on how a case was decided under foreign law. They cannot decide on the "family rights
and duties, or on the status, condition and legal capacity" of the foreign citizen who is a party to the
foreign judgment. Thus, Philippine courts are limited to the question of whether to extend the effect
of a foreign judgment in the Philippines. In a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage
involving a citizen of a foreign country, Philippine courts only decide whether to extend its effect to
the Filipino party, under the rule of lex nationalii expressed in Article 15 of the Civil Code.

For this purpose, Philippine courts will only determine (1) whether the foreign judgment is
inconsistent with an overriding public policy in the Philippines; and (2) whether any alleging party is
able to prove an extrinsic ground to repel the foreign judgment, i.e. want of jurisdiction, want of
notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. If there is neither inconsistency
with public policy nor adequate proof to repel the judgment, Philippine courts should, by default,
recognize the foreign judgment as part of the comity of nations. Section 48(b), Rule 39 of the Rules
of Court states that the foreign judgment is already "presumptive evidence of a right between the
parties." Upon recognition of the foreign judgment, this right becomes conclusive and the judgment
serves as the basis for the correction or cancellation of entry in the civil registry. The recognition of
the foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is a subsequent event that establishes a new
status, right and fact92 that needs to be reflected in the civil registry. Otherwise, there will be an
inconsistency between the recognition of the effectivity of the foreign judgment and the public
records in the Philippines.1wphi1

However, the recognition of a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is without prejudice to
prosecution for bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code.93 The recognition of a foreign
judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is not a ground for extinction of criminal liability under
Articles 89 and 94 of the Revised Penal Code. Moreover, under Article 91 of the Revised Penal
Code, "[t]he term of prescription [of the crime of bigamy] shall not run when the offender is absent
from the Philippine archipelago."

Since A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is inapplicable, the Court no longer sees the need to address the
questions on venue and the contents and form of the petition under Sections 4 and 5, respectively,
of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.

WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. The Order dated 31 January 2011 and the Resolution dated
2 March 2011 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 107, Quezon City, in Civil Case No. Q-11-68582
are REVERSED andSET ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court is ORDERED to REINSTATE the petition
for further proceedings in accordance with this Decision.

SO ORDERED.