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NUNEZ VS.

SANDIGANBAYAN

Equal Protection Creation of the Sandiganbayan

Nuez assails the validity of the PD 1486 creating the Sandiganbayan as amended by PD 1606. He was
accused before the Sandiganbayan of estafa through falsification of public and commercial documents
committed in connivance with his other co-accused, all public officials, in several cases. It is the claim of
Nuez that PD1486, as amended, is violative of the due process, equal protection, and ex post facto
clauses of the Constitution. He claims that the Sandiganbayan proceedings violates Nuezs right to
equal protection, because appeal as a matter of right became minimized into a mere matter of
discretion; appeal likewise was shrunk and limited only to questions of law, excluding a review of the
facts and trial evidence; and there is only one chance to appeal conviction, by certiorari to the SC,
instead of the traditional two chances; while all other estafa indictees are entitled to appeal as a matter
of right covering both law and facts and to two appellate courts, i.e., first to the CA and thereafter to the
SC.

ISSUE: Whether or not the creation of Sandiganbayan violates equal protection insofar as appeals would
be concerned.

HELD: The SC ruled against Nuez. The 1973 Constitution had provided for the creation of a special court
that shall have original jurisdiction over cases involving public officials charged with graft and
corruption. The constitution specifically makes mention of the creation of a special court, the
Sandiganbayan, precisely in response to a problem, the urgency of which cannot be denied, namely,
dishonesty in the public service. It follows that those who may thereafter be tried by such court ought to
have been aware as far back as January 17, 1973, when the present Constitution came into force, that a
different procedure for the accused therein, whether a private citizen as petitioner is or a public official,
is not necessarily offensive to the equal protection clause of the Constitution. Further, the classification
therein set forth met the standard requiring that it must be based on substantial distinctions which
make real differences; it must be germane to the purposes of the law; it must not be limited to existing
conditions only, and must apply equally to each member of the class. Further still, decisions in the
Sandiganbayan are reached by a unanimous decision from 3 justices a showing that decisions therein
are more conceivably carefully reached than other trial courts.

Garcia v. Mojica

Posted on October 3, 2012

G.R. No. 139043

September 10, 1999


Facts:

On May 7, 1998, petitioner, in his capacity as Cebu City mayor, signed a contract with F.E. Zuellig for the
supply of asphalt to the city. The contract covers the period 1998-2001, which was to commence on
September 1998 upon F.E. Zuelligs first delivery. Sometime in March 1999, news reports came out
regarding the alleged anomalous purchase of asphalt by Cebu City, through the contract signed by
petitioner. This prompted the Office of the Ombudsman (Visayas) to conduct an inquiry into the matter.

Respondent Jesus Rodrigo T. Tagaan, special prosecution officer of the Office of the Ombudsman, was
assigned to conduct the inquiry, docketed as INQ-VIS-99-0132. After investigation, he recommended
that the said inquiry be upgraded to criminal and administrative cases against petitioner and the other
city officials involved. Respondent Arturo C. Mojica, Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas, approved this
recommendation

Issues:

1. Whether Garcia may be held administratively liable.

2. Whether the Ombudsman was stripped of its powers by virtue of the Local Government Code.

Held:

1. No. As previously held, a reelected local official may not be held administratively accountable for
misconduct committed during his prior term of office. The rationale is that when the electorate put him
back into office, it is presumed that it did so with full knowledge of his life and character, including his
past misconduct. If, armed with such knowledge, it still reelects him, then such is considered a
condonation of his past misdeeds.

However, in the present case, respondents point out that the contract entered into by petitioner with
F.E. Zuellig was signed just 4 days before the date of the elections. It was not made an issue during the
election, and so the electorate could not be said to have voted for petitioner with knowledge of this
particular aspect of his life and character.

Petitioner can no longer be held administratively liable for an act done during his previous term. The
agreement between petitioner and F.E. Zuellig was perfected on the date the contract was signed,
during petitioners prior term. At that moment, petitioner already acceded to the terms of the contract,
including stipulations now alleged to be prejudicial to the city government. Thus, any culpability
petitioner may have in signing the contract already became extant on the day the contract was signed. It
hardly matters that the deliveries under the contract are supposed to have been made months later.

While petitioner can no longer be held administratively liable for signing the contract with F. E. Zuellig,
this should not prejudice the filing of any case, other than administrative, against petitioner. The ruling
does not mean the total exoneration of petitioners wrongdoing, if any, that might have been
committed in signing the subject contract. The ruling is now limited to the question of his administrative
liability therefore, and it is our considered view that he may not.

2. No. There is nothing in the LGC to indicate that it has repealed, whether expressly or impliedly, the
pertinent provisions of the Ombudsman Act. The two statutes on the specific matter in question are not
so inconsistent, let alone irreconcilable, as to compel us to only uphold one and strike down the other.
The decision of the Ombudsman (6 month suspension) will prevail over the LGC (60day suspension) if
the evidence of guilt is strong. The power to preventively suspend is available not only to the
Ombudsman but also to the Deputy Ombudsman.

SANTIAGO VS SANDIGANBAYAN

356 SCRA 636 Political Law The Legislative Department Suspension of a Member of Congress
Violations of RA 3019

In October 1988, Miriam Defensor Santiago, who was the then Commissioner of the Commission of
Immigration and Deportation (CID), approved the application for legalization of the stay of about 32
aliens. Her act was said to be illegal and was tainted with bad faith and it ran counter against Republic
Act No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act). The legalization of such is also a violation of
Executive Order No. 324 which prohibits the legalization of disqualified aliens. The aliens legalized by
Santiago were allegedly known by her to be disqualified. Two other criminal cases were filed against
Santiago. Pursuant to this information, Francis Garchitorena, a presiding Justice of the Sandiganbayan,
issued a warrant of arrest against Santiago. Santiago petitioned for provisional liberty since she was just
recovering from a car accident which was approved. In 1995, a motion was filed with the Sandiganbayan
for the suspension of Santiago, who was already a senator by then. The Sandiganbayan ordered the
Senate President (Maceda) to suspend Santiago from office for 90 days.

ISSUE: Whether or not Sandiganbayan can order suspension of a member of the Senate without
violating the Constitution.

HELD: Yes. it is true that the Constitution provides that each house may determine the rules of its
proceedings, punish its Members for disorderly behavior, and, with the concurrence of two-thirds of all
its Members, suspend or expel a Member. A penalty of suspension, when imposed, shall not exceed
sixty days.

But on the other hand, Section 13 of RA 3019 provides:


Suspension and loss of benefits. any incumbent public officer against whom any criminal prosecution
under a valid information under this Act or under Title 7, Book II of the Revised Penal Code or for any
offense involving fraud upon government or public funds or property whether as a simple or as a
complex offense and in whatever stage of execution and mode of participation, is pending in court, shall
be suspended from office. Should he be convicted by final judgment, he shall lose all retirement or
gratuity benefits under any law, but if he is acquitted, he shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the
salaries and benefits which he failed to receive during suspension, unless in the meantime
administrative proceedings have been filed against him.

In here, the order of suspension prescribed by RA. 3019 is distinct from the power of Congress to
discipline its own ranks under the Constitution. The suspension contemplated in the above
constitutional provision is a punitive measure that is imposed upon determination by the Senate or the
Lower House, as the case may be, upon an erring member. This is quite distinct from the suspension
spoken of in Section 13 of RA 3019, which is not a penalty but a preliminary, preventive measure,
prescinding from the fact that the latter is not being imposed on petitioner for misbehavior as a
Member of the Senate.

Republic Act No. 3019 does not exclude from its coverage the members of Congress and that, therefore,
the Sandiganbayan did not err in thus decreeing the assailed preventive suspension order.

But Santiago committed the said act when she was still the CID commissioner, can she still be suspended
as a senator?

Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019 does not state that the public officer concerned must be suspended
only in the office where he is alleged to have committed the acts with which he has been charged. Thus,
it has been held that the use of the word office would indicate that it applies to any office which the
officer charged may be holding, and not only the particular office under which he stands accused.

Santiago has not yet been convicted of the alleged crime, can she still be suspended?

The law does not require that the guilt of the accused must be established in a pre-suspension
proceeding before trial on the merits proceeds. Neither does it contemplate a proceeding to determine
(1) the strength of the evidence of culpability against him, (2) the gravity of the offense charged, or (3)
whether or not his continuance in office could influence the witnesses or pose a threat to the safety and
integrity of the records another evidence before the court could have a valid basis in decreeing
preventive suspension pending the trial of the case. All it secures to the accused is adequate
opportunity to challenge the validity or regularity of the proceedings against him, such as, that he has
not been afforded the right to due preliminary investigation, that the acts imputed to him do not
constitute a specific crime warranting his mandatory suspension from office under Section 13 of
Republic Act No. 3019, or that the information is subject to quashal on any of the grounds set out in
Section 3, Rule 117, of the Revised Rules on Criminal procedure.

CASE DIGEST

ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO, JR. vs. THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

G.R. No. 160261. November 10, 2003.

FACTS:

On July 22, 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution, sponsored by Representative Felix
William D. Fuentebella, which directed the Committee on Justice "to conduct an investigation, in aid of
legislation, on the manner of disbursements and expenditures by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court
of the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF)." On June 2, 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an
impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. and seven Associate Justices of this
Court for "culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of the public trust and other high crimes." The
complaint was endorsed by Representatives Rolex T. Suplico, Ronaldo B. Zamora and Didagen Piang
Dilangalen, and was referred to the House Committee. The House Committee on Justice ruled on
October 13, 2003 that the first impeachment complaint was "sufficient in form," but voted to dismiss
the same on October 22, 2003 for being insufficient in substance. To date, the Committee Report to this
effect has not yet been sent to the House in plenary in accordance with the said Section 3(2) of Article XI
of the Constitution. Four months and three weeks since the filing on June 2, 2003 of the first complaint
or on October 23, 2003, a day after the House Committee on Justice voted to dismiss it, the second
impeachment complaint was filed with the Secretary General of the House by Representatives Gilberto
C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William B. Fuentebella against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., founded on
the alleged results of the legislative inquiry initiated by above-mentioned House Resolution. This second
impeachment complaint was accompanied by a "Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment" signed by
at least one-third (1/3) of all the Members of the House of Representatives.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the filing of the second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G.
Davide, Jr. with the House of Representatives falls within the one year bar provided in the Constitution.

2. Whether the resolution thereof is a political question has resulted in a political crisis.
HELD:

1. Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing of the impeachment complaint and
referral to the House Committee on Justice, the initial action taken thereon, the meaning of Section 3 (5)
of Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated in the foregoing
manner, another may not be filed against the same official within a one year period following Article XI,
Section 3(5) of the Constitution. In fine, considering that the first impeachment complaint, was filed by
former President Estrada against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., along with seven associate justices
of this Court, on June 2, 2003 and referred to the House Committee on Justice on August 5, 2003, the
second impeachment complaint filed by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William
Fuentebella against the Chief Justice on October 23, 2003 violates the constitutional prohibition against
the initiation of impeachment proceedings against the same impeachable officer within a one-year
period.

2.From the foregoing record of the proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, it is clear that
judicial power is not only a power; it is also a duty, a duty which cannot be abdicated by the mere
specter of this creature called the political question doctrine. Chief Justice Concepcion hastened to
clarify, however, that Section 1, Article VIII was not intended to do away with "truly political questions."
From this clarification it is gathered that there are two species of political questions: (1) "truly political
questions" and (2) those which "are not truly political questions." Truly political questions are thus
beyond judicial review, the reason for respect of the doctrine of separation of powers to be maintained.
On the other hand, by virtue of Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution, courts can review questions
which are not truly political in nature.

es But to the Government (Cocofed vs Rep, 2012)

GR 177857-58 Cocofed vs Republic

Cocofed vs Republic

Case Digest GR 177857-58 Jan 24 2012

Full Text

Facts:
In 1971, RA 6260 created the Coconut Investment Company (CIC) to administer the Coconut Investment
Fund, a fund to be sourced from levy on the sale of copra. The copra seller was, or ought to be, issued
COCOFUND receipts. The fund was placed at the disposition of COCOFED, the national association of
coconut producers having the largest membership.

When martial law started in 1972, several presidential decrees were issued to improve the coconut
industry through the collection and use of the coconut levy fund:

PD 276 established the Coconut Consumers Stabilization Fund (CCSF) and declared the proceeds of the
CCSF levy as trust fund, to be utilized to subsidize the sale of coconut-based products, thus stabilizing
the price of edible oil.

PD 582 created the Coconut Industry Development Fund (CIDF) to finance the operation of a hybrid
coconut seed farm.

In 1973, PD 232 created the Philippine Coconut Authority (PCA) to accelerate the growth and
development of the coconut and palm oil industry.

Then came P.D. No. 755 in July 1975, providing under its Section 1 the policy to provide readily available
credit facilities to the coconut farmers at preferential rates. Towards achieving this, Section 2 of PD 755
authorized PCA to utilize the CCSF and the CIDF collections to acquire a commercial bank and deposit
the CCSF levy collections in said bank, interest free, the deposit withdrawable only when the bank has
attained a certain level of sufficiency in its equity capital. It also decreed that all levies PCA is authorized
to collect shall not be considered as special and/or fiduciary funds or form part of the general funds of
the government.

Both P.D. Nos. 961 and 1468 also provide that the CCSF shall not be construed by any law as a special
and/or trust fund, the stated intention being that actual ownership of the said fund shall pertain to
coconut farmers in their private capacities.

Shortly before the issuance of PD 755 however, PCA had already bought from Peping Cojuangco 72.2%
of the outstanding capital stock of FUB / UCPB. In that contract, it was also stipulated that Danding
Cojuanco shall receive equity in FUB amounting to 10%, or 7.22 % of the 72.2%, as consideration for
PCAs buy-out of what Danding Conjuanco claim as his exclusive and personal option to buy the FUB
shares.
The PCA appropriated, out of its own fund, an amount for the purchase of the said 72.2% equity. It later
reimbursed itself from the coconut levy fund.

While the 64.98% (72.2 % 7.22%) portion of the option shares ostensibly pertained to the farmers, the
corresponding stock certificates supposedly representing the farmers equity were in the name of and
delivered to PCA. There were, however, shares forming part of the 64.98% portion, which ended up in
the hands of non-farmers. The remaining 27.8% of the FUB capital stock were not covered by any of the
agreements.

Through the years, a part of the coconut levy funds went directly or indirectly to various projects and/or
was converted into different assets or investments. Of particular relevance to this was their use to
acquire the FUB / UCPB, and the acquisition by UCPB, through the CIIF and holding companies, of a large
block of San Miguel Corporation (SMC) shares.

Issue 1: W/N the mandate provided under PD 755, 961 and 1468 that the CCSF shall not be construed by
any law as a special and/or trust fund is valid

No. The coconut levy funds can only be used for the special purpose and the balance thereof should
revert back to the general fund.

Article VI, Section 29 (3) of the Constitution provides that all money collected on any tax levied for a
special purpose shall be treated as a special fund and paid out for such purpose only, and if the purpose
for which a special fund was created has been fulfilled or abandoned, the balance, if any, shall be
transferred to the general funds of the Government. Here, the CCSF were sourced from forced exactions
with the end-goal of developing the entire coconut industry. Therefore, the subsequent reclassification
of the CCSF as a private fund to be owned by private individuals in their private capacities under P.D.
Nos. 755, 961 and 1468 is unconstitutional.

Not only is it unconstitutional, but the mandate is contrary to the purpose or policy for which the coco
levy fund was created.

Issue 2:

W/N the coco levy fund may be owned by the coconut farmers in their private capacities
No. The coconut levy funds are in the nature of taxes and can only be used for public purpose. They
cannot be used to purchase shares of stocks to be given for free to private individuals. Even if the money
is allocated for a special purpose and raised by special means, it is still public in character.

Accordingly, the presidential issuances which authorized the PCA to distribute, for free, the shares of
stock of the bank it acquired to the coconut farmers under such rules and regulations the PCA may
promulgate is unconstitutional.

It is unconstitutional because first, it have unduly delegated legislative power to the PCA, and second, it
allowed the use of the CCSF to benefit directly private interest by the outright and unconditional grant
of absolute ownership of the FUB/UCPB shares paid for by PCA entirely with the CCSF to the undefined
coconut farmers, which negated or circumvented the national policy or public purpose declared by
P.D. No. 755.

Hence, the so-called Farmers shares do not belong to the coconut farmers in their private capacities,
but to the Government. The coconut levy funds are special public funds and any property purchased by
means of the coconut levy funds should likewise be treated as public funds or public property, subject to
burdens and restrictions attached by law to such property. ##

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