Section 2, par. (d), of PD No.
532, defines piracy as "any attack upon or seizure of any To sustain the defense and convert this case of piracy into one of grave coercion would
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 118075. September 5, 1997]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. EMILIANO CATANTAN y
TAYONG, accused-appellant.
DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J.:
EMILIANO CATANTAN and JOSE MACVEN URSAL alias "Bimbo" were charged with
violation of PD No. 532 otherwise known as the Anti-Piracy and Highway Robbery Law of
1974 for having on 27 June 1993, while armed with a firearm and a bladed weapon, acting in
conspiracy with one another, by means of violence and intimidation, wilfully and feloniously
attacked, assaulted and inflicted physical injuries on Eugene Pilapil and Juan Pilapil Jr. who
were then fishing in the seawaters of Tabogon, Cebu, and seized their fishing boat, to their
damage and prejudice. [1]
The Regional Trial Court of Cebu, after trial, found both accused Emiliano Catantan y
Tayong and Jose Macven Ursal alias "Bimbo" guilty of the crime charged and sentenced them
to reclusion perpetua. [2] Of the duo only Emiliano Catantan appealed.
In his appeal, accused Catantan contends that the trial court erred in convicting him of
piracy as the facts proved only constitute grave coercion defined in Art. 286 of the Revised
Penal Code and not piracy under PD No. 532.
The evidence for the prosecution is that at 3:00 o'clock in the morning of 27 June 1993,
the Pilapil brothers Eugene, 21, and Juan Jr., 18, were fishing in the sea some 3 kilometers
away from the shores of Tabogon, Cebu. Suddenly, another boat caught up with them. One of
them, later identified as the accused Emiliano Catantan, boarded the pumpboat of the Pilapils
and leveled his gun at Eugene. With his gun, Catantan struck Eugene on the left cheekbone and
ordered him and Juan Jr. to "dapa." [3] Then Catantan told Ursal to follow him to the pumpboat of
the Pilapils. There they hogtied Eugene, forced him to lie down at the bottom of the boat,
covered him with a tarpaulin up to his neck, stepped on him and ordered Juan Jr. to ferry them
to Daan Tabogon. They left behind the other pumpboat which the accused had earlier used
together with its passengers one of whom was visibly tied.
Noting that they were already far out into the sea, Eugene reminded Catantan that they
were now off-course but Catantan told Eugene to keep quiet or he would be killed. Later, the
engine conked out and Juan Jr. was directed to row the boat.Eugene asked to be set free so he
could help but was not allowed; he was threatened with bodily harm instead.
Meanwhile Juan Jr. managed to fix the engine, but as they went farther out into the
open sea the engine stalled again. This time Eugene was allowed to assist his
brother. Eugene's hands were set free but his legs were tied to the outrigger. At the point of
a tres cantos [4] held by Ursal, Eugene helped row the boat.
As they passed the shoreline of Nipa, they saw another boat. Catantan asked whose
boat that was and the Pilapils told him that it was operated by a certain Juanito and that its
engine was new. Upon learning this, Catantan ordered the Pilapil brothers to approach the boat
cautioning them however not to move or say anything.
On the pretext that they were buying fish Catantan boarded the "new" pumpboat. Once
aboard he ordered the operator Juanito to take them to Mungaz, another town of Cebu. When
Juanito tried to beg-off by saying that he would still pull up his net and harvest his catch,
Catantan drew his revolver and said, "You choose between the two, or I will kill you." [5] Juanito,
obviously terrified, immediately obeyed and Ursal hopped in from the other pumpboat and joined
Catantan.
But, as Ursal was transferring to the "new" pumpboat, its outrigger caught the front part
of the pumpboat of the Pilapils so he kicked hard its prow; it broke. The jolt threw Eugene into
the sea and he landed on the water headlong. Juan Jr. then untied his brother's legs and the
two swam together clinging to their boat. Fortunately another pumpboat passed by and towed
them safely ashore.
vessel, or the taking away of the whole or part thereof or its cargo, equipment, or the personal
belongings of the complement or passengers, irrespective of the value thereof, by means of
violence against or intimidation of persons or force upon things, committed by any person,
including a passenger or member of the complement of said vessel, in Philippine waters, shall
be considered as piracy. The offenders shall be considered as pirates and punished as
hereinafter provided." And a vessel is construed in Sec. 2, par. (b), of the same decree as "any
vessel or watercraft used for transport of passengers and cargo from one place to another
through Philippine waters. It shall include all kinds and types of vessels or boats used in
fishing (underscoring supplied).
On the other hand, grave coercion as defined in Art. 286 of the Revised Penal Code is
committed by "any person who, without authority of law, shall, by means of violence, prevent
another from doing something not prohibited by law, or compel him to do something against his
will, whether it be right or wrong."
Accused-appellant argues that in order that piracy may be committed it is essential that
there be an attack on or seizure of a vessel. He claims that he and his companion did not attack
or seize the fishing boat of the Pilapil brothers by using force or intimidation but merely boarded
the boat, and it was only when they were already on board that they used force to compel the
Pilapils to take them to some other place. Appellant also insists that he and Ursal had no
intention of permanently taking possession or depriving complainants of their boat. As a matter
of fact, when they saw another pumpboat they ordered the brothers right away to approach that
boat so they could leave the Pilapils behind in their boat.Accordingly, appellant claims, he
simply committed grave coercion and not piracy.
We do not agree. Under the definition of piracy in PD No. 532 as well as grave coercion
as penalized in Art. 286 of the Revised Penal Code, this case falls squarely within the purview of
piracy. While it may be true that Eugene and Juan Jr. were compelled to go elsewhere other
than their place of destination, such compulsion was obviously part of the act of seizing their
boat. The testimony of Eugene, one of the victims, shows that the appellant actually seized the
vessel through force and intimidation. The direct testimony of Eugene is significant and
enlightening -
Q: Now, while you and your younger brother were fishing at the seawaters of Tabogon at that
time, was there anything unusual that happened?
A: Yes.
Q: Will you please tell the Court what that was?
A: While we were fishing at Tabogon another pumpboat arrived and the passengers of that
pumpboat boarded our pumpboat.
Q: Now, that pumpboat which you said approached you, how many were riding in that
pumpboat?
A: Four.
Q: When you said the passengers of that pumpboat boarded your pumpboat, how did they do
that?
A: They approached somewhat suddenly and came aboard the pumpboat (underscoring
supplied).
Q: How many suddenly came aboard your pumpboat?
A: Only one.
Q: What did that person do when he came aboard your pumpboat?
A: When he boarded our pumpboat he aimed his revolver at us (underscoring supplied).
Q: By the way, when he aimed his revolver to you, did he say anything to you?
xxxx
A: He said, "dapa," which means lie down (underscoring supplied).
COURT:
Q: To whom did he aim that revolver?
A: He aimed the revolver on me.
TRIAL PROS. ECHAVEZ:
Q: What else did he do?
A: Then he ordered his companion to come aboard the pumpboat.
Q: What did he do with his revolver?
A: He struck my face with the revolver, hitting the lower portion of my left eye.
Q: Now, after you were struck with the revolver, what did these persons do?
A: We were ordered to take them to a certain place.
Q: To what place did he order you to go?
A: To Daan Tabogon. [6]
be to ignore the fact that a fishing vessel cruising in Philippine waters was seized by the
accused by means of violence against or intimidation of persons.As Eugene Pilapil testified, the
accused suddenly approached them and boarded their pumpboat and Catantan aimed his
revolver at them as he ordered complaining witness Eugene Pilapil to "dapa" or lie down with
face downwards, and then struck his face with a revolver, hitting the lower portion of his left eye,
after which, Catantan told his victims at gun point to take them to Daan Tabogon.
The incident happened at 3:00 o'clock in the morning. The sudden appearance of
another pumpboat with four passengers, all strangers to them, easily intimidated the Pilapil
brothers that they were impelled to submit in complete surrender to the marauders. The moment
Catantan jumped into the other pumpboat he had full control of his victims. The sight of a drawn
revolver in his hand drove them to submission. Hence the issuance of PD No. 532 designed to
avert situations like the case at bar and discourage and prevent piracy in Philippine
waters. Thus we cite the succeeding "whereas" clauses of the decree -
Whereas, reports from law-enforcement agencies reveal that lawless elements are still
committing acts of depredations upon the persons and properties of innocent and defenseless
inhabitants who travel from one place to another, thereby disturbing the peace, order and
tranquility of the nation and stunting the economic and social progress of the people;
Whereas, such acts of depredations constitute either piracy or highway robbery/brigandage
which are among the highest forms of lawlessness condemned by the penal statutes of all
countries; and,
Whereas, it is imperative that said lawless elements be discouraged from perpetrating such acts
of depredations by imposing heavy penalty on the offenders, with the end in view of eliminating
all obstacles to the economic, social, educational and community progress of the people.
The Pilapil brothers are mere fisherfolk whose only means of livelihood is fishing in sea
waters. They brave the natural elements and contend with the unknown forces of the sea to
bring home a bountiful harvest. It is on these small fishermen that the townspeople depend for
the daily bread. To impede their livelihood would be to deprive them of their very subsistence,
and the likes of the accused within the purview of PD No. 532 are the obstacle to the "economic,
social, educational and community progress of the people." Had it not been for the chance
passing of another pumpboat, the fate of the Pilapil brothers, left alone helpless in a floundering,
meandering outrigger with a broken prow and a conked-out engine in open sea, could not be
ascertained.
While appellant insists that he and Ursal had no intention of depriving the Pilapils
permanently of their boat, proof of which they left behind the brothers with their boat, the truth is,
Catantan and Ursal abandoned the Pilapils only because their pumpboat broke down and it was
necessary to transfer to another pumpboat that would take them back to their lair. Unfortunately
for the pirates their "new" pumpboat ran out of gas so they were apprehended by the police
soon after the Pilapils reported the matter to the local authorities.
The fact that the revolver used by the appellant to seize the boat was not produced in
evidence cannot exculpate him from the crime. The fact remains, and we state it again, that
Catantan and his co-accused Ursal seized through force and intimidation the pumpboat of the
Pilapils while the latter were fishing in Philippine waters.
WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the decision appealed from, the conviction
of accused-appellant EMILIANO CATANTAN y TAYONG for the crime of piracy penalized under
PD No. 532 and sentencing him accordingly to reclusion perpetua, is AFFIRMED. Costs against
accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.
Vitug, Kapunan, and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ., concur.
 SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. Nos. 153524-25. January 31, 2005]
RODOLFO SORIA and EDIMAR BISTA, petitioners, vs. HON. ANIANO DESIERTO in his
capacity as Head of the Office of the Ombudsman, HON. ORLANDO C.
CASIMIRO in his capacity as Deputy Ombudsman for Military, P/INS.
JEFFREY T. GOROSPE, SPO2 ROLANDO G. REGACHO, SPO1 ALFREDO B.
ALVIAR, JR., PO3 JAIME D. LAZARO, PO2 FLORANTE B. CARDENAS, PO1
JOSEPH A. BENAZA, SPO1 FRANKLIN D. CABAYA and SPO4 PEDRO
PAREL, respondents.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Yet again, we are tasked to substitute our judgment for that of the Office of the
Ombudsman in its finding of lack of probable cause made during preliminary investigation. And,
yet again, we reaffirm the time-honored practice of non-interference in the conduct of
preliminary investigations by our prosecutory bodies absent a showing of grave abuse of
discretion on their part.
Petitioners, thru a special civil action for certiorari,[1] contend precisely that the public
respondents herein officers of the Office of the Ombudsman gravely abused their discretion in
dismissing the complaint for violation of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code (Delay in the
delivery of detained persons) against private respondents herein, members of the Philippine
National Police stationed at the Municipality of Santa, Ilocos Sur.
From the respective pleadings[2] of the parties, the following facts appear to be
indubitable:
1. On or about 8:30 in the evening of 13 May 2001 (a Sunday and the day before the 14
May 2001 Elections[3]), petitioners were arrested without a warrant by respondents police
officers for alleged illegal possession of firearms and ammunition;
2. Petitioner Soria was arrested for alleged illegal possession of .38 cal. revolver (a crime
which carries with it the penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period) and for violation
of Article 261 par. (f) of the Omnibus Election Code in relation to the Commission on Election
Resolution No. 3328 (which carries the penalty of imprisonment of not less than one [1] year but
not more than six [6] years);
3. Petitioner Bista was arrested for alleged illegal possession of sub-machine pistol UZI, cal.
9mm and a .22 cal. revolver with ammunition;
4. Immediately after their arrest, petitioners were detained at the Santa, Ilocos Sur, Police
Station. It was at the Santa Police Station that petitioner Bista was identified by one of the police
officers to have a standing warrant of arrest for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 6 issued by
the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Vigan, Ilocos Sur, docketed as Criminal Case No. 12272;
5. The next day, at about 4:30 p.m. of 14 May 2001 (Monday and election day), petitioners
were brought to the residence of Provincial Prosecutor Jessica Viloria in San Juan, Ilocos Sur,
before whom a Joint-Affidavit against them was subscribed and sworn to by the arresting
officers. From there, the arresting officers brought the petitioners to the Provincial Prosecutors
Office in Vigan, Ilocos Sur, and there at about 6:00 p.m. the Joint-Affidavit was filed and
docketed;
6. At about 6:30 in the evening of the same day, 14 May 2001, petitioner Soria was
released upon the order of Prosecutor Viloria to undergo the requisite preliminary investigation,
while petitioner Bista was brought back and continued to be detained at the Santa Police
Station. From the time of petitioner Sorias detention up to the time of his release, twenty-two
(22) hours had already elapsed;
7. On 15 May 2001, at around 2:00 in the afternoon, petitioner Bista was brought before the
MTC of Vigan, Ilocos Sur, where the case for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 6 was pending.
Petitioner Bista posted bail and an Order of Temporary Release was issued thereafter;
8. At this point in time, no order of release was issued in connection with petitioner Bistas
arrest for alleged illegal possession of firearms. At 4:30 in the afternoon of the same day (15
May 2001), an information for Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunition, docketed as
Criminal Case No. 4413-S, was filed against petitioner Bista with the 4th Municipal Circuit Trial
Court of Narvacan, Ilocos Sur. At 5:00 in the afternoon, informations for Illegal Possession of
Firearms and Ammunition and violation of Article 261 par. (f) of the Omnibus Election Code in
relation to COMELEC Resolution No. 3328, docketed as Criminal Cases No. 2269-N and No.
2268-N, respectively, were filed in the Regional Trial Court at Narvacan, Ilocos Sur;
9. On 08 June 2001, petitioner Bista was released upon filing of bail bonds in Criminal Cases
No. 2268-N and No. 4413-S. He was detained for 26 days.
10. On 15 August 2001, petitioners filed with the Office of the Ombudsman for Military Affairs
a complaint-affidavit for violation of Art. 125 of the Revised Penal Code against herein private
respondents.
11. After considering the parties respective submissions, the Office of the Ombudsman
rendered the first assailed Joint Resolution dated 31 January 2002 dismissing the complaint for
violation of Art. 125 of the Revised Penal Code for lack of merit; and
12. On 04 March 2002, petitioners then filed their motion for reconsideration which was
denied for lack of merit in the second assailed Resolution dated 25 March 2002.
Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code states:
Art. 125. Delay in the delivery of detained persons to the proper judicial authorities. - The
penalties provided in the next preceding article shall be imposed upon the public officer or
employee who shall detain any person for some legal ground and shall fail to deliver such
person to the proper judicial authorities within the period of: twelve (12) hours, for crimes or
offenses punishable by light penalties, or their equivalent; eighteen (18) hours, for crimes or
offenses punishable by correctional penalties, or their equivalent; and thirty-six (36) hours, for
crimes or offenses punishable by afflictive or capital penalties, or their equivalent.
In every case, the person detained shall be informed of the cause of his detention and shall be
allowed, upon his request, to communicate and confer at any time with his attorney or counsel.
It is not under dispute that the alleged crimes for which petitioner Soria was arrested
without warrant are punishable by correctional penalties or their equivalent, thus, criminal
complaints or information should be filed with the proper judicial authorities within 18 hours of
his arrest. Neither is it in dispute that the alleged crimes for which petitioner Bista was arrested
are punishable by afflictive or capital penalties, or their equivalent, thus, he could only be
detained for 36 hours without criminal complaints or information having been filed with the
proper judicial authorities.
The sole bone of contention revolves around the proper application of the 12-18-36
periods. With respect specifically to the detention of petitioner Soria which lasted for 22 hours, it
is alleged that public respondents gravely erred in construing Article 125[4] as excluding
Sundays, holidays and election days in the computation of the periods prescribed within which
public officers should deliver arrested persons to the proper judicial authorities as the law never
makes such exception. Statutory construction has it that if a statute is clear and unequivocal, it
must be given its literal meaning and applied without any attempts at interpretation. [5] Public
respondents, on the other hand, relied on the cases of Medina v. Orozco, Jr.,[6]and Sayo v.
Chief of Police of Manila[7] and on commentaries[8] of jurists to bolster their position that
Sundays, holidays and election days are excluded in the computation of the periods provided in
Article 125,[9] hence, the arresting officers delivered petitioners well within the allowable time.
In addition to the foregoing arguments and with respect specifically to petitioner Bista,
petitioners maintain that the filing of the information in court against petitioner Bista did not
justify his continuous detention. The information was filed at 4:30 p.m. of 15 May 2001 but the
orders for his release were issued by the Regional Trial Court and Municipal Trial Court of
Narvacan, Ilocos Sur, only on 08 June 2001. They argued that based on law and jurisprudence,
if no charge is filed by the prosecutor within the period fixed by law, the arresting officer must
release the detainee lest he be charged with violation of Article 125. [10] Public respondents
countered that the duty of the arresting officers ended upon the filing of the informations with the
proper judicial authorities following the rulings in Agbay v. Deputy Ombudsman for the
Military,[11] and People v. Acosta.[12]
From a study of the opposing views advanced by the parties, it is evident that public
respondents did not abuse their discretion in dismissing for lack of probable cause the complaint
against private respondents.
Grave abuse of discretion is such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment on the
part of the public officer concerned which is equivalent to an excess or lack of jurisdiction. The
abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or
a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law as
where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or
hostility.[13]
No grave abuse of discretion, as defined, can be attributed to herein public
respondents. Their disposition of petitioners complaint for violation of Article 125 of the Revised
Penal Code cannot be said to have been conjured out of thin air as it was properly backed up by
law and jurisprudence. Public respondents ratiocinated thus:
As aptly pointed out by the respondents insofar as the complaint of Rodolfo Soria is concerned,
based on applicable laws and jurisprudence, an election day or a special holiday, should not be
included in the computation of the period prescribed by law for the filing of complaint/information
in courts in cases of warrantless arrests, it being a no-office day. (Medina vs. Orosco, 125 Phil.
313.) In the instant case, while it appears that the complaints against Soria for Illegal
Possession of Firearm and Violation of COMELEC Resolution No. 3328 were filed with the
Regional Trial Court and Municipal Trial Court of Narvacan, Ilocos Sur, only on May 15, 200[1]
at 4:30 p.m., he had already been released the day before or on May 14, 2001 at about 6:30
p.m. by the respondents, as directed by Prov. Prosecutor Jessica [Viloria]. Hence, there could
be no arbitrary detention or violation of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code to speak of. [14]
Indeed, we did hold in Medina v. Orozco, Jr.,[15] that
. . . The arresting officers duty under the law was either to deliver him to the proper judicial
authorities within 18 hours, or thereafter release him. The fact however is that he was not
released. From the time of petitioners arrest at 12:00 oclock p.m. on November 7 to 3:40 p.m.
on November 10 when the information against him for murder actually was in court, over 75
hours have elapsed.
But, stock should be taken of the fact that November 7 was a Sunday; November 8 was
declared an official holiday; and November 9 (election day) was also an official holiday. In these
three no-office days, it was not an easy matter for a fiscal to look for his clerk and stenographer,
draft the information and search for the Judge to have him act thereon, and get the clerk of court
to open the courthouse, docket the case and have the order of commitment prepared. And then,
where to locate and the uncertainty of locating those officers and employees could very well
compound the fiscals difficulties. These are considerations sufficient enough to deter us from
declaring that Arthur Medina was arbitrarily detained. For, he was brought to court on the very
first office day following arrest.
And, in Sayo v. Chief of Police of Manila[16] --
. . . Of course, for the purpose of determining the criminal liability of an officer detaining a person
for more than six hours prescribed by the Revised Penal Code, the means of communication as
well as the hour of arrest and other circumstances, such as the time of surrender and the
material possibility for the fiscal to make the investigation and file in time the necessary
information, must be taken into consideration.
As to the issue concerning the duty of the arresting officer after the information has
already been filed in Court, public respondents acted well within their discretion in ruling thus:
In the same vein, the complaint of Edimar Bista against the respondents for Violation of Article
125, will not prosper because the running of the thirty-six (36)-hour period prescribed by law for
the filing of the complaint against him from the time of his arrest was tolled by one day (election
day). Moreover, he has a standing warrant of arrest for Violation of B.P. Blg. 6 and it was only
on May 15, 2001, at about 2:00 p.m. that he was able to post bail and secure an Order of
Release. Obviously, however, he could only be released if he has no other pending criminal
case requiring his continuous detention.
The criminal Informations against Bista for Violations of Article 125, RPC and COMELEC
Resolution No. 3328 were filed with the Regional Trial Court and Municipal Trial Court of
Narvacan, Ilocos Sur, on May 15, 2001 (Annexes G and I, Complaint-Affidavit of Edimar Bista)
but he was released from detention only on June 8, 2001, on orders of the RTC and MTC of
Narvacan, Ilocos Sur (Annexes J and K, Complaint-Affidavit). Was there a delay in the delivery
of detained person to the proper judicial authorities under the circumstances? The answer is in
the negative. The complaints against him was (sic) seasonably filed in the court of justice within
the thirty-six (36)-hour period prescribed by law as discussed above. The duty of the detaining
officers is deemed complied with upon the filing of the complaints. Further action, like issuance
of a Release Order, then rests upon the judicial authority (People v. Acosta [CA] 54 O.G.
4739).[17]

The above disposition is in keeping with Agbay v. Deputy Ombudsman for the
Military,[18] wherein we ordained that

. . . Furthermore, upon the filing of the complaint with the Municipal Trial Court, the intent behind
Art. 125 is satisfied considering that by such act, the detained person is informed of the crime
imputed against him and, upon his application with the court, he may be released on bail.
Petitioner himself acknowledged this power of the MCTC to order his release when he applied
for and was granted his release upon posting bail. Thus, the very purpose underlying Article 125
has been duly served with the filing of the complaint with the MCTC. We agree with the position
of the Ombudsman that such filing of the complaint with the MCTC interrupted the period
prescribed in said Article.

All things considered, there being no grave abuse of discretion, we have no choice but
to defer to the Office of the Ombudsmans determination that the facts on hand do not make out
a case for violation of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code.

As we have underscored in numerous decisions --

We have consistently refrained from interfering with the investigatory and prosecutorial powers
of the Ombudsman absent any compelling reason. This policy is based on constitutional,
statutory and practical considerations. We are mindful that the Constitution and RA 6770
endowed the Office of the Ombudsman with a wide latitude of investigatory and prosecutorial
powers, virtually free from legislative, executive or judicial intervention, in order to insulate it
from outside pressure and improper influence. Moreover, a preliminary investigation is in effect
a realistic judicial appraisal of the merits of the case. Sufficient proof of the guilt of the accused
must be adduced so that when the case is tried, the trial court may not be bound, as a matter of
law, to order an acquittal. Hence, if the Ombudsman, using professional judgment, finds
the case dismissible, the Court shall respect such findings, unless clothed with grave
abuse of discretion. Otherwise, the functions of the courts will be grievously hampered by
innumerable petitions assailing the dismissal of investigatory proceedings conducted by the
Office of the Ombudsman with regard to complaints filed before it. In much the same way, the
courts will be swamped with cases if they will have to review the exercise of discretion on the
part of fiscals or prosecuting attorneys each time the latter decide to file an information in court
or dismiss a complaint by a private complainant. [19] (Emphasis supplied)

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition dated 27 May 2002 is hereby

DISMISSED for lack of merit. The Joint Resolution dated 31 January 2002 and the Order dated
25 March 2002 of the Office of the Ombudsman are hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Puno, (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., and Tinga, JJ., concur.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Baguio City
EN BANC
A.M. No. 03-1462-MTJ April 19, 2007
JUDGE DOLORES L. ESPAOL, Regional Trial Court, Branch 90, Dasmarias,
Cavite, Complainant,
vs.
JUDGE LORINDA B. TOLEDO-MUPAS, Municipal Trial Court, Dasmarias,
Cavite, Respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
Bizarre. The word would aptly describe this tale of the accuser turning out to be the culprit.
This case started with Judge Lorinda B. Toledo-Mupas (Judge Mupas) of the Municipal Trial
Court (MTC) of Dasmarias, Cavite, filing an administrative complaint (Administrative Matter No.
OCA IPI No. 02-1515-RTJ) against Judge Dolores L. Espaol (Judge Espaol) of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 90, Dasmarias, Cavite, for Gross Ignorance of the Law, Grave
Abuse of Authority, Misconduct, and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service. She
imputed these offenses against Judge Espaol for allegedly illegally usurping the functions of
the Executive Judge of Dasmarias, Cavite, and for ordering her (Mupas) on April 18, 2002, in
connection with Criminal Case No. 9292-01 (People v. Belinda Ventura Singello), "to desist from
accepting, for preliminary investigation,' criminal cases falling within the exclusive jurisdiction of
the Regional Trial Court, where suspects are apprehended pursuant to Sec. 7, Rule 112 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure."
Judge Espaol filed her Comment dated September 16, 20021 stating that since she was
appointed to the single sala RTC of Dasmarias, Cavite, under Supreme Court Administrative
Order No. 6 of 1975, she ipso facto became the Executive Judge exercising supervision over
the MTC of Dasmarias, Cavite. She further stated that her Order dated April 18, 2002, directing
the respondent to desist from conducting preliminary investigation, did not deprive the latter of
the authority to conduct preliminary investigation but merely stopped her from conducting the
same for being
violative of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code and
Republic Act No. 7438.
In the same Comment, Judge Espaol said that Judge Mupas operated the MTC of
Dasmarias, Cavite as a "One-Stop Shop" where criminal suspects apprehended without a
warrant are ordered detained in the municipal jail by virtue of an unsigned "Detention Pending
Investigation of the Case," in lieu of a waiver of the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised
Penal Code, as prescribed by R.A. No. 7438 and by Section 7, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure. Thus, according to Judge Espaol, the apprehended persons were
detained for a long time until Judge Mupas set the case for preliminary investigation. If the
detainee can post bail, Judge Mupas would fix the amount of bail and require that the premium,
usually equivalent to 20% or 30% thereof, be paid in cash. If the surety bond was secured
outside of the MTC, the bond would be rejected. Hence, the applicants for bail bonds would go
to the RTC of Dasmarias, Cavite to complain and apply for the release of the detention
prisoners.
This Court, acting on the Report dated July 4, 2003 of the Office of the Court Administrator
(OCA), issued on August 6, 2003 a Resolution,2 the dispositive portion of which reads:
"(T)he Court Resolved to ADOPT the following recommendations:
(a) to DISMISS the charges against Judge Dolores L. Espaol for lack of merit;
(b) to TREAT the comment dated September 16, 2002 of Judge Espaol as a
SEPARATE ADMINISTRATIVE COMPLAINT against Judge Lorinda Mupas of
MTC, Dasmarias, Cavite; and
(c) to REQUIRE Judge Toledo-Mupas to COMMENT on the allegations against
her, contained in Judge Espaols comment."
Thus, a complaint against the respondent Judge Mupas was deemed filed, and docketed as
OCA IPI No. 03-1462-MTJ.
On September 8, 2003, Judge Mupas filed a motion seeking reconsideration of this Courts
Resolution. On October 1, 2003, this Court required the OCA to file its comment thereon within
15 days from notice. The OCA wrote a Memorandum dated April 15, 20043 to then Chief Justice
Hilario G. Davide, Jr. recommending the denial of the respondents motion being a mere
reiteration of her arguments already passed upon by the Court. This Court adopted the said
recommendation of the OCA in its Resolution dated May 31, 2004.4
Accordingly, Judge Mupas faced the following charges: (1) violation of Rule 112, Section 7 of
the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, and Republic
Act No. 7438; and (2) violation of the rules on preliminary investigation (a) for the delay in the
resolution of preliminary investigation cases pending in [Judge Mupas] court; (b) for failure to
perform her ministerial duty of transmitting the records of the case, including the resolution on
the preliminary investigation, within 10 days from the issuance of the said resolution to the
provincial prosecutor of Cavite; and (c) for conducting preliminary investigation despite the fact
that there were many prosecutors in Cavite not indisposed to do the job.
On September 19, 2005, Judge Mupas filed her Reply5 (should be Comment) to Judge
Espaols Comment which was treated as a separate administrative complaint. She claimed that
the August 6, 2003 Resolution of this Court failed to consider relevant laws, rules, and
pronouncements of the Court itself. She further said that under Rule 112, Section 2 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, she is expressly authorized to conduct preliminary
investigation. She questioned the authority of Judge Espaol in ordering her to desist from
conducting preliminary investigations in the guise of "supervising" or "reviewing" her actions, as
the said authority was lodged in the provincial prosecutors. She pointed out that, in the case of
"People vs. Belinda Ventura Singello" (Criminal Case No. 9292-01), subject of Judge Espaols
Order dated April 18, 2002, the provincial prosecutor affirmed her (Mupas) finding of probable
cause against the accused without any question on the manner in which the preliminary
investigation was conducted.
She likewise claimed that, pursuant to Administrative Order No. 59-99 dated 1 June 1999, while
in single-sala stations the presiding judges are ex officio executive judges, for purposes of
supervision in the interest of the service, their salas may be merged with multi-sala stations.
Therefore, the RTC of Dasmarias, Cavite had long been merged with the multi-sala station of
the RTC of Imus, Cavite. In support of this claim, Judge Mupas noted that then Executive Judge
Lucenito N. Tagle of the RTC of Imus, Cavite issued a Memorandum to all judges within his
supervision, including both Judge Espaol and Judge Mupas, to submit periodic reports on
detention prisoners.
She further argued that none of the detention prisoners had filed an administrative complaint
against her. She said that it was her duty to conduct preliminary investigation of complaints filed
with her sala. In addition, Judge Mupas posited that Judge Espaol could not entertain
applications for bail in the RTC because the cases were pending before the MTC.
On January 30, 2006, the Court noted this Reply (should be Comment), and referred the same
to the OCA for evaluation, report, and recommendation.
In the Memorandum dated July 26, 20066 addressed to then Chief Justice Artemio V.
Panganiban, the OCA found that the Reply of Judge Mupas was merely a rehash of the
arguments she raised in her Motion for Reconsideration; it did not refute the specific allegations
of Judge Espaol. The OCA said that the explanation given by the respondent was
unsatisfactory and insufficient to absolve her from administrative liability. However, the OCA
recommended that this case be referred to an Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals for
investigation, report, and recommendation. Eventually, this case was referred to Court of
Appeals Associate Justice Myrna Dimaranan-Vidal.
During the proceedings before Justice Vidal, Judge Espaol filed her Rejoinder [Re: Reply
dated September 19, 2005] dated December 8, 2006 7 reiterating that: (1) her Order dated April
18, 2002 was lawful and within her authority to issue as the OCA declared that she was merely
performing her function as Executive Judge of Dasmarias, Cavite; (2) Judge Mupas violated
the rights of the accused whose preliminary investigation is pending in her court, they being
detained by virtue only of a "Detention Pending Investigation of the Case" in place of a valid
waiver signed in the presence of counsel for considerable lengths of time; (3) there was no
basis for Judge Mupas counter-charge that she could not grant bail while preliminary
investigation was pending before the Mupas court, considering the latter's absence upon the
prisoners' applications for bail; and (4) Judge Mupas failed to adequately explain her failure to
forward the records and the resolution of the preliminary investigation of accused Belinda
Singello in Criminal Case No. 9292-01.
Judge Mupas filed her Comment (Re: Rejoinder Dated December 8, 2006) dated December 21,
20068 and averred that: (1) acts made in her judicial capacity and in good faith could not be
subject to disciplinary action; (2) as judge, she enjoys the presumption of regularity in the
performance of her duties; (3) the preliminary investigation she conducted was within the scope
of her authority; and (4) the reason behind the seeming delay in the conduct of preliminary
investigation was the heavy congestion of the dockets of the MTC of Dasmarias, Cavite.
Preliminary conferences were conducted by Justice Vidal on January 2, 2007 and January 9,
2007.9 However, both parties opted not to present any testimonial evidence. In fact, Judge
Espaol filed on January 5, 2007 an Urgent Manifestation and Motion to Resolve,10 praying that,
inasmuch as the proceedings were summary in nature, the case be decided based on the
available records and pleadings submitted.
On the same day, Judge Espaol filed her Reply [Re: Comment dated December 21,
2006],11 arguing that: (1) Judge Mupas is guilty of gross ignorance of the law even if she acted
in good faith; and (2) the presumption of regularity in the performance of her judicial function
could not cure the incompetence of the respondent.
Both the complainant12 and the respondent13 filed their respective memoranda encompassing all
the arguments they raised in their respective pleadings. Judge Espaol also filed a Counter
Memorandum (Re: Memorandum of the Respondent dated January 18, 2007) dated January
29, 2007.14
In an undated Resolution filed with the OCA on February 9, 2007, Justice Myrna Dimaranan-
Vidal found, contrary to Judge Mupas claim, that the document entitled "Detention Pending
Investigation of Cases" cannot validly be deemed to be an implied waiver of the rights of the
accused under Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code. Justice Vidal submits the following
findings:
"Extant from the records, is Respondents admission of her practice in the issuance of the
document entitled Detention Pending Investigation of Cases claiming, however, that such
document served as an implied waiver of the rights of the accused under Article 125 of the
Revised Penal Code.
"The undersigned disagrees.
"Sec. 2 e) of RA 7438 is in point, thus:
xxx Any waiver by a person arrested or detained under the provisions of Article 125 of the
Revised Penal Code, or under custodial investigation, shall be in writing and signed by such
person in the presence of his counsel; otherwise the waiver shall be null and void and of no
effect. (Underscoring supplied)
"The afore cited law is clear and simple. Thus, construction is unnecessary. Clearly, what the
said provision requires to protect the rights of the accused is a written waiver signed by the
accused with the assistance of a counsel. However, the procedure adopted by the Respondent
runs counter thereto. She resorted to the issuance of a commitment order dubbed as Detention
Pending Investigation of the Case to legally prolong the detention of the accused pending the
resolution of the preliminary investigation. Obviously, this is not within the contemplation of the
law. Thus, the practice is highly erroneous a blatant manifestation of ignorance in the legal
procedure.
"The New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary 15 provides:
Canon 6 Competence and Diligence
xxx
Sec. 3. Judges shall take reasonable steps to maintain and enhance their knowledge, skills and
personal qualities necessary for the proper performance of judicial duties, taking advantage for
this purpose of the training and other facilities which should be made available, under judicial
control, to judges.
xxx
"Otherwise put, Respondent is presumed to know the basic measures to protect the rights of the
accused during preliminary investigation. Sadly, Respondent failed in this regard. Instead, she
maintained the practice of issuing this highly improper order, i.e., Detention Pending
Investigation of the Case, just to put a semblance of legality in the detention of the accused." 16
With respect to the other charges, Justice Vidal found the evidence insufficient to support the
accusations that Judge Mupas: (1) detained the accused for a long period of time while the
preliminary investigation was pending in her court; (2) failed to transmit to the Provincial
Prosecutor of Cavite the records of the case within 10 days after preliminary investigation; and
(3) acted without authority to conduct preliminary investigation because there were enough
prosecutors in Cavite to conduct the same.1a\^/phi1.net
Justice Vidal then concludes:
"However, the undersigned finds that Respondent should still be held administratively liable.
Respondents act of issuing orders dubbed as Detention Pending Investigation of Cases
instead of requiring the accused to execute a written waiver, with the assistance of counsel,
pursuant to Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, fall [sic] short of the measure of
responsibility expected from a judge.
"Respondent should be reminded that the actions of everyone connected with an office charged
with the dispensation of justice, from the presiding judge to the clerk of lowest rank, should be
circumscribed with a high degree of responsibility. The image of a court, as a true temple of
justice, is mirrored in the conduct, official or otherwise, of the men and women who work
thereat. Judicial personnel are expected to be living examples of uprightness in the performance
of official duties [and] preserve at all times the good name and standing of the courts in the
community."17
Thus, the dispositive portion of her Resolution reads:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, and it appearing that this is the first time the Respondent
has committed the infraction, supra, the undersigned respectfully recommends that she be
REPRIMANDED for her practice of issuing the "Detention Pending Investigation of the Case"
orders with STERN WARNING that a repetition thereof or any similar act will be dealt with more
severely".
We agree with the findings of Justice Vidal, but We find the recommended penalty too light,
grossly disproportionate to the offense committed, especially when viewed in the light of Judge
Mupas record of incorrigible misconduct.
There is no gainsaying that Judge Mupas practice of issuing "Detention Pending Investigation
of the Case" orders in lieu of a written waiver signed by the accused with the assistance of
counsel is, in the words of Justice Vidal, "a blatant manifestation of ignorance in the legal
procedure." It is gross ignorance of the law, pure and simple.
Under Rule 140, Section 8, of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10 SC, gross
ignorance of the law or procedure is classified as a serious charge, and Section 11 thereof
provides the sanctions, as follows:
SEC. 11. Sanctions. A. If the respondent is guilty of a serious charge, any of the following
sanctions may be imposed:
1. Dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the Court
may determine, and disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any
public office, including government-owned or controlled corporations: Provided,
however, that the forfeiture of benefits shall in no case include accrued leave
credits;
2. Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more than three (3)
but not exceeding six (6) months; or
3. A fine of more than P20,000.00 but not exceeding P40,000.00.
While Justice Vidal considered the respondent's practice of issuing "Detention Pending SO ORDERED.
Investigation of the Case" orders as a first-time infraction, We note that this case is not the first
time the respondent was charged and found guilty of gross ignorance of the law. REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
In Espaol v. Mupas,18 the respondent judge was fined the amount of P21,000.00 for violation of
the Code of Judicial Conduct and for gross ignorance of the law when she ordered the arrest of
the accused in six criminal cases before the expiration of the 10-day period she gave them to
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
file their counter-affidavits, and without any finding of probable cause. Associate Justice Asscociate Justice
In Loss of Court Exhibits at MTC-Dasmarias, Cavite,19 aside from being found guilty of grave
misconduct for refusing to turn over to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) for ballistics
examination a firearm that a court employee surreptitiously took from the court's steel cabinet
and used to commit suicide, Judge Mupas was held administratively liable for gross ignorance
ANGELINA SANDOVAL-
of the law for her failure to submit to the provincial prosecutor her resolution and the records of ANTONIO T. CARPIO
GUTIERREZ
the case within 10 days after preliminary investigation. The Court imposed on the respondent Asscociate Justice
Associate Justice
the penalty of suspension for three (3) months without pay, with a stern warning that a similar
infraction will be dealt with more severely.
In Bitoon, et al. v. Toledo-Mupas,20 the respondent was also found administratively liable for
gross ignorance of the law for changing the designation of the crime from a non-bailable offense MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ RENATO C. CORONA
to a bailable one, i.e., syndicated estafa to simple estafa, and granted bail without hearing on Associate Justice Asscociate Justice
the ground that the accused is entitled to it as a matter of right. The Court found her to have
exceeded her authority in the conduct of preliminary investigation and to have failed to observe
the elementary rules on bail. She was meted the penalties of a fine in the amount of
P40,000.00, suspension for three (3) months without salaries and benefits, and a stern warning
that a same or similar offense will be dealt with more severely. CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.
Associate Justice Asscociate Justice
Upon motion for reconsideration, however, the penalty of fine of P40,000.00 was deleted on the
ground that the acts of the respondent in the Espaol v. Mupas and the Loss of Court
Exhibits cases were done after the acts complained of in Bitoon. While the Court maintained
that the respondent's acts in Bitoon remain inexcusable, the respondent was not found to be an
incorrigible third-time offender deserving the penalty originally imposed. The Court also noted ADOLFO S. AZCUNA DANTE O. TINGA
that the respondent was not motivated by malice, bad faith or corrupt motives and that there Associate Justice Asscociate Justice
was an absence of any serious damage to the complainants. However, the stern warning of the
Court should have been ample reminder that the penalty of dismissal would be imposed should
the respondent commit the same or a similar infraction.21
In the present case, while the documents denominated "Detention Pending Investigation of the MINITA CHICO-NAZARIO CANCIO C. GARCIA
Case" were issued during the same period of time that the three (3) above-cited cases were Associate Justice Asscociate Justice
decided, it is noteworthy that Judge Mupas continued with the practice even after her attention
had been called. Worse, she remained insistent that the document was an implied waiver of the
rights of the accused under Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code.22 Judge Mupas must be
reminded that although judges have in their favor the presumption of regularity and good faith in
the performance of their official functions, a blatant disregard of the clear and unmistakable PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
terms of the law obviates this presumption and renders them susceptible to administrative Associate Justice Asscociate Justice
sanctions.23 Being among the judicial front-liners who have direct contact with the litigants, a
wanton display of utter lack of familiarity with the rules by the judge inevitably erodes the
confidence of the public in the competence of our courts to render justice. 24 It subjects the
judiciary to embarrassment. Worse, it could raise the specter of corruption.
When the gross inefficiency springs from a failure to consider so basic and elemental a rule, a
law, or a principle in the discharge of his or her duties, a judge is either too incompetent and
undeserving of the exalted position and title he or she holds, or the oversight or omission was
deliberately done in bad faith and in grave abuse of judicial authority. 25
All said, this Court finds the respondent, Judge Lorinda B. Toledo-Mupas, administratively liable
for gross ignorance of the law. Considering that this is her fourth offense, she deserves to be
meted the supreme penalty of dismissal from the service, with all the accessory penalties
appurtenant thereto.
WHEREFORE, Judge Lorinda B. Toledo-Mupas of the Municipal Trial Court of Dasmarias,
Cavite is found guilty of gross ignorance of the law. This being her fourth offense, she is hereby
ORDERED DISMISSED FROM THE SERVICE with forfeiture of all benefits due her, excluding
her accrued leave benefits, and with perpetual disqualification from reinstatement or
appointment to any public office, including government-owned or controlled corporations.
This Decision is final and immediately executory.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-64261 December 26, 1984
JOSE BURGOS, SR., JOSE BURGOS, JR., BAYANI SORIANO and J. BURGOS MEDIA
SERVICES, INC., petitioners,
vs.
THE CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, THE CHIEF, PHILIPPINE
CONSTABULARY, THE CHIEF LEGAL OFFICER, PRESIDENTIAL SECURITY COMMAND,
THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL, ET AL., respondents.
Lorenzo M. Taada, Wigberto E. Taada, Martiniano Vivo, Augusto Sanchez, Joker P. Arroyo,
Jejomar Binay and Rene Saguisag for petitioners.
The Solicitor General for respondents.
ESCOLIN, J.:
Assailed in this petition for certiorari prohibition and mandamus with preliminary mandatory and
prohibitory injunction is the validity of two [2] search warrants issued on December 7, 1982 by
respondent Judge Ernani Cruz-Pano, Executive Judge of the then Court of First Instance of
Rizal [Quezon City], under which the premises known as No. 19, Road 3, Project 6, Quezon
City, and 784 Units C & D, RMS Building, Quezon Avenue, Quezon City, business addresses of
the "Metropolitan Mail" and "We Forum" newspapers, respectively, were searched, and office
and printing machines, equipment, paraphernalia, motor vehicles and other articles used in the
printing, publication and distribution of the said newspapers, as well as numerous papers,
documents, books and other written literature alleged to be in the possession and control of
petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. publisher-editor of the "We Forum" newspaper, were seized.
Petitioners further pray that a writ of preliminary mandatory and prohibitory injunction be issued
for the return of the seized articles, and that respondents, "particularly the Chief Legal Officer,
Presidential Security Command, the Judge Advocate General, AFP, the City Fiscal of Quezon
City, their representatives, assistants, subalterns, subordinates, substitute or successors" be
enjoined from using the articles thus seized as evidence against petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. and
the other accused in Criminal Case No. Q- 022782 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
entitled People v. Jose Burgos, Jr. et al. 1
In our Resolution dated June 21, 1983, respondents were required to answer the petition. The
plea for preliminary mandatory and prohibitory injunction was set for hearing on June 28, 1983,
later reset to July 7, 1983, on motion of the Solicitor General in behalf of respondents.
At the hearing on July 7, 1983, the Solicitor General, while opposing petitioners' prayer for a writ
of preliminary mandatory injunction, manifested that respondents "will not use the
aforementioned articles as evidence in the aforementioned case until final resolution of the
legality of the seizure of the aforementioned articles. ..." 2 With this manifestation, the prayer for
preliminary prohibitory injunction was rendered moot and academic.
Respondents would have this Court dismiss the petition on the ground that petitioners had come
to this Court without having previously sought the quashal of the search warrants before
respondent judge. Indeed, petitioners, before impugning the validity of the warrants before this
Court, should have filed a motion to quash said warrants in the court that issued them. 3 But this
procedural flaw notwithstanding, we take cognizance of this petition in view of the seriousness
and urgency of the constitutional issues raised not to mention the public interest generated by
the search of the "We Forum" offices, which was televised in Channel 7 and widely publicized in
all metropolitan dailies. The existence of this special circumstance justifies this Court to exercise
its inherent power to suspend its rules. In the words of the revered Mr. Justice Abad Santos in
the case of C. Vda. de Ordoveza v. Raymundo, 4 "it is always in the power of the court
[Supreme Court] to suspend its rules or to except a particular case from its operation, whenever
the purposes of justice require it...".
Respondents likewise urge dismissal of the petition on ground of laches. Considerable stress is
laid on the fact that while said search warrants were issued on December 7, 1982, the instant
petition impugning the same was filed only on June 16, 1983 or after the lapse of a period of
more than six [6] months.
Laches is failure or negligence for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time to do that
which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier. It is negligence or
omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party
entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it. 5
Petitioners, in their Consolidated Reply, explained the reason for the delay in the filing of the
petition thus:
Respondents should not find fault, as they now do [p. 1, Answer, p.
3, Manifestation] with the fact that the Petition was filed on June 16,
1983, more than half a year after the petitioners' premises had been
raided.
this is the same place that respondent judge had in mind when he issued Warrant No. 20-82 [b].
The climate of the times has given petitioners no other choice. If
they had waited this long to bring their case to court, it was because
they tried at first to exhaust other remedies. The events of the past
eleven fill years had taught them that everything in this country,
from release of public funds to release of detained persons from
custody, has become a matter of executive benevolence or
largesse
Hence, as soon as they could, petitioners, upon suggestion of
persons close to the President, like Fiscal Flaminiano, sent a letter
to President Marcos, through counsel Antonio Coronet asking the
return at least of the printing equipment and vehicles. And after
such a letter had been sent, through Col. Balbino V. Diego, Chief
Intelligence and Legal Officer of the Presidential Security
Command, they were further encouraged to hope that the latter
would yield the desired results.
After waiting in vain for five [5] months, petitioners finally decided to
come to Court. [pp. 123-124, Rollo]
Although the reason given by petitioners may not be flattering to our judicial system, We find no
ground to punish or chastise them for an error in judgment. On the contrary, the extrajudicial
efforts exerted by petitioners quite evidently negate the presumption that they had abandoned
their right to the possession of the seized property, thereby refuting the charge of laches against
them.
Respondents also submit the theory that since petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. had used and marked
as evidence some of the seized documents in Criminal Case No. Q- 022872, he is now
estopped from challenging the validity of the search warrants. We do not follow the logic of
respondents. These documents lawfully belong to petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. and he can do
whatever he pleases with them, within legal bounds. The fact that he has used them as
evidence does not and cannot in any way affect the validity or invalidity of the search warrants
assailed in this petition.
Several and diverse reasons have been advanced by petitioners to nullify the search warrants in
question.
1. Petitioners fault respondent judge for his alleged failure to conduct an examination under oath
or affirmation of the applicant and his witnesses, as mandated by the above-quoted
constitutional provision as wen as Sec. 4, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court .6 This objection,
however, may properly be considered moot and academic, as petitioners themselves conceded
during the hearing on August 9, 1983, that an examination had indeed been conducted by
respondent judge of Col. Abadilla and his witnesses.
2. Search Warrants No. 20-82[a] and No. 20- 82[b] were used to search two distinct places: No.
19, Road 3, Project 6, Quezon City and 784 Units C & D, RMS Building, Quezon Avenue,
Quezon City, respectively. Objection is interposed to the execution of Search Warrant No. 20-
82[b] at the latter address on the ground that the two search warrants pinpointed only one place
where petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. was allegedly keeping and concealing the articles listed
therein, i.e., No. 19, Road 3, Project 6, Quezon City. This assertion is based on that portion of
Search Warrant No. 20- 82[b] which states:
Which have been used, and are being used as instruments and
means of committing the crime of subversion penalized under P.D.
885 as amended and he is keeping and concealing the same at 19
Road 3, Project 6, Quezon City.
The defect pointed out is obviously a typographical error. Precisely, two search warrants were
applied for and issued because the purpose and intent were to search two distinct premises. It
would be quite absurd and illogical for respondent judge to have issued two warrants intended
for one and the same place. Besides, the addresses of the places sought to be searched were
specifically set forth in the application, and since it was Col. Abadilla himself who headed the
team which executed the search warrants, the ambiguity that might have arisen by reason of the
typographical error is more apparent than real. The fact is that the place for which Search
Warrant No. 20- 82[b] was applied for was 728 Units C & D, RMS Building, Quezon Avenue,
Quezon City, which address appeared in the opening paragraph of the said warrant. 7 Obviously
In the determination of whether a search warrant describes the premises to be searched with
sufficient particularity, it has been held "that the executing officer's prior knowledge as to the
place intended in the warrant is relevant. This would seem to be especially true where the
executing officer is the affiant on whose affidavit the warrant had issued, and when he knows
that the judge who issued the warrant intended the building described in the affidavit, And it has
also been said that the executing officer may look to the affidavit in the official court file to
resolve an ambiguity in the warrant as to the place to be searched." 8
3. Another ground relied upon to annul the search warrants is the fact that although the warrants
were directed against Jose Burgos, Jr. alone, articles b belonging to his co-petitioners Jose
Burgos, Sr., Bayani Soriano and the J. Burgos Media Services, Inc. were seized.
Section 2, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, enumerates the personal properties that may be
seized under a search warrant, to wit:
Sec. 2. Personal Property to be seized. A search warrant may be
issued for the search and seizure of the following personal property:
[a] Property subject of the offense;
[b] Property stolen or embezzled and
other proceeds or fruits of the offense;
and
[c] Property used or intended to be
used as the means of committing an
offense.
The above rule does not require that the property to be seized should be owned by the person
against whom the search warrant is directed. It may or may not be owned by him. In fact, under
subsection [b] of the above-quoted Section 2, one of the properties that may be seized is stolen
property. Necessarily, stolen property must be owned by one other than the person in whose
possession it may be at the time of the search and seizure. Ownership, therefore, is of no
consequence, and it is sufficient that the person against whom the warrant is directed has
control or possession of the property sought to be seized, as petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. was
alleged to have in relation to the articles and property seized under the warrants.
4. Neither is there merit in petitioners' assertion that real properties were seized under the
disputed warrants. Under Article 415[5] of the Civil Code of the Philippines, "machinery,
receptables, instruments or implements intended by the owner of the tenement for an industry or
works which may be carried on in a building or on a piece of land and which tend directly to
meet the needs of the said industry or works" are considered immovable property. In Davao
Sawmill Co. v. Castillo9 where this legal provision was invoked, this Court ruled that machinery
which is movable by nature becomes immobilized when placed by the owner of the tenement,
property or plant, but not so when placed by a tenant, usufructuary, or any other person having
only a temporary right, unless such person acted as the agent of the owner.
In the case at bar, petitioners do not claim to be the owners of the land and/or building on which
the machineries were placed. This being the case, the machineries in question, while in fact
bolted to the ground remain movable property susceptible to seizure under a search warrant.
5. The questioned search warrants were issued by respondent judge upon application of Col.
Rolando N. Abadilla Intelligence Officer of the P.C. Metrocom. 10 The application was
accompanied by the Joint Affidavit of Alejandro M. Gutierrez and Pedro U. Tango, 11 members
of the Metrocom Intelligence and Security Group under Col. Abadilla which conducted a
surveillance of the premises prior to the filing of the application for the search warrants on
December 7, 1982.
It is contended by petitioners, however, that the abovementioned documents could not have
provided sufficient basis for the finding of a probable cause upon which a warrant may validly
issue in accordance with Section 3, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution which provides:
SEC. 3. ... and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be determined by the judge, or such
other responsible officer as may be authorized by law, after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to
be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
We find petitioners' thesis impressed with merit. Probable cause for a search is defined as such
facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe
that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense
are in the place sought to be searched. And when the search warrant applied for is directed
against a newspaper publisher or editor in connection with the publication of subversive
materials, as in the case at bar, the application and/or its supporting affidavits must contain a
specification, stating with particularity the alleged subversive material he has published or is
intending to publish. Mere generalization will not suffice. Thus, the broad statement in Col.
Abadilla's application that petitioner "is in possession or has in his control printing equipment
and other paraphernalia, news publications and other documents which were used and are all
continuously being used as a means of committing the offense of subversion punishable under
Presidential Decree 885, as amended ..." 12 is a mere conclusion of law and does not satisfy
the requirements of probable cause. Bereft of such particulars as would justify a finding of the
existence of probable cause, said allegation cannot serve as basis for the issuance of a search
warrant and it was a grave error for respondent judge to have done so.
Equally insufficient as basis for the determination of probable cause is the statement contained
in the joint affidavit of Alejandro M. Gutierrez and Pedro U. Tango, "that the evidence gathered
and collated by our unit clearly shows that the premises above- mentioned and the articles and
things above-described were used and are continuously being used for subversive activities in
conspiracy with, and to promote the objective of, illegal organizations such as the Light-a-Fire
Movement, Movement for Free Philippines, and April 6 Movement." 13
In mandating that "no warrant shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined by the
judge, ... after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce; 14 the Constitution requires no less than personal knowledge by the complainant
or his witnesses of the facts upon which the issuance of a search warrant may be justified.
In Alvarez v. Court of First Instance, 15 this Court ruled that "the oath required must refer to the
truth of the facts within the personal knowledge of the petitioner or his witnesses, because the
purpose thereof is to convince the committing magistrate, not the individual making the affidavit
and seeking the issuance of the warrant, of the existence of probable cause." As couched, the
quoted averment in said joint affidavit filed before respondent judge hardly meets the test of
sufficiency established by this Court in Alvarez case.
Another factor which makes the search warrants under consideration constitutionally
objectionable is that they are in the nature of general warrants. The search warrants describe
the articles sought to be seized in this wise:
1] All printing equipment, paraphernalia, paper, ink, photo
(equipment, typewriters, cabinets, tables,
communications/recording equipment, tape recorders, dictaphone
and the like used and/or connected in the printing of the "WE
FORUM" newspaper and any and all documents communication,
letters and facsimile of prints related to the "WE FORUM"
newspaper.
2] Subversive documents, pamphlets, leaflets, books, and other
publication to promote the objectives and piurposes of the
subversive organization known as Movement for Free Philippines, The President denied a request flied by government prosecutors for
Light-a-Fire Movement and April 6 Movement; and, sequestration of the WE FORUM newspaper and its printing
presses, according to Information Minister Gregorio S. Cendana.
3] Motor vehicles used in the distribution/circulation of the "WE
FORUM" and other subversive materials and propaganda, more On the basis of court orders, government agents went to the We
particularly, Forum offices in Quezon City and took a detailed inventory of the
equipment and all materials in the premises.
1] Toyota-Corolla, colored yellow with
Plate No. NKA 892; Cendaa said that because of the denial the newspaper and its
equipment remain at the disposal of the owners, subject to the
2] DATSUN pick-up colored white with discretion of the court. 19
Plate No. NKV 969
That the property seized on December 7, 1982 had not been sequestered is further confirmed
3] A delivery truck with Plate No. NBS by the reply of then Foreign Minister Carlos P. Romulo to the letter dated February 10, 1983 of
524; U.S. Congressman Tony P. Hall addressed to President Marcos, expressing alarm over the "WE
FORUM " case. 20 In this reply dated February 11, 1983, Minister Romulo stated:
4] TOYOTA-TAMARAW, colored white
with Plate No. PBP 665; and, 2. Contrary to reports, President Marcos turned down the
recommendation of our authorities to close the paper's printing
5] TOYOTA Hi-Lux, pick-up truck with
facilities and confiscate the equipment and materials it uses. 21
Plate No. NGV 427 with marking
"Bagong Silang." IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, Search Warrants Nos. 20-82[a] and 20-82[b] issued by
respondent judge on December 7, 1982 are hereby declared null and void and are accordingly
In Stanford v. State of Texas 16 the search warrant which authorized the search for "books,
set aside. The prayer for a writ of mandatory injunction for the return of the seized articles is
records, pamphlets, cards, receipts, lists, memoranda, pictures, recordings and other written
hereby granted and all articles seized thereunder are hereby ordered released to petitioners. No
instruments concerning the Communist Party in Texas," was declared void by the U.S. Supreme
costs.
Court for being too general. In like manner, directions to "seize any evidence in connectionwith
the violation of SDC 13-3703 or otherwise" have been held too general, and that portion of a SO ORDERED.
search warrant which authorized the seizure of any "paraphernalia which could be used to
violate Sec. 54-197 of the Connecticut General Statutes [the statute dealing with the crime of Fernando, C.J., Teehankee, Makasiar, Concepcion, Jr., Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Relova,
conspiracy]" was held to be a general warrant, and therefore invalid. 17 The description of the Gutierrez, Jr., De la Fuente and Cuevas, JJ., concur.
articles sought to be seized under the search warrants in question cannot be characterized
differently. Aquino, J., took no part.
In the Stanford case, the U.S. Supreme Courts calls to mind a notable chapter in English
history: the era of disaccord between the Tudor Government and the English Press, when
"Officers of the Crown were given roving commissions to search where they pleased in order to
suppress and destroy the literature of dissent both Catholic and Puritan Reference herein to
such historical episode would not be relevant for it is not the policy of our government to
suppress any newspaper or publication that speaks with "the voice of non-conformity" but poses
no clear and imminent danger to state security.
As heretofore stated, the premises searched were the business and printing offices of the
"Metropolitan Mail" and the "We Forum newspapers. As a consequence of the search and
seizure, these premises were padlocked and sealed, with the further result that the printing and
publication of said newspapers were discontinued.
Such closure is in the nature of previous restraint or censorship abhorrent to the freedom of the
press guaranteed under the fundamental law, 18 and constitutes a virtual denial of petitioners'
freedom to express themselves in print. This state of being is patently anathematic to a
democratic framework where a free, alert and even militant press is essential for the political
enlightenment and growth of the citizenry.
Respondents would justify the continued sealing of the printing machines on the ground that
they have been sequestered under Section 8 of Presidential Decree No. 885, as amended,
which authorizes "the sequestration of the property of any person, natural or artificial, engaged
in subversive activities against the government and its duly constituted authorities ... in
accordance with implementing rules and regulations as may be issued by the Secretary of
National Defense." It is doubtful however, if sequestration could validly be effected in view of the
absence of any implementing rules and regulations promulgated by the Minister of National
Defense.
Besides, in the December 10, 1982 issue of the Daily Express, it was reported that no less than
President Marcos himself denied the request of the military authorities to sequester the property
seized from petitioners on December 7, 1982. Thus: