Chavez vs Judicial and Bar Council

Facts:

In 1994, instead of having only 7 members, an eighth member was added to the JBC as two representatives from Congress began
sitting in the JBC one from the House of Representatives and one from the Senate, with each having one-half (1/2) of a vote.

Issue:

1. Are the conditions sine qua non for the exercise of the power of judicial review have been met in this case?

2. Is the JBCs practice of having members from the Senate and the House of Representatives making 8 instead of 7 sitting
members unconstitutional?

3. What is the effect of the Court's finding that the current composition of the JBC is unconstitutional?

Held:

1. Yes. The Courts power of judicial review is subject to several limitations, namely: (a) there must be an actual case or controversy
calling for the exercise of judicial power; (b) the person challenging the act must have standing to challenge; he must have a
personal and substantial interest in the case, such that he has sustained or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement;
(c) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and (d) the issue of constitutionality must be
the very lis mota of the case. Generally, a party will be allowed to litigate only when these conditions sine qua non are present,
especially when the constitutionality of an act by a co-equal branch of government is put in issue.

The Court disagrees with the respondents contention that petitioner lost his standing to sue because he is not an official nominee
for the post of Chief Justice. While it is true that a personal stake on the case is imperative to have locus standi, this is not to say
that only official nominees for the post of Chief Justice can come to the Court and question the JBC composition for being
unconstitutional. The JBC likewise screens and nominates other members of the Judiciary. Albeit heavily publicized in this regard,
the JBCs duty is not at all limited to the nominations for the highest magistrate in the land. A vast number of aspirants to judicial
posts all over the country may be affected by the Courts ruling. More importantly, the legality of the very process of nominations to
the positions in the Judiciary is the nucleus of the controversy. The claim that the composition of the JBC is illegal and
unconstitutional is an object of concern, not just for a nominee to a judicial post, but for all citizens who have the right to seek
judicial intervention for rectification of legal blunders.

2. Section 8, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution provides:

Section 8. (1) A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the supervision of the Supreme Court composed of the Chief
Justice as ex officio Chairman, the Secretary of Justice, and a representative of the Congress as ex officio Members, a
representative of the Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a retired Member of the Supreme Court, and a representative of the private
sector.

From a simple reading of the above-quoted provision, it can readily be discerned that the provision is clear and unambiguous. It
enumerates the ex officio or special members of the JBC composed of the Chief Justice, who shall be its Chairman, the Secretary
of Justice and a representative of Congress.

The use of the singular letter a preceding representative of Congress is unequivocal and leaves no room for any other
construction. It is indicative of what the members of the Constitutional Commission had in mind, that is, Congress may designate
only one (1) representative to the JBC. Had it been the intention that more than one (1) representative from the legislature would sit
in the JBC, the Framers could have, in no uncertain terms, so provided.

One of the primary and basic rules in statutory construction is that where the words of a statute are clear, plain, and free from
ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. It is a well-settled principle of
constitutional construction that the language employed in the Constitution must be given their ordinary meaning except where
technical terms are employed. As much as possible, the words of the Constitution should be understood in the sense they have in
common use. What it says according to the text of the provision to be construed compels acceptance and negates the power of the
courts to alter it, based on the postulate that the framers and the people mean what they say. Verba legis non est recedendum
from the words of a statute there should be no departure.

Applying the foregoing principle to this case, it becomes apparent that the word Congress used in Article VIII, Section 8(1) of the
Constitution is used in its generic sense. No particular allusion whatsoever is made on whether the Senate or the House of
Representatives is being referred to, but that, in either case, only a singular representative may be allowed to sit in the JBC.
It is worthy to note that the seven-member composition of the JBC serves a practical purpose, that is, to provide a solution should
there be a stalemate in voting. This underlying reason leads the Court to conclude that a single vote may not be divided into half
(1/2), between two representatives of Congress, or among any of the sitting members of the JBC for that matter. This unsanctioned
practice can possibly cause disorder and eventually muddle the JBCs voting process, especially in the event a tie is reached. The
aforesaid purpose would then be rendered illusory, defeating the precise mechanism which the Constitution itself created. While it
would be unreasonable to expect that the Framers provide for every possible scenario, it is sensible to presume that they knew that
an odd composition is the best means to break a voting deadlock.

The respondents insist that owing to the bicameral nature of Congress, the word Congress in Section 8(1), Article VIII of the
Constitution should be read as including both the Senate and the House of Representatives. They theorize that it was so worded
because at the time the said provision was being drafted, the Framers initially intended a unicameral form of Congress. Then, when
the Constitutional Commission eventually adopted a bicameral form of Congress, the Framers, through oversight, failed to amend
Article VIII, Section 8 of the Constitution.

It is evident that the definition of Congress as a bicameral body refers to its primary function in government to legislate. In the
passage of laws, the Constitution is explicit in the distinction of the role of each house in the process. The same holds true in
Congress non-legislative powers. An inter-play between the two houses is necessary in the realization of these powers causing a
vivid dichotomy that the Court cannot simply discount. This, however, cannot be said in the case of JBC representation because no
liaison between the two houses exists in the workings of the JBC. Hence, the term Congress must be taken to mean the entire
legislative department.

3. As a general rule, an unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates
no office; it is inoperative as if it has not been passed at all. This rule, however, is not absolute. Under the doctrine of operative
facts, actions previous to the declaration of unconstitutionality are legally recognized. They are not nullified. This is essential in the
interest of fair play.

The doctrine of operative fact, as an exception to the general rule, only applies as a matter of equity and fair play. It nullifies the
effects of an unconstitutional law by recognizing that the existence of a statute prior to a determination of unconstitutionality is an
operative fact and may have consequences which cannot always be ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial
declaration. The doctrine is applicable when a declaration of unconstitutionality will impose an undue burden on those who have
relied on the invalid law. Thus, it was applied to a criminal case when a declaration of unconstitutionality would put the accused in
double jeopardy or would put in limbo the acts done by a municipality in reliance upon a law creating it.3

Under the circumstances, the Court finds the exception applicable in this case and holds that notwithstanding its finding of
unconstitutionality in the current composition of the JBC, all its prior official actions are nonetheless valid.