(Political Parties in Context) Kay Lawson, Jorge Lanzaro-Political Parties and Democracy - Volume I - The Americas-Praeger (2010) PDF

Political Parties and
Democracy
Endorsements for Political Parties and Democracy
(See back cover for additional endorsements)
To learn about the state of party politics across the world, consult Kay
Lawsons sweeping five-volume publication, Political Parties and Democracy,
a monumental, up-to-date survey of party systems in 45 countries. The set
of books should be acquired by all research libraries and should sit on the
shelves of all scholars doing comparative research on political parties. It
provides a combination of breadth and depth, of comparative and particu-
lar analysis. While the strength of this multi-volume set lies in its rich and
convenient trove of information about party politics in regions and coun-
tries, it also makes important conceptual contributions upon which party
scholars may draw.
Kenneth Janda
Professor of Political Science, Northwestern University
Editing an excellent five-volume set of studies on parties in 46 system-

atically chosen countries seems an impossible mission. Yet, Kay Lawson
attests to the contrary. Teachers on democratic polities, students of com-
parative politics, and researchers on political parties can find in these
volumes a treasure of recent data, analysis, and comprehension. Country
chapters address a similar set of questions, and not fewer than 54 country
authors answer them with a wise combination of local expertise and sen-
sibility to more general issues of democratic theory. Lawson has been
extremely successful in putting forward a common framework examin-
ing the relationship between parties and democracy that is able to inte-
grate the study of regions as different as the Americas, Europe, Russia,
Asia, Africa, Oceania, and the Arab world. At the end, the five volumes
restate once again the utmost relevance of parties within an amazing di-
versity of political contexts, processes, and institutions. If sometimes
there are occasions in which a book is a must for its decisive contribution
to our knowledge on political parties, this is certainly one of them.
Jose Ramon Montero
Departamento de Ciencia Poltica y Relaciones Internacionales
Facultad de Derecho Universidad Aut onoma de Madrid
A pathbreaking collection of top-quality writings on party politics by

leading scholars around the world, Political Parties and Democracy opens
a genuinely new frontier of knowledge, expanding the scope of analysis
to the entire globe, combining theory with history, and raising a series
of new research questions.
Byung-Kook Kim
Professor, Department of Political Science, Korea University
This monumental work consists of five volumes with 46 chapters each
devoted to the parties of a different nation. Many of the party systems
included in the volumes are studied here for the first time in a system-
atic way with unprecedented levels of knowledge and competence by
authors who are native to the respective countries. The chapters are not
limited to summary descriptions of the systems they study, but present
extremely interesting and original insights. This is crucial for the useful-
ness and scientific relevance of the chapters dedicated to the more estab-
lished American, European and, in general, Western democracies party
systems, whose authors manage to present novel views of extensively
researched subject areas. Saying that with this work Kay Lawson has set
new standards for editorship in the field of political science would be an
obvious understatement. Political Parties and Democracy is the result of an
impressive project that will greatly benefit the scientific community. I am
sure that the five volumes it has produced will become fundamental
references for the field of political party studies and will take a very
prominent place in every party experts library.
Luciano Bardi
Professor of Political Science, University of Pisa
This welcome and remarkable collection of original essays covers

assessments of political parties in an unusually broad range of countries.
Taking into account the critical importance of parties for the operation of
democracy, juxtaposed with their weaknesses both as democratic organi-
zations and as agents of state democracy, results in clear and honest
assessments of the state of parties today. Bickerton on Canada and
Dwyre on the U.S. represent this well-reasoned approach with the confi-
dence that comes from a thorough understanding of their own countrys
situation.
Mildred A. Schwartz
Professor Emerita at University of Illinois and Visiting Scholar,
New York University
These volumes provide a valuable in-depth and up-to-date analysis of

the state of political parties across five continents, written by country
experts, and will be an important source for scholars interested in the
comparative study of political parties.
Lars Svasand
Professor of Comparative Politics, University of Bergen, Norway
Kay Lawsons Political Parties and Democracy is a tremendous success in giv-

ing readers the most recent information and insights about political parties
around the globe. The set includes not only excellent contributions on the
party systems that exemplify strong democratic regimes like the United
States and the United Kingdom, but careful insights on volatile party systems
in newer democracies such as Poland, and on systems still transitioning to
democratic rule in places as diverse as Kenya and Morocco. The universal
challenges to parties as linkage mechanisms in the early 20th century are
everywhere apparent.
Robin Kolodny
Associate Professor of Political Science, Temple University
Democracy
Five Volumes
Kay Lawson, General Editor
Volume I: The Americas

Kay Lawson and Jorge Lanzaro, Volume Editors
Volume II: Europe
Kay Lawson, Volume Editor
Volume III: Post-Soviet and Asian Political Parties
Baogang He, Anatoly Kulik, and Kay Lawson,
Volume Editors
Volume IV: Africa and Oceania
Luc Sindjoun, Marian Simms, and Kay Lawson,
Volume Editors
Volume V: The Arab World
Saad Eddin Ibrahim and Kay Lawson, Volume Editors
Political Parties in Context

Kay Lawson, Series Editor
Democracy
General Editor, Kay Lawson
Volume I: The Americas
KAY LAWSON AND JORGE LANZARO,

VOLUME EDITORS
Political Parties in Context

Kay Lawson, Series Editor
Copyright 2010 by Kay Lawson and Jorge Lanzaro
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced,

stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any
means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise,
except for the inclusion of brief quotations in a review, without prior
permission in writing from the publisher.
Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data

Political parties and democracy / Kay Lawson, set editor.
p. cm.(Political parties in context series)
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 978 0 275 98706 0 (hard copy : alk. paper)ISBN 978 0 313 08349 5
(ebook)ISBN 978 0 313 38314 4 (vol. 1 hard copy)ISBN 978 0 313 38315 1 (vol. 1
ebook)ISBN 978 0 313 38316 8 (vol. 2 hard copy)ISBN 978 0 313 38317 5 (vol. 2
ebook) 1. Political parties. 2. Democracy. I. Lawson, Kay.
JF2051.P5678 2010
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Contents
Political Parties and Democracy: Three Stages of Power

Kay Lawson xi
Introduction to Political Parties and Democracy: The Americas
Kay Lawson and Jorge Lanzaro xv
I North America 1
1 Parties and Democracy in Canada: Regional Fragmentation,
Institutional Inertia, and Democratic Deficit
James Bickerton 3
2 A Work in Progress: Parties and Democracy in the United States
Diana Dwyre 27
II Latin America 49
3 Political Parties and Democracy in Argentina: 1983 2008
Ana Mara Mustapic 51
4 Enlargement of Democracy and Changes in the Bolivian
Party System
Fernando Mayorga 73
5 Parties and Democracy in Brazil, 1985 2006: Moving toward
Cartelization
Jairo Nicolau 101
x Contents
6 Political Parties in Chile: Stable Coalitions, Inert Democracy

Alfredo Joignant 127
7 Political Parties and Democratization in Mexico:
The Endless Chain of Electoral Reforms
Esperanza Palma 149
8 How Does a Democracy with a Weak Party System Work?
The Peruvian Case
Martin Tanaka 173
9 Uruguay: Persistence and Change in an Old Party Democracy
Jorge Lanzaro 195
Notes 217
Contributors 249
Index 261
Political Parties and Democracy:
Three Stages of Power
Kay Lawson
Political Parties and Democracy consists of five volumes with 46 chapters,

each devoted to the parties of a different nation. The first volume is dedi-
cated to the Americas: Canada and the United States for North America,
and Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Peru, and Uruguay for
Central and South America. Volume II is on European parties: Denmark,
France, Germany, Italy, Norway, Spain, and the United Kingdom in the
West, and the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland in the East. Volume
III begins with four chapters on the parties of the post-Soviet nations of
Georgia, Moldova, Russia, and Ukraine and continues with the parties of
five Asian nations: China, India, Japan, Malaysia, and South Korea. Parties
in Africa and Oceania are the subject of Volume IV: Cameroon, Kenya,
Namibia, Nigeria, and South Africa, followed by Australia, Fiji, New Zea-
land, Samoa, and the Solomon Islands. Finally, Volume V is devoted first
and foremost to the Arab world, beginning with the parties of Algeria,
Egypt, Lebanon, Mauritania, and Morocco and continuing with the parties
of two neighboring states in which Arab politics play an important role:
Israel and Turkey. All authors are themselves indigenous to the nation
they write about. Indigenous1 co-editors, whose essays introduce each
section, have helped recruit the authors and guide the development of
xii Political Parties and Democracy
their chapters; final editing has been my responsibility as general editor,

and the final volume concludes with my Conclusion to the Set.
The purpose of each chapter is to examine the relationship between
political parties and democracy, providing the necessary historical, socio-
economic, and institutional context as well as the details of contempor-
ary political tensions between the two. To understand this relationship
requires a serious effort to understand as well the basic nature of the
state. That nature shapes the work of the parties. Whatever mission they
give themselves, it is control of the state that they seek. Without that
power, programs are mere words on paper or in cyberspace.
Parties are expected to provide the key building blocks of democracy
by forming a strong link between citizens and the state. It is a challenge
fledging parties commonly accept, because promising to establish a
government in keeping with the will of the people is the best way to
achieve adequate support and wrest power away from nondemocratic
leadership. Even todays most democratic and established parties trace
their roots to that primeval calculation and the struggle it entails. Many
of the parties studied here are still trapped in that early stage.
Some of the parties formed to wage the battle for democracy have
accepted defeat, at least for now, and live on only in puppet-like roles
that permit them to share the perquisites but not the substance of
power. Others have only recently formed organizations strong enough
to have led the way forward from dictatorship and are still working
out the new relationship. They came to power waving the banners of
democracy, but they are not necessarily bound or able to obey its
precepts once in power. In some cases, the move to democratic gover-
nance has been short-lived and military, religious, or ethnic autocracy
has retaken control.
Still other parties, such as the ones scholars in the West have studied
hardest and longest, have thrived for many years as more or less genu-
ine agencies of democracy, but are now gradually but perceptibly
moving forward to a third stage of power. Serious links to the populace
no longer seem to be necessary, as the central organization becomes
expert at using the tools of political marketing and the victorious party
leaders adopt policies that satisfy their most powerful supporters.
Moving steadily away from participatory linkage, parties tend to main-
tain a degree of responsive linkage, but the answer to the question
of to whom they are responsive is not necessarily a reassuringly demo-
cratic one.
In short, the development of political parties over the past century is
the story of three stages in the pursuit of power: liberation, democra-
tization, and dedemocratization. In every volume of Political Parties and
Democracy the reader will find parties at all three stages. Sometimes the
story of liberation will be part of the recent history that must be under-
stood; in other chapters the unfinished quest for freedom is the only
Political Parties and Democracy xiii
story that can yet be told. Sometimes the tale of post-liberation democra-
tization is very much a work in progress (and perhaps a dubious one).
Sometimes dedemocratization takes the form of accepting failure under
impossible circumstances after the first joys of liberation have been
tasted, and sometimes it is a more deliberate effort to escape the bounds
of what still hungry leaders consider a too successful democratization.
Understanding parties and their relationship with democracy means
understanding the stage of power their leadership has reached.
Is democracy always dependent on parties, or are there other agen-
cies capable of forcing governments to act on behalf of the entire
demos? Perhaps mass movements working via the Internet can be used
to hasten liberation, fine tune democratization, and even to forestall
dedemocratization. Possibly in the future such movements will not only
help the parties take control of the state, but then tame them to live in
comfortable league with democracy, offering party leaders sufficient
rewards for staying in power democratically and followers better
designed instruments for reasonable but effective participation.
However, party democracy, cybertized, is still no more than an inter-
esting dream, and one that goes well beyond the purview of these stud-
ies. What one can find in Political Parties and Democracy is the actual
state of the play of the game.
Introduction to Political Parties
and Democracy: The Americas
Kay Lawson and Jorge Lanzaro
Volume I of Political Parties and Democracy presents nine chapters

written about political parties in the Americas. The book begins with
the two North American nations, Canada and the United States, and
continues with seven Latin American party systems: Argentina, Bolivia,
Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Peru, and Uruguay. Among the nine the nature
of the relationship between parties and democracy varies enormously,
not only between the two Americas but also within them and within
each nation over time. In these chapters parties are found working at
all three stages of power described in the Set Introduction: seeking lib-
eration from tyranny, trying to make that liberation work via democra-
tization, and, finally, showing signs of moving forward into seeking to
maintain power by dedemocratization.
Of course, these distinctions only begin to characterize the complex
nature of each party system, as presented by authors indigenous to the
nations they write about. Their insights allow us to penetrate much more
deeply. From firsthand knowledge and experience, these authors pro-
vide the historical and socioeconomic as well as political and structural
context needed to understand that complexity and how it has evolved.
The authors candor is refreshing, their own evaluations intriguing, their
xvi Introduction
knowledge unparalleled, and their documentation strong and convinc-

ing. Brief summaries of each chapter are presented here.
Canada, says James Bickerton, has had four different party systems
over the course of its history. Although the latest systems have had
strong components of internal party democracy, the picture is not as
simple as it once was. Canadian party members are still given a strong
role to play in choosing leaders, but many of the participatory opportu-
nities formerly available at the local level have disappeared:
Local party organizations are restricted to door-to-door canvassing or
greeting the leaders tour as it passes through town. The decisions to
de-democratize find echos in the public mind as Canadian voters have
become ever less politically ideological, ever less partisan. The party
elite remain strong within government, and Canadian democracy
remains stable, but nonetheless, the signs of a slow uncoupling of party
from the demos are unmistakeable.
Diana Dwyre makes clear that the process is considerably more
advanced in the United States, where political elites have been able to
assume ever stronger control of parties ever less controlled by their
members. In the United States, candidates build their own organizations
to struggle for the nomination; the parties wait, and then become organi-
zations in service to those who win the nomination. They play a cen-
tral role in structuring politics and in putting particular individuals in
positions of power or influence and in that respect do serve the institu-
tional apparatus of democracy. Nor is responsive linkage to the people
entirely absent: U.S. parties and their candidates use the Internet to stay
in touch with voters opinions and formulate programs responding to
what they learn, to the extent they can do so and not lose the major
donors whom they must satisfy in order to meet the incredibly high costs
of campaigning. The efforts of grassroots organizations working to build
mass movements to pressure parties, candidates, and victors to provide
more democratic leadership also appear to have had some success
recently. However, as Dwyre shows in detail, the tide of dedemocratiza-
tion has come very far ashore; it is far from certain that it can be forced
to retreat by even the most relentless activists.
In North America political parties may be becoming steadily less
dependable as agencies of democratization, but in South America the
struggle for liberation has much more recently and in some cases
much more tenuously been won, meaning that the battle is still on to
make each nations grip on democratization more secure. Political par-
ties may still find it in their interests to try to serve that aspiration, but
strong forces are still at work against them and against the establish-
ment of a true democracy. Seven authors show us how difficult the
promise is to keep and the varying degrees of success achieved.
The strength and persistence of different forms of Peronism makes
the Argentine case unique, but those qualities, as Ana Maria Mustapic
Introduction xvii
ably shows, have not ensured the establishment of governments ruling

in keeping with the will of the people. Mustapic demonstrates how
institutional factors within the parties and in the external regulations
imposed upon them have contributed to the increasing fragmentation
of the party system and how at the same time Argentine voters have
become ever more skeptical and ever more demanding. Departidization
is strong and the independent electorate is steadily growing. The par-
ties have fought to retain their hold on power by personalizing the
electoral process but offer programs so lacking in feasibility that voter
disappointment inevitably grows, as does the frequency of presidential
resignations. As a result, government stability not to mention progress
toward a working democracy has been put at seemingly eternal risk.
Bolivia is another case where leadership has been strongly personal-
ized, but the story of the evolving relationship between party and
democracy in this nation, as told by Fernando Mayorga, is a very dif-
ferent one. In 1982 Bolivia returned to civilian rule and for 14 years Bo-
livian democracy functioned under a hybrid kind of presidential
regimen, a mixed electoral system and a moderate multi-partyism.
During that time economic, territorial, and ethnocultural conflicts
shaped and partially reformed the party system, helping to make possi-
ble the election in 2006 of Edo Morales, the leader of Bolivias large
Indian peasant community. Morales has made profound reforms in the
electoral system and created important new fora for citizen participa-
tion in the process of decision making, giving leading roles to social
movements rather than the parties. Mayorga offers interesting views on
how well these changes are likely to strengthen Bolivias democracy
permanently.
Jairo Nicolau carefully evaluates the arguments associating democ-
racy with strong parties before offering his examination of whether that
relationship holds good in contemporary Brazil. He finds that although
Brazil is, by any of the usual criteria, a democracy, that democracy does
not depend on strong parties. Instead, the parties are now so heavily
controlled by government regulations from provisions of the electoral
system to control of their access to the media and public funding of
their budgets that their independence from the state is seriously com-
promised. They do not campaign programmatically. Once in office,
members of the legislature show high party discipline for each vote
taken, but they also switch parties in midsession frequently and easily;
it is discipline without cohesion. Overall, Brazilian parties fail to
meet the expectations of the responsible party model; for Nicolau they
more closely fit the model of cartelization.
Chiles contemporary democracy is founded on the overthrow of tyr-
anny in the quite recent past, yet this is the nation with Latin Americas
longest experience of stable democratic government by party, counting
the years prior to the Pinochet takeover in 1973. The nations
xviii Introduction
exceptionalism now takes, says Alfredo Joignant, a different form, as

two opposing coalitions of parties have succeeded in imposing and
remaining strong under an electoral system which allows them and
only them to alternate in power, each supported by far less than a
majority of the voting age population. The result is a kind of inert de-
mocracy, one at present utterly incapable of assimilating and reflect-
ing more recent tendencies in public opinion.
Mexico is still very much in the process of transition to democracy.
Esperanza Palma finds that the long, slow movement toward alterna-
tion of power, finally achieved in the 2000 presidential election, has
produced a far more open political system, permitting parties to
become the channels of interests and discontent as never before, and
that the more thoroughly institutionalized party system has brought
with it new levels of political stability. However, the party that has
made itself the strongest agency for transmitting demands of the hith-
erto unrepresented (or inadequately represented) continues to show,
she says, a disturbing readiness to continue the use of dubious means
of protest that were more defensible under the authoritarian rule of the
past. Continuing disputes over electoral rules, especially when electoral
outcomes are seen as rigged, compound the problem. Is democracy
about outcomes or about procedures? Can Mexico end at last the end-
less chain of electoral reforms? Stability says please. Equity may say
no, not yet.
Martin Tanaka describes how Peru also had earlier periods when
parties at least attempted to open the political system but such oppor-
tunities were limited and quickly repressed by the recurrence of mili-
tary rule, the last period of which ended in 1980, only to be followed in
the 1990s by the self-coup of Alberto Fujimori, which brought autoc-
racy back to power for another decade. After early popularity owing to
success in combating two insurgent terrorist movements and making
neo-liberal economic reforms many felt were overdue, Fujimori was
brought down by corruption scandals and dubious election procedures
in 2000. Although the work of liberation continues and redemocratiza-
tion is in process, the serious weakening of the parties during the Fuji-
mori era allows a neo-liberal technocratic elite to remain effectively in
charge, says Tanaka, and political promises of redistributive social poli-
cies (in one of the poorest nations in the world) remain unfulfilled.
Uruguay is the oldest democracy in Latin America, even after subtract-
ing for two authoritarian breakdowns. After summarizing the historical
background, Jorge Lanzaro describes the new party system that came
into existence after the end of military dictatorship in 1984 and was fol-
lowed soon thereafter by constitutional and electoral law reforms. The
neo-liberal transition of the 1990s has been followed more recently by
political change, as the nation turns to the left, but Uruguay has maintained
a pluralist system with effective competition throughout. Nonetheless, some
Introduction xix
of the changes have altered the relationship between parties and democracy.
The new electoral system means there are fewer political and ideological
offers, the practice of compromise presidentialism has been replaced by
exclusive majority presidentialism, and the long-lived tradition of having
two dominant parties has been transformed into a multiparty system led by
a new party of the left. The parties are still working democratically, and
democracy is still working. But it is different now.
These brief summaries cannot do much more than whet the appetite.
As French is the beloved second language of both volume co-editors,
we cheerfully wish you bon appetit.
PART I
North America
CHAPTER 1
Parties and Democracy in

Canada: Regional Fragmentation,
Institutional Inertia, and
Democratic Deficit
James Bickerton
INTRODUCTION
Canadas political party system has undergone some dramatic changes
over the past century, yet in terms of its essential dynamics it has
remained fairly constant. The role of political parties in the democratic
process has been important, and in some respects indispensable, but a
role not always or in every way virtuous and positive. This chapter will
investigate this mixed record of performance through an examination of
the characteristics and competitive dynamics of Canadas party system,
considered within the context of the broader political system, and in
particular the shaping effects of federalism, regionalism, and the first-
past-the-post electoral system. Although these institutional and cultural
features of the Canadian political landscape have sometimes exerted a
dampening, if not perverse, effect on Canadian democracy, they have not
prevented (and have sometimes contributed to) successive waves of
democratic reform that affect the operation of parties, their relationship
with voters, and the contours of the party system itself.
FOUR CANADIAN PARTY SYSTEMS

Of first importance in Canadas party system is that it has not always
been as it is today in terms of the number of political parties or the na-
ture of their electoral appeals and bases of support, but that there have
nevertheless been certain enduring constants within Canadas party
politics.
4 Political Parties and Democracy
The most popular interpretation of Canadas party system is to view

it through the lens of four distinct stages or eras of party competition.1
The first period of party politics spanned the half century from
Canadas origins as a federation in 1867 until 1921, the year of the first
general election following World War I. The Canadian political system
established by the British North America Act in 1867 combined the
principles of both Westminster-style parliamentary democracy and
U.S.-style federalism, the potential contradictions of which (for exam-
ple, supremacy of Parliament versus divided sovereignty) led at least
one notable scholar to predict its inevitable failure.2 And over the first
quarter century of Confederation it appeared this assessment might be
borne out, as federal provincial conflict raged both in the courts and
at the ballot box over the meaning and extent of the powers allocated
in the constitution to the central and regional governments, respec-
tively. Yet by the end of the 19th century, these disagreements over
what kind of federation Canada would be (centralized versus decen-
tralized) were more or less resolved, with both political and judicial
influences acting to scale back the central governments early attempts
to dominate the provinces and diminish the scope of their powers.3
Party competition during these early decades of Confederation took
the form of a classic two-party system, which is a normal feature of po-
litical systems that use the simple plurality or first-past-the-post elec-
toral system. The Liberal and Conservative parties operated as broad
national parties, alternating in power and building electoral coalitions
comprised of different regions, classes, religions, and language groups.
As noted by Andre Siegfried in his classic study The Race Question in
Canada (1907), politics was primarily a battle over the spoils of power
between the Ins and Outs, unsullied by ideological principle and
focused on parochial concerns at the local level. For Siegfried, the one
defining characteristic of Canadian politics was the smoldering antago-
nism between the English-speaking majority and the French-speaking
minority two nations warring within the bosom of a single state.4
Not that there werent some basic differences between the parties, in
particular surrounding the question of commercial relations with the
U.S. and imperial ties with Britain. These differences certainly helped
to structure the vote during this period by defining the core support
base for each party and occasionally realigning the partisan loyalties of
the electorate (such as in the elections of 1896 and 1911).5
This combination of classic two-party competition and highly person-
alized politics, with its focus on the use of patronage, policy, and patriotic
appeals to build and maintain national party organizations and winning
electoral coalitions, had the additional salutary effect over time of inte-
grating a diverse polity and constructing a viable nation-state. The first
party system, however, did not survive the nationalist imperialist cross-
pressures generated by World War I. The issue that proved particularly
Parties and Democracy in Canada 5
vexing for Canadas two national parties was conscription, the need for
which was strongly supported by British Canadians and adamantly
opposed by French Canadians. It not only divided Canada politically
along ethno-linguistic lines but also provoked street riots and military
suppression in Quebec and reduced the Liberal Party to a largely French-
speaking rump facing a bipartisan Unionist Party and government.
Although the country was fortunate to escape the horrors and lasting
enmities that would have been generated by armed civil conflict or the
corrosive effects on national unity and political stability of an organized
separatist movement in the French-speaking province of Quebec, the po-
litical effects and aftermath of the wartime experience were nonetheless
both profound and long lasting.
The system-changing election of 1921 did more than unseat the Con-
servatives and bring the Liberals back to power, in the pattern of previ-
ous elections. The second-place finisher was an upstart agrarian party,
the Progressives, who captured a majority of the seats in western
Canada. There were also a number of independent Labour candidates
elected across the country in industrialized urban centers. The appear-
ance of these new actors in both national and provincial political arenas
marked the increasing salience of class and regional cleavages in a
rapidly urbanizing and industrializing Canada; their electoral success,
especially at this time for agrarian parties like the Progressives, marked
the failure of the traditional parties to moderate and contain rising
political tensions and conflicts.
This change in the number and character of political parties, as well
as other changes that followed in the wake of the war, was effectively
the beginning of Canadas second party system. The old-line parties
may have been able to stave off the challenge of the new parties and
for a short time restore normal politics, but the social and political
strains that accompanied the 1930s depression altered once and for all
the old pattern of party allegiances. Two new parties the socialist Co-
operative Commonwealth Federation (CCF) and the populist Social
Credit Party appeared in the election of 1935 and quickly established
durable voter bases in western Canada (and for the CCF significant
pockets of support in the east), permanently altering the political land-
scape and the dynamics of electoral politics federally and in a number
of provinces.6
Unlike the first party system, the second was a multiparty affair
dominated by one party: the Liberals. Canadas longest serving prime
minister, Mackenzie King, governed for all but five years between 1921
and 1948, with his hand-picked successor Louis St. Laurent governing
for another nine. Facing a divided opposition and a weak Conservative
Party (renamed the Progressive Conservatives in 1942), the Liberals
were able to win a record five consecutive majority governments.
During this period the foundations of the modern welfare state were
laid, and foreign, defense, and commercial policies were pursued that
weaned Canada from its colonial past and British ties toward greater
continental cooperation and integration with the United States. This
substitution of imperial relationships in effect, swapping a declining
great power for the worlds emergent superpower was not accom-
plished without creating tensions within the national fabric and psyche.
Indeed, Canadas relationship with the United States always had been
fraught with tension, with Canadians alternately repelled by their fear
of disappearing into the great U.S. economic and cultural maw and
attracted by the dynamism of the United States, its apparently insatia-
ble demand for Canadian resources, and the opportunities presented
by its huge consumer market.7
The long reign of the Liberals during the second party system fos-
tered the close integration of party and state. This government party
syndrome, as described by Reginald Whitaker, thrived on the circula-
tion of party and bureaucratic elites and the use of state spending to
maintain party organization and support in the regions.8 This use of
the state for partisan purposes, however, is mainly attributable to the
one-party dominance of government during this era, rather than to
rampant corruption. Indeed, a key development during this period was
the modernization of the Canadian state through the installation of a
professional, merit-based bureaucracy charged with administering uni-
versal programs based on nonselective criteria. The installation of a
modern state apparatus increasingly constrained and constricted the
use of traditional forms of partisan patronage as a basis for party orga-
nization. Indeed, from a partisan perspective, the weakness of this
ministerialist system of party organization, and the cause of its even-
tual downfall, was the concentration of both government and party
functions in the hands of government elites who were increasingly pre-
occupied with the tasks of administration and governance. Over time,
party affairs and concerns tended to be neglected, and when control
over state spending and programs was ceded after an eventual election
loss, party organization collapsed as well.
Canadas original two-party system buckled under the growing
diversity of demands and interests in post World War I Canada, espe-
cially regional and class antagonisms. Yet despite these shocks, the
traditional parties were able to adapt, with the Liberals becoming the
dominant party based on their superior ability to aggregate and accom-
modate the interests of different regions, classes, and language groups in
classic brokerage style. Mackenzie King was particularly adept at this
process, doing nothing by halves that could be done by quarters . . . and
never taking sides, because he never allowed sides to take shape.9 While
perhaps this cautious, managerial approach was a recipe for managing
tensions and maintaining political stability, it did not produce inspiring
leadership or seek to frame the task of governance in lofty ideals and
goals. Critics from the left opined the absence of a creative and progres-
sive politics in a nation seemingly obsessed by an overriding concern
with political stability and national unity.10 And nationalists on both the
left and the right were critical of policies that seemed to encourage
(or did nothing to discourage) the increasing economic and cultural inte-
gration of Canada with the United States, a trend that produced grow-
ing unease about Canadas sovereignty, identity, and development
prospects.11
Nor were the elite-dominated organization, brokerage fixation, and
managerial philosophy of a successful Liberal Party conducive to a
vibrant, inclusive, and participatory party democracy. Although there
were some limited advances on this front, such as the introduction of
delegate conventions for choosing party leaders and the gradual exten-
sion of the franchise to excluded groups beginning with women in
1921, Asians in 1948, and finally Aboriginal Canadians living on
reserves in 1960 a genteel elitism, racism, inequality, and intolerance
toward minorities continued to color popular attitudes, government
policies, and social structures. John Porters renowned study of the
character of Canadian society and politics in the 1950s, titled The Verti-
cal Mosaic, reflected his findings of an established hierarchy of ethnic,
linguistic, racial, gender, and class inequalities that left the upper
reaches of Canadian political, economic, and social institutions domi-
nated by unilingual, white, protestant males of British heritage.12
Challenges to this exclusive, elite-dominated political system during
this period tended to come from primarily Western-based protest par-
ties steeped in British socialist and American populist traditions and
advocating a more egalitarian society and/or direct democracy. One of
these prairie populist movement parties (the CCF) evolved into a
mainstream, labor-affiliated, social democratic party (the New Demo-
cratic Party), which has continued to be the primary alternative on the
left for Canadian voters.
In the 1960s, the role within and relationship between political par-
ties and Canadian democracy changed again. It was the ever-deepening
relationship with the United States and its implications for Canadian
sovereignty that became a key issue in the eventual political defeat of
the St. Laurent Liberals at the hands of an ardent defender of Canadas
traditional values and British ties, John Diefenbaker. Diefenbakers Pro-
gressive Conservatives won a narrow minority in 1957, quickly fol-
lowed by a massive majority the largest in proportional terms in
Canadian history. But Dief the Chief, as he came to be known, is
generally acknowledged to have been a better leader of the opposition
than prime minister, and it did not take long for his rancorous govern-
ing style to alienate voters, especially in Canadas large urban centers.
Even more problematic was his failure to develop a support base
among French Canadians, who were repelled by the Chiefs views on
the national question that were so popular in rural English Canada.

As a result of these and other factors, the massive majority of 1958 was
turned into a minority in 1962 and then to electoral defeat in 1963, ush-
ering in Canadas third party system.13
After the Diefenbaker interlude, the Liberals once again became
Canadas dominant party, although the parties themselves, and the
competitive dynamics of the party system, were substantially altered.
One important political institution, however, remained unchanged. The
single member, simple plurality (or first-past-the-post) electoral system
continuously distorted voter preferences by over-representing the
strongest party, while conversely punishing smaller parties with diffuse
national support. The electoral system distorted election outcomes in
other ways as well, exaggerating the regional character of some parties,
while denying any regional seats to others despite significant support
within those electorates. According to Alan Cairns in his classic study,
both parties and voters in Canada were ill-served by this electoral sys-
tem, which did not consistently deliver the systems one purported
benefit majority governments but did seriously distort the partisan
complexion of regional electorates, thereby exaggerating the role and
importance of regionalism within Canadian politics.14
Canadas third party system was forged in the political cauldron of
four elections in rapid succession 1962, 1963, 1965, and 1968 with
only the last producing a majority government. Under Lester Pearson,
a former Nobel Peace Prize laureate, the Liberals came to power in
1963, and did not give up control of the government until 1984 (save
for a short stint in opposition in 1979). The prime minister for most of
this period was Pierre Trudeau, a Quebec intellectual who came to
Ottawa as one of the so-called three wise men recruited by Pearson to
develop a federal response to the rise of Quebec nationalism and more
ominously an independence/separatist movement in that province. The
decade also saw the rapid rise of yet another regional party at the fed-
eral level, the Quebec-based Creditistes, a populist party that per-
sisted until the election of 1980. The third party system, however, was
primarily a three-party affair, with the Liberal and Progressive Con-
servative parties contesting for power and the smaller New Democratic
Party (NDP) vying for left-of-center votes and occasionally acting as the
spoiler or holding the balance of power in minority situations
(1962 1968, 1972 1974, 1979).15
The profound changes taking place in Canadian society during this
period progressive urbanization, expansion of a well-educated and rel-
atively affluent middle class, the increasingly multicultural character of
society (especially in the major cities), and the changing role and status of
women as they made advances in their struggle for equality profoundly
affected the dynamics of party competition and placed new demands
on political parties. During this period the governing Liberals adopted a
social democratic mantle, stemming potential gains for the left-of-center

NDP while successfully crafting a national unity/national identity strat-
egy based on the policies of bilingualism and multiculturalism. This rein-
forced and expanded upon the partys traditional support base among
French Canadians and visible minorities. At the same time, Diefenbakers
populist appeal displaced both the Liberals and smaller regional parties
in the West, and by coalescing opposition to the Liberals, made his Pro-
gressive Conservative Party a competitive alternative to the Liberals at
the national level.
It should be noted that Diefenbakers accomplishment is attributable
in part to the decline in salience of Canadas British Empire connec-
tions, obviating the rationale for the protectionist commercial policy
that had become an albatross around the Conservative Partys neck in
the resource-producing regions of Canada, and allowing the party to
appeal to a broader constituency in English-speaking Canada. The
Liberals, with a secure Quebec base but virtually shut out of western
Canada after 1958, were forced to pursue majorities in urban Ontario, a
strategy sometimes thwarted by the presence of the NDP and its oscil-
lating appeal to left-of-center voters. The overall result was the absence
of truly national parties that were competitive in all regions and the
ever-present possibility of minority governments.16
There were a number of positive developments regarding political
parties and democracy during this period. One of these concerned the
regulatory context for parties and elections. The passage of the Election
Expenses Act during a period of minority government in 1974 placed
limits on the amount of money parties could spend during election
periods, imposed legal requirements on parties to disclose the names of
donors, and used the tax system to encourage individuals to donate to
parties, thereby broadening the financing of parties beyond corpora-
tions, unions, and wealthy private donors. All of this had the effect of
placing limits on and making more transparent the role of money in
party and electoral politics and began the process of moving parties
away from their dependence on large (and presumably influential) con-
tributors to party coffers.17
The parties also experienced a dramatic expansion of their member-
ship numbers during this period and actively recruited women and
minorities to join their ranks. Party conventions became more open and
participatory, with typically thousands of delegates congregating to
choose new leaders and discuss policy resolutions. At the same time,
progress in terms of getting more women and minorities elected to Par-
liament was painfully slow, and the parties were often criticized as a
barrier to progress. Beyond selecting new leaders and periodically pass-
ing judgment on their performance, member participation tended to
be shallow, sporadic, and largely meaningless in terms of deciding
party policies. Even member recruitment tended to occur only during
leadership contests or elections, with participation spiking only to be

followed by a dramatic fall-off in membership numbers and participa-
tion between these episodes.18
A profound test of the sturdiness and resiliency of Canadian democ-
racy during the last quarter of the 20th century was the commitment
on the part of all political parties, both within Quebec and at the fed-
eral level, to resolve democratically the question of Quebecs place
within Canada. During Trudeaus years as prime minister (1968 1979;
1980 1984), the arguments for Quebec independence versus Canadian
federalism were put forward primarily by the provincial Parti
Quebecois on one side and the provincial and federal Liberal parties on
the other. Following Trudeaus retirement, two consecutive election vic-
tories by Brian Mulroneys Progressive Conservatives each time with
a majority of Quebecs seats altered the tenor and content of the
national unity debate, as did the creation in 1990 of the Bloc Quebecois
as a sovereigntist option for Quebecers at the federal level. In 1980
and again in 1995, a referendum in Quebec was held on the issue, with
the federalist side winning comfortably in the former but only barely in
the latter. Yet in over three decades of constitutional discussions, elec-
tions, and referenda, the notion that Quebecs future would be decided
by Quebecers themselves, through democratic means, was never seri-
ously questioned.19
One significant outcome of this protracted national self-examination
and questioning was the patriation (from the United Kingdom) and
reform of the Canadian constitution. The adoption of the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms in 1982, the crowning achievement of
Trudeaus tenure as prime minister, substantially altered both the sub-
stance of Canadian politics and the character of the Canadian political
system. Canada became a constitutional democracy with the courts
assuming a prominent role in interpreting and enforcing constitutional
law, thereby limiting the purview of parliaments and political execu-
tives. This was particularly the case with regard to the individual and
group rights constitutionally entrenched by the Charter. Rights
quickly became an important part of the Canadian political conversa-
tion, and the Charter itself which in addition to the standard list of
liberal rights and freedoms includes sections on minority language,
Aboriginal, multicultural, and gender rights a compelling focus for
Canadian identity and national unity.20
Brian Mulroneys second mandate as prime minister from 1988 to 1993
was marked by conflict, controversy, and ultimately a spectacular col-
lapse of voter support for his governing Progressive Conservatives, by
then under the leadership of his successor (the only woman ever to serve
as Canadian prime minister, Kim Campbell). Two new regional parties
emerged from the wreckage of the Progressive Conservatives: the sepa-
ratist Bloc Quebecois and the western-based, neo-conservative Reform
Party, each of which served a term as Canadas official opposition to the

governing Liberals, who were returned to power under the leadership of
Jean Chretien. This electoral earthquake, which also saw the NDP
reduced to near obscurity, heralded the end of the third party system and
the onset of the most regionalized and ideological brand of party politics
in Canadian history. The issues that triggered this turnabout were consti-
tutional and economic: two failed constitutional accords that were meant
to revise and supplement the 1982 changes (which were opposed by
Quebec) and a hotly contested free trade agreement with the United
States, followed in short order by a deteriorating fiscal and economic sit-
uation. In the process, many Canadians especially conservative voters
in western Canada and francophone Quebecers who had given their sup-
port to Mulroney after abandoning the Liberals in 1984 became alien-
ated from the governing Progressive Conservatives, but also from the
brokerage-style politics being practiced by all three national parties.21
The Liberals yielded their latest hold on power in 2006, but not
before passing new party and election finance legislation that elimi-
nated corporate and union donations to parties while providing them
with annual public subsidies. Although the ability of parties to solicit
money from individual Canadians continues to be important to their
success, more than ever in Canadian history they are treated and regu-
lated as public institutions, sustained by a relatively secure and
untainted source of public funds. Ironically, the changes in party
financing under the Liberals proved to be of greater financial benefit to
their erstwhile opponents: the Bloc Quebecois and the new Conserva-
tive Party (created in 2003 from a merger of the former Progressive
Conservatives and the Reform-cum-Canadian Alliance Party). The
changes were consolidated and further extended by the new Conserva-
tive government led by Stephen Harper, who took advantage of public
backlash against revelations of Liberal Party corruption in Quebec (the
so-called sponsorship scandal) to reduce the Liberals to minority status
in 2004 and to propel his own party to a minority win in 2006.22
THIRD PARTY FORMATION AND REPRESENTATION

Clearly, many Canadians were alienated from and angry with the
mainstream political parties in 1993, but apparently not with political
parties per se. In the span of just a few years, two new political parties
were able to attract significant organizational, financial, and electoral
support, especially in those regions of the country most disaffected
with politics as usual. While this represented a crisis for particular
parties and transformed the party system, it confirmed that political
parties remained the primary means of registering political protest and
that change, renewal, and renovation of parties and the party system
were still possible. New parties could form and succeed; old parties
could decline and even disappear if they failed to adapt to a changing

environment or respond adequately to voter concerns, demands, and
preferences. Party system change, in this sense, may be interpreted as a
sign of the health and vitality of Canadian democracy, rather than evi-
dence of its crisis or decrepitude.
Canada has long been something of an exception among the Anglo-
American countries in terms of third party or minor party formation.
Although only two parties have ever formed the government in Canada
(Liberal and Conservative, or some variant thereof), since 1921 the
party system has included three to five parties with elected members of
Parliament. Most of the smaller parties have had distinct regional bases
of support, even if presenting themselves as national alternatives with
candidates in all regions. Others have had no such pretensions beyond
their regional appeal.23
Various explanations have been offered for this propensity for third-
party formation (and success). Some have been case or situation specific,
such as C. B. MacPhersons interpretation of Albertas quasi-party
tradition, the origins of which, he argued, lay in its neo-colonial re-
lationship with eastern Canada and its homogeneous agrarian class
structure.24 Other perspectives on third-party formation have been more
generally applicable, such as Maurice Pinards theory of minor party for-
mation purporting to explain the Creditiste phenomenon in Quebec by
citing the coincidence of two factors one-party dominance, combined
with conditions of political or economic strain which together create a
structural conduciveness to third-party formation.25 Other explana-
tions, commonly presented by scholars of Canadian federalism, have tar-
geted the interaction of Canadas political institutions: the workings of
the electoral system in a regionally divided society, the concentration of
power and rigid party discipline typical of the Westminster form of par-
liamentary government, and finally Canadas decentralized federalism,
which makes provinces possessed of substantial autonomy, revenues,
and powers discrete political arenas worthy of political contestation,
providing minor parties with both a raison dêtre and political suste-
nance if they are successful in capturing provincial power.26
Certainly federalism has had a major impact on party organization and
behavior. As noted, a number of parties have existed, and in some cases
governed, primarily or exclusively at the provincial level.27 For the most
part, federal and provincial parties and party systems remain separate and
distinct, despite the coincidence of party labels. Indeed, federal and pro-
vincial wings of the same party may be quite hostile toward each other.28
This lack of national integration of parties in Canada can have both nega-
tive and positive effects for Canadian democracy. On the negative side,
it reduces the role that parties can play in securing political stability and
regional representation through the accommodation of diverse regional
interests within broad-based national parties. A highly regionalized party
system itself exacerbates regionalism; it distorts regional interests and iden-

tities by frequently misrepresenting regional voter preferences within par-
liament. This can become a self-perpetuating cycle where regions that
perceive themselves as poorly represented within particular parties or gov-
ernments become alienated from those parties and therefore less likely to
vote for them.29
On the positive side, minor parties have performed several roles histor-
ically that can be seen to be valuable to a vibrant democracy. For instance,
they have been key sources of both policy and organizational innovation.
The traditional mainstream parties have been poor performers, if not
largely moribund, when it comes to policy development and innovation,
instead relying on government-appointed royal commissions to advise
them on new policy directions.30 In addition, third parties have brought
radical proposals for change to the electoral table and often have been
innovators of new policies and programs at the provincial level.31 Such
was the case, for instance, with regard to Canadas system of public
health care, which was first instituted by an NDP government in the
province of Saskatchewan. A quarter century later, it was the western-
based Reform Party at the national level that was the first to champion
the neo-liberal critique of big government, which prescribed lower taxes,
cuts to social spending, deregulation, and decentralization as the cure for
societal ills.
Another way in which third parties have been of service to Canadian
democracy is in the area of organizational reform, grassroots participation,
and new member recruitment. Minor parties on both the left and right
have been innovators in terms of party organization, fund-raising techni-
ques, and election campaign tactics in ways that have internally demo-
cratized parties or extended their popular reach. Of course, as long
ago observed by political sociologist Maurice Duverger, such changes have
a contagion effect on others in the party system who attempt to emulate
and counter the introduction of any successful innovation by a competitor.
The effective use of a new technology of mass communication (radio)
by the populist Social Credit; class-based ideological appeal by the social-
ist CCF; affiliated membership, door-to-door campaigning and affirma-
tive action initiatives by the social democratic NDP; new leader selection
processes by the separatist Bloc Quebecois; and new fund-raising techni-
ques by the neo-conservative Reform Party are some examples of inno-
vations introduced and taken furthest by minor or protest parties in
Canada.32
Finally, new parties have provided an important safety valve function.
Their presence has given Canadian voters an institutional outlet for their
frustration, anger, or disillusionment with government policies, the main-
stream parties, or more broadly with the political system. By channeling
dissent into the electoral arena, new parties (unless they immediately
sweep the older parties aside) can give the mainstream parties time to
adapt and subsequently to craft or adopt policy or institutional remedies.

As well, by becoming part of the national conversation in the electoral
arena and within Parliament, new parties themselves gradually become
institutionalized and exert a moderating influence on more radical or
extreme elements within their support base. In this way, the party and po-
litical system challenged by the rise of third parties is stimulated to
respond in ways that ultimately absorb and deradicalize political dissent.
This can provide at least part of the explanation for the findings of Richard
Johnston, who argues that the most recent rise of regional parties in 1993 is
consistent with the unfolding of a recurring and long-term cycle of protest
in Canadian electoral history that results in the regional fragmentation of
the party system, only to be followed by a period of reconsolidation and
nationalization. However, Johnston does note that the latter process
appears to happen at a higher level of party system fragmentation than
existed previously, suggesting that individual parties as well as the party
system as a whole may suffer from a diminishing capacity over time
to shoulder the burden of national political integration imposed by
Canadas regional, ethnic, and linguistic diversity.33
This conclusion seems especially warranted given the continuing fail-
ure of other national political institutions to share this burden, in par-
ticular the Senate and the federal cabinet. The Canadian Senate, almost
alone among comparable federal states, has never been an effective fo-
rum for regional representation within the national Parliament. Though
comprised roughly on the basis of regional equality, as prime ministe-
rial appointees, its members have had neither the legitimacy nor the in-
clination to act as articulators and defenders of regional interests
within the legislative process, contributing to popular and scholarly
opinion that the institution is largely dysfunctional and/or irrelevant.
For its part, the federal cabinet once the primary venue for regional
representation and still constructed according to the tradition that every
region has its appropriate share of ministerial posts has declined as a
decision-making body as the power of individual ministers has faded
relative to the prime minister and his officials, and to the central agen-
cies that provide both with information and advice.34
PARTIES AS ORGANIZATIONS: HOW DEMOCRATIC?

Just how inclusive are Canadian political parties of different seg-
ments of Canadian society, and how responsive are they to the views
of their activists? What role do grassroots members play in their par-
ties? And how relevant is this to the quality of Canadian democracy?
In general, Canadian political parties have had member organizations
that are fairly dormant at the constituency level between elections, only
to be activated and pumped up with new members during general
elections and party leadership contests. When their key role in the elec-
toral process (choosing candidates or delegates) recedes in the after-
math of an election, the organizations tend to shrink to a dedicated
core group dominated by local executives. During these times, it is
estimated that between 1% and 2% of Canadians may be members of
a political party, a figure that compares unfavorably with other western
democracies.35 Moreover, this is the case even though membership in
parties is less restrictive than voting eligibility, with noncitizens and
those not yet of voting age able to join. As well, those belonging to
political parties do not tend to be representative of the population as a
whole. About two-thirds of party members are men, with an average
age around 60, and most of these are of European ancestry. Younger
and visible minority or new Canadians, as well as those without a
university education, tend to be left out.36
The parties have not been insensitive or obtuse about these discrep-
ancies and the criticisms they have provoked. In the 1970s and 1980s,
the parties made efforts to attract more women, youth, and ethnic
minorities into their membership. Internal party structures were created
in order to effect the greater participation of these underrepresented
groups, with the New Democratic and Liberal parties going farthest in
order to ensure a more representative membership base. By contrast, in
the 1990s there was a movement away from such affirmative action
measures by the populist and conservative Reform Party and its succes-
sor the Canadian Alliance, both of which rejected group-based politics
and special treatment or measures for women and minorities. This dif-
ference of approach has continued after the merger of parties on the
right to form the new Conservative Party of Canada. Finally, language
composition is another area of uneven representation, which became
worse in the 1990s due to the collapse of the Progressive Conservatives
and success of the nationalist Bloc Quebecois. After the emergence of
the Bloc Quebecois at the federal level, only the Liberals among the
remaining parties were able to boast francophone membership numbers
that were not risibly low.37
Most party members are inactive; and although there is some varia-
tion between parties, relatively few spend any time in the average
month on party activity, with a financial contribution or posting a lawn
sign the most common contributions during election periods. There is
widespread dissatisfaction with this level of participation among party
members, with most being of the opinion that there should be more
discussion of matters of public policy and a greater role in developing
the partys election platform. This interest in a policy study and develop-
ment role for party members touches on an area of weakness exhibited
by Canadian political parties, which commit few resources to ongoing
policy study, have developed neither a policy institute or founda-
tion nor strong ties with independent policy groups, and tend to leave
policy making in the hands of party leaders and their personal

entourages.38
Canadas mainstream political parties have traditionally operated as
elite-dominated, centrist-oriented brokerage parties, placing a premium
on leadership and short-term issues, with little attention to long-term
policy development. For the party leader and his advisers to craft an
electoral appeal that could produce a potentially winning coalition of
voters, flexibility in the realm of ideology and policy has been required
with consistency and coherence less important than striking the right
policy grace notes to make the broadest possible appeal. Whether this
approach was imposed on parties by Canadas ever-present (some
might say rampant) regionalism and national unity concerns or was the
result of missed opportunities when socialist parties failed to reorient
the political discourse toward a more class-based politics, the fact
remains that clear and lasting distinctions in policy platforms or the
policies pursued while in power have not been a hallmark of Cana-
dian party politics. Instead, policy study and innovation have been dis-
placed to other political sites, such as experts in the bureaucracy, and
certainly in the Canadian case, government-appointed royal commis-
sions, task forces, and judicial inquiries.39
Clearly Canadas main political parties have not been participatory
organizations when it comes to questions of policy. The same cannot be
said, however, for the role of party members in selecting local candidates
or party leaders. Carty argues that Canadian parties have operated as
franchise operations, whereby local autonomy is granted to constituency
organizations to choose their own candidates and delegates to party
conventions, in return for leaving control over policies and election
platforms to the leader and caucus, particularly the leader.40 Local nomi-
nation contests are relatively open affairs, generating significant recruit-
ment drives that can bring in hundreds of new party members, often
friends and associates of the candidates, but those recruited do not
always remain active or even stay as party members, particularly if
they were recruited to the losing side in a nomination contest. As well,
many nomination contests and almost always where there is an incum-
bent remain uncontested.41
Although the nominees of local constituency organizations still face
the hurdle of leadership approval before becoming candidates, impos-
ing candidates on a local association (the prerogative of party leaders
who must sign nomination papers) risks arousing resentment, and in
some instances, defections to other parties. This does not mean that it
never happens. Leaders have appointed local candidates because they
are stars expected to improve the partys electoral prospects or to
demonstrate they are open to members of target groups such as women
or visible minorities who are still woefully underrepresented. This pro-
clivity to interfere with the ability of local associations to nominate
candidates of their own choice has been particularly prevalent in the

Liberal Party.42
As for party leadership selection, its history is one of continual pres-
sure for an expanded electorate, with greater rank-and-file participa-
tion.43 This steady evolution toward more inclusive and participatory
forms of leadership selection has not prevented parties from adopting a
variety of selection methods that reflect their partys history and partic-
ular circumstances. The first leader selected by delegate convention, in
1919, was Mackenzie King, Canadas longest serving prime minister.
For decades thereafter the convention became the standard mechanism
for choosing leaders, but these were usually small and managed affairs.
The modern open convention with thousands of delegates arrived in
the 1960s, forcing leadership candidates to engage in intensive recruit-
ment drives and to pack local delegate selection meetings with their
supporters. This placed a premium on money and organization as the
keys to mounting a serious leadership bid. It also forced the opening
up of what had been a relatively closed, elitist process to groups that
were previously excluded, such as women, youth, and visible minor-
ities, as parties sought to keep pace with broader societal demands for
democratization, equality, and inclusiveness.44
The crisis of the third-party system brought on by the rise of the Bloc
and Reform parties, and the demise of the Progressive Conservatives,
was the occasion for the transition from delegate conventions to either
direct election through some sort of universal ballot or hybrid systems
that combine features of direct election and delegate convention. Also
important in precipitating the change was innovation at the provincial
level, led by the Parti Quebecois in 1985, to be followed over the next
decade by provincial parties in every region and of various partisan
persuasions. With provincial parties, the Bloc Quebecois, and the
Reform Party all adopting direct election of the leader with a vote for
all party members, the other federal parties felt compelled to follow
suit simply to meet the expectations of party members and the broader
public who increasingly considered this to be the litmus test of a
partys democratic character. It also was seen as a way to revitalize par-
ties after a devastating electoral defeat or a period in the political wil-
derness of opposition. Some parties, notably the Liberals, adopted a
hybrid system that is a compromise aimed at satisfying the demands of
the grass roots for a direct say and their preference as a brokerage
party for a collective and deliberative decision-making process. Unique
party histories and dynamics played a role in the decision made by
other parties to water down the one member, one vote principle by
adopting special weighting procedures, for instance to provide equality
for constituencies (the Conservatives) or to guarantee a certain degree
of influence for affiliated groups (the NDP). No party has yet to advo-
cate a system based on the U.S. presidential primary model, where
participation rates and the costs for leadership contestants are dra-
matically higher.45
PARTIES IN PARLIAMENT AND GOVERNMENT

While over the past several decades political parties as organizations
have changed appreciably, their role in Parliament has changed very
little. Party discipline continues to structure parliamentary practices
and procedures and has proved resistant to reforms intended to pro-
vide individual members of Parliament with a more significant role
than that permitted within the confines of strict party discipline. Suc-
cessful candidates who win a seat in Parliament can expect to have
their legislative role circumscribed by the strictures and requirements
of responsible government, leader-determined strategy and tactics, and
partisan adversity. The tolerance of party leaders for dissent varies, but
members of party caucuses in the House of Commons generally are
punished if they stray from party lines, as enforced by party whips
under the direction of the party leader. Moreover, Canadian govern-
ments have been reluctant to follow the British three-line whip
model that provides leeway for dissent on many votes, instead tending
to consider almost every vote in the House as a matter of confidence.
The resulting requirement to remain lockstep with party and govern-
ment means that most backbenchers either turn to constituency work to
sustain their motivation and original impulse to serve the public inter-
est, or they stay on as members of Parliament for only one or two
terms.46
That said, since Canadian governments must always have the confi-
dence of the majority in the House of Commons to effectively govern,
prime ministers and their governments risk defeat if they remain unre-
sponsive to the concerns of the government caucus and the opposition
parties. Although confidence may be a given in times of majority gov-
ernment, governing with only a plurality of seats (not uncommon in
Canadas case) considerably heightens responsiveness to the opposition.
As well, in defense of strict party discipline, it does allow governments
to move ahead with their agendas and implement their election plat-
forms recognizing that unplanned economic or social problems might
throw their timetable off schedule.47
Legislation in Parliament is not initiated by individual members of
Parliament, whose role is to pass or defeat it. However, there may be
scope in a committee to amend legislation, although this is subject to
two major limitations: Legislation generally only goes to committee af-
ter a vote on its basic principles (thereby limiting the legislative ambit
of the committee), and party discipline in the context of a majority will
ensure that committees inevitably will approve legislation in the form
the government wants. But it is the committee, often overworked and
ignored, where reformers have focused their attention, since it offers

the best hope for a more relevant role for members of Parliament. Pre-
legislative hearings on bills, a role in drafting some legislation, and an
oversight or vetting role on government appointments have all been
suggested as possible reforms. Perhaps the major stumbling block is
that governments have tended to view such upgrades for committees
as opposition-inspired impediments to its rightful mandate to govern.48
The other primary outlet for individuals elected to Parliament under a
party banner (as virtually all are) is the weekly caucus meeting. Ideally,
caucus will allow backbench members to voice the concerns of their con-
stituents and, since meetings are conducted in secret, to criticize govern-
ment policy or the performance, strategy, and tactics being employed by
the party leadership. In other words, at least in theory it can be a venue
for accountability, a vehicle for representation, and a forum for informa-
tion exchange, discussion, and deliberation. There are, however, several
problems with realizing this potential role for caucus in parliamentary
democracy: First, it is often left untapped by party leaders; second, back-
benchers particularly those recently elected often have unrealistic
expectations of their role in the policy process; and third, the whole
exercise occurs behind closed doors, denying the visibility that politi-
cians crave (and need) in order to convince constituents that their inter-
ests are being properly represented.49
In government, the leader and his entourage, including staff appointed
to the central agencies providing decision-making support to the govern-
ment, have displaced the influence of party. Always in a position of dom-
inance in a Westminster-style parliamentary government, over the past
few decades the political executive (prime minister and cabinet) has
experienced a further concentration of power in the person and the office
of the prime minister. Where party was once a legitimate and significant
communication and feedback channel for the political executive, acting
as a counterweight to the bureaucracy, it is now relegated to at best a
minor role, supplanted by pollsters, policy advisers, strategists, and con-
sultants reporting directly to the prime minister. Donald Savoie refers to
this centralization of power within the political executive as court gov-
ernment, which he links to a number of factors: the long-term pre-
occupation of Canadian prime ministers with national unity and
federal provincial issues, the intense media focus on the prime minister
as both government and party leader, the growing control over all mat-
ters of public policy and bureaucratic activity exercised by specialized
functionaries working within central agencies reporting to the prime
minister, and finally the expanding impact of the prime ministers inter-
national role linked to globalization.50
Although party influence has declined, the leaders entourage is a site
of increased power within government. As described by Sid Noel, these
entourages, composed mainly by political professionals, are essentially
clientelistic formations, with no purpose beyond providing loyalty,

service, and acclaim to their leader, and each linked directly to the
leader by bonds of mutual obligation.51 Most of the enhanced party
resources made available through party finance reforms have been
diverted from party building at the grassroots level to larger and more
sophisticated leader entourages delegated the tasks of designing and
running national, media-focused, leader-oriented election campaigns.52
Local party organizations are restricted to door-to-door canvassing or
greeting the leaders tour as it passes through town. Entourages also have
become useful for intraparty competition (to challenge incumbents or
fend off challenges), an indispensable political activity that if successful
is rewarded handsomely with patronage appointments, government con-
tracts, and other perks of office. The carryover into the private sector is
an obvious benefit for members of the entourage, whose insider knowl-
edge and personal connections make them invaluable additions to lobby-
ing and consulting firms.53 Together, court government and leader
entourages have diminished the role of political parties in the various
dimensions of governing, whether representation, policy formation, or
decision making. This declining relevance to governance no doubt has
been a factor in the declining attractiveness of parties for individuals and
groups seeking an effective vehicle and means for their own participation
and influence in the political process.
PARTIES AND VOTERS

It appears, then, that the role of parties remains paramount within
Parliament, while notably diminishing within government, but what
about their significance within the electorate? Of the roles and functions
performed by parties, turning citizens into voters by mobilizing them
into the electoral process, and structuring their vote by presenting them
with reasonably clear alternatives from which to choose, should still be
considered the most crucial to democracy.
The relationship between political parties and Canadian voters has
been described in terms of periodic system-changing realignments or
persistent one-party dominance and third-party formation. Yet another
interpretation is that party-voter relations, particularly over the past
two decades, can be understood as a case of stable dealignment. This
describes a situation where partisanship in the electorate is weak (and
growing weaker), making the potential for electoral volatility high.
Leduc has argued that a dealigned Canadian electorate means a high
potential for sudden change, whether or not such change actually
takes place in any particular election.54 Data from successive Canadian
National Election Surveys (CNES) indicate that the percentage of Cana-
dians who are only weakly partisan or do not identify with any federal
political party has risen steadily since 1993, eroding any solid basis of
partisan support within the Canadian electorate. In fact, Canadians

have the weakest political-party affinity in the Western world.55
Declining levels of partisanship in the electorate have been accompa-
nied by evident ideological weakness, with 40% of respondents to
national surveys placing themselves in the ideological center and
another 30% either rejecting the notion of ideological placement entirely
or failing to locate themselves on a simple left right continuum.56 In
contrast to U.S. voters, who tenaciously hold on to their ideological
orientations and are much more conservative, much more moral, with
more religiosity and so forth, a huge shift of Canadian voters has
occurred into the ideological no-mans land.57 This combination of
weak partisanship and lack of ideological orientation to politics, what-
ever its causes, militates against clearly distinguishable ideological
appeals from the parties, which can be expected, in reciprocal fashion,
to reinforce the prevailing tendencies and trends that are already extant
within the electorate. Although this can be seen to have consequences,
both good and bad, for democracy, it certainly makes centrist politics
and ideological inconsistency the most likely winning electoral strategy
for Canadian political parties. By default this places party leaders front
and center in terms of crafting an appeal to voters and defining the
party both in terms of policy and personality, but particularly the latter.
Pierre Trudeaus long stint as Liberal leader and prime minister is per-
haps the best example of this phenomenon, though the subsequent
periods in leadership of Brian Mulroney (Progressive Conservative,
1984 1993), Jean Chretien (Liberal, 1993 2003), and Stephen Harper
(Conservative, 2006 to present) can be similarly characterized.
The leader domination, weak partisanship, and nonideological orien-
tation that characterize Canadian party and electoral politics may help
to explain the troubling decline in voter turnout in Canada, which is
particularly severe in its cohort of young voters. But other factors rele-
vant to this downturn in voter participation are severe regionalization
and a seemingly dysfunctional electoral system. As noted above,
regionalization has been a feature of party politics in Canada for much
of the past century but has become even more pronounced since the
changes wrought by the election of 1993. One of its effects has been to
reduce competitiveness drastically in many electoral districts, which in
a first-past-the-post system is one of the surest ways over time to
depress voter turnout. With average turnout rates declining from the
75% range prior to 1993 to 60% more recently, a number of prominent
individuals, national organizations, task forces, political parties, and
even a few provincial governments have hopped on the bandwagon of
electoral system reform, with three provincial referenda on proposed
changes toward systems offering greater proportionality in vote-to-seat
outcomes (with another scheduled for 2009). However, despite ongoing
agitation, the majority of voters and politicians still demonstrate a
reluctance to abandon the present system with its known deficiencies

for the unknown implications of a new system.58
In particular, the problem of low levels of political participation
among youth has become something of a national fixation. Diagnoses
of the problem cite a number of probable causes: unresponsive political
parties, political illiteracy spawned by inadequate civics education in
schools, the need to capture youth sooner by lowering the age of
enfranchisement, and a depoliticized youth culture immersed in the
virtual worlds of gaming, MySpace, and text messaging. Political par-
ties are beginning to engage young voters with more targeted cam-
paigns and increasingly through their media of choice. But it also may
be that party politics and voting are increasingly viewed as ineffective,
ritualistic, and archaic and as such are being supplanted by more
direct, inclusive, and participatory forms of political participation.59
In Canada and elsewhere, scholars have linked their empirical obser-
vations of this shift in political activities to a long-term generational
change in cultural values toward what has been termed postmaterial-
ism. Underpinned by an affluent generation that is more highly edu-
cated and less deferential toward political elites, postmaterialists have
higher expectations regarding their own political participation. Nevitte
has theorized that shifting public attitudes toward politics is a genera-
tionally driven, public reaction against all hierarchical institutional
arrangements that limit the opportunities for meaningful citizen partici-
pation.60 According to the argument, political parties have failed to
adequately respond to this broad societal change by reforming their
own structures and practices, so therefore it is not surprising that for
many individuals other forms of political participation such as
involvement in the new social movements have become the preferred
alternative to political parties.61
CONCLUSION: POLITICAL PARTIES AND

THE DEMOCRATIC DEFICIT
The election result of 1993 created a national patchwork of party sup-
port, which constituted the most regionalized party system and Parlia-
ment in Canadian history. In this fourth Canadian party system
Atlantic Canada, Quebec, Ontario, and the West have become discrete
arenas of party competition, with different party combinations competi-
tive in each region. In fact, for the past half century national party com-
petition in Canada has been sporadic at best, with no indication that
the future will be any different. During this period parties have only
briefly, if at all, been able to lay claim to a national base of support.
The Westminster system of one-party government inherited by Canada
works reasonably well in a two-party system, with a ruling party and
an official Opposition Party that has a reasonable prospect of replacing
the government. For much of the time since the election of 1921, this
was not the case in Canada, usually benefiting the Liberals as the only
party in a position to govern. More recently, an exacerbation of the
tendency to regional fragmentation seems to have generated growing
levels of voter dissatisfaction and alienation from a political system that
consistently fails to reflect voter preferences accurately.
Already in 1991, the Royal Commission on Electoral Reform and
Party Financing was reporting on the profound concerns of Canadians
about the state of their liberal democracy, noting the widespread dis-
trust of political leaders, the political process, and political institutions.
The Commission thought that perhaps the parties themselves had been
a contributing factor to this malaise of voters, but whatever the cause,
there is little doubt that Canadian political parties are held in low
public esteem, and that their standing has declined steadily over the
past decade. They are under attack from citizens for failing to achieve a
variety of goals deemed important by significant groups within
society.62
In their 2003 study of nonvoters in Canada, Pammett and Leduc note
that an overwhelming majority of Canadians cited negative attitudes to-
ward politicians and political institutions as the principal factor under-
lying declining voter turnout in the country. Public distrust of parties
and politicians has been growing stronger over the past quarter cen-
tury, as indicated by survey responses to a number of questions meas-
uring levels of voter satisfaction or disaffection.63 During his brief
period as Liberal leader and prime minister, Paul Martin acknowledged
and moved quickly to address Canadas democratic deficit by making
democratic reform a primary issue. His action plan proposed a funda-
mental change in parliamentary culture, a rebalancing of the relation-
ship between the Cabinet and the House through various measures
that would give members of Parliament greater independence and
more freedom from strict party discipline.64 Notably, electoral system
reform was not part of this package, which in any event was bypassed
by events when Martins government went down to defeat in 2006.
Over the past decade or more, a number of reforms have been pro-
posed from various quarters aimed at reviving Canadas political par-
ties and improving the responsiveness, inclusiveness, and transparency
of its representative institutions. First, the setting of fixed election dates,
already adopted in a number of provinces, was passed into legislation
by the new Harper government. However, the incompatibility of this
measure with the vicissitudes of minority government was made evi-
dent when Prime Minister Harper proceeded to ignore his own legisla-
tion in calling an election one year in advance of the fixed election
date. A second issue, more significant but also more intractable, is that
of electoral reform. William Cross, in his democratic audit of Canadian
political parties, argues that adopting some method of proportional
representation is necessary so that parties and their supporters are

rewarded for campaigning vigorously in all parts of the country.65
However, though hailed by many as the cure for Canadas democratic
ills, progress has been stalled by the recalcitrance of voters (to date) to
embrace such a change when asked and by the unwillingness of incum-
bent parties who benefit from the existing rules of the game to under-
mine the basis of their power by making it easier for opponents to get
their candidates elected.
Perhaps reforms that relate to the organization and practices of politi-
cal parties themselves have a better prospect of success. Here Cross has
three suggestions to better equip parties to meet the changing demo-
cratic expectations of Canadians in the 21st century. The first is to open
up candidate nomination and leadership selection processes radically,
including moving toward U.S.-style primaries, as a means of enticing
more Canadians to belong to parties and to choose to be participants
on an ongoing basis. The second is to enhance the role of grassroots
members in policy study and development as a way to make their par-
ticipation in party activity more meaningful. In particular, parties could
use some of the generous public funding they now receive to establish
policy foundations that would allow members to study policy issues,
to debate alternatives, and to present their legislative caucuses with al-
ternative policy approaches.66 Finally, Cross recommends further
reforming the campaign finance system to make parties less dependent
on the public purse and to remove remaining financial barriers to
potential political candidates. With regard to the former, he and others
cite the danger of state funding crowding out individual contribu-
tions to political parties, further reducing communication with and
responsiveness to party members, which would lead to an even steeper
decline in party memberships as parties become professional machines
and wards of the state.67
It may well be that the Canadian electorate increasingly has no alle-
giances to party and that fewer partisans in the electorate means more
volatility and insecurity for all political parties. A case can be made
that this situation is at least in part a product of creaky political
institutions in need of renovation. Perhaps Canada simply exhibits, in a
rather distorted fashion, many of the characteristics of a European-style,
multiparty system, with parties grouped into ideological families that
draw sustenance from relatively stable electorates that are predisposed
to either right- or left-wing appeals. For the most part, electoral change
occurs within these ideological families rather than across family boun-
daries. The difference between Europe and Canada is that Canadas po-
litical institutions are not designed to accommodate cooperation and
power sharing between distinct but like-minded parties. On the con-
trary, its electoral system and parliamentary practices work against this,
frustrating what appears to be a fundamental, long-term dynamic in
the countrys electoral politics. Yet the future stability of the national
party system, and indeed Canadian democracy, seems to require
national political institutions that can more accurately reflect voter
intentions and accommodate a greater degree of cooperation between
individuals, parties, and regions. Given the stubborn regional fragmen-
tation of Canadas electorate and party system, clinging to the tradi-
tional way of doing things is becoming an option increasingly harder
to justify and defend.68
CHAPTER 2
A Work in Progress: Parties and

Democracy in the United States
Diana Dwyre
INTRODUCTION
During the 2008 presidential election, John McCain ran as the nomi-
nee of the Republican Party, and Barack Obama ran as the nominee of
the Democratic Party. Yet neither of their parties had much to do with
the running of their nominees campaigns. The candidates themselves
raised the majority of the money spent on the efforts to elect them. The
candidates themselves hired their own managers, pollsters, media con-
sultants, fund-raisers and other campaign staff. The candidates them-
selves opened campaign offices in the various states and ran their own
voter registration and get-out-the-vote operations. Candidates emerge
rather than being selected by the party to run for office.1 Elections
for state and local offices are similarly candidate centered. Political
parties in the United States have become organizations in service to
the candidates who run under their labels.2
That is not to say that U.S. political parties do nothing during elec-
tions, for they certainly provide important services to their candidates
and work with and independently of their candidates to help get them
elected. Parties also raise and spend a great deal of money, produce
and run many campaign advertisements, register voters, and get them
out to vote on Election Day. Indeed, in recent years, the various party
committees at the national, state, and local levels have become wealth-
ier, larger, and more technologically sophisticated, enabling them to
assist their candidates more than they did two decades ago. The politi-
cal party organizations within the U.S. Congress and in many state
legislatures also have become stronger as the level of party loyalty

among their members has increased in recent years, and competition
for control of the national and states legislatures has become more
intense.
Yet political parties are not always agents of democracy in the United
States. In part, U.S. political parties are limited in their ability to prac-
tice and enhance democracy because of structural and institutional fac-
tors beyond their control. However, U.S. political parties also
sometimes act in ways that limit democracy.
In this collection on political parties and democracy throughout the
world, our working definition of democracy is basic: Democracy is a
system of government characterized by majority rule, political equality
under the law, and the protection of individual rights. In the United
States, all of these ideals are recognized as necessary ingredients for
our democratic system to function properly and legitimately. Yet, as in
other nations, not everyone defines these ideals in the same way. At
times these values conflict with one another, and quite often the bal-
ance among them is not equal, as one is placed before the others as
more important or primary.
In this chapter, I define political parties as organizations that present
candidates under their own label in elections for government office.
Political parties in the United States certainly do provide a common
label under which candidates run for office. However, the extent to
which U.S. parties exercise control over this process is limited. More-
over, the parties are not strong links between voters in elections and
the officials they elect to represent them in party government, as the
term is understood in other countries politicians competing for office
primarily as representatives of their parties; voters choosing primarily
on the basis of party; parties behaving as cohesive teams that take col-
lective responsibility for government has never existed in the United
States, if only because the kinds of party required do not exist. They
play a central role in structuring politics and in putting particular indi-
viduals in positions of power or influence. The parties do not, however,
govern in the sense implied by the phrase party government.3 That
U.S. political parties do not conform to this comprehensive view of par-
ties helps explain why they do not always act to enhance democracy.
Other factors, however, such as the structure of the government based
on a separation of powers, a tradition of disdain for parties in the
United States, and the existence of only two major parties also contrib-
ute to an often less than robust embrace of democracy. In this chapter,
I discuss the character of political parties in the United States and the
role of parties in fulfilling the democratic values of majority rule, politi-
cal equality and the protection of individual rights. Evaluating how
well contemporary U.S. parties enhance or promote democracy requires
an examination of the historical roots of their current conditions. Thus I
A Work in Progress 29
examine whether parties facilitate or impede the work of democratic

politics within this context: their historical development and the envi-
ronment in which they now operate.
INSTITUTIONAL BARRIERS TO DEMOCRACY

The United States has the oldest political party system in the world.
This is a curious fact, given that the Founding Fathers of the United
States disliked and mistrusted political parties. They feared that parties,
or majority factions, as James Madison called them, would promote the
tyranny of the majority and trample on the rights of minorities.4 When
crafting the U.S. Constitution in 1787, the founders purposefully
designed a government that would thwart and channel the actions and
power of majorities. Thus, many of the institutional barriers to political
party strength and party government predate the development of par-
ties themselves. The system the founders created is generally consid-
ered a representative democracy based in part on majority rule with
protections for minority rights.
One of the primary architects of the U.S. Constitution, James
Madison, made clear in his famous essay Federalist No. 10, that the
founders were far more concerned about majority factions, or parties,
gaining too much power than they were about minority factions, or in-
terest groups, exercising the power of the few over the many.5 Madison
asserted that there would be so many and such a great variety of
minority factions, spread across a large and extensive country, that no
one group would tyrannize others, and various competing groups
would be forced to work together and accommodate the interests of
other groups. The founders were firm about rejecting a direct or pure
democracy as tantamount to mob rule set on practicing the tyranny of
the majority. Instead they designed a system of representative govern-
ment, or a republic, whereby the public voice, pronounced by the rep-
resentatives of the people, will be more consonant to the public good
than if pronounced by the people themselves.6 Indeed, it is this
republican principle, which enables the majority to defeat . . . sinister
views by regular vote that Madison argued would be the best check
on the power of a minority faction.7
However, Madison maintained, if the faction is a majority, popular
government enables it to sacrifice to its ruling passion or interest both
the public good and the rights of other citizens.8 To cure this mis-
chief of faction, the U.S. Constitution, especially as it was originally
written in 1787 and before any amendments to it, established a govern-
ment that embraced the idea of limited popular rule by erecting a vari-
ety of institutional obstacles to majority rule and party government.
However, eventually (and not surprisingly), some of the founders who
were the strongest critics of political parties were the very men who
established the first parties in the United States.
Separated, Scattered, and Diluted Power

A separation of powers into three branches of government (legisla-
tive, executive, and judicial) in which each branch shares some powers
of the others was designed to enable each branch to act as a check on
the power of the other two branches. For example, Congress (the legis-
lative branch) can pass legislation, but the president (a separately
elected official) can veto it, or, if the law is enacted, the Supreme Court
(by a majority of its nine justices) can deem it unconstitutional. Thus,
while the Congress is generally based on majority rule principles, gov-
ernment officials who constitute a minority can overturn its actions.
To further guard against too much popular influence and the concen-
tration of political power, the founders stipulated different methods of
selection and terms of service for national officials, which is mirrored
at the subnational level. Only those in the legislative and executive
branches are tied to the people through some sort of representation
scheme. Congress, the legislative branch, has two chambers, the House
of Representatives and the Senate. In the original Constitution, only
members of the House, who serve for two years before facing the vot-
ers again, were directly elected by the people. Moreover, only the
House is based on the principle of political equality, for each state is
represented according to the size of its population. So, each citizens
vote therefore has the same value.
Senators, with six-year terms that are not all concurrent with one
another (one-third of senators stand for election every two years), were
originally selected by the state legislatures, and each state has two sena-
tors regardless of the size of its population. This equal representation
scheme gives states with small populations as much voting power in
the Senate as the most populous states, and it allows those representing
a minority of the people the opportunity to overpower a majority, quite
contrary to principles of majority rule and political equality. Since 1913
with passage of the 17th Amendment to the Constitution, senators have
been directly elected and thus are tied more closely to their constitu-
ents. The Senate also allows any senator to filibuster, or hold up con-
sideration of legislation, as long as they like by speaking on any topic.
A filibuster can be ended only if at least three-fifths of the Senate (60 of
the 100 senators) votes to end debate by invoking cloture. A single sen-
ator and a minority of 41 of the 100 senators can control the Senate, at
least for a while, against the will of a majority of senators. These fea-
tures of the U.S. Senate work against the principle of majority rule.
The president is separately elected and has a four-year term. By con-
stitutional amendment in 1951, the president can serve only two terms.
Elections for state and local offices also are not always synchronized
with each other or with elections for national office. This scattering of
elections with differing terms of office for different chambers of the
legislature and for the executive was designed to guard against a
strong, though perhaps temporary, majority taking control of the entire
government in one or two elections and swiftly imposing its will with
no protection of minority rights. This has worked, as divided govern-
ment has become more common, where one party controls the execu-
tive branch and the other party has majority control of one or more of
the chambers of the legislature. As John Green points out, one mini-
mal condition for party government, unified control of the executive
and legislative branches, has only been met around 40% of the time
since 1960.9 When control of the government is divided between the
parties, it is quite difficult to impose collective responsibility for poli-
cies that require both legislative and executive action, for each party of-
ten blames the other branch and therefore the other party for whatever
voters dislike.
The election of the president is insulated from direct popular influ-
ence, for the president is chosen by an Electoral College of intermedia-
ries who only after 1828 were expected (although still not required) to
link their votes to the popular vote for president in each state. As
recently as 2000, the winner of the popular vote, Democrat Al Gore,
did not win a plurality of the Electoral College vote. There were some
unusual irregularities and likely corrupt activities during the 2000
election that led to this antimajoritarian result, chiefly that the state of
Florida and the U.S. Supreme Court halted the recount of ballots in
Florida and therefore gave all of the states Electoral College votes, and
therefore the presidency, to Republican George W. Bush. The fact that
the presidential candidate supported by the most voters may not win a
presidential election makes the Electoral College a serious impediment
to majority rule and democratic governance. Although there were some
calls after the 2000 election to abolish the Electoral College and have
the president directly elected by popular vote, no serious action has
been taken to amend the Constitution to do this.
Some states have implemented other barriers to majority rule. For
example, California, Arkansas, and Rhode Island require a two-thirds
majority vote in both chambers of the legislature to pass the states annual
budget. This supermajority requirement allows a minority of legislators
to influence significantly the content of the budget as they hold out for
changes and concessions more to their liking. In 2008, the California state
budget finally passed after a record 78-day impasse, during which some
state workers were laid off, others were not paid, and many schools,
social service agencies and government contractors had to wait for the
payments they were due. Many organizations that served the poor, el-
derly, and sick limited their services or closed their doors altogether.
These various institutional barriers to majority rule and political

equality were designed to limit the power of majorities. Of course, par-
ties emerged in spite of these impediments. Yet Madisons belief that
minority factions (interest groups) would not pose as much of a threat
to sound governance as majority factions (parties) has proven to be
woefully and, some say, naively incorrect, for the barriers erected to
deter majority power have left easy channels of influence for interest
groups and thus minority power. For example, the separation of
powers within the U.S. government allows interest groups a number of
avenues for influencing policy makers. If an interest group does not
succeed in one venue, it can try another one. If a congressional commit-
tee will not take up its cause, perhaps some other congressional com-
mittee will. Or perhaps the same outcome can be realized by
convincing a regulatory agency to change its rules and regulations or
by bringing the issue to the court. Moreover, since the electoral fate of
law makers is not tied to other law makers in their party, given that
they are not all elected at the same time, it is difficult for a majority to
hold them collectively responsible for the policies of government or to
utilize the republican principle to defeat a sinister minority faction.
This frees law makers to represent the interests of the few, that is, for
example, those interest groups and lobbyists who contribute to their
campaigns, rather than the interests of the many.
THE NEED FOR PARTIES

In spite of all the deterrents to majority rule that were erected, some of
the very men who viewed parties with great suspicion formed the first
political parties among the elites in government. Leading up to the 1800
presidential election, opposing sides in the national government dis-
agreed about a fundamental question that is still hotly debated today:
How much power should the national government have relative to the
power of the states? The Federalists, led by Alexander Hamilton, advo-
cated a strong central government, and the Democratic Republicans, or
Jeffersonians, led by Thomas Jefferson, wanted more limits on the power
of the national government. These legislators in Congress realized the
need to organize to most effectively win this debate. Thus they formed
congressional parties as institutional solutions to the instability of ma-
jority rule so that policies chosen or denied would reflect, in the main,
just how strong and active the new national government was to be.10
Jeffersons election to the presidency in 1800 marked not only victory for
those opposed to a strong national government but also the success of the
first political party in the United States.
Jeffersons nascent political party exercised one-party rule until the
party split into two competing factions in the 1828 election, the Demo-
cratic Party, led by Andrew Jackson, and the Whig Party. Several minor
parties then developed, and the Whigs weakened as they fractured

over the issue of slavery in particular. One of the parties to emerge as
an antislavery party was the Republican Party, founded in 1854. The
Democratic and Republican parties, while certainly now different in
many ways, are the same major parties active in the U.S. two-party sys-
tem today.
Political parties in the United States have, in some respects, expanded
democracy in important ways. The first political parties, the Federalists
and Jeffersonian Democratic Republicans, were primarily parties-in-
government only, caucuses of like-minded elected officials in Congress
who came together to pursue competing policy goals.11 As president
from 1829 to 1837, Andrew Jackson led the effort to significantly expand
the franchise, which was then enjoyed only by adult, white, male prop-
erty owners. Jackson persuaded the states to drop the property owner-
ship requirement for voting, and thereby transformed the electorate to
include the less privileged, who naturally identified with his Democratic
Party and its positions. To mobilize these new voters to participate in
electoral politics, the Democratic Party created a new form of party to
solve this collective action problem, the grassroots political party. This
first national, mass-based party gave the Democrats an electoral advan-
tage that kept them in charge of the national government virtually unin-
terrupted for 32 years, from 1829 to 1860. (The Whigs won the presidency
only twice during this time.)
From Grass Roots to Machines

The U.S. party system could now be characterized as having all three
legs of the tripartite model of parties the party organization, the
party-in-the-electorate, and the party-in-government. The ingredients
existed to develop a fully realized party system in which parties serve
as links between citizens and policy makers.12 So, how well have U.S.
parties fared?
Generally, evolution of the U.S. political party system has not always
resulted in the types of linkage we generally associate with democratic
politics. Lawson has outlined four forms of linkage in which political
parties play significant roles in linking citizens to states:
Participatory linkage, in which parties serve as agencies through which
citizens can participate in government
Responsive linkage, whereby parties serve as agencies for ensuring that
government officials will be responsive to the views of rank-and-file voters
Linkage by reward, in which parties act primarily as channels for the
exchange of votes for favors and
Directive linkage, where parties are used by governments as aids to maintain
coercive control over their subjects.13
The first two are particularly relevant to our examination of parties and
democracy. After a period of party dominance, the parties lost much of
their ability, and later their desire, to organize politics to be the link
between citizens and their government.
The grass-roots party organizations were well positioned to organize
and mobilize the massive addition of new voters that resulted in part
from the huge waves of immigration from Europe in the late 1800s and
early 1900s. Immigrants settled primarily in the big cities because of
the many factory jobs available in the midst of the Industrial Revolu-
tion, and many became citizens. From this influx of so many new vot-
ers emerged a new kind of mass-based party organization, the big city
political party machine that addressed many of the immigrants inter-
ests and troubles. Indeed, the party machines became social service
systems that helped new arrivals cope with the challenges of an urban
industrial society. They softened the hard edge of poverty, smoothed
the way with government and the police, and taught immigrants
the customs of their new home.14 This period became known as the
golden age of parties in the United States as party organizations took
root in all states and at the local level. In the big industrial cities, the
party machines organized the newly expanded working class and took
control of many city governments from the traditional Anglo-Saxon,
Protestant elites. Once in charge, the party machines and their party
bosses used the many government jobs now under their control, includ-
ing the nomination of candidates for local, state, and national offices, as
rewards for loyal party members and activists. The use of these patron-
age jobs and other benefits, such as government contracts, as rewards
for party support helped the parties mobilize huge numbers of voters,
and the U.S. experienced the highest voter turnout in presidential elec-
tions in its history thus far. This era is a clear example of linkage by
reward. Yet without adequate policy-responsive linkage, the party
machines were not models of democratic politics.
Dedemocratization
Some expansion of democracy continued as the direct popular elec-
tion of U.S. senators was adopted in 1913, women won the vote in
1920, blacks finally gained voting rights with the 1965 Voting Rights
Act, and the voting age was lowered to age 18 in 1971. However, other
developments contributed to a dedemocratization in the United
States.15 The golden age of parties was followed by the Progressive
Era beginning in the 1890s, whereby elite reformers reacted to the
power and corruption of the big-city political party machines with a se-
ries of changes that reduced the parties ability to organize and mobi-
lize popular support. Many of these reforms continue to inhibit the
mobilization of citizens by parties today.
The party machines indeed had become corrupt organizations that

used their control over the candidate nomination process to send coop-
erative candidates to government who would support the interests of
the parties corporate benefactors. Voters were mobilized not by appeal-
ing to their political interests, but by rewarding party support with pa-
tronage jobs, government contracts, and social services. The parties
were not linked to voters in a policy-responsive manner, but only by
acting as channels for the exchange of votes for favors.16 This corrupt
system made the parties agents of dedemocratization. The reaction by
the Progressives was even more de-democratizing, for their reforms
fundamentally weakened the ability of parties to serve as links between
citizens and government.
The ostensive goal of the upper-class Progressives was to end this
corruption by taking power away from the linkage mechanism in the
corrupt machine system, the political parties. Yet the Progressives also
regarded mass mobilization as an impediment to effective govern-
ment.17 Two Progressive reforms in particular continue today to limit
significantly the parties ability or desire to act as a link between voters
and policy makers: the introduction of voter registration requirements
and the use of primary elections to select party nominees.
Registration Requirements
Registration requirements for voting introduced during the Progres-
sive Era disenfranchised millions of mostly working-class and immi-
grant voters, the mass base of the big-city party machines, which the
Progressives considered a corruption of the democracy envisioned by
the founders.18 Voter turnout declined tremendously between 1890
and 1910, as many voters were required to personally register and
demonstrate their eligibility to vote at a voter registrars office well
before Election Day. These offices were usually open only on weekdays
during business hours, making it difficult for many working-class citi-
zens to register without losing a days pay.
Registering to vote is now less burdensome. For example, the 1993
motor voter law requires states to offer citizens the opportunity to
register to vote at motor vehicle, social services, and military recruit-
ment offices. However, making citizens responsible for placing them-
selves on the voting rolls, while in many democracies this is the
responsibility of the state, continues to depress voter turnout among
certain groups. The higher costs that registration requirements impose
fall more heavily on low-income, uneducated, and young citizens.
Indeed, registering to vote requires more interest and involvement in pol-
itics earlier in an election year than does voting itself. Would-be voters
are required to register before most citizens are focused on and excited
about the election. A few states have same-day registration rules,
whereby citizens may register when they show up to vote on Election

Day. Voter turnout in these states is generally higher. Yet political elites,
particularly some from the Republican Party (the more conservative of
the two parties), have fought against the spread of same-day registration,
which they say does not provide enough protection against voter fraud
(e.g., voting more than once). Voter registration requirements have
diminished the potential for democracy by shrinking the electorate to
include certain types of voters but not others and thereby reducing the
likelihood that election results will reflect the wishes of the majority.
Primary Elections
The Progressives also introduced the primary election to take the
power of candidate nomination from the political parties. Party bosses
who named their parties candidates for various offices were quite
powerful indeed. Those who used control over the nomination of can-
didates to install office holders loyal to the parties corporate sponsors,
rather than to the voters who elected them, were not acting as the ideal
democratic link between the people and policy makers. Thus the Pro-
gressives had little trouble convincing others that the party machines
and their party bosses were the nexus of rampant political corruption,
and that in order to end that corruption the political parties had to be
weakened significantly.
Additionally, primaries may be divisive and create problems for the
party in the general election. Supporters of the losing candidate may be
so resentful after a hard-fought primary race that they refuse to support
a partys nominee by either not voting in the general election or voting
for some other partys candidate. After a long and bitter 2008 Demo-
cratic Party nomination contest between Hillary Rodham Clinton and
Barack Obama, much was made of the need for the party to unite
behind the eventual nominee, Obama. The losing candidate may choose
to run as an independent or under a minor-party label in the general
election and take votes away from the partys nominated candidate in
the primary. After losing a bitter Democratic primary race in 2006,
Senator Joseph Lieberman of Connecticut created and ran as the nominee
of the Connecticut for Lieberman Party and was reelected in the general
election. Many states have sore loser laws that prevent primary elec-
tion losers from using such tactics to get on the general election ballot,
such as requiring all parties and candidates to file for the general elec-
tion at the same time.19 Some states even have open or blanket primaries
that allow voters from other parties or nonaligned voters to participate
in any partys primary election, further eroding any role parties might
play in naming and coordinating their candidates for office.
The primary election is perhaps the most significant blow to political
party vitality and effectiveness in U.S. history. Candidates no longer
need their parties to secure the nomination and mount successful cam-
paigns for office. Television, the Internet, and other technologies allow
candidates to go directly to the voters, and they now run their own
campaigns with very little guidance or assistance from their parties.
Having little or no influence over who will represent the party in gen-
eral elections and therefore no ability to connect those running under
the party label together under a common set of policy goals, U.S. politi-
cal parties have lost much of their ability to serve as a link between citi-
zens and government and to ensure that government officials will be
responsive to the interests of the partys voters (the policy-responsive
linkage). A relatively high level of party loyalty is necessary for voters
to be able to hold office holders collectively responsible for their actions
in government. If an elected official defies the party on important
issues, the party has no way to enforce party loyalty, important for pro-
jecting a cohesive party program to voters, because it cannot prevent
the renegade office holders renomination.
Remobilization, for a While

Progressive reforms did not destroy political parties in the United
States. Indeed the Democratic Party orchestrated a massive mobiliza-
tion of voters during the Great Depression in the 1930s. President
Franklin Roosevelt built the Democratic Partys New Deal Coalition in
part by securing the support of labor unions with the passage of pro-
labor policies. The unions, whose leaders (but not necessarily the rank-
and-file union membership) remain loyal to the Democrats today,
brought working-class voters back into the electorate. New domestic
programs put the unemployed back to work and provided aid to mil-
lions of needy families. The New Dealers also established new party
organizations and strengthened others across the country to mobilize
voters. The New Deal Coalition lasted over three decades as millions of
these newly mobilized voters remained loyal to the Democratic Party
and kept the Democrats in control of the national political institutions
virtually uninterrupted until the 1970s. Today, pieces of the New Deal
Coalition remain, particularly among elderly voters, and new groups
are now securely in the Democratic camp, such as African Americans.
However, the Progressive reforms and other characteristics of the U.S.
political system continue to hinder party influence and democratic
politics.
Demobilization and Unequal Representation

Now that there is virtually universal suffrage, U.S. elections could be
models of political equality and vital mechanisms of majority rule.
However, impediments to voting faced by working-class, less-educated,
and young citizens, and at times the parties lack of effort to mobilize
these groups, often means instead that elections are mechanisms of
minority rule and political inequality. Voting is highly correlated in the
United States with education, income, and age, making the population
of those who do participate quite different from the population of those
who do not. As Stephen Wayne points out, Those who are most dis-
advantaged, who have the least education, and who need a change in
conditions the most actually participate the least. Those who are the
most advantaged, who benefit from existing conditions and presumably
from public policy as it stands, vote more often.20
This unequal participation is sometimes exacerbated by the behavior
of the parties in the United States. The political parties often fail to
make much of an effort to register and mobilize poor, working-class,
and young citizens who already face hurdles to participation, such as
registration requirements. Crenson and Ginsberg argue that there are
elite apprehensions about expanding the universe of participants
because the parties see the uninvolved as unpredictable.21 They note,
for example, that the major parties and their candidates engage in neg-
ative campaigning, which disparages the opposition and is designed
to discourage both nonvoters and their opponents established support-
ers from going to the polls, and that they do not support eliminating
voter registration requirements or shifting Election Day from a week-
day to a weekend.22
Yet both parties have, at times, played a key role in expanding and
mobilizing the electorate. During the Great Depression, President
Franklin Roosevelt led his Democratic Party to strengthen subnational
party organizations and to bring great numbers of new working-class
voters and their families to the polls.23 More recently, the Republican
Partys 72-Hour Program identified and mobilized thousands of new
Republican voters all over the country to help deliver President George
W. Bush a big reelection victory in 2004. The 72-Hour Program was cre-
ated by the Republican National Committee (the partys national party
organization), which harnessed computerized consumer data, such as
magazine subscriptions and charitable contributions, and thousands of
volunteers to identify likely Republican voters through microtargeting
and get them to the polls on Election Day. Republican turnout went up
4% in 2004.24
In the 2008 election, Democratic presidential nominee Barack Obama
created a grassroots voter mobilization system independent of the
Democratic Party organization that was fueled by the Internet, e-mail,
and social networking sites such as MySpace and Facebook. Obamas
team worked with the Democratic Party, which had recently shifted its
strategy to building strong state and local party organizations in all
50 states. The new 50-state strategy marked a departure from the tradi-
tion of focusing only on those battleground states that were truly
competitive. Other groups, such as the left-leaning MoveOn.org and

labor unions, also worked to help the Obama organization achieve a his-
toric victory in which the Democratic candidate won in states considered
safe Republican territory, such as Virginia, to elect Americas first African
American president. Democratic turnout went up 2.6% in 2008.25
The Electoral College system also discourages voter turnout and thus
undermines the democratic process. Presidential candidates often con-
centrate their campaign efforts on the handful of competitive states
(only five in 2004). Most of the other states are safe bets for one or the
other candidate, so the competitive battleground states offer the best
opportunity for the candidates to gain the plurality of Electoral College
votes for victory. The candidates and their parties bypass the vast ma-
jority of states and the interests and views of the people who live in
those states. They do not work as hard to get these voters to the polls,
so turnout is lower in the nonbattleground states. Perhaps the Demo-
crats 50-state strategy will help remedy this understandable inclination
to spend limited campaign time and resources in only a few battle-
ground states.
Elected officials naturally address the issues of those who vote for
them rather than those who vote against them or do not vote at all.
Verba, Schlozman, and Brady show that political participation does
indeed enhance representation.26 Those active in the political process
are likely to get what they want from policy makers, and those who do
not participate may lose ground as the well-off are able to maintain
and even enhance their advantage. The American Political Science
Associations Task Force on Inequality and American Democracy
recently noted, Citizens with lower or moderate incomes speak with a
whisper that is lost on the ears of inattentive government officials,
while the advantaged roar with a clarity and consistency that policy-
makers readily hear and routinely follow.27 The task force asserted
that such unequal representation in politics has led to the growing
concentration of the countrys wealth and income in the hands of the
few.28 Both political parties contribute to this political and economic
inequality when they do not make an effort to include these under-
represented citizens in the political process.
THE TWO-PARTY SYSTEM

Other features of U.S. politics, some of them designed or promoted by
the parties themselves, deter democracy in elections and governance. For
example, although the U.S. two-party system may promote the creation
of majorities, it also limits who is involved in politics and narrows the
political spectrum of ideas considered by government. U.S. electoral
institutions and governmental structures contribute to this system in
which only two parties have been capable of consistently competing
seriously for elective office. The United States has single-member legisla-
tive districts, where only one candidate is elected to each office, with plu-
rality elections, in which the candidate with the most votes, even if not a
majority of the votes, wins the election. That this type of system seems
naturally to produce a two-party system is known as Duvergers law.29 It
is difficult for a smaller party to compete given such a high threshold for
victory, so the United States has not seen the rise of other parties capable
of challenging the well-established Democratic and Republican parties.
Yet some other nations with single-member districts and plurality
elections support more than two parties. Indeed, there are other factors
unique to the United States that contribute to the long-term mainte-
nance of the two-party system. The U.S. single executive elected inde-
pendently of the legislature is one of these features. While a minor
party may be able to elect a few of its members to local or state office,
it has little chance of competing nationwide for the presidency. If a
minor party or independent candidate for president wants to compete
in all 50 states, he or she must get on each states ballot separately and
navigate 50 different ballot-access procedures. The Electoral College,
which channels the popular vote for president and requires that the
winner get a plurality of electoral votes, has proven an impossible hur-
dle for a minor-party or independent candidate to clear. Additionally,
the direct primary has worked against minor-party success in the
United States, as primary elections are an effective means by which the
two major parties minimize and co-opt dissent. Primaries are open to
all who wish to run for the nomination and therefore offer disgruntled
groups a chance to pursue their issues within one of the major parties,
giving them a better chance of electoral success than running as a
minor-party candidate.
Protecting Their Hegemony

Although the two major parties are highly fragmented in the United
States, they are quite effective in protecting their status as the only
major parties. Federalism in the United States whereby power and
responsibility are distributed between and among the various states
and the national government and the separation of powers within
government diminish the ability of parties to serve as cohesive and
effective links between citizens and their government. Individual voters
are free to, and often do, split their tickets by voting for candidates
from different parties at different levels or for different branches of
government.
The national parties are often characterized as two loose collections of
the independent party organizations at the state level, with 50 Republican
and 50 Democratic parties. The Democratic National Committee and
the Republican National Committee have little formal authority over
their state party organizations, and there is not much coordination

between the national- and state-level party organizations. At the national
level, the party organizations are divided into six different party commit-
tees: the Republican and Democratic national committees, which are pri-
marily involved in presidential elections, the Republican and Democratic
Senate campaign committees, which work to elect candidates to the U.S.
Senate, and the Republican and Democratic House campaign commit-
tees, which support party candidates for the House of Representatives.
Moreover, each party has a caucus within each chamber of Congress. All
of these party entities operate relatively autonomously. The U.S. Consti-
tution gives each of the 50 states the authority to set the time, place, and
manner of elections in their states. One might expect that such a decen-
tralized system would produce a wide variety of approaches to running
elections. However, as Kolodny points out, there is a high degree of con-
formity found across states among electoral institutional features friendly
to the two major parties.30 When they set ballot access, voter registra-
tion, and campaign finance laws, they design them to protect the hege-
mony of their two parties. Indeed, the Democrats or Republicans control
all of the state legislatures and state governors offices. Additionally, the
electoral administrative officers, such as the secretaries of state and board
of elections commissioners, are often partisans as well and may make
decisions about voter registration, ballot access, ballot type, and vote
counting that are favorable to their party and its candidates. For example,
in the 2000 election it was a Republican secretary of state in Florida, who
was also a Florida state chairperson for George W. Bushs presidential
campaign, who originally halted the recount of ballots and called the
election for her partys nominee. With complete control of the official
mechanisms of electoral management, the two major parties have estab-
lished systems that keep them, and only them, in power.
Ballot Access
Gaining access to the ballot is often difficult for minor party and
independent candidates. Through their control of all state legislative
bodies and governors offices, the two major parties have erected steep
requirements for minor party and independent candidates to get on the
ballot. Minor party and independent candidates often must work to get
a spot on the ballot for each election by, for example, collecting a large
number of signatures of registered voters or having earned a certain
percentage of the vote in the last statewide or presidential election
(anywhere from 2% to 20% of the vote). Moreover, most states make it
more difficult to gain ballot access as a minor party candidate than as
an independent candidate, with, for example, much earlier deadlines
for party ballot access than independent candidate access. Indeed, an
organized party is more of a threat to two-party hegemony than a
single candidate whose rising star may fade by the next election. In
California, for the 2008 presidential election, a party had to petition for
ballot access by December 31, 2007, while an independent candidate
had until August 8, 2008.31
The tight control the major parties have over ballot access is hardly a
formula for democracy and political equality, because the views of the
supporters of other parties may not be adequately represented if their
candidates cannot even get on the ballot. Moreover, the two-party sys-
tem may contribute to low voter turnout. With only two parties, each
of them must try to attract very broad support from all groups in soci-
ety in order to get the plurality of the votes they need for electoral vic-
tory. Thus many citizens often feel that the parties and their candidates
are too similar and therefore do not present a real choice. Why vote if
the election will produce such similar results no matter who wins?
Lower voter turnout clearly works against majority rule, as most non-
presidential contests are now decided by fewer than 50% of those eligi-
ble to vote. When parties are perceived as offering different policy
paths, turnout usually increases, as in 2008, when the Democrats were
seen as a distinct change from the unpopular policies of the Republi-
cans, and particularly of Republican president George W. Bush (e.g.,
the declining economy, the war in Iraq, and various scandals involving
administration officials). The Democrats won the presidency and large
majorities in both chambers of Congress.
Campaign Finance
Like ballot access rules, campaign finance laws in the United States
are written and implemented by Democrats and Republicans to regu-
late their own candidates campaigns. Modern campaigns are incredi-
bly expensive ventures. Only a celebrity or an enormously wealthy
independent or minor party candidate may be able to fund television
advertisements, mass mailings, sophisticated voter contact operations,
and the like. Since 1974, public funding has been available to parties
for their presidential campaigns. To qualify for the full amount of fund-
ing, one must achieve major party status by receiving 25% of the popu-
lar vote in the previous election, a threshold neither the Democrats nor
Republicans have failed to reach. A major party receives the public sub-
sidy as soon as its presidential nominee is chosen. Minor party presi-
dential candidates can qualify for public funding if they receive at least
5% of the popular vote for president. Even then, they only receive the
funds after the election is over as reimbursement for general election
expenses. If the 5% threshold is reached, funding will be available
for the next election, but by then the surge of support may have waned
as the major parties will have undoubtedly worked hard to attract
the minor partys supporters. In 30 years, only one minor party has
qualified for presidential public funding, Ross Perots Reform Party in

1996. The Reform Party received $12 million for its 2000 presidential
candidate, Pat Buchanan, but he ended up with less than 1% of the
popular vote. Since 2000, a few states have adopted clean election
laws that provide public funding to their state and local candidates
who voluntarily decline to raise all but a small amount of money from
private sources. Some also offer reduced cost or free television time to
publicly funded candidates. Yet, while public funding has helped elect
more women and minorities to state legislatures, it has not resulted in
any real challenge to the two-party system in these states.
There is no public funding available for national legislative (House
and Senate) campaigns, and minor party and independent candidates
have not been able to compete with the highly successful fund-raising
of the major parties and their candidates. Generally, the individuals
and political action committees (i.e., the campaign finance committees
established by labor unions, corporations, and interest groups) that con-
tribute in House and Senate campaigns give almost exclusively to
major-party candidates, making it quite difficult for minor party and
independent candidates to raise enough money to compete with major
party candidates. In 2004, winning candidates for the House of Repre-
sentatives raised on average $1,135,862, while nonmajor party candi-
dates who vied for a House seat raised on average $4,792.32 Such a
disparity in fund-raising effectively keeps nonmajor party candidates
out of contention, even if they manage to get on the ballot.
At the national level, the Federal Election Commission (FEC) over-
sees the financing of campaigns for president and for all 535 seats in
the House of Representatives and the Senate. The FEC also determines
if a party will be considered a national party and therefore be entitled
to higher contribution limits. National parties are expected to run can-
didates for president and for the U.S. Congress and to hold statewide
nominating conventions. The FEC has a board of six governors, who
are appointed by the president with the advice and consent of the Sen-
ate. No more than three of the FEC governors may be from the same
political party, and since its creation in 1974, the FEC has always had
three Republican and three Democratic members. As one might imag-
ine, the FEC is not inclined to write rules and regulations or make deci-
sions that might weaken the two-party system.
The campaigns finance system also works to the advantage of incum-
bents and therefore contributes to the lack of competition seen in most
races for the U.S. House and Senate as well as for many states legisla-
tures. In the 2006 elections for the U.S. House of Representatives, only
63 of the 435 seats up for election were decided by a margin of less than
10%, which is less than 15% of all races for the House. Incumbents receive
the vast majority of the contributions from individuals and political action
committees, which tends to deter most challengers. House incumbents
running for reelection in 2006 raised on average $1,095,144, while their

challengers raised an average of only $381,392.33
Competition is an essential component of a legitimate democracy. It
is necessary to give voters a real choice and, therefore, a say in who
will govern. Without meaningful electoral competition, voters cannot
play the important role assigned to them in a representative democ-
racy, for elections are the means by which the people rule in such sys-
tems. Moreover, competition increases political participation. When
elections are close and the outcome is uncertain, more people will turn
out to vote. Close elections receive more media attention, which means
voters will receive more information about the candidates running. This
lowers the information costs of voting and therefore increases the pro-
pensity to vote. Both political parties will work to get their voters to
the polls in close elections where either partys candidate has a real
chance of winning. As Rosenstone and Hansen show, the political par-
ties efforts to mobilize have considerable effect. When parties make the
effort, the people they contact are far more likely to participate in elec-
toral politics than the people they pass over.34 Indeed, the efforts by
the Republican Party in 2004 and Democratic candidate Barack Obama
in 2008 support this notion that parties and their candidates can
increase voter turnout with effective mobilization efforts. Yet the cam-
paign finance advantage enjoyed by incumbents has significantly
reduced the number of competitive contests for elective office and thus
contributes to further dedemocratization.
Redistricting
District lines for national and state legislative districts are drawn, in
most states, by the state legislatures. After the national census every 10
years, states redraw district lines to account for population growth and
shifts. Since all state legislatures are controlled by Republicans and
Democrats, district lines are not drawn in ways that allow minor party
and independent candidates to seriously compete for a seat in the state
or federal legislature.
Majority parties in the states often draw district boundary lines to
favor their own partys candidates, a practice known as gerrymandering
(named after Massachusetts Governor Elbridge Gerry who, in 1812, had
the lines of one district redrawn to ensure his partys candidate would be
elected. The oddly shaped district resembled a salamander, and critics
called it a Gerry-mander.) Often gerrymandering also creates safe dis-
tricts for the other party, as one party packs its candidates district with
the partys voters, and the remaining voters of the other party are put in
a neighboring district, thereby creating two safe seats, one for each party.
After the 2000 census, Democrats in control of the legislature and the
governors office in California worked with Republicans to create safe
seats for both parties incumbents by drawing district lines in a bipartisan

gerrymander. Some Democrats criticized their party for not creating
more Democratic seats when they had the votes to do so. Others noted
that the majority Democrats wanted to avoid having their redistricting
plan challenged in court and the district lines redrawn in a way that
might work against the party. The consensus plan was not challenged,
and the redistricting amounted to an incumbent protection plan. Draw-
ing district lines in such a way resulted in very little competition for state
and federal legislative seats and no chance for minor party or independ-
ent candidates to win a seat. In this sense, the parties conspired to protect
the two-party system as well as their own incumbents.
Whether lines are drawn to favor a particular party or to favor
incumbents in general, creating safe seats means that those elected from
such districts are likely to be more ideologically extreme. With little
competition in the general election, the real contest is in the primary
election for the partys nomination, where candidates work to attract
the votes of the party faithful who tend to be more extreme in their
views than the electorate as a whole. There has been an increase in
party polarization in government in recent decades in part because of
the increased number of legislators elected from safe districts. If gov-
ernment is unified, such party unity will help the majority party
achieve its legislative goals and allow voters to more easily make a col-
lective judgment on those in power. When government is divided
between the parties, however, such ideological unity within the parties
can discourage compromise, which may result in policy deadlock. With
no one majority party, divided government also works against the prin-
ciples of majority rule and collective accountability.
CONCLUSION: CONSIDER THE ALTERNATIVES

While the discussion above may lead one to be very concerned about
the fate of democracy in the United States, the alternative, a politics
without parties, is likely to prove a much more dangerous threat to de-
mocracy. With all of the barriers to the parties success and their inclina-
tion to control their political environment in ways that detract from
democracy, political parties in the United States (and elsewhere), as
E. E. Schattschneider asserted, created modern democracy . . . and mod-
ern democracy is unthinkable save in terms of parties.35 The emergence
of political parties was, as Richard Hofstadter noted, the rise of legiti-
mate opposition in the United States.36 Parties allow those advocating
competing ideas to do so in an organized and cohesive manner. An
organized opposition is necessary for democracy in that democracy
requires, as Duverger put it, that those who govern are chosen by those
who are governed, by means of free and open elections.37 The ability to
have the choice of who governs can only exist if there is legitimate
opposition, that is, recognized opposition, organized and free enough in

its activities to be able to displace existing government by peaceful
means.38 While the parties regularly act to decrease their exposure to
such organized opposition, without it, there would be little need for po-
litical parties.
Despite the institutional constraints to party government in the United
States, party politics could and should function in a way that is more con-
ducive to democracy. Such change will likely have to come from outside
the parties. Indeed, as Lawson has noted, Any hope of reestablishing
parties as agents of democracy requires the use of the strongest tools
of democracy a free press and a demanding electorate to rejuvenate
our parties and our political systems. Simply holding parties in contempt,
and taking pleasure in describing their failures, are not much more useful
than pretending all is well.39 Yet there are developments that may be
cause for some optimism about the state of parties and democracy in the
United States.
U.S. party organizations have become stronger, wealthier, and more
involved in mobilizing voters. The parties are quite vibrant organiza-
tions, and voters interest in and attachment to the parties have
increased in recent years. The Republicans 72-Hour Program to iden-
tify and mobilize voters is a recent example of the parties natural incli-
nation to contribute to democracy by building majorities. There has
also been a rise in candidate organizations, performing many of the
campaign functions traditionally conducted by the parties, such as
Democrat Barack Obamas 2008 presidential campaign, which mobi-
lized and organized vast numbers of supporters and volunteers via the
Internet. The Obama campaign has a database with 13 million e-mail
addresses and a net roots network of volunteers that mobilized vot-
ers to nominate Obama in the primary elections and helped him win in
traditionally Republican states and battleground states in the general
election.40 Yet the temporary nature of a candidate organization may
mean that such an effort, while quite effective for one election, may not
be as conducive to promoting democracy as an electoral and governing
effort run by a political party that can serve as a bridge between cam-
paigning and governing and a link between the populace and the
government.
After the election, the Obama campaign organization, renamed Obama
for America 2.0 (or OFA 2.0),41 continued to communicate with those on
its massive e-mail list. Obama for America asked its members to help
determine a plan for the future of this movement a plan determined
by you.42 OFA reported that people are excited to volunteer around a
number of top issues, that 86% of respondents feel its important to help
Baracks administration pass legislation through grassroots support
and that 68% feel its important to help elect state and local candidates
who share the same vision for our country.43 These postelection efforts
resemble traditional party efforts to mobilize supporters around the

partys policy goals, but it remains to be seen whether Obamas organiza-
tion will combine with the Democratic Party, work parallel to it, operate
separately and differently, or something else.
Many nonparty groups also contribute to enhancing democracy in the
United States. Some work to register and mobilize poor, working-class,
minority, and young citizens to participate in elections. The 2008 election
featured highly organized efforts by nonparty groups to mobilize volun-
teers and voters. For instance, the left-leaning group MoveOn.org, an
entirely Internet and e-mail-based organization, stepped up its campaign
efforts for the 2008 election. MoveOn polled its members by e-mail dur-
ing the nominating season to pick one presidential candidate over the
other Democratic candidates to support, and the group then organized
phone banks, fund-raising, and other events that helped get the mem-
bers choice, Barack Obama, nominated. MoveOn then drew on its vast
e-mail list and fund-raising capability to organize volunteers, raise funds,
and run ads on behalf of Obama in the general election. After the elec-
tion, MoveOn asked its members to vote for their top policy goals to
focus MoveOns efforts for the next year.44 MoveOn involves its mem-
bers in such decision making more than most interest groups and is
unusually close to a particular candidates organization. Thus its grass-
roots activities may contribute to a successful effort to turn an electoral
mandate into major policy change.
Moreover, increased media attention on the partisan administrators
of elections and what decisions they make has led to calls for nonparti-
san election administration. Some activists are working to promote a
proportional representation system that might increase the representa-
tion of minor parties in government, and two states, Maine and
Nebraska, use proportional representation to distribute most of their
Electoral College votes. Minor parties continue to fight to lower the
threshold for ballot access, and reformers at both the state and national
levels want changes to the campaign finance systems that will reduce
the advantages of incumbents. Six of the 50 states use redistricting com-
missions to draw legislative district lines rather than partisans in gov-
ernment, and many more states are currently considering taking this
task away from their legislators and governors.
These are all signs that The United States has not given up on politi-
cal parties. Parties, for most, are still seen as the necessary ingredient
for a healthy democracy, the link between citizens and their govern-
ment. What is needed, however, are healthier parties. Since only Demo-
crats and Republicans write the rules that govern their own activities,
citizens should not expect to see much change unless great demand for
change comes from the people themselves.
PART II
Latin America
CHAPTER 3
Political Parties and Democracy

in Argentina: 1983 2008
Ana Mara Mustapic
INTRODUCTION
In October 2008, Argentine democracy celebrated its 25th anniversary.
By the countrys standards this was a remarkable achievement. No
earlier attempt at democratization, of which there have been several,
has displayed such continuity. No other democratic period has experi-
enced crisis situations of dimensions such as those that occurred
since the 1980s. Besides the military uprisings of 1987, 1988, and 1990,
Argentina went through two hyperinflations, the most dramatic of
which took place in 1989, followed by another in 1990. Further, starting
in the early 1990s, Argentina saw one of the most drastic changes in
the rules of the game between the state and the economy. Later, by the
end of 2001, the country had undergone a major economic, political,
and social crisis: economic recession, debt default, devaluation of the
peso, powerful social protest, and presidential resignation. Still, despite
these formidable challenges, democratic continuity was never at stake.
The current stability of democratic institutions thus provides an excel-
lent opportunity to examine the question that organizes this volume:
What has been the contribution of political parties to the working of
democratic politics?
In order to assess this contribution we could evaluate the way Argentine
parties fulfilled the functions traditionally assigned to political parties
in general: incorporation and aggregation of interests, participation,
political recruitment, and structuring electoral choices. However, as sev-
eral authors have highlighted, this approach raises some difficulties.
The first and most important is that it usually assumes as a frame of ref-
erence a mythical, and as such too demanding, golden age of political
parties: the age of mass parties.1 From this standpoint, it comes as no sur-
prise that present political parties fall short of such grandiose expecta-
tions. This chapter will take a more cautious approach, focusing on the
main role performed by political parties in contemporary democracies:
participation in open, competitive elections. The electoral role of the par-
ties leads to a discussion of the party system. Argentinas party system is
in a state of fluidity, characterized by an unstable pattern of interaction
among political parties (moving into bipartyism, predominant party sys-
tem, or multipartyism as the case may be). This raises the question of the
effects of a fluid party system on the functioning of democratic politics.
For those more or less familiar with the Argentine case, contending that
the party system is fluid may seem curious: first, because all presidents
since 1983 have belonged to one of the two big traditional parties: the Radi-
cals (Uni on Cvica Radical or UCR) or the Peronists (Partido Justicialista,
Justicialist or PJ), and second, because also since 1983 the two largest legis-
lative blocs in Congress have been the Peronist and the Radical, albeit with
an important advantage for the former. From 1983 to 1987, the Peronists
controlled the majority and, since 1987, the absolute majority in the Cham-
ber of Senators. Third, although the electoral performance of the UCR has
strongly diminished, the JP has been able to maintain a dominant position.
Taking these traits into account, it could be held that the political party sce-
nario is predictable; at least it is known that Peronism is the majority party
and it is expected to continue to be so.
In this chapter, however, we will try to show that the current party
system scenario is not as clear as in the past. This is due to the fact that
institutional stability has enabled parties to develop patterns of behav-
ior matured over time, but has only recently become an object of schol-
arly analysis. The working of Argentinas federal system is an example.
It has recently been pointed out not only that different levels of govern-
ment and electoral competition coexist, but also that subfederal units
have become highly diversified in their electoral competition patterns.2
Thus, when discussing political parties in this type of system, some
authors have proposed to label them as federalized party systems.3 It is
not our aim here to deepen discussions regarding the label but to take
the institutional environment to which the label points as a reference
framework. From this standpoint, the argument that is made in this
chapter is that fluidity of the party system at a national level should be
investigated focusing both on the changes in electoral behavior and on
institutional factors that affect the fragmentation of parties and the
autonomy of organizational subunits.
Concerning the first variable, changes in electoral behavior, I highlight
departidization and the growth of the independent voter. Concerning the
second, institutional factors affecting the fragmentation of parties and the
Political Parties and Democracy in Argentina 53
autonomy of organization subunits, I pay special attention, on the one

hand, to the particularistic and locally based incentives present in the
institutions that regulate the existence and functioning of political par-
ties, and on the other hand, to the organizational characteristics of the
parties themselves.
The fluidity of the party system affects the working of democracy
because it sharply increases the personalization of the exercise of power,
which in turn has two consequences. The first is that the president occu-
pies the center of representative government. The second is somewhat
more complex and unusual: When democracy is the only game in town,
and the party system is chronically fluid, the ensuing personalization of
power puts the stability of governments at stake. In Argentina this has
meant a recent rise in the frequency of presidential resignations. The
probability that resignations become frequent in the functioning of presi-
dential regimes must not be discarded for those countries in which inter-
action patterns between parties are variable.
The first section of this chapter is devoted to presenting the histori-
cal background of Argentine political parties and the main traits of
Argentinas unstable party system. The second and third sections deal
with the factors that produce party system fluidity: First, electoral
behavior and departidization, followed by a section on how party regu-
lation and the organization of parties produce party fragmentation and
the autonomy of organizational subunits. The fourth section examines
the problem of the personalization of party, while a fifth section con-
siders the phenomenon of presidential resignations. In the concluding
section, the impact of these factors on the exercise of power and the
working of democracy is addressed.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
In December 1983, Argentina again resumed the democratic road,
this time facing the hard legacies of the ruthless military regime
installed in 1976: the painful aftermaths of political repression, a lost
war the Malvinas War and a highly indebted and impoverished
economy. The announcement of the democratic opening, in mid-1982,
was followed by eloquent shows of support for democracy. A telling
testimony of the civic enthusiasm that this new beginning generated
was the impressive number of new affiliates to political parties. In
March 1983, official data registered 2,966,472 new affiliations, of which
1,489,565 were to the PJ, 617,251 to the UCR, and the remainder to a
multiplicity of small parties.4 Thus, the two main national parties,
the UCR and the PJ, occupied once again the center of the electorates
political preferences.
Both parties, in spite of the important ideological and cultural differ-
ences that separated them, shared a common trait: Their emergence
into public life divided the Argentine political map by promoting cleav-
ages of an ideological kind and setting up their organizations around
strong personalistic leaderships.
The UCR, the older of the two forces, had emerged in 1890 as an
antisystem party, aimed at attacking the sources of the oligarchiza-
tion of power. In the name of freedom of suffrage and respect of the
Constitution, the UCR set the basis for a popular movement whose
identity was built around a fracture, which, infused in a moral over-
tone, opposed the historic mission of radicalism, the Cause (La Causa)
of the old ruling classes, with the regime (El Regimen). Its defying
presence through militant electoral abstention, conspiracies, and direct
action led the reformist wing of the governing class to promote an elec-
toral reform. Shortly after its enactment, in 1912, the UCR proved to be
the majority party. Between 1916 and 1930, Argentina was ruled by
radical presidents, in a political atmosphere of increasing internal divi-
sion between yrigoyenists supporters of Hip olito Yrigoyen, charismatic
leader and president of the republic and anti-yrigoyenists. In Septem-
ber 1930, not nearly halfway through his second presidential mandate,
Yrigoyen was removed from power by means of a military coup. His
toppling initiated a long list of failures in the construction of a stable
democratic order. Almost 16 years and another military coup, that of
1943, had to pass for free and competitive elections to be held again. It
was within this opportunity, more precisely in 1946, that the PJ, calling
itself the Peronist Party at the time, appeared on the electoral scene,
promoted by the charismatic leadership of General Juan D. Per on.
Created from the apex of state power, Peronism won the support of
the popular sectors of the society and the entire political spectrum of
the time: socialists, radicals, and conservatives. But what became dis-
tinctive about the Peronist movement was its strong linkage to or-
ganized labor and deep roots in working- and lower-class society. With
this backing, Peronism became the hegemonic political force that would
dominate, from then onward, Argentine political life. In addition, its
presence fractured, once again, the country into two rival fields, updat-
ing the reciprocal denegation logic of Yrigoyens times. The old divi-
sion between the cause and the regime, which had been losing
strength in the 1930s, was replaced in the mid-1940s by another equally
disruptive cleavage from the institutional point of view: the opposition
of Peronism and anti-Peronism.
After the military coup that overthrew President Per on in 1955,
Argentine society found itself facing two polar images: For some the
institutions and practices of the Peronist Party were associated with an
experience of social advancement and recognition of basic rights; for
others, it was equivalent to institutional and moral decadence. The
anti-Peronist opposition, now in power, tried to oust Peronism from
political life, resorting to a variety of prohibitions, which brought about
the establishment of a democracy vitiated by electoral proscription.

Between 1955 and 1973, the top priority in the civil and, from 1966, the
military political agenda was deciding what to do about Peronism.
In 1973, in the midst of political and social polarization, the anti-
Peronists concluded that any political solution that excluded Peronism
was illusory. Thus, a new democratization process started with the
overwhelming electoral triumph of the PJ over the UCR. This strug-
gle, which set old and bitter rivals at loggerheads, was followed by a
historical gesture: the institutional agreement between the leaders of
both parties, Juan D. Per on and Ricardo Balbn, aimed at ending
the exclusionary style toward the adversary that had hitherto regu-
lated the relationships between the political classes. Unfortunately, this
pact was insufficient to stop the civil war partly generated by the
impact of their past disagreements. In this crucial time, Per ons political
charisma proved to be insufficient to contain and channel the virulent
aspirations of his supporters and gain backing for the call for political
reconstruction. The institutional agreement succumbed in the face
of the intransigent opposition of supporters of violence, both from
the right as well as the left. The states monopoly over the use of force
disappeared.
President Per ons death in July 1974 left behind a country sinking in
misgovernment and violence. The legal opposition had no strength to
put an end to the agony, which continued until March 1976, when mili-
tary officers intervened once again and took power without any
resistance from a public opinion exhausted by political and economic
chaos. In retrospect, the experience that was coming to an end illus-
trated the failure of the governing elites to ride the participation waves
that, first at the end of the 19th century and then in and after the 1940s,
washed over the political community.
Thus it was against the backdrop of these two experiences Peronisms
return to power in 1973 and subsequent fall, and the ruthless military dic-
tatorship, each with their burdens of violence and crisis, both marking the
collective awareness of Argentineans that a new democratic opportunity
opened up in 1983. The new democratic era dawned with a surprising
result: the end of the electoral preeminence that Peronism had enjoyed
since 1946. In fact, with almost 52% of the ballots, the UCR, led by Ra ul
Alfonsn, achieved what until then had been unthinkable, defeating the PJ
at the ballot boxes. Nevertheless, the Peronista candidate, Italo Luder,
reached 40% of the vote. In this foundational election, the bipartisan com-
petition pattern was precise. The UCR and the PJ received 92% of presi-
dential votes and almost 87% of legislative votes. The results were not
surprising since they were consistent with the electoral background of the
country: From 1916, civil presidents had been either radicals or Peronists.
But the following elections introduced novelties. In a tight summary, the
following facts can be highlighted.
The bipartisan format set up by the 1983 dispute was followed by

alternation in power. This occurred in 1989 when it was the PJs turn to
conquer the presidency, in elections held on the eve of a hyperinflation-
ary crisis. Alfonsns government ended in the most turbulent circum-
stances: rising inflation, strikes, military unrest, difficult negotiations
with international creditors, and public discontent. This complicated
scenario prompted the unusual decision to anticipate the handover of
the presidency. Six months before the end of his term, President
Alfonsn arranged for the transfer of power with president-elect Carlos
Menem. In a less dramatic juncture this would have more than sufficed
for a military coup. However, the novel democracy managed to endure
the test and did so with a twist: It was the first time in the countrys
history that a democratically elected government peacefully transferred
the power to an opposition party. It was a reassuring sign for the con-
solidation of the democratic process.
From 1989 onward, the PJ seemed to be set on becoming the domi-
nant party. President Menems spectacular ideological and political
turnaround, giving full support to a program of fiscal austerity, privati-
zation, and economic liberalization, was rewarded. The PJ candidates
won three consecutive legislative elections and a presidential election
in which, in addition, the UCR was displaced to the third position. But
the 1997 legislative election and the 1999 presidential election brought
PJ predominance to a halt, as for the first time the PJ was defeated in
the ballot boxes as the government party and a coalition government,
presided over by Fernando de la R ua, was born out of a new political
society known as Alianza and composed of the UCR and a newly cre-
ated force, Frente Para un Pas Solidario (FREPASO), set up by PJ dissi-
dents. It was not easy for the Alianza to agree on a common platform
as the economic heritage left by Menems neo-liberal policies did not
allow much space for maneuvering. Finally, the Alianza leaders
decided not to change Menems macroeconomic policies based on the
so-called convertibility law. The convertibility fixed the exchange rate
at 1 peso to 1 dollar, thus eliminating any possibility of an independent
monetary policy. Instead, the Alianza emphasized the struggle against
the social consequences of the structural reforms of the state and the
economy and the struggle against corruption.
The hopes nurtured by the arrival of the new government did not last
long. The Alianza inherited an economy in a harsh recession, and it
became evident that the great transformation of the 1990s was coming
to an end. Only two years later, the political situation was dramatically
altered. The 2001 legislative elections, held in the midst of a deep eco-
nomic crisis and growing civic unrest, set a new milestone: the electoral
collapse of the UCR FREPASO coalition in the backdrop of a growing
sense of political alienation indicated by the high percentage of blank bal-
lot papers and null ballot papers and the growth of electoral abstention.
This election served as a prologue to the abrupt conclusion of de la R uas

presidency a few months later. In order to complete de la R uas term, pur-
suant to the succession rules and by decision of the Congress, the presi-
dency fell once more into the hands of the PJ: first, into those of the
governor of the small province of San Luis, Rodrguez Saa. But his tenure
in office lasted only one week when he resigned after realizing that his
policy proposals would not gather enough support from his fellow parti-
sans. A week later, Eduardo Duhalde, senator and party leader of the
province of Buenos Aires, stronghold of the PJ, took the oath of the
presidency.
The effects of the 2001 crisis, the government instability it brought
about, together with the economic debacle, became noticeable in the
2003 presidential elections. In this contest, three traits must be high-
lighted. First, depolarization: Previously the sequence had been the fol-
lowing: In 1983, the two most voted presidential formulas gathered
91.9% of the votes; in 1989, 79.9%; in 1995, 73.3%; and in 1999, 86.6%.
But in 2003 together they accounted for only 46.7% of the ballots. The
second feature to underline is the great number of presidential candida-
cies of Peronist or radical affiliation. If candidates were identified
according to their family of origin, radical or Peronist, and not by
the different party labels under which they competed, each party
family offered three candidates to the presidency. Finally, a worrisome
development of the 2003 election was that the UCR official candidate
obtained only 1.9% of the ballots, while the candidate who eventually
became president, the justicialist Nestor Kirchner, gained a meager 23%
of support. He would have certainly obtained the absolute majority in
the second round, but his opponent in the runoff, the justicialist and
former president Carlos Menem, deprived him of such possibility by
abandoning the dispute.
The legislative election held in 2005 showed signs of a readjustment
of political forces that was reinforced in the 2007 presidential election.5
One is the fragmentation of the non-Peronist political forces and, in
addition, the attempt made by President Kirchner to transform Peron-
ism. With this aim, he promoted the consolidation of a new political
party, the Frente para la Victoria, which in certain districts competed
against candidates of the traditional justicialist party. Also, he
attempted to attract the support of sectors from the UCR to his electoral
coalition. This effort bore fruit in the 2007 presidential elections when
the presidential formula, now led by President Kirchners wife, Cristina
Fernandez, was completed with the candidacy of a former governor of
radical origin.
As this brief summary suggests, there is no stable party system in
Argentina. What initially seemed to be a two-party format mutated into
a predominant party system, but then acquired multipartisan traits in
1995. Since 2003, the system has shown traits of a multipartisan system
in which a political force, that of Peronist origin, collects the highest

amount of support and coexists with a fragmented group of parties,
none of which exceeds 20% of the ballots. I turn now to the factors that
have influenced these changes and helped create Argentinas fluid
party system, beginning with the electors behavior and increasing
departidization.
THE EMERGENCE OF AN INDEPENDENT ELECTORATE

Concerning the link between voters and parties, two phenomena are
most important: first, the progressive growth of the independent elec-
torate; second, the greater stability of the PJ vote. In order to address
these two issues, I begin with a very traditional and useful distinction
to characterize voters behavior: supporters, on one side, and independ-
ent voters, on the other. The link that supporters have with the party
rests on a relationship based on a prolonged identification and a dense
bond of solidarities. Independent voters, instead, are linked to the par-
ties according to the closeness of their political preferences to the par-
ties proposals. It is known that partisan identification produces an
invaluable resource for the party: loyalty. Independent voters keep an
instrumental link with the parties: In every election they will choose
the political force whose electoral program promises the defense of
their values and interests. Therefore, they may change parties from one
election to another or vote for different parties in an election when this
involves different kinds of authorities, that is to say, when facing multi-
level elections. The growth of the independent voter can be inferred
from the departidization process. Data gathered by Ipsos from 1984 to
2007 leaves no room for doubts concerning this evolution. A contrast
between the beginning of democratization and the present time shows
that while in 1984 26% of the population claimed to be affiliated to
some political party, in 2007 this figure fell to 14%. In 1984, 47% of soci-
ety sympathized with some political party; in 2007 only 17%. Lastly, it
is worth mentioning a most striking feature of Ipsoss survey, since it
reveals the loss of political parties ability to structure political prefer-
ences: In 1984, 7% of those surveyed held that they would never feel
congeniality for any party. In 2007, that figure rose to 56%.6
In view of the weakening of party identification, it comes as no sur-
prise that the electoral results show the presence of new political parties.
Before concentrating on them, it is worth explaining some characteristics
of the Argentine electoral system. Given the presidential and federal
regime of government, the electoral process, setting aside the municipal
arena, takes place on two important levels: national and provincial,
unavoidably interrelated. In addition, presidential and national legisla-
tive elections are not always concurrent, given the existence of midterm
elections. Moreover, in some years when both elections should have been
concurrent, their timing did not coincide. This configuration of the elec-
toral process opens the possibility for party dynamics to be organized in
a different way according to the kind of election taking place. In other
words, it offers incentives to vary both the kind of electoral supply as
well as the alternative programmatic options presented to the citizenship.
For this reason, it is possible to detect changing patterns depending on
the election and the district. For example, concentrating only on elections
for national offices, presidential elections tend to polarize the ballot
because the office in dispute is a single position and because the presi-
dential election system until 1995, indirect and by absolute majority of
the Electoral College encouraged that trend. The introduction of the
two-round system since 1995 partially changed this scenario. However,
the election of the Lower House members, through the DHondt system
of proportional representation with a 3% threshold, allows for a greater
fragmentation of the electoral supply, in particular in the most populated
districts. In turn, senators direct election after the 1994 constitutional
amendment, carried out by the binominal system, tends to condense the
number of competitors, given its majority nature. Consequently, a key
decision of political parties electoral strategies, deciding whether or not
to form coalitions and with whom, will ultimately rest on the office and
the level in which they are competing and may vary from province to
province.
Having sketched the electoral rules I return now to the electoral results,
beginning with the presidential elections. I have already pointed out that
in the first two elections, in 1983 and 1989, the two-party format con-
fronted the UCR and the PJ. From 1995, this picture was modified and
suffered fluctuations since the UCR was no longer one of the two strong-
est parties. In 1995, its place was momentarily taken by an excision of the
Peronist party, already mentioned, FREPASO, which collected 28.2% of
the votes against the 16.4% of the UCR. The 1999 elections witnessed the
return to a polarized scenario, but this time one of the poles was inte-
grated by a coalition, between the UCR and the FREPASO; the other pole
was occupied by the PJ. The presidential elections held in 2003 were the
most depolarized. The fragmentation of the political competition was
visible again in 2007, but this time, above all, in the non-Peronist field.
Presidential elections exhibit the presence of a party, the PJ, with
strong electoral support across time, and another party, the UCR,
which has been losing votes. Other parties occupied the political space
left by the UCR, some of them formed by UCR splinter groups, giving
place to the fragmentation of the non-Peronist political forces, a phe-
nomenon particularly apparent in the election of legislative deputies.7
The final outcome of legislative elections can be better appreciated by
taking into account the distribution of congressional seats. Table 3.1
shows the composition of the chamber of deputies by political party
block between 1984 and 2008. The information is presented on a yearly
basis and contemplates the changes that take place when representa-
tives separate from their original parties and form a new political bloc
or move to another.
The picture is quite similar to that of the presidential elections. In
spite of some fluctuation, such as those of the first years due to internal
divisions of the PJ, the other parties column has continued to grow.
Considering the first and last dates, 1984 and 2008, the PJ rose from
43.48% of the seats to 49.81%. In striking contrast, the UCR fell from
50.99% of the seats to 9.49%, while the other political forces grew from
5.53% to 40.86%, visibly nurtured by the independent voter.
The presence of the independent voter may also be detected through
a more detailed analysis of the 1983 elections. At this foundational elec-
tion, all existing elective offices were in dispute. The results showed
Table 3.1 Make-up of the Chamber of Deputies by Political Block

(% of seats)
PJ UCR Otros
1984 43.48 50.99 5.53
1985 24.60 54.76 20.63
1986 24.60 54.76 20.63
1987 24.11 50.99 24.90
1988 37.94 45.06 17.00
1989 39.13 44.66 16.21
1990 47.43 35.57 17.00
1991 43.48 35.18 21.34
1992 45.53 33.20 21.79
1993 45.14 33.20 22.18
1994 49.81 32.81 17.90
1995 47.47 32.81 20.23
1996 50.97 26.88 22.57
1997 50.19 26.88 23.35
1998 46.30 26.09 28.02
1999 46.30 26.88 27.24
2000 38.52 32.02 29.96
2001 38.91 31.23 30.35
2002 47.08 25.69 27.63
2003 44.75 24.11 31.52
2004 50.19 17.39 32.68
2005 49.81 17.79 32.68
2006 45.91 14.23 40.08
2007 43.75 16.02 40.23
2008 49.81 9.49 40.86
Source: Authors calculation based on data from Dirrecion de Informacion Palamentaria,
Camara de Diputados, Congreso de la Naci on for the period 1983 2004 and 2008, and on
the Web site of the Ministerio del Interior de la Naci
on, http://www.mininterior.gov.ar/
elecciones/archivos xls/Dip2005 2009 2007 2011.xls for the period 2005 2007.
that voters party choices varied according to the office in question:

national, provincial, or local. Given that each office is voted for sepa-
rately, a significant proportion of the electorate had no qualms about
voting for the candidate of one party for one office and that of another
party for another office. To illustrate this point, we can look at the dis-
tribution of voters preferences in the presidential, legislative, and gov-
ernors elections.8 Overall figures, even when not refined at all, reflect
voters selective behavior. Almost 52% of the ballots favored the UCR
in the presidential race, which was roughly equal to the 48% attained
by the deputies, but it won power in only 7 (32%) provincial govern-
ments of 22. Justicialism, on the other hand, obtained 40% for its candi-
date to the presidency, 38% for deputies, but took control of 12 (54%)
provincial governments.
These aggregate data hide some particular cases that are worth high-
lighting. For example, in the federal capital city the UCR obtained 15%
more for the presidential election than for that of deputies, concretely,
64% for president and 49% for deputies. In contrast, the difference in the
justicialist ballot was only 3%: 27% for president and 24% for deputies. In
the province of Catamarca, the figures were the following: UCR, 47% for
president, 42% for deputies and 36% for governor; the PJ obtained, in the
same order, 44%, 42%, and 40%. Results in the province of Salta were
even more unequal for the radicals, 45% for president, 42% for deputies,
and only 27% for governor. The PJ, instead, obtained 45% both for presi-
dent as well as for deputies, and it reached 51% for governor. Similar sit-
uations were also recorded in other districts.
These data outline the existing difference between the radical vote and
the Peronist vote. While the former tended to be the recipient of the inde-
pendent vote, the latter, because of its greater consistency, collected a
high percentage of loyal votes. Thus, while the candidate to the presi-
dency for the UCR had gathered majority support, this majority was dis-
tributed in a diverse way at the time of deciding deputies and governors.
It is worth pointing out that the difference between the radical votes for
president, on the one hand, and for deputies and governors, on the other,
matched an increase of votes in favor of third forces. The PJ, however,
basically kept a similar volume of support at all levels.
We cannot finish the analysis of voters behavior in the national
deputies election without mentioning the 2001 elections. This election,
a watershed in the party politics of Argentina, illustrates very well the
argument just set out.9 The coalition government between the UCR and
the FREPASO, besides the difficulties in keeping itself united the vice
president of the nation and leader of the FREPASO had resigned his
office confronted a very harsh economic situation: recession and the
risks of default. Unable to surmount the economic emergency and
marred by internal quarrels, the government was drastically deprived
of voters support in its first electoral test. The 2001 electoral outcome
can be better appreciated when compared to the legislative elections

held in 1999.
Table 3.2 shows the dramatic drop in votes of the Alianza UCR
FREPASO coalition, which lost no fewer than 4,531,465 ballots. Acci on
por la Rep ublica (APR) a new party born in 1999, and whose founder,
Domingo Cavallo, former president Menems minister of the econo-
my had joined the de la R ua government a few months before the
elections, lost 1,200,607 votes. Voter dissatisfaction turned to the blank
or null ballot papers and was concentrated in the most urban and
developed metropolitan districts as more refined analyses of these elec-
tions point out.10 In contrast, the loss suffered by Peronism was mea-
ger, amounting to 667,130 ballots. Once again, the justicialist vote turns
out to be more stable as opposed to the volatility of other political
forces.
The senatorial election deserves a separate comment. In accordance
with constitutional rules, provinces are represented by the same number
of senators. Until the 1994 constitutional amendment, these were two per
province and elected by provincial legislatures. Since 1994, there are
three senators per province and they are directly elected by the citizens
of each province. In the final balance, the parity of geographic representa-
tion has been favorable to the PJ whose most constant support is found in
the poorest and least populated provinces, as shown by ecological analy-
ses. Therefore, the PJ was able to achieve the majority and afterward the
absolute majority in the Senate from 1983 to date. The composition by po-
litical party of the Senate can be seen in Table 3.3.
To sum up, the electoral results reveal that Peronism enjoys a more
stable and solid support; whereas support for the non-Peronist pole is
more fragile and heterogeneous. This is a conclusion consistent with
the survey mentioned at the beginning of this section, which indicates
that 56% of the population feels no congeniality for any political party.
I end here with a few remarks concerning the emergence of the inde-
pendent voter in the present democratic experience.
To trace the genealogy of the independent voter it is necessary to
take into account the transformations undergone by the Argentine
Table 3.2 1999 and 2001 Legislative Elections

Alianza PJ APR ARI Blank Null Abstention
1999 7,590.034 5,476,625 1,374,675 819,384 161,760 4,463,092
% (41.73) (28.8) (7.5) (4.5) (0.92) (19.6)
2001 3,058,569 4,809,495 174,068 1,078,096 1,704,514 2,261,332 6,777,624
% (16.9) (26.6) (1) (6) (9.4) (12.5) (27.23)
References: Alianza UCR/FREPASO; PJ: Partido Justicialista; APR: Acci on Por la Rep
ublica; ARI:
Argentinos por una Rep ublica de Iguales.
Source: Marcelo Escolar, Ernesto Calvo, Natalia Calcagno y Sandra Minvielle (2002).
political culture. Such transformations have been appropriately ascribed

to the human rights movement that emerged during the last dictator-
ship and gained momentum with the transition to democracy.11 Its crit-
icism of the extreme arbitrariness of the state provided the material for
the symbolic construction of a more general criticism of any discretion-
ary exercise of public powers.
This cultural change paved the way to a second wave of movements
that placed their demands in terms of rights and did not hesitate to
appeal to the judicial system to assert them. In this way, for example,
incidents of police violence mobilized certain groups and served as a
stimulus for the greater proliferation of citizen movements. These experi-
ences, carried out independently from party structures, reached a singu-
lar expression with the creation of associations aimed at promoting civic
participation and controlling governmental actions. The surging of jour-
nalism based on investigative research exposed cases of government cor-
ruption and violation of rights and added to the readiness for change.
The mobilization of these active minorities led, as Enrique Peruzzotti
highlights, to a public agenda focused not only on distributive issues but
also on the effectiveness of law and public ethics.12 Thus, demands for
human rights and for civil rights focused on the exercise of a government
that generated a more demanding and better informed electorate more
alert to party alternatives. In this way, a process of redefinition of the idea
of representation, from a model based on authorization to one that
rests on the principle of representatives accountability, took place.13
In short, the human rights movement set up the basis for a more far-
reaching emancipation of political parties, especially pronounced in the
case of the PJ.
These changes in the electorate make it possible to understand, on
the one hand, Alfonsns 1983 victory but also the subsequent transfer
Table 3.3 Makeup of the Senate by Period and Political Party (in percentages)
PJ UCR Other
1983 1986 45.7 39.1 15.2
1986 1989 45.7 39.1 15.2
1989 1992 56.5 30.4 13.1
1992 1995 62.5 22.9 14.6
1995 1998 57.8 23.4 18.8
1999 2001 57.3 29.5 13.3
2001 2003 58.0 23.0 19.0
2003 2005 59.0 18.0 23.0
2005 2007 57.0 18.0 25.0
on Cvica Radical.
Note: PJ, Partido Justicialista; UCR, Uni
Source: Authors calculation bsed on data from Direcci on de Comisiones, Senado de la
Naci
on, Congreso de la Naci on.
of original electoral support toward the right and the left of the politi-
cal spectrum. They also account for Menems triumphs in 1989 and
1995 and afterward, of the Alianza in 1999 as well as the 2001 debacle
when the Alianza lost almost 60% of the votes and a large number of
voters decided to cast blank or null ballot papers. In Argentina, the in-
dependent voter votes according to his or her preferences be it for
tough management, policy promises, or government performance and
not according to allegiance to a party. The influence of this independ-
ent electorate has tipped the balance in favor of one presidential candi-
date or another and contributed to the changes in the majority coalition
in the Chamber of Deputies. However, it was not enough to alter the
Senates political profile given the weight of most traditional districts
where the independent vote is less widespread.
THE INSTITUTIONAL SOURCES OF PARTY FRAGMENTATION

This section will address the second dimension of our analysis of the
causes of the fluidity of the party system: party fragmentation. The pro-
cess of party fragmentation may be identified by looking at the effective
number of parties (ENP) competing in elections. Using the classic Laakso
and Tagepera index that measures ENP, the sequence for the presidential
elections was: in 1983, the effective number of parties equaled 2.32; in
1989, 2.95; in 1995, 2.74; in 1999, 3.18; in 2003, 5.65; and in 2007, 3.41. In
legislative elections, an increase in the ENP in the provinces is also found.
Overall, from 1983 to 2007, the ENP has increased in 17 of 24 districts. In
the remaining 7 districts, the ENP decreased, with one exception, because
these were the provinces in which only two or three deputies were
elected. Consequently, the electoral system has a majoritarian effect,
which encourages the development of fewer parties, leading to a two-
party system. Also, in five of these provinces, the PJ has not lost one elec-
tion since 1983. The ENP decrease is thus not surprising because the PJ is
predominant therein.
To analyze the process of party fragmentation I propose to take into
account the institutional devices that tend to favor the emergence of
political parties and give strategic and organizational autonomy to their
subunits. With that aim, I focus on the laws that regulate parties activity,
the electoral timing, and the parties organizational characteristics.
Party Regulation
Besides the low entry costs for creating a party, an additional impor-
tant feature of party regulation in Argentina as contained in Law 23298
is that it acknowledges two kinds of parties: the district party and the
national party. The basic territorial unit of all parties is the district,
which in Argentina coincides with provincial limits. When one party is
granted recognition in at least five districts, it is considered a national

party. Legislation thus introduces a territorial differentiation that con-
trasts with the laws of federal countries such as Mexico and Brazil
where federal legislation acknowledges only national parties. In order
to obtain such acknowledgment, the party must have support in at least
10 of the 32 states, in the case of Mexico, and one-third or nine of the
states in Brazil. But state party organizations are not autonomous. In
contrast, in Argentina, parties are autonomous. Their autonomy is sanc-
tioned by the national legislation and, according to jurisprudence, they
have preeminence over the national party organization. When the same
party is recognized in five districts, it is considered a national party.
The difference between the district party and the national party is that
only the latter can present candidates for the presidency. Candidacies
for the posts of deputy or senator are resolved at the district level.
The authorization to create political parties in only one district is an
important incentive to the proliferation of party organizations, as has
been apparent throughout the years. In 1983, the number of parties rec-
ognized was 79, whereas in 2005 there were 304. But, in addition, the
trend to create parties in only one district has also grown. In 1983, 65%
of the existing parties acted in only one district; in 2005 this rose to
81%. In other words, on average, in 1983, one political party was active
in four districts; in 2005, that figure barely exceeded two districts. It is
clear that the strategy of creating new political parties has privileged
territorial concentration in a few districts. But only the PJ and the UCR
have a national scope, that is, they are present in all 24 districts.
The main effect of this large number of parties is that it has a bearing
on the competitive strategy the party will adopt, in particular, at the
time of forming electoral alliances. Throughout the years, although fluc-
tuations can be observed in the total number of alliances, data are clear
regarding the growth in the size of alliances, which are composed of an
ever growing number of parties. Also, one alliance can be comprised of
different parties according to the district where it competes, and one
party can take part in different alliances according to the district. What
is more, a party can be a member of an alliance in one district with
parties that it competes with in another.
Timing of Elections
Another mechanism that grants autonomy to territorial subunits is the
timing of the elections. From 1983 to 1989, national elections were simul-
taneously held in all districts. In 1991, the law that set forth the unifica-
tion of elections was repealed and, for the first time, the national
deputies election was carried out on different dates in different districts.
In this way, calling for national legislative elections was subject to
the political convenience of the incumbents.14 This placed a strategic
resource in the governors hands, particularly the possibility of exploiting

the coattail effect when a popular party candidate running for an execu-
tive office attracts votes for other candidates of the same party. If the pop-
ular candidate belongs to the governors party, the timing of the elections
will certainly be the same; if there is still doubt regarding such popular-
ity, there is a high probability they will not coincide. One extreme case of
this strategic game occurred in 2003, at the time of the first elections after
the late 2001 collapse. On that occasion, the maximum territorial and tem-
poral dispersion of national elections was seen. The presidential election
was held in April and only two provinces those to which two of the
presidential candidates belonged held the national deputies election
simultaneously. In turn, in the remaining 22 provinces, the national
deputies election was distributed over 11 different dates.
Decentralized Organization
Parties organizational characteristics also grant a considerable degree
of autonomy to their territorial subunits and thereby further party frag-
mentation.15 To illustrate this point I will take as a reference the two
traditional parties, the UCR and the PJ, but the observation holds true
for any party with national scope. A key element to examine vis-a-vis
the internal dynamic of party politics is the rules that distribute power
within the organization.
The first aspect to stress is that the national parties adopted a territo-
rial organization consistent with Argentinas federal system. Parties
reproduce these territorial divisions in their internal organization, and
they introduce a multilevel authority structure: the national, the provin-
cial, and the local. Thus, the highest national authorities assembled, for
example, in national councils, boards, or committees, coexist jointly
with the highest provincial authorities that chair the respective district
councils, boards, or committees, linked at the same time to local leaders
at the municipal level.
The second feature is that these subunits enjoy an important degree
of autonomy, particularly in provincial organizations as compared to
the national organization. The result is a decentralized structure of
power. Several factors encourage this outcome. The partys organiza-
tions at the provincial level have substantial decision power at the time
of choosing their own leaders. In fact, except in exceptional circumstan-
ces, the partys national authorities have no instruments for interven-
tion. The provincial organizations also have considerable discretion to
produce their own internal rules. Thus each district decides on its own
authority structure, electoral norms, length of mandates, introduction
of diverse representation principles, electoral rules, and so forth.
A third important contribution to the autonomy of parties subunits
stems from the modalities of public funding. Parties public funding is
mostly channeled through provincial organizations. The present state

regulation sets forth that 80% of the amount the party receives must be
directly distributed to the district party units and the remaining 20% to
the national organization. The subordinated status that the national or-
ganization has in the allocation of state funds is also made evident in
the provisions of the parties rules themselves. According to them, the
partys national budget rests, to a great extent, on the districts financial
contribution, thereby enhancing the independent strength of the local
units and the likelihood of severe party fragmentation.
PERSONALIZATION OF POWER
To fully understand the parties role in the working of Argentine
democracy it is necessary to introduce one more factor: the programmatic
dimension. Viewed from this angle, the major Argentine parties are basi-
cally electoral machines that appeal to a wide electorate and therefore
lack programmatic density. In fact, the ideological distance among them
is very narrow. When ideological linkages between parties and voters are
weak and party competition is not structured along programmatic divid-
ing lines, it comes as no surprise that the leaders personal qualities and
the perspectives of success at the ballot boxes are the main engines of the
electoral game. Certainly, in the foundational moment, any political party
forges its identity and sense of collective solidarity around some political,
social, or cultural divide. The UCR demand for democracy and political
liberties and the Peronist defense of workers rights and social justice
shaped the Argentine party system. But those divides have begun to
fade. What currently characterizes party politics in Argentina is a pro-
grammatic indefiniteness. This is perhaps most evident in the case of the
Justicialist party. Between 1989 and 1999, the PJ gave full support to
Menems political turnabout, which introduced neo-liberal policies for-
eign to the Peronist tradition. Simultaneously, he granted a presidential
pardon to high-ranking officers accused of human rights abuses and con-
demned under Alfonsns government. Four years later, in 2003, under
the leadership of presidents Nestor Kirchner and, since 2007, Cristina
Fernandez de Kirchner, the PJ reversed Menems policies. The new justi-
cialist government promoted more state intervention in the economy
and launched a human rights offensive against the military involved in
crimes against humanity.
Under these conditions, in which collective incentives dilute and
party politics become, above all, merely electoral politics, the possible
combinations and strategies of the parties organizational subunits have
widened. The following two examples are worth mentioning as way of
illustration. The first is the 2007 presidential elections, which was a
clear expression of the art of political combination. The presidents
wife, Cristina Fern andez de Kirchner, was the candidate with the best
chance of succeeding her husband in office. Swiftly, candidates of the

other categories and levels national deputies and senators, governors,
provincial lawmakers, and municipal authorities who belonged to the
candidates party as well as to numerous allied small parties, looked
for the coattail effect. Furthermore, the presidential candidate wel-
comed support from almost every quarter. As a result, polling places
were flooded with ballot papers in which the same presidential candi-
date was accompanied by different lists of candidates for lower level
positions, candidates who in fact may have been competing among
themselves.
The second example also involves the PJ. One of the electoral strat-
egies familiar among district leaders has been to split from the party in
order to create their own organization and compete in the elections
against the official party list. Once the election is over and the verdict
is known, it is usual for them to return, triumphant or not, to their
original organization. The defection and reentry costs are clearly low,
allowing a kind of opportunistic behavior that describes the organiza-
tional flexibility of justicialism.16 The maneuvers set in place to face the
challenges of the 2003 presidential election are a case in point. Being
unable to agree on the presidential candidate, Peronists decided to run
three candidates with the electoral courts cooperation. This strategy
came with a price: None of them were authorized to use the party
label. In the emergency, each one launched his candidacy under the
umbrella of a different electoral alliance, which included at least one PJ
district organization.
In a context dominated by party fragmentation, autonomy of the
organizational subunits, and growing importance of the independent
voter, strengthening the leaderships role becomes unavoidable. In the
search for some principle of unity, parties end up taking refuge with
the president or with the presidential candidates. With these features in
mind, it is important to examine the consequences of this development
on the exercise of governmental power, a process that has resulted in
what Thomas Poguntke and Paul Webb have designated the presidenti-
alization of politics.17
When referring to the European experience, the contrast is raised
between the more party-oriented politics of the past with the more per-
sonalized or presidentialized politics of the present. Argentinas expe-
rience, but also that of other Latin American countries, offers some
differences. Personalization of power is a phenomenon prevalent prior
to the eruption of new communication technologies. In fact, the two
Argentine popular parties, the UCR and the PJ, were born the former at
the end of the 19th century and the latter in the mid-20th century as
catch-all parties, that is to say, as parties with weak ideological linkages
and the ambition of embracing a wide social basis. In comparative terms,
the cleavages of society, so important in the formation of European
parties, were less relevant in the origins of Argentine parties. Here the
presence of strong charismatic leaders Hip olito Yrigoyen in the case of
the UCR and Juan Domingo Per on for the PJ was decisive, particularly
because of their ability to propose dividing lines, which ended up split-
ting the Argentine society into two halves. However, the legacy these
dividing lines left in regard to programmatic content was ambiguous
enough to shelter different and sometimes even opposite policy pro-
posals. In this respect and as was mentioned before, the PJ trajectory
exhibits more pronounced shifts than any other political party. As Steven
Levitsky has pointed out, Peronisms programmatic orientation remains
very much up for grabs. Peronisms coalitional changes appear to be
more permanent.18
It is within this enduring historical tradition, where the partys fate
has little autonomy from the leaders and the relationship of the latter
with the electorate responds to a plebiscitary style, that the most recent
presidentialization process lies. This appears above all in one of the
aspects pointed out by Poguntke and Webb: that of the growth of exec-
utive formal powers. After the 1994 constitutional amendment, the
Argentine presidential office, already strong due to the legislative initi-
ative and veto power, was reinforced with new attributions: the decree
power, the item veto, and the legislative delegation (i.e., Congresss
decision to temporarily yield power to the executive in some specific
matters). Because of this, the presidential ability to act unilaterally was,
therefore, strongly enhanced. But the same movement that pushed the
president to the center of the institutional and political arena also
increased his or her public exposure and, therefore, vulnerability, and,
ultimately, the likelihood of losing all power in a forced resignation.
PRESIDENTIAL RESIGNATIONS
One of the novelties that the current democratic experience produced
has been the remarkable rise in the number of presidential resignations.
Since 1983, Argentina has experienced four: Ra ul Alfonsn, in 1989, a
few months prior to the end of his mandate; Fernando de la R ua in
2001; Adolfo Rodrguez S aa, also in 2001, appointed by the Congress to
substitute for de la Rua and whose tenure lasted only one week; and
Eduardo Duhalde in 2003. These resignations took place in contexts of
deep economic and social crises. Here I examine one of them more
closely because it so clearly reveals how the presidentialization of poli-
tics can go hand in hand with presidential vulnerability.
Brought to power by the UCR FREPASO coalition, de la R uas presi-
dency exhibited some features that made it unique. The 48.4% of
the ballots that paved his way to the presidency was not enough to
prevent him from facing the uncomfortable combination of a coalition
government and a divided government. His was a coalition government
because de la Rua had to share decisions with UCR and FREPASO leaders
but also a minority government since the PJ retained its traditional major-
ity in the Senate. De la Ruas mandate was thus exposed to a double risk:
the oppositions veto power in the Senate and the predictable disagree-
ments between partners in a coalition. This picture would not be complete
without mentioning two other factors. First, as opposed to his predeces-
sors, de la R
ua had never been the party leader but only the head of one of
the UCRs fractions based in Buenos Aires. Second, he was neither the
leader nor the promoter of the coalition that took him to power. In fact, the
coalition leaders promoted his candidacy due to his good image in public
opinion. However, as for his party political support, he started the presi-
dency from a weak position.
During his government administration, he did not hesitate to resort
to the unilateral decision instruments available to him, in particular,
the decree power and legislative delegation.19 The first risk a president
exposes himself to when resorting to a strategy that privileges unilat-
eral decisions is isolation; the first cost of such a strategy can be loss of
congressional support. This may well be a cost a president is willing to
pay. However, a second danger, and one of greater consequence, fol-
lows: the restructuring of coalitions within the Congress. Both risks
materialized under the de la R ua government. Against the backdrop of
a deep economic, social, and political crisis echoed by the striking
results of the October 2001 elections the isolationist strategy he chose
severed his relationship with Congress and ended up alienating the
support of his own party. Under these circumstances the balance of
power in Congress turned in favor of the PJ representatives who tried
to build alternative parliamentary coalitions. Finally, a scenario of social
turmoil and street demonstrations ended up triggering de la R uas res-
ignation as Congress refused to support his request to form a national
unity government. These dramatic events and their rather exceptional
outcome presidential resignation are a telling illustration of the
argument put forward here of the perils of presidentialization in
politics.
CONCLUSION
Since the return of democracy in 1983, Argentinas party system has
experienced significant changes. Indeed, a bipartisan system, character-
ized by the dominant presence of the JP and the UCR, was replaced by
a multiparty system in which the PJ enjoyed a dominant position while
the UCR was relegated to a broad set of minor political forces. Nowa-
days, with a fragmentation process still in progress, it is preferable to
talk about a fluid party system.
In this chapter I have described the factors that cause such fluidity. I
have shown how the growth of the independent electorate, when it no
longer identifies itself with any particular party, feeds the electoral vol-
atility. I have also described state regulation of parties, the timing of
elections, the decentralized organization of political parties, and the
particularistic and local trends they produce. As a result, the scenario
in the electoral arena approaches quite closely to Sartoris atomized
pluralism, that is, as Bardi and Mair recall, a situation in which parties
are labels, loose coalitions of notables that often change at each elec-
tion.20 In addition, I have highlighted the consequences of party fluidity
over the working of democracy. Using Poguntke and Webbs concept, I
have explained the widening of executive presidentialization. The formal
powers the president has been acquiring augment the centrality of the
presidents figure already prevalent in the Argentine institutional sys-
tem. The result has been to resort to autocratic and discretional proce-
dures for making decisions. However, this has not been its only
worrisome consequence. Allocating more power to the president has
also increased his or her political exposure and with it come risks of
greater presidential vulnerability when dealing with crisis situations.
The frequency of presidential resignations makes this very clear.
Being at the helm of the state nowadays is a very taxing job. Never-
theless, parties can make a contribution to attenuate if not to eliminate
presidential vulnerability. As it follows from the argument put forward
in this chapter there are two questions Argentine parties have yet to
address: their own internal fragmentation and their relationship with a
more demanding electorate. Party fragmentation can be tackled with
new party regulations imposing higher entry costs and tougher require-
ments for alliance formation. To deal with a more demanding elector-
ate, parties should introduce organizational changes with a view to
enhancing party performance in public office such as promoting party
personnel with technical expertise in policy areas and adopting a more
vigilant public ethics agenda.
To move toward the goals just outlined, time and effort are needed.
Paradoxically, the highly personalized and discretional style of manag-
ing public policies can be seen, as Juan Carlos Torre pointed out, as a
blessing in disguise, for it causes blame for the governments perform-
ance to fall mainly on the president while sparing the democratic sys-
tem as a whole.21 Thus, presidential resignations could be seen in
retrospect as one of the mechanisms through which democracies suc-
ceed in surviving crises. If that is the case, Argentinians are in a better
position to buy time in order to change and improve the institutions
and political organizations of democratic governance.
CHAPTER 4
Enlargement of Democracy and

Changes in the Bolivian Party
System
Fernando Mayorga
Translated to English by Luis H. Antezana
INTRODUCTION
In 1952, a nationalist revolution started important transformations in
Bolivia: agrarian reform, mine nationalization, and universal voting.
This last measure gave political rights to peasants, indigenous people,
and women. However, representative democracy was weak because the
Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario (MNR) dominated the party
system and politics was limited to disputes among the partys leaders.
This dispute concluded with a coup detat held in 1964, which initiated
a cycle of military governments. After 15 years a very conflictive period
of transition to democracy began in 1978, and four years later it was
possible to install the first civilian government. Thus, in October 1982,
the longest democratic period in Bolivias history began. Since then,
democracy has functioned under a hybrid kind of presidential regimen,
a mixed electoral system and moderate multi-partyism. However, in
December 2007, the Constitutional Assembly approved a constitutional
reform that, although it must still be approved or rejected by a national
referendum, already announces a different political arena.
The hybrid nature of this presidentialist system of government is a
corollary of the constitutional norm that allows the presidents election
by a parliamentary final decision, if no electoral candidate has obtained
the absolute majority of votes in the general elections. Between 1982
and 2002, five general elections took place, and none had a winner with
an absolute majority in the electoral boxes. Thus, the constitution and
election results forced the political parties to build up parliamentary or
presidential coalitions, first, in order to elect a president, and second, to

establish links of mutual cooperation between the executive and legisla-
tive powers, and thus to secure political stability to the government
and its future administration. This kind of political interaction between
parties has been called pact democracy, and the resultant type of gov-
ernment is known as a hybrid or parliamentary presidency.1 In 2005,
for the first time a candidate obtained an absolute number of votes in
the general elections, and therefore the government was assumed
directly by the leading party, which in this case did not need to seek or
establish parliamentary alliances.
The electoral system supposes a model that combines representation
by territory in the High Chamber (Senators Chamber), and by popula-
tion in the Low Chamber (Deputies Chamber). In the former, each of
the nine departments is represented by three senators, two for the
majority and one for the first minority.2 As for the latter, until 1997
deputies were elected by departments, in a single list for each party, by
proportional representation according to each departments population.
Since 1994, a new system has been adopted. This is a mixed system
that combines proportional representation by departments with simple
majority rule for the uninominal districts (provinces sectors). In 2005,
the electoral system was politically enlarged, eliminating the parties
exclusive right to propose candidates by admitting two new possible
contenders the citizen clusters and indigenous peoples which can
also participate in the general and local elections. Also in 2005, after a
political agreement and for the first time in Bolivias history, the
departmental authorities (prefects) were directly elected by the citi-
zens although, according to the constitution, their nomination is still a
presidential prerogative.
Finally, the system of political parties presents itself as a moder-
ately plural system with an average of five relevant parties; that is,
parties with enough capacity to be part of the parliamentary and
governmental coalitions, or to perform as an efficient opposition.
Throughout the years, the system of political parties has gone through
some significant changes in its composition, notably the surge of po-
litical forces representing new social demands and identities. Like-
wise, the possible relationship between the parties went from a
dominant, centripetal tendency from 1985 until the late 1990s to a
situation marked by acute ideological polarization; a polarization that
became quite problematic, especially since 2003, due to the surge of
several social movements with political demands, whose active partici-
pation caused a growing weakening of the previous system of politi-
cal parties.
This chapter will evaluate the role played by the political parties in
Bolivian democratization in a national context, constantly subjected to
critical situations and political changes. In order to analyze the mutations
Democracy and Changes in the Bolivian Party System 75
suffered by the system of political parties, I will describe the influence

exerted by the lines of conflict or cleavages that, on the one hand, di-
vided the society, and on the other, found institutional channels that
motivated the surge, dissolution, or renewal of political parties.3 In order
to analyze the role played by the political parties, I will evaluate the
institutional reforms adopted in order to solve deficiencies in the politi-
cal systems functioning, especially as answers to the social demands for
larger representation and participation. It should be noted that this social
factor is very important in Bolivia. Since 1952, the countrys political his-
tory has been marked by a constant and significant presence of labor
unions and social movements in the political processes, frequently ques-
tioning the supposed leading role of the political parties.
Emphasizing these factors, I begin by reviewing the historical devel-
opment of Bolivias political parties from 1982 to 2005, and then in a
final section, focus more directly on the relationship between the
parties and democracy today.
HISTORICAL PHASES: BOLIVIAN PARTIES

AND ELECTIONS FROM 1982 TO 2008
To understand the recent history of Bolivian parties, it is necessary
first to recognize that during the period 1982 to 2005 several cleavages
among which the economic, territorial, and ethnocultural conflicts
were the most salient shaped and partially reformed the Bolivian party
system. The cleavage state versus market state manifested itself in the
contradiction between policies emphasizing the states intervention in
the economy, on the one hand, and those that promote the private
investments on the other. Since 1985, a transition from state capitalism to
neo-liberalism was implemented by a series of measures destined to
adjust the economic structure, but since 2005, the state has again taken a
leading role. Centralism has been and still is a dominant trait in the
organization of the Bolivian state. The territorial cleavage (central versus
regional) has manifested itself in the regions struggle for political decen-
tralization, a struggle that has been present throughout Bolivias history,
so much so that a historian once affirmed that the history of Bolivia is
the history of the regions struggle.4 Finally, the ethnic cleavage is a
manifestation of the cultural diversity that resulted from the Spanish
conquest and colonization of the indigenous territory and people, a
cleavage that began in 1825 (a year of national independence). Policies of
cultural homogenization, promoted during the 19th century and later,
did not succeed as they did in other parts of Latin America.
As democratization began, with its consequent enlargement of the
active citizenship, ethnic demands began to acquire a growing impor-
tance. New parties, closely articulated with the peasant syndicates and
the indigenous organizations, were structured, and in January 2006,

Evo Morales, a peasant leader of indigenous origin, democratically
assumed the presidency of the republic.5 His party promotes constitu-
tional reform that emphasizes the collective rights of the indigenous
and peasant communities, disregarding regional demands for greater
departmental autonomy. A new cleavage has thus emerged between
the social groups and political actors promoting regional demands, on
the one hand, and those fighting for ethnocultural policies, on the
other. This new cleavage is clearly manifest in the intense struggle car-
ried out regarding the reform of the state, especially in relation to the
territorial distribution of power.
With this summary of shifting cleavages in mind, we can distinguish
three phases in the recent history of the Bolivian political parties. In
each phase I begin with an overview and then discuss the parties and
specific developments in the Bolivian party system
Phase One: The Inaugural Phase, 1982 1985

The first phase, inaugural and foundational, lasted three years, from
1982 to 1985, and, in general, it was marked by the fragility of the
new democratic and political institutions. The popular expectations in
the democratic transition manifested themselves by a boom in social
demands coming from the labor unions and peasant syndicates,
which had been the main actors during the resistance and fight
against the military dictatorships. These demands were not positively
solved due to the aggravated inflationary crisis; in consequence, the
social sectors, which previously supported the government, began to
radicalize their protests. Moreover, the government an electoral alli-
ance of national parties and leftist groups did not have a parliamen-
tary majority, and the permanent struggle between the executive and
legislative powers ended up in an unmanageable political crisis. This
acute lack of governability was resolved thanks to a political accord
that decided to shorten the current presidential period and anticipate
the next general elections. Thus, the political parties entered into a
new phase with two main challenges: to solve the economic crisis
and, at the same time, to establish some procedures in order to guar-
antee political stability.
Political change began in October 1982, when the first civil govern-
ment was finally installed with Hern an Siles Zuazo as president, at the
head of an alliance of political forces (the Unidad Democratica y Popu-
lar [UDP]), composed of the Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario
de Izquierda (MNRI), the Partido Comunista Boliviano (PCB), and the
Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionario (MIR). In 1980, this same alli-
ance had won the general elections, but it did not take control of the
government because a military coup detat interrupted the process. In
1982, the UDP won again, this time with 34.1 percent of the total votes.
The general results showed a clear voting tendency in favor of the Left,
with almost half of the total votes. Nevertheless, despite the ideological
affinity, the UDP was not able to articulate this tendency and transform
it into a parliamentary majority and thus had to govern with feeble
legislative support. The political parties considered centrist obtained
almost a third of the total votes, with the leader being the MNR, with
17% of the votes. As a tendency, the Right obtained nearly a fifth of the
votes, with a leading 14.8% obtained by the Acci on Democratica Nacio-
nalista (ADN) (Table 4.1). These voting tendencies mask the real disper-
sion of the political forces. Not only did 13 candidates run for office,
but 11 parties obtained parliamentary representation. Obviously, the
political representation was extremely fragmented. The initial consen-
sus between the parties, about the need to end military rule and a will-
ingness to grant tolerant support to the UDP in order to favor the
democratic process, was promptly displaced by political polarization.
Eventually, the struggle between officialism and opposition paralyzed
the public administration, and the economic crisis, inherited from the
military regimes, became almost unbearable.
The outcome was a dismembering of the ruling front, which found
itself pressed by two extremes: the permanent mobilization of the labor
unions by means of strikes and street marches on the one hand, and the
systematic parliamentary boycott carried out by the opposition against
the executive initiatives, on the other. Meanwhile, the Left divided itself
into the governmental officialism and the labor unions and the main
forces of Center and Right (MNR and ADN) deployed their opposition
by means of a concerted control of the legislative chambers.
The new system of political parties was now forced to act under an
antagonistic logic of friend and foe. That struggle was quite evident in
Congress, where, systematically, the opposition blocked all initiatives
proposed by the executive power. Furthermore, due to the UDPs legis-
lative minority, the opposition parties found no real resistance when
they exerted pressure. That legislative situation also weakened the gov-
ernments capacities to negotiate with the labor movement.
The economic crisis, quite acute due to the galloping hyperinflation,
motivated a multiplication of labor strikes and sectoral protests, which,
along with the political instability caused by the mutual blockade
between the executive and legislative powers, led to a situation of de-
mocracy at drift.6 At the end of 1984, the political crisis was solved by
an agreement among the parties to move forward the national elections,
initially foreseen for 1986.
The procedure was a novelty because it made possible a dialogue
for democracy, mediated by the Catholic Church, in which not only
the political parties took part but also several social actors, in partic-
ular the entrepreneurs. The labor unions and the peasantry did not
Table 4.1 National Elections in Bolivia, 1980

Party Votes Percentage
UDP 507,173 34.1
MNRA 263,706 17.0
ADN 220,309 14.8
PS-1 113,959 7.7
FDR 39,401 2.6
PRA-A 36,443 2.4
MNRU 24,542 1.6
FSB 21,372 1.4
AFIN 17,150 1.2
MITKA-1 17,023 1.1
PUB 10,308 1.1
MITKA 15,852 1.1
PRIN-A 15,724 1.1
Total votes 1,489,484
Note: All relevant party abbreviations have been defined in the text.
Source: Corte Nacional Electoral, 25 Anos de Evolucion Electoral en Bolivia, Boletn Estad
stico No 7, Ano III (La Paz, Corte Nacional Electoral, Noviembre de 2007, www.cne.org.bo).
participate in this dialogue because such accords diminished the effect

of their demands. With the labor unions relatively defeated, the parties
began to play a leading role in the political process.
During this phase, the dangers of a possible regression to the previ-
ous authoritarian militarism were eliminated, as the accord between
the social actors and the political parties solved the crisis by means of
an electoral solution. Nevertheless, it also became quite evident that the
government was extremely fragile when the ruling party lacked a par-
liamentary majority. If the political instability introduced into the politi-
cal agenda the theme of governability, the growing economic crisis
stimulated the debate about the states role in a market economy. Also,
the low degree of democratic institutionalism became quite evident
when the general elections were moved forward without respect for
the existing constitutional rules, and a social actor foreign, in principle,
to the political institutions the Catholic Church had to be brought in
to mediate between the political and social contenders.
Phase Two: Adaptation and Stability, 1985 2003

The second phase, from 1985 through the early 2000s, was a period
of adaptation and stability for the parties. The prevailing economic
model was designed to reduce the states intervention in the economy.
Neo-liberalism was the answer to the existing cleavage between
state and market, and its implementation was carried out by adopting
measures of structural adjustment aimed at stopping hyperinflation
(20,000%!) and capitalizing the public enterprises with foreign capital.

The political scheme that went with this economic orientation was the
formation of coalition governments, negotiated among the traditional
parties, which alternated in the governments management during 18
years. During this phase, some new political parties, which expressed
nationalist and ethnocultural social demands, appeared on the scene,
but they did not alter the scheme because they adapted themselves to
the rules of the representative democracy. Governmental stability was
guaranteed by means of political pacts that allowed a concerted
majority in Congress to support the executive powers initiatives. How-
ever, popular protests against neo-liberalism and pact democracy began
to shake the existing panorama in 2000. The results of the general elec-
tion in 2002 confirmed that tendency, notably due to the presence of
leftist opposition forces, linked with the peasant and indigenous move-
ments. This new presence changed the previous composition of the sys-
tem of political parties. In 2003, the last government coalition between
traditional parties was formed, but the political polarization and the
social protests induced crises that eventually led to the presidents
resignation.
Specific changes in the parties and the party systems for this period
began with the elections in 1985, which produced a recomposition of
the parties spectrum. There were 18 candidates, but in Congress, only
10 parties obtained representation; furthermore, the parliamentary rep-
resentation was concentrated in three major parties: ADN, MNR, and
MIR.7 In contrast with the previous elections, the right and center ten-
dencies obtained more than half of the votes (ADN 28.6% and
MNR 26.4%), while the left seemed to be losing its previous leading
presence the MNRI disappeared, on the one hand, and on the other,
the political forces akin to the peasant and labor movements began to
disaggregate with the exception of the MIR (8.9%), which transformed
into the third parliamentary force (Table 4.2).
During this period, the logic of political pacts between the parties
was inaugurated and eventually established, on this occasion, by means
of a parliamentary accord between the MNR and the ADN. They both
agreed to support Vctor Paz Estenssoro, the MNRs candidate, at the
head of the government, who then could count on the support of ADN,
the main force in Parliament. Despite their initial differences between
1985 and 1989, these two parties worked together, first, in order to
readjust the economic structure, but also to secure the political stability
by means of a direct collaboration between the executive and legislative
powers.
A new economic policy was implemented. It stopped the hyperinflation
and laid the foundation for an economic model aimed to dismantle the inter-
ventionist state. The structural adjustment and its measures were following
the recommendation from the Washington Consensus8 the answer to

ADN 493,737 28.6
MNR 456,704 26.4
MIR 153,143 8.9
MNRI 82,418 4.8
MNRV 72,197 4.2
PS-1 38,786 2.2
FPU 38,124 2.2
MRTKL 31,678 1.8
PDC 24,079 1.4
FSB 19,958 1.2
MRTKL 16,269 0.9
POR 13,712 0.8
ACP 12,918 0.8
MNRI-1 11,696 0.7
IU 10,892 0.6
FNP 9,635 0.6
AUR 9,420 0.5
ARENA 8,665 0.5
the problematic state/market cleavage. In order to implement those meas-

ures, a pact was subscribed between the MNR the party that in the 1950s
had led the national revolution with the ADN, until then, the lone critic
of the states omnipresent economic role. Besides its economic effects, this
new economic policy practically dismantled the once very powerful min-
ers labor union, whose weakening, in a certain way, helped to consolidate
the growing protagonism of the political parties. Political stability was
based on a parliamentary pact between the ruling party and the main force
of the opposition, and the system of political parties became the space in
which the national policies were decided. Thus, a new model of govern-
ability, the so-called pact democracy, was forged.
This tendency became almost systematic in 1989, when the three tra-
ditional parties (MNR, 23.1%; ADN, 22.6%; and MIR, 19.6%) concen-
trated almost two-thirds of the total votes. On the other hand, the
opposition, aggregated in the alliance Izquierda Unida (IU), obtained
only 7.2% of the votes. A novelty in this election were the results
(11.0%) obtained by Conciencia de Patria (CONDEPA) (Table 4.3). This
new party was the first expression in Bolivia of neo-populism, a politi-
cal current that appeared in several Latin American countries during
the 1980s, around leaders who criticized the traditional parties and
their economic programs. Besides CONDEPA, this current was
strengthened by the creation of the Unidad Cvica Solidaridad (UCS).9
Its presence was very important because it represented the im-
poverished sectors of the population (notably urban migrants, female
domestic labor force, and petty merchants); in a certain way, inside the
system of political parties, it took the spaces previously occupied by
the Left. Moreover, it incorporated new social identities into political
representation. For example, the UCS was the first to put an indigenous
woman into Parliament. It also advanced demands for a better and
fairer economic redistribution, questioning the new economic policy. It
insisted on this issue because its electoral support came from the poor
and the needy and because its programs offered governmental assis-
tance to benefit them. Nevertheless, the existence of two parties with
the same characteristics limited the chances that a neo-populist candi-
date could successfully dispute the presidency, as happened in other
countries of the region.
The surge of neo-populism had already been quite manifest in the
municipal elections. Since 1987, in order to strengthen the democratiza-
tion process, local governments were elected (in those years, the prac-
tice was limited to the main cities and certain provincial capitals).
In 1989 and 1991, CONDEPA and UCS, taken together, represented
one-third of the electorate, alternating for third place. In both elections,
the traditional parties obtained more than half of the total votes and
the winner was the Acuerdo Patri otico (AP), an alliance between ADN
and MIR; the Left did not get beyond 10 percent of the votes. In 1991,
neo-populism reached the zenith of its possible electoral presence. This
result put into evidence two facts. First, both neo-populist parties had
to face the fact that their incapacity to address effectively the medium
and upper classes hindered their electoral growth; moreover, in the
case of CONDEPA, the high concentration of its bases in a single
department (La Paz) made it almost impossible to transform itself into
a national party. Second, there was no real connection between the neo-
populist municipal forces and their possible weight at the national
level: UCS did not possess parliamentary representation, and CON-
DEPA, although it supported Jaime Paz Zamoras nomination, was not
a functional part of the alliance that ruled Bolivia during 1989 1993.
That is, the neo-populist articulation with the current political system
was partial and marginal, and thus the fear that these parties could
become real adversarial forces dissipated, especially at the municipal
level, when they began to subscribe to pacts of alliance with the tradi-
tional parties.
Nevertheless, the neo-populist presence modified the traditional ide-
ological spectrum usually divided between Right and Left and
strengthened pact democracy. Thus, the political parties could converge

MNR 363,113 23.1
ADN 357,298 22.6
MIR 309,033 19.6
CONDEPA 173,459 11.0
IU 113,509 7.2
PS-1 39,763 2.5
MRTKL 22,983 1.5
FULKA 16,416 1.0
FSB 10,608 0.7
MIN 9,687 0.6
Total Votes 1,415,870
on an ideological center, where the representative democracy and eco-

nomic neo-liberalism might coexist with no real problems or frictions.
This centripetal tendency became practically institutionalized in 1989,
with the election of Paz Zamora as president of the Republic, by means
of a parliamentary accord between the ADN and MIR, which had
finished second and third, respectively, in the general elections the
MNR was first but this time it was not able to negotiate successfully
the necessary parliamentary majority. The new ruling alliance implied
several interesting facts. Since the MIR was a political force related to
the Left and the ADN was representative of the Right, this pact diluted
the ideological polarization in the system of political parties, and a new
discourse which we define as democratic neo-liberalism became
not only dominant, but also gave a new shape to the political scene.
Democratic neo-liberalism can be represented as a horseshoe, with rep-
resentative democracy on one end and economic neo-liberalism on the
other; in this image, there is a narrow space between the extremes, a
space where the parties with parliamentary representation, although
ideologically opposed, may interact.10
The MIR was akin to the pole representative democracy, due to its
resistance and fight against the military dictatorship, but it was alien to
the economic neo-liberalism, due to its leftist perspective. On the
other hand, the ADN openly subscribed to the neo-liberal policies a
mark of its rightist perspective but its real commitment to the democ-
racy was still unknown because its leader had been a dictator. Thus
ruling the country, the MIR started to manage the structural adjustment
and began to privatize the states enterprises; that is, it found itself
fully compromised with the neo-liberal reform. For its part, ADNs
support to Paz Zamora for the presidency, despite MIRs third place,
indicated its willingness to obey the democratic rules. Thus, the risks of
an authoritarian return or a change in the economic adjustment disap-
peared from the political scene. Moreover, the MNR, first force of the
opposition, was the party that most clearly combined the poles articu-
lated by democratic neo-liberalism.
Besides this convergence between political forces from Right and Left
(for the new governments management), another decisive event took
place. The current surge of the neo-populist parties (CONDEPA and
UCS) did not alter the hegemonic tendency of the forces of democratic
liberalism; on the contrary, this tendency was strengthened because
both parties entered into the logic of political pacts. In 1989, in Con-
gress, CONDEPA backed up the election of Paz Zamora as president,
and in return for its agreement, this party was to manage a regional
office of development. Moreover, between 1991 and 1995, with the sup-
port of the MIR and ADN, CONDEPA took control of the municipality
of La Paz, seat of the national government. For its part, in 1989 and
1991, the UCS signed a postelectoral pact with the MNR in order to
govern the municipalities of several important cities across the country.
Later, the neo-populist parties would become direct partners in the
national governmental coalitions, thus putting into evidence, if neces-
sary, the strength of the centripetal tendency, which characterized the
system of political parties at that time and defined the trend of the
political and economic reforms.
During the 1989 1993 presidential period, the ruling administration
deepened the economic liberalization, when several minor national
enterprises were privatized, and in some cases contracts of shared risks
with foreign capitals were created. Efforts at political reform focused
on the need to perfect the electoral system and to answer the criticisms
of those who wanted the system to give representation to political insti-
tutions other than the now traditional parties. Setting up new electoral
rules and procedures, decentralizing political power, and securing the
independence of the judiciary power received greater attention as the
problems of governability diminished and social demands focused on
subjects such as social participation, representation, and the quality of
the nations democratic institutions.
During this phase, the leading parties accommodated themselves to
democratic neo-liberalism and its codes, working to overcome the state-
market and authoritarianism democracy cleavages. At the same time,
however, other demands grew stronger, especially those related to the
ethnic questions, with demands such as the official recognition of the
multicultural nature of the country and the political incorporation of
the indigenous peoples as such. These demands by peasant and indige-
nous organizations became more forceful impulse starting from 1992,
when the discovery of America was being celebrated. As a sequel to
the neo-liberal policies, another conflict also became manifest: the ten-
sion between privatization and social redistribution. The negative
impact of the states withdrawal from social policies was indirectly pal-
liated by the assistance provided by the neo-populist leaders. Both
issues ethnic demands and social policies influenced the later elec-
toral campaigns and their programs.
In 1993, the general elections brought the MNR back into the govern-
ment. Sanchez de Lozadas victory was the clearest during this phase,
with 33.8% of the total votes. The former governmental coalition (ADN
and MIR) obtained 20%. The neo-populist vote comprised almost one-
third of the electorate (CONDEPA with 13.6% and UCS with 13.1%), a
sign of relative stagnation (Table 4.4). In other words, in 1993, the sys-
tem of political parties remained stable, with five relevant forces, all of
which were committed to the codes of democratic liberalism. This con-
vergence made possible several agreements between the ruling party
and the opposition in order to carry out further reforms.
Nevertheless, the parties strategies and discourses did not remain
the same. The MNR, for example, invited an indigenous intellectual
to run for the vice presidency, in order to dispute strategically
CONDEPAs constituency, on the one hand, and perhaps more impor-
tant, to address the peasant and indigenous movements whose
demands and social presence were increasing.11 The MNRs candidate
had recognized that in Bolivia, it is not enough to use your head,
you must also have a heart, talking about the need to include

MNR 585,837 33.8
Acuerdo Patri
otico 346,813 20.0
CONDEPA 235,428 13.6
UCS 226,820 13.1
MBL 88,260 5.1
ARBOL 30,864 1.8
ASD 30,286 1.7
VR9 21,100 1.2
FSB 20,947 1.2
EJE 18,176 1.0
IU 16,137 0.9
MKN 12,627 0.7
Independent 8,096 0.5
assistance to the poor in the electoral strategies and incorporating

the ethnic and political social demands into the governments plans for
further actions.
The logic of political pacts continued, and this time the new govern-
ment was built around the MNR supported by the UCS, MBL (Movi-
miento Bolivia Libre, a moderate left-wing party), and MRTKL
(Movimiento Revolucionario Tupac Katari de Liberaci on, an indigenous
party). For its part, the opposition was lead by the ADN and MIR, which
in general concurred with the current economic and political model.
Between 1993 and 1997, the new economic policy acquired an integral
dimension, notably with the capitalization of the monopolistic states
enterprises in electricity, railways, telecommunications, air transporta-
tion, and hydrocarbon; that is, with investments provided by transna-
tional capitals. However, education and health care public services were
not privatized. The regional cleavage was answered with a law that priv-
ileged local developments, recognizing democratic governments in all
municipal districts. The municipal governments were strengthened with
fiscal resources, according to their population number. The departments,
however, benefited only from administrative decentralization. These
measures, together with an equity bonus,12 were answers to the redis-
tribution demands as well as initiatives to palliate the negative effects
caused by the privatization of the national enterprises.
In 1994, a partial constitutional reform was approved. The articles
related to the economic regime were not altered, as most of the changes
affected the political system and were intended to correct the existing
deficiencies in quality and efficiency of the democratic institutions. In
order to face the ethnic cleavage, several constitutional provisions were
adopted, among which the most salient were the open recognition of
the nations ethnic and cultural diversity, the formalization of the peas-
ant and indigenous authorities and organizations, the official delivery
of communal lands to the indigenous peoples, and the recognition of
their traditional forms of law. Also, a new education policy was
launched, which included intercultural elements and bilingualism.
Especially at the municipal level, economic neo-liberalism was thus
now combined with a form of participatory democracy, anchored in
multicultural policies.
The 1997 electoral results confirmed the stability of the political party
system and strengthened its moderate multi-partyism, with five parties
having significant parliamentary forces. On this occasion, the ADN
won the election with 22.3% of the votes; the MNR was second,
with 18.2%; CONDEPA obtained 17.2%; the MIR (16.8%) was closely
followed by the UCS with 16.1% of the votes (Table 4.5). Overall, neo-
populism once again gained approximately one-third of the citizens
support, and together the three already traditional parties obtained
more than half of the total. The Left barely approached 6%, but the

ADN 485,209 22.3
MNR 396,216 18.2
CONDEPA 373,516 17.2
MIR 365,113 16.8
UCS 350,742 16.1
IU 80,599 3.7
MBL 67,152 3.1
VSB 30,214 1.4
EJE 18,320 0.8
PDB 10,378 0.5
electoral and consequent parliamentary presence of the cocaleros (peas-

ants, producers of coca leaves) began, with four representatives in the
Low Chamber, organizing their political instrument, the Movimiento al
Socialismo (MAS). The surge of new social identities and political
actors ratified the systems capacity to integrate new forces because the
opposition was still manageable, and institutional politics was still ca-
pable of dealing with the social demands and conflicts.
The government coalition reproduced a previous pact between MIR
and ADN, but this time the elected president was Hugo Banzer Suarez,
a former dictator. The coalition included a recently created party,
Nueva Fuerza Republicana (NFR), and also CONDEPA and UCS. This
large coalition enjoyed an absolute control in both congress chambers,
so the parliamentary opposition became literally irrelevant. In order to
manifest their protests and demands, the antigovernment sectors had
to use other channels outside the institutionalized ones.
From 1997 to 2002, despite the intention to modify some of the laws
approved by the previous government, economic policy retained its
original pattern. One novelty was the plan to eradicate the coca leaves
plantations, a measure that gradually turned into an important political
issue, especially due to the pressures exerted by the United States and its
need to fight the narcotics traffic. To this, the peasants movement
answered, defending the coca leaf as a symbol of cultural resistance, thus
adding new ingredients to the opposition, led by MAS, against neo-
liberalism as a foreign intrusion. Another novelty were the national
dialogues, in which civil societys organizations participated, along
with the parties with parliamentary representation, in order to decide
the use of the resources generated by the foreign debts reduction.
Despite such participative initiatives, a cycle of social protest against

neo-liberal policies began in 2000, combining criticisms of pact democ-
racy with demands for a more participative democracy, all under the
banner of constitutional reform. The questioning of the current (post-
1985) model of governability had already begun to express itself in
1997, with the presence of left-wing forces in Congress, such as the
MAS, which combined their opposition in Congress with extraparlia-
mentary actions massive protest marches and road blockades
abetted by their close relationship with the syndicated movements,
especially the peasantry. Thus, an alternative protest against the neo-
liberal policies began to take form, proposing a larger role for the state
in the economy, while questioning the representative capacity of the
dominant political parties. An urban protest, against the privatization
of the water services and road blockades carried out by peasant syndi-
cates and indigenous communities, started a process of popular mobili-
zations, with serious political consequences.
The mentioned political consequences became evident in the 2000
general elections. The traditional parties weakened and new ones
appeared in the political arena. The MNR won the elections with 22.4%
of the total votes; the MIR was fourth, with l6.3%; and, notably, the
ADN had a minimum response (3.4%). After 16 years of hegemony,
the parties of pact democracy obtained together fewer than half of the
votes nevertheless, after the parties negotiations, the MNRs candi-
date, Gonzalo S anchez de Lozada was elected president, with MIRs
support. As for the other parties, the MAS finished second, with
20.94% with Evo Morales as candidate and since it did not negotiate
its votes, became the head of the opposition; next came a new party,
with neo-populist traits, the NFR, with 20.91%. In these elections, the
Movimiento Indgena Pachacuti (MIP), an openly indigenous party,
also appeared (Table 4.6).
The electoral debates and campaigns foretold what was to come; they
were marked by the rebuff to the capitalization project, on the one
hand, and by the growing demands for a constituent assembly, on the
other. The new government had to rule with feeble parliamentary sup-
port and had to face a powerful opposition from the new forces (MAS
and MIP), which went from criticizing the economic model to an open
demand for the nationalization of all enterprises related to the coun-
trys natural resources, in order, they proclaimed, to found the coun-
try anew.
The centripetal tendency, marked by the neo-liberal hegemonic
capacity and pact democracy, came to an end. The system of political
parties became more polarized, with the MAS as the head of the oppo-
sition transformed into the second electoral force. The ruling official
majority, not long ago sufficient to ensure a stable governability, now
could no longer prevent political instability nor ensure passage and

MNR 624,126 22.46
MAS 581,884 20.94
NFR 581,163 20.91
MIR 453,375 16.32
MIP 169,239 6.09
UCS 153,210 5.51
ADN 94,386 3.40
MCC 17,405 0.63
PS 18,162 0.65
CONDEPA 10,336 0.37
implementation of the governments decisions. Agreements between

officialdom and opposition were no longer possible due to their pro-
grammatic differences. Confrontations replaced accords, and in October
2003 the political crisis had to be resolved by the presidents resigna-
tion, after a large and violent popular revolt.
Phase Three: Crisis and Polarization, 2003 2008

The third phase began in October 2003, when a popular revolt caused
the fall of the government that had been elected only 15 months
previously. From then on, the path of this phase remained and
remains quite uncertain, because the political crisis has transformed
itself into a state crisis. It began with large social protests and was fol-
lowed by a growing discrediting of representative democracy, domi-
nated by the leading role played by the political parties. The popular
protests caused two presidential resignations within 20 months, and
the political crisis had to be answered with the call for new national
elections, which took place in December 2005. As noted, these elections
resulted in the first victory by an absolute majority of votes ever
obtained by a single candidate, and therefore control of the government
could be assumed without the need to form a coalition among several
parties.
The new government put forward a program emphasizing indige-
nous rights and demands and aimed at strengthening the states role.
The system of political parties suffered a profound reformulation
because several traditional parties disappeared from the electoral scene;
at the same time, political organizations, strongly articulated with the

peasant and indigenous movements, consolidated themselves.
In order to recover the states leading role in the national economy,
the new government began to replace the previous neo-liberal meas-
ures with policies aimed at nationalizing the public enterprises. Like-
wise, representative democracy was broadened with the use of
participative democracys mechanisms, such as referenda. The states
reform began with a Constituent Assembly that approved a new consti-
tution project, clearly favoring the peasants and indigenous demands.
Some regional movements with urban support rejected this result, how-
ever, demanding larger departmental autonomy, that is, a decentralized
form of state.
The existing contradiction between the ethnic and the regional
demands regarding the territorial distribution of the political power was
the central theme of the Constituent Assembly (August 2006 December
2007) and was partially solved with the constitutional recognition, at
the same level of departmental and indigenous autonomies. The new
constitution will be voted on in January 2009 to conclude the state
transition.
This phase started with the crisis unleashed by President Sanchez de
Lozadas resignation in October 2003 that dismembered the govern-
ment coalition. For the moment, the crisis was solved constitutionally,
when the contenders agreed to let Vice President Carlos Mesa assume
the presidency. Despite the agreements, Mesa had to face the situation
without real parliamentary support. His ruling period lasted only 20
months, because the crisis followed its course and, besides the parties
polarization, it gave place to an open struggle between social move-
ments, which proposed mutually exclusive projects. On the one hand,
the MAS, and the peasant and indigenous movements, insisted on the
immediate convocation of a constitutional assembly in order to refor-
mulate the state and also on their demands to nationalize the natural
resources, notably the hydrocarbon industry. On the other hand, the
traditional parties and several regional civic committees demanded
departmental autonomies and direct election of prefects. These social
actors deployed massive mobilizations open cabildos (town councils),
marches, blockades all of which increased the parties polarization.
Finally, the crisis ended with another presidential resignation and the
call for general elections in 2005, a resolution finally accorded by the
parties, due in large measure to the social pressures.
In February 2004, a partial constitutional reform was approved. This
reform had important consequences in the further behavior inside the
political system. Mechanisms of participatory democracy, such as refer-
enda and the constituent assembly, were incorporated with the goal of
transforming the existing process of making decisions and changing the
existing procedures for reforming the Constitution (usually, Congress
was in charge of that kind of reform; now, an assembly elected by the

popular vote would decide it). The participatory spectrum of the politi-
cal system was also changed, incorporating new organizations into the
political arena citizens clusters and indigenous peoples thereby
eliminating the parties monopoly as agencies of political representa-
tion. The inclusion of the citizens clusters was a response to strong
resentment against the parties, and recognition of the indigenous peo-
ples rights to political participation was a sign of the growing strength
of the ethnic cleavage, as peasant and indigenous movements took on
leading social roles and MAS was transformed into the leading political
force.
The new structures of participatory and representative democracy
did not close the possible political reforms. In December 2005, the pre-
fects election by citizens choice took place, thus limiting the customary
presidential right to nominate departmental authorities. The demand
for nationalization of the hydrocarbon industry was solved by means
of a national referendum; also, an agreement was reached to consult
the citizenship about departmental autonomy and to call elections for a
constituent assembly.
The final results of the 2005 general election deeply affected the sys-
tem of political parties. The MAS won the election with almost 53% of
the citizens votes, the civil organization Poder Democratico y Social
(PODEMOS) was second with 29%, Unidad Nacional (UN) obtained
about 8%, and the MNR, the only survivor of the traditional parties,
obtained close to 7% of the votes (Table 4.7).13 The victory of the MAS
candidate, Evo Morales, was unprecedented: For the first time in this
democratic period, a candidate could assume the presidency directly,
without the need of parliamentary pacts. Two decades of governments
formed by means of pacts between the traditional parties committed to
combining neo-liberalism with representative democracy were left
behind.
After 20 years, the MAS victory also meant the return of the left into
political power. This kind of left is, nevertheless, very different from
the one that came into power during the early 1980s, anchored in the
labor unions and the universities. The MAS is a political movement
that represents ethnocultural and peasant demands; it is supported by
a conglomerate of syndicated organizations, social movements, and in-
digenous people; it proposes a nationalist and statist project and
deploys an international policy akin to Venezuela and Cuba. Finally, it
is articulated around the figure of Evo Morales, the first Bolivian presi-
dent with an indigenous origin, leader of the peasant syndicates of coca
producers, and an iconic figure in the antiglobalization movement.
The system of political parties found itself now reduced to four
forces with parliamentary representation. The previous polarization
became more acute, with a divided government, in which the

MAS 1,544,374 53.74
PODEMOS 821,745 28.59
UN 224,090 7.79
MNR 185,859 6.47
MIP 61,948 2.16
NFR 19,667 0.68
FREPAB 8,737 0.30
USTB 7,381 0.26
executive and the legislative powers were in permanent struggle,

mainly because the opposition found no other way except to use its
majority in the Senate as a last resort to confront the executives deci-
sions. At the same time, an unheard of vertical division of powers
appeared on the political scene, when most of the prefects elected by
popular vote were opposition candidates (five, then six, out of nine),
and entered into conflict with the central government. The existing dis-
tances between the ruling party and the opposition were aggravated
during the constitutional assembly (August 2006 September 2007). This
possible place for national consensus did not fulfill its purpose when,
in the middle of several legal questions, the MAS used its large major-
ity to approve a new constitutional text with a marked indigenist tend-
ency. Although the new constitution must still be approved in a
national referendum, its current text is frequently treated by the ruling
party as if it had already been ratified. As an answer, the regional and
parliamentary opposition approved autonomic statutes for several
departments by means of local referenda, which were also contami-
nated by illegality. Thus, representative democracy found itself sur-
passed by a plebiscitary logic that reached its peak in August 2008,
with the call for a national referendum to revoke (or not) the presi-
dents and prefects mandates, although such a procedure is in no way
provided for by the current Constitution.
In short, the system of political parties functionality presents some
new traits, especially due to the active presence of institutional and po-
litical scenes that run parallel to the Congress and therefore weaken its
capacity to deal in an orderly fashion with the political process. More-
over, the system of political parties finds itself subjected to the pres-
sures exerted by the social movements, which clearly reveal the
existing territorial and ethnocultural fractures, which have, for the first
time, caused confrontations between civilians who support the govern-

ment and its opposition. Political crisis, ideological polarization, and
severe social conflicts are the main characteristics of this phase, the out-
come of which is still uncertain.
Nevertheless, the transition toward a (possible) new kind of state did
not happen without some deeds worthy of attention. First, the contradic-
tion between state and market was solved by means of a nationalization
policy in order to reinstall the states leading role in the national econ-
omy. The hydrocarbon industry was the first to be affected by this policy.
Concerning this initiative, there were no significant disagreements among
the political parties, and public opinion supports the measures taken.
However, there are no such coincidences concerning the reform of
the institutions of the state, because the indigenous demands and the
demands for greater regional power are mutually exclusive. On the one
hand, the ruling party promotes a constitutional reform that empha-
sizes the ethnic cleavage, proposing a pluri-national state in which
the collective rights of the indigenous people and the peasants com-
munities are highlighted, including their own territorial property rights.
On the other hand, the opposition proposes departmental autonomy as
an answer to the regional cleavage, limiting its reach to the decen-
tralization of the state and rejecting any other territorial redistribution
of power. In short, the existing contradiction between the ethnic and
regional demands divides the system of political parties, motivates
regional fractures, and radicalizes social conflicts. During the past quar-
ter of a century, the Bolivian democracy and its system of political par-
ties have alternated through phases of stability and crisis, and its
future is uncertain. Nevertheless, along the road several institutional
reinforcements have been accomplished. In the next part, I evaluate the
role played by the political parties in the strengthening of democracy.
POLITICAL REFORM AND DEMOCRATIC ENLARGEMENT:

WHAT ROLE FOR THE PARTIES?
The political reforms discussed so far have covered several areas, but
here the focus will be on the changes related to representation and par-
ticipation. The first of these two facets is associated with the system of
political representation and its capacity to express the diversity of social
interests, demands, and identities in Bolivia.14 The second facet is
related to citizens participation in the process of decision making and,
collaterally, in public management. We understand this set of reforms
as constituting a process designed to produce democratic enlargement
in which new rules and institutions are incorporated into the existing
system: rules and institutions that promote the citizens participation
and strengthen their representation by bringing several social sectors
into the political arena, as well as recognizing the validity of different

democratic procedures. To carry out this evaluation, we must pay spe-
cial attention to the protagonists, since political and institutional
reforms can be introduced by collective pressures from below (the
groups previously excluded) or by strategic calculation from above
(the existing leaders and rules).15 During the 1990s, reforms were pro-
moted by the political parties without the labor unions, which had been
weakened by the policies of structural adjustment. The governments
based on pact democracy strengthened the centrality enjoyed by the
system of political parties, and there the reforms were first discussed
and planned in meetings between the parties leaders and later imple-
mented by the existing parliamentary alliances between the ruling
officialdom and the supporting opposition. However, after 2000, the
implemented reforms were in response to pressures exerted by the
social organizations, notably the peasant and indigenous movements
and the regional civic mobilizations. Nowadays, the path followed by
political reform is subject to a struggle in which several social and po-
litical actors are still involved; in this struggle, the system of political
parties plays a secondary role because final decisions do not depend on
Congress, but on the approval of a new constitution by means of a
national referendum.
So now, what has been modified in this democracy and what is its
meaning? Since the establishment of pact democracy in 1985 until the
political crisis in October 2003, representative democracy centered on
the parties was the dominant procedure guiding the political systems
reform performance. The parties were in charge of implementing social
demands, and the process of decision making was limited to the inter-
actions between the executive and legislative powers. In 2004, several
important constitutional modifications were approved, incorporating
institutions that favor a participative democracy and opening the elec-
toral arena to new organizations, eliminating thus the parties exclusive
role as agency of political representation. At the end of 2007, a constitu-
tional assembly approved a new constitutional text, with several insti-
tutional reforms. The new constitution text proposes a runoff ballot if
no candidate obtains an absolute majority of votes in the first national
election; it also contemplates a possible recall referendum for elected
authorities and would permit the immediate presidents reelection for a
second term. In this way, a greater importance is clearly given to the
citizens votes, and the political parties mediation diminishes. On the
other hand, the communal democracy is recognized and incorpo-
rated, accepting the diverse traditional procedures, which the indige-
nous people and the peasant communities use to elect their
representatives, that is, with institutional procedures different from the
liberal principle of individual citizenship. Overall, the democratic
performance seems to be based on a diversity of procedures, paying

more attention to political representation than to institutional efficiency.
In order to evaluate the political reforms and the role parties have
played in achieving these changes, we distinguish three enlargement
moments in this democratic process, during which the political parties
play several roles according to their relationships with the social
movements.
First Moment (1991 1999)

During the 1990s, the first democratic enlargement took place. That
reformist impulse was the consequence of a centripetal convergence in
the system of political parties, around democratic neo-liberalism. This
event made possible a couple of interparty accords, in which all the
parliamentary forces were involved, that defined an agenda of institu-
tional reforms. The process took place between 1991 and 1992, and cul-
minated in 1994 with a constitutional reform that approved a series of
innovations related to political representation.
The institutional changes gave more credibility to the electoral pro-
cess, with the electoral courts composed by members independent from
the parties and elected by two-thirds in Congress willing to respect the
voting results, and the adoption of a new, more precise definition of
proportional voting, in order to ensure the representation of minorities.
The election of the members for the Supreme Court of Justice was also
decided, with a two-thirds vote in Congress required for official nomi-
nation. A proposal for a constitutional reform was prepared and pre-
sented, and a specific set of norms for political party behavior was
approved. These agreements designed the scope for the coming politi-
cal reform, whose final materialization took three presidential periods.
This reform clearly showed the efficiency of the pacts agreed to by the
political parties and also indicated the autonomy of their decisions,
before the pressures of the social movements.
It is worthwhile to highlight the introduction of the two-thirds rule
in Congress, in order to nominate authorities and approve special
norms, because this rule required a necessary consensus between the
government and the opposition. That is, besides the alliances between
the parties motivated by the constitutional norm on the subject that
meant that it was necessary to elect a president in Congress when there
was no winner by majority a more ample rule was approved, one that
oriented the parties behavior toward further alliances between the par-
ties, including those of the opposition.
The most important changes were introduced in the partial constitu-
tional reform in 1994, approved by two-thirds of the Congress mem-
bers. This partial reform was an answer to the demands for further
participation and representation, as well as to the need for greater
political stability. As for the first, the right to vote was granted to citi-
zens older than 18 years of age, instead of the previously required 21;
for the second, it was decided to elect half of the representatives by
means of uninominal candidates in the municipal districts; and third, it
was decided that if no candidates (for president and vice-president)
obtained an absolute majority in the national elections, Congress would
choose only between the two leading contenders. In order to strengthen
the judiciary power, the Constitutional Tribunal, the Judiciary Council,
and the Peoples Defense (Ombudsman) were created.
Other minor reforms were aimed at strengthening both citizen partic-
ipation as well as the representative capacity of the parties. In 1997, the
law of shares was approved; in order to promote womens participa-
tion, at least one-third of the candidates in any electoral list must be
women. In 1999, the Law of Political Parties was also approved,
announced as promoting transparency in political parties behavior and
democratizing their internal procedures. If necessary, the Electoral
Court could now prosecute them. Beginning in 1997, the political par-
ties received fiscal funds for their electoral campaigns. However, this
law never could be completely applied and, with the surge of the next
political crisis, was postponed.
At the municipal level, in 1995 a very important reform took place
with the promulgation of the Popular Participation Law. This law recog-
nized local governments elected by their own citizens. Thus, municipal
democracy became a new political arena, one that stimulated the surge
of new political forces and modified the existing relationships between
the political parties and the (local) social organizations. One effect of this
law was the personalization of political representation, which became
crucial with the election of uninominal candidates directly related to
their municipal districts for Congress. Creating this new electoral space
was quite a favorable development for the social movements, which now
could promote their own political representatives and parties, like the
MAS, originally conceived as a political instrument for peasant syndi-
calism and indigenous people, social groups with great organizational
capacity. Briefly said, the reforms carried out during the 1990s created
favorable political and institutional conditions for the surge and
later, leading role of the peasant and indigenous movement, a surge
that culminated with Evo Morales and MASs victory in the 2005
presidential and general elections.
The reforms implemented during this period allowed Bolivia to
enlarge the scope of democratization and modified positively the rules
for electoral competence, introducing mechanisms aimed to strengthen
the links between the system of political parties and society. Neverthe-
less, one of the most notable measures, the Law of Political Parties, a
law that pretended to improve the parties internal democracy and to
promote the renewal of their leaderships, lacked appropriate
implementation, a failing that further weakened the traditional parties

and their representative capacity and cast serious doubts on the efficacy
of parliamentary pacts. Consequently, in the late 1990s, the pact democ-
racy ideology was questioned from below, that is, by means of the
growing presence of the social actors in the political arena.
Second Moment (2000 2004)

From January 2000 on, a cycle of social protests began to shake the
country. These protests combined strong criticisms against the pact de-
mocracy, with the proposal to found the country anew under the
banner of a constituent assembly. In February 2004, motivated by the
protests, Congress approved a second partial constitutional reform.
There, new institutions and procedures, akin to those made to increase
participative democracy, were incorporated, such as the referendum,
the citizens legislative initiative, and the constitutional assembly.
These reforms modified the procedures usually followed during the de-
cision-making process, both at the judicial as well as at the level of con-
stitutional reform. Since then, several popular consultations have been
carried out regarding such policy questions as the use of natural
resources, the states political decentralization, and the possibility of
recalling political authorities.
The constitutional assembly was summoned in order to propose a
complete reform of the constitution. In the past, this was done by Con-
gress, which had the power to make partial constitutional reforms.
Incorporating citizens clusters and indigenous people as electoral con-
tenders also weakened the parties and responded to the antipartisan
mood that prevailed in the society. Now the political competence of
the indigenous people was an answer to the growing importance of the
ethnic and cultural cleavage, manifest in the leading role played by the
peasant and indigenous movements and in the presence of the MAS as
the countrys main political force. If, as in the 1994 constitutional
reform, this cleavage was answered by the recognition of the multieth-
nic and multicultural nature of the Bolivian society and with the ap-
proval of several collective rights for the indigenous peoples, their
effects would be clearly noticed only later, when MAS conceived as a
political instrument of the peasant unions and indigenous move-
ments self-representation began to play a leading role after 2002.
The combined moves to democratize (representative and partic-
ipative) as well as the granting of electoral competence to nonpartisan
organizations did not close the doors to further reforms. In December
2005, motivated by a demand presented by several regions of the coun-
try, for the first time, the prefects were elected by the citizens vote,
limiting the presidential prerogative to name directly the departmental
authorities. A year and a half later, a referendum took place in order to
define the sense in which the states decentralization should be

oriented at the same time, the representatives for the constituent as-
sembly were elected. Both events mark the beginning of a third
moment in the democratic enlargement; a moment culminating in the
complete reformulation of the constitution, the political and institu-
tional effects of which will be analyzed further on.
Toward a Third Moment (2006 2008)

Between August 2006 and December 2007, the constitutional assem-
bly took place. This assembly approved a new constitution, which
includes several political reforms. As mentioned earlier, its definitive
approval depends on a national referendum not yet held at present
writing, but some of its proposals have already been implemented
like the recall referendum (in August 2008) in order to solve a politi-
cal crisis caused by the intense struggles around the constitutional
reform and the states political decentralization. Although some forth-
coming reforms were de facto applied, the design of the possible
political system still depends on the official approval of the new consti-
tutional text. I will now analyze that text, paying special attention
to the possible effect that its proposals may have for democracy and
political representation.
The changes to the political institutions, especially in regard to politi-
cal representation, are mostly related to the notion of national plural-
ism, which marks the new model for the state, now defined in the new
constitution as a pluri-national state. This definition underlines the
explicit recognition of pluralism in several facets political, economic,
judiciary, cultural, and linguistic pluralisms16 something that certainly
supposes an enlargement for the states representative capacity. How-
ever, the most important aspect of the states pluri-national character-
and the aspect that becomes the axis for the political system17 is
national pluralism. This means the recognition of several nations
inside the state, and the term nations denotes above all the indigenous
people and the peasant communities.
This recognition would modify the existing democratic political sys-
tem at several levels. A communal democracy would be added to
the already practiced representative and participatory democracies.
This triple combination implies the official recognition of the norms
and procedures by which the indigenous people and the peasant com-
munities propose, elect, or nominate their authorities, on the one hand,
and their representatives for the broader political institutions, on the
other. For representation, the consuetudinary norms need to be com-
bined with the universal, direct, and secret vote that characterizes the
representative democracy. Such a combination implies several changes
in the norms followed to constitute the legislative power, since a
creation of special indigenous electoral districts is also proposed in the

new constitutional text. In short, this is a combination of several elec-
toral rules, which, however, does not necessarily imply the coexistence
of several forms of democracy, but a differentiation of the political
subjects and the scope of their political representation something that
may end up in a conflictive dualism. The system of political representa-
tion would have a mixed character with several procedures and
different values according to the social identities involved and the
quality of their citizens rights.
From another point of view, this aggregate enriches the mechanisms of
participative democracy already incorporated by the 2004 constitutional
reform. Thus, the assembly (a meeting of syndicates and the community),
the cabildo town and community council, and the tradition of previous
consult (consulting the community prior to authorizing a change)
become institutionalized, although their scope has not yet been clarified.
They are encompassed under the term direct democracy, and for the
moment they seem to be understood as (social) mechanisms of consulta-
tion. There, the norm most clearly introduced is the revocability of man-
date, pertinent to all posts obtained by popular vote, including the
presidency in this case, the norm becomes part of the way in which a
governments management is or is not approved and maintained.
The proposals related to the governments regime are equally radical,
especially if one keeps in mind the proposed changes relative to the
electoral system and their consequences in the system of political par-
ties. The inclusion of the second round in the poll boxes eliminates the
possibility of presidential election by the Congress and, with that the
hybrid nature of the previous presidentialism of political pacts, disap-
pears.18 Furthermore, the presidents direct election by absolute
majority is endorsed and reinforced with a second alternative: If a can-
didate obtains 40% of the total voting, with a 10% difference to the sec-
ond most voted, he or she can also be directly elected. To these reforms
should be added the immediate reelection for a second presidential
period and as mentioned earlier the revocability of mandate when
applied, in this case, to the presidents and vice presidents mandates.
This reform strengthens a potential presidentialism, although it does
not really modify the existing relations between the executive and legis-
lative powers in fact, it introduces a parliamentary twist, because if
Congress censures them, the ministros (secretaries of state) must resign.
The presidentialist strengthening is a consequence of the changes in the
electoral system and some parliamentary norms although, the final
outcome depends on the system of political parties final configuration
(see below). For the moment it is clear that this reform bets heavily on
the presidents direct election.
As for Congress, the mixed representation system is maintained for
the Lower Chamber, but the proportional representation is introduced
to elect the Upper Chamber. Nevertheless, the Chambers form of com-

position is modified: For the Upper Chamber, proportional voting is
introduced for the territorial representation of the nine departments,
with four seats per district. Instead, half of the 130 representatives for
the Lower Chamber would be elected in pluri-nominal districts by pro-
portionate voting and the other half by simple majority in uninominal
districts. Some of these uninominal districts will represent the 36 indig-
enous peoples creating what the national pluralism.
This kind of election by uninominal districts and simple majority favors
the large parties, weakens the small ones, and hinders political pluralism.
Thus, a majority party may end up controlling the resources of power as
well as the elaboration and approval of norms, and in that case, institu-
tional conditions would be produced in order to strengthen the limit of a
majoritys presidentialism, instead of a pluralist presidentialism.19
Nevertheless, the outcome depends on the system of political parties
and its configuration. That is, under a dominant party these norms tend
to concentrate the power into the presidential authority and his or her
party. On the contrary, if fragmented multi-partyism occupies the scene,
these norms can produce a situation of nongovernability with the conse-
quent institutional blockage, discrediting of presidential authority, and
political crisis. In both cases, the quality of the democracy may become
problematic, despite or, because of its enlargement.
In short, during a quarter of a century, an enlargement of the repre-
sentative capacity of the democratic institutions has evolved, yet at the
same time the importance of the political parties has diminished due to
the new patterns of citizens participation in the political process and
the leading role played by social movements. In order to fully appreci-
ate the results, one must wait for the effects of the new constitutional
reform in a democracy that has been capable of enlarging its capacities,
including new identities and new ways of meeting age-old social
demands, but may not yet be capable of avoiding the risk of political
crisis.
SUPPLEMENTARY REFERENCES (IN ADDITION

TO THOSE IN ENDNOTES)
on, Fernando, and Norbert Lechner. Mas Alla del Estado, Mas Alla Del
Calder
Mercado: La Democracia (La Paz: Plural, 1998).
na. In Curso
Cazorla, Jose, and Juan Montabes. El Sistema de Partidos en Espa~
de Partidos Polticos (Madrid: Akal, 1997).
Lazarte, Jorge. Entre dos Mundos: La Cultura Poltica y Democratica en Bolivia
(La Paz: Plural, 2000).
Mainwaring, Scott, and Timothy R. Scully. Introduction. In Building
Democratic Institutions: Party Systems in Latin America, ed. Mainwaring and
Scully (Palo Alto, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1997).
CHAPTER 5
Parties and Democracy in Brazil,

1985 2006: Moving toward
Cartelization
Jairo Nicolau
INTRODUCTION
The histories of modern democracies and modern parties commingle.
The prevailing version of that composite history, bearing in mind what
happened in Europe, points to three movements. The first is the trans-
formation of Parliament into a fundamental arena of political delibera-
tion peopled by organizations (the parties) with feeble links to society.
The second movement is the expansion of the right to vote from a
reduced number of citizens to practically all adults (universal suffrage).
The ingress of thousands of voters in the political market produced an
immediate response from the parties, which would inevitably change
their nature. Upon a third movement, parties cease to be strictly legisla-
tive organizations and turn into vote-amassing structures capable of
channeling the interests of thousands of voters newly included in the
political system.1 In short, expanding the suffrage is associated with
party transformation from strictly parliamentary organizations to
organizations of intermediation between government and society.
It is known that this view regarding party development sums up bet-
ter what happened in some European countries than in others. It is also
known that it is hard to identify the exact moment of the origin of rep-
resentative institutions and politics democratization in these countries.
However, there is no great controversy in classifying as democratic the
institutional arrangements post-1945 in the majority of European coun-
tries, the United States, Canada, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand.
Likewise, it is not difficult to acknowledge that parties have, since that
time, been the major connecting organizations between citizens and

government.
The fact that the parties evolved simultaneously with modern democ-
racies suggests that it is impossible to imagine one without the other.
From this statement frequently ensues Elmer Schattschneiders quota-
tion present in most texts on this topic: modern democracy is unthink-
able save in terms of political parties.2 But was it actually an
impossibility for contemporary democracies to exist without the par-
ties? There are many answers to this question. One of them is to
observe to what extent parties and democracy are conceptually associ-
ated. In other words, would the presence of parties (or competition
between them) be a necessary attribute of the concept of democracy?
Various scholars have reviewed the concept of democracy and the
ways of empirically measuring whether or not it is present.3 It is strik-
ing how any mention of parties (or of a competitive party system) is
absent from the major writings on democracy. For example, there is no
mention of parties in the 10 conditions laid down by Robert Dahl for
democracy to mention only the most famous one.4 Gary Goertz made
an overview of democracy indicators proposed by nine different
authors.5 Only one of them mentions party legitimacy and party com-
petition as fundamental attributes of the democratic regime.6 In one of
the most elegant proposal of operationalization of the democracy con-
cept, combining necessity and sufficiency notions, five conditions
required for democracy were selected (broad political liberties, competi-
tive elections, inclusive participation, civilian supremacy, national sov-
ereignty), yet there was no mention of party system attributes.7
Therefore, at least from a conceptual point of view, Schattschneiders
phrase does not seem to make sense. A better option is to view the
relation between parties and democracy as a case of elective affinity.
This affinity might be the result of a historical process of simultaneous
evolution of representative institutions and organizations (political par-
ties) created to solve collective action problems generated in such an
environment. From this perspective, democratic regimes can coexist
with various kinds of parties and party systems. Parties can, for
instance, have different internal configurations and connection patterns
with voters; be more or less influenced by an ideology or a program-
matic appeal; or be more or less cohesive in the legislative arena. This
variation has triggered efforts on the part of political scientists to create
typologies and models for the various party and partisan system con-
figurations found in democratic countries.8
One of the most widely used models to emphasize political parties
centrality in contemporary democracies is the responsible party model.9
This model has two essential features. The first is the assertion that
there are only two relevant actors in the political representation
Democracy in Brazil 103
process: electors and parties. The second is that parties are highly disci-
plined organizations, leaving individual politicians to play a secondary
role in the political process.10 The more specific requirements of the re-
sponsible party model are summed up by Jacques Thomassen and Her-
mann Schmitt:
1. Voters have a choice of parties in competitive elections, i.e., they can choose
between at least two parties with different programs.
2. The internal cohesion, or party discipline, of political parties is sufficient to
enable them to implement their policy program.
3. Voters have policy preferences.
4. Voters are aware of the differences between the programs of different politi-
cal parties.
5. Electors vote according to their policy preferences, i.e., they choose the party
that best represents their policy preferences.11
The responsible party model has earned a number of criticisms,

including that of being empirically invalid, since neither political par-
ties nor voters behave according to its predictions.12 Notwithstanding,
it continues to be largely used as an assessment parameter of represen-
tative systems, in particular in European proportionalistic democra-
cies.13 The goal is to assess to what extent the actual functioning of
parties distances itself from the ideal type suggested by the responsible
party model. Some areas have been particularly marked by the model.
In electoral surveys, a classic theme is the role of long-term party con-
nections (party identification) in voting choice.14 Another research
agenda assesses party discipline in the legislature.15 Some authors seek
to determine public policy differences implemented by different kinds
of government. But does it really make any difference which party
rules the government?16 During a recent discussion about democracy
quality, G. Bingham Powell Jr. pointed out a series of subversions of
linkage mechanisms between citizens and their representatives; two of
them (party incoherence in electors choice and party switching) are
held to be violations of the premise of partisan representation.17
For specialists studying the party systems of new democracies, some
questions inevitably arise: Is the responsible party model good for sum-
marizing the functioning of representative systems? Is the prevailing
form of connection between represented and representatives the pro-
grammatic one? Does it still make sense to think that parties hold sway
in every sphere of the representative system (elections, legislative, and
executive)? One of the objectives of this chapter is to analyze Brazilian
party experience after 1985 in the light of such questions. It is my inten-
tion to answer to what extent the responsible party model is valid in
depicting the Brazilian representative system.
Figure 5.1 gives a stylized view of the Brazilian representative system

at the national level. Three processes stand out. The first is the choice
by voters of representatives for the executive and legislative branches.
A second fundamental moment (decision making) occurs during the
representatives term. That is when the executive and legislative mem-
bers define legislation and the general parameters of public policies.
Finally, in the third stage, public policies are implemented (that is to
say, decisions made by the executive and legislative branches become
effective through the action of government officials).
The importance of parties in a representative system is indicated by
the broken line on the upper part of Figure 5.1. Parties are fundamental
organizations because they participate in the three decisive moments of
the representative system. Parties are the decisive unit in the electoral
moment, since politicians must belong to one of them in order to be
able to run for office. Parties are fundamental in organizing legislative
work and executive offices (ministries or secretaries). Finally, they con-
trol the part of the bureaucracy responsible for implementing policies.
Figure 5.1 summarizes only the representative dimension of the polit-
ical system. For that reason, it is far from detailing the complexity of
the Brazilian political system. Figure 5.1 does not include other nonrep-
resentative arenas (e.g. the judiciary and regulatory agencies), which
have had an ever increasing influence in the political system over the
past few years. Likewise, it excludes civil society organizations (interest
groups, social movements, media, and religious groups), which have a
sizable influence over voters, representatives, and civil servants in
charge of implementing policies.
This chapter focuses on the analysis of Brazilian political parties at two
fundamental moments in the political process: elections and representation
(depicted as numbers 1 and 2 of Figure 5.1).18 However, before focusing
directly on elections and representation, it is important to explain key
Figure 5.1 Brazilian Representative System

government regulations that affect parties and to offer a description of the

most important parties in Brazilian politics today. Then we look at another
key set of regulations: those governing the electoral system. Finally, we
will examine the role of Brazilian governance and attempt to bring it all to-
gether in an assessment of the relationship between parties and democracy
in Brazil.
KEY GOVERNMENT REGULATIONS

An undeniable phenomenon of Brazilian democracy since 1985 is the
increasing regulation of party activity on the part of the state. State con-
trol of parties has been occurring at different levels, from the legislative
control of several aspects of party life, such as enrollment and listing
members, to the increasing intervention of the judiciary Superior
Court of Justice (STF) and Superior Electoral Court (TSE) in the rep-
resentative system, through the promulgation of decisions that have a
strong impact on parties and elections.19 In addition, parties are becom-
ing more and more dependent on resources from the state-controlled
Party Fund and free time on radio and television. In combination, these
conditions ensure that the Brazilian party system is one of the most
regulated among all democratic countries.20 Furthermore, these regula-
tions have played a major role in determining the number and nature
of Brazilian parties. Here we look at three key regulations: rules gov-
erning how parties may register, how much state funding parties
receive, and state maintenance and use of lists of party members.
Rules for Party Registration

A party must be previously registered with the Superior Electoral
Court (TSE) an agency of the judiciary in charge of organizing and
inspecting elections in order to be able to participate in an election in
Brazil.21 In the first 10 years of the democratic regime (1985 1995), Act
6767 (1979, from the period of military rule) continued to set the require-
ments for party registration, establishing a distinction between parties
having a provisional registration and a definitive one. In order to obtain
a provisional registration with the TSE, parties only had to produce their
bylaws, a list showing at least 101 founders, and a national directorate
(from 7 to 11 members). To obtain a definitive registration, parties had to
organize conventions in at least nine states and in at least 20% of the cities
of such states. During that 10-year period, there was a boom in party cre-
ation in Brazil.
In the eight elections carried out between 1985 and 1994 (1985, 1998,
and 1992 local elections; 1989 presidential elections; state elections and
for Congress in 1986 and 1990; and presidential, state and congressional
elections in 1994), 67 different parties participated. A significant number
were organized by persons without prior party experience and without

expression in Brazilian politics. Such parties were highly ephemeral, with
very few taking part in more than one election: 31 parties took part in one
election only; five ran in two, and seven ran three times.22
What explains this party explosion within the country? The fact that
parties holding a provisional registration were allowed to participate in
the elections was probably a decisive factor. Although the law makes a
difference between organizations with a provisional registration (moder-
ate registration requirements) and those with definitive registration
(stricter requirements), this distinction had only a slight effect since par-
ties holding provisional registration sometimes ran for six elections (only
in the 1994 general elections did all the parties running hold definitive
registration).
Rules for party registration changed in 1995 and parties now must
procure support from a significant number of voters, with that support
being backed by signatures: at least 0.5% of votes cast for parties in the
last election for the House of Representatives (466,000 voters, taking as
a basis the 2006 elections), distributed throughout nine states at least,
with a minimum of 0.1% of the electorate in each of them. Since then,
only 11 parties obtained registration. It is worth noting that of those,
only two (the Socialism and Liberty Party [PSOL] and the Brazilian
Republican Party [PRB]) met the signature requirements; the other
nine enjoyed the benefit of a transition rule from the former law to the
new one.23
State Funding of Brazilian Parties

The increasing supply of government funds to the parties is a trend
found both in traditional democracies and the new democracies.24
Brazilian parties presently receive three types of government funding:
radio and television airing time for party propaganda, radio and television
airing time of campaign propaganda, and money from the Party Fund.
Parties are entitled to broadcast a national program (and a statewide
one) via open television channels and radio stations biannually. Pro-
grams are broadcast on all channels simultaneously, and last for 10
(or 5) minutes, according to votes won in the elections for the Chamber
of Deputies. Parties are further entitled to broadcast spots (30 seconds
or 1-minute insertions) during commercial time on radio and television.
Nationwide propaganda is carried out four days per semester, lasting a
total of three to five minutes per day; parties share equal time for state-
wide program broadcasting. Program production is the parties respon-
sibility, but the network enjoys tax exemption for the time used for
party propaganda.25
During electoral campaigns, parties have access to a large radio
and television airing time. The Free Electoral Air Time (HEG) lasts for
45 days (it ends two days before the election) and is aired twice a day.
In television channels, HEG is broadcast between 1:00 P.M. and 1:50 P.M.
and between 8:30 P.M. and 9:20 P.M. Time is divided as follows: one-
third in equal parts and two-thirds pro rata the number of party seats
in the Chamber of Deputies. The 50 minutes of each segment are di-
vided among the various offices being disputed (president, representa-
tive, senator, governor, and state assembly person).26 In addition,
parties have a further total of 30 minutes in which to present electoral
propaganda spots (of up to one minute each), throughout the radio and
television program that is broadcast during the same period. According
to Federal Revenue Bureau estimates, in the last general elections
(2006), tax exemption enjoyed by radio and television stations was 191
million reals (about $120 million at July 2008 rates).27
The Party Fund is comprised of resources basically originating from
the union budget and marginally from fines and donations. Presently,
fund resources are distributed to the parties according to the following
criterion: 5% in equal parts and 95% pro rata votes obtained in the last
elections to the Chamber of Deputies. Parties must account for their ex-
penditure yearly. In 2007, parties received about 121.1 million reals
(some 75 million at July 2008 rates), distributed, in millions of reals, as
follows: PT (17.1); PMDB (16.5); PSDB (15.5); DEM (12.7); PP (8.5); PSB
(7.3); PTB (6.7); PDT (6.3); PR (6.5); PPS (4.9); PCdoB (2.9); and 14 other
small parties (16.4).28
Party Fund resources are today the main resources parties have for
maintaining the party structure and waging election campaigns. The
money is used for keeping up headquarters, funding party leaders
trips, payment of personnel and party chairmens salaries, and support
of foundations and formation and research institutes linked to the par-
ties. There is no research regarding funds raised by parties from their
militant members. But the Workers Party (PT) itself a party tradition-
ally getting significant amounts from its members nowadays has
party fund resources as its main source.29 Although the resources of
the Party Fund are distributed mainly according to the previous vote of
the parties (a rule that favors the major parties), the resources that the
smaller parties get in absolute terms have been considered crucial by
the leaders of these parties. The parties are accountable for their spend-
ing with the TSE, and there are no complaints about corruption with
these resources.
State Maintenance and Use of Party Membership Lists

The 1998 Brazilian Constitution granted ample liberty for parties to
establish their own mechanisms for enlisting members, organizing activ-
ities, and selecting leaders. State control of internal party affairs occurs
only in one particular aspect: maintaining lists of party members. This
control affects candidate selection, since a citizen must be a member of a

party for more than a year before seeking nomination. In the months of
May and December of each year, parties are required to submit a list of
the names of all members. Based on this list, the Electoral Court can then
identify instances of membership to more than one party and ascertain
whether the candidate meets the minimum membership time.
Table 5.1 shows the total members of major Brazilian parties, accord-
ing to TSE records. Total membership is significant: 9.6% of Brazilian
voters are formally enrolled with one of the parties. Such data, how-
ever, must be regarded with caution. Party leaders acknowledge that
the list of members given to Electoral Courts is far from accurate in
revealing the number of citizens involved in party activity. Since the
registration of parties in Brazil was, until 1995, conditional upon obtain-
ing a minimum number of members in many municipalities, almost all
parties had to carry out campaigns of mass affiliation. Thus, many
joined only to help the party meet legal requirements. Although they
continue to appear in the list sent to Electoral Courts, many listed
members are rarely involved in party activity.
In summary, Brazilian parties are heavily controlled by and depend-
ent on the state. Control is maintained by the Electoral Courts, which
govern party registration, control of membership, and requiring parties
to maintain and submit their accounts.30 This form of control was
increased, starting in 2002, through a series of decisions from the courts
(TSE and Supreme Court), which had a strong impact on party activity,
Table 5.1 Total Number of Party Members and Percentage of Members

vis-a-vis Total Voters, Brazil, May 2006
Party Members %
Nonmembers 117,555,250 90.4
PMDB 2,073,176 1.6
PP 1,264,982 0.9
PSDB 1,189,876 0.9
PT 1,152,595 0.9
PTB 1,029,325 0.8
PDT 1,019,115 0.8
DEM 1,001,204 0.8
PR 719,787 0.5
PSB 412,064 0.3
PPS 408,376 0.3
PC DO B 237,840 0.2
Others 1,950,347 1.5
Total 130,013,937 99.9
Note: See note 28 for acronym spell outs.
Source: Tribunal Superior Electoral (TSE) (Superior Electoral Court). Available at http://
www.tse.gov.br/internet/index.html.
leading some analysts to speak of judicialization of party life.31

Dependency is maintained by money: The state transfers resources
directly to the parties (particularly via the Party Fund and through
radio and television airing time for broadcasting propaganda), and
these resources are essential if the parties are to engage in normal polit-
ical activities.32
MEANINGFUL PARTIES IN BRAZIL

It is no simple task to identify, among the 78 Brazilian parties (some
of which underwent a name change between two elections) presenting
candidates between 1985 and 2006, which ones might be considered as
having some importance vis- a-vis the political system. Party systems
scholars are often called upon to separate from the whole of existing
parties those having some relevance. The simplest criterion suggested
is to establish an arbitrary percentage of votes (or seats in the legisla-
tive), above which a party is considered relevant. Klaus von Beyme,33
in his study of party systems in European countries, considered as rel-
evant only those parties obtaining more than 2% of votes, while
Giovanni Sartori34 opposed establishing a purely quantitative criterion
(a given percentage of votes or seats in the legislature) to identify the
importance of a party. In his view, what is fundamental is to identify
within each context the parties affecting the nature of the political sys-
tem, either by their potential to form government coalitions or because
they affect the nature of the competition. For that reason, a party
placed at the 10% level, may be much less important than one reaching
only a 3% level.35
Both the establishing of an arbitrary percentage, as proposed by
Beyme, and the qualitative criterion, as suggested by Sartori, have as
their reference the parliamentary democracies, wherein the Lower
House is the more important deciding arena. A particular difficulty in
the case of Brazil, a presidential and federalist country, is the existence
of other arenas of electoral competition. Voters choose their representa-
tives at the local level (town council and mayor), state level (legislative
assembly and state governors), and national level (Senate, Chamber of
Deputies, and presidency) through different electoral systems (see fol-
lowing section). Parties can, therefore, be relevant players in subna-
tional politics, but of little significance nationwide, or even achieve a
significant number of seats for either of the Congress Houses (Senate or
Chamber of Deputies), but not in both. They may be meaningful in
Congress, but not in disputes for the presidency of the republic.
Here I seek simply to identify the parties that simultaneously attained
relative permanence and achieved a minimum electoral performance
in the national elections. To that end, the criterion suggested by Rose
and Mackie was followed.36 A party is considered institutionalized
(nonephemeral) if it disputes more than three elections for the Chamber

of Deputies and electorally relevant if it has won at least 1% of the vote in
at least three elections for the Chamber of Deputies.37 Only 11 of the 78
parties met both criteria: PMDB, PT, PP (formerly PDS, PPR and PPB),
PTB, PDT, PR (formerly PL), PSB, DEM (formerly PFL), PPS (formerly
PCB), PCdoB, and PSDB.38
Table 5.2 shows basic data about these 11 parties: the acronym, name,
year founded, some outstanding organizational changes (fusions and
name changes), and general data about party orientation. One fact
worth mentioning is the longevity of the major parties of the time, even
though some have changed their name and undergone fusion processes
with other parties. Five of them PP, PT, PMDB, PTB, and PDT were
founded during the military regime, in 1980. Six other parties appeared
during the first years of the democratic regime: DEM, PSB, PPS, PCdoB,
PR, and PSDB. PSDB, the relevant youngest party, is 20 years old.39
Table 5.3 shows vote percentages and seats obtained in the elections
between 1985 and 2006. The major Brazilian parties combined provide
a significant number of votes and seats in the Chamber of Deputies
elections. The only election to deviate from this pattern was the one in
1990, when two ephemeral parties (National Reconstruction Party
[PRN] of then president Fernando Collor; and the Progressive Party
[PP] basically made up of dissident PMDB state leaderships) achieved
an important count.40
However, Table 5.3 also reveals another fundamental characteristic of
the Brazilian party system of that time: high fragmentation. In the last
five general elections, only one party (PMDB in 1994) managed to get
more than 20% of votes in elections for the Chamber of Deputies. Meas-
ured by the effective number of parties (N), those figures reveal a high
party fragmentation as of 1990: 1986 (2.4); 1986 (2.8); 1990 (8.7); 1994
(8.2); 1998 (7.1%); 2002 (8.5); 2006 (9.3).41
PARTIES IN THE ELECTORAL ARENA

One of the premises of the responsible party model is that voters
choice is based on comparison of agendas brought forth by parties. In
that sense, the vote is eminently party and programmatic oriented. This
premise has been constantly placed in check by empirical studies about
electoral behavior in traditional democracies. A candidate may be voted
for by reason of his or her personal attributes (competence, image, lead-
ership capacity); by reason of his or her government performance; or
because he or she delivered particular services to certain clients.42 That
is to say, the main reason for a voter to vote for a candidate may not
always originate from the fact that the latter belongs to a particular
party. Among analysts of electoral behavior in traditional democracies,
the consensus is mostly that party-oriented voting has been losing force
Table 5.2 Main Parties in Brazil (1985 2008)
Acronym Portuguese name English name Year of foundation Organizational changes Party orientation
DEM Democratas Democrats 1985 From 1985 2007, Partido Center-right, created in 1984,
da Frente Liberal (PFL) by former ARENA party
(Liberal Front Party); leaders (a party supporting
became Democratas the military regime) who
(DEM) in 2007. supported opposition can-
didate (Tancredo Neves) in
the presidential indirect
elections of 1985.
PcdoB Partido Communist 1985 Leftist, founded in 1962;
Comunista Party of active in the underground
do Brasil Brazil until 1985.
PDT Partido Democratic 1980 Moderate left party, founded
Democr atico Labor Party by former exile Leonel
Trabalhista Brizola (1922 2004).
PR Partido Republican 1985 From 1985 2006, Partido Small center-right party.
Republicano Party Liberal (Liberal Party).
PMDB Partidos do Brazilian 1980 Centrist, organized from the
Movimento Democratic Movimento Democratico
Democr atico Movement Brasileiro, MDB (Brazilian
Brasileiro Parties Democratic Movement)
(1965 1979), a party in
opposition to military
regime.
(Continued)
Table 5.2 Main Parties in Brazil (1985 2008) (Continued)
Acronym Portuguese name English name Year of foundation Organizational changes Party orientation
PP Partido Progressive 1980 Between 1980 1993 Partido Center-right, organized from
Progressista Party Democr atico Social (PDS) the Alianca Renovadora
(Social Democratic Party). Nacional, ARENA
In 1993, PDS merged (1965 1979) (National
with Partido Democratico Renewal Alliance), a party
Crist~
ao (PDC) (Christian providing parliament sup-
Democratic Party) and port to the military regime.
took the name of Partido
Progressista Renovador
(PPR). In 1995, PPR
merged with Partido
Progressista (PP) and
took the name of Partido
Progressista Brasileiro
(PPB). In 2005, PPB
became known as Partido
Progressista (PP).
PPS Partido Popular Popular 1985 Between 1985 1991, Founded in 1922. Active in
Socialista Socialist Partido Comunista the underground until
Party Brasileiro (Brazilian 1985. Small moderate-left
Communist Party). New party.
name Partido Popular
Socialista (PPS) in 1991.
PSB Partido Socialista Brazilian 1985 Small moderate-left party.
Brasileiro Socialist
Party
PSDB Partido da Social Brazilian Social 1988 Centrist, founded by PMDB
Democracia Democracy dissidents, during the
Brasileira Party National Constitution
Convention. Main
Leadership: Fernando
Henrique Cardoso
(Brazilian president elected
in 1994 and 1998).
PT Partido dos Workers Party 1980 Leftist party of extraparlia-
Trabalhadores mentary origin. Founded
by union leaders, far left
groups, social movement
militants. Main Leadership:
Luis Inacio Lula da Silva
(Brazilian president elected
in 2002 and 2006).
PTB Partido Brazilian Labor 1980 Small center-right party.
Trabalhista Party
Brasileiro
Table 5.3 Percentage of Votes and Seats Obtained by Parties Elections for
Chamber of Deputies, Brazil, 1986 2006
1986 1990 1994 1998 2002 2006
PMDB 48 votes 19 votes 20 votes 15 votes 13 votes 15 votes
53 seats 22 seats 21 seats 16 seats 14 seats 17 seats
DEM 18 12 13 13 18 11
24 17 17 21 16 13
PT 7 10 13 13 18 15
3 7 10 11 18 16
PSDB 9 14 18 14 14
8 12 19 14 13
PP 8 9 9 11 8 7
7 8 10 12 10 8
PDT 7 10 7 6 5 5
5 9 7 5 4 5
PTB 5 6 5 6 5 5
4 8 6 6 5 4
PR 3 4 4 3 4 4
1 3 3 2 5 5
PSB 1 2 2 3 5 6
0 2 3 4 4 5
PPS 1 1 1 1 3 4
1 1 0 1 3 4
PcdoB 1 1 1 1 2 2
1 1 2 1 2 3
Others 1 17 11 10 5 12
1 14 9 2 5 7
Note: See note 28 for acronym spell outs.
Source: Data obtained from http://jaironicolau.iuperj.brbanco2004.html.
and the weight of short-term factors has been increasing, in particular,

candidate evaluation and issue voting.43 The electoral decline of parties
is slow and generalized. In the new democracies, it is still difficult to
notice more general trends; however, synchronic studies are already
showing data for possible comparisons.44 In the specific case of Brazil,
a series of studies have shown that party accounts for little in voters
choices
However, whether or not voters choose a candidate on the basis of
party, parties are the agencies that present candidates to the voters,
and electoral rules governing this presentation can create a more party-
oriented vote than a survey of voter preferences would predict. For
example, the closed-list version of proportional representation (a sys-
tem that does not offer voters the possibility of voting for specific
names) provides a more party-oriented vote than do preferential vote
systems (Single Transferable Vote, Open-List, Flexible List, Alternative
Vote), which give voters a greater chance to express their preference in

nonparty terms.45
Brazil uses three electoral systems in elections for national offices.
The president is elected according to the absolute majority system (run-
off); if no candidate receives more than 50% of the valid votes, a new
election is undertaken between the two most-voted for candidates. The
presidents term lasts four years, and he or she can be elected for
another consecutive term. National Congress is comprised of the Cham-
ber of Deputies (Lower House) and the Senate (Upper House). The Sen-
ate is comprised of 81 senators (three elected per state). Senators are
chosen by the majority system (plurality) for an eight-year term, part of
the Senate is at each election (two-thirds in one election, one-third in
the next election). Each party (or party coalition) can put forth one
name, with the one who obtains more votes being elected. In the fol-
lowing elections, a party (or a coalition) may put up two names, and
the two receiving the most votes are elected. The Chamber of Deputies
has 513 members, elected in the states (number of party seats varies
between 8 and 70) through open list pro rata representation.46 In order
to analyze the importance of the party in the electoral arena, I shall
focus on the elections for the Chamber of Deputies.
A voter has two options when choosing representatives for the
House: either to choose the candidates number or that of the chosen
party in the electronic ballot box. After pressing the correct button, a
photo of the candidate or a reference to the party chosen appears on
the screen. In practice, this voting procedure gives the voter the feeling
that rather than a list proportional representation system, elections
function like a large competition between candidates. Most citizens do
not realize the complexity of the vote aggregation system and seat
apportionment among competing parties.
In general, the major mechanisms of proportional representation sys-
tem in force in Brazil are explained in the sections that follow.
Threshold and Electoral Formula

Parties may run alone or in electoral coalition (coligac~ao).47 In order
to achieve representation, the party (or coligac~ao) must exceed the elec-
toral quota, which is calculated by dividing the total votes cast to the
parties and candidates by the number of seats being disputed. Percent-
age wise, an electoral quota is the result of dividing 100% by the num-
ber of seats to be occupied in the election (Hare quota system). For
instance, the state of Acre has eight representatives in the Chamber of
Deputies; therefore, its quota is 12.5% (100 8). With the quota acting
as the threshold, in Acre a party needs to receive more than 12.5% of
the votes in order to elect someone to the Chamber of Deputies.
Calculation for seat apportionment happens in two stages. During

the first stage, total votes of parties (or alliances) are divided by elec-
toral quota; each one will receive as many seats as how many times it
achieves electoral quota. In the second stage, seats not filled will be
apportioned according to the DHondt formula: the total of votes of
each party (or alliance) is divided by the number of seats it has already
received plus one; parties having the higher averages receive seats not
apportioned in the first stage.
Open List and Electoral Alliances

For apportioning seats among candidates of a party or alliance, the
open list system is used. Parties produce a list of candidates without
preference hierarchy. Seats obtained by parties or alliances are appor-
tioned to candidates having the most votes. In this way, the vote cast
for the party (party vote) serves only for the purpose of seat apportion-
ment; however, it does not affect which candidate will be elected in
each list. The number of voters taking part in the party vote has never
been strong. In the six elections for the Chamber of Deputies carried
out from 1986 to 2002, the party vote rate was as follows: 14% (1986),
18% (1990), 8% (1994), 14% (1998), 10% (2002).
An alliance works in practice the same way as a party, since a coali-
tions votes are totaled for the purpose of seat apportionment among
the component parties. In contrast to the majority of countries allowing
for such alliances, there is no second turn of calculation, according to
which seats are proportionally distributed according to the number of
votes obtained by parties making up the alliance.48 Generalized usage
of the alliance system and the single count of their votes for seat appor-
tionment end up weakening the role of parties as a fundamental unit
in the electoral process. This procedure generates two important effects.
The first is that for each party participating in an alliance, it is most im-
portant to ensure that its candidates are placed among the top ones on
the list, regardless of the partys specific contribution to the final vote
score for the alliance. Through this, some deviations may happen: Party
A participating in electoral alliance AB may elect a representative
receiving fewer votes than party B, and the latter may fail to elect any
candidate; party A may even elect a representative receiving fewer
votes than party C, which did not engage in an alliance and did not
manage to achieve the requisite quota. The second effect is that voting
for one party (party vote) that is in an alliance means that the vote con-
tributes to the final outcome for the alliance, but it is not specifically
counted for the party. Therefore, a voters intention to favor a given
party ends up being violated by the mechanics of the Brazilian electoral
system.
Literature regarding electoral systems draws attention to the fact that

the open list stimulates the predominance of individual reputation to
the detriment of party reputation.49 In Brazil, evidence of campaign
personalization is strong. Each candidate organizes his or her campaign
structure (participation in events, preparing party propaganda, fund-
raising, and accounting for expenditure) in a nearly independent man-
ner, with little regard for party directorates. Since party performance
stems, to a great extent, from the sum of individual candidates success
in obtaining votes, in organizing candidates lists, parties are strongly
interested in including individuals popular in their field of activity, but
not necessarily having a history of involvement in party activity, such
as artists, soccer players, radio announcers, and religious leaders.50 An
electoral survey undertaken by the Rio de Janeiro Research University
Institute (Instituto Universit ario de Pesquisas do Rio de Janeiro
[IUPERJ]) in 2002 presented considerable evidence confirming the
reduced importance of parties in choosing a candidate for the Chamber
of Deputies.51 Some questions attempted to estimate electors level of
involvement with parties. Upon being asked whether they were sympa-
thetic to one party or another, 42% said yes they were. Distribution of
party sympathy shows predominance of one party, namely the PT. This
party was mentioned as the favorite by 25% of voters, more than the
sum of preferences for the other three parties (PMDB: 6%; PSDB: 4%;
PFL: 3%; and others: 4%).52 Another question tried to establish which
was more important to the voter the party or the candidate in cast-
ing his or her vote for the Chamber of Deputies. The candidate was
considered more important by 83% of voters. The party was indicated
as more important by 17% of people interviewed (including 9%, who
considered both the party and the candidate as important).
Table 5.4a presents the outcome of crossing party sympathy with the
party for which the elector voted in the Chamber of Deputies election.
Only the results of the four major parties could be analyzed, since the
number of observations of other parties is low. A major point to stress
is that out of the total voters, only 18% voted for the same party they
stated feeling sympathetic with, whereas 10% voted for parties other
than the ones they claimed to feel favorable toward. A significant num-
ber of voters (10%) who expressed sympathy for a party did not know
the name of party they had voted for.
Evidence to the effect that electoral campaigns in Brazil are candidate
centered is significant. In their campaigns for seats in the legislature, can-
didates have resorted to different kinds of appeal: belonging to the same
territory as the voters; belonging to the same social group as voters (reli-
gion, professional group, association); having some personal attribute
that distinguishes him or her (charisma, leadership, competence). Seldom
does a candidate campaign by emphasizing his or her tie within a given
party. A combination of factors has contributed to the decreasing
Table 5.4a Percentage of Sympathy toward Party and Kind of Vote in

Chamber of Deputies Elections, 2002
Does not
Votes to the Votes to know; cannot
same party another party remember Total
PT 13 6 6 25
PMDB 2 2 2 6
PSDB 2 1 1 4
PFL 1 1 1 3
Others/no 62
sympathy
Total 18 10 10 100
Source: Electoral survey IUPERJ. Final Report. Mimeo. 2002.
importance of parties in the electoral arena. In proportional office elec-

tions, the combination of open list with the massive use of electoral coali-
tions (coligac~ao) has diluted the role of the party as a fundamental unit in
electoral dispute. Brazilian voters (at least in the race for the Chamber of
Deputies) are far from behaving as expected by the responsible party
model. In reality, electoral choice more often happens because of a candi-
dates attributes or performance rather than those of the party to which
the candidate belongs.
PARTIES IN THE GOVERNMENT

Some studies regarding party systems of traditional democracies
have drawn attention to the fact that, despite the fact that parties influ-
ence on voters decision is declining, parties continue to be fundamen-
tal organizations within the governmental sphere.53 Parties importance
in the governmental arena may result, above all, from parties ability to
solve collective action issues and coordinate legislative work.54 In addi-
tion, parties can be crucial elements in the administration because they
control cabinets (ministries) and offices in the bureaucratic structure.55
We have seen that in the responsible party model, the party is the
unit responsible for policy implementation. For voters to evaluate
the government, it is necessary to evaluate party performance within
the government. For that reason, party cohesion is essential. Studies
regarding party cohesion and accountability have traditionally been
focused on parliamentary democracies.56 One of the challenges faced
by studies about party government in presidential democracies is the
existence of two units (executive and legislative), which are elected and
operate as independent powers. In order to evaluate parties perform-
ance in the government, we must look at these spheres separately.
Parties in the Executive

In Brazil, party control of the national executive branch occurs basi-
cally through occupying offices at two levels: ministries and offices in
state bureaucracy.57 The latter vary in importance, ranging from the
presidency of government corporations to commissioned offices in the
lower echelons of public administration. A recent survey identified
19,797 offices in the federal government capable of being filled through
political appointment.58 A sampling of 302 holders of such offices dis-
closed that 25% of them were linked to political parties.59 Allocation of
ministries among parties is fundamental in assembling coalition gov-
ernments in Brazil. It is worth noting two aspects of this process: the
number of parties that have managed to fill the ministries and the
extent of party penetration in ministries.
Throughout the term of each president, a series of changes occurred
in the party composition of ministries, encouraging some scholars to
speak of different cabinets in the course of the presidential term.60 For
purposes of this chapter, it is only important to identify which parties
held ministries during each presidency. Table 5.4b provides an outline
of parties participating in the ministry of six governments in the period
1985 2006. All relevant parties of that period occupied ministries. In
addition, two ephemeral parties (PRN and PP) and two parties just
organized (PRB and PV61) participated in one of the governments. In
other words, there is no single party having a political importance that
did not participate in one of the governments of that period. The vic-
tory of Luis Inacio Lula da Silva in 2002 was paramount to that end,
allowing PT (a leftist party and the countrys best organized one) to
attain the government, 22 years after its foundation.
As can be seen from Table 5.4b, all presidents organized coalition
governments. The number of parties in each ranged from 4 (Sarney
government) to 11 (Lula government). One of the main reasons for set-
ting up coalition governments is the high fragmentation of party sys-
tem. Since 1990 (when the first elected president occupied office), an
elected presidents party has not obtained more than 20% of seats in
the election. Therefore, presidents were left with two alternatives: either
organize ministries with one minority party or set up coalition minis-
tries (minority or majority). Every president chose to include more par-
ties, in addition to his own, in the government. The strategy of setting
up coalition governments has ensured that presidents have an absolute
majority of seats in the House of Representatives. The only exception
occurred during the Collor de Mello government, who, in part of his
term, could not attain support of an absolute majority in the Chamber
of Deputies.
The alternation of power and existence of irrelevant parties among
the 11 parties of substance draws the Brazilian experience near a
able 5.4b Political Parties in Federal Government, 1985 2006
PDS
PPR % of ministers % Seats in
PPB PL PCB party Chamber of
Period PMDB PFL PTB PP PR PRN PP PSDB PDT PSB PPS PT PCdoB PV PRB members* Deputies **
se Sarney 3/85 3/90 X X X X 84 81
rnando 3/90 Oct-92 X X X X X X 44 38
Collor
amar Franco 10/92 12/94 X X X X X X X X 56 59
rnando 1/95 12/98 X X X X X X 68 67
Henrique
Cardoso 1
rnando 1/99 12/02 X X X X X X 61 62
Henrique
Cardoso 2
us Inacio 1/03 12/05 X X X X X X X X X X X 82 61
Lula da
Silva1
otes See notes 28 and 38 for spell outs for acronyms
Average of different ministries organized in each presidential term
Average of Congress support achieved by government in the different ministries organized
urce Figures reworked from Octavio Amorim Neto, Algumas Consequências Polticas de Lula Novos Padr~ oes de Formac~ao e Recrutamento Ministerial, Controle de
genda e Produc~ao Legislativa, in Instituic~
oes Representativas no Brasil; Balanco e Reforma, org Jairo Nicolau e Timothy J Power (Belo Horizonte Editora UFMG, 2007),
73
fundamental dimension of the cartel party model described by Richard

Katz and Peter Mair: In fact, the differences in the material positions
of winners and losers have been dramatically reduced. On the one
hand, the set of governing parties is no longer as limited as it once
was. At the risk of over-generalization, almost all substantial parties
may now be regarded as governing parties. All have access to office.62
A second option for evaluating party presence in government is to
focus on the degree of party participation versus nonparty participation
within ministries. Traditionally in Brazil, presidents organize their
administrations, offering ministries partly to parties comprising parlia-
mentary support basis in Congress and partly to individuals without
party links, mostly technical experts and persons belonging to the pres-
idents personal circle.
Table 5.4b shows data regarding the percentage of ministers who are
members of political parties. Governments that have had a greater
number of ministers with party ties were those of Jose Sarney (84%)
and Lula da Silva (82%). The government having the least party partici-
pation was that of Fernando Collor (only 44% of its members were con-
nected to a party). The impact of this variation (governments having
more or less party participation) is still unknown. Everything points to
the fact that it does not affect the executive capacity to have its initia-
tives approved in Congress, since all governments have been very suc-
cessful in this particular.63 But, even so, some questions still remain to
be answered by future surveys: Could it be that governments with
fewer ministers linked to parties face more difficulties in having their
bills passed in the legislature? Could it be that the degree of party par-
ticipation in ministries affects the nature of passed legislation?
Evidence regarding the activity of Brazilian parties within the execu-
tive is not substantial. As we have seen, the average number of minis-
ters linked to parties varied according to the government. An issue still
warranting more study is the possible impact of a government with
more or less party participation. Another challenge will be to identify,
in greater detail, party performance in other executive offices, in partic-
ular, in the thousands of positions of trust available at federal level.
Parties within the Legislature

Party cohesion can be better evaluated by analyzing party perform-
ance in the legislature.64 Here it is possible to find answers to questions
such as: How do party members behave with regard to the executives
initiatives? How do they respond to roll-call voting in the plenary and
in the committees? What degree of freedom does a representative have
to disagree (by his or her vote) with a collective decision of representa-
tives of a party?
In order to analyze party performance within Brazilian legislative

power, I will focus on the Chamber of Deputies. Party performance
occurs in various areas: committees, plenary, connection with voters, or
relationship with the executive. In addition, each party has its own
organizational characteristics exerting influence over its performance.
Two aspects deserve a more thorough treatment, because they chal-
lenge the idea of party cohesion or discipline. The first is the represen-
tatives behavior during roll-call voting, which often happens in a
plenary session. The second is the intense party switching indulged in
by representatives during the course of their term.
The Brazilian Chamber of Deputies often makes decisions through
roll-calls, whereby all representatives present are called upon to express
their position (through a yes, no, or abstention) vis-a-vis a certain bill.65
Vote results are made public and are the source of many studies on
party behavior in the House, in particular those studies evaluating
party discipline.66
Table 5.5 shows the discipline rate, measured by the party unity index,
of the seven major Brazilian parties.67 The average discipline rate varies
according to party and government. According to the average of all voting
analyzed, PT is the most disciplined party and PMDB the least disciplined.
Are those figures high? Are they low? The best answer would be a com-
parison with discipline rate of parties in other democracies. But such a
comparison is difficult to render for two reasons. The first is that roll-call
practice is not used in all democracies. Second, roll-call is used with a dif-
ferent intensity and for specific legislative bills in different countries.68
One of the countries that often resorts to roll-call is the United States. To
arrive at a comparative parameter, it is worth looking at the U.S. figures.
Over a 10-year period (1995 2004), the average discipline rate of the Dem-
ocratic Party was 87 and that of the Republican Party was 92.69 Those fig-
ures are very close to the ones found for Brazilian parties (with the
exception of PT, which has a very high discipline rate).
The discipline rate of parties during roll-calls becomes a more fragile
indicator when one looks at a marked characteristic of the Brazilian polit-
ical system post-1985, which has intense party switching on the part of
political chairmen. Switching became a generalized phenomenon and
included politicians elected by all parties and at the three levels of the po-
litical structure (local, state, and national). It is hard to find a political
leader who has not belonged to more than one party. Switching drasti-
cally reconfigures the seat representation of parties in the legislature,
which nearly always arrives at the end of the term showing a much dif-
ferent composition from the one it had in the beginning. Brazilian politi-
cians change to another political party for many reasons: to maximize
their electoral chances, to receive benefits from the government (when
moving from an opposition party to a governing party), or because of
intraparty and ideological conflicts.
Table 5.5 Discipline Rate in Roll-Call Voting (Parties Chosen): Average by

Government and Period, 1988 2006, Chamber of Deputies, Brazil
PT PDT DEM PSDB PTB PP PMDB
Jose Sarney 100 89 91 82 83 86 84
Fernando Collor de Mello 99 93 91 86 85 90 86
Itamar Franco 98 91 83 90 83 83 89
Fernando Henrique Cardoso1 99 94 96 94 91 84 82
Fernando Henrique Cardoso2 100 96 96 97 88 92 87
Ignacio Lula da Silva 96 92 85 87 90 86 88
Period average 99 93 90 89 87 87 86
Note: Chamber of Deputies voting considered only when the executive had made its prefer
ence known.
Source: Figures calculated from Figueiredo and Limongi, Instituicoes Polticas e Governabi
lidade: Desempenho do Governo e Apoio Legislativo na Democracia Brasileira, 170.
In the period between 1985 and 2006, some 30% of the representa-
tives left the party for which they had been elected before the end of
their four-year term.70 There are instances of representatives joining
more than one party during the same term. Studies show that switch-
ing does not happen at random. Some patterns can be identified: (1)
representatives elected by two left parties (PT and PCdoB) switch less
than the ones elected by other parties; (2) switching occurred more
intensely close to the deadline set down by law (politicians must be a
party member for at least one year to run in an election); (3) in general,
government parties have their number of seats increased along the
term.71
Table 5.6 shows the number of representatives elected by major parties
between 1986 and 2006 who left their parties during their term. PT and
PCdoB lost proportionally fewer representatives than the other parties.
The other three major parties (DEM, PSDB, and PMDB) lost one-fourth of
their elected representatives. The other six parties sustained losses of
more than a third of their representation. Figures clearly depict the extent
of the phenomenon of party switching in Brazil.
In March 2007, a resolution by the STF, the Brazilian constitutional
court, had a strong impact on Brazilian party life. An inquiry from
DEM, a party having recently lost many representatives to other par-
ties, asked the TSE who held title to the term: the party or the represen-
tative. The STFs decision was to punish with loss of representation any
congressional representatives or executive chief who left the party they
were affiliated with when they were elected, except if switching was
supported by one of the following justifications: party incorporation or
fusion; creation of a new party; change in the partys agenda; or serious
personal discrimination.72 It is still early to evaluate the impact of this
decision on party system but by January 2008, parties had filed 8,578
Table 5.6 Percentage of Deputies Leaving the Party, Chamber of Deputies,

1986 2006
Deputies leaving the party, % Total elected
PT 6.6 258
PcdoB 8.1 37
PPS 23.0 26
DEM 24.6 479
PSDB 24.7 271
PMDB 24.9 832
PSB 34.3 67
PDT 35.3 173
PTB 38.7 155
PP 42.6 472
PR 56.2 73
Note: See notes 28 and 38 for acronym spell outs.
Source: From Melo, Nem Tanto ao Mar, Nem Tanto a Terra: Elementos para uma Analise
do Sistema Partidario Brasileiro (2007), 288.
mandates of politicians who had switched to other parties, a figure rep-

resenting 15% of elective offices in this country.73
Some scholars have stressed the negative impact of party switching on
accountability and responsiveness in modern democracies.74 Unfortu-
nately, there are no systematic comparative studies regarding this phe-
nomenon. Case studies of some countries such as Russia, Poland, and
Italy show that party switching happens on a large scale.75 However, sel-
dom has the phenomenon reached the duration (1985 2007) and inten-
sity known in Brazil.
Party performance in the Chamber of Deputies reveals a curious situa-
tion. On the one hand, parties remain relatively disciplined in their vot-
ing in a plenary session, but on the other hand, party switching during a
term has radically altered parties internal composition. The list of con-
gressional representatives belonging to each party in the beginning of the
term is quite different from that pertaining to the end of term. Paradoxi-
cally, parties show strong signs of discipline, but not of cohesion.
CONCLUSION
In October 2008, Brazil commemorated the 20th anniversary of its con-
stitution, promulgated in 1988. During this period the country experi-
enced the most democratic phase of its history thus far. Enrolled voters
now total 130 million. Every two years, elections are held throughout the
Brazilian territory, either locally or for state and federal offices. Five pres-
idential elections and elections for Congress were carried out under the
new constitutional order. All the serious political crises the country has
endured were associated with corruption scandals (the most serious of
which led to the impeachment of Fernando Collor, the first president

elected post-1988), and none of them involved active engagement on the
part of the armed forces. Nowadays, the military has stepped away from
politics, and there are no significant political antisystem groups active in
the country. Perhaps the greatest political challenge of the period may
have been the victory of Luis In acio Lula da Silva, from the PT, in the elec-
tions of October 2002. Two months later, Lula took office, without any sign
of an institutional crisis. Against any of the criteria used in the literature of
comparative politics, Brazil must be considered a full democracy.
What kind of party has functioned during this democratic experience
period? Evidence gathered in this chapter reveals that Brazilian parties
are far from meeting responsible party model expectations. Parties do
not emphasize their government agenda while campaigning, few voters
choose their candidates based on the candidates party membership,
and the parties are far from behaving in a coherent manner in the legis-
lative arena (the high discipline in roll-call is accompanied by the high
intensity of party switching).
The only unequivocal transformation of parties in Brazil is the ever
increasing state regulation to which they are subjected. This has hap-
pened in several spheres: party registration; control of member lists;
registration of candidacies; and control of party and electoral expendi-
ture. Further evidence of statization of parties in Brazil is the increas-
ing dependency of parties with regard to public funds (radio and
television air time and contributions from the party fund).
It is tempting to close by stating that recent Brazilian experience dis-
proves a premise repeated by several comparativists: strong parties are
crucial for a strong democracy. However, I believe that establishing
such a duality would lose sight of some fundamental dimensions of the
Brazilian representative system. Associating pragmatism or low ideo-
logical intensity with the rising dependency on state funds takes the
Brazilian parties closer to the cartel party system. This indeed seems to
be an reasonable way to view them. Searching for V.O. Key, we end up
finding Richard Katz and Peter Mair.
SUPPLEMENTARY REFERENCES (IN ADDITION

TO THOSE IN THE ENDNOTES)

Alvares, Maria Luzia. Mulhers na Competi~ao Eleitoral: Sele~ao de Candidaturas
e Padr~ao de Carreira Poltica no Brasil (2004).
Dalton, Russell J., and Hans-Dieter Klingemann. Citizens and Political
Behavior. In The Oxford Handbook of Political Behavior, ed. Russell J. Dalton
and Hans-Dieter Klingemann (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).
Fleischer, David. Os Partidos Polticos. In Sistema Poltico Brasileiro: Uma
Introduc~ao, eds. L
ucia Avelar and Ant^ onio Oct
avio Cintra (S~
ao Paulo:
Fundac~ao Konrad Adenauer/Editora Unesp, 2007), 303 348.
Gunther, Richard, and Larry Diamond. Species of Political Parties: A New

Typology. Party Politics 9 (2003): 167 199.
Kinzo, Maria DAlva. Radiografia do Quadro Partidario Brasileiro (S~ ao Paulo:
Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 1993).
Mainwaring, Scott. Rethinking Party Systems in the Third Wave of Democratization:
The Case of Brazil (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1999).
Rodrigues, Leôncio Martins. Mudancas na Classe Poltica Brasileira (S~ ao Paulo:
Publifolha, 2006).
Rodrigues, Leôncio Martins. Partidos, Ideologia e Composic~ao Social: Um Estudo das
Bancadas Partidarias na Câmara dos deputados (S~
ao Paulo: Edusp, 2002).
CHAPTER 6
Political Parties in Chile: Stable

Coalitions, Inert Democracy
Alfredo Joignant
INTRODUCTION
In the 1997 parliamentary elections in Chile, the socialist candidate in
the heavily populated District 20 of the metropolitan region obtained
12.5% of the votes without making the slightest campaign effort. This
unusual situation was a result of his resignation as a candidate after
the end of the candidate registration period, so his name still appeared
on the ballot on Election Day. A unique case, apparently strange, but
one that leads to the hypothesis of a profound electoral anchorage of
political parties in Chile following the return to democracy in 1990 and
the irresistible persistence of the monopoly held by two coalitions dur-
ing elections.
This hypothesis is justified not only by the relative weight that a
political party may have in a specific district, but also by the long
history of political parties that sustain democracy in Chile, the persist-
ence of political cultures reinforced by the characteristics of the elec-
toral system, and the inertia of voters between 1989 and 2005.
This chapter will proceed historically. It will begin with the early his-
tory of stable parties, continue with the emergence of left-wing radical-
ism, discuss the collapse of democracy from 1973 to 1989, and finally
come to the present era. The final section is devoted to testing this
chapters guiding hypothesis inertial democracy and discussing the
burdens this tradition imposes on the further democratization of Chile.
THE CHILEAN EXCEPTION: THE EARLY ESTABLISHMENT

OF STABLE PARTIES
Authors who have taken an interest in Chilean political life have of-
ten emphasized the exceptional character of its democracy as compared
to other Latin American countries, regardless of whether they are his-
torians, sociologists, or political scientists. Thus Collier and Sater charac-
terize Chile as having, from 1829 to 1994, a background of political
stability and institutional continuity over and above most Latin American
and also some European countries like, for example, France.1 Not
totally different is the opinion of Foweraker, who affirms that Chile
was the only example of a multi party presidential system to sur-
vive obstacle free for four decades and, hence, without a presidential
majority in Congress.2 Countless comparative studies echo this assess-
ment of Chiles political history up until the coup detat of 1973, see-
ing it as an off the track case in Latin America as far as democratic
stability is concerned.3 In all these studies, Chile regularly ranked first
in democratic solidity, alongside Uruguay and Costa Rica.4
This democratic stability, which was in fact a case of political stabil-
ity, can be traced to several causes. First is the electoral system. Chile
was one of the first countries on the continent to encourage the repre-
sentation of minority parties or to maintain party competence, as well
as access to the decision making process through appropriate elec-
toral devices, a proportional representation system with an open list,
using the DHondt distributive formula.5
A second explanation of the advanced nature of Chilean democ-
racy lies in the early and gradual introduction of universal suffrage.
The initial extension of suffrage took place in 1874 and involved an
expansion of the electorate, free of all interruptions or ruptures, and
was sustained by the 1890 electoral law.6 It is this universalization
process that Colomer presented in a formal model contrasting Chilean
gradualism and the ruptures brought on by the marked expansion of
suffrage in various Latin American countries, such as Argentina, Peru,
and, to a lesser extent, Brazil.7 This gradual universalization of suffrage
in Chile helped to give electoral expression to the Radical Party (PR),
whose origins are usually explained as being the result of cleri-
cal anticlerical cleavage, which, in turn, served to gradually break the
monopoly of political competition between liberals and conservatives.
Thus the essential voting choreography existed long before the be-
ginning of the 20th century, even in the context of elections still marked
by fraud.8 Such fraud has been seen as interacting with the develop-
ment of the electoral competition,9 serving a pedagogical learning
function related to the act of voting.10 This process remained incom-
plete until at least 1934, which was when women obtained the right
to vote in municipal elections. It would find its maximum expression in
Political Parties in Chile 129
1970 with the establishment of the age of 18 years as the minimum

voting age.
Many observers have found a third cause for Chiles early political
stability in the nature of its cleavages, using the theoretical approach of
Lipset and Rokkan.11 This approach allows for the identification of two
great social fissures, both at the point of origin of specific parties and at
the ever more complex point of political competition they confronted.
On the one hand, the aforementioned clerical anticlerical cleavage
brought about the birth of new political forces (the PR) along with a
predominance of conflicts surrounding civil and political rights, which,
in turn, became sufficiently powerful to create a conflict between liber-
als and conservatives. It is in the context of this cleavage that the first
conflicts surrounding the extension of suffrage and its democratization
take place and where the intervention of the conservative governments
in election processes by means of its electoral agents and the subse-
quent fraud come to be seen as veritable leitmotifs in the elections of
those times.
Nevertheless, thanks to the capitalist development of Chile that came
as a result of the saltpeter boom in the last quarter of the 20th century,
Chilean workers began to organize, especially in the northern part of
the country, and to do so initially in anarchist form. These first forms
of working organization were a subdued expression of the increasing
influence exercised by a new cleavage (industrialist worker vs.
employer) but led to the formation of the Democratic Party (1887), later
the Socialist Working Party (1911), two precursory parties preceding
the Communist Party (PC, founded in 1921) and, years later, the Social-
ist Party (PS, in 1933).
Thus the Chilean party system was formed on the basis of two great
cleavages that coexisted for the better part of the period running
between 1870 and 1952. These cleavages permitted the creation of the
right left axis, which in turn organized the political space in relation
to the issues inscribed in both. However, more important still was that
Chile was thus able to establish early on a party system, more like that
of its European counterparts, especially France, than those of its Latin
American neighbors.12 As in Europe, the Chilean system was organized
around cleavages and a left right axis, whereas parties in neighboring
states especially in Argentina were far more feeble and organized
around strong but localized individual leaders (caudillos). As indicated
by Roberts and Wibbels, only in Chile did the party system develop
the foundation of classes along with an ideological continuum that
brought it closer to the systems in operation in western Europe.13
Thus it is along the perimeter defined by these two cleavages that
conservative, liberal, radical, communist, and socialist parties took their
place, whose lasting electoral presence up until 1952 became a real bar-
rier, preventing the entrance of new political forces. It is only in the
framework of the democratic breakdowns of 1927 led by Colonel Carlos

Ib ~ ez, which gave way to the first Chilean military dictatorship of the
an
20th century (1927 1931), that the electoral monopoly held by these
first four parties (PR, PC, Conservative, and Liberal parties) came
under serious challenge. After that, the political struggle once again
focused on these same four parties, with the addition of the PS in 1933.
Not even the experience of the Popular Front (1938 1941), a govern-
ment alliance involving socialists, radicals, and communists, was able
to eliminate some of these parties while strengthening others. After the
failure of this first form of center left government came a period of
electoral hegemony by the PR based on a pendulum center strategy
that allowed for an oscillation to both the left and the right.
The second great challenge to the dominion of the dominant party
labels was the electoral earthquake of 1952, which brought to power
Carlos Ib ~ ez, the same dictator of 20 years earlier now anointed as a
an
democratically elected president. Although Iban ~ ez was victorious in
1952 on the strength of a speech generally labeled as populist, in that
it sought to sweep aside the monopoly of the parties by appealing
to the personal and extrainstitutional virtues of its leadership, his
movement never managed to organize itself into a bloc with regular
and relevant electoral success.14 In this regard, Jean Gruegel is right in
observing that Ib ~ ezs failure was due to the seemingly irresistible
an
continuity of the same old parties, determined to recover their
monopoly of the electoral game and justify their doing so as a reactive
movement in the face of a political system crisis created by the
merging of two antinomic principles (the socialist and neo-fascist) in a
single movement of the people.15
Furthermore, just as the fall of the first Iban ~ ez government was
marked by the appearance of the PS, the failure of his second attempt
20 years later coincided with the birth of a new party in 1958, the
Christian Democrat Party (PDC), also destined to endure.
THE SOCIOECONOMIC AND POLITICAL ORIGINS

OF LEFT-WING RADICALISM
Despite the apparent stability of Chilean parties and the consolida-
tion of the left with the birth of the Communist Party in the 1920s and
the birth of the PS in 1933, profound mutations in Chilean political life
took place toward the end of the 1950s, especially on the left. The de-
velopment of the Cold War and the Cuban Revolution of 1959 had a
radicalizing effect on all political forces.16 What were these effects and
how did they affect both the individual parties and the entire political
field? How did the electorate react? Can we see in this rampant radical-
ization the early origins of the coup detat of 1973 and the resultant
downfall of democracy? How can we explain the astonishing survival
of so many of the Chilean political parties throughout a dictatorship

that lasted 17 years? It is to these questions that we now turn.
Our approach will be to concentrate on the political impact in Chile
of the socioeconomic factors that served as catalysts of the Cold War
and Cuban Revolution. This is contrary to most scholarship, which has
attempted to explain the relationship between parties and democracy
in Chile by emphasizing first and foremost their ideologies and internal
struggles (generally stressing the parties of the left and the PDC).17
Although a few studies have tackled the subject of the stability of the
liberal, conservative, radical, socialist, and communist party electorate,
most have focused instead on the phenomenon of the radicalization of
left-wing parties and voters, especially once the enormous political
impact caused by the Cuban Revolution became apparent.18 This focus,
especially apparent in North American studies, provided an empirical
vision of the change in course, stressing the vertical and horizontal elec-
toral penetration of the party system in Chile during 1963 1969 and
showing the strong resemblance among forms of partisan competition at
the national and local levels.19 Such a finding suggests that there was a
common mode of diffusion of political struggles and partisan actors.
But did this territorial penetration by the parties really mean that the
radicalization of the actors followed the same pattern as that of the
electorate? If so, then the relationship among political parties, the radi-
cal behavior of voters, and democratic stability need to be investigated.
The first systematic work on this problem was by Soares and
Hamblin who, on the basis of census information, brought to light a
multiplying effect of variables such as class polarization, industriali-
zation, anomie, urbanization, and relative economic deprivation when
accounting for the voting patterns of the radical left at the 1952 elec-
tions.20 Alejandro Portes then detected an absence of effects in objec-
tive variables without the mediation of subjective factors in voting or in
the expression of left-wing party affection in 1961, as part of a survey
of heads of home in Santiago.21 In both studies, however, the radical-
ization of the left-wing electorate was not easily explained, and no con-
clusive proof was offered of a generalized radicalization of the
electorate or of the most disfavored social groups. It remained to be
seen that there were regular voting patterns among this electorate, for
example, in favor of the reformist presidential candidates advocating
change (Ib an~ ez in 1952 and Allende in 1958). In 1970, Sandra Powell
carried out an analysis by areas, allowing her to conclude that all
Chilean parties became highly aggregative between 1952 and 1964 as
a result of much less stratified social bases.22 This meant that elector-
ates had become increasingly heterogeneous, but not that they were
equally radicalized.
The hypothesis of a growing radicalization was largely accepted by
the political actors as well as by most observers, especially in the
United States. This was, after all, the era in which the U.S. administra-
tion was promoting the Alliance for Progress (begun in 1961) in Latin
America, and it was part of this program to seek to convince others
that the countries of the developing world were now veering off into
revolutionary or subversive paths and should therefore be integrated
into the Alliance.23 The hypothesis of menace required asserting that
there was a serious risk that the entire population would be radicalized
unless intervention addressing the social and economic causes of this
phenomenon took place.
However, the proof of such radicalization was never provided.
Where radicalization was widespread, as in the four settlements on the
periphery of Santiago studied by Portes, the reason appeared to lie in
the strength of socialization patterns from father to son. Petras and
Zeitlin found that organized workers were taking new ideas of strug-
gle and class solidarity to friends and relatives still living out in the
countryside and working in agriculture, a finding that ignored the
local politicization work undertaken by the PS and PC or the unioniza-
tion of agricultural workers encouraged by Frei Montalva Christian
Democrat government (1964 1970) but did introduce political aspects
into the dissemination of left-wing radicalism.24 In sum, it was becom-
ing clear that radicalization was the result of profound economic and
social inequalities that served as the material basis for the work of
mobilization undertaken by the parties on the left as they campaigned
against the established order and a formal and bourgeois democracy.
However, these inequalities received scant attention in the explana-
tions offered for the radicalization of left-wing parties and their elector-
ates. Instead, the tendency was to move directly to the notion of
polarization, developed by Giovanni Sartori25 and used by him to
explain the democratic collapse in Chile in 1973 as based on the polar-
ized and highly ideologized characteristics of party competition in the
context of an atomized party system, as well as the study by Linz and
Stepan,26 who conceive this as a set of opportunities and obstacles for
actions to be taken by the main players. Although the interest of these
two works is incontestable, it is important to note that such explana-
tions hide the role played by poverty, inequalities, and underdevelop-
ment as factors weakening the cognitive and affective foundations of
Chilean democracy and opening the way for the left-wing workers
parties to propose radical projects largely inspired by the Cuban Revo-
lution. From the presidential triumph of Frei Montalva in 1964 to the
fall of the Popular Unity government led by Salvador Allende
(1970 1973), the party system absorbed the impact of increasing polar-
ization in Chilean society, if we take this to mean a growing ideological
distance between the conflicting forces, the proliferation of strikes, and
an elevation in the levels of political violence all aspects systemati-
cally tackled by Valenzuela.27 These aspects, along with the phenomena
of hypermobilization (an explosive rise in union membership, high

indexes of mobilization beyond union and party control, expressed
through a considerable increase in illegal strikes),28 would end up be-
coming the most widely accepted explanation for the radicalization not
only of the left but of all political forces and, hence, for the 1973 demo-
cratic collapse.29 That all of this stemmed first and foremost from actual
socioeconomic conditions was by and large ignored.
DEMOCRATIC COLLAPSE AND THE REACTIVATION

OF OLD PARTY LABELS
Various interpretations have been given to the coup detat of 1973.
For some authors, the democratic collapse brought to a brutal conclu-
sion the unprecedented revolutionary process achieved via electoral
channels and led by a left-wing party coalition (Popular Unity) forged
on the basis of the Socialist Party Communist Party axis, with the
addition of various other less important forces. For such authors, the
coup was in keeping with the counterrevolutionary logic.30 Other
authors, however, viewed the collapse of democracy as a result of the
very centrifugal dynamics created by an atomized party system, forces
that were encouraged by a situation of supposedly observable polariza-
tion both in the political field and in the highly varied interactions of
everyday life.31 As such, the coup detat represented a solution to a sit-
uation of crisis. For yet others, armed intervention was basically aimed
at disarticulating the classic sociopolitical matrix on which Chilean
democracy rested, that is, the regular patterns of interaction between
state, party system, and social base.32
Regardless of the interpretation adopted in the long run, the relevant
point is that the democratic collapse took the form of violent repression
against left-wing parties in the framework of a general recess from
parliamentary and party life decreed by the military dictatorship of
General Augusto Pinochet. The repression was so extreme as to consti-
tute, according to Steve Stern, the policide project against the original
Popular Unity forces, a systematic strategy of destruction of modal-
ities relating to how politics and governance were to be exercised
and understood in an effort to substitute them for technocratic and
authoritarian forms of government.33
Indeed, one of the characteristics of the military dictatorship
(1973 1990) involved a deliberate absence of party expressions close to
the regime. Still more, this absence of pro-regime parties was achieved
with the approval of the right-wing parties under the umbrella of the
National Party (PN, founded in 1965 as a result of a fusion between lib-
erals and conservatives, in recess since 1973), and of the gremialismo
movement that began to sprout in the Catholic University and that was
set to become the Independent Democrat Union (UDI) Party at the end
of the 1980s.34 It is thus possible to maintain that the military dictator-

ship was the type of regime that encouraged technocratic forms of gov-
ernment and was characterized by an anticommunist ideology plainly
hostile to party and parliamentary routines.
However, the scope of this policide project did not prevent the
same party labels from reappearing at the end of the Pinochet regime.
Unfortunately, we know little of the work done to preserve the old par-
ties, especially the Socialist Party and the Communist Party, both of
which suffered the disappearance of whole generations of leaders and
militants by means of forced disappearance, prison, and exile. Nor do
we know exactly how Christian Democrat militantism and the old con-
servative elites were preserved under a regime of party recess.35 This
in itself is an area worthy of further exploration.
Regardless, it is important to mention that the reactivation of the par-
ties when facing the 1989 legislative elections as a result of the defeat
of Pinochet in the 1988 plebiscite was not simply a mechanical reflec-
tion of a sudden awakening of labels, since the ever more explicit
existence of the opposing parties, especially the Socialist Party, the
Communist Party, and the Christian Democrat Party, was already
observable in the press and various social fields throughout the 1980s.
FROM TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY TO INERTIAL

DEMOCRACY
With the return to democracy on March 11, 1990, Chile again became
the object of exceptional judgments, in this case with respect to the
supposedly exemplary nature of its transition. Such an opinion was
based on different types of arguments, either specific or totally local
ones (as Munck stated in 1994, the first transfer of power between
leaders of the same party after almost 50 years36), or founded on gen-
eral evaluations referring to the unique success of an agreed transition
not implying the immediate political disappearance of the ex-dictator,37
although we should not overlook the fact that these judgments gener-
ated a great deal of controversy.38
However, the most reasonable explanation for the success of the transi-
tion is that the resurgence of the old political parties and the appearance
of new forces were based on an agreement between elites of the opposi-
tion and Concertaci on.39 This latter coalition of center left political par-
ties, in power since 1990 and comprised of the PS, PDC, PRSD, and the
Partido por la Democracia (PPD),40 won all the elections up until 2005
(Table 6.1), running against a right-wing opposition coalition (known
today as Alianza por Chile), which comprises Renovaci on Nacional
National Renewal (RN) and UDI (Uni on Democratica Independiente).41
The hypothesis to be explored in this section is that following the return
to democracy in 1990, the Concertaci on knew how to maintain voter
apathy and maintain itself in power.42 As we shall see, there are powerful
electoral and institutional reasons to explain the reproduction of
the dominant political parties and alliances and thereby the creation of
an inertial democracy based on the continuous success of the same
coalition.
Institutions Shaping Chilean Politics Today

Chilean democracy is based on a presidential regime, typical in Latin
America. Under the constitution of 1980, inherited from a dictatorship
and still in place despite numerous reforms reinforcing the powers of
the president, executive power is directed by the president, elected for
four years without the possibility of immediate reelection. Facing him
is a bicameral legislature composed of a Senate whose 38 members are
elected for eight years and indefinitely renewable, within binomial cir-
cumscriptions, and a Chamber of Deputies whose 120 members are
elected for four years, also for renewable terms and also in binominal
districts.
Voting in Chile is compulsory once citizens have registered in the
electoral registers to vote in three types of elections: presidential, legis-
lative, and municipal. Between 1925 and 1970, the Chilean presidential
elections did not allow for a second round, which meant that if no can-
didate obtained the absolute majority of the votes in the only electoral
round, it was up to Congress to choose the president from the first
majorities. From 1989 to the present, a second round between the first
two relative majorities became possible. Regarding the duration of the
Table 6.1 Elections in Chile, 1989 2005

Year Type of election
1989 (December) Presidential election
1989 (December) Legislative elections (concurrent)
1992 (October) Local elections
1993 (December) Presidential election
1996 (October) Municipal election
1997 (December) Legislative elections (not concurrent)
1999 (December) Presidential election (1st round)
2000 (January) Presidential election (2nd round)
2000 (October) Local elections
2001 (December) Legislative elections (not concurrent)
2004 (October) Local elections (major election)
2004 (October) Local elections (councilors election)
2005 (December) Presidential election (1st round)
2006 (January) Presidential election (2nd round)
presidential mandate, it has been characterized by inconsistency since

1989: four years (1990 1994), six years (1994 2000 and 2000 2006),
and finally fixed at four years from 2006 on.
When the presidential mandate lasted four years, the presidential
elections were concurrent with the legislative elections, which was not
the case on two occasions (in 1997 and 2001). The legislative elections
consist of elections for senators (38) and deputies (120), the former
elected for eight years and the latter for four years, in circumscriptions
and districts of identical magnitude in which two seats are always in
play (a situation found only in Chile), in a single round, with an open-
list system (the voter chooses a single candidate whether that person
belongs to a party or is independent). Given the duration of the man-
date of the senators, these are renewed in halves every four years.43
The electoral system is based on proportional representation, with a
DHondt method of conversion of votes into seats, which explains why
in order for a party or a coalition of parties to obtain both seats in dis-
pute they must double the votes of the force that follows it.
Finally, the municipal elections evolved between 1992 and 2000 on
the basis of voting for council representatives (whose number varies as
a function of the population size of the municipalities, that is with mag-
nitudes of 6, 8, or 10) with an open-list system, also governed by a
DHondt system, such that the council candidate who has reached the
first majority with at least 35% of the votes is elected mayor (in a
default, the mayor is elected by the municipal council of its members).
From 2004 to the present, the election of mayors has been separate from
the election of the council.
Electoral Results
In this electoral scene widely dominated by the Concertaci on and the
Alianza por Chile, the PC competes together with other small leftist
forces without success in obtaining seats in legislative elections, but has
some success at the lower levels. The extraparliamentary left (Figure
6.1) obtains an average 6.36% in legislative elections, but does slightly
better in municipal elections (6.58%), and given the greater magnitude
of the municipal districts, it is able to attain a certain number of council
seats.44 Figure 6.1 shows the electoral representation of the three main
coalitions in legislative (deputies, five elections) and municipal (council,
four elections) elections, from 1989 to 2005, as a percentage of the valid
national votes cast.
In Figure 6.2, the electoral weight of the four historical parties (PS,
PC, PDC, and PRSD) is contrasted with the total for the national vote
(first bar on the left), the vote for the Concertaci on (second bar to the
right),45 and continues with the total vote for the Concertaci on (third
bar) and for the Alianza (fourth bar).
Figure 6.1. Electoral Results of Three Main Coalitions in Legislative Elections

(Deputies, Five Elections) and Local Elections (Councillors, Four Elections),
1989 2005 (in percentage of the national valid votes).
Source: Servicio Electoral (www.elecciones.gov.cl).
Figure 6.2. Relative Electoral Weight of Four Historical Parties (SP, CDP, CP,
and Radical Social Democrat Party), 1989 2005.
Source: Servicio Electoral (www.elecciones.gov.cl).
As can be seen, the average vote for the more established parties was
39.7% in legislative elections and 44.87% in municipal elections.46 In
this sense, the relative strength of these parties is superior to that of its
adversaries of the right in legislative elections (between two and four
Table 6.2 Electoral Results of the Parties That Competed Regularly in Legislative Elections, 1989 2005
1989 1993 1997 2001 2005
CDP (votes) 1,766,347 1,827,373 1,331,745 1,162,210 1,370,501
CDP (%) 25.99 27.12 22.98 18.92 20.76
CDP (seats) 38 37 38 23 20
SP (votes) n.a. 803,719 640,397 614,434 663,561
SP (%) n.a. 11.93 11.05 10.00 10.05
SP (seats) n.a. 15 11 10 15
PPD (votes) 778,501 798,206 727,293 782,333 1,017,956
PPD (%) 11.45 11.84 12.55 12.73 15.42
PPD (seats) 16 15 16 20 21
Radical Social Democrat Party 268,103 200,837 181,538 248,821 233,564
(votes)
Radical Social Democrat Party (%) 3.94 2.98 3.13 4.05 3.54
Radical Social Democrat Party (seats) 5 2 4 6 7
National Renewal (votes) 1,242,432 1,098,852 971,903 845,865 932,422
National Renewal (%) 18.28 16.31 16.77 13.77 14.12
National Renewal (seats) 29 29 23 18 19
Independent Democrat Union 667,369 816,104 837,736 1,547,209 1,475,901
(votes)
Independent Democrat Union (%) 9.82 12.11 14.45 25.18 22.36
Independent Democrat Union (seats) 11 15 17 31 33
CP (votes) n.a. 336,034 398,588 320,688 339,547
CP (%) n.a. 4.99 6.88 5.22 5.14
CP (seats) No competition 0 0 0 0
Humanist Party (votes) 52,225 67,733 168,597 69,692 102,842
Humanist Party (%) 0.77 1.01 2.91 1.13 1.56
Humanist Party (seats) 0 0 0 0 0
Notes n a , not applicable when party did not compete Percentage of votes and number of seats in each election do not add up to 100% (120 seats),
because the table does not include independent candidates and parties that did not compete in all elections
1
No results either for independents or in coalition
Source Official electoral data available in www servel cl
percentage points), and substantially greater in municipal elections

(where the Alianza por Chile obtains an average 34.97%, almost 10 per-
centage points difference). As Table 6.2 shows, the electoral weight of
the PS, PDC, and PRSD in the Concertaci on decreased in municipal
elections from 79% in 1992 to 74% in 2004, a pattern that is accentuated
in legislative elections (75% in 1993 and 66% in 2005), but compensated
for by the increasing electoral success of the PPD after the decline of
the PDC.
Obviously these numbers are far from constituting conclusive evi-
dence regarding votes on the basis of party loyalties (for example, inter-
preting the declining electoral impact of traditional parties on the
electorate of the Concertaci on and on the total votes would be a weak
test for party identifications). In effect, a certain presumption of adhe-
sion exists, in this case through survey data, for coalition candidates
independently of the parties to which they belong, although this does
not necessarily conclusively establish the existence of a coalition elector-
ate, inasmuch as a weakening of the measurements is also observed.47
Without trying to settle the issue about the extent of the loyalties
involved, the true research problem is whether the permanence of these
parties, and with them the predominance of the two main coalitions, is
explained because of continuity with the old cleavages, or if these divi-
sions have in fact been displaced by new ones.
In this regard, a certain controversy has arisen regarding the continu-
ity (or discontinuity) of the party system, politically relevant because of
the party strategies involved, depending on who is right. For Valen-
zuela and Scully, the party system is essentially the same as that which
existed until 1973.48 This, they argue, is not only due to the evident for-
mal continuity of four of the eight parties that regularly compete in leg-
islative elections (PS, PDC, PRSD, and PC), but is determined as well
by the supposed continued effectiveness of the same cleavages from
which they originated, reflected in important correlations between the
electoral results at commune level of 1988 and 1989, and those of
1969, 1970, and 1973, on the one hand for the left, and on the other for
the PDC.49 Valenzuela tried in addition to verify the accepted thesis in
Chile of the three electoral thirds, according to which the electorate has
been historically divided, following the logic of the right center left
axis into relatively equal proportions, which he argues still holds today,
although in an imperfect way (the left being the smallest third).50
Very different are the positions of Tironi and Ag uero and Torcal and
Mainwaring, who argue for an essential discontinuity of the party sys-
tem within the framework of the appearance of a new cleavage: dicta-
torship/democracy.51 In the center of this scholarly controversy are
very different conceptions of the genesis of the cleavages. While for
Valenzuela a sociological conception of cleavages according to the
theory of Lipset and Rokkan52 prevails, others are ready to revise that
theory and assume that political action itself can generate cleavages
sufficiently powerful to reorganize the party system in new terms.53 If
they are right, the Concertacion has a better chance of enduring as a co-
alition formed against dictatorship. But if the old cleavages are being
revived, the political struggle will once again turn around the questions
of social and economic inequalities. It is not possible to prove or dis-
prove either interpretation today, but clearly the question of which one
is correct will have important consequences for Chilean political life.
A scholarly consensus does exist regarding the remarkable continuity
of the electoral predominance of the two main coalitions. As Table 6.3
shows, the electoral monopoly of these two coalitions has oscillated
between 85% and 92% of the valid votes, with these votes producing a
minimum of 116 to a maximum of 120 seats, which in 1993 constituted
the totality of the Lower House.
This monopolistic representation of the electorate is even more spec-
tacular when assessing the volatility of the electorate by means of the
Pedersen index, both at coalition and party levels (Figure 6.3).54
If the data contained in DataGob already placed Chile at low levels
of electoral volatility in 2001 at coalition level (8.85 versus 28.32 for
America and the Caribbean), this figure drops significantly in 2005,
according to my calculations, when it reached 6.04.55 Although the
number of elections is not very big, this volatility index at the coalition
level increases when the elections are not concurrent (8.01 in
1997 2001) dropping by one or two points in concurrent elections (7.49
in 1989 1993 and 6.04 in 2001 2005). If one repeats the same exercise
at party level, with the exception that the construction of the volatility
index covers in this case only the legislative elections held since 1993,56
favoring the tickets that competed continuously in these elections, the
volatility index is fixed at 4.91 in 2005. Also a considerable increase in
this index between nonconcurrent elections is observed here (11.08 in
1997 2001), dropping by more than six percentage points when the
elections are concurrent (4.91 in 2001 2005).
Caution must be exercised when interpreting this last index. The
nature of the binomial electoral system requires the two principal coali-
tions to present lists with two candidates, and only two candidates, in
all the districts where only two seats are being contested. For Alianza
Table 6.3 Electoral Concentration (Votes and Seats) of the Two Main
Coalitions in Legislative Elections, 1989 2005
1989 1993 1997 2001 2005
Votes of Concertaci
on and Alianza por 85.67 92.08 86.77 92.17 90.58
Chile (%)
Number of seats of Concertaci on and 117 120 116 119 119
Alianza por Chile (total seats: 120)
Figure 6.3. Pedersen Electoral Volatility Index in Legislative Elections, by

Coalitions and Parties, 1993 2005.
por Chile, this does not present a serious difficulty, given that it is com-
prised of two parties: candidate lists are thus formed by one member
from each party or else by independents supported by one of the two
parties. On the other hand, the law poses numerous problems for the
Concertaci on, which consists of four parties. The negotiations required
to determine which two parties will have candidates in each circum-
scription are extremely difficult, and a single party is never able to
present candidates in all the districts. This leads necessarily to a reduc-
tion in the number of parties as the four parties cannot have as many can-
didates as those of the Alliance, and also to the common conclusion that
there is a low number of effective electoral parties in Chile generally
between a little more than two and something less than four based
on the Laakso and Taagepera index.57 But this evaluation is made
under the problematic assumption that the two coalitions are parties,
or behave as such, which naturally results in the low indices of elec-
toral volatility. In any case, both indices indicate a very low electoral
volatility, which already constitutes the beginning of an explanation
for the monopoly from which the two dominant coalitions benefit.
EVOLUTION OF THE ELECTORATE

To understand this monopoly, it is helpful to consider descriptive
elements of the electorate as a whole and its behavior. The first thing to
observe (Figure 6.4) is the ever more dissimilar evolution of the voting
age population (VAP) and of the electorate enrolled in the electoral
registers. The evolution of both populations remained relatively stable
until 1993; since then the gap between them has not stopped widening,
Figure 6.4. Evolution of the Voting Age Population (VAP) and Registered
Voters, Legislative Elections, 1989 2005 (in millions).
Note: For 1989, the VAP data corresponds to 1990.

Source: VAP, Instituto Nacional de Estadsticas (www.ine.cl) and registered
voters, Servicio Electoral (www.elecciones.gov.cl).
reflecting an enrolled electorate practically frozen at around 8 million

voters. If in 2005 the electorate increased 8.06% with respect to 1989
(even with a slight reduction in 1997), the VAP increased 24.93%, so
the breach between the enrolled electorate and the VAP has increased
regularly, to the point that in 2005 those registered represented only
72.60% of the VAP.58 This then means that the population for which
competition takes place in the Chilean elections from 1989 is approxi-
mately the same, which suggests that the coalitions and the parties
adjust their slate of candidates and their campaign strategies to the
characteristics of an ever older electorate (the same who voted for the
plebiscite in 1988 against or for Pinochet), and to the new cleavage
democracy/dictatorship. In fact, the votes for the two coalitions have
varied between 85% and 92% in five legislative elections, independently
of the widening gap between the VAP and the registered electorate.
This means mainly that the Concertaci on and the Alianza por Chile are
farther from being majority coalitions in relation to the VAP, especially
if one considers that the electoral disaffection index has more than
doubled in 16 years, going from 22.53% in 1989 to 57.42% in 2005
(Table 6.4). In this sense, the considerable stability of the valid votes
and the low rates of null and blank votes observed (except in 1997 for
the three cases) give rise to a true buffer of electoral security in favor
of both coalitions. There follows from the above a bicoalitional predom-
inance founded on the disaffection of a great contingent of potential
Table 6.4 Electoral Disaffection: Evolution of Registered Voters by Valid Votes, Blank Votes, Null Votes, and Abstentions
Relative to Voting Age Population (VAP) in Legislative Elections, 1989 2005
1989 1993 1997 2001 2005
1
VAP 8,499,972 9,052,632 9,782,590 10,506,435 11,322,769
Registered voters 7,557,537 8,085,439 8,069,624 8,075,446 8,220,897
Registered voters (%/VAP) 88.91 89.31 82.48 76.86 72.60
Valid votes 6,797,122 6,738,859 5,795,773 6,144,003 6,601,811
Valid votes/total vote 94.95 91.25 82.95 87.34 91.60
Valid votes (%/VAP) 79.96 74.44 59.24 58.47 58.30
Null votes 191,330 390,675 925,014 652,334 348,940
Null votes (%/total vote) 2.67 5.29 13.51 9.27 5.33
Null votes (%/valid votes) 2.81 5.79 15.96 10.61 5.28
Null votes (%/VAP) 2.25 4.31 9.45 6.20 3.08
Blank votes 170,194 255,482 298,564 237,955 221,600
Blank votes (%/total vote) 2.38 3.46 4.24 3.38 3.07
Blank votes (%/valid votes) 2.50 3.79 5.15 3.87 3.35
Blank votes (%/VAP) 2.00 2.82 3.05 2.26 1.95
Formal abstention (%)2 5.27 8.66 13.01 12.89 12.75
Potential abstention (%)3 15.78 18.42 28.24 33.04 36.65
Electoral disaffection index (%)4 22.53 28.61 49.40 54.02 57.42
1
For 1989, VAP data corresponds to 1990
2
Formal abstention sum of valid votes, null votes and blank votes divided by registered voters
3
Potential abstention sum of valid votes, null votes and blank votes divided by VAP
4
Electoral Disaffection Index sum of valid votes, blank votes, null votes and abstentions divided by registered voters
Source Data from the Chilean Electoral Service (www servel cl) and Instituto Nacional de Estadsticas (www ine cl)
voters, as well as on the ever more predictable character of the behav-

ior of the voters who vote, where 9 of 10 voters vote for candidates of
the Concertaci on or Alianza. Although it is not possible to categorically
affirm what logic leads voters to vote this way, be they coalition or
party loyalties, strategic rationalities, adhesions aimed at awarding
incumbents, social determinations underlying the electoral behavior, or
continuity of the cleavage democracy/dictatorship,59 my hypothesis is
that the party democracy in Chile is based on inertial properties of the
electorate, from which the dominant coalitions benefit greatly.
The inertial properties of the Chilean electorate can be explained in
part by declining interest in voting altogether. In 1988, the year of the
famous plebiscite leading to the defeat of General Pinochet, the differ-
ence between the VAP and the registered electorate was about 1 million
persons, but by 2005 it was 3 million, rising to 3.5 million at the time of
the municipal elections of 2008. Voters younger than 30 were less
inclined to register, and as a consequence the average age of registered
voters was higher. But even the members of this aging electorate, used
to voting in a certain way and socialized into politics at the time of dic-
tatorship, were more and more inclined not to vote at all, taking refuge
in abstention. In the presidential election of 2005, the socialist candidate
of the Concertaci on won by 32.88 percent of the VAP but 53.5% of the
actual vote; her opponent, Sebasti an Pinera, candidate of the Alliance
for Chile, had 28.58% of the potential vote and 46.5% of the actual vote.
In 2008, the Alliance for Chile obtained its first victory over the Con-
certacion in municipal elections for mayors (but not for councilors), but
it did so in an election when 2 million registered voters abstained. And
when the Concertaci on won in the municipal elections in 2008, it was
with a rate of slightly more than 30% abstentionists. There are presently
many Chilean senators serving after winning seats with less than 15%
of the potential vote. Needless to say, these figures pose serious prob-
lems regarding the legitimacy of elected representatives.
Given the growing strength of this stagnant electorate, many recom-
mend making registration automatic and voting optional. But there is
little chance that this reform will be put in place before the presidential
and legislative elections of December 2009, given the fact that it would
augment the electorate automatically and abruptly by more than 3.5
million persons, making the election at least theoretically extremely
uncertain. It is true that most political forces agree on automatic regis-
tration; but the question is when it will be politically feasible to enact
and whether or not voting should at the same time be made optional.
In any case, if one can speak of a stable democracy in Chile, it is first
of all because the country has been able to conclude its transition and
normalize a democratic regime. But it has to be recognized that this
is because of the electoral stability of the two principal coalitions and
the frozen character of the electorate. It is possible that the current
opposition, the Alliance for Chile, may win the next presidential elec-
tion (see Epilogue). But that will be due less to an ideological shift of the
electorate than to the personal attraction of its candidate Sebastian Pi~
nera,
as well as to the political difficulties of the Concertaci
on since coming to
power in 1990. Such a result will not change the fundamental democratic
stability, synonymous with inertial democracy. The competition will be
based on a limited electorate whose behavior is all but mechanical and
not at all inclined to break the monopoly of the two principal coalitions,
although they may bring about an alternation between the two of them.
The inertial aspect of Chilean democracy is apparent in the remarkable
electoral stability of the parties and the coalitions they form, a stability
leaving little chance for the appearance of new forces.
The Machinations That Make It Work

It is not by chance that behind the coalitions or partys decisions on
congressional candidates there exist practices well adjusted to the pre-
dictable character of the electorate. First, the way the slate presented to
Congress by the Concertaci on is assembled must be considered. Accord-
ing to Siavelis, the system works very much like an insurance policy:
even the losers (those placed lower on the slate who do not win elective
posts) can count on being given good places in government. This
depends, of course, upon an overall Concertaci on victory, something that
becomes more likely as time goes by, given the general tendency to
reelect incumbents. Conversely, Alianza por Chile, which cannot hope to
double the Concertaci on in a given district (with one exception since
1993), puts together its candidate lists to guarantee one of the seats in
contention and to avoid being overtaken in certain districts. Thus, under-
standing the inertial aspects of the electorate in Chile gives us a better
understanding of the reasons for the predominance of the Concertaci on,
followed by the opposition Alianza.60
However, in 2007, Morales and Poveda developed a way of deter-
mining when a candidate would have an Absolute Margin of Electoral
Security (AMES), that is, where the candidate would have more than
33.3% of the vote in a district.61 This predictive measure combines the
verified electoral force of every party of both coalitions and the institu-
tional properties of the binomial system. Morales and Poveda applied it
to the PDC and found that the party reached the AMES in 18 districts
in 1989 and 1993, 10 in 1997, 6 in 2001, and 10 in 2005, for a total of 60.
When one reconstructs the AMES for each of the six parties with steady
representation in the lower house (Table 6.5), what becomes apparent
is the increasing number of seats that are distributed this way. While in
1989, 26.66% of the seats were distributed by means of the AMES, in
the legislative elections of 2005 it was almost 36%, slightly lower than
the 38% observed in 2001. The increase in the number of seats won
Table 6.5 Evolution of Seats Obtained by Parties Based on Absolute Margin

of Electoral Security (AMES) in Legislative Elections, 1989 2005
1989 1993 1997 2001 2005
CDP 18 18 10 5 10
PPD 6 7 5 10 17
SP Did not 5 8 6 7
compete
Radical Social 1 0 1 0 3
Democrat Party
National Renewal 7 8 7 9 1
Independent 0 1 5 16 5
Democrat Union
Total seats obtained 32 39 36 46 43
under AMES
Seats obtained under 26.66 32.5 30 38.33 35.83
AMES (%)
Note: AMES figures only individual performance of candidates running under a coalition
list, as opposed to the total performance of the list.
through the AMES is explained, in the first place, by the remarkable

capacity of the Concertaci on parties to reach the 33.3% threshold of
votes: in fact, in the legislative elections of 2005, the Concertaci
on par-
ties won more than half of their deputies by this route. Second, it is
also the result of the gradual learning on the part of the parties of the
Alianza por Chile (especially the UDI) regarding the most efficient use
of the binomial system up to the 2001 elections. Although this was fol-
lowed by a decrease to a minimum of six seats, that reflects a relatively
more balanced distribution of the votes, below 33.3%, between the UDI
and RN at the district level.
From the viewpoint of coalitions and not of parties, AMES is attained
by the Concertaci on and Alianza por Chile in practically all the districts
(a total of 60): 58 in 1989, and 59 in the four subsequent elections.
Although the Concertaci on exhibits a success rate at AMES level in
almost all the districts, the Alianza has also increased its effectiveness,
going from a minimum of 31 districts in 1989 to 45 in 2005, to a maxi-
mum of 54 in 2001. This means that the dispute between these two coa-
litions for one of the two seats, be it to obtain an advantage in the case
of the Concertaci on or to prevent it on the part of the Alianza, has been
remarkably reduced: while in 1989, 30 seats were really in dispute, only
16 were so in 2005 (and only 7 in 2001). Thus, the uncertainty of the
competition, that is, the percentage of seats that escape the incidence of
the AMES, has declined from a maximum of 25% in 1989 to only 13%
in 2005.
As a first approximation, the number of seats shown in Table 6.5

reflects the mechanical impact of the AMES for each party. But more
deeply, the considerable proportion of seats that are distributed to the
parties by means of the AMES, and a fortiori on a coalition scale, is not
explained only by the institutional properties of the binomial system.
What prevails in this mode of distribution is efficient use of the binomial
system based on the knowledge acquired by the coalitions and the parties
about the behavior of the electorate. This efficiency is transformed into
an almost perfect electoral certainty with respect to the majority of seats
in dispute, objectively taking away competitiveness from the legislative
elections in Chile. It can therefore be explained that with such low levels
of uncertainty, which are consistent with the low electoral volatility
observed by means of the Pedersen index, the competition is transferred
to the interior of the coalitions. Declining competition between the coali-
tions has become the main object of criticism of the binomial system on
the part of its detractors.62
CONCLUSION
It is important to remember that this critique does not take into con-
sideration all the variables involved. The institutional dimensions of
the binomial system do not produce consequences by themselves alone,
and even less do they unilaterally explain the electoral monopoly from
which both the Concertaci on and Alianza por Chile benefit. If this
monopoly is confirmed election after election, it is due to the increasing
gap between the VAP and the actual voters, which makes the behavior
of the electorate extremely predictable. In becoming predictable, the
natural uncertainty about the results of the elections is reduced consid-
erably, which allows the parties and the coalitions to recruit candidates
by appealing to the certainties provided by both the promise of
appointments to government posts (the insurance policy) and the
AMES. The high rate of reelection of incumbents further amplifies the
barely competitive character of the Chilean legislative elections.
The excessive stability of the Chilean political system can be explained
by the combined impact of all these variables. The result makes it possi-
ble to speak of democracy in Chile, but only as a very special case, the
case of inertial democracy. At present Chile is a democracy that permits
only two political forces (coalitions), each supported by far less than a
majority of the voting age population, to compete effectively for power.
EPILOGUE
On January 17, 2009, Sebastian Pinera did in fact win election to the
presidency by a 52% to 48% margin (see page 145).
CHAPTER 7

Democratization in Mexico:
The Endless Chain of Electoral
Reforms
Esperanza Palma
INTRODUCTION
How do parties facilitate or impede the work of democratic politics?
Today, it is widely accepted within democratic theory that contempo-
rary democracies are the result of parties and are unthinkable without
them. For third-wave democracies in particular, building, or rebuilding,
strong party organizations has been a key issue on the democratizing
agenda since they are the institutions that organize the new systems of
representation, including mobilizing voters and structuring political
power. Nevertheless, analyses of political parties in recently democra-
tized countries show the difficulty of strengthening and making them
more functional to democratic politics.1 In some Latin American coun-
tries, parties have to face authoritarian legacies, such as populism and
the weakness of the state, and they have to act in contexts where
democratization has been uneven along the national territory. They also
have to deal with an agenda inherited from various types of transition
to democracy.
The main argument of this chapter is that the recent development of the
party system in Mexico is related to the process of transition to democracy
and problems of democratic consolidation. After about 50 years of a hege-
monic party system, the regime was gradually democratized by parties
through electoral and political reforms that culminated with the 1996
reform, which closed a process of the institutionalization of electoral and
political pluralism and finally allowed for alternation in power in the 2000
presidential election. Since this crucial stage of democratization, we have
witnessed positive and negative signs in the actions of parties in demo-

cratic politics. On the one hand, political parties have become the channels
of interests and discontent for a relevant part of the citizenry; they have
placed substantive issues on the public agenda and have been the main
institutions forming political professionals and candidates that run for
office. The party system in Mexico has undergone a process of institu-
tionalization that now guarantees more political stability than some of its
counterparts in Latin America.
On the other hand, after the 2000 election there was a new period of
conflicts and tensions among the main parties, which guided the transi-
tion to democracy regarding the rules of electoral competition and
campaigns as well as the relations between the legislature and the presi-
dency. Moreover, the 2006 presidential election brought up an old prob-
lem of electoral politics in Mexico: the absence of a consensus on the
electoral results whose consequence was a postelectoral conflict that, at
some point, brought the political system to the brink of a major crisis.
Two problems must be considered when analyzing the role played
by parties in democratic politics in contemporary Mexico. First, Mexican
democracy is not a consolidated democracy, not a political regime in
which democracy as a complex system of institutions, rules, and pat-
terned incentives and disincentives has become, in a phrase, the only
game in town.2 This thesis is relevant to this analysis given that consoli-
dation presupposes that actors accept that conflicts will be resolved
according to established norms and that violation of these norms is costly
and ineffective. Some leftist party leaders and their social bases believe
that disputes can be resolved through noninstitutional means, under-
mining the work of democratic politics. Moreover, they show the legacy
of a relatively recent authoritarian past and a process of democratiza-
tion where the main cleavage was authoritarianism vs. democracy. For
instance, civil disobedience or openly confrontational strategies like occu-
pying the tribune of Congress, as happened in November 2006 and
March 2008, erode the fragile democratic institutions and the legitimacy
they have accrued. The leftist Partido de la Revoluci on Democratica
([PRD], Party of the Democratic Revolution) is a case in point. It can be
defined as a party semi-loyal to democratic institutions since some of its
leaders promote, tolerate, or excuse actions of their own or of other actors
that go beyond the legitimate and peaceful patterns of the political pro-
cesses.3 Nevertheless, the role played by the PRD must be analyzed care-
fully since some of its actions have paradoxical consequences: They have
eroded legitimacy, up to a point, and impeded agreements with other
parties, but they have also had the positive effect of raising some issues
for public debate and pushing for further political reforms.
Second, since Mexican democracy is not consolidated, there is still an
ongoing debate about electoral rules and the most appropriate institu-
tional design for processing pluralism, a debate in which the parties
Political Parties and Democratization in Mexico 151
calculations about possible gains and losses are always at stake. This is
mixed with dilemmas such as the means and strategies that are valid
in order to pursue some political goals, and whether democracy is
about outcomes or about procedures,4 as well as substantive issues on
economic and social policy. Thus, one of the distinctive features of the
Mexican case is that its long process of democratization has moved
through cycles of electoral reforms since 1977. Alternation in power in
the 2000 presidential election represented a crucial stage of Mexican
democratization since it symbolized the end of the hegemony of the
Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI, Revolutionary Institutional
Party). Nevertheless, it did not put an end to the disputes over electoral
results, as the 2006 presidential election showed.
The ongoing debate on rules and institutional design has revealed
the contradictions between institutional structures (the electoral rules
inherited from the first stages of democratization and a governmental
system inherited from the authoritarian period) and contemporary po-
litical dynamics (increasing party pluralism and electoral competition).
In order to illustrate these tensions in party politics, this chapter will
focus on the following problems: the process of democratization from
1977 to 2000, including a brief overview of the party system; the main
lines of conflict among parties after alternation in power in 2000; the
role played by the electoral system and some party strategies in the
present process of political polarization; and, finally, some perceptions
of public opinion about parties.
THE HEGEMONIC PARTY SYSTEM AND THE PROCESS

OF DEMOCRATIZATION
The current Mexican party system is an institutionalized5 party system
with three main parties and four minor parties.6 The three main parties
cover the ideological spectrum from right to left: the Partido Acci on
Nacional (PAN, National Action Party) at the right, the PRI, at the center,
and the PRD at the left. These are the parties that dispute the presidency
and aggregate about 90% of the national vote. These parties also control
Congress.
One distinctive element about the Mexican case, as compared to other
party systems in Latin America,7 is that the current three main parties
were created under authoritarian rule. The hegemonic party system,
based on a presidential system, was established after the 1910 Revolution
with the creation of the Partido Nacional Revolucionario (PNR, National
Revolutionary Party) in 1929 (some years later it became the PRI). The
system included citizens within the political body through universal suf-
frage.8 This party was created by the revolutionary elite in order to bring
revolutionary leaders and their followers together and organize access to
power by institutional means. It monopolized power for about seven
decades and claimed to be the inheritor of the revolutionary nationalist

ideology. More than being a state party, as communist parties were, it
was an authoritarian party dependent on the ruling elite, with no ideo-
logical tasks. It had, and still has, a corporatist structure based on three
sectors: workers, peasants, and a third sector combining artisans, teach-
ers, and civil servants. Before industrialization and modernization took
place, these sectors represented almost the whole of society. The PRI also
implemented clientelistic practices using social programs as means to
mobilize voters. The PRI founded a state committed to the promotion of
the welfare of popular classes under a nationalistic project that in its ori-
gin included an agrarian reform, a progressive labor law, and state inter-
vention in key sectors of the economy such as oil and electricity.
A hegemonic party system, following Giovanni Sartoris definition,9
does not allow for alternation in power, although regular elections are
held to elect the president, congressional representatives, governors, and
local authorities with an electoral schedule that is well observed. In
Mexico second-class parties were allowed to participate in unfair and
noncompetitive elections. The hegemonic party controlled electoral pro-
cesses and later, in the 1980s, when opposition parties grew stronger, it
manipulated electoral results to stop them from winning elections.
The rightist PAN (the ruling party since 2000) was created in 1939 in
the context of L azaro Cardenas leftist policies of the expropriation of the
foreign-owned oil and electricity companies. Founded by some former
collaborators of revolutionary governments, the PAN vindicated a liberal
state, political pluralism, and some Christian Democratic values regard-
ing human dignity.10 For several decades, this party participated in elec-
tions with no expectation of winning any governmental post because its
leaders recognized the importance of developing a long-term strategy
that contributed to the creation of a culture of opposition politics and
gradually to the democratization of the regime. The PAN was unambigu-
ously a loyal opposition given that it always stood for institutional means
to change the hegemonic party system.11 It was not until the 1980s, after
amendments to the electoral reform of 1977 that introduced proportional
representation for electing the legislature, that this party began to win
some seats in Congress. It also won some positions in the local govern-
ment in northern Mexico, the more modern and industrialized part of the
country, and drew support from entrepreneurs, the middle class, and
some traditional Catholic popular sectors. The PAN is linked to some
Catholic organizations such as the Opus Dei and organizations of entre-
preneurs. Today, some of its most important leaders are business people
who have run for elections and won important positions, such as former
president Vicente Fox. During democratization, PANs strategy consisted
of building an electoral base first, at the local level.
The leftist PRD was born in 1989 as the result of an electoral coalition
formed in 1988 for participating in the presidential election of that year.
The electoral coalition Frente Democr atico Nacional (FDN, National Dem-
ocratic Front), resulted from an alliance between the Corriente Democra-
tica (CD, Democratic Current), a split from the PRI, the Partido Mexicano
Socialista (PMS, Mexican Socialist Party), the former Mexican Communist
Party, and several social organizations of the urban lower-middle class
that had been acting in the political scenario with a leftist program. The
main goal of FDN was to support the presidential candidacy of a former
member of the PRI, Cuahutemoc C ardenas, the son of a past president of
Mexico greatly respected for his social and economic policies. The CD
criticized the neo-liberal economic policy of the PRIs government and the
authoritarian internal rules of this party (i.e., the dependence of the party
on the president to define the partys political orientation and its presiden-
tial candidate). In the early 1980s PRIs government shifted to neo-liberal
policies that emphasized the reduction of state investment in social pro-
grams and the withdrawal of the state from the economy. As a result of
this internal conflict, the PRI expelled the members of the CD, which then
made an alliance with other leftist parties.
The PRD incorporated three political traditions: revolutionary nation-
alism, the radicalism and anti-institutional methods of the social Left,12
and the parliamentary Left, which had by then moved toward a social-
ist identity more oriented toward government and concerned with pub-
lic policy.13 This mixture, as will be analyzed later, has been very
conflictive given that these political groups have a diversity of views
about the party structure and party politics. Another relevant feature
of this party, which will leave a hallmark on its future development,
is the role played by a strong leadership. This had consequences on
its internal institutionalization and its future strategy once the transi-
tion ended. Unlike the PAN, the PRD believes that political and social
change can only be implemented from the position of the presi-
dency and it has therefore overemphasized the importance of winning
that office.
The 1988 presidential election was a key factor in the process of democ-
ratization. The contest took place between the PRI and the FDN. The for-
mer stood for a transformation of the relationship between the state and
the economy, and the latter vindicated the revolutionary nationalism that
the PRI had abandoned. In addition, the FDN put into question PRIs he-
gemony and placed the need of a democratic transformation that would
allow opposition parties to access power on the public agenda. For the
first time in a presidential election, the PRI was contested. The 1988 elec-
tion was a critical one that produced a dealignment from the PRI.14 As a
result, an important sector of PRI voters turned to the FDN. For the first
time in contemporary electoral history in Mexico, an opposition presi-
dential candidate won an important percentage of the national vote: 32%
vs. the PRIs 51%. In the past the PRI had averaged 70% of the national
vote, campaigning on programs that emphasized welfare policies and the
defense of a nationalistic project. As the PRI governments actually aban-

doned this project, its public support eroded.
Before the foundation of the PRD, the leftist parties were marginal in
electoral politics and had little support among the middle class. As a
consequence of this election, two cleavages emerged: the authoritarian
vs. democracy cleavage and the income-distribution vs. neo-liberalism
cleavage. These cleavages among parties had a social-electoral basis.
From that time on, the PRIs base shrank, and its support concentrated
gradually in rural areas and the lower income classes as the result of cli-
entelistic practices targeting the population most likely to benefit from
social programs.15 The FDN drew support from states with a diversity of
levels of industrialization and modernization; from the Federal District16
to states like Oaxaca, which shows one of the lowest levels of economic
and social development. The Federal District became one of the main bas-
tions of the PRD, and in 1997 the party won its first election for city
mayor. The analyses of Butler et al. and Bruhn show that there was no
statistical correlation between the vote for the FDN and some socioeco-
nomic variables, such as education level, income, religion, and urban
population.17 In other words, the FDN drew its support from almost all
social sectors. On the other hand, PAN, running on a platform that
defended state efficiency and stood against corruption and populism,
obtained 16.82% of the national vote and drew support mainly from
highly educated and high-income sectors.
The authoritarianism democracy cleavage emerged as a powerful
line of division between the PRI on one side and PAN and PRD on the
other, a cleavage among citizens as well as between the parties. PAN
and PRD demanded clean and fair elections and the creation of an au-
tonomous electoral college. From that point on, they pushed constantly
for electoral reforms that allowed for the construction of electoral insti-
tutions independent from the PRI and that guaranteed free elections.
Since there was considerable evidence of a rigged election, and both
PAN and FDN contested the electoral results, the demand for clean
and fair elections became one of the most important issues for public
opinion and pushed PRI toward further democratization.18
During the 1990s, both PAN and PRD became stronger and opened
new channels of representation to a democratic citizenship.19 Their
strategies, for the most part, pursued democratization by gradual
reforms. The period that runs from the 1988 election to 1994 (when an
important electoral reform was approved) witnessed contradictory
processes: The opposition won several positions at the local level, de-
spite the fact that the Electoral College was still controlled by the PRI
and the president. At the same time, several postelectoral conflicts
developed, mainly when the dispute took place between the PRI and
PRD. Relations between these parties were very tense, and the left did
not consider the results of the 1994 presidential election to be valid.
During this period, opposition parties engaged with PRI in several

processes of negotiation in the pursuit of one main demand: to change
the electoral system and the rules of access to political power under
democratic conditions. In Mexico, democratization consisted of electoral
reforms that gradually built an electoral system that guaranteed
free and fair elections based on an independent Electoral College (IFE,
Instituto Federal Electoral) formerly controlled by the president and
PRI and the recognition and promotion of pluralism through the
design of a mixed system of majority and proportional representation
for Congress, maintaining a simple majority for electing the president.
The 1994 and 1996 electoral reforms incorporated new principles for
integrating the IFE, establishing that the General Council, the most
powerful organ of the IFE, would be formed by citizens elected by a
majority in Congress. Parties have representation in the sessions of the
council and have the right to speak, but not the right to vote.
Thus, today, as a result of several electoral reforms, Mexico has a sys-
tem that organizes representation as follows: The legislature is comprised
of 500 seats, 300 elected in majority districts and 200 elected by the pro-
portional representation principle. It is renewed every three years. The
Senate is renewed every six years and holds 128 seats; 64 seats elected by
majority (that is, 2 for each of the 32 states), 32 by the first minority
principle in each state (the party that came second in the state election),
and a pure proportional representation list of 32 seats. The president is
elected in a first round election for six years, as are the governors. It is
worth mentioning that as a result of the 1996 electoral reform, the mayor
of the Federal District and deputies of its constituencies were opened to
electoral contestation. Before this reform, the Federal District did not hold
local elections, with the mayor of the city being appointed by the presi-
dent of the country. The founding election in the capital of the country
was held in 1997 and it was won, from then on, by the PRD. It must be
added that the electoral system establishes, since 1996, that in order for a
party to obtain legal registration and therefore receive public funding it
must obtain at least 2% of the national vote in any of the national elec-
tions.20 There is no reelection for any political post. This is the legacy of a
principle established in the 1917 Constitution after the Mexican Revolu-
tion in order to prevent a dictatorship. This principle, which was one of
the main demands of the Revolution, effective suffrage, no reelection,
acts against accountability and makes politicians more dependent on
their own parties than on the electorate. This issue will be discussed later
in the chapter.
Summing up, parties played a crucial role during the first years of
democratization by (1) conducting a peaceful transition to democracy,
privileging for the most part, negotiation over confrontation; (2) channel-
ing the political diversity of Mexican society; and (3) structuring a new
system of representation.
LINES OF CONFLICT AMONG POLITICAL PARTIES

DURING THE 2000 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION:
THE DEMOCRACY AUTHORITARIANISM CLEAVAGE
The midterm elections of 1997, held under the last PRI government,
and some local elections, such as the foundational one in the capital of
the country, showed clear signs of the end of the hegemony of the PRI.21
In that year PRI obtained 39% of the national vote for Congress and
239 seats, whereas PAN obtained 37% and 122 seats, and PRD 25% and
125 seats.22 PRI thus lost control of Congress and no longer had the
power to change the constitution: Any constitutional amendment needs
two-thirds of the votes in Congress. Divided government appeared for
the first time in Mexico with the same consequence as elsewhere: difficul-
ties in cooperation between the president and Congress.23 Furthermore,
the electoral law of 1996 establishes that a party cannot hold more than
300 seats, a cap designed to promote pluralism and interparty coopera-
tion, but it too poses new issues for governance.
During the 1990s, the most important dimension of conflict and divi-
sion between the opposition parties and the PRI, and within the elector-
ate, was authoritarianism/democracy or opposition/government. The
centrality of the democratic issue subordinated ideological dimensions;
however, after alternation in power took place in 2000, it became irrele-
vant, as will be shown. The 2000 presidential election clearly expressed
this cleavage. The PAN, in alliance with the minor party, the Partido
Verde Ecologista de Mexico (PVEM, Ecologist Green Party of Mexico),
formed the Alianza por el Cambio (Alliance for Change) and won the
presidency. The crucial issue of this election was the possibility of alter-
nation in power versus the political continuity of the PRI. The Alianza
candidate, Vicente Fox, was able to organize a campaign that projected
him as the choice of change in contrast to the PRD, whose candidate
was, for the third time, C ardenas.24 C
ardenas organized his campaign
on the income distribution neo-liberalism cleavage, but focusing on
this issue was ineffective given that the real possibility of defeating the
PRI was at stake. C ardenas presented a scenario with two poles: on the
one hand, the PRD, and on the other, the PAN and the PRI as agents
of a neo-liberal economic and social model.25 In contrast, PAN and its
presidential candidate were able to build a broad electoral coalition
along the axis of democracy that incorporated voters who were not ide-
ological sympathizers with the party but that saw in it the possibility of
political change. The presidential candidate appealed explicitly to leftist
voters in this election, eager to defeat the PRI. Some scholars have
shown, using public opinion polls, that part of the electorate voted
along the axis PRI anti-PRI (authoritarianism democracy) and not on
ideological grounds, and PANs candidate waged the strongest anti-PRI
campaign.26 In 2000, around 8% of the national electorate held a far
leftist position, and in former elections they voted for the PRD. In 2000,
Fox gained 50% of the vote from this group of the electorate and 50%
of the vote of centrist voters.27 The strategic vote came mainly from
leftist voters. Strategic voting is also corroborated by split voting:
Whereas Fox obtained 42.52% of the national vote, PAN candidates for
Congress gained only 38.32%.28
In this election, PANs candidate won 42.52% of the vote, PRI 38.32%
and PRD 16.64%. Map 7.1 shows that the coalition PAN-PVEM won in
20 states, PRI in 11 states, and the PRD candidate in just 1.29
It must be highlighted that PAN won in the northern states, where it
had been creating an electoral base over previous decades. PRD won in
only one state, Michoac an in the south, the birthplace of its presidential
candidate. According to some studies, older voters were more likely to
vote for the PRI candidate and younger voters for the opposition. Edu-
cation also had a negative relation with the PRI vote, and higher
income sectors were more likely to vote for the PAN candidate and less
likely to vote for the left. The PAN grew in rural districts and increased
its vote considerably in the marginal areas of urban districts.30
Some scholars agree that the 2000 election symbolizes the end of
the transition to democracy.31 Although in 1997 there were rele-
vant achievements in democratic electoral politics, alternation in power
Map 7.1 Presidential Electoral Results, 2000

at the presidential level was crucial for political actors and for public
opinion. The perception that Mexico was a democracy grew among citi-
zens: from 37% who thought so in May 1999, to 59% who thought that
Mexico was a democracy by May 2002.32
This was the first time in a long political period that the electoral
results were not contested. Nevertheless, PRDs position and evaluation
of the 2000 election left open the possibility of future conflicts. The
PRD recognized the importance of PANs victory since it represented
the end of what they called the party-state regime. Yet this party
emphasized that substantial regime change implied a shift to a new
economic and social model, different from the neo-liberal one.33
THE CLEAVAGE BETWEEN LEFT AND RIGHT: THE 2006

PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION AND ITS AFTERMATH
After the 2000 presidential election a new line of conflict among par-
ties emerged: The cleavage between left and right, which displaced the
democracy authoritarianism axis that no longer was politically rele-
vant after alternation in power, had taken place.
In the 2006 presidential election, the PRD, in alliance with the Labor
Party (PT) and Convergencia, formed the electoral coalition Alianza por
el bien de todos (Alliance for the Good of All) and nominated Andres
Manuel L opez Obrador, a popular candidate who had been the mayor
of Mexico City from 2000 to 2006. L opez Obrador had emerged during
the transition, was a former member of the PRI, and had led local social
movements in the state of Tabasco. He also held the position of presi-
dent of the PRD from 1996 to 1999. Although L opez Obrador has held
important political positions within the party and as the mayor of the
capital city, his trajectory is clearly marked by his close relation to
social movements and social organizations. As the mayor of the city,
his main political platform, which became his campaign program, tar-
geted the most vulnerable sectors of society: the poor, the elderly, sin-
gle mothers, and the disabled, among others.34 Some of his proposals,
such as a monthly pension for the elderly, became compulsory under
local law. These measures were combined with investment in infra-
structure in Mexico City. By 2003, some public opinion polls conducted
in Mexico City showed a citizen approval of 81% for L opez Obrador,35
and he became one of the favorites for the presidency, with the meas-
ures he favored becoming the main guidelines for the PRDs presiden-
tial campaign manifesto. The campaign slogan The poor first, for the
good of all was very appealing in a country where 30 million of 103
million people live under conditions of poverty.36
In 2004, a relevant event took place that set the conditions for an
extremely polarized election: The attorney general, with the clear inter-
vention of the president, demanded that the Senate deprive L opez
Obrador of his legal immunity (privilege of elected politicians) in order

to try him for legal action brought by the citizens of a neighborhood
for the supposedly illegal measure of building a public street on private
property. He was accused of having abused his authority. Respected
lawyers claimed that the action had no legal grounds. It was clear that
the political goal was to exclude L opez Obrador from the possibility of
becoming a presidential candidate. In the end, President Fox himself
had to stop the judicial process. However, the event created the sce-
nario of two sworn enemies and was the starting point of the thesis of
a conspiracy against L opez Obrador.
The PAN candidate, Felipe Calder on, presented an electoral platform
explicitly meant to continue Foxs policies and aimed at the promotion
of private investment, the control of inflation, and increase in tax reve-
nue by eliminating evasion. Calder on emphasized the importance of
the rule of law for political stability and the proper functioning of the
market. According to his platform, the main responsibility of the state
is to provide equal opportunities to individuals who have to work for
their own welfare.37 Public investment would be mixed with private
investment in the areas of education, health, public security, and infra-
structure. As part of its campaign, PAN put out television commercials
that presented L opez Obrador as a danger to Mexico given that his
populist program would bankrupt the state. Some entrepreneurs paid
for commercials that promoted the idea that the PRD would expropri-
ate private investors and would provoke political chaos in a way simi-
lar to what Hugo Ch avez had done in Venezuela. While at the
beginning of the campaign L opez Obrador was ahead among electoral
preferences, some weeks before the election, Calder on caught up with
him and most polls showed a dead heat between the two candidates.
The PRI was marginalized in the 2006 contest; its candidate, Roberto
Madrazo, could never position himself successfully within the left right
dispute.38
The results for the presidential election reflected the political polariza-
tion of the campaigns: Calder on obtained 35.89% of the vote, whereas
Lopez Obrador seized 35.31% a less than 1% difference. The PRI, allied
with PVEM, took 22.26%.39 The IFE was unable to announce the results
the same day, leaving a political vacuum that allowed the PRD to con-
test the electoral results (arguing that there was something suspicious
about the delay in announcing official results).
Before analyzing the postelectoral conflict, which is relevant to the
analysis developed here, it is important to point out that the polariza-
tion of the vote between left and right has a territorial basis.
Map 7.2 shows how the country was split between a North that
voted for PAN and a South for L opez Obrador, with some exceptions,
like Baja California Sur, where the PRD is the ruling party, and Yucatan
in the southeast of the country, where the PAN candidate won the
Map 7.2 Presidential Electoral Results, 2006
election. In general terms, the northern states are more modernized and
urbanized, whereas the south has the most marginalized and poorest
areas of the country, with a strong presence of indigenous commun-
ities.40 The PRI disappeared from the map; its presidential candidate
did not win in any state. Nevertheless, a closer look at voting statistics
reveals that the polarization is not so extreme, given that in most cases
the difference between first and second place is around 10% (Table 7.1).
It is also interesting that in 14 states the PRI came in second in the
presidential contest. The concurrent elections for Congress also showed
a different panorama: PAN obtained 33.39% of the vote, PRD 28.99%
and PRI 28.21% (see Figure 7.1).
The precampaign environment, the conspiracy theory held by the
PRD, and the polarized electoral results led to a postelectoral conflict
with contradictory effects on democratic politics. The electoral results
were contested by the PRD, arguing that the election was plagued by
many irregularities. The same day of the election, before any official
announcement had been made, L opez Obrador called on his followers
to gather in the main square of Mexico City, declaring he had won the
election. The PRD implemented a strategy of confrontation that is
explained by the characteristics of its leadership and its social base,
both of which had become accustomed to using extrainstitutional
means to pursue their goals. The postelectoral strategy included a legal
Table 7.1 Electoral Presidential Results by Vote
Votes by presidential candidate (%)
State First electoral force Second force Third force

Aguascalientes PAN PRI-PVEM PRD
46.77 23.56 21.73
Baja California PAN PRD PRI-PVEM
47.35 23.59 21.38
Baja California Sur PRD PAN PRI-PVEM
43.06 34.35 16.52
Campeche PRD PAN PRI-PVEM
32.38 31.85 27.97
Chiapas PRD PRI-PVEM PAN
43.36 33.58 16.92
Coahuila PAN PRI-PVEM PRD
43.11 26.45 24.21
Chihuahua PAN PRI PRD
45.10 29.43 18.26
Colima PAN PRI-PVEM PRD
41.79 29.67 23.80
Distrito Federal PRD PAN PRI-PVEM
58.13 27.39 08.55
Durango PAN PRI-PVEM PRD
44.62 26.92 22.53
Guanajuato PAN PRI-PVEM PRD
59.09 18.81 15.37
Guerrero PRD PRI-PVEM PAN
51.43 26.51 16.15
Hidalgo PRD PAN PRI-PVEM
40.79 26.63 24.95
Jalisco PAN PRI-PVEM PRD
49.32 24.26 19.22
Estado de Mexico PRD PAN PRI-PVEM
43.31 31.07 18.12
Michoacan PRD PAN PRI-PVEM
41.17 34.49 18.94
Morelos PRD PAN PRI-PVEM
44.11 31.92 15.67
Nayarit PRD PRI-PVEM PAN
41.82 33.70 18.89
Nuevo Le
on PAN PRI-PVEM PRD
48.89 27.61 15.96
Oaxaca PRD PRI-PVEM PRD
45.96 31.72 16.77
Puebla PAN PRD PRI-PVEM
37.49 32.24 23.19
Queretaro PAN PRD PRI-PVEM
(Continued)
Table 7.1 Electoral Presidential Results by Vote (continued)

Votes by presidential candidate (%)
State First electoral force Second force Third force

48.91 24.29 27.24
Quintana Roo PRD PAN PRI-PVEM
38.33 28.90 27.24
San Luis Potosi PAN PRI-PVEM PRD
45.58 21.81 21.54
Sinaloa PAN PRD PRI-PVEM
37.06 30.77 26.87
Sonora PAN PRD PRI-PVEM
50.12 25.70 18.77
Tabasco PRD PRI-PVEM PAN
56.28 37.81 3.51
Tamaulipas PAN PRD PRI-PVEM
41.29 26.47 25.93
Tlaxcala PRD PAN PRI-PVEM
44.00 34.16 14.55
Veracruz PRD PAN PRI-PVEM
35.23 34.21 24.73
Yucatan PAN PRI-PVEM PRD
46.17 32.96 15.86
Zacatecas PRD PAN PRI-PVEM
35.62 31.95 24.44
Note: PRI (National Revolutionary Party), PAN (National Action Party), PRD (Party of the
Democratic Revolution), PVEM (Ecologist Green Party of Mexico).
Source: http://www.ife.org.mx.
petition to the Electoral Tribunal (TRIFE) for a vote by vote recount,

citing problems regarding electoral scrutiny as well as some acts of civil
disobedience. For instance, L opez Obrador and his followers took over
one of the main avenues of Mexico City, installing a huge camp site
there that completely blocked traffic for several weeks. Paradoxically,
the PRD mayor of the city had to deal with the public discontent gener-
ated by this measure. When TRIFE announced that the election had been
legitimate, the PRD announced new measures of civil disobedience.41
Lopez Obrador summoned his followers to a National Democratic Con-
vention where he was proclaimed the legitimate president against
the usurper Felipe Calder on. In that convention Obrador announced
the creation of a legitimate cabinet and other measures of civil disobe-
dience, such as impeding Calder on from being sworn in as president.
This meant that the parties that supported Andres Manuel L opez Obra-
dor AMLO took over the congressional tribune in order to impede the
elected president from formally taking office at a congressional session,
as the constitution demands. After Calder on took office, in the middle of
Figure 7.1 Seats in Legislature By Political Party 2006 2009: PRI (National
Revolutionary Party), PAN (National Action Party), PRD (Party of the Demo-
cratic Revolution), PVEM (Ecologist Green Party of Mexico), PT (Labor Party).
this crisis, L
opez Obrador announced that his party and followers would
only recognize him as the legitimate president and that they would not
have any political relations with Calderons government.
Polarization translated into public opinion. Moreno shows, in his
study of public opinion of the 2006 postelectoral conflict, that some
weeks after the election was held, 38% of the population believed that
electoral fraud had taken place, whereas 51% did not share this belief.42
Moreno argues that the more politically informed citizens are and the
more exposed they are to party elite debates, the more they reflect the
positions of those elites. Parties shape the perceptions of citizens. More
recent studies show that by 2008, the percentage of citizens that
believed that Calder on won the election rose to 57%.43
The postelectoral strategy implemented by the PRD has had negative
effects on democratic politics. It responds both to L opez Obradors
leadership and to the social movements and organizations that support
him, which envisage his leadership as the main possibility for change.
Although L opez Obrador has placed relevant and substantive issues on
the public agenda, which express cleavages in the Mexican society, his
strategy seeks the delegitimization of institutions by using means that
are not the normal procedures to process conflict. Is the loser of an
election going to contest electoral results every time the outcome is a
very close result? This view of politics acts against the normalization of
democratic life and expresses a personalization of politics.44 As was
mentioned earlier, the origins of this political conception of party activ-
ity relates to the origins of the PRD, which was born under a strong
leadership45 and in the context of a presidential election that certainly
was fraudulent in 1988 when the PRI and its government controlled the
whole electoral process.
The measures implemented by the PRD after the election have set
the mold for what seems to be a long-term strategy. Some evidence of
this is shown in the way the PRD has responded to a presidential initi-
ative sent to Congress at the beginning of 2008 for reforming the state-
owned oil company PEMEX (Mexican Petroleum). The presidential and
PAN initiative brings up one of the main conflicting lines between the
two leading parties, given that it seeks to allow private investment in
some areas of oil production. Days before the parliamentary groups of
PAN and PRI were set to vote to approve this initiative, the PRD took
over the tribune of Congress, demanding that there be a public debate
before any decision was taken on this crucial matter. The party thus
managed to delay the approval of the reform and to open some public
spaces for the public debate. It can be argued that it is the responsibil-
ity of Congress to inform and involve citizens in such a sensitive issue
as the reform of PEMEX.46 Nevertheless, the methods used by the PRD
show the weak attachment of this party to republican and institutional
forms.
The role played by L opez Obrador and his political base has had not
only some negative effects on democratic politics, but also an impact
within the PRD itself. Months after the election took place, the PRD
group called the New Left, formed by some members of parliamentary
groups as well as some PRD governors, declared that they would ana-
lyze initiatives from the executive and would engage with PAN in
negotiations in Congress if necessary.47 They also criticized L opez
Obrador for using the party as his personal instrument and for debili-
tating the party by implementing a strategy that would leave it out of
the process of negotiation with other parties. In 2008, the division
within the party between the two groups, New Left and the group sup-
portive of L opez Obrador, translated into a struggle for electing the
president of the party. Furthermore, after their internal election took
place, both groups claimed they had won the election. The directorate
of the party has not been able to resolve who the winner was and will
have to hold another election in 2010.
Summing up, the 2006 electoral process has had contradictory effects
on Mexican democracy: On the one hand, it reinforced the dividing line
between left and right by putting the issue of income distribution on
the public agenda in a context where the neo-liberal model seemed to
be unquestionable. Political division among parties and public opinion
is compatible with democratic politics. As Chantal Mouffe has argued,

agonism plays an important role in democracies since ideological divi-
sions between left and right can promote further equality and popular
participation.48 The hegemony of neo-liberalism and the center-oriented
consensus that has been reached in many societies have demobilized
the working class and have blurred left-wing proposals. Following this
line of argument, the current cleavage in Mexico is welcome. On the
other hand, some of the actions of the PRD, embedded in a particular
view of politics, have delayed democratic consolidation and might open
scenarios of serious confrontation and institutional breakdown.
THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM AND THE 2007 ELECTORAL REFORM

The 2006 election showed the limitations and problems of the elec-
toral system. The main objective of the electoral reforms during democ-
ratization was the recognition of pluralism and an autonomous
electoral college. The parties did not foresee that the rule for presiden-
tial election would lead to conflict in the context of a polarized contest,
especially if one of the parties is prepared to start a conflict around the
electoral results. Some scholars have pointed out that the main issue
resulting from the 2006 election was the viability of this rule.49
Crespo argues that when there is little electoral distance between the
first and the second place in a presidential election the possible human
errors when counting the votes leave room for mistrust.50 In the 2000
presidential election, the distance between the winning PAN candidate
and the second-place PRI candidate was 6% and nobody doubted that
the election had been clean. In 2006, under the same rules, when the
winner only had 0.5% more of the vote than the second place, mistrust
emerged, exacerbated by the context of a nonconsolidated democracy.
However, the same can happen in consolidated democracies as it has
in the United States in 2000, in Germany in 2005, and in Italy in 2006.
Proposals such as a second round were placed in the public and aca-
demic debate. Nevertheless, the new electoral reform the party elites
introduced in 2007 did not introduce measures that could prevent a
tight electoral result from happening again. It is worth noting that they
did not even address seriously the possibility of permitting officehold-
ers to seek reelection. Clearly concerned about the impact of the 2006
election on governance, PAN and PRI agreed with many of the pro-
posals that the PRD placed on the negotiating table. They focused on
the following topics: public funding for parties, the timing of cam-
paigns, the role of the mass media in the campaigns, and the smaller
parties. The most relevant reforms in these areas were a drastic reduc-
tion of public funding for ordinary party activities and for campaigns.
Public finance for ordinary party activities will be distributed according
to the number of citizens registered on the electoral roll. Thirty percent
of the money will be distributed among all the parties and 70% accord-
ing to the vote they receive in a national election. Public finance for
campaigns will be reduced by 50%.51 The length of the campaigns was
also modified by this reform. Previously, presidential campaigns lasted
about 160 days, now they last only 90 days.
The most relevant amendment was the one regarding the regulation
of party propaganda during the campaigns. Before the 2007 reform, the
parties and any particular organization could directly pay for commer-
cial advertisements on television and radio. The new law prohibits the
direct buying of political advertising time in the mass media. Now, the
IFE will pay for the commercials during the campaigns and will distrib-
ute advertising time among the parties.52 The reform went further:
Attending to the PRDs complaint about a dirty war during campaigns,
the new rules state that any governmental propaganda during the cam-
paigns regarding public programs is forbidden, since such propaganda
can be used for electoral goals.
The reform also includes a very controversial measure: the prohibi-
tion against using denigrating expressions regarding institutions and
parties or libeling politicians. This measure has raised concerns among
some intellectuals and public opinion leaders who have argued that it
will be extremely difficult to trace the dividing line between a well-
grounded criticism and libel; this measure is not only inapplicable but
also represents an attack against freedom of speech.53
Finally, the reform includes new restrictions on smaller parties and
new parties. The most relevant amendment is the new regulation for
forming electoral coalitions. Before the 2007 electoral reform, any party
could be part of a coalition and the total vote obtained by the coalition
counted toward maintaining registration. This allowed small and new
parties, such as PVEM, PT, and Convergencia, to maintain their regis-
tration during their first electoral years. Today, each one of these par-
ties is able to win around 3% of the national vote (i.e., 10% of the
national vote altogether). The new law establishes that parties can form
coalitions, but the logo of the coalition can no longer appear on the bal-
lot; each party of the coalition will present its own logo, and voters will
have to choose one of them. Thus, the total vote for the coalition will
no longer count for small parties. While established small parties might
have no problem at obtaining the minimum of 2% of the national vote,
more recently founded parties will have to participate in a disputed
market to obtain this percentage of the vote. The new electoral law also
prohibits parties that lose their registration from contending again in
an electoral process; that must return the public funding they obtained.
Whereas the former can be controversial, the latter is a positive meas-
ure given that in the past many small parties that lost their registration
kept the resources obtained from the state, and there were no account-
ability mechanisms.
The 2007 reform strengthens bigger parties. An important issue on a

democratic agenda should be the design of an electoral system that allows
citizens to create new parties for organizing their political preferences,
which might not be included in the existing party system. Nevertheless, a
very permissive law might allow small parties to appear and disappear
easily from one election to another, creating confusion among the elector-
ate and the impossibility of assigning political blame.54
It is important to mention some of the issues absent from this reform.
First, it did not include a second round for presidential election or any
other provisions to ensure plurality, as has been the case in many coun-
tries in Latin America.55 None of the three main parties put forward
this proposal at the various roundtables on political reform.56 Second,
allowing reelection was only proposed by PAN and only for members
of Congress and municipal authorities. In Mexico, only legislators can
run for a second time for a seat in Congress after one term of office.
The PRI and PRD stood against this initiative. Whereas PAN intends
to change party links with society by reelection, the PRI and PRD
(especially the latter) intend to strengthen their social links by incorpor-
ating leaders of civil society and organizations as candidates. The PRD
includes in its internal rules a special quota for outsiders. The PRI is
more concerned with its internal-elites rotation. As a PRI senator in the
2006 2012 legislature, Jes us Murillo Karam stated: If we approve
reelection we will have a problem within the party because we will cre-
ate a monopoly of leaders who can obtain public positions, excluding
an important part of the members of the party. It impedes the political
circulation of elites and the incorporation of younger politicians.57
The constitutional clause mandating no reelection is, however, a
major problem in Mexicos system of representation. It makes represen-
tatives more dependent on their parties for their political careers than
on the citizens. The absence of a debate on reelection reveals how little
Mexican parties, with the exception of the PAN, are concerned about
introducing accountability mechanisms. It remains one of the pending
themes on a democratic agenda.
PARTIES AND SOCIETY

How do citizens view the role played by parties in democratic poli-
tics? This is a critical question for understanding the democratic ties
parties have with society. Contradictory trends can be found in the
relation between public opinion and parties in Mexico. Even though
they are important actors in structuring electoral preferences and politi-
cal perceptions, partisan attachments have declined, citizens have low
levels of trust in these organizations, and a considerable part of the
population sees them as irrelevant for democracy.
The segment of party sympathizers declined after the transition ended.

According to Moreno and Mendez, the proportion of independents
changed from 2000 to 2006: In 2000 they counted for 31% of the electorate,
whereas in 2006 the proportion increased to 37%.58 The group of parti-
sans has therefore declined: In 2000, 64% of citizens had a partisan attach-
ment, whereas in 2006 it declined to 59%.59 This phenomenon is due to
the decline of PRIs sympathizers during this period. This party lost
around 10% of its followers as part of the continuing electoral dealign-
ment: Between 2000 and 2006 PRI sympathizers declined from 34% to
23% of the electorate. By contrast, the PAN maintained 21% of sympa-
thizers, while PRDs sympathizers increased from 9% to 15%. Data sug-
gest that there is transference of loyalties from the PRI to the PRD. It is
worth noting that the PRI has the biggest pool of party sympathizers,
although it no longer obtains the majority of votes. This means that inde-
pendent voters represent a disputed market for the PAN and the PRD.
The level of trust in parties is also a relevant indicator of their per-
formance. Public trust in parties is very low, as it is in most democra-
cies,60 and has fluctuated considerably during the postdemocratization
period: In 2000 (when a presidential election was held), 34% of
Mexicans showed much trust in parties; this percentage dropped
after the midterm election of 2003 to 17%, and rose again to 33% in the
electoral context of the 2006 presidential election.61 Trust improves in
the context of presidential elections given that they draw more atten-
tion and interest from citizens.
There is a vast literature within comparative politics on the causes
and consequences of low levels of trust in parties and politicians and
the profile of citizens who show lower levels of political trust. Russell
Dalton and Susan Pharr and Robert Putnam argue that one of the main
causes of low trust in parties is the emergence of a sophisticated, more
informed, and demanding citizenship with high expectations about the
performance of democratic institutions that are hardly met.62
However, Mariano Torcal and Gabriela Catterberg and Alejandro
Moreno have analyzed this phenomenon in recently democratized
countries, and their findings are different from the scholars cited
above.63 Torcal shows that low trust is linked to low levels of informa-
tion, cynicism, and disaffection; whereas Catterberg and Moreno argue
that in some Latin American countries that have recently undergone
democratization processes, erosion of trust is related to a posthoney-
moon effect: The low performance of new democracies and their inabil-
ity to solve acute social problems generate frustration and alienation
from politics. Some studies on Mexico have shown that citizens who
have higher levels of trust in parties are more politically informed and
more likely to prefer democracy over any other form of political re-
gime.64 These studies suggest that the causes of low trust in parties in
younger democracies are to be found in the poor performance of

regimes and lower levels of political information and disaffection.
The problems of democratic consolidation in Mexico are also reflected
in social perceptions of the democratic status of this country and the role
played by parties and Congress. According to Latinobar ometro, 52% of
Mexicans thought that without political parties there can be no democ-
racy, whereas 54% thought that without Congress there can be no democ-
racy.65 Mexico is slightly below average for the region: In 2006, 55% of
Latin Americans thought that without political parties there can be no de-
mocracy, and 58% thought that without Congress there can be no democ-
racy. In the same year, only 17% of Mexicans thought that Mexico was
very democratic, and 17% believed that it was not democratic at all.
About 50% thought that there is an intermediate democracy. Again, this
perception is below public perceptions of consolidated democracies in
Latin America such as Uruguay, Costa Rica, Chile, and Argentina.
Voter turnout has declined since the end of the first stage of Mexican
democratization. In the 1994 presidential election (see Figure 7.2), turn-
out was 77%, still under the process of regime change. From then on,
electoral participation has declined both in midterm elections and presi-
dential elections. In the 1997 midterm election, the turnout was 58%,
and in the 2003 midterm election it dropped to 40%. In the 2000 presi-
dential election, voter turnout was 64% and it went down to 59% in the
2006 presidential election.
Democratic theory emphasizes that participation is crucial for citizens
to be involved in the system of representation, to influence political
decisions, and to demand accountability.66 Yet cases like the Mexican
one, where participation has dropped after the transition to democracy,
could be interpreted as part of the process of democratization, given
Figure 7.2 Voter Turnout in National Elections, 1994 2006.
Source: http://www.ife.org.mx.
that this phenomenon responds to the debilitation of clientelistic and

corporativist mechanisms used earlier by the PRI for mobilizing voters,
particularly lower income voters. Some research on electoral participa-
tion support this hypothesis. For instance, some studies have shown
that in the 2000 presidential election the most politically sophisticated,
those with higher levels of education and political information, were
the citizens who proportionally voted the most.67 The data for levels of
party attachments and social perceptions of parties and democracy
illustrate the contradictory processes that Mexican political culture is
going through after the period of PRI hegemony ended.
CONCLUSION
This chapter has analyzed the role played by parties during the proc-
ess of democratization. Parties guided a gradual transition to democ-
racy via electoral and political reforms that institutionalized pluralism
and opened new channels for citizen representation.
Alternation in power in 2000 was crucial for the process of democra-
tization. Nevertheless, it did not end the disputes over electoral results.
The 2006 postelectoral conflict is a sign of the weakness of the recently
democratized electoral institutions. Moreover, problems of democratic
consolidation affect public opinion. Less than half of Mexicans believe
that there can be democracy without parties and without Congress.
Trust in parties is very low, and since this phenomenon is likely to be
linked to political disaffection, it has an impact on citizen control on
political leaders.
The introduction of accountability mechanisms is one of the pending
issues on the democratic agenda in Mexico. Prohibiting the reelection
of representatives allows politicians to be more independent from the
electorate since they have less incentive to be accountable. This prob-
lem is clearly not on the agenda of party leaders either the PRI or the
PRD. The 2007 electoral reform includes some self-protective measures
for well-established parties, such as the new regulations for coalitions
and the prohibition for publicly using any expression that denigrates
institutions and politicians. Libeling politicians should not be accepted
under democratic rules; nevertheless, the ambiguity of what denigra-
tion means seems to leave little room for honest criticism.
This chapter has focused to a great extent on the PRDs strategy,
given that this party played a major part in relevant conflicts during
the past few years. As compared to PAN and PRI, parties that seek po-
litical stability, the PRD is an ambivalent actor in democratic politics.
On the one hand, it has made an important contribution to public
debate by posing an alternative to neo-liberalism. On the other hand, it
acts against democratic consolidation by using political means that
undermine the fragile institutions and democratic legitimacy. This party

could change its role in democratic politics if the current party leader-
ship is replaced by the more moderate wing of the party. This is one of
the main lines of conflicts that this party faces internally.
In short, the relationship today between parties and democracy in
Mexico is to be understood by contradictory processes that parties have
undergone and pending issues of democratization and consolidation.
One of the most relevant features of this relationship is that parties
have not been able to hold a long-term commitment to electoral rules.
This translates into an endless chain of electoral reforms that always
seem to be provisional and permanent debates on institutional design.
The ongoing debate on these matters and the permanent electoral
reformism gives the impression that democratization never ends.
SUPPLEMENTARY REFERENCES (IN ADDITION TO ENDNOTES)

Gobierno del Distrito Federal. Web page: www.df.gob.mx
Moreno, Alejandro. Evaluaci on Ciudadana del Gobierno de Andres Manuel
opez Obrador. Grupo Reforma 25 (2004).
L
Moreno, Alejandro. Posturas Ciudadanas Sobre la Reforma de Pemex. Grupo
Reforma (July 13, 2008).
Negretto, Gabriel. Propuesta Para Una Reforma Electoral en Mexico. Poltica y
Gobierno 1 (2007): 215 227.
Valencia Escamilla, Laura. Puntos de veto en la relaci
on Ejecutivo-Legislativo.
Sociologica 62 (2006): 44 78.
CHAPTER 8
How Does a Democracy with a

Weak Party System Work?
The Peruvian Case
Martin Tanaka
INTRODUCTION
To understand the role political parties have played in the democra-
tization of Peru, it will be helpful to begin with a quick overview of the
past 40 years and then examine the relationship between political par-
ties and efforts at democratization in each of three periods more
closely: 1980 1990, 1990 2001, and 2001 to the present.
Like other Latin American countries, Peru has not had a strong dem-
ocratic tradition. For most of its history, the nation lived under military
rule, with brief and interrupted democratic periods. Peru suffered the
consequences of the hegemony of agrarian elites and did not have an
inclusive and competitive party system. During the 20th century, there
certainly were parties that attempted to open and democratize the pub-
lic sphere: for example the populist American Popular Revolutionary
Alliance (APRA) and the Communist Party, but such parties were
banned and persecuted by the political establishment.
However, in 1980, General Francisco Berm udez called for democratic
elections, ending the most recent period of military rule. For the first
time in its history, Peru had a competitive political arena, with no polit-
ical exclusions and with universal suffrage for the entire adult popula-
tion, including the illiterate.
In the succeeding years, Peru had an inchoate party system, but
was nonetheless building the foundation of a representative party sys-
tem.1 The party system was organized along ideological lines: liberal
and conservative parties, the traditional populist APRA, and a Marxist
left. Thanks to the parties with strong ideological identities the overall
party system matched the model Giovanni Sartori labeled as polarized
pluralism with a centripetal dynamic of competition.2 Each group
showed strong connections with different civil society organizations,
and, despite a high level of electoral volatility, parties appeared as the
political representation of different social groups and interests.
At the same time, this was also a system with serious problems of
governability. The nation faced the challenge of two insurgent terrorist
movements: Sendero Luminoso (the Shining Path) and the T upac
Amaru Revolutionary Movement, the former an extremely violent and
dogmatic organization. The ideological polarization led to a noncooper-
ative interaction between political actors, which in turn had a negative
impact on the possibility of implementing efficient and stable public
policies. The poor performance of the governments affected the links
between the parties and the citizenry, expressed in extreme electoral
volatility. By the end of the 1980s, ideologization also caused internal
conflict and divisions in the main parties. Those divisions affected
all parties simultaneously in the context of the 1990 general elections,
in the middle of hyperinflation and increasing terrorist attacks. The
unexpected outcome of this was not simply the deepening of govern-
ability problems, but rather the ensuing unacceptability of any of the
established parties candidates for the presidency, a situation that
allowed Alberto Fujimori, a relatively unknown political outsider who
belonged to none of the established parties, to win. Fujimori cam-
paigned against neo-liberal policies, but immediately after taking office
implemented, in a very radical way, the same policies he had harshly
criticized other candidates for advocating, posing the problem that con-
stant policy switches make for the functioning of vertical accountability
mechanisms.3
Worse, Fujimori found that the rule of law and democratic institu-
tions were obstacles to a personalistic and authoritarian leadership and
decided on an auto-golpe, a self-coup, in April 1992, after which he
dissolved Congress, revised the constitution, and called for new con-
gressional elections. The judiciary, military, and media were brought
under his control. The coup was supported by an overwhelming majority
of the population. Peru became the only Latin American case of a suc-
cessful coup detat under the third wave of democratization, which also
ended the party system under construction in the 1980s.4 The Fujimori
government won approval because it was able to stop hyperinflation,
implement comprehensive neo-liberal reform, and defeat terrorist
groups. Although it maintained the institutions of a democracy, Peru
was then ruled by an authoritarian regime. It was a hybrid political
regime, based on a strong personalistic leadership with important
popular support, with a highly centralized and unaccountable decision-
making process that intervened and tried to control all counterbalancing
Weak Parties in a Working Democracy: The Peruvian Case 175
state powers, the media, and civil society organizations and that
constantly attacked the opposition based on an antipolitics and anti-
institutional discourse. Yet there were opposing forces: Peru under
Fujimori can be characterized as a competitive authoritarian regime.
The Fujimori authoritarian regime unexpectedly collapsed after
achieving a second reelection in the questionable 2000 elections, due to
internal divisions detonated by huge corruption scandals. Fujimori was
forced to call new elections and then fled the country, resigning from
office in November 2000. In 2001, Peru again had free and fair competi-
tive elections, bringing President Alejandro Toledo (Per u Posible Party)
to office in July and leading to a subsequent redemocratization process.
However, the heritage of the weakness of political parties and of
having legitimized a personalistic outsider style of doing politics had
ambiguous consequences.
On the one hand, the weakness of parties and the limitations to po-
litical deliberation in the 1990s led to the consolidation of the techno-
cratic elite, closely linked with multilateral institutions. They allowed
the continuity of market-oriented policies that brought some degree of
macroeconomic success. At the same time, no one was held accountable
for these policies because candidates changed their stances constantly.
They were critical of neo-liberal reforms during campaigns, but once
in power they were either not able or not willing to change them.
Peruvian governments in the 2000s, unlike other countries, have not
been able to implement efficient redistributive social policies of the type
that also maintain market-friendly policies. The explanation lies in the
weakness of the state and political parties, brought on by a centralized
and authoritarian style of decision making during the Fujimori years
that weakened ministries and decentralized institutions. Post-Fujimori,
weak parties in government lack sufficient cadres with technical exper-
tise necessary to develop efficient public policies. This absence is elo-
quent in all policy areas and throughout the country. This problem
might be solved by turning to politically independent professionals, but
partisan cadres tend to distrust and be jealous of such cadres. The con-
sequence of this is that social policies remain basically under partisan
control, but without technical expertise, and tend to be managed under
clientelistic considerations, so the goal of achieving redistribution is not
accomplished.
The continuity of macroeconomic policies created some trust and
expectations in some sectors of the citizenry; but at the same time, the
poor performance of social and redistributive policies created great
resentment. This dualism was expressed clearly in the 2006 general
election. The urbanized, modern, coastal sector of the country voted for
parties that offered minor changes and a basic continuity of the socio-
economic policies; while the rural, poor, and Andean sector of the
country voted for new, outsider candidates who offered a radical
departure from the prevailing socioeconomic policies. However, neither

of these two major options was carried out through representative par-
ties once the election was over.
With this background in mind, we now examine the political parties
and the role they played in the efforts to democratize during the 1980s.
PERUVIAN DEMOCRACY IN THE 1980s

The reestablishment of civilian government in 1980 provided unpre-
cedented opportunities to consolidate democracy and a representative
party system. For the first time in its history, Peru established a com-
pletely inclusive democracy in which illiterates were allowed to vote.
Parties such as APRA, which had historically been banned for question-
ing the status quo and diverse groups of the Marxist left that appeared
in the 1970s, became protagonists of the democratic game. The party
system that emerged after the 1978 transition consisted of three large
political blocs. The United Left (Izquierda Unida [IU]) occupied the left
side of the spectrum; the Popular Christian Party (Partido Popular
Cristiano [PPC]), and Popular Action (Acci on Popular [AP]) were on
the right; and APRA occupied the center. These three blocs had roots
in important political and intellectual traditions that dated back to the
1920s. In their battle for hegemonic control of the country, all three
attempted to carry out programs and advance ideologies that had been
postponed during the military rule; as a result, the political atmosphere
of the 1980s was effervescent. In contrast to previous decades, the
political system now interacted with an increasingly active and mobi-
lized civil society, represented by business interests, workers, and new
social movements. In short, Peru had an unprecedented opportunity to
build a fully representative party system.5
Regarding the electoral strength of the main parties, we find that
from 1978 until the first round of the 1990 presidential election, the four
main parties (IU, PPC, AP, and APRA) captured over 70% of the vote.
In the Constituent Assembly elections of 1978, these four major parties
received 88.5% of the vote; and over the years prior to the 1989 munici-
pal elections, this figure grew to more than 90%. In the 1989 elections
the percentage decreased, to 71.5%, and in the first round of the 1990
presidential election, which Mario Vargas Llosa won, the figure
dropped a bit more, to 68%. Although electoral volatility was high from
the outset of the democratic regime, electoral preferences were always
expressed even in 1990 within the confines of the party system.
In 1980, Fernando Bela unde, the AP candidate, won the presidency.
He formed a coalition with PPC but faced strong opposition from
APRA and IU. Bela unde tried to implement liberal economic reforms
but was strongly opposed by the unions, social movements, and oppo-
sition parties. Under his administration Peru had an average inflation
rate of 97.3%, and 0.7% gross domestic product (GDP) growth. The
problems under the Bela unde administration generated a movement in
the electorate toward the left, and in the 1985 elections Alan Garca, the
young leader of a renovated APRA party (after the death of its founder
Vctor Raul Haya de la Torre), won the elections with 53% percent of
the vote. In second place was Alfonso Barrantes, from the IU, with
25%. After them came Luis Bedoya, from PPC, with 12%, and finally
Javier Alva, from the incumbent AP, with only 7% (Table 8.1).
There were great expectations regarding Garcas government. Since
1932, the APRA, a typical Latin American populist party, had tried to
win power and had been banned and persecuted. Its victory in 1985,
aided by Garcas inflammatory Populist rhetoric, was its first time in
power, and the government immediately put into practice a heterodox
economic recovery plan that, during the first year of his administration,
gave Garca huge popular support. Unfortunately for him, that could
not last.
Between 1986 and 1990, Peru had an average 1,662.5% of inflation
rate and 2.0% of GDP growth. From 1987 until the end of his admin-
istration, Garca faced total opposition from the parties of the right and
from entrepreneur organizations, especially after his failed attempt to
nationalize the banking system.
The failure of both administrations has a lot to do with extreme ideo-
logization: on the one hand, in a liberal, market reform oriented sense,
and on the other, a statist, leftist, and socialist proposal. Even more,
beyond the limits of the party system were the insurrectional projects
of the Shining Path (Sendero Luminoso, SL) and the T upac Amaru
Revolutionary Movement (Movimiento Revolucionario T upac Amaru
[MRTA]): the former, an extremely dogmatic and violent organization
that began a popular war against the state in 1980, precisely when
the country was beginning for the first time a democratic regime with
no exclusions, and the latter, a terrorist group more like a Guevarista
style, but much smaller in comparison with SL. The action of SL and
MRTA and a brutally repressive response from state forces caused
30,000 75,000 deaths between 1980 and 1990.
The Peruvian party system during the 1980s had at the extremes the
IU on the left and the Democratic Front (Frente Democratico [FRE-
DEMO]) on the right. After its founding in 1980, the IU, a political front
formed by seven leftist organizations, had steadily increased its elec-
toral clout, winning more than 30 percent of the vote in the 1986 mu-
nicipal elections. Several 1987 opinion polls indicated that Alfonso
Barrantes, by that time the most likely IU candidate, would be the top
choice among voters in the 1990 presidential race.6 In late 1987, the IU
called its First National Convention, eventually held in January 1989, to
fine-tune the organization and strategy for coming to power through
the electoral route. At this convention, the FREDEMO adopted rules,
Table 8.1 Peru: Vote for the Major Political Parties, 1978 2000 (%)
LEFT
Year AP PPC APRA (IU) Total

1978 (C) NP 23.8 35.3 29.4 88.5
1980 (P) 45.4 9.6 27.4 14.4 96.8
1980 (M) 35.8 11.1 22.5 23.3 92.7
1983 (M) 17.5 13.9 33.1 29 93.5
1985 (P) 7.3 11.9 53.1 24.7 97.0
1986 (M) NP 14.8 47.6 30.8 93.2
1989 (M) 20.4 20.2 71.8
1990 (P) 22.6 13 68.2
1992 (C) NP 9.7 NP NP 9.7
1993 (M) 11.6 5.7 10.8 3.9 32.0
1995 (P) 1.64 NP 4.11 0.57 6.3
1998 (M) 5.0 NP 7.0 NP 12.0
2000 (P) 0.4 NP 1.4 NP 1.8
2001 (P) 24.0 26.0 NP 50.0
2002 (M) 5.7 18.0 12.0 1.5 37.2
2006 (P) 5.8 23.8 24.3 1.4 55.3
2006 (M) 4.0 17.0 14.0 NP 35.0
Notes: The 1978 and 1992 elections are for the Constituent Assembly (C). The 1980, 1985,
1990, 1995, and 2000 elections are for the presidency (P). The elections of 1980, 1983, 1986,
1993, and 1998 are municipal elections (M). Here we are looking at the total vote for the Peru
vian Aprista Party (APRA), the Popular Christian Party (PPC), Popular Action (AP), and the
United Left (IU), or the votes obtained by the political alliances in which they participated.
NP, did not participate.
policy, platform guidelines, and a plan for immediate political action

and chose a unified political leadership.
As for the right, the AP and PPC suffered harsh setbacks in the April
1985 general elections, after the second administration of Fernando
Belaunde (1980 1985). But by August 1987, they had taken the political
initiative once again, heading the opposition to President Alan Garcas
proposal to nationalize the banking system. The rightist bloc underwent
a significant revitalization. August 1987 saw the birth of the Liberty
Movement (ML), led by writer Mario Vargas Llosa and economist
Hernando de Soto, which promoted market-oriented ideas and state
modernization. January 1988 saw the formation of a major alliance FRE-
DEMO (the Democratic Front) involving the ML, AP, and the PPC. In
the November 1989 municipal elections, FREDEMO emerged as the
countrys main political group, and opinion polls showed that Mario
Vargas Llosa was likely to be Perus next president.7
The Peruvian political scene was thus highly polarized by 1989. On
one pole was a left with revolution in mind, with a kind of electoral
path to socialism such as was followed by the Popular Unity Front
(UP) in Allendes Chile (1970 1973). On the other pole, the right advo-
cated a liberal ideology and profound modernization of the economy
and the state within the framework of a market economy. Given the
ideological polarization of these programs, the triumph of either the left
or the right would have created problems of governability. What
occurred, unexpectedly, was a crisis of representation: radicalized
political groups left vacant the political center formerly occupied by
APRA, and the empty space was filled by an outsider. Such an un-
usual and unexpected outcome is understood by analyzing the 1990
election campaign and the conflicts within the parties.
The campaigns context was marked by a deep recession, hyperin-
flation, and high levels of political violence. In 1989, the Sendero Lumi-
noso announced it had arrived at a strategic balance with the forces
of order, the stage prior to a strategic offensive that would lead to
the seizure of power, and began a siege of Lima. In this context, in-
ternal conflicts within the major parties led to open struggles and divi-
sions, leading a sector of the electorate to seek other options outside
the system. How can the actors behavior be explained? The context of
crisis and violence, coupled with the (correct) perception that there was
an extreme situation involving the exhaustion of one political cycle
and the chance to start another, led the actors to abandon risk-averse
behaviors, to be audacious, and to make decisions marked by ideologi-
cal reasoning rather than pragmatism. Such conduct intensified the
contradictions and internal conflicts among the principal actors and
produced the vacuum of representation of which the hitherto unknown
Fujimori took advantage.
The party system that had been in formation during the 1980s col-
lapsed at the beginning of the 1990s. This breakdown resulted not so
much from the performance of the political actors throughout the 1980s
as from what they did near the end of 1988, when inflation accelerated
and the country entered into a dynamic period marked by the
1989 1990 elections.8 Despite the complicated situation, nothing sug-
gested that in 1990 a grave crisis of representation would develop and
that in the succeeding years the party system would collapse. On the
contrary, both the analysts and the actors themselves perceived that
the principal danger lay in the growing polarization, the vacating of
the political center with the crisis of the ruling APRA, and the strength-
ening of the extremes. These were the trends that led to serious prob-
lems of governability. In the context of the threat posed by Sendero
Luminoso, this situation could have led to a repressive military inter-
vention. Until 1989, the parties seemed relatively strong, with possibil-
ities for recovery in the not too distant future.9
The explanation of the collapse of the party system is found in the
ideologization, political polarization, and centripetal dynamic of elec-
toral competition, which caused simultaneous internal divisions in all
major political actors. Certainly this all occurred under critical circum-
stances an inflation rate of 7,481.7% in 1990, a negative growth rate of
the GDP of 12.9 in 1989, and a huge number of deaths in a decade of
armed internal conflict (most of the 69,280 deaths estimated by the
Comisi on de la Verdad y Reconcialiaci on [CVR] or Commission for
Truth and Reconciliation, occurred during the 1980s) but nonetheless
the parties played key roles in their own downfall.
In 1987, the IU was in need of profound reorganization. Until then,
despite its electoral gains, the IU had functioned mainly as a coalition
of parties, representing various parties general secretaries in a National
Executive Committee (CDN), where each party maintained its own po-
litical line. The IUs internal problems grew more acute during the
administration of Alan Garca, whose populist and revolutionary rheto-
ric created problems of identity and strategy. Barrantes, IU chairman
until May 1987, maintained a stand of critical collaboration with the
Garca administration. Barrantes resigned his post because he did not
have the backing of the majority of the party general secretaries, who
espoused a much firmer opposition line toward the Garca government.
A clear course of conduct with a unity of approach was urgently
needed, and that is why the first national convention was called. After
an intense and interesting period of preparation, which saw the enroll-
ment of more than 130,000 members, an extremely high figure by
Peruvian standards, the convention was held. But far from fostering the
consolidation of the IU, it initiated a tortuous process of division.
On one side of the debate, with Alfonso Barrantes, were those who
believed that to win elections and fashion a minimally stable and suc-
cessful government it was essential to exclude the IUs radical sector.
The radical sector had not clearly rejected armed struggle and thus
would make it impossible to surmount a veto by the armed forces and
conservative sectors. On the other side of the debate were the parties of
the Revolutionary Bloc (Bloque Revolucionario),10 which believed that
the seeds of revolution were present, making it appropriate to prepare
for a large-scale political and possibly a military confrontation. Accord-
ingly, the real objective was not to arrive at a government through elec-
tions but to prepare for taking power through insurrection. So on one
side were those outlining a reformist program, broad in scope, appeal-
ing to the average voter; on the other were those propounding a
strengthening of the bases, of strategic sectors, a digging-in to prepare
for the coming confrontation. In the middle of this controversy were
the Peruvian Communist Party (PCP) and independent IU activists
with no party allegiance. The division of the IU amid mutual recrimina-
tions and accusations unfolded between January and October 1989 (the
month candidacies for the 1990 elections had to be filed) and ruined
the lefts electoral chances.11 In the 1990 elections, the left divided. The
IU presidential candidate Henry Pease polled 8.2% of the vote, while
Alfonso Barrantes, candidate for the newly created Socialist Left (IS),
won only 4.7%.
The crisis of the left increased the electoral chances of the right.
Throughout most of 1989, with the collapse of the left, presidential
opinion polls indicated that Mario Vargas Llosa was the favorite. In the
second half of 1989 and the early months of 1990, the question was
whether or not Vargas Llosa would get the more than 50% needed to
win in the first round. FREDEMO, however, had its own internal prob-
lems. The leadership of Vargas Llosa and Movimiento Libertad within
the alliance generated jealousies and rivalries in AP and PPC. These
frictions came to a head in June 1989 when the FREDEMO strategy for
the November municipal elections became the subject of so much
debate that Vargas Llosa tendered his resignation as a presidential can-
didate, a resignation he later withdrew.12
In spite of these problems, FREDEMO made a fairly good showing in
the November 1989 municipal elections. Although those elections wit-
nessed the appearance of the first independent candidates, indicating
the delegitimization of the major parties, most of these independents
were in fact aligned with the major parties.13 The polarization and
sense of urgency in the country affected FREDEMO and its campaign
strategy, which makes it easier to understand why Vargas Llosa did
not come up with a more conclusive victory in the first round of the
1990 election (he won only 32.6% of the vote). Vargas Llosa distanced
himself from the median voter with a fairly ideological campaign, seek-
ing a clear mandate to go ahead with a profound neo-liberal reform.
This campaign did not inspire enthusiasm in the electorate, especially
after the popular mobilization against neo-liberal reforms in Caracas in
February 1989 under the administration of Carlos Andres Perez.
The crisis and chaos into which the government plunged seriously
damaged APRAs electoral chances, yet APRA could not be completely
written off. In the 1989 municipal elections, APRA remained the second
largest party at the national level, behind FREDEMO, and slightly ahead
of the left. APRAs candidate Luis Alva Castro won 22.5% percent of the
vote in the 1990 presidential election. But APRA, too, had internal prob-
lems that decreased its electoral chances. According to the 1979 Constitu-
tion, Alan Garca could not seek reelection, and his efforts to pass a
constitutional reform allowing him to run ended in failure between 1987
and 1988. As a result, the general secretary of the party Luis Alva Castro
competed with Garca for control of APRA. Garca fought to maintain
control, and he decided to maintain his distance from Alva Castro. Garca
gambled on leading the opposition to Mario Vargas Llosas candidacy
(for ideological reasons, once again) and backed Alfonso Barrantes rather
than the APRA candidate throughout most of the campaign.
The vacuum left by the division of the left, FREDEMOs internal
problems and the extreme ideologization of its campaign, and the
weakness of an APRA candidate who had to assume the costs of the

failures of Garcas administration without receiving the benefits of
support from the top all came at an especially critical moment and cre-
ated a vacuum of representation. The political center was left more or
less vacant, which allowed it to be filled by a candidate with no prior
political experience who was not even mentioned in the surveys until a
few weeks before the election.14 From the group of minor candidates,
Alberto Fujimori, former rector of the Universidad Agraria (Agrarian
University), suddenly turned out to be an attractive option. Once
Fujimori began to rise in the opinion polls, Garca began to support
him through his connections in the press, and his support was decisive.
With Garcas support, just a few weeks before the election, Fujimori
ceased to be a minor candidate and went on to place second in the
contest.15 In the first round, Vargas Llosa won with 32.6%, and Fujimori
surprisingly came in second place with 29.1%. In round two, with the
votes of APRA and the left, Fujimori won the presidency, with 62.4%,
compared to Vargas Llosas 37.6%.
Once in office, Fujimori found himself with a minority in Congress.
In the elections for the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies, FREDEMO
obtained 32.3% and 30.1%, respectively; Cambio 90, only 21.7% and
16.5%; APRA, 25.1% and 25.0% (that is, it topped Cambio 90 in both
houses); IU, 9.8% and 10.0%; IS, 5.5% and 5.3%. Cambio 90 won only
32 of the 180 seats in the Chamber of Deputies, and in the Senate, only
14 of 62. FREDEMO had 63 deputies and 21 senators; APRA, 53 depu-
ties and 17 senators (again, more than Cambio 90); IU, 16 deputies and
6 senators; IS, 4 deputies and 3 senators. Fujimori had no possibility of
aspiring to reelection in 1995 because it was prohibited by the 1979
Constitution. Therefore, his presidency was perceived as a singular epi-
sode, certainly ephemeral, and once it was over, the parties would
again occupy center stage. Things turned out quite differently.
THE DESTRUCTION OF THE OLD ORDER AND THE

TRANSITION TO A COMPETITIVE AUTHORITARIANISM
Fujimoris relatively rapid success in stabilizing the economy through
market-oriented reforms and his later achievements in combating ter-
rorism allowed him to build a coalition that supported his leadership,
which was authoritarian, antipolitical, and anti-institutional. Fujimoris
relative consolidation kept him from ending up like other leaders who
came to power, challenging an establishment that eventually drove
them out (Affonso Fernando Collor in Brazil, 1990 1992; Jorge Serrano
Elas in Guatemala, 1993; Abdal a Bucaram in Ecuador, 1997). Through
an antisystem discourse, Fujimori embodied and represented tradition-
ally excluded sectors, but did so within clientelistic and populist
schema.
Fujimori constructed a new institutional order under a political he-

gemony that signaled the end of the preceding one, through a new con-
stitution and the takeover of all public authorities. He proceeded by
first staging a self-coup (April 1992) and then calling for the election
of the Democratic Constituent Congress (November 1992). Fujimori
stayed roughly within the margins of legality and enjoyed broad elec-
toral support but substantially undermined pluralism, competition, and
the balance of powers (horizontal accountability), thereby creating what
can be characterized as a competitive authoritarianism in which
democratic representation was replaced by a plebiscitarian legitimacy.16
The disequilibrium was further accentuated by the inability of the
opposition to both leaders to consolidate viable alternatives and over-
come obstacles to collective action. So, during the 1990s, the Peruvian
case illustrates the consequences that the weakness of a competitive
party system can have.17
In Peru, after the April 1992 coup, Fujimori called for a new congress
that also served as a constituent assembly. In November 1992, the Con-
stituent Democratic Congress (CCD) was installed, with a Fujimorist
majority, unlike the 1990 1992 Congress, in which Fujimoris support-
ers had been a minority.18 The return to constitutional order was estab-
lished by the October 1993 referendum, which approved the new
constitution by a scant margin,19 and by the 1995 general election for
president and Congress, in which Fujimori easily won reelection in the
first round. Fujimori won 64.4% of the vote as well as a majority in the
unicameral Congress; his movement won 52.1% of the congressional
vote. His closest competitor, Javier Perez de Cuellar, former United
Nations Secretary-General (1982 1991), received 21.8% of the presiden-
tial vote, and his Union for Peru movement (UPP) captured 14% of the
congressional vote. In the Congress elected in 1995, there were two
main blocs: one linked to the government, Cambio 90 Nueva Mayora,
with 67 of 120 seats, and the opposition bloc, led by UPP, with 17 seats.
After these two, the party with the greatest number of seats was APRA,
which had only 8 representatives.
Problems appeared soon after the presidents reelection. Since
Fujimorism was a highly personalized movement, it required that
Fujimori the person stay in power longer than Fujimorism itself, a
movement with no major existence beyond its leader.20 The path fol-
lowed by Fujimori after 1992 is an interesting illustration of how to
construct an authoritarian order through democratic means when
holding a majority in Congress and of how a democratic invocation of
the majority can be used to destroy republican balance and liberal prin-
ciples. The path Fujimori followed to set up an authoritarian govern-
ment may be summarized by giving an account of the reelection law
and the maneuvers intended to impede any challenge to his 2000 presi-
dential candidacy. In August 1996, Congress, with a clear Fujimorist
majority, passed the law of Authentic Interpretation of the 1993 Con-

stitution, according to which Fujimoris first presidential term had not
been from 1990 1995 but from 1995 2000 (since the first had been gov-
erned by the 1979 Constitution, not that of 1993), thus allowing
Fujimori to stand for his first reelection in 2000. Shortly after this rul-
ing, several opposition leaders (a wide sum of different leaders, some
from the parties of the 1980s and others who emerged during the
1990s) began collecting signatures to seek a referendum on the repeal
of the Authentic Interpretation law. The response came in October 1996
when Congress passed legislation regulating the exercise of the referen-
dum: calling a referendum would now require not only citizen signa-
tures but also the approval of at least two-fifths of the members of
Congress (that is, 48 votes). The route to blocking the referendum sub-
sequently involved a congressional confrontation with the judges of
the Constitutional Court, which in January 1997 declared by a simple
majority that the law of Authentic Interpretation was inapplicable.
Congress responded in May of that year by dismissing the justices
who had voted for that interpretation. In July 1998, the promoters of
the referendum presented to the National Office of Election Processes
(ONPE) petitions with 1,441,535 citizen signatures. In August, the
ONPE enforced the referendum law of October 1996. Instead of calling
for the referendum, it sent the request to Congress, where the opposi-
tion did not have the 48 votes necessary to approve the referendum.
Fujimori needed to do more than block the referendum. He also had
to keep the National Election Jury (JNE) from being able to declare that
there was a basis for challenging his candidacy by invoking its uncon-
stitutionality, and thus he had to control the JNE. According to Article
179 of the 1993 Constitution, the JNE is to be comprised of five mem-
bers: one elected by the Supreme Court, from among its retired and
active justices; one elected by the Board of Supreme Prosecutors from
among retired and active supreme prosecutors; one elected by the Bar
Association of Lima, from among its members; one elected by the
deans of the law faculties of public universities, from among their for-
mer deans; and one elected by the deans of the law faculties of private
universities, from among their former deans. Fujimoris strategy con-
sisted of controlling the institutions with representatives on the JNE.
Accordingly, in June 1996, the reorganization of the judiciary and the
Prosecutor Office was announced, and different actions were taken in
order to secure that the two representatives of these institutions would
not impede Fujimoris reelection plans. In November 1997, the govern-
ment announced the takeover of the public universities, a move
through which it assumed control over the deans of the law faculties.
That accomplished, Fujimori could now count on three of the five votes
on the JNE. As further insurance, in May 1998 Congress passed a law
changing the kind of vote required for the JNE to declare that there
was a basis for challenging a candidacy: the vote went from a simple
majority (three votes) to a qualified majority of four of the five.
After these machinations, in December 1999 Alberto Fujimoris candi-
dacy was filed and then challenged by the opposition, and ultimately
the challenge was rejected by the JNE. The route to reelection involved
near-absolute control over all state institutions. This became even more
evident during the 2000 election campaign, when public resources were
mobilized with the aim of promoting Fujimori. Even the armed forces
got into the act.21
All these maneuvers against the rule of law generated antagonism,
and during long periods of time the majority of the public opinion dis-
approved the performance of Fujimori. Why then was the political
opposition not able to put effective limits on these authoritarian prece-
dents? The defeat of the opposition can in large measure be attributed
to its internal weakness and scattered nature, the absence of a common
strategy, and the lack of a sufficiently supported clear alternative offer-
ing more than a simple return to a past the citizenry rejected. In partic-
ular, the opposition raised institutional banners, the respect of the rule
of law, and had little to say in social and economic terms. Yet that was
precisely the strong point for Fujimori. He expressed the sentiments of
previously excluded popular sectors and used clientelistic schemes to
mobilize them. In the end, Fujimori gained legitimacy with plebiscitary
schemes that gave him significant popular support, but not because he
had democratic legitimacy or showed respect for the rule of law.
Fujimorism always had the support of the winners of the economic
reform process: that sector of the business community that is linked to
large-scale mining interests, finance, and commerce, who benefited
from trade liberalization, privatization, and foreign investment incen-
tives.22 Yet this sector, while strategic, is extremely small and thus not
able to deliver the electoral gains sought by Fujimori for the 2000 elec-
tions. For this, the regimes legitimacy depended on the support of the
poor. Thanks to privatizations, the upturn in tax revenues, and greater
access to loans from abroad, the Peruvian state under Fujimori renewed
its economic presence, despite its neo-liberal character. In fact, the sec-
ond Fujimori administration saw the highest social expenditure levels
in more than two decades, and this helps explain the regimes greater
support among the poorest of the poor. This support was built through
clientelistic schemes, with quite effective, targeted social expenditure
under a centralized structure, controlled by the presidency.
Thus, state spending grew considerably in those categories that
increased coverage for the poor. According to Adrianzen, between 1992
and 1998 the public budget expanded nearly fivefold. Most signifi-
cantly, per capita social spending climbed from US$12 in 1990 to
US$158 in 1996, while also increasing as a percentage of GDP.23 In fact,
the second Fujimori administration saw the highest social expenditure
levels in more than two decades, and this helps explain the regimes
greater support from the poorest of the poor. This social spending was
not executed through the social ministries (education and health), but
rather through the Ministry of the Presidency, which rendered it highly
subject to clientelism rather than state initiatives. The high political divi-
dends reaped by these antipoverty policies were readily apparent when
comparing the results of the much contested 1993 referendum on the
new constitution with the outcome of the 1995 presidential and con-
gressional elections, where Fujimori won a clear majority.
In terms of the decision-making process, a logic of closed and
isolated decision making at the top became a trademark of the Fujimori
era. This was comprised of a small circle, with Fujimori at the center,
surrounded by a select group of advisers that included Vladimiro
Montesinos from the National Intelligence Service (SIN). Montesinos
quickly became a central figure and was responsible for the execution
of most political decisions. This circle became impenetrable even to the
cabinet ministers. Whereas under more democratic circumstances,
everyday political decisions were negotiated via party leaders and in-
terest group factions, in this case they were conducted mainly with SIN
and the top-ranking officers of the armed forces. Without them, Fuji-
mori would have had to enter openly into negotiations and compro-
mise with various actors, which was not his style of decision making.
Fujimorismo then, was a very personalistic regime, based on the con-
trol of state resources. Its anti-institutional nature lay in the fact that
there was not, properly speaking, any political movement behind it.
The various incarnations of this movement Cambio 90, or Nueva
Mayora, or Vamos Vecinos, or Per u 2000 were only electoral vehicles
and not authentic representational organizations. There was no move-
ment or organization that benefited from his political capital, and the
survival of Fujimorismo depended exclusively on his staying in power.
This, in turn, required access to state resources, so as to maintain verti-
cal clientelistic relations with the popular sectors. Hindsight shows
how quickly these imperatives turned into political manipulation, as
Fujimoris political survival meant avoiding the uncertainty of electoral
mechanisms at all costs. Reelection was thus a crucial issue, and this
had become all too clear by the time of the 2000 presidential elections.
Fujimorismo, unable to resolve the reelection question by legitimate
institutional means, simply ran roughshod over the prevailing legal
order. This had high political costs, especially given the context of eco-
nomic slowdown, which further diminished the regimes legitimacy. In
such a scenario, it would have been difficult to push the agenda of
second-generation reforms, which frequently entail, at least in the short
run, some economic pain for benefits that are dispersed. In addition, by
their very nature, second-phase reforms demand a more democratic
approach. Such mechanisms of coordination and consensus-building
with political and social groups were incompatible with the nature of
the Fujimori administration.
This does not mean that Fujimori enjoyed unaltered popular support
along his administration. He had to face steadily mounting opposition
by 1996. Approval ratings for the opposition came to equal those of the
president by mid-1997, with the trend continuing into late 1998. It is
also important to mention that the legitimacy of Fujimorismo varied in
this period by social sector. Five major stages stand out in terms of
gauging the legitimacy of Fujimorismo in the 1990s. The first is the
honeymoon, right after Fujimoris election in 1990; the second is the
adjustment crisis, from January to September 1991, when the Fujimori
government faced considerable opposition; the third, the long stage of
hegemony, extended from October 1991 to October 1996; the fourth,
that of mounting political and economic crisis, from November 1996 to
December 1998; and the last is marked by the 2000 elections, which I
examine below.
The political crisis that came at the end of the third stage was accom-
panied by a sharp drop in the average approval ratings for the presi-
dent, from about 65% to 39%. Nonetheless, when disaggregating that
information by social group, there emerges a difference of almost 10%
between the B sector (middle) and the D sector (lower), with the latter
voicing stronger support for the president (33.6% versus 42.9% of peo-
ple supporting Fujimori; respectively, sector C was 38%). The differ-
ences between these two sectors reached almost 15% from 1999 to early
2000, the period leading up to the 2000 elections (40.6% versus 54.3% of
support; sector C was 45.7%).24
In aggregate terms the greatest opposition to Fujimorismo came from
the middle sectors, Peruvians who were hard hit by the economic crisis
and who benefited only marginally from the numerous public works
and state assistance programs. The same holds for the wage-earning
popular sectors, hard hit by more flexible labor rules and the expansion
of temporary and other precarious forms of employment. If we analyze,
for example, wage trends in the private sectors economically active
population (EAP), we find it falling steadily. The same can be said for
the ratio of the number of unionized workers to the members of the
EAP who could potentially be unionized.
This led to a notable loss in workers bargaining power, reflected in
the steady decline in real wages, which had been high even by regional
standards. This prompted the existing unions to be highly critical of
the government and to seek entrance to the political arena to defend
their interests. Trade union leaders, for example, sought elected office
in the 2000 congressional race, although with little success, given the
enormous size of Perus informal sector.
The middle class and other members of the formal labor market
residing in the main urban areas were not the only ones to distance
themselves from Fujimorismo. Ever larger sectors of the business class

did so as well. In general, profits increased much faster than salaries
and wages in recent years, but those producers whose fortunes were
bound up with the domestic market displayed ever more autonomy
vis-
a-vis the government, in some cases openly opposing it. This rising
opposition from business was based on other economic complaints a
contraction in demand, high interest rates, low exchange rates, a heavy
tax burden, and the absence of constructive dialogue with the govern-
ment when voicing their concerns.
Over time, the business component of Fujimoris coalition, which had
been relatively solid until early 1997, fragmented. It is interesting to
note that the CONFIEP (Confederaci on de Instituciones Empresariales
Privadas), the highest-level business association, had clearly split in
two by March 1998 because of controversies about how to face the gov-
ernment policies. The split was reflected in the controversial election of
Manuel Sotomayor as president of the CONFIEP. Behind Sotomayor
were the associations favored by Fujimoris economic policy: large com-
panies linked to primary exports and financial activities (e.g., the Socie-
dad Nacional de Minera y Petr oleo, the Sociedad Nacional de
Exportadores, the Sociedad Nacional de Pesquera, the Asociaci on de
Banca y Seguros). On the other side were those businesses linked to
production and trade in the domestic market and medium-scale export-
ing concerns (the Sociedad Nacional de Industrias [SNI]; the Asociaci on
de Exportadores [ADEX]; and the C amara de Comercio de Lima
[CCL]). Once Sotomayor had been elected, the latter associations
announced that they would not participate in the meetings of the exec-
utive committee of CONFIEP, which until then was unthinkable. In late
1998, ADEX, SNI, and CCL formed the Coordinadora Gremial de
Producci on, which directly competed with CONFIEP in representing
private interests before the state. In addition, these associations began
to distance themselves from Fujimoris campaign for reelection in 2000.
The breakaway of this sector of business found its highest expression
when well-known business leaders sided with opposition political move-
ments in the 2000 elections. Thus, Eduardo Farah, former president of
the SNI, ran for first vice president and congressman on the opposition
ticket of Solidaridad Nacional; Carlos Bruce, former president of ADEX,
was a candidate for Congress on the Somos Per u ticket, another opposi-
tion faction; similarly, David Waisman, representative of the small busi-
ness committee (COPEME) of the SNI, ran for Congress and for second
vice president on the Per u Posible ticket; and finally, Eduardo McBride,
also a former president of ADEX, ran for Congress, also on the Per u Posi-
ble ticket. It is interesting to note that these businessmen took on as their
own the discourse regarding the need for second-generation reforms,
which had practically become a matter of common sense in the business
world. One expression of this was the invitation to Moises Nam, the
author of an influential article on this very subject, to be the keynote

speaker at the annual Conference of Executives in January 2000.25 In
addition, the leading presidential candidates, except for President Fuji-
mori, attended that meeting in order to lay out their proposals. Fujimori
had figured that the business environment, where the emphasis was on
strengthening institutions, would be hostile to him.
In sum, Fujimorismo faced mounting opposition from the middle
sectors, the trade unions, and business interests linked to the domestic
market. As such, in the 1997 1999 period, the ideal conditions existed
for the formation of a reformist coalition to back second-generation
reforms that promised to correct for the policy weaknesses inherent in
Fujimorismo. The themes of debate increasingly centered on the need
to institutionalize the state, to overcome poverty, to improve the distri-
bution of wealth, and to generate greater consensus on various issues.
It is in this context that several political movements emerged, which
claimed to be independent (i.e., not affiliated with any political
party), and embodied the aspirations for change. The most important
of these was Somos Per u, the movement built around Lima mayor
Alberto Andrade, who had been elected in 1995 and reelected in 1998.
The polls leading up to the 2000 elections suggested from mid-1997 to
mid-1999 that the next president would be Alberto Andrade.26
Peru could have continued down a path like that of Argentina, where
Menemismo entered into crisis and lost legitimacy, and a center left co-
alition won. Despite Menems efforts to secure a third term in 1999, the
opposition effectively regrouped around second-generation social and
institutional issues, which finally led to an opposition victory. However,
this did not happen in Peru. The 2000 elections resulted in a very high
vote in favor of Fujimoris reelection, thanks in large part to the govern-
ments extensive use of state resources in favor of Fujimori and against
the opposition.27 There was also a strong showing for Alejandro Toledo,
who in the end became the main opposition candidate; however, this
was not the result of the consolidation of a cohesive opposition front, but
rather a surprising and spontaneous movement by the electorate akin to
Fujimoris 1990 flash candidacy. Like Fujimoris 1990 victory, Toledo
drew mainly on ethnic and symbolic themes in his 2000 bid for the presi-
dency, raising the need to promote the creation of more jobs as a slogan,
but without infusing much serious policy debate into the race.
Peru suffered the consequences of the nonexistence of a stable party
system along with the consequences of the fragility of the new leader-
ships and movements that have sprung up in recent years. Because of
the precariousness of the groups in power and those in opposition, the
problems of democratic representation are not going away. In the
vacuum left by the collapse of the party systems, authoritarian govern-
ments emerged, but they were no better at establishing new hegemonic
parties. The new movements that have appeared in recent years are
characterized by personalism, precariousness, improvisation, and vola-

tility. It is in this context that Fujimorism unexpectedly collapsed, torn
by internal contradictions and weakened by its personalistic nature, af-
ter the irregular reelection in 2000. The main explanation for the fall of
Fujimorism lies in the conflicts between the president and his intelli-
gence adviser Vladimiro Montesinos, not because of the consolidation
of alternatives within the opposition.
THE CHALLENGE OF A DEMOCRACY WITHOUT PARTIES

In Peru, the challenge now is to surmount the legacy of a decade of
authoritarianism that weakened state institutions, which were run in
order to keep Fujimorism in power. Another negative legacy is the fra-
gility of social and political organizations. After the party system of the
1980s was destroyed, the gap was filled by Fujimorism and independ-
ent movements, but none of these has consolidated itself. Fujimorism
also damaged Peruvian societys capacity for collective action, under-
mining the representativeness of the social actors and isolating them
from society. Contrary to some views, the fall of Fujimorism was not
the result of the growth of the opposition or of social protests. That
false notion has led to overestimating the capabilities of the political
groups, now at the center of the political scene and in control of the
Congress, and to underestimating the continuity of patterns characteris-
tic of Fujimorism, which are maintained in the political culture, the
media, the judiciary, and other institutions. The precariousness of the
administrations led by presidents Alejandro Toledo (2001 2006) and
Alan Garca (2006 2011) show the weakness of the participating actors.
Precarious and volatile movements and parties generate two perverse
logics. First, these groups have limited time horizons; they give priority
to short-term logics and are unable to devise long-term policies or strat-
egies for themselves. Second, since they are new and precarious move-
ments, their political rewards are not great. It is enough for them to
obtain some mayorships and governorships or congressional seats and
from these positions strive for future growth and consolidation. This
logic hinders the formation of coalitions, generates a scenario of frag-
mentation, and impedes resolving problems of collective action. For
these reasons, both the actors in power and the opposition are weak.
In the Peruvian case, this is the story of movements such as Uni on
por el Per u, Somos Per u, Solidaridad Nacional, Per u Posible, or the
Partido Nacionalista. If we analyze the Peruvian Congress of recent
years and observe which groups gather the majority of the seats, we
will find extreme levels of volatility, with the relative exception of the
APRA party. This also helps explain how Garca could win the 2006
elections, despite the disastrous performance of his first administration
(Table 8.2).
Table 8.2 Peru: Congress Seats of the Main Three Parties, 1995 2011
1995 2000 2000 2001 2001 2006 2006 2011
Party or Party or Party or Party or

Alliance % Alliance % Alliance % Alliance %
1 Group Cambio 90-NM 55.83 Per
u 2000 43.30 Per
u Posible 37.50 Uni
on por el Per
u 37.50
2 Group UPP 14.16 Per
u Posible 24.16 APRA 23.30 APRA 30.00
3 Group APRA 6.60 FIM 7.50 Unidad Nacional 14.16 Unidad Nacional 14.16
Total 76.59 74.96 74.96 81.70
In the Peruvian case, the current consequences of the weakness of

the political parties and the logics based on which they function are ba-
sically twofold. On the one hand, parties are mostly personalistic, prag-
matic, and nonideological. One consequence of this is that the winners
arrive to power without proper preparation, without a clear idea of
what to do once in power, and without cadres capable of assuming the
tasks of public administration. As a consequence of this, public policies
tend to be driven by inertia and by the influence of de facto powers,
domestic and international. This helps to explain the continuity of
market-oriented policies in Peru, despite the fact that both Toledo and
Garca (especially the latter) campaigned by promising a substantial re-
vision of at least some of its orientations. This constitutes a case of pol-
icy switches, which was inaugurated in 1990 by Alberto Fujimori, a
situation where mechanisms of vertical accountability are ineffective.28
It seems that no matter what the promises of the candidates, public
policies remain unchanged. This tends to delegitimize electoral compe-
tition and undermine the preference of democracy as a political regime.
In recent years, parties have come to power without having the nec-
essary strength and will to make important changes in the macroeco-
nomic sphere or to modify the style of policy making that consolidated
Table 8.3 Institutionalization Index Latin American Party Systems

Institutionali- Electoral Party Party
zation index volatility Party roots legitimacy organization
Uruguay 76 84 73 51 97
Rep. Dominicana 74 75 75 50 98
Nicaragua 70 84 62 34 98
Honduras 68 94 66 40 74
Mexico 67 88 62 33 85
Panama 67 77 66 41 83
El Salvador 66 90 62 35 78
Chile 65 95 49 40 77
Paraguay 64 79 82 32 65
Argentina 62 74 46 34 94
Costa Rica 61 77 62 40 67
Colombia 60 89 49 30 73
Brazil 59 80 49 40 66
Bolivia 56 66 60 26 72
Venezuela 55 60 47 42 73
Peru 53 51 54 34 75
Ecuador 53 73 53 23 62
Guatemala 48 58 45 34 58
Source: Jones, Mark: The role of parties and party systems in the policymaking process. In
State reform, public policies, and policymaking processes. Washington: IDB, 2005.
under the years of Fujimori. This weakness gives an excessive and

unaccountable power to de facto powers, articulated by technocrats,
multilateral and financial institutions, big entrepreneurs, and the main-
stream media. One unexpected positive effect of this situation is the
continuity of the same policies at the macroeconomic level that have
allowed Peru to have a level of GDP growth way above the Latin
American average in recent years. However, at the same time, the
weakness of political parties explains the persistence of the limitations
that the current economic model has. Peru has consistent economic
growth, but ineffective social policies, so poverty levels do not decrease
substantially, especially in rural areas and among people with indige-
nous origins, where they are indeed very high: Between 2001 and 2004
GDP per capital growth was 9.4%; national poverty levels went from
54.3% to 51.6%; in rural areas, from 77.1% to 72.5%.29
This explains why in the 2006 elections there was an emergence of
social class, ethnicity, and region as important cleavages, as in no other
time in recent Peruvian history.30 Votes for Alan Garca were highly
concentrated in Lima and urban and modern areas, while his competi-
tor, Ollanta Humala, was stronger outside Lima, in rural areas and
poor areas.
After the 2006 elections, there was a widespread perception that dis-
tributive and social policy issues were crucial, and that to put an em-
phasis on those matters was a mandate from election results. It seemed
that the Garca government was going to lead a center-left oriented
administration, as in many other Latin American countries, where it is
said that, after the exhaustion of the neo-liberal Washington Consen-
sus, Peru is now witnessing a left turn.31 However, Garcas admin-
istration has developed very timid and partial initiatives in the social
policy area surprising considering the 2006 election results, what has
occurred in countries like Brazil, Chile, Uruguay, Bolivia, or Venezuela,
and even what Fujimori did during the 1990s, and considering as well
that the economy is growing and that there are budgetary resources to
implement aggressive social policies. Why is the second APRA govern-
ment so conservative in social policies? The explanation can be found
to a large extent in the weakness of political parties, particularly as it is
manifested in a scarcity of cadres with sufficient technical expertise
and in the distance and distrust between think tanks and politicians,
two conditions that developed under the Fujimori administration. What
happens when a party in government does not have the necessary per-
sonnel and does not have trust and working relationships with the cen-
ters producing new ideas and policy proposals? Decisions remain
ineffective. This helps to explain the fact that Peru in the past five years
has had economic growth, but no substantial reduction in poverty, now
at around 45% of the population. State policies are not the result of a
political debate on the public sphere, but the consequence of the
influence of de facto powers and technocratic policy networks that are

not accountable to the citizens (Table 8.3).32
In sum, Peru has one of the lowest levels of party institutionalization
in Latin America. Amid the climate of questioning of politics and par-
ties now present throughout the Andean region, the case of Peru fur-
nishes valuable lessons on the importance of parties above and beyond
their limitations. This is perhaps the most important conclusion. Parties
are important. Despite their shortcomings; their absence makes prob-
lems worse rather than solves them. And when they are weak, so too is
democracy.
CHAPTER 9
Uruguay: Persistence and Change

in an Old Party Democracy
Jorge Lanzaro
INTRODUCTION
Democracy in Uruguay has historically been a party democracy. As
such, it is quite an unusual case in Latin America. Furthermore, it is the
oldest democracy in this region, because it has persisted since the very
beginning of the 20th century, undergoing two authoritarian breakdowns
and significant changes.
This regime is based on the existence of a long-lived, plural, and com-
petitive party system, which reached a high level of institutionalization.
The party system was born with the country itself in the first half of the
19th century and therefore has a place among the oldest in the Western
world.1 It was originally a two-party system, integrated by the Partido
Colorado (PC colorados) and the Partido Nacional (PN blancos),2 which
dominated the political arena from the countrys founding civil wars
until the end of the 20th century. These parties overcame several critical
cycles and were the main players in successive phases of change, a histor-
ical sequence along which both parties and the party system as a whole
displayed varying configurations.
However, the traditional system has not come out unscathed from
the most recent critical juncture. Since the democratic transition begin-
ning in 1980, the party system has regained consistency and renewed
its central position in the political system, but it has also experienced a
formidable transformation: The traditional parties lost ground and
the left-wing Frente Amplio (FA) which was born before the dictator-
ship and brought together all left groups achieved sustained electoral
growth and finally won control of the government in 2005. This consoli-
dated a major political realignment: The left achieved a majority position
and the traditional parties bloc, which in the 1984 opening election
brought in 81% of the votes, dropped to 46%. The Partido Colorado,
which was a dominating party for many decades controlling the gov-
ernment for periods totaling more than 100 years was reduced to a
meager 10%.3 Nonetheless, the party system persists, in the face of conti-
nuity and change, having had its strength tried by a major mutation.
Uruguayan democracy has largely been the work of its parties and is
linked to the political vicissitudes of the party system, with its periods of
prosperity, weaknesses, and changes. This has shaped the democratic
regime and produced the consequences that are usually associated with
competitive party politics. In the first place, this circumstance tends to
moderate power concentration and ensures better margins for the distribu-
tion of public authority, with effective checks and balances. It also pro-
vides a decision-making pattern, adjusted to a certain balance between
majorities and minorities: thus, political products tend to have some
consensus and generate more limited dissent. Although this makes party
politics more gradual and moderate, it also makes them more stable.
Furthermore, competitive party politics generate possibilities for the redis-
tribution of power and goods involving a considerable supply of public
benefits in a system of compromises that attends to the needs of the pop-
ular and middle-class sectors, while at the same time considering the
interests of the higher classes. On the other hand, conservative reactions
and liberal thrusts generating pendulous swings and focal points of
polarization usually encounter multiple veto players and go through
adjustments, making them relatively moderate. Last but not least, political
pluralism enables social pluralism to flourish. Since the Uruguayan party
system has been plural and competitive for most of the time since its ori-
gin, this has become the key to its prevalence and also to the vicissitudes
of this regime, which can be considered as a typical case of pluralist presi-
dential democracy.4 Due to the features of the traditional system, the struc-
ture of the state, and the decision-making pattern, this pluralist regime
had, for many years, the traits of a peculiar consociational democracy.5
These political factors were determinant in shaping the nations type of
development, resulting since the beginning of the 20th century and espe-
cially after 1930 in a strongly state-centered model. They also prompted
the early development of a social welfare system, which marked its time.
Nevertheless, Uruguay has not managed to avoid authoritarian break-
downs, which have happened every time the parties have faltered in their
political productivity, cooperation, and loyalty and when pluralism degen-
erated into disaggregation and polarization. In fact, several critical junc-
tures produced a sequence of authoritarian moments and democratic
moments, promoting the processes of change and creating new political
outlines. This happened in the later part of the 19th century, during the
Uruguay 197
states founding stages. It happened once again in the 1930s, a period

when state expansion and internal market development were promoted.
Finally, it happened again during the crisis of the 1960s, the sharpest crisis
of them all, which resulted in a long and grievous dictatorship, from 1973
to 1984, when the country fell under military rule with the compliance of
civilian presidents and collaborationists.
After the subsequent democratic transition in 1984, the development
model was again transformed and there has also been a major change in
the political structure: Party democracy still continues and retains its com-
petitive character, but the new party system, accompanied by the 1996 con-
stitutional reform and a substantial change in the electoral regime, altered
the old consociational pattern and to a certain extent also lowered secular
pluralism. In the framework of this party democracy, there was a neo-
liberal transition during the 1990s, shaped by pro-market reforms in the
economy and the state. In the case of Uruguay, the neo-liberal transition
was gradual due to party competition and not as drastic as those in other
countries in Latin America, where the age of market reforms occurred
without a competitive party system or even without any parties at all. In
the 21st century there has been a turn toward the left, as in many countries
in South and Central America. But unlike the populist left regimes, in the
case of Uruguay, as well as in Brazil and Chile, the turn to the left marked
the debut of a social democratic government. This experience has been
undertaken within the framework of a party system, which despite having
changed a lot, remains nevertheless plural and competitive.
Given these traits, the Uruguayan trajectory stands out in the history of
Latin America and also in the regions present landscape, where after an
era of authoritarian regimes, there are many systems without effective par-
ties or party systems and several regimes, which despite being electoral
democracies, show serious faults in political institutionalization, plurality,
and effective competition. The first section of this chapter reviews the
foundational process and the main stages of Uruguayan democracy. It also
underlines the typical traits of this democratic regime, which explain its
stability but have also been the origin of its crises. The second section
examines mutations in both the party system and the plural political tex-
ture, which come with the double transition: the sequence of democratic
transition and neo-liberal transition, which has shaped the critical juncture
the country has undergone in recent decades. The purpose of this discus-
sion is to show both persistence and change in an old party democracy.
PATTERNS OF PLURALIST DEMOCRACY

From Guns to Ballots: The Only Game in Town
Uruguay became independent from Spain in 1830, as a country that
broke away from the old viceroyalty of the River Plate of which it had
been part, together with Argentina. The emancipation process, which

began after the defeat of an English invasion, also put an end to the
domination that both Portugal and Brazil sought at the time of the cri-
sis in the Spanish Empire.6
The traditional Uruguayan parties the PC and the PN were born in
the first half of the 19th century. These two parties were the main actors
building both the state and a new nation in this small buffer country
between Argentina and Brazil. Together they achieved considerable cen-
trality early on due to the vitality of each political team and also the
weakness of other political players such as economic oligarchies, the mili-
tary, and the Catholic Church. This circumstance was associated with the
absence of a peasant society and of a sedentary indigenous civilization
that settled either in agricultural economies or in mining enclaves. Unlike
other Latin American countries, Uruguay was originally an empty ter-
ritory, colonized late and committed to extensive cattle ranching, incor-
porating a low-density population that was rather mobile and free. The
new nation was formed with transplanted peoples,7 mainly European
immigrants, and a relatively reduced number of slaves from Africa.
From this background derive some of the deep-rooted elements of
Uruguayan civic culture, which were strengthened by the expansion of
public education, the political influence of batllismo, and the polyarchic
forms, with the first popular incorporation adopted at the beginning of
the 20th century.8 In this cultural fabric, trends toward egalitarianism
stand out, which do not eliminate class differences, racial discrimina-
tion, or gender differences, but rather mark hierarchical relationships
and the way authority is exercised in society, economy, and politics.
From the very beginning, and before achieving democracy, the par-
ties held a rather balanced power relation, focused on the center-
periphery cleavage and on controlling or resisting the incipient state. In
the second half of the 19th century, there was progress in building the
state and other institutions, due to the efforts of the civil elites and also
of the military chiefs of the new professional army, which during the
1870s engaged in significant foundational work. In this phase, which is
identified by historians as the anarchy period, elections were never-
theless held, but under a majoritarian regime that was not only quite
exclusive but also lacked effective voting guarantees. This regime
stirred up few loyalties and gave way to civil wars that left no net bal-
ance of winners and losers. Confrontations in the battlefield did not
end with the simple political defeat of one of the sides, but rather to a
series of pacts of a constitutional nature that reformulated public insti-
tutions to include representatives of both parties, in increasingly plural
openness. Furthermore, the state could eventually be consolidated and
recognized as having a monopoly of legitimate violence and as the
national political center, insofar as it became a pluralistic structure that
provided space for minorities in a sort of Madisonian pattern, avoiding
Uruguay 199
the tyranny of the majority. This happened one step at a time, thanks
to successive political agreements that led to the multiplication of par-
liamentary seats and the progressive broadening of proportional repre-
sentation, including coparticipation of both parties in the executive
administration as a strategic complement. This process was crowned by
the Electoral Law of July 11, 1910 (Law 3.640), which established the
cornerstone of the electoral regime in force until the 1996 reform, and
preceded male universal suffrage. Combined with the other measures
of political integration agreed to in different pacts since the 1870s, this
law was a fundamental step toward institutionalizing political conflict.
Competition among parties now passed definitely from arms to ballots,
and elections became the only game in town, while the state was
consolidated as a national political center. Citizenship for men was
enlarged in 1912. Thus, at the beginning of the first decade of the 20th
century, democracy was inaugurated in Uruguay.
A Polyarchic Path
The original and sustained party plurality materialized in a polyarchy,
given that the building of the state and the political system was shaped
by the balance of forces and gave birth to a pluralist presidential democ-
racy with a notable degree of power distribution.9 The fundamen-
tal democratization10 granted during the first two decades of the 20th
century, with modern popular incorporation (universal suffrage for
men, electoral and civil rights, association and collective action rights),
came into being after the party elites had already made progress in set-
ting up rules for competition and opposition. This basic condition of the
polyarchic path was reached by means of a long series of foundational
pacts (18721910), concerning, in particular, the electoral regime, propor-
tional representation, and coparticipation in the organs of the new state.
Consequently, the critical juncture passing from elite politics to mass
politics did not happen through rupture, but through continuity, and it
was not led by outsiders, but came from within the establishment, guided
by the hands of leaders of the historical political parties. The main actors
were indeed the PC and the PN as a duet, which in that transition became
modern citizen parties and adopted new forms of organization and polit-
ical profession, headed by a new generation of leaders. Among them was
Jose Batlle y Ord ~ ez, from the PC, who had been president during two
on
periods (19031907 and 19111915) and who was considered the crea-
tor of his times. He became the legendary founding father of the batl-
lismo, a political current that shaped Uruguay as a model country and
had a determining influence throughout the 20th century,11 bequeathing
a legacy that the left has to a large extent taken up. His counterpart and
opponent was Luis Alberto de Herrera, from the PN, another main char-
acter in Uruguayan politics from the beginning of the 20th century until
1959.12 Therefore, this was a plural democratic process, undertaken

jointly by both parties, in strongly competitive terms and with a rather
balanced distribution of votes. Popular incorporation was not created by
a sole leading actor seizing power and did not involve exclusive or antag-
onistic thrusts. In addition to this, the incorporation of middle sectors
and lower classes did not lead to the flight of the higher classes, which
were also integrated into the new system, with different party preferen-
ces and different lines of conflict and alliance in both economic and social
areas. This fundamental democratization did imply a redistribution of
political and economic resources, but was relatively moderate and went
through two movements that did not generate authoritarian ruptures:
initially, the movement toward state intervention and the first steps to-
ward social welfare; subsequently, a conservative reaction, against the
forwardness of those progressive initiatives.
Political pluralism has allowed social pluralism to prosper since the
beginning of the 20th century. In that competitive arena, parties affirmed
their vocation as catch-all parties and were careful not to weave exclusive
relationships with any social group. Correspondingly, new and old busi-
ness associations, the trade unions of the incipient working class, and ad
hoc civil organizations, which brought together other incorporated popu-
lar sectors, kept their autonomy and notwithstanding the asymmetry
of socioeconomic powers, gained participation in a new world of group
politics in a key of political pluralism.
The original polyarchic path had long-term constitutive effects and
founded a lasting pluralist democracy. Historically, the Uruguayan
model is thus distinguished from other Latin American polities: from
the unique example of realized hegemony, with a stable monopoly, as
evolved from the Mexican Revolution; and from more common situa-
tions of frustrated hegemony or truncated pluralism, with a recurrent
imbalance of powers and congenital instability, as in the very different
cases of Argentina and Bolivia.
A Peculiar Kind of Consociational Democracy

In addition to this, such plural construction gave way to a peculiar type
of consociational democracy, which prevailed under different expres-
sions, from the foundational processes until the 1973 dictatorship. In the
Uruguayan case, that type of democracy did not involve social cleavages
based on nationality, ethnicity, religion, and class as in the seminal
elaboration of Arend Liphart but referred to specifically political con-
flicts, concerning above all state-building and the center-periphery cleav-
age.13 In this scenario, the two traditional parties operated as subjective
motherlands,14 both as power associations and political communities,
with their own hierarchies, traditions, and subcultures, which would be
Uruguay 201
integrated as such into the nation and into the plural political system they
themselves built.
By virtue of this main feature, the Uruguayan composition may be
compared to the one established by the two historical parties of Colom-
bia in the mid-20th century.15 But the Uruguayan consociational build-
ing is older, more consistent, and unlike the Colombian one, did not
give place to an agreed alternation: although it did limit the balance of
winners and losers, it was nevertheless inscribed in a regime of effec-
tive competition.
Coparticipation, the electoral regime, proportional representation,
and the requirement of qualified majorities for constitutional reforms
and parliamentary decisions on strategic questions constituted key ele-
ments in this peculiar consociational democracy.
The model of political representation, and in particular the electoral
regime, set up by the fundamental law of 1910 and abolished in 1996,
was a basic pillar of the pluralist system that ruled throughout the 20th
century (with the exception of the authoritarian period from 1933 to
1942, ruled by a coalition of the right-wing sectors of the two tradi-
tional parties, and the military dictatorship that canceled democratic
life and all party activities between 1973 and 1984). In that ancient re-
gime, presidential election by plurality was combined with almost pure
proportional representation in the selection of parliamentary members
and with the mechanism of a double simultaneous vote (for the
party and for candidates within the party), which was the cornerstone
of the Uruguayan system and one of its most salient characteristics.16
According to this rule, national elections included at the same time a
form of internal elections: the fractions within a party competed with one
another, while also accumulating votes together to compete against the
other parties. This formula applied to all posts, with several candidates
per party (for the presidency, parliament, and municipalities). The for-
mula was a strategic element in the foundational pact that made it possi-
ble to regulate competition between the two historical parties, while at
the same time serving to regulate internal competition within each party.
This ingenious rule strengthened the reproduction of bipartyism and
protected both the unity of each association to compete and its internal
plurality, thereby providing the whole party with a good electoral drag-
net. Such a procedure counteracted the operation of the iron law of oli-
garchy17 within each party and favored the permanence of fractions,
maintaining a degree of ideological differentiation and important but rel-
atively moderate internal fragmentation. Within each of the big parties,
there usually existed two or three large sectors, which were the truly rele-
vant actors in the political scene, operating with significant autonomy.
Pluralism and apportionment rules were thus ingrained in the state
structure and shaped government processes by means of the coparticipa-
tion of both parties in the executive administration and the requirement of
parliamentary intervention, with qualified majorities required for adopting

strategic decisions and high-rank appointments (control bodies, regulatory
agencies, armed forces, judiciary, and diplomatic corps). Coparticipation
was initially applied to the distribution of municipal posts, recognizing the
regional settlements of the two parties and giving local caudillos public
authority, political influence, and patronage possibilities. Afterward, copar-
ticipation became national. For two periods (19191933 and 19511966),
executive power was organized as a collegiate body (as in Switzerland),
organized into a majority and a minority, with representatives from the
two large parties and their different sectors. In a more permanent way,
according to rules included in the constitution, coparticipation shaped the
agencies and boards of the decentralized administration (public enterprises
and social services), as the distribution of posts was made according to par-
liamentary representation.18 In this way, minorities were ensured direct
participation in public management, with access to political resources and
client networks, without the specific need for consensual convergence (gov-
ernment support, alliances, or coalitions). Further from its parliamentary
seats, the opposition thus enters the states executive structure, without
being less competitive and without having to be a coalescent opposition,
joining forces with the government. Of course such access to the benefits of
power no doubt more than once stimulated cooperative behavior on the
part of the opposition.
The broadening of the economic and social scope of the state was thus
adjusted to the political principles that presided over the original process
and had a pluralist-democratic trademark. Indeed, the process did not
merely reinforce the faculties of the executive power or the president in a
regime of authority concentration. On the contrary, per the 1917 constitu-
tional reform, it was subject to a pattern of decentralization and copartici-
pation, which shaped the development and expansion of the political
structure of the state throughout the 20th century, until the arrival of the
dictatorship in 1973. Following that political and institutional pattern,
the executive power of the cabinet of ministries grew, but at the same time
the field of decentralized administration, composed of state companies
and public services with collective boards, was also extended. Thus, an
archipelago of powerful and competitive public centers was set up, which
controlled policy-making processes in key sectors (banking, energy, trans-
port, ports, communications, education, social security, and so forth).
Together with these forms of party coparticipation, there have been
since the 1930s instances of corporatist coparticipation in tripartite or
bipartite organizations integrated by government agents, business repre-
sentatives, and union delegates. These were responsible for important
branches of social security that made up the welfare state and for many
of the regulatory functions, which multiplied during the Keynesian era.19
Despite this sector of democratic corporatism, the Uruguayan state
has in general been an outstanding example of a party state, with a
Uruguay 203
political structure and an administrative architecture that sets it apart.

The traditional parties were jointly and from the very start state parties,
whose political reproduction (organization, resources of power, links to
citizens, legitimacy, and political careers) was associated to the state
they built and reformed, as a strategic engine of the changes in the
development model.
POLITICAL TRANSITION: THE RISE OF THE LEFT AND THE

END OF THE TRADITIONAL BIPARTY SYSTEM (19842005)
The political model analyzed up to now had a serious crisis in the
1960s, which led to a long and severe dictatorship. The core of this pro-
cess lay in the crisis of the party system. Traditional parties failed to find
ways to renew themselves or to renew the political design, the state, or
the economy. They lost centrality, leadership, and capacity to combine
interests. They ran into insurmountable difficulties in building an alter-
native project, a new political compromise, and new social alliances.
Important reform initiatives arose from within the parties themselves,
particularly those destined to replace the old ISI (Import Substitution
Industrialization) socioeconomic model with the new patterns of desar-
rollismo (developmentalism), promoted by the ECLAC (United Nations
Economic Commission for Latin America and the Carribean) at that
time. Furthermore, in 1966, a constitutional reform was passed that
provided two major novelties: first, programmatic norms and a set of
new public institutions that modernized the structure of the state (such
as a Central Bank, Planning Office, Social Security Institute, and Civil
Service Office); second, a return to a unipersonal presidency, with an
increase of competences and a higher degree of power concentration,
after 15 years of a collegiate executive power.
Nevertheless, political initiatives were generally blocked by competi-
tion between parties and factions in a cycle that intensified political
fragmentation and social opposition. There was intensive activism by
pressure groups and class associations that turned into a sort of cor-
poratization of politics. The trade unions joined forces under a single
confederation and acted as a hub of political mobilization.
It is in this context that the first advances of the left took place,
through mass movements and new party coalitions, with an ideological
offensive and a switch in political strategy, which gave it greater elec-
toral strength and placed it as a defying actor in the national scene.20
This process represented a historical change, crowned by the founda-
tion of the FA. In 1971, the old left parties (Socialist Party and Commu-
nist Party) joined the Christian Democrats, independent left groups,
and fractions coming from the traditional parties to found the FA. In
the elections of that year, the FA obtained over 18% of the votes, open-
ing a gap in the bipartite system, which subsequently led to a major
electoral realignment. At that time, General Liber Seregni made his

debut as the FA party leader and presidential candidate and from then
on played an important political role. During the dictatorship, he was
imprisoned for more than nine years. He was liberated in 1984, took an
active part in the transition to democracy, and became a front line
national figure until his death (which occurred just before the FAs vic-
tory in the 2004 elections).
Since 1962 there have also been some urban guerrilla actions, in par-
ticular those of the Movimiento de Liberaci on Nacional (MLN Tupa-
maros), which increased after 1968. These actions added a factor to the
current political decomposition, leading to the rise of the right and the
eruption of the military.21
In 1968, there was an important turn in the course of events of those
times. In the middle of the crisis, Jorge Pacheco Areco of the PC insti-
tuted a bonapartist presidency of authoritarian characteristics, which
succeeded in achieving a certain measure of order and economic stabil-
ity, but had an adversarial relationship with parliament and contrib-
uted to the multiplication of political conflicts and social antagonisms.
The outcome was catastrophic. As a result of centrifugal competition,
ideologic distancing, and radical oppositions, Uruguay entered into a
polarized pluralism that unfolded into the 1973 coup detat and a mili-
tary dictatorship from which the country did not emerge until 1985.22
The dictatorship came when the Tupamaros organization had already
been destroyed, and although the guerilla actions were a factor in the
militarys coming out of their quarters, the coup was the result of
the general factors of the crisis and political polarization the faults of
the historical parties; the spreading of democratic disloyalty and the
demotion of political institutions; the rise of the left as a defying actor,
its ideological advance, and cultural penetration; the mobilization of
the trade unions, students, and other social groups in counterpoint to
the rights activism, which in turn had different manifestations among
civilians and the military.
The democratic transition began through the initiative of the military
chiefs, who in 1980 held a constitutional plebiscite with the purpose of
institutionalizing the authoritarian regime. Something similar happened
in Chile during the same year, where the plebiscite called by Pinochet
sanctioned the constitution that with some amendments remains in
force to date. In Uruguay, to the contrary, the result was adverse for
the dictatorship: Despite the fact that it was held in the midst of severe
limitations to political freedoms, the government project which
seemed to have all the winning cards was rejected by 57% of votes
against it.
The plebiscite was a landmark citizen event, which had lasting politi-
cal and symbolic effects and opened up the possibility of giving new
life to both parties and social movements. Starting at that point, the
Uruguay 205
transition was driven by an increasingly active mobilization of demo-

cratic opposition, moving toward a transition by agreement, which
finally materialized in a pact celebrated in 1984 between the military
and the party opposition, in which the leaders of the PC and the FA
took part (the PN stayed out of the deal).
By virtue of this pact, in the 1984 opening election, which led to Julio
Mara Sanguinettis first presidency, several prominent leaders were
banned and were not permitted to be candidates (in particular: Jorge
Batlle, PC; Wilson Ferreira Aldunate, PN; and Liber Seregni, FA). In
1984, democracy was restored and the 1966 constitution was once again
in force. Nevertheless, the military still retained enough power to stop
the trial begun against them for violations to human rights and man-
aged to secure an amnesty law. This law was passed in 1986, with the
votes of the PC and the majority of the PN, but with the opposition of
the FA. The law was confirmed by a 1989 popular referendum (56%
votes in favor, a similar percentage to that which in 1980 rejected the
constitution proposed by the dictatorship).
In the new democratic phase, the party system recovered both center
stage and consistency, but at the same time it had undergone a huge
transformation, marked by the development of the left and the end of
the traditional two-party system.23 This transformation prospered with
the liberal transition, which took shape beginning in 1990, reaching its
high point 15 years later, with the first victory of the left in national
elections and the debut of a social democratic government.
Over the past quarter century Uruguay has continued to be a com-
petitive and plural party democracy, a quality that shapes these chap-
ters of the countrys history and preserves the gradualism of its
political processes. Hence, the liberal thrust, the institutional innova-
tions that go with it, and the subsequent turn to the left have specific
traits, certainly quite different from the ones such phenomena have had
in authoritarian regimes or in democracies without healthy party sys-
tems. Nevertheless, under the constitutional reform that was passed in
1996, the new electoral regime and the changes in government practices
modified important aspects of the old pluralist democracy.
Liberal Transition
Democratic transitions and liberal transitions in Latin America dur-
ing the past few decades have varied from one country to the other,
due to different factors and, in particular, according to the weight par-
ties and party systems have had in such processes. Certainly this
dimension (party-less party-ness) is a fundamental variable of politi-
cal dynamics, which is reflected in the types of democracy emerging
from the different transitions, as well as in the political format and the
outputs of the liberal reforms.24
In the case of Uruguay, parties have recovered their role and central-
ity during the democratic transition, which has in itself been a period
of restoration of the political system. Consequently, they were able to
provide the keys to party government25 during the second transition:
an agenda of structural reforms (state, economy, and social policies)
shaped by neo-liberal trends in the terms of the so-called Washington
consensus.26
The PC and the PN took the initiative in undertaking the pro-market
reforms. Unlike in other countries, the application of these prescriptions
was made without a detonating critical situation. Rather, it was mainly
the result of an active competition within and among the parties, in
which the more provocative initiatives came from the right wings of both
traditional parties. As agenda-setters, these parties pushed the reform of
the state and the economy through government, ideological offensives,
and electoral campaigns. From 1985 to 2005, while in office, they pro-
moted privatizations, changes in state functions, and economic liberaliza-
tion, setting up new patterns of economic and social regulation.
The struggle between and within the traditional parties, with consid-
erable disagreements among their different factions, could be displayed
as a triangle vis-
a-vis the constant opposition of the left, backed by the
unions, and openly against liberalization prospects. In addition, there
has been significant citizen participation, including plebiscites on con-
stitutional matters and referendums to block the privatization of major
public enterprises. However, unlike what happened in other countries
in the region, in this case plebiscitary democracy is not a populist
resource and it is not a consequence of the weakness of the party sys-
tem: quite the contrary, it has been a complement of the political game
played within the representative institutions and responds to party tac-
tics, operating mainly as veto actions or potential of threat from the
labor unions and the FA.
Due to political competition, the reforms were of a gradualist and mod-
erate nature, which put limits on liberalization, preserving existing
state economic and social functions to a fairly large extent.27 In the Lora
Privatization Index, in 19851999 during the up cycle of the liberal
trends Uruguay ranks last of 18 countries in Latin America, with the
lowest value of privatized active public assets in proportion to gross
nation product (GNP) (below 0.1%).28 Furthermore, some of the pro-
posed reforms were quite heterodox:29 the old social welfare was in part
preserved although public services incorporated market logics and all
governments put active social policies in practice. Together with eco-
nomic growth, between 1985 and 1994 under the successive governments
of the PC and the PN, this helped reduce the share of the population
under the poverty line from 46% to 15%. Thus, toward 1999 and before
the economic crisis of 2002, Uruguay was among the leading countries in
the UNDP rankings for Latin America: third in the Human Development
Uruguay 207
Index and first in the Poverty Index. Furthermore, that year Uruguay
was the only country in the region that, when the product grew, regis-
tered an improvement in income distribution.30
Despite the above, the consequences of the liberal transition were rel-
atively important and had political effects on the parties and political
competition.
Political Innovation and Constitutional Reform

In order to drive reforms and confront the resistance this process
causes, there were movements toward centralization both within the
parties and within the government, tending to reinforce the executive.
However, despite these trends toward concentration, which are univer-
sal and have had perverse effects in other Latin American countries,
Uruguay maintained a certain balance of power. There was no govern-
ing by decree, and reforms moved regularly through parliament and
party bargaining processes.
As the FAs electoral support grew, under Liber Seregnis and Tabare
Vazquezs leadership, alliances between the PC and the PN tended to
prosper, giving rise to a politics of blocs. Meanwhile, the traditional par-
ties each had their turns at the presidency and engaged in a learning
process that involved cooperating, weaving compromises, and building
coalition governments, which were increasingly consistent. This debut
added Uruguay to the wave of coalition presidentialism recorded in
Latin America since the 1980s.31 Coalitions allowed parties to form par-
liamentary majorities, sustain liberal policies, and promote state reforms
that were nevertheless incremental, since competition between the coali-
tion partners and the FA opposition tended to impose a gradual path,
with the moderation of political initiatives (ex ante and ex post).
In 1996, in order to delay the FAs access to government, or at least to
make such a possibility depend upon greater political support, tradi-
tional parties pushed a constitutional reform, which dismantled the elec-
toral regime that had allowed them to develop since the early 20th
century.32 This new design eliminated the double simultaneous vote and,
instead of the former plurality principle, adopted majority rule with two
rounds for the presidential elections (ballottage). In addition, the new elec-
toral system allows only one presidential candidate per party, chosen
through compulsory and simultaneous primaries for all parties. How-
ever, Uruguay kept the system of proportional representation for parlia-
mentary elections, held concurrently with the first presidential round.
Taking into account the typology of constitutional reform processes
in Latin America from the mid-1980s, the 1996 Uruguayan reform can
be considered to be of a defensive nature. It did not arise from an of-
fensive of political actors taking advantage of a position of relative su-
periority or seeking to promote a specific political-ideological project,
but rather it was set forth by the parties of the establishment to face the
menacing rise of the left. Threatened by this challenge, they resigned
themselves to selling the jewels of the crown and let go of the valua-
ble resources of the ancient regime. For this they had to overcome not
only the FA opposition, but also the resistance of their own ranks.33
The coalition partners modified the system, including norms that
according to their calculations could favor their political permanence
and that were destined to halt the FAs access to government by setting
a higher entry barrier.
With those features, the reform coalition appeared as a two against
one strategy.34 Nevertheless, as an effect of the balances generated by
party competition and following the political will of the reform coali-
tion under President Sanguinettis leadership, in the case of Uruguay
this strategy sought to compromise with the adversaries and to regulate
the political conflict by following a centrist line and adopting a rather
pluralist temperament. There was a concern for temperance, broaden-
ing consensus, and limiting dissent very different from what has been
seen in the constitutional reforms adopted during the 2000s in democ-
racies hitherto considered to be effectively without parties, such as
Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela.
In Uruguay, the prevailing incremental pattern shaped the process and
content of the reform, which had the support of important sectors within
the FA and incorporated several historical demands of the left, seeking to
reduce the affront to those who were in fact the reforms target.
Thus the birth of new forms of political competition generated im-
portant innovations in the forms of presidential government and pro-
moted a constitutional reform that brought a substantial change in the
electoral regime, undertaken always in a pluralist key and as part of
party politics. In turn, these changes had important consequences in
the life of the parties, both for the FA and for the traditional parties
themselves, which as often happens ended up imprisoned by their
own institutional innovations.
Realignment of the Party System

The new system did not fulfill the defensive expectations of the reform
coalition. The trends that motivated the reform remained at work, electoral
realignment followed its course, and the historical transformation of the
party system was consolidated, bringing changes in its general format and
in each partys systemic function. Traditional bipartyism eventually ended
and the left, under the FAs flag, continued to grow steadily until it became
the largest party of the Uruguayan political scene (1999 election) and even-
tually made its debut in government (2004 election).
Table 9.1 shows this process over the course of quite a few years,
along several critical elections. The lefts debut in office was reached
Uruguay 209
Table 9.1 Electoral Support by Blocks, 1971 2004 (% of valid votes)

PC PN FA
1971 81 18
1984 76 21
1989 69 21
1994 63 30
1999 55 40
2004 46 52
Note: PC, Partido Colorado; PN, Partido Nacional; FA, Frente Amplio.
Source: Instituto de Ciencia Poltica database, http://www.fcs.edu.uy/pri/.
20 years after the return to democracy and 33 years after the founding
of the FA in 1971. It was therefore a gradual process, taking place in a
framework of democratic stability and effective political competition.
The party system changed (but did not break up), the senior parties
remained in the running, and the ascent of the challenging left party
happened step by step, in demanding conditions.
The new composition of the party system maintains the polarity and
appeal of political competition. Even without polarization, within a
scheme of moderate ideological distances and battling for the center, the
left right cleavage serves as an axis of interparty competition and elec-
toral alignment. The explicit recognition and differentiation of the party
elite and of voters is consistent with this pattern.35 In this context, the FAs
development as the challenger party has worked as a safety valve,
enhancing the party systems vitality and capacity of aggregation.
The Changing Fortunes of the Traditional Parties

Political competition is the basic cause of system realignment, but its
effect on the traditional party bloc and the FA has certainly been differ-
ent. In the course of the double transition of the past few decades, tra-
ditional parties have performed reasonably well, renewing modes of
government, managing the reform agenda, and recycling their leader-
ship, elites, and programs. Paradoxically, the success they have had
regarding those issues has proved costly, and the blocs electoral support
has systematically declined. Two related factors help explain this trend.
First, the reform of the state and the liberalization of the economy
alter their secular nature as state parties and result in a certain reduc-
tion of their resources of power, particularly regarding the scope, form,
and extent of discretionary faculties in the political allocation of public
goods. This modifies legitimation patterns and cuts the ancient system
of linkages to citizens, economic agents, and social groups.
Second, the effects of the new patterns of party competition and
cooperation, which have been reinforced by the new electoral system,
must be borne in mind. Since 1990, to the extent that the FA grows,
blancos and colorados the classic rivals went through a progressive

process of convergence and contrived coalitions. They became mutually
close and relatively undifferentiated, forming a political pole and even
an ideological family.36 As a result of ideological overlapping and of
political association, it is indeed more difficult for them to cultivate
their own identities and traditions or to articulate different options and
compete against each other.
Internal differentiation also diminishes and with it the dragnet possi-
bilities formerly provided by the coexistence of right and left wings
inside each of the traditional parties. Diversity has persisted within both,
but the competition of the FA and the duties of government given the
narrowing of electoral support and decline in number of parliamentary
seats have fostered greater convergence among fractions and the need
for party discipline. Indeed, bipolarity generates internal concentration
and has hurt the more progressive wings of the two traditional parties.
The electoral regime established by the 1996 constitutional reform fed
these complications and imposed new demands. Although the election
of the president by majority vote could have a unifying effect, in princi-
ple, the double logic of the system allows at the same time party plural-
ity: All parties may compete in the first round for proportional
representation in Parliament and for a chance in the presidential run-
off election. Nevertheless, to compete effectively, neighboring parties
should have a certain political density and a visible party offer. The
new limit of one presidential candidate per party reduces the possibil-
ity of political differentiation between party factions, which must line
up behind the winner of the primary elections. This affects the individ-
ual profile of each internal sector, reducing the partys electoral reach.
Thus, it may be said that the electoral descent of traditional parties
appears in part as a result of their own strategies: first, due to the neo-
liberal offensive they led forth, and, second, in the defensive reactions
they adopted vis- a-vis the growth of the left (political cooperation and
coalitions, constitutional reform, and change in electoral rules). Indeed,
in this critical juncture, traditional parties through action or reaction,
moved by political competition weakened the pillars on which their
domain was anchored throughout the 20th century.
The Continuing Development of the Left

Of course, these factors operate in a context that is marked by the
emerging FA: The transformation of the left and its competition strat-
egies are key elements in explaining electoral realignment. Otherwise
the liberal transition might have led to different political evolutions
and eventually to the ruin of the party system, as has been the case in
other Latin American countries: depending precisely on the strength of
Uruguay 211
the party system and the performance of the ruling parties, as well as
on the type of development of the left groups, which is in this context
a decisive factor.
The liberal transition is a phase of political darwinism for parties,37
posing strong challenges and at the same time opening new possibil-
ities. The FA proved able to take advantage of this structure of oppor-
tunity, evolving into a successful party. The FAs prosperity can be
explained considering three factors:38
1. The FAs development as a catch-all and electoral party in Kirchheimers

words trying to exchange effectiveness in depth for a wider audience and
more immediate electoral success,39 but nevertheless maintaining a broth-
erhood with trade unions and social movements.
2. The FAs structure as a coalition party, starting from an original genetic
model, which unified all leftist groups, while at the same time preserving a
high level of fractionalism, which serves as a strong electoral dragnet.
3. The FAs two-pronged strategy, which combined opposition to liberalization
and privatizations, in defense of the statist tradition, trends toward ideologi-
cal moderation and competition for the center.
This strategy is articulated with the FAs political transformation and

its development as a catch-all party, marked by ideological conversion.
Step by step, inter- and intraparty competition, political learning, and
the experience of governing Montevideo (uninterrupted since 1990)
have induced ideological temperance and pragmatic positions, in a
movement that affirms a new political identity and at the same time
wins voters from the center.
In a bloc-versus-bloc competition, within a nonpolarized format, the
logic of difference and opposition coexists with the trend toward ideo-
logical moderation and contending for the center. The majority presi-
dential election tends to reinforce this trend.
URUGUAY AS ONE OF THE NEW SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC

GOVERNMENTS IN LATIN AMERICA
With the victory of the left in the 2004 elections and the election of
Tabare Vazquez to the presidency, a social democratic government was
installed in Uruguay for the first time. This debut adds to the experien-
ces in Brazil and Chile (presidencies of Lula da Silva, Ricardo Lagos,
and Michele Bachelet).
All these peripheric social democracies, which have no precedents
in Latin America, may be compared to classic European examples and
particularly to the late experiences that came about in the 1970s and
1980s in Spain, Portugal, and Greece. As in the Latin American cases,
these Southern European social democratic governments arrived in the
context of a double transition: after their respective democratic tran-

sitions, and in the furrow of liberal transitions, far away from the vir-
tuous circles of the Keynesian era and during a new thrust in
globalization.40
Unlike the new populist presidencies and other current experiences
of the left in Latin America, these governments are taking place in
party democracies.41 Precisely what identifies the social democratic
governments and marks a basic distinction from other contemporary
examples is that they are experiences of a left that should fittingly be
considered institutional in two senses: First, there is a high degree
of institutionalization, relative seniority, and political accumulation for
left parties in government: Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT) in Brazil,
Partido Socialista (PS) in Chile, and Frente Amplio (FA) in Uruguay.
This background provides an important acquisition of powers, experi-
ence, and political responsibility, with cadre-formation processes and
long-term leadership building, which rests on party ranks and acquires
recognition both nationwide and among the elites. This leadership pat-
tern is brought into play for presidential candidacies, and then in office.
Second, these parties are integrated into electoral competition and
the republican democratic regime, at the heart of plural and competi-
tive party systems, with low or falling volatility and relatively institu-
tionalized (high instutionalization in Chile and Uruguay; more
rudimentary but with some progress in Brazil). Effective competition
and pluralism shape the roads to government and the evolution of the
ruling left party. They also shape the ways in which government is
exercised.
In this struggle, parties adjust their strategies to those institutional
constraints and in particular to a very demanding electoral competition,
increased by setting up a majority presidential election. There are two
ways to win that are open to them: They may accumulate forces as an
autonomous pole and annex small groups, seeking majority thresholds,
as the FA has done, being itself a coalition party. Or, they may work in
coalitions, as in the cases of Brazil and Chile, which are in turn differ-
ent from each other. The two roads are different and this has conse-
quences in the form of government. But there is, in both, an ideological
and programmatic revisionism that cradles competition toward the
center of the left right spectrum.
Along this road, those socialist, revolutionary, or reformist lineage
accept the rules of representative democracy, not only regarding elec-
tions, but also vis-
a-vis government proceedings. They adjust to the cor-
responding political restrictions, which in turn leads them to incorporate
economic restrictions. Due to this political conduct and the prevail-
ing ideological currents, they adopt the logic of capitalist economics in
open markets, admitting a certain continuity in the status quo and with
neo-liberal parameters. It is therefore fitting to think of the creation of
Uruguay 213
what Adam Przeworski defines as a policy regime: governments of

differing ideological affiliation applying similar policies, due to prevail-
ing constraints and according to electoral calculations.42
Nevertheless, given their ideological roots and moved by inter- and
intraparty competition, these governments in turn cultivate distinct ori-
entations in strategic public policies, calling on enhanced politics and
state intervention to search for economic development, social cohesion,
and democratic progress.
Summing up, what defines these social democratic governments is
the combination of continuity and innovation, riding on a moderate
reformism and no longer the revolution of capitalist societies promoted
by institutional left parties within stable, plural, and competitive democ-
racies. Therefore, they have the same typical characteristics as the classic
or late European examples.
In all three cases, social democratic potential is certainly different
and depends on the political resources of each government, joined by
the following factors: (1) historical legacies in state institutions and
public policies; (2) power coefficient and evolution of the governing left
party; and (3) linkages with unions and other popular sectors.
In these areas, Uruguay has certain advantages when compared to
Brazil and Chile, which make it a more likely experience for setting up
a social democratic alternative, making it in fact a reference model
within the region.
Majority Presidentialism and Social Democratic Potential

The first left government in Uruguay has had relatively important
opportunities for innovation thanks to its political resources: legacies,
brotherhood with the unions, and particularly the FAs power coeffi-
cient. Indeed, it has been a one-party government, holding an infre-
quent majority presidentialism and thus having a rather significant
social democratic potential.43
As to legacies, in addition to long-term assets, the 1990 reforms pre-
serve and even improve the governments toolbox, providing more
favorable conditions for a repolitization spin and for the enhance-
ment of the state. As already noted, Uruguays recent transition fol-
lowed gradual political engineering, shaped by party competition and
the lefts opposition, which set limits to the neo-liberal drive and priva-
tizations. The more important public services and companies remained
in the hands of the state and underwent modernization processes, fol-
lowing a reform pattern that also moderated privatizations and decen-
tralizations in such key sectors as education or social security.
Together with the government party, unions constitute one of
the two political pillars of the social democratic construction. Unions
were relevant actors in the democratic transition, but they were quick to
suffer in the liberal transition of the 1990s. Although they were weak-
ened during that cycle in labor bargaining, altering their composition
and losing affiliates, they still managed to preserve their peak
organization, and by adjusting their strategy, they recycled political
syndicalism by militating against the pro-market reforms. This was
achieved by resorting to referendums, seeking the plebiscite of the bal-
lots instead of staging plebiscites of the street or other traditional strug-
gle measures. Such citizen exercises changed the mobilization pattern
and aggregated the power to veto liberalization initiatives and, above
all, privatizations. These practices contributed to the development of a
left alternative and reinforced the strategic linkage between the FA and
the unions.
This linkage to labor is reflected in the composition of the present gov-
ernment, which is comprised of an important number of cadres coming
from the unions, thus presenting a typical social democratic configura-
tion. It can also be seen in the labor policies of the Vazquez administra-
tion, which recognizes the working classs concerns (salary, social
security, and so forth) and allocates power to unions, favoring the exer-
cise of their functions. The replacement of the old salary councils44 is a
key element in this scenario, and it outlines a neo-corporative scheme
that does not, nevertheless, reach a peak level. In exchange, the labor
unions give the government its support, without eliminating conflict
and mobilizations, and thereby preserve a degree of autonomy.
The power coefficient in a governing party measures the possibil-
ity of translating programmatic proposals into political decisions
and basically refers to parliamentary representation, taking into account
the ruling partys position both at the heart of the left and in the whole
party system.45
For its debut in office, the FA enjoyed a high power coefficient given
that it is virtually the monopoly party in the Uruguayan left and forms
a single party government with an absolute majority in both chambers
and almost perfect discipline, without being forced to call on coalitions
or parliament agreements. Presidential leadership also provides an
advantage, since President V azquez has been both head of government
and head of the party, after a rather long and competitive career. It also
helps that the ideological distance between the FA and the opposition
parties is relatively moderate.
The FA has reached the rank of a dominant party and it holds a major-
ity presidentialism, a position that no party has had in Uruguay since
1966 and that has also been quite infrequent in Latin America during the
past 25 years. There is therefore a single government party, with parlia-
mentary backing, to sanction ordinary and special laws, to approve
budgets, to sustain presidential vetoes, and to appoint directors of public
services, military commanders, and members of the diplomatic corps.
Political competition with the traditional parties continues to be present
Uruguay 215
and grows when nearing the new election period. However, the deans of
the party system are relegated to a rather innocuous opposition, and
given that the old coparticipation mechanism is still not operative, they
remain outside the executive administration circuits.
In this scenario, the FA government has passed the most abundant
series of laws and decrees since the return to democracy in 1985, with a
political agenda that has had a more marked left orientation than other
social democratic experiences in the region. This can be appreciated
when examining the list of its most salient innovations: human rights
(concerning the legacies of the recent dictatorship); economic policy and
tax policy, with the introduction of a generalized and progressive income
tax; growth of public expenditure in education, investments in human
capital, and establishment of a national health system; and regulation of
labor relations, including replacing salary councils and strong protection
of the union rights in short, a portfolio of social policies, including uni-
versal welfare services and focalized social programs to fight poverty
and provide assistance to vulnerable sectors of the population (children
and young people, female heads of household).46
CONCLUSION: PERSISTENCE AND CHANGE

IN URUGUAYS PARTY DEMOCRACY
During the past decades, Uruguay like most countries in Latin
America has gone through a critical juncture, which has brought
about historical transformations in both the political system and the
model of capitalist development. Along this transition, the Uruguayan
party democracy shows certain continuity and at the same time has
experienced important changes.
Party pluralism has been re-created and now shapes political pro-
cesses, in a framework of effective competition, which has held steady
during the new phase of changes.47 Nevertheless, some of the secular
traits of pluralist democracy have been altered, leaving behind three of
its most distinctive notes.
First, the system of double simultaneous vote, which allowed for
multiple candidates and favored the reproduction of party sectors, has
been replaced by a majority election regime with single party candidates,
which has had concentrating effects on political and ideological offers.
Second, the practice of compromise presidentialism with noncoalition
party agreements has been suspended. This practice used to introduce
consensus margins and some cooperative lines in the government-
opposition relationships. Third, consociational arrangements have been
put aside. Such arrangements have brought proportional representation
into the sphere of executive administration and involved the coparticipa-
tion of opposing minorities in the collegiate boards of public enterprises,
as well as in the control bodies.
Since 1990, in the course of the liberal transition, traditional parties

resorted to coalition presidentialism to face the FAs ascent as a chal-
lenging third party. In 2005, the left began a new social democratic gov-
ernment, exercising an exclusive majority presidentialism and reducing
the power of the old doyens of the party system.
Almost 100 years after the crowning of its original building with the
sanction of the fundamental law of 1910 democracy in Uruguay contin-
ues to be a party democracy, and stands out as such in the Latin
American landscape. At the same time, it has also undergone a signifi-
cant transformation, modifying the parameters that ruled during most of
the 20th century. Once more, this transformation stems from the change
in the party system, which this time is very deep: The long-lived biparty-
ism, which was born with the country itself, gave way to a new party sys-
tem, in which the founding parties are still competitive players, but the
left, under the FA flag, has conquered a leading position.48
Notes
INTRODUCTION, POLITICAL PARTIES AND DEMOCRACY:

THREE STAGES OF POWER
1. Having only indigenous authors is a unique and important characteristic
of Political Parties and Democracy and thus well worth mentioning. As the word
indigenous has two senses, it is perhaps also worth mentioning that here it is
used in its primary sense: living in a particular area or environment; native to
describe all authors and all co-editors, none of whom lives outside the countries
he or she writes about. Authors of specific chapters occasionally use the words
indigenous and native in their secondary sense, to refer to specific ethnic
groups. Both usages are correct and the reader will find that the usage intended
is always clear in context.
CHAPTER 1, PARTIES AND DEMOCRACY IN CANADA:

REGIONAL FRAGMENTATION, INSTITUTIONAL INERTIA,
AND DEMOCRATIC DEFICIT
1. R. Kenneth Carty, Three Canadian Party Systems: An Interpretation of
the Development of National Politics, in Canadian Political Party Systems, ed. R.
K. Carty (Peterborough: Broadview Press, 1993), 563 586; James Bickerton,
Alain-G. Gagnon, and Patrick Smith, Ties That Bind: Parties and Voters in Canada
(Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1999); R. Kenneth Carty, William Cross, and
Lisa Young, Canadian Party Politics in the New Century, Journal of Canadian
Studies 35 (2000 2001): 23 39.
2. A. V. Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution (London:
Macmillan, 1961).
218 Notes
3. Richard Simeon and Ian Robinson, The Dynamics of Canadian Federal-

ism, in Canadian Politics, 4th edition, ed. James Bickerton and Alain-G. Gagnon
(Peterborough: Broadview Press, 2004), 101 126.
4. Andre Siegfried, The Race Question in Canada (Toronto: McClelland and
Stewart, 1966).
5. Richard Johnston, The Electoral Basis of Canadian Party Systems,
1878 1984, in Canadian Political Party Systems, ed. R. Kenneth Carty (Peterbor-
ough: Broadview Press, 1992), 587 623.
6. The Social Credit would take power for the next 36 years in the province
of Alberta and for the better part of four decades in British Columbia; the CCF
would win power in the western province of Saskatchewan in 1944, the first
socialist party to form a government in North America.
7. These themes are well represented in post-Confederation Canadian history
texts. For a review see Carl Berger, The Writing of Canadian History (Toronto:
Oxford University Press, 1976).
8. Reginald Whitaker, The Government Party: Organizing and Financing the Lib-
eral Party of Canada, 1930 1958 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1977).
9. F. R. Scott, WLMK, in The Blasted Pine (Toronto: MacMillan, 1967), 36.
10. John Porter, The Vertical Mosaic: An Analysis of Social Class and Power in
Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1965).
11. Sylvia Bashevkin, True Patriot Love: The Politics of Canadian Nationalism
(Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1991); Peter Russell, ed., Nationalism in Can-
ada (Toronto: McGraw-Hill, 1966); George Grant, Lament for a Nation: The Defeat
of Canadian Nationalism (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1970).
12. Porter, The Vertical Mosaic, chapter 12.
13. Peter C. Newman, Renegade in Power: The Diefenbaker Years (Toronto:
McClelland and Stewart, 1963).
14. Alan Cairns, The Electoral System and the Party System in Canada,
1921 1965, Canadian Journal of Political Science 1 (March 1968): 55 80.
15. Richard Johnston, The Electoral Basis of Canadian Party Systems,
1878 1984, in Canadian Political Party Systems, ed. R. Kenneth Carty (Peterbor-
ough: Broadview Press, 1992), 587 623.
16. R. Johnston, A. Blais, H. E. Brady, and J. Crete, Letting the People Decide:
Dynamics of a Canadian Election (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queens Univer-
sity Press, 1992).
17. Khayyam Paltiel, Canadian Election Expenses Legislation, 1963 1985: A
Critical Appraisal or Was the Effort Worth It? in Contemporary Canadian Politics,
ed. Robert Jackson (Scarborough: Prentice-Hall, 1987), 228 247.
18. George Perlin, ed., Party Democracy in Canada: The Politics of National Party
Conventions (Scarborough: Prentice-Hall, 1988).
19. Kenneth McRoberts, Misconceiving Canada: The Struggle for National Unity
(Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1997); Richard Simeon and Ian Robinson, The
Dynamics of Canadian Federalism, in Canadian Politics, 4th edition, ed. James
Bickerton and Alain-G. Gagnon (Peterborough: Broadview Press, 2004), 101 126.
20. Alan Cairns, The Case for Charter Federalism, in Reconfigurations
(Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1995), 186 193.
21. A. Brian Tanguay, The Transformation of Canadas Party System in the
1990s, in Canadian Politics, 2nd edition, ed. A.-G. Gagnon and J. Bickerton
(Peterborough: Broadview Press, 1994), 113 140.
Notes 219
22. William Cross, Political Parties (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2004), chapter 7;
Lisa Young, Anthony Sayers, and Harold Jansen, Altering the Political Land-
scape: State Funding and Party Finance, in Canadian Parties in Transition, 3rd
edition, ed. Alain-G. Gagnon and A. Brian Tanguay (Peterborough: Broadview
Press, 2007), 335 354.
23. Examples of the former include the CCF-NDP and the Reform Party; of
the latter, the Social Credit and Bloc Quebecois.
24. C. B. MacPherson, Democracy in Alberta (Toronto: University of Toronto
Press, 1962).
25. Maurice Pinard, The Rise of a Third Party (Montreal: McGill-Queens Uni-
versity Press, 1975).
26. Alan Cairns, The Governments and Societies of Canadian Federalism,
Canadian Journal of Political Science 10 (1977): 695 725; Richard Simeon, Region-
alism and Canadian Political Institutions, in Queens Quarterly 82 (1975):
499 511.
27. The United Farmers, Social Credit, CCF, NDP, and Saskatchewan Party in
western Canada; the NDP in Ontario; the Union Nationale and Parti Quebecois
in Quebec.
28. For example, this was the case for decades with the federal and provincial
Liberal parties in Quebec, while in the 2008 federal election the provincial Con-
servative government in Newfoundland and Labrador ran an ABC (anyone but
Conservative) campaign against their federal counterpart.
29. Alan Cairns, The Electoral System and the Party System in Canada,
1921 1965, Canadian Journal of Political Science 1 (1968): 55 80; Roger Gibbins,
Early Warning, No Response: Alan Cairns and Electoral Reform, in Insiders
and Outsiders: Alan Cairns and the Reshaping of Canadian Citizenship, ed. Gerald
Kernerman and Phillip Resnick (Vancouver: University of British Columbia
Press, 1975), 39 50.
30. Neil Bradford, Innovation by Commission: Policy Paradigms and the
Canadian Political System, in Canadian Politics, 3rd edition, ed. James Bickerton
and Alain-G. Gagnon (Peterborough: Broadview Press, 1999), 541 564.
31. Hugh Thorburn, Interpretations of the Canadian Party System, in Party
Politics in Canada, 6th edition, ed. Hugh Thorburn (Scarborough: Prentice-Hall,
1991), 114 124.
32. Bickerton, Gagnon, and Smith, Ties that Bind; Alain Gagnon and Brian
Tanguay, Minor Parties in the Canadian Political System: Origins, Functions,
Impact, in Canadian Parties in Transition, 2nd edition, ed. Brian Tanguay and
Alain-G. Gagnon (Toronto: Nelson, 1996), 106 134; William Cross, Political Par-
ties (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2004).
33. Richard Johnston, The Electoral System and the Party System Revisited,
in Insiders and Outsiders: Alan Cairns and the Reshaping of Canadian Citizenship, ed.
Gerald Kernerman and Phillip Resnick (Vancouver: University of British Colum-
bia Press, 2005), 51 64.
34. James Bickerton, Between Integration and Fragmentation: Political Parties
and the Representation of Regions, in Canadian Parties in Transition, 3rd edition,
ed. Gagnon and Tanguay, 411 436.
35. Cross, Political Parties, 15 19.
36. Ibid., 21 22.
37. Ibid., 22 23.
220 Notes
38. Ibid., chapter 3.

39. Janine Brodie and Jane Jenson, Piercing the Smokescreen: Stability and
Change in Brokerage Politics, in Canadian Parties in Transition, 3rd edition, ed.
Gagnon and Tanguay, 47; Bradford, Innovation by Commission.
40. R. Kenneth Carty, The Politics of Tecumseh Corners: Canadian Political
Parties as Franchise Organizations, in Canadian Journal of Political Science 35
(December 2002): 723 746.
41. Steven B. Wolinetz, Cycles and Brokerage: Canadian Parties as Mobiliz-
ers of Interest, in Canadian Parties in Transition, 3rd edition, ed. Gagnon and
Tanguay, 179 196.
42. Cross, Political Parties, 68; Wolinetz, Cycles and Brokerage, 184.
43. Cross, Political Parties, 76.
44. Perlin, Party Democracy, various chapters.
45. Leonard Preyra, From Conventions to Closed Primaries: New Politics
and Recent Changes in National Party Leadership Selection in Canada, in Party
Politics in Canada, 8th edition, ed. Hugh Thorburn and Alan Whitehorn (Toronto:
Prentice-Hall, 2001), 443 459; Cross, Political Parties, chapter 5.
46. David Docherty, Parliament: Making the Case for Relevance, in Canadian
Politics, 4th edition, ed. Bickerton and Gagnon, 178.
47. Ibid., 164.
48. Ibid., 178 181.
49. Ibid., 174 178; Paul Thomas, The Role of National Party Caucuses, in
Party Government and Regional Representation in Canada, research coordinator
Peter Aucoin (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1985), 69 136.
50. Donald Savoie, Governing from the Centre: The Concentration of Power in
Canadian Politics (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1999).
51. Sid Noel, Leaders Entourages, Parties and Patronage, in Canadian
Parties in Transition, 3rd edition, ed. Gagnon and Tanguay, 197.
52. Ibid., 206.
53. Ibid., 206 207.
54. Lawrence Leduc, Realignment and Dealignment in Canadian Federal Pol-
itics, in Canadian Parties in Transition, 3rd edition, ed. Gagnon and Tanguay,
167 168.
55. As asserted by Frank Graves, president of Ekos Research Associates, which
does in-depth polling in Canada and the United States. Michael Valpy, The
Growing Ideological No Mans Land, The Globe and Mail, September 21, 2008.
56. Leduc, Realignment and Dealignment, 170.
57. Graves as cited in Valpy, Ideological No Mans Land.
58. A. Brian Tanguay, Reforming Representative Democracy: Taming
Canadas Democratic Deficit, in Canadian Politics, 4th edition, ed. Bickerton and
Gagnon, 239 262; F. Leslie Seidle, Provincial Electoral Systems in Question:
Changing Views of Party Representation and Governance, in Canadian Parties
in Transition, 3rd edition, ed. Gagnon and Tanguay, 303 334.
59. Henry Milner, The Problem of Political Drop-Outs: Canada in Compara-
tive Perspective, in Canadian Parties in Transition, 3rd edition, ed. Gagnon and
Tanguay, 437 466.
60. Neil Nevitte, The Decline of Deference (Peterborough: Broadview Press,
1996), 62.
Notes 221
61. William Cross, Representation and Political Parties, in Canadian Politics,

5th edition, ed. James Bickerton and Alain-G. Gagnon (Toronto: University of
Toronto Press, 2009), 251.
62. Royal Commission on Electoral Reform and Party Financing, Reforming
Electoral Democracy 1 (Ottawa: Supply and Services, 1991), 221.
63. Tanguay, Reforming Representative Democracy, 269 272.
64. Ibid., 281.
65. Cross, Political Parties, 183 184.
66. Ibid., 179.
67. Ibid., 180 182; Tanguay, Reforming Representative Democracy, 280.
68. Analysis of the 1993 and 1997 federal elections results confirm this. The
partisan changes that occurred outside Quebec were a vote shift within ideologi-
cal families; in other words, ideological affiliation did matter when partisans
defected to another party. Only in Quebec was there evidence of a fundamental
realignment of voters in terms of party identification, related to the rise of the
Bloc Quebecois. For an analysis of the 1997 federal election that confirms the
centrality of region to the pattern of partisan support, see Neil Nevitte, Andre
Blais, Elisabeth Gidengil, and Richard Nadeau, Unsteady State: The 1997 Canadian
Federal Election (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 2000).
CHAPTER 2, A WORK IN PROGRESS: PARTIES AND

DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES
1. L. Sandy Maisel and Walter J. Stone, Determinants of Candidate Emer-
gence in U.S. House Elections: An Exploratory Study, Legislative Studies Quar-
terly 22 (February 1997): 79 96.
2. Paul S. Herrnson, Congressional Elections: Campaigning at Home and in
Washington (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 2007).
3. Richard Katz, Political Institutions in the United States (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2007), 110.
4. See James Madison, Federalist No. 10 (1787) in Alexander Hamilton,
John Jay, and James Madison, The Federalist Papers (1787 1788) at http://
thomas.loc.gov/home/histdox/abt fedpapers.html.
5. The Federalist Papers, written by three prominent founders James Madi-
son, Alexander Hamilton, and John Jay were essays published in New York
newspapers during 1787 and 1788 to persuade the voters of New York and
other states to ratify the new Constitution of the United States.
6. Madison, Federalist No. 10.
7. Ibid.
8. Ibid.
9. John C. Green, Still Functional After All These Years: Parties in the
United States, 1960 2000, in Political Parties in Advanced Industrial Democracies,
ed. Paul Webb, David Farrell, and Ian Holliday (New York: Oxford University
Press, 2002), 314.
10. John H. Aldrich, Why Parties: The Origin and Transformation of Party Politics
in America (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995), 72.
11. Ibid., see chapter 3.
12. Kay Lawson, ed., Political Parties and Linkage: A Comparative Perspective
(New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1980).
222 Notes
13. Ibid., 13 14.

14. Marjorie Randon Hershey, Party Politics in America (New York: Pearson,
2009), 18.
15. Kay Lawson, When Parties Dedemocratize, in When Parties Prosper: The
Uses of Electoral Success, ed. Kay Lawson and Peter Merkl (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne
Reinner, 2007), 353 366.
16. Lawson, Political Parties and Linkage, 14.
17. Matthew A. Crenson and Benjamin Ginsberg, Downsizing Democracy: How
America Sidelined Its Citizens and Privatized Its Public (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins
University Press, 2002), 55.
18. Ibid., 56.
19. Hershey, Party Politics in America, 164.
20. Stephen Wayne, Is This Any Way to Run a Democratic Election?
(Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 2007), 36.
21. Cremson and Ginsberg, Downsizing Democracy, 51.
22. Ibid., 49.
23. Ibid., 59.
24. Curtis Gans, Much-hyped Turnout Record Fails to Materialize: Conven-
ience Voting Fails to Boost Balloting, News release, November 6, 2008, at
www.american.edu/media.
25. Ibid.
26. Sidney Verba, Kay Schlozman, and Henry Brady, Voice and Equality: Civic
Voluntarism in American Politics (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1995).
27. Task Force on Inequality and American Democracy of the American
Political Science Association, American Democracy in an Age of Rising Inequality
(Washington, D.C.: American Political Science Association, 2004), 1.
28. Ibid.
29. Maurice Duverger, Political Parties (New York: Wiley, 1954).
30. Robin Kolodny, The U.S. Two-Party System: Using Power to Prosper, in
When Parties Prosper: The Uses of Electoral Success, ed. Lawson and Merkl, 318.
31. See 2008 Petitioning for President, in Ballot Access News at http://
www.ballot-access.org/ballot-chart.html.
32. Federal Election Commission, Congressional Candidates Spend $1.16
Billion During 2003 2004, news release, June 9, 2005, at http://www.fec.gov/
press/press2005/20050609candidate/20050609candidate.html.
33. The Campaign Finance Institute, House General Election Candidates: Net
Receipts 2000 2006 Through September 30 of Election Year in 2006 Dollars, at
http://www.cfinst.org/data/Congress.aspx.
34. Steven Rosenstone and John Mark Hansen, Mobilization, Participation and
Democracy in America (New York: Longman, 2003), 170.
35. E. E. Schattschneider, Party Government (New York: Farrar and Rinehart), 1.
36. Richard Hofstadter, The Idea of a Party System: The Rise of Legitimate Opposi-
tion in the United States, 1780 1840 (Berkeley: University of California Press,
1969).
37. Maurice Duverger, Political Parties: Their Organization and Activity in the
Modern State (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1963), 353.
38. Hofstadter, The Idea of a Party System, 8.
39. Lawson, When Parties Dedemocratize, in When Parties Prosper: The Uses
of Electoral Success, ed. Lawson and Merkl, 366.
Notes 223
40. Peter Overby, The Fate of Obamas Net Roots Network, National Public
Radio, December 5, 2008, transcript at www.npr.org.
41. Corine Hegland, Beyond His E-Mail List, National Journal (December 13,
2008): 26 31.
42. Obama for America e-mail, What Youre Saying, December 19, 2008.
43. Ibid.
44. MoveOn.org e-mails to members, Official Ballot Email, December 17,
2008; The Results Are In, December 19, 2008.
CHAPTER 3, POLITICAL PARTIES AND DEMOCRACY IN

ARGENTINA: 1983 2008
1. Ilvo Diamanti, La Democrazia Degli Interstizi: Societ a e Partiti in Europa
Dopo la Caduta del Muro, Rassegna Italiana di Sociologia 3 (2007): 387 412.
2. Ernesto Calvo and Marcelo Escolar, La Nueva Poltica de Partidos en la
Argentina (Buenos Aires: Prometeo Libros, 2005); Edward L. Gibson, Federalism
and Democracy in Latin America (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press,
2004); Marcelo Leiras, Todos los caballos del rey (Buenos Aires: Prometeo Libros,
2007).
3. Edward L. Gibson and Julieta Suarez Cao, Competition and Power in
Federalized Party Systemas, CHSS Working Paper, 2007.
4. Hasta fines de marzo se afiliaron 2.966.472 personas a los partidos
polticos, El Bimestre Poltico y Economico 2 (1983): 67.
5. Ernesto Calvo, Argentina, Elecciones Legislativas 2005: Consolidaci on
Institucional del Kirchnerismo y Territorializaci on del Voto, Revista de Ciencia
Poltica 25 (2005): 153 160.
6. IPSOS-Mora y Araujo, 2008.
7. Gerardo Adrogue and Liliana De Riz, Democracia y Elecciones en la
Argentina: 1983 1989, in Reforma Institucional y Cambio Poltico, ed. Dieter Noh-
len and Liliana De Riz (Buenos Aires: Cedes-Legasa, 1991), 237 295; Calvo and
Escolar, La Nueva Poltica de Partidos en la Argentina.
8. Natalio Botana and Ana M. Mustapic, La Reforma Constitucional Frente
al Regimen Poltico Argentino, in Reforma Institucional y Cambio Poltico, ed.
Dieter Nohlen and Liliana De Riz (Buenos Aires: Cedes-Legasa, 1991), 45 92.
9. Juan Carlos Torre, Citizens versus Political Class: The Crisis of Partisan
Representation, in Argentine Democracy, ed. Steven Levitsky and Mara Victoria
Murillo (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2005), 165 180.
10. Marcelo Escolar, Ernesto Calvo, Natalia Calcagno, and Sandra Minvielle,

Ultimas Imagenes Antes del Naufragio: Las Elecciones de 2001 en la
Argentina, Desarrollo Economico 42 (2002): 25 44.
11. Enrique Peruzzotti, Towards a New Politics: Citizenship and Rights in
Contemporary Argentina, in Citizenships Studies 6 (2002): 77 93.
12. Ibid.
13. Enrique Peruzzotti, Demanding Accountable Government: Citizens, Poli-
ticians, and the Perils of Representative Democracy in Argentina, in Argentine
Democracy, ed. Levitsky and Murillo, 229 249.
14. Virginia Oliveros y Gerardo Scherlis, Elecciones Concurrentes o Elec-
ciones Desdobladas? La Manipulaci on de los Calendarios Electorales en la
224 Notes
Argentina, 1983 2003, in Que cambio en la Poltica Argentina? Elecciones, Institu-

ciones y Ciudadana en Perspectiva Comparada, ed. Isidoro Cheresky and Jean-
Michel Blanquier (Rosario: Homo Sapiens, 2004), 179 211.
15. Ana M. Mustapic, Argentina: La Crisis de Representaci on y los Partidos
Polticos, America Latina Hoy 32 (2002):163 183.
16. Steven Levitsky, Crisis and Renovation: Institutional Weakness and the
Transformation of Argentine Peronism, 1983 2003, in Argentine Democracy, ed.
Levitsky and Murillo, 181 206.
17. Thomas Poguntke and Paul Webb, The Presidentialization of Politics in
Democratic Societies: A Framework for Analysis, in The Presidentialization of
Politics, ed. Thomas Poguntke and Paul Webb (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2005), 1 25.
18. Levistky, Crisis and Renovation, 206.
19. Ana M. Mustapic, Inestabilidad Sin Colapso. La Renuncia de los Presi-
dentes: El Caso de Fernando de la R ua, Desarrollo Economico 45 (2005): 263 280.
20. Luciano Bardi and Peter Mair, The Parameters of Party Systems, Party
Politics 14 (2008): 147 166.
21. Juan Carlos Torre, The Politics of Economic Crisis in Argentina, Journal
of Democracy 4 (1993): 104 116.
CHAPTER 4, ENLARGEMENT OF DEMOCRACY AND CHANGES

IN THE BOLIVIAN PARTY SYSTEM
1. Eduardo Gamarra, Presidencialismo Hbrido y Democratizaci on, in
Rene Mayorga, coord., Democracia y Gobernabilidad (Caracas: America Latina,
Cebem-Ildis-Nueva Sociedad, 1992). See also, Rene Mayorga, Democracia y
Gobernabilidad (Caracas: America Latina, Cebem-Ildis-Nueva Sociedad, 1992).
2. The countrys political and administrative division establishes the territo-
rial existence of departments, provinces, municipalities (provinces sections),
and cantons. Since 1897, the municipalities are autonomous, and in 1995 this
autonomy was enlarged to all province sections. The departmental level is now
subject to debate, with possible autonomous governments as a form of political
decentralization.
3. Jimenez Alfredo Ramos, Los Partidos Polticos en las Democracias Latinoamer-
icanas (Merida: Universidad de los Andes, 1995).
4. Luis Jose Roca, Fisonoma del Regionalismo Boliviano (La Paz: Plural, 1999).
5. On December 6, 2009, Evo Morales was reelected by a vote of 64% with
electoral participation of 94.6%.
6. Rene Mayorga, ed., Democracia a la Deriva (La Paz: Clacso/Cebem, 1987).
7. The MNR was founded in 1941, the MIR appears in 1971, and ADN was
organized in 1979. The MNR played the leading role in the 1950s nationalist rev-
olution; the MIR surged with a socialist trend and played an important role dur-
ing the transition toward democracy; and the ADN was a conservative party
organized around the former dictator Hugo Banzer Su arez, who governed
between 1971 and 1978.
8. A compound of macroeconomic reforms for structural adjustments
designed by the international financial organisms seated in Washington, D.C.
These measures were meant to promote economic growth in Latin America,
Notes 225
favoring market forces. Its economic and ideological orientation influenced the
regions governments and became a long-range program with great incidence
during the 1990s. See John Williamson, What Washington Means by Policy Reform
(Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics, 1989).
9. Max Fernandez, another neo-populist leader and head of the UCS, was
excluded from the elections in 1989 when the polls showed a good panorama
for him and his party. UCS would suffer several ups and downs before it could
participate in that years municipal election. See Fernando Mayorga, Neopopu-
lismo y Democracia en Bolivia: Compadres y Padrinos en la Poltica (1988 1999) (La
Paz: Plural Editores, 2002).
10. This analogy was proposed by Jean-Pierre Faye (1972) and was used by
Luis H. Antezana, Sistema y Procesos Ideol ogicos en Bolivia (1935 1979), in
Bolivia, Hoy, Siglo XXI, ed. Zavaleta Rene (Mexico, 1983), to study the Bolivian
revolutionary nationalism, the dominant ideology during the 1950s, with its
extreme poles of nation and revolution.
11. Vctor Hugo Cardenas, the first indigenous person to become vice presi-
dent, was the leader of the MRTKL, one of the katarismos branches the katar-
ismo was an intellectual and syndicated tendency anchored in the aymara
peasants communities; this movement installed the ethnic cleavage within the
Bolivian political discourse, denouncing the internal colonialism.
12. This bonus meant a yearly amount of money for senior citizens, money
that came from the states shares in the capitalized enterprises.
13. PODEMOS and UN were created by former ADN and MIR leaders in
order to participate in the 2005 elections. The MAS was founded in 1999. That
is, all of them are quite recent political forces, and they surged due to the tradi-
tional parties collapse.
14. Buenaventura de Sousa Santos, Reinventar la Democracia: Reinventar el
Estado (Buenos Aires: Clacso, 2005).
15. Josep Colomer, Instituciones Polticas (Barcelona: Ariel, 2001), 15.
16. The First Article of the new constitution reads: Bolivia is constituted in a
Unitary Social State of Pluri-national Communal Rights, free, independent, dem-
ocratic, inter-cultural, decentralized, and with autonomies. Bolivia is based in
the plurality and the political, economic, judiciary, cultural, and linguistic
pluralism, [all] inside the integrative process of the country.
17. Several political institutions now carry this label: Plurinational Legislative
Assembly, Plurinational Electoral Council, Plurinational Constitutional Tribunal;
likewise, this constitutional text emphasizes the plurinational government
(Article 5, II), and among the presidents tasks, establishes that he or she must
nominate the cabinets secretaries (ministros) respecting the multinational char-
acter and the equity of gender (Article 173, 22).
18. The new constitutional text introduces the term president of the State,
replacing the conventional president of the Republic. In fact, the notion of a
republic disappears in the new constitutional text because, it is argued, it
had colonial and liberal connotations; neither is the customary Bolivian
nation mentioned, due obviously to the national pluralism that now should
characterizes the state.
19. According to Jorge Lanzaro, the pluralism must be understood in relation
to the governments regime, the electoral procedures, the representation, and
the processes to make decisions, in the states powers, the administrative
226 Notes
structure, and the partys relationships. See Jorge Lanzaro, ed., Tipos de
Presidencialismo y Coaliciones Polticas en America Latina (Buenos Aires: Clacso,
2003), 45.
CHAPTER 5, PARTIES AND DEMOCRACY IN BRAZIL, 1985 2006:

MOVING TOWARD CARTELIZATION
1. The role of legislative strengthening and universal suffrage as determi-
nants for the emergence of modern parties is stressed by several scholars.
Among them: Giovanni Sartori, Parties and Party Systems: A Framework for Analy-
sis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976); Richard S. Katz and Peter
Mair, Changing Models of Party Organization and Party Democracy: The
Emergence of the Cartel Party, Party Politics 1 (1995): 5 28; Susan E. Scarrow,
The Nineteenth-Century Origins of Modern Political Parties: The Unwanted
Emergence of Party-Based Politics, in Handbook of Party Politics (London: Sage,
2006); Gary W. Cox, The Efficient Secret: The Cabinet and the Development of Politi-
cal Parties in Victorian England (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987).
2. Elmer E. Schattschneider, Party Government (New York: Rinehart, 1942), 1.
3. Gary Goertz, Social Science Concepts: A Users Guide (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton
University Press, 2005); David Collier and Robert Adcock, Democracy and
Dichotomies: A Pragmatic Approach to Choices about Concepts, Annual Review
of Political Science 2 (1999): 537 565; Richard S. Katz, Democracy and Elections
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997); Kirk Bowman, Fabrice Lehoucq, and
James Mahoney, Measuring Political Democracy: Case Expertise, Data Ade-
quacy, and Central America, Comparative Political Studies 38 (2005): 939 970.
4. Robert A. Dahl, Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition (New Haven, Conn.:
Yale University Press, 1971).
5. Goertz, Social Science Concepts.
6. Zehra F. Arat, Democracy and Human Rights in Developing Countries
(Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1991).
7. Bowman, Lehoucq, and Mahoney, Measuring Political Democracy.
8. Larry Diamond and Richard Gunther, Political Parties and Democracy (Balti-
more: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001); Andre Krouwel, Party Models,
in Handbook of Party Politics, ed. Richard S. Katz and William J. Crotty (London:
Sage, 2006), 249 269; Sartori, Parties and Party Systems; Alan Ware, Political Par-
ties and Party Systems (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995); Luciano Bardi
and Peter Mair, The Parameters of Party Systems, Party Politics 14 (2008):
147 166.
9. Although dominant, a responsible party model is far from exhausting link-
age patterns between citizens and government in contemporary democracies.
For, example, Herbert Kitschelt, Linkages Between Citizens and Politicians in
Democratic Polities, Comparative Political Studies 33 (2000): 845 879, suggests
two other linkage patterns, based on charisma and clientelism, as presently
found in todays democracies. See Peter Mair, The Challenge to Party Govern-
ment, West European Politics 31 (2008): 211 234.
10. Jacques Thomassen, Empirical Research into Political Representation:
Failing Democracy or Failing Models, in Elections at Home and Abroad, ed. M.
Kent Jennings and Thomas E. Mann (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press,
1994), 251.
Notes 227
11. Jacques Thomassen and Hermann Schmitt, Policy Representation,

European Journal of Political Research 32 (1997): 168.
12. Thomassen, Empirical Research into Political Representation, 252.
13. Bernard Webels, Political Representation and Democracy, in The Oxford
Handbook of Political Behavior, ed. Russell J. Dalton and Hans-Dieter Klingemann
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 831 849; Wolfgang C. Muller, Politi-
cal Parties in Parliamentary Democracies: Making Delegation and Accountabil-
ity Work, European Journal of Political Research 37 (2000): 309 333.
14. Soren Holmberg, Partisanship Reconsidered, in The Oxford Handbook of
Political Behavior, ed. Dalton and Klingemann, 557 570.
15. Shaun Bowler, David M. Farrell, and Richard S. Katz, eds., Party Discipline
and Parliamentary Government (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1999).
16. Richard Rose, Do Parties Make a Difference? (Chatham: Chatham House,
1980); Andre Blais, Donald Blake, and Stephane Dion, Do Parties Make a Dif-
ference? A Reappraisal, American Journal of Political Science 40 (1996): 514 520;
Andre Blais, Donald Blake, and Stephane Dion, Do Parties Make a Difference?
Parties and the Size of Government in Liberal Democracies, American Journal of
Political Science 37 (1993): 40 62.
17. G. Bingham Powell, Jr., The Chain of Responsiveness, Journal of Democ-
racy 15 (2004): 91 105.
18. The lack of more systematic evidence regarding party involvement in the
implementation phase of public policies in Brazil was the main reason for this
topic not to have been more minutely discussed.
19. Vitor Emanuel Marchetti Ferraz, Jr., Poder Judiciario e Competic~ao Poltica no
Brasil: uma Analise das Decis~oes do TSE e STF sobre Regras Eleitorais (Doutorado
em Ciências Sociais: Poltica, PUC-SP, 2008).
20. Lauri Karvonen, Legislation on Political Parties: A Global Comparison,
Party Politics 13 (2007): 437 455.
21. The Superior Electoral Court (TSE) was created in 1932. It is a branch of
the judiciary power and has played an active role in party activity (registration,
accounts auditing, affiliations) and in organizing elections (registration of candi-
dacies, logistics on election day, auditing of expenditure).
22. For a complete list of parties participating in each election, see: http://
jaironicolau.iuperj.br/jairo2006/port/pags/participacao.htm.
23. Legislation ensured that parties having filed for registration prior to the
new law coming into force would have their definitive registration accepted by
TSE.
24. Ingrid van Biezen and Petr Kopecky, The State and the Parties: Public
Funding, Public Regulation and Rent-Seeking in Contemporary Democracies,
Party Politics 13 (2007): 235 254.
25. There are no studies regarding the yearly amount of tax exemption gener-
ated by such programs.
26. In the second round, the two candidates have each two daily 10-minute
programs.
27. Found in Folha de S~ao Paulo: April 12, 2006.
28. PT, Workers Party; PMDB, Party of the Brazilian Democratic Movement;
PSDB, Party of the Brazilian Social Democracy; DEM, Democrats; PP, Progres-
sive Party; PSB, Brazilian Socialist Party; PTB, Brazilian Labour Party; PDT,
Democratic Labour Party; PR, Party of Republic; PPS, Popular Socialist Party;
228 Notes
PcdoB, Communist Party of Brazil. Data regarding Party Fund amounts in 2007
was obtained from http://www.tse.gov.br/internet/partidos/fundo parti-
dario/2007.htm.
29. In 2005, PT became involved in a serious scandal of unlawful procurement
of funds. Since then, the party has been experiencing a grave financial crisis.
Data regarding party finances is no longer made available for consultation. Al-
ready 2003 data pointed to a strong dependency on the Party Fund; 53% of
yearly expenditure came from that source (data obtained on December 3, 2003,
from partys Web page at http://www.pt.org.br/portalpt/secretarias/financas-
6.html).
30. The parties must render account of resources received from the fund every
year. In spite of many political scandals of the period connected to the misuse
of private resources electoral campaign, there was no political scandal related to
use of the party fund.
31. Between 2002 and 2007, the judiciary (TSE and Supreme Court [STF])
made some decisions having a strong impact on parties and elections. Among
them, it is worth mentioning verticalization, which is elimination of the per-
formance clause and party fidelity. Verticalization did away with the liberty
enjoyed by parties to colligate with any partner. The rule was in force in 2002
and 2006 and barred colligated parties engaged in the presidential dispute from
colligating with any party participating in any other presidential colligation.
The performance clause was created in 1995 and was scheduled to come into
force in 2006. Parties unable to obtain 5% of votes in the elections for the Cham-
ber of Deputies would be entitled to only paltry resources from the Party Fund,
reduced television broadcast time, and would lose some privileges within the
Chamber of Deputies. The 5% clause was judged unconstitutional by the STF.
Since March 2007, holders of elective office are barred from changing parties.
STF ruled that the office belongs to the party and not to the official elected. As
of that time, officials changing their party would lose their office and be
replaced by their substitutes who belonged to the original party. See Ferraz,
Poder Judiciario e Competic~ao Poltica.
32. Parties have benefited from the fact that their members fill positions in the
executive and legislature. In the three legislative power spheres (town council,
state legislative assembly, and Chamber of Deputies), elected officials may hire
special advisers paid from public funds. In the Chamber of Deputies, each rep-
resentative may hire between 5 and 25 advisors; to that end, he or she has a pro-
vision of 60 thousand reales a month around $37 thousand in June 2008
figures. (Data from the Chamber of Deputies press office. Web page: http://
www.tse.gov.br/internet/partidos/fundo partidario/2008.htm.) It is generally
the rule for such advisers to engage mostly in party activities.
33. Klaus von Beyme, Competitive Party System, in The Blackwell Encyclo-
paedia of Political Institutions (Oxford: Blackwell, 1987), 123 126.
34. Sartori, Parties and Party Systems.
35. Ibid., 146.
36. Richard Rose and Thomas T. Mackie, Do Parties Persist or Fail? The Big
Trade-Off Facing Organizations, in When Parties Fail: Emerging Alternative
Organizations, ed. Kay Lawson and Peter Merkl (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univer-
sity Press, 1988), 536.
Notes 229
37. Voting for a representative was considered for two reasons. The first is
that it works as a parameter for government funds distribution to the parties
(free radio and television air time; resources from the party fund). The second
reason is that, unlike the dispute for majority offices, for which few parties com-
pete, elections to the Chamber of Deputies are disputed by the major parties in
all (or nearly all) states in the country.
38. See note 28 for spell outs of party abbreviations. Also: PFL, Party of the Lib-
eral Front; PDS, Social Democratic Party; PPR, Progressive Reform Party; PPB,
Brazilian Progressive Party; PL, Liberal Party; PCB, Brazilian Communist Party.
39. Presently, 27 parties hold a definitive registration. For a full list, see
http://www.tse.gov.br/internet/partidos/index.htm.
40. The Progressive Party (PP) was active from 1993 to 1995. Its namesake PP
appeared in 2005 and is still active.
41. Carlos Ranulfo Melo, Nem Tanto ao Mar, Nem Tanto a Terra: Elementos
para uma Analise do Sistema Partidario Brasileiro, in A Democracia Brasileira:
Balanco e Perspectivas para o Seculo XXI, ed. Carlos Ranulfo Melo and Manuel
Alcantara Saez (Belo Horizonte: Editora UFMG, 2007), 279.
42. David M. Farrell and Ian McAllister, Voter Satisfaction and Electoral
Systems: Does Preferential Voting in Candidate-Centred Systems Make a Differ-
ence? European Journal of Political Research 45 (2006): 723 749; Bruce Cain, John
Ferejohn, and Morris Fiorina, The Personal Vote: Constituency Service and Electoral
Independence (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1987); Michael Gal-
lagher, Conclusion, in The Politics of Electoral Systems (Oxford: Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 2005); Kitschelt, Linkages Between Citizens and Politicians in
Democratic Polities.
43. Russell J. Dalton and Martin P. Wattenberg, The Not So Simple Act of
Voting, in Political Science: The State of the Discipline II, ed. Ada W. Finifter
(Washington, D.C.: APSA, 1993), 3 26; Russell J. Dalton and Hans-Dieter
Klingemann, Citizens and Political Behavior, in The Oxford Handbook of Politi-
cal Behavior, ed. Dalton and Klingemann.
44. Holmberg, Partisanship Reconsidered.
45. John M. Carey and Matthew Soberg Shugart, Incentives to Cultivate a
Personal Vote: A Rank Ordering of Electoral Formulas, Electoral Studies 14 (De-
cember 1995): 417 439; Lauri Karvonen, Preferential Voting: Incidence and
Effects, International Political Science Review 25 (2004): 203 226.
46. Jairo Nicolau, O Sistema Eleitoral de Lista Aberta no Brasil, Dados 49
(2006): 689 720.
47. Coligac~ao is the name used in Brazil for electoral coalitions in proportional
representation. The synonym used more widely in the literature on electoral sys-
tems is the French term apparentement.
48. Arend Lijphart, Electoral Systems and Party Systems: A Study of Twenty-Seven
Democracies, 1945 1990 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), 134 138.
49. Carey and Shugart, Incentives to Cultivate a Personal Vote.
50. David Samuels, Incentives to Cultivate a Party Vote in Candidate-centric
Electoral Systems: Evidence from Brazil, Comparative Political Studies 32 (1999):
487 518; Jairo Nicolau, O Sistema Eleitoral Brasileiro, in Sistema Poltico Brasi-
leiro: Uma Introduc~ao, 2nd edition, ed. Ant^ onio Octavio Cintra and Lucia Avelar
(S~ao Paulo: Fundac~ao Konrad Adenauer/Editora Unesp, 2007), 293 301.
230 Notes
51. Survey carried out by IUPERJ between December 12 and 15, 2004. Home
interviews were made in 115 municipalities in the entire country.
52. For many years, PT was an exception in the Brazilian party scenario, since
it gambled on constructing party reputation during the election campaign. See
Samuels, Incentives to Cultivate a Party Vote in Candidate-centric Electoral
Systems; Nicolau, O Sistema Eleitoral de Lista Aberta no Brasil.
53. Shaun Bowler, Parties in Legislatures: Two Competing Explanations, in
Parties Without Partisans, ed. Russell J. Dalton and Martin P. Wattenberg (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2000), 157 179; Michael F. Thies, On the Primacy of
Party Government: Why Legislative Parties Can Survive Party Decline in the
Electorate, in Parties without Partisans, eds. Dalton and Wattenberg,238 257.
54. John Aldrich, Political Parties In and Out of Legislatures, in The Oxford
Handbook of Political Institutions, ed. R. A. W. Rhodes, Sarah Binder, and Berta
Rockman (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 555 576.
55. Kaare Strm, Parties at the Core of Government, in Parties without Parti-
sans, ed. Dalton and Wattenberg, 180 207.
56. G. Bingham Powell, Jr., Elections as Instruments of Democracy: Majoritarian
and Proportional Visions (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2000);
Powell, The Chain of Responsiveness; Strm, Parties at the Core of Govern-
ment; Kaare Strm, Delegation and Accountability in Parliamentary Democra-
cies, European Journal of Political Research 37 (2000): 261 289.
57. For a general view of parties in the federal executive, see Octavio Amorim
Neto, Algumas Consequências Polticas de Lula: Novos Padr~ oes de Formac~ ao
e Recrutamento Ministerial, Controle de Agenda e Produc~ ao Legislativa, in
Instituic~oes Representativas no Brasil; Balanco e Reforma, ed. Jairo Nicolau and
Timothy J. Power (Belo Horizonte: Editora UFMG, 2007), 55 73; Octavio
Amorim Neto, O Poder Executivo, Centro de Gravidade do Sistema Polltico
Brasileiro, in Sistema Poltico Brasileiro: Uma Introduc~ao, 2nd edition, ed. Ant^
onio
Octavio Cintra and L ucia Avelar (S~ao Paulo: Fundac~ ao Konrad Adenauer/Editora
Unesp, 2007), 131 141; Argelina Cheibub Figueiredo and Fernando Limongi, Exec-
utivo e Legislativo na Nova Ordem Constitucional (Rio de Janeiro: FGV Editora, 1999).
58. Maria Celina DAraujo, Governo Lula: Contornos Sociais e Polticos da Elite do
Poder (Rio de Janeiro: CPDOC, 2007), 16. This data pertains to the year 2006.
59. Ibid., 39.
60. Amorim Neto, O Poder Executivo; Figueiredo and Limongi, Executivo e
Legislativo.
61. PV (Partido Verde; Green Party) is a small ecologist party founded in
1986. PRB (Brazilian Renewal Party) is a small center-right party created in
2005.
62. Richard S. Katz and Peter Mair, Changing Models of Party Organization
and Party Democracy: The Emergence of the Cartel Party, Party Politics 1
(1995): 5 28
63. Figueiredo and Limongi, Executivo e Legislativo.
64. Performance of parties in Brazilian Nacional Congress (in particular, in
the Chamber of Deputies) has deserved special attention from political scien-
tists; for a general view of the large bibliography on this subject, see Ant^ onio
Octavio Cintra and Marcelo Lacombe, A C^ amara dos Deputados na Nova
Rep ublica: a Vis~ao da Ciência Poltica, in Sistema Poltico Brasileiro: Uma
Notes 231
Introduc~ao, 2nd edition, ed. Ant^ onio Octavio Cintra and L ucia Avelar (S~
ao Paulo:
Fundac~ao Konrad Adenauer/Editora Unesp, 2007), 143 182; Leany Barreiro
Lemos, O Senado Federal Brasileiro no Pos-Constituinte (Braslia: Senado Federal,
2008).
65. Constitutional amendments and complementary laws are always roll-call
voted; ordinary laws and provisional measures are so voted only when
requested by at least 31 deputies.
66. Argelina Cheibub Figueiredo and Fernando Limongi, Instituic~ oes Polti-
cas e Governabilidade: Desempenho do Governo e Apoio Legislativo na Demo-
cracia Brasileira, in A Democracia Brasileira: Balanco e Perspectivas para o Seculo
XXI, ed. Carlos Ranulfo Melo and Manuel Alcantara S aez (Belo Horizonte: Edi-
tora UFMG, 2007), 147 198; Figueiredo and Limongi, Executivo e Legislativo;
Jairo Nicolau, Disciplina Partidaria e Base Parlamentar na C^ amara dos Deputa-
dos no Primeiro Governo Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1995 98), Dados 43
(2000): 709 735; Barry Ames, Os Entraves da Democracia no Brasil (Rio de Janeiro:
FGV Editora, 2001).
67. Party unity index is found by dividing the total majority votes of a given
party by the total deputies of same party present at a given vote.
68. Bowler, Parties in Legislatures, 170 174.
69. Harold W. Stanley and Richard G. Niemi, Vital Statistics on American Poli-
tics 2005 2006 (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 2005), 218 219.
70. Melo, Nem Tanto ao Mar, Nem Tanto a Terra: Elementos para uma
Analise do Sistema Partidario Brasileiro, 288.
71. Carlos Ranulfo Melo, Retirando as Cadeiras do Lugar: Migrac~ao Partidaria na
Câmara dos Deputados (1985 2002) (Belo Horizonte: Editora UFMG, 2004).
72. Ferraz, Poder Judiciario e Competic~ao Poltica, 184.
73. Ibid., 189.
74. Strm, Parties at the Core of Government; Powell, The Chain of
Responsiveness.
75. William B. Heller and Carol Mershon, Party Switching in the Italian
Chamber of Deputies, 1996 2001, Journal of Politics 67 (2005): 536 559; Matt
Golder, Democratic Electoral Systems Around the World, 1946 2000, Electoral
Studies 24 (2005): 103 121.
CHAPTER 6, POLITICAL PARTIES IN CHILE: STABLE

COALITIONS, INERT DEMOCRACY
1. Simon Collier and William E. Sater, Historia de Chile, 1808 1994 (Madrid:
Cambridge University Press, 1999), 10.
2. Joe Foweraker, Institutional Design, Party Systems and Governability.
Differentiating the Presidential Regimes of Latin America, British Journal of
Political Science 28 (1998): 657, 659.
3. Other examples include Maurice Zeitlin, Los determinantes sociales de la
democracia poltica en Chile, in America Latina: reforma o revolucion?, ed. James
Petras and Maurice Zeitlin (Buenos Aires: Editorial Tiempo Contempor aneo,
1970), 178. This is precisely the common sense expressed in countless compara-
tive studies, generally through surveys drawn from experts asked to evaluate
232 Notes
the solidity of the democratic institutions of each country. Russell H. Fitzgibbon,

Measuring Democratic Change in Latin America, Journal of Politics 29 (1967):
129 166; Kenneth F. Johnson, Scholarly Images of Latin American Political De-
mocracy in 1975, Latin American Research Review 11 (1976): 125 140.
4. Russell H. Fitzgibbon, A Political Scientists Point of View, American Po-
litical Science Review 44 (1950): 124, argued that these countries had the highest
percentages of population of European origin.
5. Ronald H. McDonald, Electoral Systems, Party Representation, and Politi-
cal Change in Latin America, Western Political Quarterly 20 (1967): 702, 704.
6. J. Samuel Valenzuela, Democratizacion va reforma: la expansion del sufragio
en Chile (Buenos Aires: Ediciones del IDES, 1985); Alfredo Joignant, El lugar
del voto. La ley electoral de 1874 y la invenci on del ciudadano-elector en Chile,
Estudios P ublicos 81 (2001): 245 275; Alfredo Joignant, Un sanctuaire electoral.
Le bureau de vote et linvention du citoyen-electeur au Chili a la fin du XIXeme
siecle, Geneses. Sciences sociales et histoire 49 (2002): 29 47.
7. Josep M. Colomer, Taming the Tiger: Voting Rights and Political Instabil-
ity in Latin America, Latin American Politics and Society 46 (2004): 40 42. For
studies noting limits and inaccuracies in this work see J. Samuel Valenzuela,
Making Sense of Suffrage Expansion and Electoral Institutions in Latin Amer-
ica: A Comment on Colomers Tiger, Latin American Politics and Society 46
(2004): 59 67; and Alfredo Joignant, Modelos, juegos y artefactos. Supuestos,
premisas e ilusiones de los estudios electorales y de sistemas de partidos en
Chile (1988 2005), Estudios P ublicos 106 (2007): 208 209.
8. J. Samuel Valenzuela, La ley electoral de 1890 y la democratizaci on del
regimen poltico chileno, Estudios P ublicos 71 (1998): 275.
9. Eduardo Posada-Carb o, Electoral Juggling: A Comparative History of the
Corruption of Suffrage in Latin America, 1830 1930, Journal of Latin American
Studies 32 (2000): 642.
10. In this sense, the sociohistory of the act of voting and of the various tech-
nologies that coded the expansion of voters, as well as the history of universal
voting rights in France, provide essential methodological lessons to understand
the comparative genesis and evolution of an electoral democracy and of a party-
based democracy such the Chilean democracy. Alain Garrigou, Le secret de
lisoloir, Actes de la recherche en sciences sociales 71 72 (1988): 25 45 (on the se-
cret chamber); Olivier Ihl, Lurne electorale. Formes et usages dune technique
de vote, Revue francaise de science politique 43 (1993): 30 60 (on the ballot box);
Michel Offerle, Le nombre des voix. Electeurs, partis et electorat socialistes a la
fin du XIXeme siecle en France, Actes de la recherche en sciences sociales 71 72
(1988): 5 21 (on the cartographic and social construction of electorate); Michel
Offerle, Lelecteur et ses papiers. Enquête sur les cartes et les listes electorales
(1848 1939), Geneses. Sciences sociales et histoire 13 (1993): 29 53 (on electoral ID
cards); Yves Deloye and Olivier Ihl, Des voix pas comme les autres, Revue
francaise de science politique 2 (1991): 141 170 (on blank and nonvalid votes);
Pierre Rosanvallon, Le sacre du citoyen. Histoire du suffrage universel en France
(Paris: Gallimard, 1992); Alain Garrigou, Histoire du suffrage universel en France,
1848 2000 (Paris: Seuil, 2002); and Michel Offerle, Un homme, une voix? Histoire
du suffrage universel (Paris: Gallimard, 1993) (on the social and political history of
universal suffrage in France).
Notes 233
11. Seymour Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan, Party Systems and Voter Alignments:
Cross-National Perspectives (New York: Free Press. 1967); J. Samuel Valenzuela and
Timothy R. Scully, De la democracia a la democracia: continuidad y variaciones en
las preferencias del electorado y en el sistema de partidos en Chile, Estudios Publicos
51 (1993): 195 228; J. Samuel Valenzuela, Orgenes y transformaciones del sistema
de partidos en Chile, Estudios Publicos 58 (1995): 5 80.
12. See Roger S. Abbott, The Role of Contemporary Political Parties in
Chile, American Political Science Review 45 (1951): 450 462, on the early influ-
ence of France on Chilean political life.
13. Kenneth M. Roberts and Erik Wibbels, Party Systems and Electoral Vola-
tility in Latin America: A Test of Economic, Institutional, and Structural Explan-
ations, American Political Science Review 93 (1999): 579.
14. For an interesting analysis of the problems posed by the concept popu-
lism in Latin American politics, see Kurt Weyland, Clarifying a Contested
Concept: Populism in the Study of Latin American Politics, Comparative Politics
34 (2001): 1 22. For a comparative analysis of the populist phenomenon on a
global scale, see Olivier Ihl et al., La tentation populiste au coeur de lEurope (Paris:
La Decouverte, 2003); Guy Hermet, Les populismes dans le monde. Une histoire soci-
ologique XIXe XXe siecle (Paris: Fayard, 2001); and Yves Meny and Yves Surel,
Par le peuple, pour le peuple. Le populisme et les democraties (Paris: Fayard, 2000).
15. Jean Gruegel, Populism and the Political System in Chile: Iba~ nismo
(1952 1958), Bulletin of Latin American Research 11 (1992): 169 186.
16. John D. Martz, Doctrine and Dilemmas of the Latin American New
Left, World Politics 22 (1970): 171 196.
17. See on the Communist Party (PC), Hernan Ramrez Necochea, Origen y for-
macion del Partido Comunista de Chile (Santiago: Austral, 1965); on the Socialist
Party (PS), Julio Cesar Jobet, El Partido Socialista de Chile, 2 vols. (Santiago:
Ediciones Prensa Latinoamericana, 1971); Benny Pollack, The Chilean Socialist
Party: Prolegomena to Its Ideology and Organization, Journal of Latin American
Studies 10 (1978): 117 152; and on the rivalry between the two David R.
Corkill, The Chilean Socialist Party and the Popular Front 1933 41, Journal
of Contemporary History 11 (1976): 261 273. In English on the Christian Demo-
crat Party (PDC), Tad Szulc, Communists, Socialists, and Christian Demo-
crats, Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 360 (1965):
99 109; Emmanuel De Kadt, Paternalism and Populism: Catholicism in Latin
America, Journal of Contemporary History 2 (1967): 89 106; George W. Grayson,
Jr., Chiles Christian Democratic Party: Power, Factions, and Ideology, The
Review of Politics 31 (1969): 147 171; Michael Dodson, The Christian Left in
Latin American Politics, Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs 21
(1979): 45 68.
18. For example, Steven W. Sinding, The Evolution of Chilean Voting Pat-
terns: A Re-examination of Some Old Assumptions, Journal of Politics 34 (1972):
774 796, through the creation of an electorate stability index between 1920 and
1960; and Arturo Valenzuela, The Scope of the Chilean Party System, Compar-
ative Politics 4 (1972): 179 199; Arturo Valenzuela, Political Participation, Agri-
culture, and Literacy: Communal versus Provincial Voting Patterns in Chile,
Latin American Research Review 12 (1977): 105 114.
19. Valenzuela, The Scope of the Chilean Party System.
234 Notes
20. Glaucio Soares and Robert L. Hamblin, Socio-Economic Variables and

Voting for the Radical Left: Chile, 1952, American Political Science Review 61
(1967): 1053 1065.
21. Alejandro Portes, Leftist Radicalism in Chile: A Test of Three Hypothe-
ses, Comparative Politics 2 (1970): 251 274.
22. Sandra Powell, Political Change in the Chilean Electorate 1952 1964,
Western Political Quarterly 23 (1970): 380.
23. Remember that the Charter of the Alliance called for greater international
cooperation, deep domestic structural reforms, sustained economic develop-
ment, more equitable economic distribution, and better public services. This
mission explains why the Alliance received US$20 billion. Javier Corrales and
Richard E. Feinberg, Regimes of Cooperation in the Western Hemisphere:
Power, Interests, and Intellectual Traditions, International Studies Quarterly 43
(1999): 11, note 18.
24. James Petras and Maurice Zeitlin, Los mineros y el extremismo agrario,
in America Latina: reforma o revolucion?, ed. James Petras and Maurice Zeitlin
(Buenos Aires: Editorial Tiempo Contemporaneo, 1970), 201.
25. Giovanni Sartori, Partidos y sistemas de partidos (Madrid: Alianza Editorial,
1976).
26. Juan J. Linz and Alfredo Stepan, ed., The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978).
27. Arturo Valenzuela, El quiebre de la democracia en Chile (Santiago: Ediciones
Universidad Diego Portales, 2003, first edition in English 1978).
28. Henry A. Landsbergen and Tim McDaniel, Hypermobilization in Chile,
1970 1973, World Politics 28 (1976): 502 541.
29. For a severe criticism of this approach, see Nancy Bermeo, Ordinary People
in Extraordinary Times. The Citizenry and the Breakdown of Democracy (Princeton,
N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2003), 162, who does not observe massive elec-
toral polarization phenomena in Chile, but a dramatic change in the size of the
electorate that increased by 1,280,000 people between 1969 and 1973. In this
same sense, James W. Prothro and Patricio E. Chaparro, Public Opinion and
the Movement of Chilean Government to the Left, 1952 72, Journal of Politics
36 (1974): 2 43, find no important correlations between the increasing left-wing
inclinations of Chilean governments between 1952 and 1972 and the left-wing
orientation of public opinion based on survey data.
30. Tomas Moulian, Chile actual: anatoma de un mito (Santiago: LOM, 1997).
31. Sartori, Partidos y sistemas de partidos; Valenzuela, El quiebre de la democracia
en Chile.
32. Manuel Antonio Garret on, El proceso poltico chileno (Santiago: FLACSO,
1983); Manuel Antonio Garret on, Hacia una nueva era poltica. Estudio sobre las
democratizaciones (Santiago: Fondo de Cultura Econ omica, 1995).
33. Steve J. Stern, The Memory Box of Pinochets Chile, vol. 2: Battling for Hearts
and Minds. Memory Struggles in Pinochets Chile, 1973 1988 (Durham, N.C.: Duke
University Press, 2006), 180, note 27.
34. Alfredo Joignant and Patricio Navia, From Politics by Individuals to Party
Militancy: Socialization, Political Competition and Electoral Growth of the Chilean
UDI, in When Parties Prosper: The Uses of Electoral Success, ed. Kay Lawson and
Peter H. Merkl (Boulder, Colo.: Lynn Rienner, 2007), 249 272. Gremialismo
was a student movement that became a political movement during the reform of
Notes 235
the Catholic University, and was characterized by a radical critique of liberal de-
mocracy and the defense of corporatist ideas inspired by Spanish Francoism.
35. A first approach can be found in Alfredo Joignant, El gesto y la palabra
(Santiago: LOM-Arcis, 1998, chapter 3). This in itself is an area worthy of further
exploration, only partially tackled in relation to the Communist Party by
Carmelo Furci, The Chilean Communist Party (PCCh) and Its Third Under-
ground Period, 1973 1980, Bulletin of Latin American Research 2 (1982): 81 95;

and by Rolando Alvarez, Desde las sombras. Una historia de la clandestinidad comu-
nista (1973 1980) (Santiago: LOM, 2003).
36. Gerardo L. Munck, Democratic Stability and Its Limits: An Analysis of
Chiles 1993 Elections, Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs 36
(1994): 6.
37. Oscar Godoy, La transici on chilena a la democracia: pactada, Estudios
Publicos 74 (1999): 79 106.
38. Alfredo Joignant and Amparo Menendez-Carri on, De la democracia de
los acuerdos a los dilemas de la polis: transici on incompleta o ciudadana pen-
diente?, in La caja de Pandora: el retorno de la transicion chilena, ed. Amparo
Menendez-Carri on and Alfredo Joignant (Santiago: Planeta-Ariel, 1999), 13 48.
39. Paul W. Posner, Popular Representation and Political Dissatisfaction in
Chiles New Democracy, Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs 41
(1999): 59 85.
40. During the year 2000, the old Radical Party (PR) became Partido Radical
Socialdem ocrata (now PRSD) after it merged with the small Social Democracia
Party. On the other hand, Partido por la Democracia (PPD) was created in 1987
as an instrumental force for the 1988 plebiscite, incorporating socialist party
leaders and members, as well as members of other left-wing organizations that
were illegal at that time. It became consolidated as a catch-all center left politi-
cal party.
41. RN was founded in 1987, while UDI claims that it was created in 1983 (for
age problems in this political party, see Joignant and Navia, From Politics by
Individuals to Party Militancy.
42. We rely here on Paul W. Posner, Local Democracy and the Transforma-
tion of Popular Participation in Chile, Latin American Politics and Society 46
(2004): 57.
43. There were nine appointed senators, plus the lifelong senators (ex-
presidents of the republic) who were all eliminated after the 2005 constitutional
reforms because they were regarded as authoritarian enclaves capable of lim-
iting popular sovereignty: for an analysis of the Chilean transition within the
framework of these enclaves, see Mark Ensalaco, In with the New, Out with
the Old? The Democratising Impact of Constitutional Reform in Chile, Journal
of Latin American Studies 26 (1994): 409 429.
44. For a detailed analysis of Chilean elections since 1989, see Patricio Navia,
Participaci on electoral en Chile, 1988 2001, Revista de ciencia poltica 24 (2004):
81 103; and Jose Miguel Izquierdo and Patricio Navia, Cambio y continuidad
en la elecci on de Bachelet, America Latina Hoy 46 (2007): 75 96.
45. In this case, the votes obtained by the PC are excluded because they do
not form part of Concertaci on.
46. It is important to point out that the votes obtained by these four parties in
1989 are absolutely equivocal, since on this occasion the Socialist and
236 Notes
Communist parties could not compete because of legal prohibitions. Thus, the
average vote of these four traditional parties rises to 42.16% if the 1989 elections
are not considered, two points less than in municipal elections. In any case, cau-
tion is advisable regarding the supposed electoral continuity of these parties,
because behind the appearance of permanence there are deep underlying dis-
continuities regarding their militancy, methods of organization, leaders, doctri-
nal references, and appropriations of the brands: Michel Offerle, Les partis
politiques (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1987). This same precaution
should be prioritized with regard to the parties of the right, which exhibits an
evident discontinuity formal and of its parliamentary elites: Joignant and
Navia, From Politics by Individuals, Cordero, La composici on social de la
nueva camara de diputados, in Documento de Trabajo ICSO-Universidad Diego
Portales (Santiago, 2005), 8, for evidence based on analyses of generational
cohorts of the deputies up to 1973. On this point, we disagreed strongly with J.
Esteban Montes; Scott Mainwaring, and Eugenio Ortega, Rethinking the Chil-
ean Party Systems, Journal of Latin American Studies 32 (2000): 804, who intro-
duce a false and direct continuity between the right of the 1990s under the cloak
of RN and the Partido Nacional of the mid-1960s, in circumstances when its
denomination did not even survive.
47. According to a recent opinion poll, identification with Concertaci on has
declined between June and July 2006 and March and April 2008 from 32% to
25%, as opposed to Alianza por Chile (which has remained stable at 16%) and
the extraparliamentary left grouped in the Juntos Podemos M as coalition (near
7% average support), with an increasing predominance of those who do not
identify with any pact (41% in the first measurement and 49% in the last). This
phenomenon of nonidentification is still more obvious regarding parties, since
in March and April 2008, 53% of voters did not identify with any party: Estudio
Nacional sobre partidos polticos y sistema electoral (March April 2008).
48. Valenzuela and Scully, De la democracia a la democracia.
49. Under the problematic assumption that the coalitions of parties existing
until 1973 (Unidad Popular) and the PDC (without alliances) would still be rele-
vant in electoral terms at the beginning of the nineties: Valenzuela and Scully,
De la democracia a la democracia, 198; for an analysis extending this assump-
tion to 1992, see J. Samuel Valenzuela, Orgenes y transformaciones del sistema
de partidos en Chile, Estudios P ublicos 58 (1995): 5 80.
50. Valenzuela, Orgenes y transformaciones.
51. Eugenio Tironi and Felipe Ag a el nuevo paisaje poltico
uero, Sobrevivir
chileno? Estudios P ublicos 74 (1999): 151 168. Mariano Torcal and Scott Main-
waring, The Political Recrafting of Social Bases of Party Competition: Chile,
1973 95, British Journal of Political Science 33 (2003): 55 84.
52. Lipset and Rokkan, Party Systems and Voter Alignments.
53. Thus, it does not seem possible to resolve this dispute empirically, since it
originates in different interpretations and readings of cleavage theory. In this
regard, Joignant, Modelos, juegos y artefactos, 238 249; also, J. Samuel Valen-
zuela, Timothy R. Scully, and Nicolas Somma, The Enduring Presence of Reli-
gion in Chilean Ideological Positionings and Voter Options, Comparative Politics
40 (2007): 17.
54. As is well known, Pedersen introduces his electoral volatility index adding
the net, positive or negative, change to the percentage of votes obtained by each
Notes 237
party in one legislative election or another, such that the higher levels reflect
greater degrees of volatility. Mogens N. Pedersen, The Dynamics of West
European Party Systems: Changing Patterns of Electoral Volatility, European
Journal of Political Research 7 (1979): 1 26, and Changing Patterns of Electoral
Volatility in European Party Systems, 1948 1977: Explorations and Explana-
tions, in Western European Party Systems. Continuity and Change, ed. Hans
Daalder and Peter Mair (London: Sage, 1983): 29 66.
55. The DataGob indicators can be found at http://www.iadb.org/DataGob/,
with data for Chile updated until 2001.
56. For analysis purposes, the elections of 1989 are not considered for assess-
ing electoral volatility at the party level due to the exceptional character of these
elections (first during the transition) and the fact that the Socialist and Commu-
nist parties could not participate in them.
57. Payne et al. record 2.07 in 1997: Mark Payne et al., La poltica importa.
Democracia y desarrollo en America Latina (Washington D.C.: Banco Interameri-
cano de Desarrollo e Instituto Internacional para la Democracia y la Asistencia
Electoral, 2003): 129, whereas Cabezas and Navia report 3.84 for the period
1989 2001: Jose Miguel Cabezas and Patricio Navia, Efectos del sistema bino-
minal en el n umero de candidatos y de partidos en elecciones legislativas en
Chile, 1989 2001, Poltica 45 (2005): 41. Markku Laakso and Rein Taagepera,
Effective Number of Parties. A Measure with Application to West Europe,
Comparative Political Studies 12 (1979): 3 27.
58. Over a much longer time span, L opez Pintor concluded that for the period
1945 2001, Chile exhibited a rate of 45.9% of VAP registered voters, in 11 legis-
lative elections, placing it in position 145 among 169 countries: Rafael L opez
Pintor, Voter Turnout Rates from a Comparative Perspective, in Voter Turnout
Since 1945. A Global Report, ed. Rafael L opez Pintor et al. (Stockholm: Interna-
tional IDEA, 2002), 84. Although this mediocre performance is explained, partly,
by the belated access of women to the right to vote in legislative elections and
by the slow materialization of potential voters as voters properly registered in
the electoral registers (in 1953, the registered electorate reached 17% of the VAP,
in 1963, 31.3% and in 1973, 44.1%, numbers that are not in line with the wide-
spread hypermobilization, generalized politicization, and extreme polariza-
tion hypotheses for explaining the democratic breakdown of 1973 due to
dynamic centrifuges [Bermeo, Ordinary People in Extraordinary Times, 144]),
the steady widening of the gap during the period 1993 2005 between the regis-
tered electorate and the VAP could be interpreted as the reproduction of a rela-
tively normal historical tendency to disaffection.
59. In this regard, the classic ecological fallacy identified by Robinson, has
tended to transform itself in Chile into more of an obstacle to understanding the
principles of vote generation, rather than a methodological precaution aimed at
preventing the investigator from inferring from the electoral data explanations
of the conduct of the voters: William S. Robinson, Ecological Correlations and
the Behavior of Individuals, American Sociological Review 15 (1950): 351 357. In
this regard, it is necessary to move from the analyses of the institutional and
electoral contexts of voting to more complete explanations of the social logics
that lead to voting in a particular way: in this respect, a first approximation is
the one by Miguel Angel L opez and Mauricio Morales, La capacidad
238 Notes
explicativa de los determinantes familiares en las preferencias electorales de los

chilenos, Poltica 45 (2005): 87 108.
60. Peter M. Siavelis, Coalition, Voters and Party System Transformation in
Post-authoritarian Chile, Government and Opposition 37 (2002): 76 105; Peter M.
Siavelis, The Hidden Logic of Candidate Selection for Chilean Parliamentary
Elections, Comparative Politics 34 (2002): 419 438; John M. Carey and Peter M.
Siavelis, El seguro para los subcampeones electorales y la sobrevivencia de la
Concertaci on, Estudios Publicos 90 (2003): 5 27.
61. Mauricio Morales and Antonio Poveda, El PDC: bases electorales, deter-
minantes de adhesi on e impacto en las votaciones de R. Lagos y M. Bachelet,
Estudios P ublicos, 107 (2007), 129 165.
62. Peter M. Siavelis, Electoral Reform Doesnt Matter or Does It? A Moder-
ate Proportional Representation System for Chile, Revista de ciencia poltica 26
(2006): 216 225; Dieter Nohlen, La reforma del sistema binominal desde una
perspectiva comparada, Revista de ciencia poltica 26 (2006): 191 202; for argu-
ments that question this aspect, John Carey, Las virtudes del sistema binomi-
nal, Revista de ciencia poltica 26 (2006): 226 235.
CHAPTER 7, POLITICAL PARTIES AND DEMOCRATIZATION IN

MEXICO: THE ENDLESS CHAIN OF ELECTORAL REFORMS
1. Susan Stokes, Son los Partidos Polticos el Problema de la Democracia
en America Latina? Poltica y Gobierno 1 (1998): 13 46.
2. Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan, Toward Consolidated Democracies, in
Consolidating the Third Wave Democracies: Themes and Perspectives, ed. Larry Diamond
and Marc Plattner (London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997), 14 33.
3. Juan Linz, The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes: Crisis, Breakdown and Requi-
libration (London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978).
4. These dilemmas have to be addressed in any process of democratic
design. See Richard Katz and William Crotty, Handbook of Party Politics (London:
Sage, 2006).
5. Institutionalization is a matter of degrees. Following Mainwaring and
Scully the institutionalization of party systems has four dimensions: patterns of
party competition, roots in society, legitimacy, and the control on party leaders.
See Scott Mainwaring and Timothy Scully, Introduction: Party Systems in Latin
America, in Building Democratic Institutions: Party Systems in Latin America, ed.
Scott Mainwaring and Timothy Scully (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University
Press, 1995). In Mexico, the system has a medium level of institutionalization,
although each party within the system has internally different levels of
institutionalization.
6. Three of these minor parties, PVEM (Mexican Green, Ecologist Party), PT
(Labor Party), and Convergencia Democratica (Democratic Convergence),
always support one of the major candidates parties for the presidency. The
other minor party, Alternativa Socialdem ocrata y Campesina (Social Democratic
and Peasant Alternative), was created before the 2006 election and has its own
candidates for the presidency.
7. In countries like Uruguay and Chile, the current parties were created
under democracy and suspended after the military coups. After the transitions
to democracy, the same old parties reemerged. See Manuel Antonio Garret on,
Notes 239
Hacia Una Nueva Era Poltica: Estudio Sobre las Democratizaciones (Mexico: Fondo
de Cultura Econ omica, 1998).
8. The Mexican case showed similarities with the process in the Communist
party-systems where inclusion preceded contestation. For postcommunist cases,
see Zsolt Enyedi, Party Politics in Post-Communist Transition, in Handbook of
Party Politics, ed. Richard Katz and William Crotty (London: Sage, 2006).
9. Giovanni Sartori, Parties and Party Systems: A Framework for Analysis
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976).
10. Soledad Loaeza, El Partido Accion Nacional: la Larga Marcha, 1939 1994:
Oposicion Leal y Partido de Protesta (Mexico: Fondo de Cultura Econ omica, 1999).
11. Soledad Loaeza, El Partido Acci on Nacional: La Oposici on Leal en
Mexico, in Lecturas de Poltica Mexicana (1977), 161.
12. The social Left includes an important number of social organizations some
of them with revolutionary origins, while others are formed by students and
neighbor based organizations.
13. Vctor H. Martnez, Fisiones y Fusiones, Divorcios y Reconciliaciones: La Diri-
gencia del Partido de la Revolucion Democratica (PRD) 1989 2004 (Mexico: Plaza y
Valdes/Centro de Estudios Polticos y Sociales de Monterrey/Facultad de Cien-
cias Polticas y Sociales/Facultad de Contadura y Administraci on [UNAM]/
FLACSO, 1999).
14. Valdimer O. Key Jr., A Theory of Critical Elections, Journal of Politics 17
(1955): 3 18.
15. Guadalupe Pacheco, Caleidoscopio Electoral: Elecciones en Mexico, 1979 1999
(Mexico: IFE/UAM-X/Fondo de Cultura Econ omica, 2000).
16. The Federal District is the capital of Mexico where the federal government
quarters are situated.
17. Edgar Butler et al., An Examination of the Official Results of the 1988
Mexican Presidential Election, in Sucesion presidencial: The 1988 Mexican Presi-
dential Election, ed. Victoria E. Rodrguez and Peter M. Ward (Alburqueque: Uni-
versity of New Mexico Press, 1995); Kathleen Bruhn, Taking on Goliath: The
Emergence of a New Left Party and the Struggle for Democracy in Mexico (University
Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997).
18. Jorge Domnguez and James McCann, Democratizing Mexico: Public Opinion
and Electoral Choice (London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996).
19. Esperanza Palma, Las Bases Polticas de la Alternancia en Mexico: Un Estudio
del PAN y el PRD Durante la Democratizacion (Mexico: UAM-A, 2004).
20. This was established in the Federal Law of Electoral Procedures and Insti-
tutions (COFIPE) approved in 1996.
21. Pablo Javier Becerra, Las Elecciones de 1997: La Nueva L ogica de la
Competencia, in Despues del PRI: Las Elecciones de 1997 y los Escenarios de la
Transicion en Mexico, ed. Cesar Cancino (Mexico: Centro de Estudios de Poltica
Comparada, 1998), 75 96.
22. Palma, Las Bases Polticas de la Alternancia en Mexico.
23. The analysis of the conflicts between the president and Congress that have
taken place since 1997 exceeds the limits of this chapter. Some scholars show
that the rate of approval of presidential initiatives by Congress has decreased
importantly: from 99 percent in 1994 1997 to 70 percent in 2003 2006. See
Laura Valencia Escamilla, Puntos de Veto en la Relaci on Ejecutivo-Legislativo,
Sociologica 62 (2006): 56.
240 Notes
24. Ulises Beltran, Venciendo la Incertidumbre: El Voto Retrospectivo en la

Eleccion Presidencial de 2000 en Mexico, Poltica y Gobierno 2 (2005): 325 358.
25. Esperanza Palma, El PRD y las Elecciones del 2000, El Cotidiano 106
(2001): 15 23.
26. Alejandro Moreno, El Votante Mexicano: Democracia, Actitudes Polticas y
Conducta Electoral (Mexico: Fondo de Cultura Econ omica, 2003).
27. Moreno, El Votante Mexicano, 183 184.
28. Palma, Las Bases Polticas de la Alternancia en Mexico.
29. Ibid.
30. Alejandro Tuiran, La Marginaci on que Opt o por el Cambio, Reforma
(August 6, 2000): Enfoque supplement.
31. Luis Salazar, ed., Mexico 2000: Alternancia y Transicion a la Democracia
(Mexico: Cal y Arena, 2001).
32. Moreno, El Votante Mexicano, 225.
33. Palma, El PRD y las Elecciones del 2000.
34. Esperanza Palma and Rita Balderas, Una Evaluaci on del PRD Despues
de la Alternancia de 2000, in Mexico 2006: Implicaciones y Efectos de la Disputa
por el Poder Poltico, ed. Roberto Gutierrez, Alberto Escamilla, and Luis Reyes
(Mexico: UAM, 2007), 85 123.
35. Alejandro Moreno, Perfilan candidato id oneo, Reforma (February 23,
2004): 1.
36. CEPAL, Segundo Informe Regional: Mexico, Capital Humano e Ingre-
sos, Serie de Estudios y Perspectivas 90 (2007).
37. Francisco Reveles, El PAN en la Elecci on Presidencial de 2006: Candi-
dato, Propuestas y Resultados, in Mexico 2006: Implicaciones y Efectos de la Dis-
puta por el Poder Poltico, ed. Gutierrez, Escamilla, and Reyes, 21 54.
38. Since 2000, this party has undergone an identity crisis. Its main political
internal discussions revolve around the new ideology that should be adopted.
In its national convention held in August 2008, the party decided to adopt a
social democratic identity.
39. There were two other candidates from minor parties: Roberto Campa, of
the newly created Nueva Alianza, a split from the PRI, who gained 0.96% of the
vote and lost registration, and Patricia Mercado who ran for Alternativa Social-
dem ocrata y Campesina.
40. Juan Reyes del Campillo, 2006: El Nuevo Mapa Electoral, in Mexico
2006: Implicaciones y Efectos de la Disputa por el Poder Poltico, ed. Gutierrez, Esca-
milla, and Reyes, 153 177.
41. Palma and Balderas, Una Evaluaci on del PRD Despues de la Alternancia
de 2000.
42. Alejandro Moreno, La Opini on Publica Mexicana en el Contexto Postelec-
toral de 2006, Perfiles Latinoamericanos 31 (2008): 41.
43. Roy Campos, Las Limpieza Percibida en las Elecciones, Consulta
Mitofsky (December 12, 2008).
44. Michelangelo Bovero, Elecciones Controvertidas, Signo de los Tiempos,
in Foreign Affairs en Espa~ nol 7 (2007) at http://www.foreignaffairs-esp.org/
20070101faenespessay070116/michelangelo-bovero/elecciones-controvertidas-
signo-de-los-tiempos.html.
45. The PAN and the PRI, on the other hand, are more institutionalized par-
ties that have greater control over their leaders.
Notes 241
46. Most public opinion polls have shown that the majority of citizens are
against the privatization of the state-owned oil company. A poll conducted by
Grupo Reforma in July 2008 showed that 64% of citizens are against privatiza-
tion; see Grupo Reforma, Encuesta: Seg un la Pregunta es la Respuesta,
Reforma (July 20, 2008), Enfoque supplement.
47. Palma and Balderas, Una Evaluaci on del PRD Despues de la Alternancia
de 2000, 119.
48. Chantal Mouffe, La Paradoja Democratica (Barcelona: Gedisa, 2003).
49. Jose A. Crespo, 2006: Hablan las Actas: Las Debilidades de la Autoridad Elec-
toral Mexicana (Mexico: Debate, 2008); Matthew Sober Shugart, Mayora Rela-
tiva vs. Segunda Vuelta, in Poltica y Gobierno 1 (2007); and Gabriel Negretto,
Propuesta Para Una Reforma Electoral en Mexico, Poltica y Gobierno 1 (2007).
50. Jose A. Crespo, 2006: Hablan las Actas: Las Debilidades de la Autoridad Elec-
toral Mexicana (Mexico: Debate, 2008).
51. This is according to the Federal Law of Electoral Procedures and Institu-
tions (COFIPE) revised and approved in 2007.
52. Lorenzo C ordova, La Nueva Reforma Electoral, Nexos 367 (2007) p 7.
53. Hector Aguilar Camn, La Suprema Corte y la Libertad de Expresi on,
Milenio (July 10, 2008), Opinion section, National edition.
54. A very important analysis of negative consequences of a fragmented party
system is the one developed by Scott Mainwaring on the Brazilian case; see Scott
Mainwaring, Rethinking Party Systems in the Third Wave of Democratization (Stan-
ford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1999).
55. Shugart, Mayora Relativa vs. Segunda Vuelta, 180.
56. Senado de la Rep ublica, Iniciativas de Ley Sobre la Reforma del Estado,
Senado de la Rep ublica, at www.senado.gob.mx/comisiones/LX/cenca.
57. Interview conducted by the author with PRI Senador Jes us Murillo Karam,
March 2, 2008, Mexico City.
58. Alejandro Moreno and Patricia Mendez, Identificaci on Partidista en las
Elecciones Presidenciales en Mexico: 2000 y 2006, Poltica y Gobierno 1 (2007):
50.
59. Ibid., 52.
60. Susan Phar and Robert Putnam, Dissaffected Democracies: Whats Troubling
the Trilateral Countries? (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2000).
61. Esperanza Palma, El Problema de la Confianza en los Partido en las
Democracias Latinoamericanas, Reflexiones Desde el caso Mexicano, Seminario
Partidos Polticos y Sistemas Electorales (2008): 77.
62. Russell Dalton, Citizen Politics: Public Opinion and Political Parties in
Advanced Western Democracies (Chatman, N.J.: Chatman House, 1996); Phar and
Putnam, Dissaffected Democracies.
63. Mariano Torcal, Richard Gunther, and Jose Ram on Montero, Anti-Party
Sentiments in Southern Europe, in Political Parties: Old Concepts and New Chal-
lenges, ed. Richard Gunther, Jose Ram on Montero, and Juan Linz (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2002), 257 290. Gabriela Catterberg and Alejandro
Moreno, The Individual Bases of Political Trust: Trends in New Established
Democracies, paper prepared for delivery at the 58th Annual Conference of
the American Association for Public Opinion Research (AAPOR), Nashville,
Tennessee, 2003.
64. Palma, El Problema de la Confianza en los Partido.
242 Notes
65. Latinobar
ometro, Informe Latinobar ometro 2006, Latinobar ometro web
page, at www.latinobarometro.org.
66. Arendt Lijphart, Unequal Participation: Democracys Unresolved
Dilemma, American Political Science Review 19 (1997): 1 14.
67. Jorge Buenda and Fernanda Somuano, La Participaci on Electoral en la
on Presidencial de 2000 en Mexico, Poltica y Gobierno 2 (2003): 289 323.
Elecci
CHAPTER 8, HOW DOES A DEMOCRACY WITH A WEAK PARTY

SYSTEM WORK? THE PERUVIAN CASE
1. Scott Mainwaring and Timothy Scully, eds., Building Democratic Institu-
tions: Party Systems in Latin America (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press,
1995).
2. Giovanni Sartori, Parties and Party Systems: A Framework for Analysis (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976).
3. Susan Stokes, Mandates and Democracy: Neoliberalism by Surprise in Latin
America (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001).
4. Samuel Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth
Century (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991).
5. Martin Tanaka, Peru 1980 2000: Chronicle of a Death Foretold? Deter-
minism, Political Decisions and Open Outcomes, in The Third Wave of Democra-
tization in Latin America: Advances and Setbacks, ed. Francis Hagopian and Scott
Mainwaring (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 261 288.
6. See Cynthia McClintock, The Prospects for Democratic Consolidation in
a Least Likely Case: Peru, in Comparative Politics, 21:2 (1989) 127 148.
7. According to an October 1989 APOYO poll, 47% of voters intended to vote
for Vargas Llosa in the April 1990 presidential election.
8. In November 1989 there were municipal elections, and in April 1990 elec-
tions for the president of the republic and all congressional seats.
9. Martin Tanaka, Los espejismos de la democracia. El colapso del sistema de parti-
dos en el Peru, 1980 1995, en perspectiva comparada (Lima: Instituto de Estudios
Peruanos, 1998).
10. Comprised of the Unified Mariateguista Party (PUM), the National Union
of the Revolutionary Left (UNIR), and the Popular Front of Workers, Peasants,
and Students (FOCEP).
11. Candidates for the municipal elections filed in August 1989; presidential
hopefuls filed in October 1989; congressional candidates in January 1990. During
that entire period, the internal struggles of all the parties were daily topics in
the news media.
12. Vargas Llosa wanted FREDEMO to run Front candidates in the municipal
elections, whereas AP and PPC wanted to run candidates from their own ranks,
with Front candidates being nominated only for the presidential and congres-
sional contests. This disagreement led to Vargas Llosas decision to withdraw
temporarily his presidential bid.
13. Ricardo Belmont, for example, elected mayor of Lima as an independent,
campaigned openly for Vargas Llosa, even making a speech at the latters end-
of-campaign rally in Lima.
Notes 243
14. Some writers maintain that the Fujimori phenomenon was the expres-
sion of a grave crisis of political representation in Peruvian society, and that it
expressed ethnic, cultural, class, and other problems of representation. In my
view, such positions illustrate the fallacy of retrospective determinism. Once
an event has taken place, an argument is constructed presenting that event as
inevitable. Yet less than a month before the election, it was almost impossible to
imagine such an outcome.
15. According to a survey firm, APOYO, Fujimori no longer appeared under
the heading others (for very minor candidates) in its poll taken between
March 8 and 11, when he had 3% of popular preferences. In the March 16 18
poll, he registered 6%; in the March 24 26 survey, 9%. According to IMASENs
March 5 7 poll, Fujimori had 2.5%: in the March 9 12 survey, 6.1%; and in the
March 14 16 survey, 9.5%. These figures began to increase at a faster rate, and
Fujimori reached 29.1% on April 8.
16. Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way, The Rise of Competitive Authoritarian-
ism, Journal of Democracy 13 (2002): 51 65.
17. Martin Tanaka, From Crisis to Collapse of the Party Systems and Dilem-
mas of Democratic Representation: Peru and Venezuela, in The Crisis of Demo-
cratic Representation in the Andes, ed. Scott Mainwaring and Ana Maria Bejarano
(Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2006), 47 77.
18. In the April 1990 elections, Cambio 90 obtained 21.7% of the votes for the
senate and 16.5% of the votes for deputies. In November 1992, Cambio
90 Nueva Mayora obtained 49.2% of the votes and won 44 of a total of 80 con-
gressional seats.
19. The yeses prevailed over the nos, 52% to 48 amid accusations of fraud.
20. In the 2000 election, with Fujimori as the candidate, the Peru 2000 move-
ment received 42% of the votes for Congress. Just one year later, the movements
identified with Fujimorism, Cambio 90 Nueva Mayora and Soluci on Popular,
obtained barely 4.8% and 3.6%, respectively.
21. On the 2000 election, see the many election-observation reports, produced
by the OAS mission, the Carter Center, the National Democratic Institute, the
U.S. State Department, the International Federation for Human Rights, the Elec-
toral Reform International Service, and the Washington Office on Latin America;
also the reports by Peruvian groups such as Transparencia, Foro Democr atico,
Consejo por la Paz, and the Defensora del Pueblo (the government ombudsman
office).
22. Martin Tanaka, The Political Constraints on Market Reform in Peru, in
Post-Stabilization Politics in Latin America: Competition, Transition, Collapse, ed.
Carol Wise, Riordan Roett, and Guadalupe Paz (Washington D.C.: Brookings
Institution Press, 2003), 221 248.
23. Alberto Adrianzen, El gasto social, el Estado y la pobreza en el Per u, in
Construyendo una agenda social, ed. Narda Henrquez (Lima: PUCP, 1999),
253 254. All dollar amounts are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.
24. According to APOYO, sector A is the wealthiest, B and C are the middle
and lower classes, and D is the poorest.
25. Moises Nam, Latin America: The Second Stage Reform, Journal of
Democracy 5 (October 1994): 32 48.
244 Notes
26. Another important movement that had a chance of winning from late 1998
to mid-1999 was Solidaridad Nacional, led by former social security administra-
tion director Luis Casta~ neda.
27. These maneuvers included bribing the press and using the judiciary to
harass opposition candidates.
28. Susan Stokes, Mandates and Democracy.
29. Waldo Mendoza and Juan Manuel Garca, Per u, 2001 2005: crecimiento
economico y pobreza. Documento de Trabajo 250 (Lima: PUCP, 2006).
30. Martin Tanaka and Sofa Vera, El neodualismo de la poltica peruana,
in Revista de Ciencia Poltica 28 (Santiago: Instituto de Ciencia Poltica, Pontificia
Universidad Cat olica de Chile, 2008), 347 365.
31. Jorge Casta~ neda, and Marco Morales, eds., Leftovers: Tales of the Latin
American Left (New York: Routledge, 2008); Pedro Perez Herrero, ed., La
izquierda en America Latina (Madrid: Pablo Iglesias, 2006).
32. Sonia Fleury, El desafo de la gestion de las redes de polticas, Revista
Instituciones y Desarrollo 12 13 (2002): 221 247; Dirk Messner, Del Estado
centrico a la sociedad de redes. Nuevas exigencias a la coordinaci on social, in
Reforma del Estado y coordinacion social, ed. Norbert Lechner, Rene Mill an, and
Francisco Valdes (Mexico: Plaza y Valdes and IIS-UNAM, 1999), 77 121.
CHAPTER 9, URUGUAY: PERSISTENCE AND CHANGE IN AN

OLD PARTY DEMOCRACY
1. Uruguays traditional parties are among the oldest of the Americas and of
Western Europe (second or third, depending on criteria used). With regard to
party systems ranking, while the two traditional parties still prevailed, up until
the 1990s, Uruguay achieved first place, followed by the United States and
Colombia. In the past few years, the party system became younger as the FA
grew as a third party. Mariana Sotelo, La longevidad de los partidos tradicio-
nales uruguayos, in Los partidos polticos uruguayos en tiempos de cambios (Monte-
video: Universidad Cat olica 1999): 129 165.
2. Colorados and blancos: reds and whites, following the colors of the
badges identifying each party in the 19th-century civil wars, when they were born.
3. The transformation of the Uruguayan party system resembles the change-
over in the English system during the first decades of the 20th century, particu-
larly after universal suffrage in 1918: a phase during which the new Labour
Party grew to become the main rival of the Conservative Party, while the Liberal
Party held on to minority positions but did not disappear.
4. Jorge Lanzaro, ed., Tipos de presidencialismo y coaliciones polticas en America
Latina (Buenos Aires: Clacso, 2001).
5. Jorge Lanzaro, Democracia Pluralista y Estructura Poltica del Estado,
Revista Uruguaya de Ciencia Poltica 14 (2004): 103 135.
6. Gerardo Caetano and Jose Rilla, Historia contemporanea del Uruguay. De la
Colonia al Siglo XXI (Montevideo: Fin de Siglo, 2005). Juan Pivel Devoto and
Alcira Ranieri de Pivel Devoto, Historia de la Rep ublica Oriental del Uruguay
(Montevideo: Editorial Medina, 1956).
7. Darcy Ribeiro, As Americas e a Civilizacao (1969, New edition: Sao Paulo:
Compa~ na das Letras, 2007).
Notes 245
8. See David Collier and Ruth Berins Collier, Shaping the Political Arena
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1991).
9. See Robert Dahl, Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition (New Haven,
Conn.: Yale University Press, 1971); Barrington Moore, Social Origins of Dictator-
ship and Democracy (Boston: Beacon 1966); Lanzaro, Tipos de presidencialismo y
coaliciones polticas en America Latina; Jorge Lanzaro, Uruguay: el presidencia-
lismo pluralista, in Revista Mexicana de Sociologa 2 (1998): 187 215.
10. Karl Mannheim, Man and Society (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul,
1940).
11. Milton Vanger and Jose Batlle y Ord ~ ez, The Creator of His Times
on
1902 1907 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963); Milton Vanger, The
Model Country: Jose Batlle y Ordon~ez of Uruguay 1907 1910 (Hanover: University
Press of New England, 1980).
12. During his long career, Herrera had to deal not only with Batlle y
Ord on~ ez, but also with his nephew, Luis Batlle Berres, the leader of the second
wave of batllismo, who governed during two periods (1947 1950 and
1955 1959). Within the PC, there has been a Batlle dynasty: Batlle y Ord ~ ezs
on
father, Lorenzo Batlle, was president in the period 1868 1872, and Luis Batlles
son Jorge Batlle was the last PC president (2000 2005), just before the arrival
of the left to government. In the PN, Herreras grandson, Luis Alberto Lacalle,
was also president (1990 1995).
13. Arend Lijphart (Consociational Democracy, World Politics, 21 2 1969:
207 225) coined the concept of consociational democracy in reference to the
processes of associative nation building, in societies traversed by social clea-
vages: nationality, ethnic, religious, and class. I argue that this notion applies to
processes of that kind involving political parties, in cases like Uruguay, in which
the parties are not simply representing social and economic divisions, but oper-
ate as catch-all parties and are themselves the constitutive subjects of truly polit-
ical conflicts, originally related to the distribution of power during the process
of state building (center periphery cleavage).
14. Julio Martnez Lamas, Riqueza y Pobreza del Uruguay (Montevideo: Palacio
del Libro, 1930).
15. Jonathan Hartlyn, The Politics of Coalition Rule in Colombia (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1988).
16. Jorge Lanzaro, Uruguay: Reformas polticas en la nueva etapa democr a-
tica, in Reforma poltica y electoral en America Latina, ed. Daniel Zovatto and
Jesus Orozco (Mexico: IDEA-Instituto de Investigaciones Jurdicas, UNAM,
2007): 905 951.
17. Robert Michels, Political Parties: A Sociological Study of the Oligarchical Ten-
dencies of Modern Democracies (New York: Free Press, 1962).
18. This regime can be compared to the Austrian proporz and also to similar
practices in Colombia and Costa Rica, albeit not so regular and institutionalized.
19. Corporatist institutions are not exclusive to authoritarian, fascist, or popu-
list regimes. Quite the contrary, it is common to find them in democratic
regimes in Europe and Latin America, in a more widespread form from the
1920s, particularly in social democratic governments and above all during
the Keynesian era. See Philippe Schmitter, Still the Century of Corporatism,
The Review of Politics 36 (1974): 85 131; Jorge Lanzaro, El fin del siglo del corporati-
vismo (Caracas: Nueva Sociedad, 1998).
246 Notes
20. Jorge Lanzaro, ed., La izquierda uruguaya entre la oposicion y el gobierno

(Montevideo: Fin de Siglo, 2004).
21. After the dictatorship, and having suffered a military defeat, followed by
long years of imprisonment or exile, the Tupamaros joined democratic politics
and in 1992 were finally admitted as members of the FA. Over the past few
years, they have formed a sector that has gained positions and their current
head, Jose Mujica, has become a very popular leader, competing as a FA candi-
date for the presidential election in 2009.
22. Juan Mara Bordaberry, Pachecos successor, who had been elected in
1971, accepted a compromise with the military, endorsing el golpe de estado and
dissolving parliament. Bordaberry stayed in office until 1976, holding a presi-
dency that was intervened by the armed forces. He was succeeded by civil-
ians appointed by the high authorities of the army (Alberto Demichelli,
Aparicio Mendez). During the last years of the dictatorship, the presidency was
held by General Gregorio Alvarez (1981 1984), one of the main actors of the
coup. Bordaberry and Alvarez are now in prison, processed for human rights
crimes committed during the dictatorship.
23. Jorge Lanzaro, Uruguayan Parties: Transition within Transition, in When
Parties Prosper, ed. Kay Lawson and Peter Merkl (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner,
2007).
24. Concerning politics and parties in the recent cycle of market reforms, see
our introduction in Rolando Franco and Jorge Lanzaro, eds., Poltica y Polticas
Publicas en los Procesos de Reforma en America Latina (Buenos Aires: Mi~ no and
Davila, 2006). Also Javier Corrales, Presidents, Ruling Parties and Party Rules:
A Theory on the Theory of Economic Reform in Latin America, Comparative
Politics 32 (2000): 127 149.
25. The party government refers to a permanent process of political produc-
tivity. See, among others, the ensemble of works edited by Francis Castles and
Rudolf Wildenmann, eds., The Future of Party Government (Berlin: de Gruyter,
1986). But it is subject to extraordinary challenges in times of change, which
involve the transformation of politics and at the same time require the restruc-
turing of parties.
26. Concerning Washington Consensus, see John Williamson, What
Washington Means by Policy Reform (Washington, D.C.: Institute for Interna-
tional Economics 1989). For an analysis of the second transition in Uruguay,
see Jorge Lanzaro, La segunda transicion en el Uruguay. Gobierno y partidos en un
tiempo de reformas (Montevideo: Fundaci on de Cultura Universitaria, 2000).
27. See our contributions to Alvaro Forteza et al., Pro-Market Reform in Uru-
guay: Gradual Reform and Political Pluralism, in Understanding Market Reforms
in Latin America, ed. Jose Mara Fanelli (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007):
227 265.
28. Brazil is in third place (over 10% of the GNP), followed by Argentina (just
below 9%) on a list headed by Bolivia (almost 20%) and Peru (15%). Eduardo
Lora, Las reformas estructurales en America Latina: que se ha reformado y como medi-
rlo, IDB Working Paper 462, Washington, DC, 2001.
29. Jorge Lanzaro, La reforma educativa en el Uruguay (1995 2000): virtudes
y problemas de una iniciativa heterodoxa, CEPAL Serie Polticas Sociales 91
(2004): 5 41.
Notes 247
30. United Nations Development Program, Informe sobre Desarrollo Humano en

Uruguay 1999 (Montevideo: UNDP 1999). http://www.undp.org.uy/share/pdf/
dhuru.pdf.
31. Beginning in the 1980s, presidencialismo de coalicion (coalition presidential-
ism) emerged as a product of certain political conditions of the new wave of de-
mocracy: multiparty systems, generally with the president elected by majority
in two rounds, economic adjustments, and structural reforms, in a cycle of sub-
stantive transformations of politics and parties. Counter to what some authors
predict, the difficult combination of presidentialism and multipartyism does
not necessarily lead to a stalemate or threats to democracy, but more than once
finds appropriate routes for government and reforms, even in periods of turbu-
lence and sharp change. It also becomes clear that government coalitions are not
exclusive to the parliamentary system, as is usually believed. See Lanzaro, Tipos
de Presidencialismo y Coaliciones Polticas en America Latina.
32. Lanzaro, Uruguay: Reformas polticas en la nueva etapa democratic.
33. The 1996 reform was passed in a constitutional referendum by a tight mar-
gin, 50.4% votes for (barely above the absolute majority required in such cases)
and 46.2% votes against. In the 1994 elections, the FA obtained 30% of votes and
in 1995 it obtained 40%. Furthermore, some left leaders and voters were in favor
of the reform. This therefore means that the negative vote did not come only
from the left, but also from of the rank-and-file of the traditional parties.
34. Theodore Caplow, Dos contra uno: teora de coaliciones en las tradas (Madrid:
Alianza Universidad, 1974).
35. According to Latinobarometro statistical series, Uruguay is one of the
Latin American countries in which the left right ideological cleavage shows con-
sistent significance and is accepted as such in public opinion polls and political cul-
ture surveys, regarding identity and self-identification of both elite and citizens.
36. The overlapping between the PC and PN, which in 1984 was 77% of the
electorate, in 1999 reached 90%. In the same period, the ideological distance
between the two parties fell from 12% to 3.3%, thus drawing a family circle
(Calculations based on Equipos-Mori and Cifra surveys).
37. Michael Coppedge, Political Darwinism in Latin Americas Lost Decade,
in Political Parties and Democracy, ed. Larry Diamond and Richard Gunther
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001): 173 205.
38. Jorge Lanzaro, ed., La izquierda uruguaya entre la oposicion y el gobierno
(Montevideo: Fin de Siglo, 2004).
39. Otto Kirchheimer, The Transformation of Western European Party Sys-
tem, in Political Parties and Political Development, ed. Joseph LaPalombara and
Myron Weiner (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1966); 177 200.
Angelo Panebianco, Modelli di partito. Organizzazione e potere nei partiti politici
(Bologna: Il Mulino, 1982).
40. Jorge Lanzaro, La social democracia criolla, Revista Nueva Sociedad 217
(2008): 10 22.
41. For an analytic distinction among left governments with or without par-
ties, see Jorge Lanzaro, La tercera ola de las izquierdas latinoamericanas:
entre el populismo y la social democracia, in Las izquierdas latinoamericanas y el
gobierno: experiencias y desafos, ed. Pedro Perez Herrero (Madrid: Editorial Pablo
Iglesias, 2006): 47 81.
248 Notes
42. Adam Przeworski, How Many Ways Can Be Third?, in Social Democracy
in Neoliberal Times. The Left and Economic Policy since 1980, ed. Andrew Glyn
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2001): 312 333.
43. Jorge Lanzaro, Uruguay: A Social Democratic Government in Latin
America, in Latin Americas Left Turn, ed. Steven Levitsky and Kenneth Roberts
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, forthcoming).
44. Tripartite institutions that functioned from the early 1940s until 1968 and
for a few years after the last democratic transition (1985 1992).
45. With some additions that are of my own account, I here freely take up
Merkels notion of power quotient. Wolfgang Merkel, Final de la Socialdemoc-
racia? (Valencia: Edicions Alfons el Magnanim, 1995).
46. See Lanzaro, Uruguay: A Social Democratic Government in Latin
America; Evelyne Huber and Jennifer Pribble, Social Policy and Redistribu-
tion under Left Governments in Chile and Uruguay, in Latin Americas Left
Turn, ed. Steven Levitsky and Kenneth Roberts (Cambridge: Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, forthcoming).
47. The Effective Competition Index, is a measure of the ratio of power
between government and opposition based on the number of representatives for
each party or coalition in the Lower House. See David Altman and Anbal
nan, Assessing the Quality of Democracy: Freedom, Competitiveness
Perez-Li~
and Participation in Eighteen Latin American Countries, Democratization 9
(2002): 85 100. By applying this index during 1989 2007, it can be seen that
Uruguay together with Brazil and Chile has relatively high effective competi-
tion indexes, thus settling into good positions in the regions context (Lanzaro,
La social democracia criolla).
48. On November 29, 2009, Jose Mujica, canddiate of the F.A., won a runoff
for the presidency. Therefore, the left government in Uruguay has been renewed
for a second period (2010-2015).
Contributors
GENERAL EDITOR
KAY LAWSON is Professor Emerita of political science at San Fran-
cisco State University. She was a visiting professor at the University of
Paris, Sorbonne, 1992 2000, and coeditor of the International Political
Science Review, 2000 2009. She is general editor of two series: Political
Parties in Context (Praeger) and Perspectives in Comparative Poli-
tics (Palgrave). She is the author of numerous books and articles on
political parties including The Comparative Study of Political Parties
(1976) and editor of many others including Political Parties and Linkage
(1980), When Parties Fail (1988), and When Parties Prosper (2007), the last
two with Peter Merkl. Her textbook, The Human Polity: A Comparative
Introduction to Political Science, is now in its fifth edition. In 2003 she
received the Samuel J. Eldersfeld Career Achievement award of the section
on Political Organizations and Parties of the American Political Science
Association.
VOLUME I: THE AMERICAS

JAMES BICKERTON is professor of political science at Saint Francis
Xavier University in Nova Scotia, Canada. Recent publications include
coeditorship of Canadian Politics, 5th ed. (2009), coauthorship of
Regions in Danielle Caramani, ed., Comparative Politics (2008), and
Freedom, Equality, Community: The Political Philosophy of Six Influential
250 Contributors
Canadians (2006). His research interests include federalism, nationalism,

and regionalism, as well as Canadian party and electoral politics.
DIANA DWYRE is professor of political science at California State

University, Chico. She is coauthor with Victoria Farrar-Myers of Legisla-
tive Labyrinth: Congress and Campaign Finance Reform (2001) and Limits
and Loopholes: The Quest for Money, Free Speech and Fair Elections (2008),
as well as author of many journal articles and book chapters on politi-
cal parties and political finance. She was the William Steiger American
Political Science Association Congressional Fellow in 1998 and the
Australian National University Fulbright Distinguished Chair in
American Political Science in 2009 2010.
ALFREDO JOIGNANT is professor and researcher of the Instituto de

Polticas P
ublicas Expansiva UDP, Diego Portales University in Chile,
and past president of the Chilean Political Science Association
(1998 2000). He is the author of several articles on political parties,
political competence, and political socialization in the Revue francaise de
science politique. His work currently focuses on the political sociology of
elites and the politics of memory.
JORGE LANZARO is professor at the Instituto de Ciencia Poltica,

Universidad de la Rep ublica (Uruguay), of which he was founder and
director. Among his latest publications: A Social Democratic Govern-
ment in Latin America, in Steven Levitsky and Kenneth Roberts, eds.,
Latin Americas Left Turn (Cambridge University Press, forthcoming);
Uruguayan Parties: Transition within Transition, in Kay Lawson and
Peter Merkl, eds., When Political Parties Prosper; La tercera ola de las
izquierdas en America Latina, in Las izquierdas latinoamericanas (Ma-
drid: Pablo Iglesias); and Tipos de Presidencialismo y Coaliciones Polticas
en America Latina (Buenos Aires: Clacso).
FERNANDO MAYORGA is professor and director of CESU-UMSS,

Saint Simon University in Cochabamba, Bolivia. He is the author of
Encrucijadas. Essays about Democracy and State Reform in Bolivia (Gente
Com un 2007) and The Antiglobalization Movement in Bolivia (Plural/
UNRISD 2008) as well as multiple book chapters and articles about
neo-populism, parties, and political discourse.
ANA MARIA MUSTAPIC is an associate professor in the Department

of Political Science and International Studies of the Torcuato Di Tella Uni-
versity in Buenos Aires. Her primary areas of research include Congress,
political parties, and electoral systems. She has served as a consultant
for the OAS, the UNDP, and the IDB on political reform. She is currently
finishing a book on the micro foundations of party politics in Argentina.
Contributors 251
JAIRO NICOLAU is professor in the Department of Political Science,

Instituto Universit
ario de Pesquisas do Rio de Janeiro (IUPERJ), Brazil.
He is author of Historia do Voto no Brasil (2002) and Sistemas Eleitorais
(2004), and multiple book chapters and articles on political parties, elec-
toral systems, and elections.
ESPERANZA PALMA is professor in the Department of Social Sci-

ences, Universidad Aut onoma Metropolitana-Cuajimalpa, in Mexico
City. She is the author of Las bases polticas de la alternancia en Mexico: un
estudio del PAN y el PRD durante la democratizacion (Mexico, UAM-A
2004) and author of multiple book chapters and articles on political parties
during transitional processes in Latin America, particularly in Mexico, the
so-called crisis of parties, and the perspectives of consolidation of the leftist
parties in Mexico.
MARTIN TANAKA is Peruvian and took his PhD in political science

from FLACSO Mexico. He is currently a senior researcher at the Insti-
tute of Peruvian Studies (IEP) and professor at the Catholic University
of Peru. He is the author of numerous books, book chapters, and
articles on political parties, democracy, and social movements, in Peru
and in Latin America; published by the IEP, Cambridge and Stanford
University Presses, Brookings Institution Press, and the University of
London, among many others.
VOLUME II: EUROPE

ATTILA AGH is a professor of political science at the Budapest Corvi-
nus University and director of the research center Together for Europe
at the Hungarian Academy of Sciences. He has published books in the
United Kingdom on the democratization of the east-central European
region and has recently edited a series of books in English on the new
member states of the European Union, focusing on governments, par-
ties, and organized interests.
ELIN HAUGSGJERD ALLERN is postdoctoral fellow of political sci-

ence at the University of Oslo, Norway. Her research interests include
party organizational change, the relationship between parties and inter-
est groups, and multilevel government and political parties. Her work
has appeared in several edited volumes and journals, including West
European Politics and European Journal of Political Research, as well as her
book, Political Parties and Interest Groups in Norway (ECPR Press 2010).
JRGEN ELKLIT is professor of political science at Aarhus University

in Denmark. His main professional interests are local and national poli-
tics and elections in Denmark and elections and democratization in
252 Contributors
new democracies. His latest book is Nye kommunalvalg? Kontinuitet og

forandring ved valget i 2005 (New local elections? Continuity and change
in the 2005 elections) (2007, coedited with Roger Buch).
CHRISTIAN ELMELUND-PRSTEKR is an assistant professor at

the Department of Political Science, University of Southern Denmark.
His most recent book is on negative campaigning in Danish elections
(Kammertoner og Unoder i valgkamp, University Press of Southern Den-
mark 2009). He has published several articles on political communica-
tion, negative campaigning, agenda-setting, and party organization.
JUERGEN FALTER is professor of political science at the University of

Mainz (Germany) and was president of the German Association of
Political Science (2000 2003). He has published about 25 books and
monographs, and over 200 articles on voting behavior, the Nazi elector-
ate, political extremism, political attitudes, and methodological prob-
lems of the social sciences.
PIERO IGNAZI is professor of comparative politics at the faculty of

political science of the University of Bologna, Bologna, Italy. His recent
publications include Political Parties and Political Systems: The Concept of
Linkage Revisited (Praeger 2005, coedited with A. Rommele and D. Far-
rell), Extreme Right Parties in Western Europe (Oxford University Press
2006), and Partiti politici in Italia (Il Mulino 2008).
ULRIK KJAER is professor of political science, University of Southern Den-

mark. His most recent book is on local political leadership (Lokalt politisk
lederskab, with Rikke Berg, University Press of Southern Denmark 2007). He
has published several articles and book chapters on political recruitment,
elections, parliamentarians, local governments, and local party systems.
HIERONIM KUBIAK is professor of sociology at the Jagiellonian Uni-

versity and Andrzej Frycz Modrzewski Cracow University, Poland.
Among his recent publications are: Democracy and the Individual Will
(1997); Parties, Party Systems and Cleavages in Poland: 1918 1989 (1999);
Reformers in PUWP (2000); Polands Democratic Left Alliance: Beyond Post-
communist Succession (2007); and On the Threshold of the Post-Westphalia
Era. A Theory of Nation (2007).
LAURA MORALES is a research fellow at the Institute for Social

Change of the University of Manchester. Her interests lie in the areas of
political behavior, social capital, and political parties. She is the author of
Joining Political Organisations (ECPR Press 2009) and of many book
Contributors 253
chapters and articles, among which is European Integration and Span-

ish Parties: Elite Empowerment amidst Limited Adaptation (with L.
Ramiro), in Thomas Poguntke et al., eds., The Europeanization of National
Political Parties: Power and Organizational Adaptation (London: Routledge
2007).
MIROSLAV NOVAK is the first professor of political science at the

Charles University and rector of the CEVRO Institute, both in Prague.
He has published regularly in French and in Czech, including Systemy
politickych stran (Political Party Systems, 1997). He is among other
appointments a member of the editorial boards of La Revue internatio-
nale de politique compare, La Revue detudes politiques et constitutionelles est-
europeennes, and lAnnuaire francais des relations internationals.
LUIS RAMIRO is associate professor of political science at the Univer-

sity of Murcia, Spain. He is the author of many book chapters and articles
on political parties, including Euroscepticism and Political Parties in
Spain (with I. Llamazares and M. Gmez-Reino), in P. Taggart and A.
Szcerbiak, eds., Opposing Europe? The Comparative Party Politics of Euro-
scepticism (Oxford University Press 2008) and European Integration and
Spanish Parties: Elite Empowerment amidst Limited Adaptation (with
L. Morales), in T. Poguntke et al., eds., The Europeanization of National Po-
litical Parties: Power and Organizational Adaptation (Routledge 2007).
NICOLAS SAUGER is senior research fellow at Sciences Po (Paris)

and associate professor at the Ecole Polytechnique, France. He has
coedited the special issue Frances Fifth Republic at Fifty of West Eu-
ropean Politics 32(2) (2009) and several book chapters on political par-
ties, institutions, and methodological issues related to survey research.
PAUL WEBB is professor of politics at the University of Sussex. His

research interests focus on representative democracy, particularly party
and electoral politics. He is author or editor of numerous publications,
including The Modern British Party System (Sage 2000), Political Parties in
Advanced Industrial Societies (Oxford University Press 2002, with David
Farrell and Ian Holliday), and Party Politics in New Democracies (Oxford
University Press 2005, with Stephen White). He is currently coeditor of
the journal Party Politics.
VOLUME III: POST-SOVIET AND ASIAN POLITICAL PARTIES

Post-Soviet
IGOR BOTAN is the executive director of the Association for Partici-
patory Democracy, an independent center of analysis and consultation
254 Contributors
on the decision-making, political, electoral, and socioeconomic pro-

cesses in the Republic of Moldova. He is the author of many articles on
electoral and party system development in Moldova and is also the po-
litical analyst for Moldovan issues at Radio Free Europe/Romanian
Service and at the Intelligence Unit of The Economist.
ANATOLY KULIK is senior research fellow in political science at the

Russian Academy of Sciences and lecturer at State University Higher
School of Economics (Moscow). He writes widely on comparative party
politics, political party development in post-Soviet Russia, and e-gover-
nance. Among his recent publications are: Russian Mnogopartijnost
in the Light of Political Competition, in Political Competition and Parties
in Post-Soviet States, edited by E. Meleshkina et al. (2009); Russian
Party System after Electoral Cycle 2007 2008: The End of the His-
tory?, in The New Political Cycle: Agenda for Russia, edited by O. Mali-
niva et al. (2008); and To Prosper in Russia: Parties Deep in the
Shadow of the President, in When Parties Prosper: The Use of Electoral
Success, edited by Kay Lawson and Peter Merkl (2007).
ANDREY A. MELESHEVYCH is professor and dean of the School of

Law, National University of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy in Ukraine. He is
the author of Party Systems in Post-Soviet Countries: A Comparative Study
of Political Institutionalization in the Baltic States, Russia, and Ukraine (2007)
and multiple book chapters and articles on political parties, electoral
law, and institution building in transitional countries.
GEORGE TARKHAN-MOURAVI is codirector of the Institute for Pol-

icy Studies (IPS) in Tbilisi, Georgia, and chairman of the board of direc-
tors, PASOS association of Eastern European think tanks based in
Prague, Czech Republic. He has authored a number of publications on
political developments and regional security in the Caucasus and the
Black Sea region, interethnic relations, forced migration, human devel-
opment, and democratic transition in Georgia.
Asia
BAOGANG HE received his MA from the Peoples University of
China, Beijing, and PhD from ANU, Australia. He is chair in interna-
tional studies at the School of Politics and International Studies, Deakin
University, Melbourne, Australia, and author of four books, three
edited books, and numerous refereed articles. His current research
interests include deliberative democracy, Chinese democratization, and
Chinese politics.
Contributors 255
EDMUND TERENCE GOMEZ is an associate professor of political

economy at the Faculty of Economics and Administration, University
of Malaya, and recently (2005 2008) served as research coordinator at
the United Nations Research Institute for Social Development
(UNRISD) in Geneva. His many books include Malaysias Political
Economy: Politics, Patronage and Profits (1997), The State of Malaysia: Eth-
nicity, Equity and Reform (2004), Politics in Malaysia: The Malay Dimen-
sion (2007), and The State, Development and Identity in Multi-ethnic
Countries: Ethnicity, Equity and the Nation (2008).
M. V. RAJEEV GOWDA is professor of economics and social sciences

at the Indian Institute of Management Bangalore. He coedited Judg-
ments, Decisions, and Public Policy (2002). He is also active in Indian poli-
tics. He has authored book chapters and articles on Indian political
parties and also on e-democracy.
TAKASHI INOGUCHI is president of the University of Niigata Prefec-

ture, professor emeritus of University of Tokyo, executive editor of the
Japanese Journal of Political Science, and director of the AsiaBarometer
project. He has published 80 books and numerous journal articles on Ja-
pan and international affairs. His current interests include political
party systems, political cultures, and cross-national comparisons of
norms and values through surveys. He is the coeditor of Globalization,
the State and Public Opinion (with Ian Marsh, 2008) and Demographic
Change and Asian Dynamics: Social and Political Implications, Asian
Economic Policy Review (June 2009).
HOON JAUNG is professor of political science at Chung-Ang Univer-

sity in Seoul, Korea. He is the author of President Roh Moo Hyun and
New Politics in South Korea (2003) and numerous articles on party poli-
tics and democratization issues of Korea. He was Reagan-Fascell Fellow
at the National Endowment for Democracy (Washington, D.C.) in 2005
and now serves as editor-in-chief for Korean Legislative Studies.
ESWARAN SRIDHARAN is the academic director of the University of

Pennsylvania Institute for the Advanced Study of India (UPIASI), New
Delhi. His research interests are in comparative party systems and coa-
lition politics, political economy of development, and international rela-
tions of South Asia. He has written or edited five books, published
over 40 journal articles and book chapters, and is the editor of India
Review (Routledge).
256 Contributors
VOLUME IV: AFRICA AND OCEANIA

Africa
ADEKUNLE AMUWO is professor of politics at the Howard College
Campus, University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban, and has recently com-
pleted a term as executive secretary of the African Association of Politi-
cal Science (2004 2009). He is a widely published pan-African scholar
and activist. Two recent works are Constructing the Democratic Develop-
mental State in Africa: A Case Study of Nigeria, 1960 2007 (2008) and a
coedited book on Civil Society, Governance and Regional Integration in
Africa (2009).
NICOLA DE JAGER holds a DPhil in political science from the Univer-

sity of Pretoria and is a lecturer at the political science department of the
University of Stellenbosch in South Africa. She has published in peer-
reviewed research publications and has consulted locally and internation-
ally on issues of democratization, dominant party systems, political soci-
ety, and civil society with a specific focus on South African and African
politics.
LEAH KIMATHI holds a BED (Hons) from Moi University and an MA

in history specializing in international relations from Kenyatta Univer-
sity. She also holds a fellowship in international philanthropy from
Johns Hopkins University. A recipient of the Claude Ake Memorial
Award in 2004, she has been involved in several research works in the
area of the African state and has published in the same. She is pro-
grams coordinator with Africa Peace Point, a Pan-African conflict reso-
lution organization, and a part-time lecturer at the Catholic University
of Eastern Africa in Nairobi. She is currently a conflict mediator and
researcher.
WILLIAM A. LINDEKE now serves as the senior research associate for

democracy and governance at the Institute for Public Policy Research
(IPPR) in Windhoek, Namibia. He was professor of political science at
the University of Massachusetts Lowell (retired) and professor of politi-
cal studies at the University of Namibia. He has authored or coau-
thored several book chapters and articles on Namibian politics and on
SADC issues. He is co-national investigator for Round Four of the Afro-
barometer in Namibia.
ANDRE DU PISANI is professor of political studies and former dean

of faculty at the University of Namibia (UNAM) and is the director in
Namibia of the Southern African Defence and Security Management
Network (SADSEM). He is the author, editor, or coeditor of several
Contributors 257
books and numerous articles on Namibian politics and security issues

in the SADC region.
LUC SINDJOUN is professor and head of the political science depart-

ment at University of Yaounde II (Cameroon). He is the author of sev-
eral books, chapters, and articles on comparative politics, African
politics, and international relations.
HERMAN TOUO is a lecturer at the University of Ngaoundere, Came-

roon. His PhD dissertation was titled Les dynamiques dancrages du
pluralisme partisan au Cameroun (1990 2006): leconomie des rapports
entre pouvoir et opposition. He is also interested in youth movements,
especially the impact of youth mobilization on democratic governance
in Cameroon. He participated as 2002 2003 fellow on Understanding
Exclusion, Creating Value: African Youth in a Global Age, a project ini-
tiated by the Africa Program of the Social Science Research Council
(SSRC).
Oceania
ALUMITA L. DURUTALO is a lecturer in the Division of Politics and
International Affairs at the University of the South Pacific, Fiji Islands.
She obtained her PhD from the Australian National University in Can-
berra and specializes in party and electoral politics and customary and
modern political leadership in the Pacific. Her numerous journal
articles and book chapters include Fiji: Party Politics in the Post-Inde-
pendent Period (Roland Rich et al., eds.).
RAYMOND MILLER is an associate professor and chair of the Depart-

ment of Politics at the University of Auckland, where he specializes in
political parties, representation, electoral systems and elections, and
leadership. He has collaborated on a number of election studies, includ-
ing Proportional Representation on Trial (2002) and Voters Veto (2004).
Recent publications include Party Politics in New Zealand (2005), New
Zealand Government and Politics (2006), and Political Leadership in New
Zealand (2006).
GORDON LEUA NANAU is a researcher at the Solomon Islands Col-

lege of Higher Education (SICHE). In 2009 he completed his PhD at the
School of International Development, University of East Anglia, U.K.,
with a doctoral dissertation on insecure globalization in the South Pa-
cific. His research interests are in the areas of rural development,
decentralization, conflicts and peace making, globalization, and interna-
tional development. His chapter on Intervention and Nation-Building
258 Contributors
in Solomon Islands: Local Perspectives appeared in Interventionism and

State-building in the Pacific: The Legitimacy of Cooperative Intervention
(eds. Greg Fry and Tarcisius Tara Kabutaulaka, Manchester University
Press, 2008).
MARIAN SIMMS is professor of political studies and Head of Social

Sciences at Deakin University in Melbourne, Australia. She has pub-
lished numerous articles and books including Australian and New
Zealand Politics: Separate Paths but Path Dependent, The Round Table,
2006, and From the Hustings to Harbour Views; Electoral Administration in
New South Wales, 1856 2006 (University of NSW Press, 2006). Her next
book, Kevin07: The 2007 Australian Election, is in press.
ISALEI SIOA is a senior lecturer in history and head of the social scien-
ces department at the National University of Samoa. She has made con-
tributions to the following books, Lagaga: A Short History of Western
Samoa, Tamaitai Samoa (Women of Samoa: Their Stories), and has published
articles in the Journal of Arts Faculty, National University of Samoa.
VOLUME V: THE ARAB WORLD

Arab World
MOHAMED OULD MOHAMED ABDERRAHMANE MOINE is a
Professor of Diplomacy in the Ecole nationale dadministration of
Nouakchott University in Mauritania. From 1992 to 2008, he occupied
diplomatic and governmental positions in Belgium, Canada, and South
Africa. He is the author of numerous articles on the subjects of human
rights protection, international relations, and democratization.
MOKHTAR BENABDALLAOUI is professor of philosophy and head

of the Department of Philosophy at Hassan II University, Casablanca,
and director of the Center for Studies and Research in the Humanities.
SAAD EDDIN IBRAHIM is professor of sociology at the American Univer-

sity in Cairo, founding chairman of the Ibn Khaldun Center for Develop-
ment Studies and founder of the Arab Organization for Human Rights. He
is widely known for his work on electoral fraud in Egyptian elections, work
that led to his arrest and conviction and a global outpouring of support from
scholars, human rights organizations, and political leaders. Recently con-
victed a third time, he is now in exile. During 2008 2009 he served as
professor of political sociology at Indiana University and as the Shawwaf
Chair Professor at the Center of Middle East Studies at Harvard University.
His numerous awards and publications are listed at http://www.eicds.org.
Contributors 259
SALAHEDDINE JOURCHI is a journalist and the vice president of the

Tunisian Human Rights League in Tunis.
ABDERRAZAK MAKRI is a medical doctor and holds an M.A. in

Islamic law and a post-graduate degree in Management Sciences. He is a
founding member of the Movement Society of Peace (MSP) in Algeria
and is currently the vice-president of the Movement and an elected
member of the Parliament in Algeria. Dr. Makri is the author of several
publications, including Islam and Democracy, Towards an Effective Citi-
zenship, which was developed by the Center for the Study of Islam and
Democracy (CSID) and Street Law, Inc., and has been used as a training
manual for NGO leaders and Imams throughout the Arab world.
ANTOINE NASRI MESSARRA is professor of political science at Leb-

anese University and Saint Joseph University, Beirut. He is president of
the Lebanese Political Science Association and program coordinator of
the Lebanese Foundation for Permanent Civil Peace.
EMAD EL-DIN SHAHIN is the Henry Luce Professor of Religion,

Conflict and Peacebuilding at the University of Notre Dame. He was
an associate professor of political science at the American University in
Cairo and visiting associate professor of the Department of Govern-
ment, Harvard University, while writing for this study. His recent
works include Political Ascent: Contemporary Islamic Movements in North
Africa (1997); coeditorship of Struggling over Democracy in the Middle East
and North Africa (2009); and coauthorship of Islam and Democracy (2005,
in Arabic).
Neighboring States
YUNUS EMRE is a Ph.D. candidate at Bogazici University, Istanbul,
and a graduate assistant at Istanbul Kultur University. His research
interests are European and Turkish politics, the economic and social
history of modern Turkey, and 20th-century historiography.
YAEL YISHAI is Professor Emerita of political science at the University

of Haifa, Israel. She is the author of several books including Land of
Paradoxes. Interest Politics in Israel (SUNY, 1991) and multiple articles
and book chapters on interest groups, civil society, and political parties
in Israel. Her current research interests are in the processes leading to
antipolitics and its outcomes.
Index
Figures indicated by f.
Absolute Margin of Electoral Security Alvarez, Gregorio, 245n22
(AMES), 145 47 American Political Science
Accion Democratica Nacionalista Association, 39
(ADN), 77, 79 87, 224n7 American Popular Revolutionary
Accion Popular (AP), 176, 178, 242n12 Alliance (APRA), 173, 176, 177,
Acuerdo Patri otico (AP), 81 181
ADN (Acci on Democratica Naciona- AMES (Absolute Margin of Electoral
lista), 77, 79 87, 224n7 Security), 145 47
Aguero, Felipe, 139 Andrade, Alberto, 189
Alberta, Canada, quasi-party Antezana, Luis H., 224n10
tradition in, 12 anti-Peronism, 54, 55
Alberto de Herrera, Luis, 199 200, anti-yrigoyenists, 54
244n12 AP (Acci on Popular), 176, 178, 242n12
Alfonsn, Raul, 55, 56, 63, 69 AP (Acuerdo Patri otico), 81
Alianza, 56, 64 APRA (American Popular
Alianza por Chili, 134, 136, 139, 142, Revolutionary Alliance), 173,
144, 145, 146 176, 177, 181
Alianza por el bien de todos, 158 Argentina
Alianza por el Cambio, 156 Chamber of Deputies, 60f
Allende, Salvador, 131, 132 convertibility law, 56
Alliance for Progress, 132 crisis situations in, 51, 57
Alliance Party, 11, 15 decentralized organization of
Alternativa Socialdem ocrata y parties, 66 67
Campesina, 238n6 district party, 64 65
Altman, David, 247n47 elections in, 56 62, 62f,
Alva, Javier, 177 65 66, 189
Alva Castro, Luis, 181 electoral reforms in, 54
262 Index
Argentina (continued) Bolivia

federal system, 51 ADN (Acci on Democr atica
Frente para la Victoria, 57 Nacionalista), 77, 79 87, 224n7
FREPASO (Frente Para un Pas AP (Acuerdo Patri otico), 81
Solidario), 56, 59, 61 centralism in, 75
government instability, 57 citizens clusters in, 90
historical background, 53 58 cleavages in, 75, 78, 85, 90, 92, 96,
human rights movement, 63 225n11
Lora Privatization Index ranking, coalition governments, 79, 86, 89
246n28 coca leaves plantations, 86
multipartisan system in, 57 58, 70 cocaleros, 86
national party, 64 65 CONDEPA (Conciencia de Patria),
number of parties, 64 65 80, 81, 83 86
party fragmentation, 64 67, 68, 70 conflicts in, 75
party regulation, 64 65 Congress, 74, 98 99
party system in, 51, 53, 58, 64, 129, Constitution, 91, 97
192f constitutional assembly
personalization of power, (2006 2007), 97
67 69 constitutional reform in, 73, 89 90,
PJ (Peronists), 51, 53 56, 58 62, 94 99
64 68, 70 Constitutional Tribunal, 95
political culture, 62 63 crisis situations in, 77, 78, 88 92
presidential resignations in, 53, 57, economic neo-liberalism, 82
69 70 education, 85
River Plate and, 198 elections in, 73, 78f, 80f, 82f, 84f,
Senate, 62, 63f 87f, 90, 91f, 98
suffrage in, 128 electoral system, 73, 74, 83
UCR (Uni on Cvica Radical), equity bonus, 85
51 55, 59 61, 65 68, 70 institutional reforms, 94
voting and voters, 58 64 IU (Izquierda Unida), 80
authoritarianism, 174 75, 182 90, judicialization in, 109
199, 204 Judiciary Council, 95
labor unions in, 74, 77 78, 80
Bachelet, Michele, 211 Law of Political Parties (1999),
Balbn, Ricardo, 55 95 96
Banzer Suarez, Hugo, 86, 224n7 law of shares (1997), 95
Bardi, Luciano, 70 Lora Privatization Index ranking,
Barrantes, Alfonso, 177, 180 81 246n28
batllismo, 199 MAS (Movimiento al Socialismo),
Batlle, Jorge, 205, 244n12 86 87, 89 91, 96, 225n13
Batlle, Lorenzo, 244n12 MBI (Movimiento Bolivia Libre), 85
Batlle, Luis Alberto, 244n12 MIP (Movimiento Indgena
Batlle Berres, Luis, 244n12 Pachacuti), 87
Batlle y Ordon~ ez, Jose, 199 MIR (Movimiento de Izquierda
Bedoya, Luis, 177 Revolucionario), 76 77, 79 87,
Belaunde, Fernando, 177, 178 224n7
Belmont, Ricardo, 242n13 MNR (Movimiento Nacionalista
Beyme, Klaus von, 109 Revolucionario), 73, 79 80,
Bloc Quebecois, 10 11, 13, 15, 17 82 85, 87, 90, 224n7
Index 263
MNRI (Movimiento Nacionalista Chamber of Deputies, 110, 114f,

Revolucionario de Izquierda), 115 17, 118f, 122, 124, 228n37
76 77, 84 85 coalition governments, 119
MRTKL (Movimiento Revolucio- corruption scandals, 124 25
nario Tupac Katari de Liber- discipline rate, 122, 123f
aci
on), 85 elections in, 115, 117 18, 125
national dialogues, 86 electoral system, 115 17
neo-liberalism in, 75, 78, 79, 83 84 executive administration,
neo-populism in, 80 81, 84, 85 119, 121
NFR (Nueva Fuerza Republicana), the left in, 197
86, 87 legislature, 121 24, 124f
pact democracy in, 74, 80, 81, 87, Lora Privatization Index ranking,
93, 96 246n28
parliamentary presidency (hybrid) military and politics in, 125
in, 74 National Congress, 115
party system in, 73, 74, 78 92, national party, 65
192f open list system in, 116 17
PCB (Partido Communista parties in government, 118 24, 120f
Boliviano), 76 77 party fragmentation, 110
Peoples Defense, 95 Party Fund, 107, 109, 125
pluralism in, 97 99, 225n16, party funding, 106 7, 125, 227n30
225n17, 225n18, 225n19 party increase in, 105 6
PODEMOS (Poder Democratico y party longevity, 110
Social), 90, 225n13 party membership, 107 9,
political reforms, 92 99 227 28n31
Popular Participation Law (1995), party system in, 105 9, 108f, 192f,
95 212, 227n23
presidential resignations in, 88, 89 party unity index, 122
relevant parties, 109 10 PMDB (Party of the Brazilian
representation by territory in, 74, Democratic Movement), 122
224n2 PP (Progressive Party), 110
revolutionary nationalism in, PR (Radical Party), 128, 130
224n10 PRN (National Reconstruction
roll-call voting, 123f Party), 110
social movements and protests, 89, PSOL (Socialism and Liberty
96 Party), 106
state capitalism in, 75 PT (Partido dos Trabalhadores),
UCS (Unidad Cvica Solidaridad), 212
81, 83, 85, 86 PT (Workers Party), 107, 122,
UDP (Unidad Democratica y 229n52
Popular), 76 77 radio and television air time,
UN (Unidad Nacional), 90, 225n13 106 7, 109, 125
Bordaberry, Juan Maria, 245n22 relevant parties, 111 13f,
Brady, Henry, 39 117, 123
Brazil representative system, 104, 104f
Act 6767 (1979), 105 6 responsible party model, 102 3,
Alianza, 56, 64 110, 226n9
Brazilian Republican Party, 106 roll-call voting, 122, 230n65
campaign personalization in, 117 Senate, 115
264 Index
Brazil (continued) Parliament, 18 20

social democratic government in, 211 parties as organizations, 14 18
statization of parties in, 125 party conventions in, 9
STF (Superior Court of Justice ), party financing, 11
105, 123, 227n31 party integration, lack of, 12 13
suffrage in, 128 party leadership selection, 17
TSE (Superior Electoral Court), 105, party membership, 15
123, 177, 227n21, 227n31 party reforms in, 23 24
verticalization, 227 28n31 party system in, 4 14, 17, 22
voting and voters in, 103, 110, 114, policy study in, 15 16
122, 124, 228n37, 230n65 political regionalism, 8
British North American Act (1867), 4 postmaterialism in, 22
Brizola, Leonel, 111f Progressive Conservative Party, 5,
Bruce, Carlos, 188 7, 8, 9, 11
Bucaram, Abdala, 182 Progressive Party, 5
Buchanan, Pat, 43 Reform Party, 10 11, 13, 15, 17
Bush, George W., 31, 38, 42 regional parties, 14
Senate, 14
Cairns, Alan, 8 Social Credit Party, 5, 13
Calderon, Felipe, 159, 162 63 U. S. relationship, 6, 7
California, state budget (2008), 31 Unionist Party, 5
Campa, Roberto, 240n39 voting and voters, 15, 20 22, 23
Campbell, Kim, 10 Westminster system in, 22
Canada See also specific cities
Alliance Party, 11, 15 capitalism, state, 75
Bloc Quebecois, 10 11, 13, 15, 17 Cardenas, Cuahutemoc, 153, 156
CCF (Cooperative Commonwealth Cardenas, L azaro, 152
Federation), 5, 7 Cardenas, Vctor Hugo, 224n11
Charter of Rights and Freedoms Cardoso, Fernando Henrique, 113f,
(1982), 10 120f, 123f
Confederation in, 4 Carty, R. Kenneth, 16
Conservative Party, 5, 11 Casta~neda, Luis, 243n26
Constitution, 10 Catamarca province, 1983 elections,
Creditistes, 8, 12 61
Election Expenses Act (1974), 9 Catholic Church, 77, 78
electoral reforms in, 23 24 Catterberg, Gabriela, 168
electoral system, 8 Cavallo, Domingo, 62
federalism in, 12 CCD (Constituent Democratic
free trade agreement, 11 Congress), 183
health care system, 13 CCF (Cooperative Commonwealth
leaders entourages, 19 20 Federation), 5, 7
legislation, 18 CD (Corriente Democr atica), 153
liberal democracy in, 23 centralism, 75
Liberal Party, 5 9, 11, 15, 17, 23 Chili
local nomination contests, 16 17 Alianza por Chili, 134, 136, 139,
modern state apparatus 142, 144, 145, 146
installation, 6 capitalist development in, 129
NDP (New Democratic Party), 7, 8, cleavages, 129, 139 40
9, 11, 13, 15 Conservative Party, 130
Index 265
Constitution (1980), 135 36 voting and voters, 131, 135 45,

constitutional plebiscite, 204 137 38f, 140 43f, 147
coup detat (1973), 128, 130, 133 Chretien, Jean, 11, 21
democratic collapse in, 130, 132, Christian Democratic Party (PDC),
133 34 130, 136 37, 139, 145
Democratic Party, 129 Clinton, Hillary Rodham, 36
democratic stability in, 128 coalition presidentialism, 207, 246n31
elections in, 127, 130, 135 36, 135f, cocaleros, 86
137 38f, 139 41, 140 42f, Cold War, 131
144 47, 146f Collier, Simon, 128
electoral system, 128, 136 Collor de Mello, Fernando, 110, 119,
executive office, 135 36 120f, 121, 123f, 125, 182
gremialismo movement in, 133 Colombia
hypermobilization in, 133 electoral regime, 245n18
the left in, 197 party system in, 192f, 201
left-wing radicalism in, 130 33 Colomer, Josep M., 128
legislature, 135 Communist Party (PC), 129, 130, 134,
Liberal Party, 130 136 37, 139
military dictatorship in, 130, Communist party-systems, 238n8
133 34 Concertaci on, 134 36, 139 42,
NP (National Party), 133 144 46
party labels, 133 34 Conciencia de Patria (CONDEPA), 80,
party stability, 128 30 81, 83 86
party system in, 129, 131, 139 40, Confederaci on de Instituciones
192f, 212 Empresariales Privadas
PC (Communist Party), 129, 130, (CONFIEP), 188
134, 136 37, 139 Confederation, 4
PDC (Christian Democratic Party), CONFIEP (Confederaci on de Institu-
130, 136 37, 139, 145 ciones Empresariales Privadas),
polarization in, 132, 133 188
policide project in, 133 34 Connecticut for Lieberman Party, 36
Popular Front, 130 Conservative Party (Canada), 5, 11, 15
Popular Unity government, 132, Conservative Party (Chili), 130
133 consociational democracy, 200 203,
PRSD, 136 37, 139 215, 244n13
PS (Partido Socialista), 212 Constituent Democratic Congress
PS (Socialist Party), 129, 134, (CCD), 183
136 37, 139 Convergencia Democr atica, 158,
return to democracy (1990), 238n6
134 35 Cooperative Commonwealth
right-left axis, 129 Federation (CCF), 5, 7
RN (National Renewal), 134, 146 Coordinadora Gremial de
social democratic government in, Produccion, 188
211 corporatist institutions, 202, 245n19
Socialist Working Party, 129 Corriente Democr atica (CD), 153
socioeconomic conditions, 131 33 Costa Rica
suffrage in, 128, 129 democratic stability, 128
UDI (Independent Democratic electoral regime, 245n18
Union Party), 133 34, 146 party system in, 192f
266 Index
Creditistes (Canada), 8, 12 in United States, 31, 36 37, 40

Crenson, Matthew A., 38 in Uruguay, 198 99, 201, 205,
Crespo, Jose A., 165 207 8, 210 11, 245n21
Cross, William, 24 electoral reforms
Cuban Revolution, 131, 132 in Argentina, 54
in Canada, 23 24
Dahl, Robert, 101 in Mexico, 149, 151 52, 154 55,
Dalton, Russell, 168 165 67
de la R
ua, Fernando, 56, 57, 69 70 electoral systems
De Soto, Hernando, 178 in Bolivia, 73, 74, 83
dedemocratization, x xi in Brazil, 115 17
dedemocratization, U. S., 34 35 in Canada, 8
Demichelli, Alberto, 245n22 in Chili, 128, 136
democratic liberalism, 84 in Mexico, 152, 155, 165 67
democratic neo-liberalism, 82 in Uruguay, xvii
Democratic Party (Chile), 129 Electoral Tribunal (TRIFE), 162
Democratic Party (U. S.), 32, 33, England, party system in, 244n3
36 38, 41, 122 Estenssoro, Vctor Paz, 79
Democratic Republicans (U. S.), 32, 33 Europe
DHondt system, 59, 128, 136 corporatist institutions in, 245n19
dictatorships, military, 130, 133 34, party development in, 101 2
197, 199, 203, 204 party system in, 129
Diefenbaker, John, 7, 9
Duhalde, Eduardo, 57, 69 FA (Frente Amplio), 195 96, 203 4,
Duverger, Maurice, 13, 45 209 12, 214
Duvergers law, 40 Farah, Eduardo, 188
Faye, Jean-Pierre, 224n10
Economic Commission for Latin FDN (Frente Democr atico Nacional),
American and the Caribbean 153, 154
(ECLAC), 203 Federal Election Commission (FEC),
economic neo-liberalism, 85 43
Ecuador, party system in, 192f federalism, 12, 40
Effective Competition Index, 247n47 Federalist No. 10 (Madison), 29
El Salvador, party system in, 192f Federalists (U. S.), 32, 33
elections Fernandez, Max, 224n9
in Argentina, 56 62, 62f, 65 66, Fernandez de Kirchner, Cristina, 57,
189 67 68
in Bolivia, 73, 78f, 80f, 82f, 84f, 87f, Ferreira Aldunate, Wilson, 205
90, 91f, 98 filibuster, 30
in Brazil, 115, 117 18, 125 Founding Fathers (U. S.), 29
in Catamarca province, 61 Foweraker, Joe, 128
in Chili, 127, 130, 135 36, 135f, Fox, Vicente, 152, 156, 157
137 38f, 139 41, 140 42f, Franco, Itamar, 123f
144 47, 146f FREDEMO (Frente Democr atico),
in Mexico, 150 65, 157f, 160 63f, 177 78, 181 82, 242n12
169 70, 169f, 240n39 Free Electoral Air Time (HEG), 106 7
in Peru, 175 77, 180 83, 187 89, free trade agreement, 11
193, 242n7, 242n11, 242n20 Frente Amplio (FA), 195 96, 203 4,
in Salta province, 61 209 12, 214
Index 267
Frente Democratico (FREDEMO), JNE (National Election Jury), 184

177 78, 181 82, 242n12 Johnston, Richard, 14
Frente Democratico Nacional (FDN), Justicalism, 61
153, 154
Frente para la Victoria (Argentina), 57 katarismo, 224 25n11
Frente Para un Pas Solidario Katz, Richard, 121
(FREPASO), 56, 59, 61 King, Mackenzie, 5, 6, 17
Fujimori, Alberto, xvi, 174 75, 179, Kirchner, Nestor, 57, 67
182 90, 192, 242n15, 242n20 Kolodny, Robin, 41
Fujimorism, 183, 185, 190, 242 43n20
Labor Party (PT), 158, 238n6
Garcia, Alan, 177, 178, 180, 181 82, labor unions, 74, 77 78, 80
190, 193 Lagos, Ricardo, 211
Gerry, Eldridge, 44 Lanzaro, Jorge, 225n19
gerrymandering, 44 45 Latin America
Ginsberg, Benjamin, 38 coalition presidentialism in, 207,
Goertz, Gary, 101 246n31
Gore, Al, 31 constitutional reform in, 207
Green, John, 31 corporatist institutions in, 245n19
Gruegel, Jean, 130 liberal transition in, 205 7
Guatemala, party system in, 192f party system in, 192f
social democratic government in,
Hamblin, Robert L., 131 211 15
Hamilton, Alexander, 32 UNDP rankings, 206 7
Hansen, John Mark, 44 See also specific countries
Harper, Stephen, 11, 21, 23 Law of Political Parties (1999), 95 96
health care, 13, 85 Lawson, Kay, 46
HEG (Free Electoral Air Time), 106 7 Leduc, Lawrence, 20, 23
High Chamber (Bolivia), 74 Levitsky, Steven, 69
Hofstadter, Richard, 45 Liberal Party (Canada), 5 9, 11, 15,
Humala, Ollanta, 193 17, 23
human rights movement, 63 Liberal Party (Chili), 130
hypermobilization, 133 liberalism, democratic, 84
Liberty Movement (ML), 178, 181
~ ez, Carlos, 130, 131
Iban Lieberman, Joseph, 36
immigrants (U. S.), 34 Linz, Juan J., 132
Import Substitution Industrialization Liphart, Arend, 200
(ISI), 203 Lipset, Seymour Martin,
Independent Democratic Union (UDI) 129, 139
Party, 133 34, 146 Lopez Obrador, Andres Manuel,
Indigenous, meaning of, xi 158 59, 160, 162 63, 164
IS (Socialist Left), 181 Lora Privatization Index rankings,
ISI (Import Substitution Industrializa- 206, 246n28
tion), 203 Luder, Italo, 55
Izquierda Unida (IU), 80, 176, 177 Lula da Silva, Luis In acio, 113f, 119,
120f, 121, 211
Jackson, Andrew, 32, 33
Jefferson, Thomas, 32 Mackie, Thomas T., 109 10
Jeffersonians, 32, 33 Madison, James, 29, 32
268 Index
Madrazo, Roberto, 159 PAN (Partido Acci on Nacional),

Maine, proportional representation 151 52, 154, 156 58, 160, 164,
in, 47 168, 240n45
Mainwaring, Scott, 139, 238n5, 240n54 parties and society in, 167 70
Mair, Peter, 70, 121 party conflict in, 156 58
Malvinal War, 53 party propaganda in, 166
Martin, Paul, 23 party system in, 150, 151 55, 192f,
Marxist left, 173 74, 176 238n5
MAS (Movimiento al Socialismo), pluralism in, 155, 170
86 87, 89 91, 96, 225n13 PMS (Partido Mexicano Socialista),
MBI (Movimiento Bolivia Libre), 85 153
McBride, Eduardo, 188 PNR (Partido Nacional
McCain, John, 27 Revolucionario), 151 52
Mendez, Aparicio, 245n22 political reforms in, 149
Mendez, Patricia, 168 PRD (Partido de la Revoluci on
Menem, Carlos, 56, 57, 64, 67, 189 Democr atica), 150 54, 156, 158,
Mercado, Patricia, 240n39 160, 164, 168
Mesa, Carlos, 89 president and Congress
Mexican Petroleum (PEMEX), 164, cooperation, 156, 239n23
240n46 PRI (Partido Revolucionario
Mexican Revolution (1910), 151, 155 Institucional), 151, 153 54, 156,
Mexico 160, 168, 240n38, 240n45
Alianza por el bien de todos, 158 PT (Labor Party), 158, 238n6
Alianza por el Cambio, 156 PVEM (Partido Verde Ecologista
Alternativa Socialdem ocrata y de Mexico), 156, 238n6
Campesina, 238n6 social Left, 153, 238n12
CD (Corriente Democratica), 153 TRIFE (Electoral Tribunal), 162
cleavages, 154, 156 65 voting and voters, 156 57, 169,
Congress, 150, 155, 156 169f
Constitution, 155, 156 See also specific cities
Convergencia Democratica, 158, Michoac an, Mexico, 157
238n6 military dictatorships, 130, 133 34,
democratization process, 151 55 197, 199, 203, 204
elections in, 150 65, 157f, 160 63f, MIP (Movimiento Indgena
169 70, 169f, 240n39 Pachacuti), 87
electoral coalitions, 166 MIR (Movimiento de Izquierda Revo-
electoral college, 154 lucionario), 76 77, 79 87, 224n7
electoral law (1996), 156 ML (Liberty Movement), 178, 181
electoral reforms, 149, 151 52, MLN Tupamaros (Movimiento de
154 55, 165 67 Liberacion Nacional), 204,
electoral system, 152, 155, 165 67 245n20
FDN (Frente Democratico MNR (Movimiento Nacionalista
Nacional), 153, 154 Revolucionario), 73, 79 80,
Federal District, 154, 238n16 82 85, 87, 90, 224n7
governors, 155 MNRI (Movimiento Nacionalista Rev-
legislature, 152, 155, 163f olucionario de Izquierda),
national party, 65 76 77, 84 85
New Left, 164 Montalva, Frei, 132
Nueva Alianza, 240n39 Montesinos,Vladimiro, 186
Index 269
Morales, Evo, 76, 87, 90, 224n5 New Left (Mexico), 164
Morales, Maurico, 145 NFR (Nueva Fuerza Republicana), 86,
Moreno, Alejandro, 163, 168 87
Mouffe, Chantal, 165 Nicaragua, party system in, 192f
MoveOn.org, 47 Noel, Sid, 19
Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS), NP (National Party), 133
86 87, 89 91, 96, 225n13 Nueva Alianza, 240n39
Movimiento Bolivia Libre (MBI), 85 Nueva Fuerza Republicana (NFR), 86,
Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucio- 87
nario (MIR), 76 77, 79 86,
224n7 Oaxaca, Mexico, development in, 154
Movimiento de Liberaci on Nacional Obama, Barack, 27, 36, 38 39, 44, 46,
(MLN Tupamaros), 204, 245n20 47
Movimiento Indgena Pachacuti Obama for America 2.0 (OFA 2.0),
(MIP), 87 46 47
Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucio- Opus Dei, 152
nario de Izquierda (MNRI),
76 77, 84 85 Pacheco Areco, Jorge, 204
Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucio- pact democracy, 74, 80, 81, 87, 93, 96
nario (MNR), 73, 79 80, 82 85, Pammett, Jon, 23
90, 224n7 PAN (Partido Acci on Nacional),
Movimiento Revolucionario Tupac 151 52, 154, 156 58, 160, 164,
Katari de Liberaci on (MRTKL), 168, 240n45
85 Panama, party system in, 192f
Mujica, Jose, 245n21 Paraguay, party system in, 192f
Mulroney, Brian, 10, 21 Parti Quebecois, 10, 17
Murillo Karam, Jes us, 167 Partido Acci on Nacional (PAN),
151 52, 154, 156 58, 160, 164,
Nam, Moises, 188 89 168, 240n45
National Election Jury (JNE), 184 Partido Colorado (PC), 195 96,
National Party (NP), 133 198 99, 207, 244n2, 246n36
National Reconstruction Party (PRN), Partido Communista Boliviano (PCB),
110 76 77
National Renewal (RN), 134, 146 Partido de la Revoluci on Democratica
NDP (New Democratic Party), 7, 8, 9, (PRD), 150 54, 156, 158, 160,
11, 13, 15 164, 168
Nebraska, proportional representa- Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT), 212
tion in, 47 Partido Mexicano Socialista (PMS),
neo-liberalism 153
in Bolivia, 75, 78, 79, 82, 83 84 Partido Nacional (PN), 195, 198, 199,
democratic neo-liberalism, 82 207, 244n2
economic neo-liberalism, 85 Partido Nacional Revolucionario
in Uruguay, 197 (PNR), 151 52
neo-populism, 80 81, 84, 85 Partido Popular Cristiano (PPC), 176,
Neves, Tancredo, 111f 178, 242n12
Nevitte, Neil, 22 Partido Revolucionario Institucional
New Deal Coalition, 37 (PRI), 151, 153 54, 156, 160, 168,
New Democratic Party (NDP), 7, 8, 9, 240n38, 240n45
11, 13, 15 Partido Socialista (PS), 212
270 Index
Partido Verde Ecologista de Mexico PEMEX (Mexican Petroleum), 164,

(PVEM), 156, 238n6 240n46
Party of the Brazilian Democratic Perez, Carlos Andres, 181
Movement (PMDB), 122 Perez de Cuellar, Javier, 183
party systems Perez-Li~ an, Anbal, 247n47
n
in Argentina, 51, 53, 58, 64, 129, Peron, Juan D., 54, 55, 69
192f Peronism, 54 55, 57, 62, 69
in Bolivia, 73, 74, 78 92, 192f Perot, Ross, 43
in Brazil, 105 9, 108, 108f, 192f, Peru
212, 227n23 AP (Acci on Popular), 176, 178,
in Canada, 4 14, 17, 22 242n12
in Chili, 129, 131, 139 40, 192f, 212 APRA (American Popular Revolu-
in Colombia, 192f, 201 tionary Alliance), 173, 176, 177,
in Costa Rica, 192f 181
in Ecuador, 192f Authentic Interpretation law, 184
in El Salvador, 192f authoritarianism in, 174 75,
in England, 244n3 182 90
in Europe, 129 CCD (Constituent Democratic
in Guatemala, 192f Congress), 183
in Latin America, 192f CONFIEP (Confederaci on de Insti-
in Mexico, 150, 151 55, 192f, tuciones Empresariales Priva-
238n5 das), 188
in Nicaragua, 192f Congress, 183 84, 190, 191f
in Panama, 192f Constitution, 181, 184
in Paraguay, 192f Coordinadora Gremial de
in Peru, 173 74, 176 77, 179 80, Producci on, 188
189 90, 192f coup detat in, 174
in Republic Dominicana, 192f democracy (1980s), 176 82
in United States, 28, 33, 34 35, economic crisis, 187
39 45 elections in, 175 77, 180 83,
in Uruguay, 192f, 195 97, 201, 203, 187 89, 193, 242n7, 242n11,
205, 208 10, 209f, 212, 216, 242n20
243n1, 244n3 exports and financial activities, 188
in Venezuela, 192f FREDEMO (Frente Democr atico),
Paz Zamora, Jaime, 81, 82, 83 177 78, 181 82, 242n12
PC (Communist Party), 129, 130, 134, Fujimori phenomemon, 182, 242n14
136 37, 139 Fujimorism, 183, 185, 190,
PC (Partido Colorado), 195 96, 242 43n20
198 99, 207, 244n2, 246n36 GDP, 177, 180, 185, 193
PCB (Partido Communista Boliviano), IS (Socialist Left), 181
76 77 IU (Izquierda Unida), 176, 177
PCP (Peruvian Communist Party), Lora Privatization Index ranking,
180 246n28
PDC (Christian Democratic Party), Marxist left in, 173 74, 176
130, 136 37, 139, 145 military rule, 173
Pearson, Lester, 8 ML (Liberty Movement), 178, 181
Pease, Henry, 180 National Election Jury, 184
Pederson electoral volatility index, National Executive Committee,
140 180
Index 271
party system in, 173 74, 176 77, Popular Unity government, 132, 133
179 80, 189 90, 192f Porter, John, 7
PCP (Peruvian Communist Party), Portes, Alejandro, 131, 132
180 postmaterialism, 22
political movements, 189, 243n26 Poveda, Antonio, 145
poverty levels, 193 Powell, G. Bingham, Jr., 103
PPC (Partido Popular Cristiano), Powell, Sandra, 131
176, 178, 242n12 PP (Progressive Party), 110
production and trade, 188 PPC (Partido Popular Cristiano), 176,
public policies, 192 94 178, 242n12
referendum law (1996), 184 PR (Radical Party), 128, 130
Revolutionary Bloc, 180 81, PRD (Partido de la Revoluci on
242n10 Democr atica), 150 54, 156, 158,
Solidaridad Nacional, 243n26 160, 164, 168
Somos Per u, 189 PRI (Partido Revolucionario Institu-
state spending, 185 86 cional), 151, 153 54, 156, 160,
terrorist movements in, 174, 177, 168, 240n38, 240n45
179 PRN (National Reconstruction Party),
voting and voters, 128, 178f 110
womens suffrage in, 128 Progressive Conservative Party, 5, 7,
Peruvian Communist Party (PCP), 8, 9, 11
180 Progressive Party (Canada), 5
Peruzzotti, Enrique, 63 Progressive Party (PP), 110
Petras, James, 132 PRSD, 136 37, 139
Pharr, Susan, 168 Przeworski, Adam, 213
Pinard, Maurice, 12 PS (Partido Socialista), 212
Pi~
nera, Sebastian, 144, 145 PS (Socialist Party), 129, 134, 136 37,
Pinochet, Augusto, 133, 134, 144, 204 139
PJ (Peronists), 51, 53 56, 58 62, PSOL (Socialism and Liberty Party),
64 68, 70 106
pluralism PT (Labor Party), 158, 238n6
in Bolivia, 97 99, 225n16, 225n17, PT (Partido dos Trabalhadores), 212
225n18, 225n19 PT (Workers Party), 107, 122,
left parties and, 212 229n52
in Mexico, 155, 170 Putnam, Robert, 168
in Uruguay, 196, 199 202, 204, 215 PVEM (Partido Verde Ecologista de
PMDB (Party of the Brazilian Demo- Mexico), 156, 238n6
cratic Movement), 122
PMS (Partido Mexicano Socialista), Quebec
153 Liberal Party corruption in, 11
PN (Partido Nacional), 195, 198, 199, place within Canada, 10
207, 244n2
PNR (Partido Nacional Revolucio- Race Question in Canada, The
nario), 151 52 (Siegried), 4
Poder Democratico y Social Radical Party (PR), 128, 130
(PODEMOS), 90, 225n13 redistricting, 44 45, 47
Poguntke, Thomas, 68, 69, 70 Reform Party (Canada), 10 11, 13, 15,
polyarchy, 199 200 17
Popular Front (Chili), 130 Reform Party (U. S.), 43
272 Index
Republic Dominicana, party system STF (Superior Court of Justice ), 105,

in, 192f 123, 227n31
Republican Party (U. S.), 33, 36, 38, suffrage, womens, 128, 129
41, 122 Superior Court of Justice (STF), 105,
revolutionary nationalism, 224n10 123, 227n31
River Plate, 197 98 Superior Electoral Court (TSE), 105,
RN (National Renewal), 134, 146 123, 177, 227n21, 227n31
Roberts, Kenneth M., 129
Rokkan, Stein, 129, 139 Tabasco, Mexico, social movements
roll-call voting, 122, 123f, 230n65 in, 158
Roosevelt, Franklin D., 37, 38 Task Force on Inequality and Ameri-
Rose, Richard, 109 10 can Democracy, 39
Rosenstone, Steven, 44 Thomassen, Jacques, 103
Tironi, Eugenio, 139
Saa, Rodrguez, 57, 69 Toledo, Alejandro, 175, 190, 192
St. Laurent, Louis, 5 Torcal, Mariano, 139, 168
Salta province, 1983 elections, 61 Torre, Juan Carlos, 70
Sanchez de Lozada, Gonzalo, 84, 87, TRIFE (Electoral Tribunal), 162
89 Trudeau, Pierre, 8, 10, 21
Sanguinetti, Julio Mara, 205, 208 TSE (Superior Electoral Court), 105,
Sarney, Jose, 120f, 121, 123f 123, 177, 227n21, 227n31
Sartori, Giovanni, 70, 109, 132 T
upac Amaru Revolutionary
Sater, William E., 128 Movement, 174, 177
Savoie, Donald, 19
Schattschneider, Elmer E., 45, 101 UCR (Uni on Cvica Radical), 51 55,
Schmitt, Hermann, 103 59 61, 65 68, 70
Scholzman, Kay, 39 UCS (Unidad Cvica Solidaridad), 81,
Scully, Timothy R., 139, 238n5 83, 85, 86
Sendero Luminoso, 174, 177, 179 UDI (Independent Democratic Union
Seregni, Liber, 204, 205, 207 Party), 133 34, 146
Serrano Elas, Jorge, 182 UDP (Unidad Democr atica y Popu-
Siavelis, Peter M., 145 lar), 76 77
Siegfried, Andre, 4 UN (Unidad Nacional), 90, 225n13
Soares, Glaucio, 131 UNDP rankings, 206 7
Social Credit Party (Canada), 5, 13 Unidad Cvica Solidaridad (UCS), 81,
social democratic governments, 83, 85, 86
211 15 Unidad Democr atica y Popular
Socialism and Liberty Party (PSOL), (UDP), 76 77
106 Unidad Nacional (UN), 90, 225n13
Socialist Left (IS), 181 on Cvica Radical (UCR), 51 55,
Uni
Socialist Party (PS), 129, 134, 136 37, 59 61, 65 68, 70
139 Unionist Party (Canada), 5
Socialist Working Party (Chili), 129 United States
Solidaridad Nacional, 243n26 campaign finance, 42 44
Somos Per u, 189 Canada relationship, 6, 7
Sotomayer, Manuel, 188 candidates ballot access, 41 42
state capitalism, 75 clean election laws, 43
Stepan, Alfredo, 132 Connecticut for Lieberman Party,
Stern, Steve, 133 36
Index 273
Constitution, 29 unequal representation in, 37 39

dedemocratization in, 34 35 voting and voters, 34 39, 42, 44,
Democratic National Committee, 46 47
40 41 Voting Rights Act (U. S.), 34
Democratic Party, 32, 33, 36 38, Whig Party, 32 33
41, 122 See also specific states
Democratic Republicans, 32, 33 Uruguay
Democratic Senate campaign com- amnesty law, 205
mittee, 41 authoritarianism in, 199, 204
discipline rate, 122 batllismo in, 199
elections in, 31, 36 37, 40 civil wars, 198
Electoral College, 31, 39, 40 cleavages in, 209, 246n35
Electoral Law (1910), 199, 201 coalition governments, 207 8
executive administration, 30 consociational democracy in,
FEC (Federal Election Commis- 200 203, 215, 244n13
sion), 43 Constitution (1966), 205
federalism in, 40 constitutional plebiscite, 204
Federalists, 32, 33 constitutional reform in, 202, 203,
50-state strategy, 38, 39 205, 207 8, 210, 246n33
Founding Fathers, 29 coup detat (1973), 204
grass-roots party organizations, democratic stability in, 128
33 34 effective competition in, 215
House of Representatives, 30 Effective Competition Index in,
immigrants, 34 247n47
institutional barriers to democracy, elections in, 198 99, 201, 205,
29 32 207 8, 210 11, 245n21
majority rule, 31 32, 42 Electoral Law (1910), 199, 201, 216
motor voter law (1993), 35 electoral regime in, 197, 199,
need for parties in, 32 37 201 2, 205, 207, 210, 215
parties as links between citizens electoral system, xvii, 207
and states in, 33 34, 35, 37, 40, executive administration, 199, 202,
47 203
party system in, 28, 33, 34 35, FA (Frente Amplio), 195 96,
39 45 203 4, 209 12, 214
progressives and, 34 35, 36, 37 independence of, 197 98
redistricting, 44 45, 47 ISI (Import Substitution Industriali-
Reform Party, 43 zation), 203
Republican House campaign labor policies, 214
committee, 41 the left in, 197, 203 5, 208 11, 216
Republican National Committee, liberal transition in, 205 7, 211
38, 40 41 Lora Privatization Index ranking,
Republican Party, 33, 36, 38, 41, 206
122 majoritarian regime in, 198
Republican Senate campaign com- military dictatorship in, 197, 199,
mittee, 41 203, 204
roll-call voting in, 122 MLN Tupamaros (Movimiento de
separation of powers, 30 32, 40 Liberacion Nacional), 204,
17th Amendment, 30 245n20
72-Hour Program, 38, 46 neo-liberalism in, 197
274 Index
during 19th century, 198 99 voting and voters

parliament, 199 in Argentina, 58 64
party government, 206, 245 46n25 in Brazil, 103, 110, 114, 122, 124,
party system in, 192f, 195 97, 201, 228n37, 230n65
203, 205, 208 10, 209f, 212, 216, in Canada, 15, 20 22, 23
243n1, 244n3 in Chili, 131, 135 45, 137 38f,
PC (Partido Colorado), 195 96, 140 43f, 147
198 99, 207, 244n2, 246n36 in Mexico, 156 57, 169, 169f
pluralism in, 196, 199 202, 204, 215 in Peru, 128, 178f
PN (Partido Nacional), 195, 198, in U. S., 34 39, 42, 44, 46 47
199, 207, 244n2 See also elections; electoral systems
polyarchy in, 199 200
presidentialism in, 213 16 Waisman, David, 188
pro-market reforms, 206 Washington Consensus, 79, 193, 206,
River Plate and, 197 98 224n8
social democratic government in, Wayne, Stephen, 38
211 15 Webb, Paul, 68, 69, 70
social policies, 215 Westminster system (Canada), 22
unions, 213 14 Whig Party (U. S.), 32 33
Whitaker, Reginald, 6
Valenzuela, Samuel, 139 Wibbels, Erik, 129
Vargas Llosa, Mario, 176, 178, 182, Workers Party (PT), 107, 122, 229n52
242n7, 242n12, 242n13
Vazquez, Tabare, 207, 211, 214 Yrigoyen, Hip olito, 54, 69
Venezuela, party system in, 192f yrigoyenists, 54
Verba, Sidney, 39
Vertical Mosaic, The (Porter), 7 Zeitlin, Maurice, 132
verticalization, 227 28n31 Zuazo, Hernan Siles, 76

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Political Parties and

Editing an excellent five-volume set of studies on parties in 46 system-

A pathbreaking collection of top-quality writings on party politics by

This welcome and remarkable collection of original essays covers

These volumes provide a valuable in-depth and up-to-date analysis of

Kay Lawsons Political Parties and Democracy is a tremendous success in giv-

Volume I: The Americas

Political Parties in Context

Volume I: The Americas

KAY LAWSON AND JORGE LANZARO,

Political Parties in Context

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced,

Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data

ISBN: 978 0 275 98706 0 (set)

This book is also available on the World Wide Web as an eBook.

Political Parties and Democracy: Three Stages of Power

6 Political Parties in Chile: Stable Coalitions, Inert Democracy

Political Parties and Democracy consists of five volumes with 46 chapters,

their chapters; final editing has been my responsibility as general editor,

Volume I of Political Parties and Democracy presents nine chapters

knowledge unparalleled, and their documentation strong and convinc-

ably shows, have not ensured the establishment of governments ruling

exceptionalism now takes, says Alfredo Joignant, a different form, as

Parties and Democracy in

FOUR CANADIAN PARTY SYSTEMS

The most popular interpretation of Canadas party system is to view

the national question that were so popular in rural English Canada.

social democratic mantle, stemming potential gains for the left-of-center

leadership contests or elections, with participation spiking only to be

Party, each of which served a term as Canadas official opposition to the

THIRD PARTY FORMATION AND REPRESENTATION

could decline and even disappear if they failed to adapt to a changing

system itself exacerbates regionalism; it distorts regional interests and iden-

adapt and subsequently to craft or adopt policy or institutional remedies.

PARTIES AS ORGANIZATIONS: HOW DEMOCRATIC?

policy making in the hands of party leaders and their personal

candidates of their own choice has been particularly prevalent in the

PARTIES IN PARLIAMENT AND GOVERNMENT

ignored, where reformers have focused their attention, since it offers

clientelistic formations, with no purpose beyond providing loyalty,

PARTIES AND VOTERS

partisan support within the Canadian electorate. In fact, Canadians

reluctance to abandon the present system with its known deficiencies

CONCLUSION: POLITICAL PARTIES AND

representation is necessary so that parties and their supporters are

A Work in Progress: Parties and

legislatures also have become stronger as the level of party loyalty

examine whether parties facilitate or impede the work of democratic

INSTITUTIONAL BARRIERS TO DEMOCRACY

Separated, Scattered, and Diluted Power

These various institutional barriers to majority rule and political

THE NEED FOR PARTIES

parties then developed, and the Whigs weakened as they fractured

From Grass Roots to Machines

The party machines indeed had become corrupt organizations that

whereby citizens may register when they show up to vote on Election

Remobilization, for a While

Demobilization and Unequal Representation

competitive. Other groups, such as the left-leaning MoveOn.org and

THE TWO-PARTY SYSTEM

Protecting Their Hegemony

their state party organizations, and there is not much coordination

qualified for presidential public funding, Ross Perots Reform Party in

This election served as a prologue to the abrupt conclusion of de la R uas