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Department of Justice
. .
Name: S -A , R A -165
Enclosed is a copy of the Board's decision and order in the above-referenced case.
Sincerely,
Cynthia L. Crosby
Deputy Chief Clerk
Enclosure
Panel Members:
Cole, Patricia A.
Greer, Anne J.
Pauley, Roger
Userteam: Docket
Cite as: R-S-A-, AXXX XXX 165 (BIA July 25, 2017)
"
JUL 2 5 2017
In re: R S -A
APPEAL
CHARGE:
The respondent, a native and citizen of Mexico, appeals from an Immigration Judge's
November 22, 2016, decision denying his application for cancellation of removal under section
240A(b)(l) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 1229b(b)(l). The appeal will be
sustained and the record will be remanded.
The respondent concedes removability by virtue of his unlawful presence in the United States
(Tr. at 4). The main issue on appeal is whether the respondent's 2010 conviction for "misconduct
involving weapons" in violation of section 13-3102(A)(4) of the Arizona Revised Statutes
(hereafter "section 13-3102(A)(4)") disqualifies him from being granted cancellation of removal.
We review that legal issue de novo. See 8 C.F.R. 1003.l(d)(3)(ii).
Section 240A(b)(1)(C) of the Act requires an applicant for cancellation of removal to prove
that he has not been convicted of an "offense under" sections 212(a)(2) or 237(a)(2) of the Act,
8 U.S.C. l182(a)(2), 1227(a)(2). According to the Immigration Judge, the respondent did not
carry his burden of proof in that regard because his 2010 conviction was for an offense under
section 237(a)(2)(C) of the Act-i.e., "possessing . . . any weapon, part, or accessory which is a
firearm or destructive device (as defined in section 92l(a) of title 18, United States Code)." The
respondent challenges that determination on appeal.
To determine whether the respondent's conviction is for an offense under section 237(a)(2)(C),
we employ the "categorical approach," which focuses on the minimum conduct that has a realistic
probability of being prosecuted under the elements of the respondent's offense, rather than on the
particular facts for which he was prosecuted. See Matter of Chairez, 26 l&N Dec. 349, 355-58
(BIA 2014); see also Medina-Lara v. Holder, 771 F.3d 1106 (9th Cir. 2014); United States
v. Aguilera-Rios, 769 F.3d 626 (9th Cir. 2014). In April 2010, when the respondent committed
his offense, section 13-3102(A)(4) provided that "(a] person commits misconduct involving
Cite as: R-S-A-, AXXX XXX 165 (BIA July 25, 2017)
165
weapons by knowingly ... [p]ossessing a deadly weapon or prohibited weapon if such person is a
prohibited possessor." At all relevant times, Arizona has defined the term "deadly weapon" to
mean"anything that is designed for lethal use," including"a firearm." See ARIZ. R.Ev. STAT. ANN.
13-3 lOl(A)(l) (2009). Knives, for instance, count as '.'deadly weapons." See State v. Williams,
515 P.2d 849, 850 (Ariz. 1973);State v. Clevidence, 736P.2d 379, 385 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1987). The
term"prohibited weapon" has at all relevant times been defined by reference to a list of items that
In Descamps, the Supreme Court explained that a criminal statute is divisible only if it (1) lists
multiple discrete offenses as enumerated alternatives or defines a single offense by reference to
disjunctive sets of "elements," more than one combination of which could support a conviction,
and (2) at least one (but not all) of those listed offenses or combinations of disjunctive elements is
a "categorical match" to the relevant generic standard. See Descamps, 133 S. Ct. at 2281, 2283.
Employing this standard, we conclude that section 13-3102(A)(4) is indivisible because, although
it is phrased in the disjunctive to encompass the possession of either a "deadly weapon" or a
"prohibited weapon," neither of those statutory alternatives is a categorical match to the
requirements of section 237(a)(2)(C).
As noted previously, the terms"deadly weapon" and"prohibited weapon" are both defined by
Arizona law to include items that are not "firearms" or "destructive devices" under federal law;
indeed, a single item (such as a nunchaku) could support a conviction under either statutory
alternative without being a "firearm" or a "destructive device." Hence, even if"deadly weapons"
and "prohibited weapons" define discrete elements of section 13-3102(A)(4), the statute remains
categorically overbroad vis-a-vis section 237(a)(2)(C).
In light of the foregoing, we conclude that the respondent has carried his burden of proving the
absence of a disqualifying "firearm offense" conviction because section 13-3102(A)(4) is
overbroad and indivisible vis-a-vis section 237(a)(2)(C) of the Act. Accordingly, we will vacate
the Immigration Judge's decision denying the respondent's application for cancellation of removal
Cite as: R-S-A-, AXXX XXX 165 (BIA July 25, 2017)
. .
165
on that basis.1 We express no present opinion as to whether the respondent is otherwise eligible
for (or deserving of) cancellation of removal or other relief, but we do note that his conviction
remains relevant as an adverse discretionary factor.
Cite as: R-S-A-, AXXX XXX 165 (BIA July 25, 2017)
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW
UNITED STATES IMMIGRATION COURT
PHOENIX, ARIZONA
In the Matter of
)
R S -A ) IN REMOVAL PROCEEDINGS
)
RESPONDENT )
APPLICATIONS:
A211egation 1, he admitted Allegation and 2,.:. l:leHe denied the entry date found on the
,
Notice to Appear at A211egation 37_. and admitted Allegation 4 that he has not admitted
v.as admitted. Allegation 5, regarding the criminal conviction, was denied. The illegal
entry charge was sustained. Again, the moral turpitude charge was withdrawn by trial
by clear and convincing evidence for illegal entry. Respondent designated Mexico as
Tabs 1 through a... were admitted. Also part of the record, but not marked as an exhibit,
respondent's brief denying removability under 237(a)(2)(C). Respondent has not been
charged with being removable under 237(a)(2)(C). The brief is not on point, but the
Court has considered the contents of that brief. The respondent has been convicted as
Maricopa County Superior Court on June 8, 2010 and was sentenced to one-year
probation with the adult probation department. The conviction document is part of the
counsel, at a master calendar hearing, has admitted that the respondent is not eligible
only seek voluntary departure, respondent's counsel decided that he would like to
change his mind and retract the concession. The Court-Ras ordered the respondent to
submit a brief regarding his eligibility for this relief despite his conviction. Respondent,
despite the Court's order, has failed to do that. It is the respondent's burden to
demonstrate that he is eligible for relief. He has neither done so by way of written legal
argument or by any other documentation in the record to show that this application
The Court, therefore, based upon foregoing and after consideration of all arguments
before this matter grants the respondent the privilege of voluntary departure at
conclusion of proceedings.
ORDER
departure bond in the amount of $500.00 with the Department of Homeland Security on
Should the respondent fail to comply with the above conditions the
voluntary departure grant in the alternative, the Court orders the respondent removed to
Mexico from the United States based upon the sustained charge herein.
signature
LAMONTE S. FREERKS
Immigration Judge