Deans

Circle 2016
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS

Digested by: DC 2016 Members

Editors: Tricia Lacuesta

Lorenzo Luigi Gayya
Cristopher Reyes
Macky Siazon
Janine Arenas
Ninna Bonsol
Lloyd Javier

PROPERTY
First Sem Cases
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TABLE OF CONTENTS

CLASSIFICATION OF PROPERTY........2

OWNERSHIP AND RIGHTS OF BUILDER, PLANTER, SOWER...4

QUIETING OF TITLE.....17

CO-OWNERSHIP / POSSESSION...20

EASEMENTS...30

DONATIONS......40

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PROPERTY

CLASSIFICATION OF PROPERTY

LEUNG YEE v. FRANK L. STRONG MACHINERY COMPANY and J. G. WILLIAMSON

G.R. No. L-11658, February 15, 1918, CARSON, J.

The Chattel Mortgage Law contemplates and makes provision for mortgages of personal property and
the sole purpose and object of the chattel mortgage registry is to provide for the registry of mortgages of
personal property.

Facts:

Compaia Agricola Filipina bought rice-cleaning machinery from Frank L. Strong Machinery
Company and to secure the payment of such, it executed a chattel mortgage over such machineries including
the building to which they are installed. This mortgage was registered in the chattel mortgage registry. Due to
its failure to pay, the mortgaged property was sold and was bought by Strong Machinery Company. Later,
Strong Machinery Company took possession of the said building. Unknown to Strong Machinery Company, the
same buildings are likewise subject of another mortgage executed by Compaia Agricola Filipina in favor of
Leung Yee to secure its outstanding obligation. Compaia Agricola Filipina also defaulted in his obligation
which prompted Yee to levy execution upon the building. Yee subsequently bought the property in an auction
sale and was issued a sheriff's certificate of the sale which he latter registered.

The defendant machinery company filed with the sheriff a sworn statement setting up its claim of
title and demanding the release of the property from the levy. Upon execution of the necessary bond, the
sheriff sold the property to Yee. Thereafter, Yee instituted an action to recover possession of the building
from the machinery company.The RTC relied on Article 1473 of the Civil Code and ruled in favor in favor of
the machinery company holding that the company had its title to the building registered prior to the date of
registry of the plaintiff's certificate.

Issue:

Whether or not the annotation of a deed of sale of real property in a chattel mortgage registry can be
given the legal effect of an annotation in the registry of real property.

Ruling:

NO. The registry referred to in Article 1473 is of course the registry of real property, and it must be
apparent that the annotation or inscription of a deed of sale of real property in a chattel mortgage registry
cannot be given the legal effect of an inscription in the registry of real property. By its express terms, the
Chattel Mortgage Law contemplates and makes provision for mortgages of personal property; and the sole
purpose and object of the chattel mortgage registry is to provide for the registry of "Chattel mortgages," that is
to say, mortgages of personal property executed in the manner and form prescribed in the statute. The building
of strong materials in which the rice-cleaning machinery was installed by the "Compaia Agricola Filipina"
was real property, and the mere fact that the parties seem to have dealt with it separate and apart from the
land on which it stood in no wise changed its character as real property. It follows that neither the original
registry in the chattel mortgage of the building and the machinery installed therein, not the annotation in that
registry of the sale of the mortgaged property, had any effect whatever so far as the building was concerned.

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DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES v. COURT OF APPEALS, MYLO O. QUINTO, and JESUS
CHRISTINE S. CHUPUICO
G.R. No. 109946, February 9, 1996, BELOSILLO, J.

What divests the government of title to the land is the issuance of the sales patent and its subsequent
registration with the Register of Deeds. It is the registration and issuance of the certificate of title that segregate
public lands from the mass of public domain and convert it into private property.

Facts:

DBP granted a loan to Spouses Olidiana which was secured by a real estate mortgage on several
properties. At the time of the mortgage, the disputed lot was still the subject of a Free Patent application filed
by the Spouses Olidiana with the Bureau of Lands but registered under their name for taxation purposes.
Spouses Olidiana amended their Free Patent application over several parcels of land, in which they waived all
their rights and interests over the disputed lot in favor of Chupuico and Quinto. Thereafter, each of them
obtained original certificate of title over the subdivided lot. For failure of Spouses Olidiana to comply with
their mortgage contract, DBP extrajudicially foreclosed all their mortgaged properties, and was awarded as
the highest bidder. When DBP tried to register the sale, it was discovered that the lot had already been
divided into 2 parcels, belonging to Chupuico and Quinto, respectively. DBP then filed an action for quieting of
title. RTC ruled against DBP as the Spouses Olidiana were not yet owners in fee simple when they mortgaged
the property and that the property was still a public land when mortgaged to DBP, thus it could not have been
the subject of a valid mortgage. The CA affirmed such decision.

Issue:

Whether or not the lot was still a public land which could not have been validly mortgaged.

Ruling:

YES. DBP did not acquire valid title over the land in dispute because it was public land when
mortgaged by the Spouses Olidiana. In Visayan Realty, Inc. v. Meer, the Court ruled that the approval of a sales
application merely authorized the applicant to take possession of the land so that he could comply with the
requirements prescribed by law before a final patent could be issued in his favor. Meanwhile the government
still remained the owner thereof, as in fact the application could still be cancelled and the land awarded to
another applicant should it be shown that the legal requirements had not been complied with. What divests
the government of title to the land is the issuance of the sales patent and its subsequent registration with the
Register of Deeds. It is the registration and issuance of the certificate of title that segregate public lands from
the mass of public domain and convert it into private property. Since the disputed was still the subject of a
Free Patent Application when mortgaged to DBP and no patent was granted to the Spouses Olidiana, the lot
remained part of the public domain.

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REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. DAMIAN ERMITAO DE GUZMAN, DEOGRACIAS ERMITAO DE

GUZMAN, ZENAIDA ERMITAO DE GUZMAN, ALICIA ERMITAO DE GUZMAN, SALVADOR ERMITAO DE
GUZMAN, DOMINGA ERMITAO DE GUZMAN, NATIVIDAD ENCARNACION, MELBA E. TORRES, FLORA
MANALO, SOCORRO DELA ROSA, JOSE ERMITAO, ESMERANDO ERMITAO, TRICOM DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION and FILOMENO ERMITAO
G.R. No. 137887, February 28, 2000, YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.

Forest lands are not capable of private appropriation and possession thereof, however long, cannot
convert them into private property, unless and until such lands were reclassified and considered disposable and
alienable.

Facts:

Conflicting applications for confirmation of imperfect title were filed by Norma Almanzor and
Salvador De Guzman over parcels of land. The RTC ruled in favor of De Guzman. The CA affirmed the RTC
decision and the petition for registration of the De Guzmans. The Republic now contends that the De Guzmans
have not overthrown the presumption that the lands are portions of the public domain belonging to the
Republic of the Philippines.

Issue:

Whether or not the subject parcels of land are part of the public domain.

Ruling:
YES. The property subject of De Guzmans application was only declared alienable in 1965. Prior to
such date, the same was forest land incapable of private appropriation. It was not registrable and possession
thereof, no matter how lengthy, could not convert it into private property, unless and until such lands were
reclassified and considered disposable and alienable. Therefore, prior to its declaration as alienable land in
1965, any occupation or possession thereon cannot be considered in the counting of the thirty year
possession requirement. This is in accord with the ruling in Almeda vs. Court of Appeals, and because the rules
on the confirmation of imperfect titles do not apply unless and until the land classified as forest land is
released in an official proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of the disposable agricultural lands
of the public domain.

OWNERSHIP AND RIGHTS OF BUILDER, PLANTER, SOWER

GERARDO MENDOZA, TRINIA AND IYLENE ALL SURNAMED MENDOZA v. SOLEDAD SALINAS
G.R. No. 152827, February 6, 2007, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.

While a writ of possession may be issued only pursuant to a decree of registration in an original land
registration proceedings, the court cannot issue against possessors under claim of ownership, as actual
possession under claim of ownership raises a disputable presumption of ownership, and the true owner must
resort to judicial process for the recovery of the property, not summarily through a motion for the issuance of a
writ of possession.

Facts:

Salinas filed an application for registration over a parcel of land and prayed for the issuance of a writ
of possession in her favor. The Mendozas opposed Salinas application for the issuance of a writ of possession
claiming that they were not oppositors/parties to the registration case and they have been in actual physical

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possession of the property for 34 years. The RTC, however, granted Salinas application for the issuance of a
writ of possession. Now, the Mendozas contended that they cannot be ousted of their possession of the
property, having been in actual possession of the property, as evidenced by Gerardo Mendoza's Sales
Application over the land.

Issue:

Whether or not writ of possession should be issued in favor of Salinas.

Ruling:

NO. The issuance of a writ of possession is a ministerial duty of the court in a decree of registration in an
original land registration proceeding. Such ministerial duty, however, ceases to be so with particular regard to
petitioners who are actual possessors of the property under a claim of ownership. Art. 433 of the Civil Code
provides that actual possession under claim of ownership raises a disputable presumption of ownership. The
true owner must resort to judicial process for the recovery of the property. Thus, one who claims to be the
owner of a property possessed by another must bring the appropriate judicial action for its physical recovery,
not summarily through a motion for the issuance of a writ of possession. It is noted that there already exists a
final and executory decision disregarding Salinas' claim for possession over the property. An action for
unlawful detainer was filed by Salinas against the Mendozas but was dismissed by the MTCC. Salinas did not
appeal the case but filed for a writ of possession in the land registration case. Moreover, the Mendozas
opposed Salinas' application for the issuance of a writ of possession and apprised their actual, peaceful,
physical and uninterrupted possession. The RTC, nevertheless, ruled that a writ of possession may be issued
in a land registration proceeding. Thus, it was erroneous for the RTC to have issued the writ of possession
against the Mendozas.

MARIA TORBELA, represented by her heirs, namely: EULOGIO TOSINO, husband and children: CLARO,
MAXIMINO, CORNELIO, OLIVIA and CALIXTA, ALL SURNAMED TOSINO, APOLONIA TOSINO VDA. DE
RAMIREZ and JULITA TOSINO DEAN; PEDRO TORBELA, represented by his heirs, namely: JOSE AND
DIONISIO, BOTH SURNAMED TORBELA; EUFROSINA TORBELA ROSARIO, represented by her heirs,
namely: ESTEBAN ROSARIO, MANUEL ROSARIO, ROMULO ROSARIO, and ANDREA ROSARIO-HADUCA;
LEONILA TORBELA TAMIN; FERNANDO TORBELA, represented by his heirs, namely: SERGIO TOBELA,
EUTROPIA VELASCO, PILAR ZULUEAT, CANDIDO TORBELA, FLORENTINA TORBELA, and PANTALEON
TOBELA; DOLORES TORBELA TABLADA; LEONORA TORBELA AGUSTIN, represented by her heirs,
namely: PATRICIO, SEGUNDO, CONSUELO, and FELIX, ALL SURNAMED AGUSTIN; and SEVERINA
TOBELA ILDEFONSO v. SPOUSES ANDRES T. ROSARIO AND LENA-DUQUE-ROSARIO and BANCO
FILIPINO SAVINGS AND MORTGAGE BANK
G.R. No. 140528, December 7, 2011, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.

The builders right to the rents of the improvements shall continue until the landowner has chosen his
option under Art. 448 of the Civil Code. And in case the landowner decided to appropriate the improvements, the
builder shall have the right to retain said improvements, as well as the rents thereof, until the indemnity for the
same has been paid.

Facts:

The Torbela siblings inherited a land from Spouses Torbela. They executed a deed of absolute
quitclaim over a lot in favor of Dr. Andres Rosario, and a TCT was issued in the Rosarios name. Another deed
of absolute quitclaim was executed by Dr. Rosario, acknowledging that he only borrowed the lot from the
Torbela siblings and was already returning the same to the latter. Dr. Rosario then obtained a loan from DBP

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secured by a mortgage constituted on the lot, and the proceeds of the loan were used for the construction of
improvements thereon. Thus, a four-storey commercial building was constructed. Upon full payment of the
loan, Dr. Rosario acquired another loan from Banco Filipino secured by a mortgage constituted on the same
lot. For failure to pay their loan, Banco Filipino extrajudicially foreclosed the mortgage as the lone bidder.
Torbela siblings then filed a complaint against Spouses Rosario and Banco Filipino. The RTC ruled that the
mortgage executed by the Spouses Rosario in favor of Banco Filipino is legal and valid. It further ordered the
Torbela siblings to account for the rentals they received from tenants of the building constructed. The CA
affirmed the RTC decision.

Issue:

Whether or not Dr. Rosario is entitled to the rents of the improvements on the lot.

Ruling:

YES. The rules on accession shall govern the improvements on the lot and the rents thereof. If both the
owner and the builder acted in bad faith, they are deemed to have acted in good faith under Art. 453 of the
Civil Code. Thus, under Art. 448, where the builder has acted in good faith, the landowner has the option to
acquire the improvements after payment of the proper indemnity or to oblige the builder to pay for the land.
It is the landowner who is allowed to exercise the option because his right is older and because, by the principle
of accession, he is entitled to the ownership of the accessory thing. But even as the option lies with the
landowner, the grant to him, nevertheless, is preclusive. The owner is entitled to such remotion only when,
after having chosen to sell his land, the other party fails to pay for the same.

There is no question that Dr. Rosario only holds the lot in trust for the Torbela siblings and that he is
the builder of the improvements on the lot. When it comes to the improvements, both the Torbela siblings (as
landowners) and Dr. Rosario (as builder) are deemed in bad faith. The Torbela siblings were aware of the
construction of a building by Dr. Rosario, while Dr. Rosario proceeded with the said construction despite his
knowledge that the lot belonged to the Torbela siblings. Still following the rules of accession, civil fruits, such
as rents, belong to the owner of the building. Thus, Dr. Rosario has a right to the rents of the improvements
and is under no obligation to render an accounting of the same to anyone. His right to the rents of the
improvements shall continue until the Torbela siblings have chosen their option under Art. 448. And in case
the Torbela siblings decide to appropriate the improvements, Dr. Rosario shall have the right to retain said
improvements, as well as the rents thereof, until the indemnity for the same has been paid.

FEDERICO GEMINIANO, MARIA GEMINIANO, ERNESTO GEMINIANO, ASUNCION GEMINIANO, LARRY

GEMINIANO, and MARLYN GEMINIANO v. COURT OF APPEALS, DOMINADOR NICOLAS, and MARY A.
NICOLAS
G.R. No. 120303, July 24, 1996, DAVIDE, JR., J.

Art. 448 of the Civil Code, in relation to Art. 546, which allows full reimbursement of useful
improvements and retention of the premises until reimbursement is made, applies only to a possessor in good
faith. It does not apply where one's only interest is that of a lessee under a rental contract.

Facts:

A parcel of land was originally owned by the petitioners mother, Paulina Geminiano. On a portion of
that lot stood the petitioners unfinished house which was sold to Dominador and Mary Nicolas with an
alleged promise to sell to the latter that portion of the lot. Subsequently, Paulina leased a portion of the lot,
including that portion on which the house stood, in favor of Nicolas. Nicolas then introduced additional

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improvements and registered the house in their names. After the expiration of the lease contract, Paulina
refused to accept the monthly rentals. It turned out that the lot was the subject of a suit, which resulted in its
acquisition by one Maria Lee and later on sold to Lily Salcedo, who in turn sold it to Spouses Dionisio. Spouses
Dionisio waived their rights over the lot in favor of the petitioners, thus the lot was registered in their names.
The petitioners then demanded Nicolas to vacate the premises and pay the rentals in arrears, but the demand
was unheeded. Petitioners then filed a complaint with the MTCC. MTCC ruled that there was no implied
renewal of the lease between Paulina and Nicolas and that the latter were not builders in good faith, thus not
entitled to reimbursement of the value of the house and improvements. The RTC reversed the MTCCs
decision and ordered the petitioners to reimburse Nicolas for the value of the house and improvements and
allowing the latter to remain in possession of the premises until they were fully reimbursed for the said value.
This was affirmed by the CA.

Issue:

Whether or not Dominador and Mary Nicolas are builders in good faith.

Ruling:

NO. The Court has held in a long line of cases that Art. 448 of the Civil Code, in relation to Art. 546 of
the same Code, which allows full reimbursement of useful improvements and retention of the premises until
reimbursement is made, applies only to a possessor in good faith, i.e., one who builds on land with the belief that
he is the owner thereof. It does not apply where one's only interest is that of a lessee under a rental contract;
otherwise, it would always be in the power of the tenant to "improve" his landlord out of his property.

In this case, both parties admit that the land in question was originally owned by Paulina. The land
was allegedly acquired later by Lee by virtue of an extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage. Lee, however, never
sought a writ of possession in order that she gain possession of the property in question. Paulina therefore
remained in possession of the lot. Being mere lessees, Nicolas knew that their occupation of the premises
would continue only for the life of the lease. Plainly, they cannot be considered as possessors nor builders in
good faith.

TECNOGAS PHILIPPINES MANUFACTURING CORPORATION v. COURT OF APPEALS and EDUARDO UY

G.R. No. 108894, February 10, 1997, PANGANIBAN, J.

Art. 527 of the Civil Code presumes good faith, and since no proof exists to show that the encroachment
over a portion of a land was done in bad faith by the builder of the encroaching structures, the latter should be
presumed to have built them in good faith. It is presumed that possession continues to be enjoyed in the same
character in which it was acquired, until the contrary is proved.

Facts:

Tecnogas purchased a parcel of land from Pariz Industries together with all the buildings and
improvements including the wall existing thereon. Portions of the buildings and wall bought by Tecnogas
together with the land are occupying a portion of Uys adjoining land. Upon learning of the encroachment or
occupation by its buildings and wall of a portion of Uys land, Tecnogas offered to buy from Uy that particular
portion of land occupied by portions of its buildings and wall, but Uy refused the offer. The parties entered
into an agreement wherein Tecnogas agreed to demolish the wall at the back portion of its land thus giving to
Uy possession of a portion of his land previously enclosed by Tecnogas wall. Uy later filed a complaint against
Tecnogas in connection with the encroachment or occupation by the latters buildings and walls of a portion

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of its land but said complaint did not prosper. Uy then dug a canal along Tecnogas wall, a portion of which
collapsed and led to the filing the latter of the complaint. The RTC ruled in favor of Tecnogas and ordered Uy
to sell to the former the portion of the land owned by him and occupied by portions Tecnogas buildings and
wall. On appeal, the CA reversed the decision of the RTC, ruling that Tecnogas cannot be considered in good
faith because as a land owner, it is presumed to know the metes and bounds of his own property, especially if
the same are reflected in a properly issued certificate of title.

Issue:

Whether or not Tecnogas is considered in bad faith.

Ruling:

NO. There is no question that when Tecnogas purchased the land from Pariz Industries, the buildings
and other structures were already in existence. The record is not clear as to who actually built those
structures, but it may well be assumed that Tecnogas predecessor-in-interest, Pariz Industries, did so. Art.
527 of the Civil Code presumes good faith, and since no proof exists to show that the encroachment over
a portion of Uys land was done in bad faith by the builder of the encroaching structures, the latter
should be presumed to have built them in good faith. It is presumed that possession continues to be
enjoyed in the same character in which it was acquired, until the contrary is proven. Good faith consists in
the belief of the builder that the land he is building on is his, and his ignorance of any defect or flaw in his title.
Hence, such good faith, by law, passed on to Parizs successor, which is Tecnogas. Further, possession
acquired in good faith does not lose this character except in case and from the moment facts exist which show
that the possessor is not unaware that he possesses the thing improperly or wrongfully. The good faith ceases
from the moment defects in the title are made known to the possessor, by extraneous evidence or by suit for
recovery of the property by the true owner.

TECNOGAS PHILIPPINES MANUFACTURING CORPORATION v. COURT OF APPEALS and EDUARDO UY

G.R. No. 108894, February 10, 1997, PANGANIBAN, J.

Under Art. 448 of the Civil Code, the benefit to the builder is that, instead of being outrightly ejected
from the land, he can compel the landowner to make a choice between the two options: (1) to appropriate the
building by paying the indemnity required by law, or (2) sell the land to the builder. The landowner cannot
refuse to exercise either option and compel instead the owner of the building to remove it from the land.

Facts:

Tecnogas purchased a parcel of land from Pariz Industries together with all the buildings and
improvements including the wall existing thereon. Portions of the buildings and wall bought by Tecnogas
together with the land are occupying a portion of Uys adjoining land. Upon learning of the encroachment or
occupation by its buildings and wall of a portion of Uys land, Tecnogas offered to buy from Uy that particular
portion of land occupied by portions of its buildings and wall, but Uy refused the offer. The parties entered
into an agreement wherein Tecnogas agreed to demolish the wall at the back portion of its land thus giving to
Uy possession of a portion of his land previously enclosed by Tecnogas wall. Uy later filed a complaint against
Tecnogas in connection with the encroachment or occupation by the latters buildings and walls of a portion
of its land but said complaint did not prosper. Uy then dug a canal along Tecnogas wall, a portion of which
collapsed and led to the filing the latter of the complaint. The RTC ruled in favor of Tecnogas and ordered Uy
to sell to the former the portion of the land owned by him and occupied by portions Tecnogas buildings and
wall. On appeal, the CA reversed the decision of the RTC, ruling that Tecnogas cannot be considered in good
faith because as a land owner, it is presumed to know the metes and bounds of his own property, especially if

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the same are reflected in a properly issued certificate of title. Consequently, the builder, if sued by the
aggrieved by the landowner for recovery of possession, could have invoked the provisions of Article 448 of
the Civil Code.

Issue:

Whether or not Tecnogas who is not the builder of the structures can invoke Art. 448.

Ruling:

YES. The benefit to the builder under Art. 448 is that, instead of being outrightly ejected from the
land, he can compel the landowner to make a choice between the two options: (1) to appropriate the building
by paying the indemnity required by law, or (2) sell the land to the builder. The landowner cannot refuse to
exercise either option and compel instead the owner of the building to remove it from the land. The Court
ruled that first, there is no sufficient showing that Tecnogas was aware of the encroachment at the time it
acquired the property from Pariz Industries. Thus, contrary proof has not overthrown the presumption of
good faith. Lasltly, upon delivery of the property by Pariz to Tecnogas, the latter acquired ownership of the
property. Consequently, Tecnogas is deemed to have stepped into the shoes of the seller in regard to all rights
of ownership over the immovable sold, including the right to compel Uy to exercise either of the two options
provided under Art. 448.

PEDRO ANGELES, represented by ADELINA T. ANGELES, Attorney-in-fact v. ESTELITA B. PASCUAL,

MARIA THERESA PASCUAL, NERISSA PASCUAL, IMELDA PASCUAL, MA. LAARNI PASCUAL and EDWIN
PASCUAL
G.R. No. 157150, September 21, 2011, BERSAMIN, J.

Under Art. 448 of the Civil Code, the land being the principal and the building the accessory, preference
is given to the landowner to make the choice as between appropriating the building or obliging the builder to
pay the value of the land.
Facts:
Regidor Pascual and Pedro Angeles were registered owners of adjacent parcels of land. Pascual
owned Lot 4 and Angeles owned Lot 5. Each of them built a house of his respective lot, believing all the while
that his respective lot was properly delineated. It was not until Metrobank, as the highest bidder in the
foreclosure sale of the adjacent Lot 3, caused the relocation survey of Lot 3 that the geodetic engineer
discovered that Pascuals house had encroached on Lot 3. Consequently, Metrobank successfully ejected
Pascual. Pascual then caused the relocation survey of his own lot and discovered that Angeles house also
encroached on his lot. Pascual demanded rentals for the use of the encroached are of Lot 4 from Angeles, or
the removal of Angeles house. Angeles refused the demand. Pascual then sued Angeles in the RTC. The RTC
ruled that Pascual proved Angeles encroachment on Lot 4 and the he is entitled to relief. The CA affirmed
with modification RTCs decision applying Art. 448 of the Civil Code, defining the rights of a builder in good
faith.
Issue:
Whether or not the CAs application of Art. 448 of the Civil Code was correct and proper.
Ruling:

YES. The provision contemplates a person building, or sowing, or planting in good faith on land
owned by another. The law presupposes that the land and the building or plants are owned by different
persons, like here. The RTC and CA found and declared Angeles to be a builder in good faith. Good faith
consists in the belief of the builder that the land he is building on is his and in his ignorance of a defect or flaw in
his title. With the unassailable finding that Angeles house straddled the lot of Pascual, and that Angeles had

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built his house in good faith, Art. 448 of the Civil Code, which spells out the rights and obligations of the
owner of the land as well as of the builder, is unquestionably applicable. Consequently, the land being the
principal and the building the accessory, preference is given to Pascual as the owner of the land to make the
choice as between appropriating the building or obliging Angeles as the builder to pay the value of the land.
Contrary to the insistence of Angeles, therefore, no inconsistency exists between the finding of good faith in
his favor and the grant of the reliefs set forth in Art. 448 of the Civil Code.

LUCIANO BRIONES AND NELLY BRIONES v. JOSE MACABAGDAL, FE D. MACABAGDAL and VERGON
REALTY INVESTMENTS CORPORATION
G.R. No. 150666, August 3, 2010, VILLARAMA, JR., J.

Art. 527 of the Civil Code presumes good faith, and since no proof exists to show that the mistake was
done by the builders in bad faith, the latter should be presumed to have built the house in good faith.

Facts:

Spouses Macabagdal purchased from Vergon Realty a parcel of land. On the other hand, the Brioneses
are the owners of an adjacent lot. The Brioneses then constructed a house on Spouses Macabagdals lot which
they thought was their own. After being informed of the mix up by Vergons manager, Spouses Macabagdal
demanded the Brioneses to demolish the house and vacate the property. The latter, however, refused. Thus,
Spouses Macabagdal filed an action to recover ownership and possession of the land with the RTC. The
Brioneses insisted that the lot on which they constructed their house was the lot which was pointed to them
as theirs by Vergons agents. They interposed the defense of being buyers in good faith. The RTC ruled in
favor of Spouses Macabagdal and found that the Brioneses were builders in bad faith. This was affirmed by
the CA.

Issue:
Whether or not the Brioneses are builders in good faith.
Ruling:

YES. Art. 527of the Civil Code presumes good faith, and since no proof exists to show that the
mistake was done by the Brioneses in bad faith, the latter should be presumed to have built the house in good
faith.

Thus, when a person builds in good faith on the land of another, Art. 448 of the Civil Code governs, in
which the builders, sowers or planters believe themselves to be owners of the land or, at least, to have a claim
of title thereto. The builder in good faith can compel the landowner to make a choice between appropriating
the building by paying the proper indemnity or obliging the builder to pay the price of the land. The choice
belongs to the owner of the land, a rule that accords with the principle of accession, i.e., that the accessory
follows the principal and not the other way around. However, even as the option lies with the landowner, the
grant to him, nevertheless, is preclusive. He must choose one. It is only if the owner chooses to sell his land,
and the builder or planter fails to purchase it where its value is not more than the value of the improvements,
that the owner may remove the improvements from the land. The owner is entitled to such remotion only
when, after having chosen to sell his land, the other party fails to pay for the same.

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The Brioneses have the right to be indemnified for the necessary and useful expenses they may have
made on the subject property. Consequently, the Spouses Macabagdal have the option to appropriate the
house on the subject land after payment to the Brioneses of the appropriate indemnity or to oblige them to
pay the price of the land, unless its value is considerably more than the value of the structures, in which case
the Brioneses shall pay reasonable rent.

PLEASANTVILLE DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION v. COURT OF APPEALS, WILSON KEE, C.T. TORRES

ENTERPRISES, INC., and ELDRED JARDINICO
G.R. No. 79688, February 1, 1996, PANGANIBAN, J.

Good faith consists in the belief of the builder that the land he is building on is his and his ignorance of
any defect or flaw in his title. And as good faith is presumed, the petitioner has the burden of proving bad faith
on the part of the respondent.

Facts:

Jardinico bought a lot from Robillo, who purchase the same from Pleasantville. At that time, Lot 9 was
vacant. When Jardinico secured from the Register of Deeds a TCT in his name, he discovered that
improvements had been introduced on Lot 9 by Wilson Kee, who had taken possession thereof. Kee bought
on installment Lot 8 of the same subdivision from C.T. Torres Enterprises, Inc. (CTTEI), the exclusive real
estate agent of Pleasantville. CTTEI then, through its employee, accompanied Kees wife to inspect Lot 8.
Unfortunately, the lot pointed by the employee was Lot 9. Kee then proceeded to construct his residence and
other improvements on the lot. Jardinico then demanded Kee to remove all improvements and vacate Lot 9.
When Kee refused, Jardinico filed with the MTCC a complaint for ejectment. Kee, in turn, filed a third-party
complaint against petitioner and CTTEI. The MTCC held that the erroneous delivery of Lot 9 to Kee was
attributable to CTTEI. However, the MTCC found that Plesantville had already rescinded its contract with Kee
over Lot 8 for the latters failure to pay the installments due. The MTCC concluded that Kee no longer had any
right over the lot. Consequently, Kee must pay reasonable rentals for the use of Lot 9, and, furthermore, he
cannot claim reimbursement for the improvements he introduced on said lot. On appeal, the RTC ruled that
Pleasantville and CTTEI were not at fault or were not negligent, and that Kee was a builder in bad faith. The
CA however ruled that Kee was a builder in good faith.

Issue:

Whether or not Kee was a builder in good faith.

Ruling:

YES. Good faith consists in the belief of the builder that the land he is building on is his and his
ignorance of any defect or flaw in his title. And as good faith is presumed, Pleasantville has the burden of
proving bad faith on the part of Kee. At the time he built improvements on Lot 8, Kee believed that said lot
was what he bought from Pleasantville. He was not aware that the lot delivered to him was not Lot 8. Thus,
Kee is in good faith. Pleasantville failed to prove otherwise. Plesantville points to Kees violation of the
contract, to demonstrate Kees bad faith, however, the Court disagrees. Such violations have no bearing
whatsoever on whether Kee was a builder in good faith, that is, on his state of mind at the time he built the
improvements on Lot 9. These alleged violations may not be bases to negate the presumption that Kee was a
builder in good faith.

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SPOUSES RAFAEL BENITEZ AND AVELINA BENITEZ v. COURT OF APPEALS, SPOUSES RENATO
MACAPAGAL AND ELIZABETH MACAPAGAL
G.R. No. 104828, January 16, 1997, PANGANIBAN, J.

Art. 448 of the Civil Code is unequivocal that the option to sell the land on which another in good faith
builds, plants or sows on, belongs to the landowner.

Facts:

Spouses Benitez purchased a parcel of land with improvement from the Cavite Development Bank.
Subsequently, Spouses Macapagal bought a lot. Later on, they filed a case with the RTC against Spouses
Benitez for the recovery of possession of an encroached portion of the lot they purchased. The parties were
able to reach a compromise in which Spouses Macapagal sold the encroached portion to Spouses Benitez.
Spouses Macapagal purchased still another property, adjacent to that of Spouses Benitez. After a relocation
survey was conducted, Spouses Macapagal discovered that a portion of their property was occupied by
Spouses Benitezs house. Despite verbal and written demands, Spouses Benitez refused to vacate. Spouses
Macapagal then filed with the MeTC for ejectment .The MeTC decided in favor of Spouses Macapagal. This was
affirmed by the RTC and the CA. Spouses Benitez now question the denial of their claimed pre-emptive right
to purchase the encroached portion of the Spouses Macapagals land.

Issue:

Whether or not Spouses Benitez have the pre-emptive right to buy the encroached land.

Ruling:

NO. Art. 448 of the Civil Code is unequivocal that the option to sell the land on which another in good
faith builds, plants or sows on, belongs to the landowner. The option is to sell, not to buy, and it is the
landowner's choice. Not even a declaration of the builder, planter, or sower's bad faith shifts this option to
him per Art. 450 of the Civil Code. This advantage in Art. 448 is accorded the landowner because "his right is
older, and because, by the principle of accession, he is entitled to the ownership of the accessory thing." There
can be no pre-emptive right to buy even as a compromise, as this prerogative belongs solely to the landowner.
No compulsion can be legally forced on him, contrary to what Spouses Benitezs asks claim. Such an order
would certainly be invalid and illegal. Thus, the lower courts were correct in rejecting the Spouses Benitez's
offer to buy the encroached land.

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DESAMPARADO VDA. DE NAZARENO and LETICIA NAZARENO TAPIA v. THE COURT OF APPEALS, MR. &
MRS. JOSE SALASALAN, MR. & MRS. LEO RABAY, AVELINO LABIS, HON. ROBERTO G. HILARIO, ROLLEO I.
IGNACIO, ALBERTO M. GILLERA and HON. ABELARDO G. PALAD, JR., in their official and/or private
capacities
G.R. No. 98045, June 26, 1996, ROMERO, J.

Accretion requires the concurrence of these requisites: (1) that the deposition of soil or sediment be
gradual and imperceptible; (2) that it be the result of the action of the waters of the river; and (3) that the land
where accretion takes place is adjacent to the banks or rivers.

Facts:

A parcel of land was formed as a result of sawdust dumped into the dried-up creek and along the
banks of the Cagayan river. Jose Salasalan and Leo Rabaya leased the subject lots on which their houses stood
from one Antonio Nazareno, petitioners' predecessor-in-interest. The private respondents allegedly stopped
paying rentals. As a result, Antonio and petitioners filed a case for ejectment with the MTC. MTC ruled against
private respondents, which decision was affirmed by the RTC. Before he died, Antonio caused the approval by
the Bureau of Lands of the survey plan to perfect his title over the accretion area being claimed by him. Before
the approved survey plan could be released to the applicant, however, it was protested by Salasalan and
Rabaya before the Bureau of Lands. In compliance with the order of District Land Officer Gillera, an
investigation was conducted and which recommended that Survey Plan in the name of Antonio, be cancelled
and that private respondents be directed to file appropriate public land applications. Antonio filed a motion
for reconsideration with the Undersecretary of the Department of Natural Resources, but denied the motion.
Petitioners then filed a case before the RTC for annulment of the orders rendered. The RTC dismissed the
complaint. The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC.

Issue:

Whether or not the petitioners can claim the rights of a riparian owner.

Ruling:

NO. Accretion, as a mode of acquiring property under Art. 457 of the Civil Code, requires the
concurrence of these requisites: (1) that the deposition of soil or sediment be gradual and imperceptible; (2) that
it be the result of the action of the waters of the river; and (3) that the land where accretion takes place is
adjacent to the banks or rivers. These are the rules on alluvion which if present, give to the owners of lands
adjoining the banks of rivers any accretion gradually received from the effects of the current of waters.In this
case, the petitioners admit that the accretion was formed by the dumping of boulders, soil and other filling
materials on portions of the creek and the Cagayan River bounding their land. It cannot be claimed, therefore,
that the accumulation of such boulders, soil and other filling materials was gradual and imperceptible,
resulting from the action of the waters or the current of the creek and the Cagayan River. In Hilario v. City of
Manila, the Court held that the word "current" indicates the participation of the body of water in the ebb and
flow of waters due to high and low tide. Petitioners, thus, cannot claim the rights of a riparian owner.

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DESAMPARADO VDA. DE NAZARENO and LETICIA NAZARENO TAPIA v. THE COURT OF APPEALS, MR. &
MRS. JOSE SALASALAN, MR. & MRS. LEO RABAY, AVELINO LABIS, HON. ROBERTO G. HILARIO, ROLLEO I.
IGNACIO, ALBERTO M. GILLERA and HON. ABELARDO G. PALAD, JR., in their official and/or private
capacities
G.R. No. 98045, June 26, 1996, ROMERO, J.

Where the land was not formed solely by the natural effect of the water current of the river bordering
said land but is also the consequence of the direct and deliberate intervention of man, it was deemed a man-
made accretion and, as such, part of the public domain.

Facts:

A parcel of land was formed as a result of sawdust dumped into the dried-up creek and along the
banks of the Cagayan river. Jose Salasalan and Leo Rabaya leased the subject lots on which their houses stood
from one Antonio Nazareno, petitioners' predecessor-in-interest. The private respondents allegedly stopped
paying rentals. As a result, Antonio and petitioners filed a case for ejectment with the MTC. MTC ruled against
private respondents, which decision was affirmed by the RTC. Before he died, Antonio caused the approval by
the Bureau of Lands of the survey plan to perfect his title over the accretion area being claimed by him. Before
the approved survey plan could be released to the applicant, however, it was protested by Salasalan and
Rabaya before the Bureau of Lands. In compliance with the order of District Land Officer Gillera, an
investigation was conducted and which recommended that Survey Plan in the name of Antonio, be cancelled
and that private respondents be directed to file appropriate public land applications. Antonio filed a motion
for reconsideration with the Undersecretary of the Department of Natural Resources, but denied the motion.
Petitioners then filed a case before the RTC for annulment of the orders rendered. The RTC dismissed the
complaint. The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC.

Issue:

Whether or not the land is a private land being accretion to Antonios titled property.

Ruling:

NO. Petitioners' submission not having met the first and second requirements of the rules on
alluvion, the Court thus concluded that the accretion was man-made or artificial. In Republic v. CA, the Court
ruled that the requirement that the deposit should be due to the effect of the current of the river is
indispensable. This excludes from Art. 457 of the Civil Code all deposits caused by human intervention. Thus,
in Tiongco v. Director of Lands, et al., where the land was not formed solely by the natural effect of the water
current of the river bordering said land but is also the consequence of the direct and deliberate intervention
of man, it was deemed a man-made accretion and, as such, part of the public domain. In this case, the subject
land was the direct result of the dumping of sawdust. Even if the Court were to take into consideration
petitioners' submission that the accretion site was the result of the late Antonios labor consisting in the
dumping of boulders, soil and other filling materials into the creek and Cagayan River bounding his land, the
same would still be part of the public domain.

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HEIRS OF EMILIANO NAVARRO v. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and HEIRS OF SINFOROSO

PASCUAL
G.R. No. 68166, February 12, 1997, HERMOSISIMA, JR., J.

Accretion as a mode of acquiring property under Art. 457, requires the concurrence of the following
requisites: (1) that the accumulation of soil or sediment be gradual and imperceptible; (2) that it be the result of
the action of the waters of the river; and (3) that the land where the accretion takes place is adjacent to the bank
of the river.

Facts:

Sinforoso Pascual filed an application to register a parcel of land, claiming that this land is an
accretion to his property, thus, a riparian owner thereof. It is bounded on the eastern side by the Talisay
River, on the western side by the Bulacan River, and on the northern side by the Manila Bay. The Talisay River
and the Bulacan River flow downstream and meet at the Manila Bay thereby depositing sand and silt on
Pascual's property resulting in an accretion thereon. Emiliano Navarro opposed such application, claiming
that the land sought to be registered is part of the public domain, it being a part of the foreshore of Manila Bay
and that he was a lessee and in possession of a part of the subject property by virtue of a fishpond permit and
had already converted it into a fishpond. The Court of First Instance denied Pascuals petition for land
registration. The Intermediate Appellate Court, however, granted the petition, applying Art. 457 of the Civil
Code.

Issue:

Whether or not the land sought to be registered be deemed an accretion.

Ruling:

NO. Accretion as a mode of acquiring property under Art. 457, requires the concurrence of the
following requisites: (1) that the accumulation of soil or sediment be gradual and imperceptible; (2) that it be
the result of the action of the waters of the river; and (3) that the land where the accretion takes place is
adjacent to the bank of the river.

The Court held that first, the northeastern boundary of Pascuals land is the Manila Bay. Pascuals
land, therefore, used to adjoin, border or front the Manila Bay and not any of the two rivers whose torrential
action is to account for the accretion on their land. Moreover, Pascuals own land lies between the Talisay and
Bulacan Rivers. If the accretion were to be attributed to the action of either or both of the rivers, the alluvium
should have been deposited on either or both of the eastern and western boundaries of Pascuals own tract of
land, not on the northern portion thereof which is adjacent to the Manila Bay. Clearly lacking, thus, is the third
requisite of accretion, which is, that the alluvium is deposited on the portion of Pascuals land which is
adjacent to the river bank. Second, Pascuals own tract of land adjoins the Manila Bay. Manila Bay is obviously
not a river, and jurisprudence is already settled that Manila Bay is part of the sea, being a mere indentation of
the same. The disputed land, thus, is an accretion not on a river bank but on a sea bank, or on what used to be
the foreshore of Manila Bay which adjoined Pascuals own tract of land on the northern side. As such, the
applicable law is not Art. 457 of the Civil Code but Art. 4 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866, which
provides that lands added to the shores by accretions and alluvial deposits caused by the action of the sea,
form part of the public domain.

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OFFICE OF THE CITY MAYOR OF PARAAQUE CITY, OFFICE OF THE CITY ADMINISTRATOR OF
PARAAQUE CITY, OFFICE OF THE CITY ENGINEER OF PARAAQUE CITY , OFFICE OF THE CITY
PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT COORDINATOR, OFFICE OF THE BARANGAY CAPTAIN AND
SANGGUNIANG PAMBARANGAY OF BARANGAY VITALEZ, PARAAQUE CITY, TERESITA A.
GATCHALIAN, ENRICO R. ESGUERRA, ERNESTO T. PRACALE, JR., MANUEL M. ARGOTE, CONRADO M.
CANLAS, JOSEPHINE S. DAUIGOY, ALLAN L. GONZALES, ESTER C. ASEHAN, MANUEL A. FUENTES, and
MYRNA P. ROSALES v. MARIO D. EBIO AND HIS CHILDREN/HEIRS namely, ARTURO V. EBIO, EDUARDO
V. EBIO, RENATO V. EBIO, LOURDES E. MAGTANGOB, MILA V. EBIO, and ARNEL V. EBIO
G.R. No. 178411, June 30, 2010, VILLARAMA, JR., J.

While a creek is a property of public dominion, the land which is formed by the gradual and
imperceptible accumulation of sediments along its banks does not form part of the public domain by clear
provision of law.

Facts:

Respondents claim that they are the absolute owners of a parcel of land which was an accretion of
Cut-cut creek. The Office of the Sangguniang Barangay of Vitalez passed a resolution seeking assistance from
the City Government of Paraaque for the construction of an access road along Cut-cut creek. The proposed
road would traverse the lot occupied by the respondents. When they were advised to vacate the said area,
they registered their opposition thereto. However, several officials of the city government proceeded with
cutting trees along the area. Respondents then applied for a writ of preliminary injunction with the RTC. The
RTC denied the application. The CA, however, reversed the RTC decision, applying Art. 457 of the Civil Code.
Now, the petitioners argue that since the creek, being a tributary of the river, is classified as part of the public
domain, any land that may have formed along its banks through time should also be considered as part of the
public domain.

Issue:

Whether or not the alluvial deposits along the banks of a creek form part of the public domain.

Ruling:

NO. The law that governs ownership over the alluvial deposits along the banks of a creek is Art. 84 of
the Spanish Law of Waters, in relation to Art. 457 of the Civil Code. Art. 84 of the Spanish Law of Waters
provides that accretions deposited gradually upon lands contiguous to creeks, streams, rivers, and lakes, by
accessions or sediments from the waters thereof, belong to the owners of such lands. Art. 457 of the Civil
Code also states that to the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong the accretion which they
gradually receive from the effects of the current of the waters. Thus, the alluvial property automatically
belongs to the owner of the estate to which it may have been added. The only restriction provided for by law
is that the owner of the adjoining property must register it under the Torrens system; otherwise, the alluvial
property may be subject to acquisition through prescription by third persons. Hence, while it is true that a
creek is a property of public dominion, the land which is formed by the gradual and imperceptible
accumulation of sediments along its banks do not form part of the public domain by clear provision of law.

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QUIETING OF TITLE

LUCIO ROBLES, EMETERIA ROBLES, ALUDIA ROBLES and EMILIO ROBLES v. COURT OF APPEALS,
SPOUSES VIRGILIO SANTOS and BABY RUTH CRUZ, RURAL BANK OF CARDONA, INC., HILARIO ROBLES,
ALBERTO PALAD, JR., in his capacity as Director of Lands, and JOSE MAULEON in his capacity as
District Land Officer of the Bureau of Lands
G.R. No. 123509, March 14, 2000, PANGANIBAN, J.

To be entitled to the remedy of quieting of title, petitioners must show that they have title to the real
property at issue, and that some deed or proceeding beclouds its validity or efficacy.
Facts:
The petitioners inherited the subject land from their father, Silvino Robles. The petitioners entrusted
the payment of the land taxes to their half-brother, Hilario Robles. However, the tax declaration in the name
of Silvino was canceled and transferred to Exequiel Ballena, Hilarios father-in-law. Thereafter, Ballena
secured a loan from a bank using the tax declaration as security. The tax declaration was transferred to the
name of Antipolo Rural Bank and later on, was transferred to the name of Hilaro and his wife. Hilarios wife
secured a loan from Cardona Rural Bank using the tax declaration as security. For failure to pay her
obligation, foreclosure proceedings were had and the Rural Bank became the highest bidder. The property
was then sold to Spouses Vergel and Ruth Santos, and consequently, a free patent was issued in their favor.
Upon learning the mortgage, the petitioners tried to redeem the property but were unsuccessful. They then
filed an action for quieting of title with the RTC. The RTC ruled in favor of the respondents. But the CA held
that the petitioners no longer had any title to the subject property at the time they filed the action.
Issue:

Whether or not the petitioners are entitled to the remedy of quieting of title.

Ruling:

YES. An action to quiet title is a remedy for the removal of any cloud or doubt or uncertainty on the
title to real property. It is essential for the complainant to have a legal or an equitable title to or interest in the
real property which is the subject matter of the action. Also, the deed, claim, encumbrance or proceeding that
is being alleged as a cloud on plaintiffs title must be shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its
prima facie appearance of validity or legal efficacy.

The CA failed to consider irregularities in the transactions involving the disputed property. The
failure to show the indubitable title of Ballena to the property in question is vital in this case. It was from him
that Hilario had allegedly derived his title thereto as owner, an allegation which thereby enabled him to
mortgage it to the Rural Bank of Cardona. The occupation and the possession thereof by the petitioners and
their predecessors-in-interest was not disputed, and Ballenas acquisition of the said property by prescription
was not alleged. Thus, the deed of conveyance purportedly evidencing the transfer of ownership and
possession from the heirs of Silvino to Ballena should have been presented as the best proof of that transfer.
No such document was presented, however. Therefore, there is merit to the contention of the petitioners that
Hilario mortgaged the disputed property to the Rural Bank of Cardona in his capacity as a mere co-owner
thereof. Clearly, the said transaction did not divest them of title to the property at the time of the institution of
the action for quieting of title.

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ANASTACIA VDA. DE AVILES, ET AL. v. COURT OF APPEALS and CAMILO AVILES

G.R. No. 95748, November 21, 1996, PANGANIBAN, J.

An action for quieting of title is not the proper remedy for settling boundary dispute.

Facts:

The petitioners aver that the subject land is the share of their father, Eduardo Aviles and brother of
Camilo Aviles. Such land was mortgaged by Eduardo and was foreclosed, but was redeemed by Anastacia Vda.
De Aviles. Thereafter, Camilo asserted a color of title over the northern portion of the property by
constructing a bamboo fence and moving the earthen dikes, thus disturbing the possession of the petitioners
over said portion. Camilo then admitted the agreement of partition executed by him and his brothers. The
areas allotted to them was agreed and measured before the execution of the agreement. Camilo agreed to
have a smaller area. The subject portion however is part of the share given to him in the agreement of
partition. Thus, Camilo is only occupying an area which is smaller than his actual share. An action for quieting
of title was thus filed with the RTC. The RTC dismissed the complaint and ordered the parties to employ the
services of a Land Surveyor. On appeal, the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC in part, reasoning that the a
special civil action for quieting of title is not the proper remedy for settling a boundary dispute, and that
petitioners should have instituted an ejectment suit instead.

Issue:

Whether or not an action for quieting of title is the proper remedy for settling boundary dispute.

Ruling:

NO. To avail the remedy of quieting of title, a plaintiff must show that there is an instrument, record,
claim, encumbrance or proceeding which constitutes or casts a cloud, doubt, question or shadow upon the
owners title to or interest in real property.

The CA correctly ruled that there was no evidence of any muniment of title, proceeding, or a written
contract. The Agreement of Partition executed by Camilo and his brothers and the Deed of Sale evidencing the
redemption by Anastacia in no way constitute a cloud or cast a doubt upon the title of petitioners. Rather, the
uncertainty arises from the parties failure to situate and fix the boundary between their respective
properties. Both petitioners and Camilo admitted the existence of the agreement of partition and that the only
controversy is whether these lands were properly measured. There is no adverse claim by the defendant
which is apparently valid, but is, in truth and in fact, invalid, ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable and which
constitutes a cloud thereon. The construction of the bamboo fence enclosing the disputed property and the
moving of earthen dikes also are not the clouds or doubts which can be removed in an action for quieting of
title. Thus, an action to quiet title or to remove cloud may not be brought for the purpose of settling a
boundary dispute.

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PHIL-VILLE DEVELOPMENT AND HOUSING CORPORATION v. MAXIMO BONIFACIO, CEFERINO R.

BONIFACIO, APOLONIO B. TAN, BENITA B. CAINA, CRISPINA B. PASCUAL, ROSALIA B. DE GRACIA,
TERESITA S. DORONIA, CHRISTINA GOCO and ARSENIO C. BONIFACIO, in their capacity as the surviving
heirs of the late ELEUTERIA RIVERA VDA. DE BONIFACIO
G.R. No. 167391, June 8, 2011, VILLARAMA, JR., J.

For an action for quieting of title may prosper, two requisites must concur: (1) the plaintiff has a legal
or equitable title or interest in the real property subject of the action; and (2) the deed, claim, encumbrance, or
proceeding claimed to be casting cloud on his title must be shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its
prima facie appearance of validity or legal efficacy.

Facts:

Phil-Ville owns three parcels of land of the subdivision plan, which form part of the Maysilo Estate.
Earlier, the heirs of Maria de la Concepcion Vidal, including Euleteria Rivera Vda. De Bonifacio claimed to be
the co-owners of certain properties, including Maysilo Estate, and filed a petition with the CFI praying for the
substitution of their names on the title instead of Vidal, which was granted. Thereafter, the heirs of Vidal filed
a petition for partition of the properties, which was again granted. 31 years later, Euleteria obtained an order
in her favor from the RTC for the partition and segregation of lots of the Maysilo Estate and a writ of
possession which resulted to a demand upon Phil-Ville to vacate the said lots. But such writ of possession and
notice to vacate was rendered void by the CA upon a petition for certiorari. Nonetheless, Phil-Ville filed an
action for quieting of title over the three lots against the heirs of Euleteria. The RTC rendered in favor of Phil-
Ville. However, the CA set aside the RTC decision and dismissed Phil-Villes complaint.

Issue:

Whether or not the title in the name of Euleteria constitutes a cloud over Phil-Villes titles over
portions of the Maysilo Estate.

Ruling:

YES. In order that an action for quieting of title may prosper, two requisites must concur: (1) the
plaintiff or complainant has a legal or equitable title or interest in the real property subject of the action; and
(2) the deed, claim, encumbrance, or proceeding claimed to be casting cloud on his title must be shown to be
in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie appearance of validity or legal efficacy.

The first requisite is present because Phil-Ville was able to establish its title over the real properties
by submitting documentary evidence to support its claim. On the other hand, the respondents have not
adduced competent evidence to establish their title to the property or to dispute Phil-Villes claim over the
same. The Court also found that Euleteria was 96 years old when she died in 1997, thus she was born in 1901.
That makes Euleteria two years older than Vidal who was born in 1903. Hence, it was physically impossible
for her to be an heir of Vidal. Moreover, the Partition Plan of the Maysilo Estate shows that the lot was
awarded not to Vidal. This was not at all disputed by respondents. The second requisite is likewise present.
While it is true that title in the name of Euleteria is an instrument that appeared to be valid but was
subsequently shown to be invalid, it does not cover the same parcels of land that are described in Phil-Villes
titles and that a comparison of the technical descriptions of the parties titles negates an overlapping of their
boundaries.

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CO-OWNERSHIP / POSSESSION

CAROLINA (CARLINA) VDA. DE FIGURACION, HEIRS OF ELENA FIGURACION-ANCHETA, namely:

LEONCIO ANCHETA, JR., and ROMULO ANCHETA, HEIRS OF HILARIA A. FIGURACION, namely: FELIPA
FIGURACION-MANUEL, MARY FIGURACION-GINEZ, and EMILIA FIGURACION-GERILLA, AND HEIRS OF
QUINTIN FIGURACION, namely: LINDA M. FIGURACION, LEANDRO M. FIGURACION, II, and ALLAN M.
FIGURACION v. EMILIA FIGURACION-GERILLA
G.R. No. 151334, February 13, 2013, Reyes, J.

A co-owner is entitled to sell his undivided share; hence, a sale of the entire property by one co-owner
without the consent of the other co-owners is not null and void and only the rights of the co-owner/seller are
transferred, thereby making the buyer a co-owner of the property.

Facts:

Subject of the dispute is Lot No. 707 originally owned by one Eulalio Adviento (Eulalio). Eulalilo
begot two children, Agripina Adviento (Agripina) with his first wife and herein petitioner Carolina, with his
second wife. Faustina Upon the death of Eulalilo, the ownership over Lot No. 707 passed unto his two
daughters Agripina and Carolina. In 1961, Agripina executed a Deed of Quitclaim over the eastern half of Lot
No. 707 in favor of her niece, herein respondent Emilia. Subsequently however, Carolina executed an Affidavit
of Self-Adjudication adjudicating unto herself the entire Lot No. 707. Carolina likewise executed a Deed of
Absolute Sale over Lot No. 707 in favor of petitioners Hilaria and Felipa. Relying on the Deed of Quitclaim,
Emilia built a house on the eastern half of Lot No. 707. The present controversy started in 1994 when Hilaria
and her agents threatened to demolish the house of Emilia who, in retaliation, was prompted to seek the
partition of Lot No. 707.

Issue:

Whether or not respondent Emilia is the owner of the eastern half portion of Lot No. 707.

Ruling:

YES. The status of Agripina and Carolina as the legitimate heirs of Eulalio is an undisputed fact. As
such heirs, they became co-owners of Lot No. 707 upon the death of Eulalio on July 20, 1930. Since Faustina
was predeceased by Eulalio, she likewise became a co-owner of the lot upon Eulalios death. Faustinas share,
however, passed on to her daughter Carolina when the former died on October 18, 1949. The Affidavit of Self-
Adjudication executed by Carolina did not prejudice the share of Agripina because it is not legally possible for
one to adjudicate unto himself an entire property he was not the sole owner of. A co-owner cannot alienate the
shares of her other co-owners nemo dat qui non habet. Hence, Lot No. 707 was a co-owned property of
Agripina and Carolina. As co-owners, each of them had full ownership of her part and of the fruits and
benefits pertaining thereto. Each of them also had the right to alienate the lot but only in so far as the extent
of her portion was affected. Thus, when Carolina sold the entire Lot No. 707 on December 11, 1962 to Hilaria
and Felipa without the consent of her co-owner Agripina, the disposition affected only Carolinas pro
indiviso share, and the vendees, Hilaria and Felipa, acquired only what corresponds to Carolinas share.

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REY CASTIGADOR CATEDRILLA v. MARIO and MARGIE LAURON

G.R. No. 179011, April 15, 2013, Peralta, J.

Art. 487 of the NCC provides that a co-owner may bring an action for ejectment, without the necessity of
joining all the other co-owners as co-plaintiffs, because the suit is deemed to be instituted for the benefit of the
plaintiff alone, such that he claims possession for himself and not for the co-ownership, the action will not
prosper.

Facts:

The subject land of the present controversy is Lot No. 5 which was originally owned by one Lilia
Castigador (Lilia). Upon the death of Lilia, Lot No. 5 was inherited by her heirs which included herein
petitioner Rey. Sometime in 1980, respondents Mario and Margie Lauron, through the tolerance of the heirs
of Lilia, constructed a residential building on the northwest portion of Lot No. 5. Subsequently thereafter, the
heirs of Lilia asked respondents to vacate Lot No. 5. When the respondents refused, petitioner Rey filed a
Complaint for Ejectment against the respondents. The respondents argue that petitioner should have
impleaded his other co-heirs they being considered as indispensable parties.

Issue:

Whether or not the co-heirs of petitioner Rey are considered indispensable parties which are
required to be impleaded pursuant to Section 1, Rule 7 and Section 7, Rule 3 of the ROC.

Ruling:

NO. In the more recent case of Carandang v. Heirs of De Guzman, this Court declared that a co-owner
is not even a necessary party to an action for ejectment, for complete relief can be afforded even in his absence,
thus:

In sum, in suits to recover properties, all co-owners are real parties in interest. However, pursuant to
Article 487 of the Civil Code and the relevant jurisprudence, any one of them may bring an action, any kind of
action for the recovery of co-owned properties. Therefore, only one of the co-owners, namely the co-owner
who filed the suit for the recovery of the co-owned property, is an indispensable party thereto. The other co-
owners are not indispensable parties. They are not even necessary parties, for a complete relief can be
afforded in the suit even without their participation, since the suit is presumed to have been filed for the
benefit of all co-owners. In this case, although petitioner alone filed the complaint for unlawful detainer, he
stated in the complaint that he is one of the heirs of the late Lilia Castigador, his mother, who inherited the
subject lot, from her parents. Petitioner did not claim exclusive ownership of the subject lot, but he filed the
complaint for the purpose of recovering its possession which would redound to the benefit of the co-owners.
Since petitioner recognized the existence of a co-ownership, he, as a co-owner, can bring the action without
the necessity of joining all the other co-owners as co-plaintiffs.

SPOUSES MANUEL and SALVACION DEL CAMPO v. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and HEIRS OF JOSE
REGALADO, SR.
G.R. No. 108228, February 1, 2001, QUISUMBING, J.

A co-owner cannot rightfully dispose of a particular portion of a co-owned property prior to partition
among all the co-owners. However, this should not signify that the vendee does not acquire anything at all in
case a physically segregated area of the co-owned lot is in fact sold to him. Since the co-owner/vendors
undivided interest could properly be the object of the contract of sale between the parties, what the vendee

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obtains by virtue of such a sale are the same rights as the vendor had as co-owner, in an ideal share equivalent to
the consideration given under their transaction. In other words, the vendee steps into the shoes of the vendor as
co-owner and acquires a proportionate abstract share in the property held in common.

Facts:

Salome, Consorcia, Alfredo, Maria, Rosalia, Jose, Quirico and Julita, all surnamed Bornales, were the
original co-owners of Lot 162. In 1940, Salome sold part of her 4/16 share in Lot 162 to Soledad Daynolo. A
few years later, Soledad and her husband, Simplicio Distajo, mortgaged the subject portion of Lot 162 as
security for a debt to Jose Regalado, Sr. This transaction was evidenced by a Deed of Mortgage. Meanwhile,
three of the eight co-owners of Lot 162, specifically, Salome, Consorcia and Alfredo, sold 24,993 square
meters of said lot to Jose Regalado, Sr. On May 4, 1951, Simplicio Distajo, heir of Soledad Daynolo who had
since died, paid the mortgage debt and redeemed the mortgaged portion of Lot 162 from Jose Regalado, Sr.
The latter, in turn, executed a Deed of Discharge of Mortgage in favor of Soledads heirs. On same date, the said
heirs sold the redeemed portion of Lot 162 to herein petitioners, the spouses Manuel Del Campo and
Salvacion Quiachon.

Subsequently, Jose Regalado, Sr. subdivided Lot 162 into smaller lots, each covered by a respective
title in his name. One of these small lots is Lot No. 162-C-6 with an area of 11,732 square meters which was
registered under the name of Jose Regalado, Sr. Alleging that they own an area of 1,544 square meters located
within Lot 162-C-6 which was erroneously registered in the name of Regalado, petitioners Manuel and
Salvacion del Campo brought a complaint for repartition, resurvey and reconveyance against the heirs of the
now deceased Jose Regalado, Sr.

Issue:

Whether or not Salome, as co-owner of Lot 162, could validly sell a definite or concrete portion of the
co-owned lot.

Ruling:

NO, however, the mere fact that Salome purportedly transferred a definite portion of the co-owned
lot by metes and bounds to Soledad, does not per se render the sale a nullity. Resultantly, Soledad
became a co-owner of Lot 162 as of the year 1940 when the sale was made in her favor. It follows that
Salome, Consorcia and Alfredo could not have sold the entire Lot 162 to Jose Regalado, Sr. on April 14, 1948
because at that time, the ideal shares held by the three co-owners/vendors were equivalent to only 10/16 of
the undivided property less the aliquot share previously sold by Salome to Soledad. Based on the principle that
no one can give what he does not have, Salome, Consorcia and Alfredo could not legally sell the shares
pertaining to Soledad since a co-owner cannot alienate more than his share in the co-ownership. The SC have
ruled many times that even if a co-owner sells the whole property as his, the sale will affect only his own share
but not those of the other co-owners who did not consent to the sale. Since a co-owner is entitled to sell his
undivided share, a sale of the entire property by one co-owner will only transfer the rights of said co-owner to
the buyer, thereby making the buyer a co-owner of the property.

In this case, Regalado merely became a new co-owner of Lot 162 to the extent of the shares which
Salome, Consorcia and Alfredo could validly convey. Soledad retained her rights as co-owner and could
validly transfer her share to petitioners in 1951. The logical effect of the second disposition is to substitute
petitioners in the rights of Soledad as co-owner of the land. Needless to say, these rights are preserved
notwithstanding the issuance of TCT No. 14566 in Regalados name in 1977.

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PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK v. JOSE GARCIA AND CHILDREN NORA GARCIA, JOSE GARCIA, JR., BOBBY
GARCIA AND JIMMY GARCIA AND HEIRS OF ROGELIO GARCIA NAMELY: CELEDONIO GARCIA, DANILO
GARCIA, ELSA GARCIA, FERMIN GARCIA, HEHERSON GARCIA, GREGORIO GARCIA, IMELDA GARCIA AND
JANE GARCIA
G.R. No. 182839, June 02, 2014, Brion, J.

Each co-owner has the full ownership of his part or share in the co-ownership and may alienate, assign
or mortgage it except when personal rights are involved. Should a co-owner alienate or mortgage the co-owned
property itself, the alienation or mortgage shall remain valid but only to the extent of the portion which may be
allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership.

Facts:

The subject of the present controversy is a parcel of land covered by TCT No. T-44422 under the
name of Jose Garcia Sr. (Jose Sr.) who acquired the subject property during his marriage with Ligaya Garcia
(Ligaya). Ligaya died on January 21, 1987. Respondents Nora, Jose Jr., Bobby and Jimmy are the children of
Jose Sr. and Ligaya. Sometime in 1989, the spouses Rogelio and Celedonia Garcia (Spouses Garcia) obtained a
loan from petitioner PNB. Jose Sr., who agreed to accommodate the Spouses Garcia, offered the land covered
by TCT No. T-44422 as security for the loan. For this purpose, Jose Sr. executed Special Powers of Attorney
(SPAs) dated April 14, 1992 and October 6, 1993, respectively, expressly authorizing the Spouses Garcia to
apply for, borrow, or secure any loan from PNB, and to convey and transfer the subject property by way of
mortgage. All of these transactions, however, were without the knowledge and consent of Jose Sr.s children.
Claiming that the Real Estate Mortgage Contract was null and void as to them, respondents Nora, Jose Jr.,
Bobby and Jimmy filed a Complaint for Nullity of the Real Estate Mortgage against PNB and the Spouses
Garcia.

Issue:

Whether or not Jose Sr. could validly mortgage the entire property without the consent of his
children.

Ruling:

NO. Because of the petitioner banks failure to rebut the allegation that the subject property was
acquired during the formers marriage to Ligaya, the legal presumption of the conjugal nature of the property,
in line with Article 160 of the Civil Code, applies to this property. Proof of the subject propertys acquisition
during the subsistence of marriage suffices to render the statutory presumption operative. Upon the death of
Ligaya on January 21, 1987, the conjugal partnership was automatically dissolved and terminated pursuant to
Article 175(1) of the Civil Code, and the successional rights of her heirs vest, as provided under Article 777 of
the Civil Code, which states that [t]he rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of the death
of the decedent.

Consequently, the conjugal partnership was converted into an implied ordinary co-ownership
between the surviving spouse, on the one hand, and the heirs of the deceased, on the other. This resulting
ordinary co-ownership among the heirs is governed by Article 493 of the Civil Code.

In the present case, Jose Sr. constituted the mortgage over the entire subject property after the death
of Ligaya, but before the liquidation of the conjugal partnership. While under Article 493 of the Civil Code,
even if he had the right to freely mortgage or even sell his undivided interest in the disputed property, he
could not dispose of or mortgage the entire property without his childrens consent. As correctly emphasized

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by the trial court, Jose Sr.s right in the subject property is limited only to his share in the conjugal partnership
as well as his share as an heir on the other half of the estate which is his deceased spouses share.
Accordingly, the mortgage contract is void insofar as it extends to the undivided shares of his children (Nora,
Jose Jr., Bobby and Jimmy) because they did not give their consent to the transaction. Accordingly, the
Amendment of Real Estate Mortgage constituted by Jose Sr. over the entire property without his co-owners
consent is not necessarily void in its entirety. The right of the petitioner bank as mortgagee is limited though
only to the portion which may be allotted to Jose Sr. in the event of a division and liquidation of the subject
property.

VILMA QUINTOS, represented by her Attorney-in-Fact FIDEL I. QUINTOS, JR.; FLORENCIA I. DANCEL,
represented by her Attorney-in-Fact FLOVY I. DANCEL; and CATALINO L. IBARRA v. PELAGIA I.
NICOLAS, NOLI L. IBARRA, SANTIAGO L. IBARRA, PEDRO L. IBARRA, DAVID L. IBARRA, GILBERTO L.
IBARRA, HEIRS OF AUGUSTO L. IBARRA, namely CONCHITA R., IBARRA, APOLONIO IBARRA, and
NARCISO IBARRA, and the spouses RECTO CANDELARIO and ROSEMARIE CANDELARIO
G.R. No. 210252, June 16, 2014, Velasco, Jr., J.

Art. 494 of the New Civil Code is an exception to Rule 17, Sec. 3 of the Rules of Court to the effect that
even if the order of dismissal for failure to prosecute is silent on whether or not it is with prejudice, it shall be
deemed to be without prejudice.

Facts:

Petitioners Vilma, Florencia, and Catalino, and respondents Pelagia, Noli, Santiago, Pedro, David,
Gilberto, and the late Augusto are siblings. Their parents, Bienvenido and Escolastica Ibarra, were the owners
of the subject property, a parcel of land covered by TCT No. 318717. When Bienvenido and Escolastica died,
the ownership of the subject property passed to their 10 children. Respondents, in 2002 filed an action for
partition against petitioners. The action was however dismissed by the trial court due to the failure of the
parties to appear despite due notice. Having failed to secure a favorable decision for partition, respondent
siblings instead resorted to executing a Deed of Adjudication to transfer the property in favor of the ten (10)
siblings. As a result, TCT No. 318717 was cancelled and in lieu thereof, TCT No. 390484 was issued in the
name of the ten siblings. Thereafter, respondent siblings sold their 7/10 undivided share over the property in
favor of their co-respondents, the spouses Recto and Rosemarie Candelario. As a consequence thereof, TCT
No. 390484 was partially cancelled and TCT No. 434304 was issued in the name of the Candelarios, covering
the 7/10portion.

Alleging that the subject property was given to them by their parents during the lifetime of the latter,
petitioners filed a complaint for Quieting of Title and Damages against respondents. Respondents countered
that petitioners cause of action was already barred by estoppel when sometime in 2006, one of petitioners
offered to buy the 7/10 undivided share of the respondent siblings. They point out that this is an admission
on the part of petitioners that the property is not entirely theirs. Lastly, respondents sought, by way of
counterclaim, the partition of the property.

Issue:

Whether or not the counterclaim of respondents for partition is already barred by res judicata.

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Ruling:

NO. In the case at bar, respondent siblings admit that they filed an action for partition docketed as
Civil Case No. 02-52, which the RTC dismissed through an Order dated March 22, 2004 for the failure of the
parties to attend the scheduled hearings. Respondents likewise admitted that since they no longer appealed
the dismissal, the ruling attained finality. Moreover, it cannot be disputed that the subject property in Civil
Case No. 02-52 and in the present controversy are one and the same, and that in both cases, respondents raise
the same action for partition. And lastly, although respondent spouses Candelario were not party-litigants in
the earlier case for partition, there is identity of parties not only when the parties in the case are the same,
but also between those in privity with them, such as between their successors-in-interest.

With all the other elements present, what is left to be determined now is whether or not the
dismissal of Civil case No. 02-52 operated as a dismissal on the merits that would complete the requirements
of res judicata.

Rule 17, Section 3 enumerates the instances when a complaint may be dismissed due to the plaintiff's
fault: (1) if he fails to appear on the date for the presentation of his evidence in chief on the complaint; (2) if
he fails to prosecute his action for an unreasonable length of time; or (3) if he fails to comply with the Rules or
any order of the court. The dismissal of a case for failure to prosecute has the effect of adjudication on the
merits, and is necessarily understood to be with prejudice to the filing of another action, unless otherwise
provided in the order of dismissal. Stated differently, the general rule is that dismissal of a case for failure to
prosecute is to be regarded as an adjudication on the merits and with prejudice to the filing of another action,
and the only exception is when the order of dismissal expressly contains a qualification that the dismissal is
without prejudice. In the case at bar, petitioners claim that the Order does not in any language say that the
dismissal is without prejudice and, thus, the requirement that the dismissal be on the merits is present.

Truly, the SC have had the occasion to rule that dismissal with prejudice under the above-cited rule
amply satisfies one of the elements of res judicata. It is, thus, understandable why petitioners would allege res
judicata to bolster their claim. However, dismissal with prejudice under Rule 17, Sec. 3 of the Rules of Court
cannot defeat the right of a co-owner to ask for partition at any time, provided that there is no actual
adjudication of ownership of shares yet.

Between dismissal with prejudice under Rule 17, Sec. 3 and the right granted to co-owners under Art.
494 of the Civil Code, the latter must prevail. To construe otherwise would diminish the substantive right of a
co-owner through the promulgation of procedural rules. Such a construction is not sanctioned by the
principle, which is too well settled to require citation, that a substantive law cannot be amended by a
procedural rule.

HEIRS OF QUIRICO SERASPI AND PURIFICACION R. SERASPI v. COURT OF APPEALS AND SIMEON
RECASA
G.R. No. 135602. April 28, 2000, Mendoza, J.

Good faith consists in the reasonable belief that the person from whom the possessor received the thing
was its owner but could not transmit the ownership thereof.

Facts:

The two parcels of land subject of the present case were originally owned by one Marcelino Recasa
(Marcelino). During his lifetime, Marcelino contracted 3 marriages. When he died, Marcelino had 15 children
from his 3 marriages. Marcelinos intestate estate was partitioned into 3 parts, each part corresponding to the

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share of the heirs in each marriage. Subsequently thereafter, the heirs from the first marriage and second
marriage sold their shares in the estate of Marcelino to Quirico and Purificacion Seraspi (the Seraspis), whose
heirs are the present petitioners. Using the lands in question as security, the Seraspis obtained a loan from
Kalibo Rural Bank, Inc. (KRBI). When the Seraspis failed to pay the loan, the lands mortgaged were foreclosed
and the same were sold to KRBI being then the highest bidder. The lands were subsequently sold to Manuel
Rata (Manuel) Quiricos brother-in-law. Manuel, as owner of the property, allowed Quirico to administer the
property.

In 1974, private respondent Simeon Recasa (Simeon), Marcelinos child by his third wife, taking
advantage of the illness of Quirico, forcibly entered the lands in question and took possession thereof.
Meanwhile, the Seraspis purchased the lands from Manuel and afterwards filed a complaint against Simeon
for recovery of possession of lands.

Issue:

Whether or not private respondent Simeon Recasa acquired ownership of the properties in question
through acquisitive prescription.

Ruling:

NO. Article 1117 of the New Civil Code provides that acquisitive prescription of dominion and other
real rights may be ordinary or extraordinary, depending on whether the property is possessed in good faith
and with just title for the time fixed by law. Private respondent contends that he acquired the ownership of
the questioned property by ordinary prescription through adverse possession for ten (10) years. The
contention has no merit, because he has neither just title nor good faith. Art. 1129 provides that: For the
purposes of prescription, there is just title when the adverse claimant came into possession of the property
through one of the modes recognized by law for the acquisition of ownership or other real rights, but the
grantor was not the owner or could not transmit any right.

In the case at bar, private respondent did not acquire possession of the property through any of
the modes recognized by the Civil Code, to wit: (1) occupation, (2) intellectual creation, (3) law, (4) donation,
(5) succession, (6) tradition in consequence of certain contracts, and (7) prescription. Neither can private
respondent claim good faith in his favor. Private respondent entered the property without the consent of the
previous owner. For all intents and purposes, he is a mere usurper.

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DOMINGO R. CATAPUSAN, MINELIO R. CATAPUSAN, and FILOMENO R. CATAPUSAN vs. THE COURT OF
APPEALS, VICENTE CATAPUSAN, JR., CIPRIANO CATAPUSAN, GREGORIA CATAPUSAN, SEGUNDA
BAUTISTA CATAPUSAN, NICANOR T. CATAPUSAN, NARCISA T. CATAPUSAN, GREGORIO T. CATAPUSAN,
BENIGNO T. CATAPUSAN, REYNALDO T. CATAPUSAN, CATALINA T. CATAPUSAN, GERTRUDES
CATAPUSAN and FLORA DIAZ CATAPUSAN
G.R. No. 109262, November 21, 1996, Francisco J.

In actions for partition, the court cannot properly issue an order to divide the property, unless it first
makes a determination as to the existence of co-ownership. The court must initially settle the issue of ownership,
the first stage in an action for partition. Needless to state, an action for partition will not lie if the claimant has
no rightful interest over the subject property.

Facts:

The property under controversy is a parcel of land located in Wawa, Tanay, Rizal. Domingo
Catapusan (Domingo et al) herein petitioners, are the children of one Bonifacio Catapusan (Bonifacio) with
one Paula Reyes (Paula). Their marriage was contracted sometime in 1927. On the other hand, private
respondents, Vicente Catapusan Jr (Vicente et al) are the children of Bonifacio from a prior marriage with one
Narcissa Tanjuatco (Narcissa) and only surviving heir of one Dominga Piguing (Dominga). When Narcissa
died, Bonifacio married Paula. The Wawa property originally belonged to Dominga and upon her death was
transferred to Narcissa. Thereafter, Domingo et al filed an action for partition over the Wawa property which
they allegedly co-own with their half-brothers and half-sisters. Domingo et al presented tax declarations as
their only piece of evidence. The RTC dismissed the complaint filed by Domingo et al. On appeal with the CA,
the CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC. The CA opined that the evidence of Domingo et al was insufficient in
proving ownership of the same over the Wawa property. Now, Domingo et al comes before the Supreme
Court assailing the decision of the CA. Domingo et al among others, argue that an action for partition does not
include question of ownership. Hence this petition.

Issue:

Whether or not an action for partition includes question of ownership.

Ruling:

YES. In fact, Section 1 of Rule 69 requires the party filing the action to state in his complaint the
nature and extent of his title to the real estate. Until and unless the issue of ownership is definitely resolved, it
would be premature to effect a partition of the properties.

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ZOSIMA VERDAD v. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, SOCORRO C. ROSALES, AURORA ROSALES,
NAPOLEON ROSALES, ANTONIO ROSALES, FLORENDA ROSALES, ELENA ROSALES AND VIRGINIA
ROSALES
G.R. No. 109972, April 29, 1996, Vitug, J.

When a co-owner sells his interest over a co-owned property the co-owner/vendor is mandated by law
to send a written notice to his co-owners, notwithstanding actual knowledge of the latter. A written notice is
required in order to remove all uncertainties about the sale, its terms and conditions, as well as its efficacy and
status.

Facts:

The parcel of land subject of the present controversy was originally owned by one Macaria, who,
during her lifetime contracted two marriages. At the time of her death, Macaria was survived by her son
Ramon and her grandchild Estela of the first marriage and her children of the second marriage, namely, David
Rosales (David), Justo Rosales, Romulo Rosales, and Aurora Rosales. Private respondent Socorro Rosales
(Socorro) is the widow of David who himself, sometime after Macarias death, died intestate without an issue.
Subsequently, the heirs of Ramon, without the knowledge of their co-heirs, sold their interest on the disputed
land to petitioner Zosima Verdad (Zosima). Wanting to redeem the property, Socorro tendered the sum of
P23,000.00 to Zosima. The latter refused to accept the amount for being much less than the lots current
value. No settlement having been reached before the Lupong Tagapayapa, private respondents initiated
against Socorro an action for "Legal Redemption with Preliminary Injunction".

Issue:

Whether or not private respondent Socorro has the capacity to redeem the property, she not being a
co-heir herself in the intestate estate of Macaria.

Ruling:

YES. The Court ruled that Socorro can. It is true that Socorro, a daughter-in-law (or, for that matter, a
mere relative by affinity), is not an intestate heir of her parents-in-law; however, Socorro s right to the
property is not because she rightfully can claim heirship in Macarias estate but that she is a legal heir of her
husband, David Rosales, part of whose estate is a share in his mothers inheritance. David Rosales,
incontrovertibly, survived his mothers death. When Macaria died on 08 March 1956 her estate passed on to
her surviving children, among them David Rosales, who thereupon became co-owners of the property. When
David Rosales himself later died, his own estate, which included his undivided interest over the property
inherited from Macaria, passed on to his widow Socorro and her co-heirs pursuant to the law on succession.
Socorro and herein private respondents, along with the co-heirs of David Rosales, thereupon became co-
owners of the property that originally descended from Macaria. When their interest in the property was sold
by the Burdeos heirs to petitioner, a right of redemption arose in favor of private respondents as provided
under Article 1619 and Article 1620 of the NCC.

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ANDREA TABUSO and RENATO BISMORTE v. COURT OF APPEALS and the HEIRS OF ESTEBAN ABAD
represented by Nemesio Abad and Ana Abad Paghubasan,
G.R. No. 108558, June 21, 2001, PANGANIBAN, J.

Actual stay on the property is not necessary in order to prove ownership of the same.

Facts:

Andrea Tabuso and Renato Bismorte filed a petition for declaration of ownership involving an
unregistered land before the RTC of Naval Leyte. Tabuso alleged that they have been paying the land taxes of
the property and that they had built a house in the subject property. For their part, the respondents
presented evidence of their ownership which consist of tax declaration and testimony of the owner of the
adjacent land. The trial court ruled in favor of respondents holding that there was abundant proof of private
respondents' ownership of the lot in question and even if the latter had built a house thereon, such action was
only tolerated by private respondents. On appeal, the CA upheld the ruling of the RTC in toto.

Issue:

Whether or not the respondent is the owner of the subject property.

Ruling:

YES. For a period of more than 60 years, private respondents have been able to establish that they
are the owners of the lot; and that for said period, they have been in open, continuous and uninterrupted
possession of the same. The occupation of the property by petitioners is not in the concept of owners, because
their stay is merely tolerated. An owner's act of allowing another to occupy his house, rent-free, does not
create a permanent and indefeasible right of possession in the latter's favor. Lastly, the claim of petitioners
that private respondents are not in actual possession of the land is unsubstantiated. Besides, it is not
necessary that the latter actually stay on the property in order to prove ownership of the same. As found by
both the trial and the appellate courts, since the acquisition of the subject property by private respondents,
they had religiously paid the taxes due thereon. Further, one of the co-owners executed a lease contract over
it in favor of a tenant. These acts are clearly consistent with ownership.

FERNANDA MENDOZA CEQUENA AND RUPERTA MENDOZA LIRIO v. HONORATA MENDOZA BOLANTE

G.R. No. 137944, April 06, 2000, Panganiban, J.

Tax receipts and declarations are prima facie proofs of ownership or possession of the property for
which such taxes have been paid. Coupled with proof of actual possession of the property, they may become the
basis of a claim for ownership. By acquisitive prescription, possession in the concept of owner -- public, adverse,
peaceful and uninterrupted -- may be converted to ownership. On the other hand, mere possession and
occupation of land cannot ripen into ownership.

Facts:

The land subject of the present controversy was originally declared for taxation purposes in the
name of Sinforoso Mendoza (Sinforoso) father of respondent Honorata Mendoza (Honorata). When Sinforoso
died in 1930, Margarito Medoza (Margarito), brother of Sinforoso, and father of herein petitioners, took

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possession of the land and cultivated it with his son Miguel. Despite this, Honorata and her mother continued
residing on the lot. When Honorata came of age in 1948, she paid realty taxes for the years 1932-1948. In
1953, however, Margarito declared the lot for taxation in his name. When Margarito died, Miguel continued to
cultivate the disputed land until he was physically ousted by Honorata in 1985.

Issue:

Whether or not petitioners are the real owners of the disputed land being the heirs of their father
Margarito in whose name the disputed land is declared for taxation purposes.

Ruling:

NO. Ownership of immovable property is acquired by ordinary prescription through possession for
ten years. Being the sole heir of her father, respondent showed through his tax receipt that she had been in
possession of the land for more than ten years since 1932. When her father died in 1930, she continued to
reside there with her mother. When she got married, she and her husband engaged in kaingin inside the
disputed lot for their livelihood.

Respondent's possession was not disturbed until 1953 when the petitioners' father claimed the land.
But by then, her possession, which was in the concept of owner -- public, peaceful, and uninterrupted -- had
already ripened into ownership. Furthermore she herself, after her father's demise, declared and paid realty
taxes for the disputed land. Tax receipts and declarations of ownership for taxation, when coupled with
proof of actual possession of the property, can be the basis of a claim for ownership through
prescription.

In contrast, the petitioners, despite thirty-two years of farming the subject land, did not acquire
ownership. It is settled that ownership cannot be acquired by mere occupation. Unless coupled with the
element of hostility toward the true owner, occupation and use, however long, will not confer title by
prescription or adverse possession. Moreover, the petitioners cannot claim that their possession was public,
peaceful and uninterrupted. Although their father and brother arguably acquired ownership through
extraordinary prescription because of their adverse possession for thirty-two years (1953-1985), this
supposed ownership cannot extend to the entire disputed lot, but must be limited to the portion that they
actually farmed. Tax declarations and receipts are not conclusive evidence of ownership. At most, they
constitute mere prima facie proof of ownership or possession of the property for which taxes have been paid.
In the absence of actual public and adverse possession, the declaration of the land for tax purposes does not
prove ownership. In sum, the petitioners' claim of ownership of the whole parcel has no legal basis.

EASEMENTS

SPS. MANUEL AND VICTORIA SALIMBANGON v. SPS. SANTOS AND ERLINDA TAN
G.R. No. 185240, January 20, 2010, Abad, J.

The existence of a dominant estate and a servient estate is incompatible with the idea that both estates
belong to the same person.

Facts:

Guillermo Ceniza (Ceniza) died intestate leaving a parcel of land to his children Benedicta, Guillermo,
Jr., Victoria, Eduardo, and Carlos. Subsequently thereafter, Cenizas children adjudicated and divided among

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themselves the parcel of land left by Ceniza. The heirs of Ceniza agreed that Lot A will be given to petitioner
Victoria and Lots B, C, D and E to Eduardo, Carlos, Guillermo and Benedicta respectively. The heirs likewise
agreed that Lot B would be subjected to a perpetual and gratuitous road right of way of 1.50 m. wide along its
SW boundary in favor of Lots A, D & E of the subdivision. Subsequently, however, respondent
spouses Santos and Erlinda Tan (the Tans) bought Lots B, C, D, and E from all their owners. The Tans built
improvements on Lot B that spilled into the easement area. Unable to use the old right of way, petitioners
Spouses Manuel and Victoria Salimbangon (the Salimbangons) lodged a complaint with the City Engineer of
Mandaue against the Tans. For their part, the Tans filed an action with the RTC against the Salimbangons for
the extinguishment of the easement on Lot B.

Issue:

Whether or not the easement of right of way on Lot B has been extinguished when the Tans bought
Lots B, C, D and E.

Ruling:

YES. As Eduardo Ceniza testified, the true agreement of the heirs was for the establishment of an
easement of right of way for the benefit solely of the lots that did not have direct access to the street, namely
Lots D and E. As originally constituted in that agreement, each of Lots A and B was to contribute a strip of 1.5
meters between them that when combined formed a 3-meter wide alley leading from Lots D and E to the
street. To the extent that Lots A and B retained the right to use the 1.5-meter portion that they contributed to
the establishment of the easement, the agreement gave their owners the right to use the common alley as
well. As Eduardo testified, however, the true intent of the heirs was to give Lots D and E access to the
street. Lots A and B did not need this alley since they were facing the street. Consequently, when the owner of
Lots D and E also became the owner of Lot B, the easement of right of way on Lot B became extinct by
operation of law. The existence of a dominant estate and a servient estate is incompatible with the idea that
both estates belong to the same person.

ANASTACIA QUIMEN v. COURT OF APPEALS and YOLANDA Q. OLIVEROS

G.R. No. 112331, May 29, 1996, BELLOSILLO,J.

In easement of right of way that easement where the way is shortest and will cause least prejudice shall
be chosen. However, if the two circumstances do not concur in a single tenement, the way where damage will be
least shall be used even if not the shortest route.

Facts:

A piece of property was inherited by petitioner Anastacia, her brothers Sotero, Sulpicio, Antonio and
sister Rufina. The siblings agreed to subdivide the property equally among themselves, as they did, with the
shares of Anastacia, Sotero, Sulpicio and Rufina abutting the municipal road. The share of Anastacia, was
designated as Lot No. 1448-B- 1. It is bounded on the right by the property of Sotero designated as Lot. No.
1448-B-2. Located directly behind the lots of Anastacia and Sotero is the share of their brother Antonio
designated as Lot No. 1448-B-C which the latter divided into two equal parts, now Lots Nos. 1448-B-6-A and
1448-B-6-B. Lot No. 1448-B-6-A is located behind Anastacias Lot, while Lot No. 1448-B-6-B is behind the
property of Sotero, father of respondent Yolanda. In 1982 Yolanda purchased Lot No. 1448-B-6-A from her
uncle Antonio through her aunt Anastacia. According to Yolanda, when petitioner offered her the property for
sale she was hesitant to buy it as it had no access to a public road. But Anastacia assured her that she would
give her a right of way on her adjoining property. Thereafter, Yolanda constructed a house on the lot she
bought using as her passageway to the public highway a portion of Anastacias property. But when Yolanda

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finally offered to pay for the use of the pathway Anastacia refused to accept the payment. In fact she was
thereafter barred by Anastacia from passing through her property.

Issue:

Whether or not a right of way should be granted in favor of Yolanda over the property of petitioner
Anastacia.

Ruling:

YES. In applying Art. 650 of the New Civil Code, respondent Court of Appeals declared that the
proposed right of way of Yolanda, which is one (1) meter wide and five (5) meters long at the extreme right of
petitioners property, will cause the least prejudice and/or damage as compared to the suggested passage
through the property of Yolandas father which would mean destroying the sari-sari store made of strong
materials. Absent any showing that these findings and conclusion are devoid of factual support in the records,
or are so glaringly erroneous, this Court accepts and adopts them. As between a right of way that would
demolish a store of strong materials to provide egress to a public highway, and another right of way which
although longer will only require an avocado tree to be cut down, the second alternative should be
preferred. After all, it is not the main function of this Court to analyze or weigh the evidence presented all
over again where the petition would necessarily invite calibration of the whole evidence considering
primarily the credibility of witnesses, existence and relevancy of specific surrounding circumstances, their
relation to each other, and the probabilities of the situation. In sum, the Court found that the decision of
respondent appellate court is thoroughly backed up by law and the evidence.

SPOUSES CESAR and RAQUEL STA. MARIA and FLORCERFIDA STA. MARIA v. COURT OF APPEALS, and
SPOUSES ARSENIO and ROSLYNN FAJARDO

Where there are several tenements surrounding the dominant estate, and the easement may be
established on any of them, the one where the way is shortest and will cause the least damage should be
chosen. But if these two circumstances do not concur in a single tenement, the way which will cause the least
damage should be used, even if it will not be the shortest. And if the conditions of the various tenements are the
same, all the adjoining owners should be cited and experts utilized to determine where the easement shall be
established

Facts:

Private respondents Arsenio and Roslynn Fajardo (Spouses Fajardo) are the registered owners of a
piece of land denominated as Lot No. 124. Spouses Fajardos Lot 124 is surrounded by several immovables,
some of which are Lot 6-A and a portion of Lot 6-B owned respectively by petitioners Cesar and Raquel Sta.
Maria and Florcerfida Sta. Maria (Sta. Marias). Alleging that their lot, Lot 124, is surrounded by properties
belonging to other persons, including those of Sta. Marias and that Spouses Fajardo have no adequate outlet
to the provincial road, an easement of a right of way passing through either of the properties owned by Sta.
Marias which are directly abutting the provincial road would be private respondents only convenient, direct
and shortest access to and from the provincial road. Thus, private respondents filed an action praying that an
easement of right of way on the lots of petitioners be established in their favor.

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Issue:

Whether or not a compulsory right of way can be granted to private respondents over the properties
of petitioners.

Ruling:

YES. All told, the findings of fact of both courts satisfied the following requirements for an estate to
be entitled to a compulsory servitude of right of way under the Civil Code, to wit: (1) the dominant estate is
surrounded by other immovables and has no adequate outlet to a public highway (Art. 649, par. 1); (2) there
is payment of proper indemnity (Art. 649, par. 1); (3) the isolation is not due to the acts of the proprietor of
the dominant estate (Art. 649, last par.); and (4) the right of way claimed is at the point least prejudicial to the
servient estate; and insofar as consistent with this rule, where the distance from the dominant estate to a
public highway may be the shortest (Art. 650).

As to such requisites, the Court of Appeals made the following disquisitions: Anent the first requisite,
there is no dispute that the plaintiffs-appellees property is surrounded by other immovables owned by
different individuals. The second requisite for the establishment of an easement of right way, i.e., payment of
indemnity, is likewise present in this case. Plaintiff-appellee spouse Roslynn Fajardo testified on direct
examination that they are willing to pay the corresponding damages provided for by law if granted the right
of way (TSN, November 5, 1992, p. 11). The third requisite is that the isolation of plaintiffs-appellees property
should not have been due to their own acts. In the case under consideration, the isolation of their lot is not
due to plaintiffs acts. The property they purchased was already surrounded by other immovables leaving
them no adequate ingress or egress to a public highway. Going now to the fourth requisite of least prejudice
and shortest distance, the Court agrees with the lower court that this twin elements have been complied with
in establishing the easement of right of way on defendants-appellants properties.

In the case at bar, the ocular inspection disclosed that there are three options open to the plaintiffs-
appellees as a route to reach the national road. Among the three (3) possible servient estates, it is clear that
defendants-appellants property would afford the shortest distance from plaintiffs-appellees property to the
provincial road. Moreover, it is the least prejudicial since as found by the lower court, it appears that there
would be no significant structures to be injured in the defendants property and the right-of-way to be
constructed thereon would be the shortest of all the alternative routes pointed to by the defendants.

CRESENCIA CRISTOBAL, ROBERTO MAKIMKIM, DAMASO MAKIMKIM, SPOUSES SALVADOR

HERMALINO and PONCIANA MAKIMKIM, MILAGROS MAKIMKIM, REMEDIOS MAKIMKIM, SPOUSES
FRANCISCO ESTANISLAO and FLORDELIZA MAKIMKIM, ERLINDA MAKIMKIM, JOSE
MAKIMKIMand GINA MAKIMKIM v. COURT OF APPEALS, CESAR LEDESMA, INC., SPOUSES JESUS C.
PACIONE and LERMA B. PACIONE
G.R. No. 125339, June 22, 1998, BELLOSILLO, J.

It is not enough that the easement be where the way is shortest. It is more important that it be where it
will cause the least prejudice to the servient estate.

Facts:

Petitioners own a house and lot situated at No. 10 Visayas Avenue Extension, Quezon City. In going to
and from the nearest public road, petitioners used Road Lot 2 which road was exclusively owned by
respondent Cesar Ledesma, Inc. When Visayas Avenue became operational as a national road, Cesar Ledesma,

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Inc., filed a petition before the RTC praying that he be allowed to convert Road Lot 2 into residential lots. The
petition was granted, hence, Road Lot 2 was converted into residential lots designated as Lot 1 and Lot
2. Subsequently, Cesar Ledesma, Inc., sold both lots to respondent Spouses Pacione. When the Pacione
spouses, who intended to build a house on Lot 1, visited the property, they found out that a portion of the lot
was was being used as a passageway by petitioners to and from Visayas Avenue. Accordingly, the spouses
complained about the intrusion into their property to the Barangay Office. At the barangay conciliation
proceeding, petitioners offered to pay for the use of a portion of Lot 1 as passageway but the Pacione spouses
rejected the offer. Alleging that their property was bounded on all sides by residential houses belonging to
different owners and had no adequate outlet and inlet to Visayas Avenue except through the property of the
Spouses Paciones, petitioners instituted an action for easement of right of way with the RTC.

Issue:

Whether or not an easement of right of way should be granted in favor of petitioners over the
property of the Paciones spouses.

Ruling:

NO. To be entitled to a compulsory easement of right of way, the preconditions provided under Arts.
649 and 650 of the Civil Code must be established. These are: (1) that the dominant estate is surrounded by
other immovables and has no adequate outlet to a public highway; (2) that proper indemnity has been paid;
(3) that the isolation was not due to acts of the proprietor of the dominant estate; (4) that the right of way
claimed is at a point least prejudicial to the servient estate and, in so far as consistent with this rule, where
the distance from the dominant estate to a public highway may be the shortest.

In the present case, the first element is clearly absent. As found by the trial court and the Court of
Appeals, an outlet already exists, which is a path walk located at the left side of petitioners property and
which is connected to a private road about five hundred (500) meters long. The private road, in turn, leads to
Ma. Elena Street which is about 2.5 meters wide and, finally, to Visayas Avenue. This outlet was determined
by the court a quo to be sufficient for the needs of the dominant estate, hence petitioners have no cause to
complain that they have no adequate outlet to Visayas Avenue. Further, no evidence was adduced by
petitioners to prove that the easement they seek to impose on private respondents property is to be
established at a point least prejudicial to the servient estate.

Admittedly, the proposed right of way over private respondents property is the most convenient,
being the shorter and the more direct route to Visayas Avenue. However, it is not enough that the easement
be where the way is shortest. It is more important that it be where it will cause the least prejudice to the
servient estate. As discussed elsewhere, petitioners failed to sufficiently demonstrate that the proposed right
of way shall be at a point least prejudicial to the servient estate.

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CAMARINES NORTE ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC. (CANORECO) vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. LUIS L.
DICTADO, Presiding Judge, RTC, Branch 39, Daet, Camarines Norte, EDUARDO R. MORENO, LT. COL.
RUFINO CHAVEZ, CAPT. ALFREDO BORJA, CONRAD C. LEVISTE and VINES REALTY CORPORATION
G.R. No. 109338, November 20, 2000, Pardo, J.

The power of eminent domain may be used to subject a real property to an easement of right of way.

Facts:

Respondent Vines Realty is the owner of the two parcels of land wherein the power lines and electric
posts of petitioner CANORECO are standing. Wanting to use its property, Vines Realty filed a motion for an
order of demolition and removal of improvements on the subject land, which improvements included the
power lines and electric posts of CANORECO. Contending that it had subsisting right-of-way agreements over
said properties, CANORECO opposed the motion of Vines Realty. The trial court ruled in favor of Vines Realty
and a Writ of Demolition was issued in its favor. The court of appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court,
hence, this petition.

Issue:

Whether or not CANORECO is entitled to an easement of right of way over the lands of Vines Realty.

Ruling:

YES. Electric cooperatives, like CANORECO, are vested with the power of eminent domain. The
acquisition of an easement of a right-of-way falls within the purview of the power of eminent domain.
However, a simple right-of-way easement transmits no rights, except the easement. Vines Realty retains full
ownership and it is not totally deprived of the use of the land. It can continue doing what it wants to do with
the land, except those that would result in contact with the wires. The acquisition of this easement,
nevertheless, is not gratis. Considering the nature and effect of the installation power lines, the limitations on
the use of the land for an indefinite period deprives private respondents of its ordinary use. For these
reasons, Vines Realty is entitled to payment of just compensation, which must be neither more nor less than
the money equivalent of the property.

BRYAN U. VILLANUEVA v. HON. TIRSO D.C. VELASCO in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 88, JULIO N. SEBASTIAN and SHIRLEY LORILLA
G.R. NO. 130845, November 27, 2000, QUISUMBING, J.

A legal easement is one mandated by law, constituted for public use or for private interest, and becomes
a continuing property right. As a compulsory easement, it is inseparable from the estate to which it belongs.

Facts:

Petitioner Bryan Villanueva is the registered owner of the parcel of land subject of the present
controversy. He bought it from Pacific Banking Corporation. The bank had acquired it from the spouses
Maximo and Justina Gabriel (the Gabriels) at a public auction. When petitioner bought the parcel of land there
was a small house on its southeastern portion. It occupied one meter of the two-meter wide easement of right
of way the Gabriels granted to the Espinolas, predecessors-in-interest of private respondents, in a Contract of
Easement of Right of Way. Wanting to enforce the contract of easement, private respondents Sebastian and
Lorilla, as successors-in-interest of the Espinolas, filed a complaint against the Gabriels praying that they

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recognize the easement of right of way granted by them to the Espinolas. The case was decided in favor of
private respondents and a right of way was granted to them. Consequently, a Writ of Demolition was issued in
favor of private respondent and the spouses Gabriels were ordered to demolish the small house encroaching
on the easement. Arguing that he is not bound by the decision in the case between the Gabriels and private
respondents, petitioner filed a third party claim praying that the Writ of Demolition be quashed.

Issue:

Whether or not the easement on the subject property binds petitioner.

Ruling:

YES. At the outset, the subject easement (right of way) originally was voluntarily constituted by
agreement between the Gabriels and the Espinolas. But as correctly observed by the Court of Appeals, the
easement in the instant petition is both (1) an easement by grant or a voluntary easement, and (2) an
easement by necessity or a legal easement. A legal easement is one mandated by law, constituted for public
use or for private interest, and becomes a continuing property right. As a compulsory easement, it is
inseparable from the estate to which it belongs, as provided for in said Article 617 of the Civil Code. The
essential requisites for an easement to be compulsory are: (1) the dominant estate is surrounded by other
immovables and has no adequate outlet to a public highway; (2) proper indemnity has been paid; (3) the
isolation was not due to acts of the proprietor of the dominant estate; (4) the right of way claimed is at a point
least prejudicial to the servient estate; and (5) to the extent consistent with the foregoing rule, where the
distance from the dominant estate to a public highway may be the shortest. The trial court and the Court of
Appeals have declared the existence of said easement (right of way). This finding of fact of both courts below
is conclusive on the Court, hence there is no need to further review, but only to re-affirm, this finding. The
small house occupying one meter of the two-meter wide easement obstructs the entry of private respondents
cement mixer and motor vehicle. One meter is insufficient for the needs of private respondents. It is well-
settled that the needs of the dominant estate determine the width of the easement. Conformably then,
petitioner ought to demolish whatever edifice obstructs the easement in view of the needs of private
respondents estate.

COSTABELLA CORPORATION v. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 80511, January 25, 1991, Sarmiento, J.

The owner of the dominant estate may validly claim a compulsory right of way only after he has
established the existence of four requisites, to wit: (1) the (dominant) estate is surrounded by other immovables
and is without adequate outlet to a public highway; (2) after payment of the proper indemnity; (3) the isolation
was not due to the proprietor's own acts; and (4) the right of way claimed is at a point least prejudicial to the
servient estate. Additionally, the burden of proving the existence of the foregoing pre-requisites lies on the owner
of the dominant estate.

Facts:

Petitioner owns real property where its beach hotel is located. Adjacent to the said property are the
properties of private respondents. Private Respondents alleged that there was a right of way provided when
the construction of the beach hotel began but it was subsequently closed by the petitioner, thus, preventing
them from traversing any part of it. As a direct consequence of these closures, an action for injunction with
damages was filed against the petitioner by the private respondents. The RTC ruled in favor of private
respondents. On appeal, the CA held as without basis the RTC finding that the private respondents had

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acquired a vested right over the passageway in question by virtue of prescription but nevertheless, in the
interest of justice, grant the right of way. Hence, the case.

Issue:

Whether or not the private respondents had acquired an easement of right of way, in the form of a
passageway, on the petitioner's property.

Ruling:

NO. There is absent any showing that the private respondents had established the existence of the
four requisites mandated by law. For one, they failed to prove that there is no adequate outlet from their
respective properties to a public highway. On the contrary, as alleged by the petitioner in its answer to the
complaint, and confirmed by the appellate court, "there is another outlet for the plaintiffs to the main road."
Thus, the respondent Court of Appeals likewise admitted that "legally the old road could be closed." Yet, it
ordered the re- opening of the old passageway on the ground that "the existing outlet is inconvenient to the
plaintiff." To be sure, the true standard for the grant of the legal right is "adequacy." Hence, when there is
already an existing adequate outlet from the dominant estate to a public highway, the need to open up
another servitude is entirely unjustified. Further, the private respondents failed to indicate in their complaint
or even to manifest during the trial of the case that they were willing to indemnify fully the petitioner for the
right of way to be established over its property. Neither have the private respondents been able to show that
the isolation of their property was not due to their personal or their predecessors-in-interest's own acts.
Finally, the private respondents failed to allege, much more introduce any evidence, that the passageway they
seek to be re-opened is at a point least prejudicial to the petitioner. Considering that the petitioner operates a
hotel and beach resort in its property, it must undeniably maintain a strict standard of security within its
premises. Otherwise, the convenience, privacy, and safety of its clients and patrons would be compromised.
That indubitably will doom the petitioner's business. It is therefore of great importance that the claimed right
of way over the petitioner's property be located at a point least prejudicial to its business.

TOMAS ENCARNACION v. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 77628, March 11, 1991, Fernan, C.J.

Generally, the right of way may be demanded: (1) when there is absolutely no access to a public
highway, and (2) when, even if there is one, it is difficult or dangerous to use or is grossly insufficient.

Facts:

Petitioner Encarnacion and private respondent Heirs of the late Aniceta Magsino Viuda de Sagun are
the owners of two adjacent estates in Batangas. Petitioner owns the dominant estate while Private
Respondents owned the servient estate. The private respondents, without any compensation, provided a road
path to provide access to the highway. However, petitioners plant nursery business, where he uses the
pathway as passage to the highway for his family and for his customers, flourished. He then bought a jeep for
transporting his plants but that jeep could not pass through the roadpath. He approached the servient estate
owners and requested that they sell to him one and one-half meters of their property to be added to the
existing pathway so as to allow passage for his jeepney but his request was denied. Petitioner then instituted
a case to seek the issuance of a writ of easement of a right of way over an additional width of at least two (2)
meters over the De Saguns' land but the RTC and the CA rendered judgment dismissing petitioner's complaint.
Hence, the case.

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Issue:

Whether or not petitioner is entitled to the easement.

Ruling:

YES. While there is a dried river bed less than 100 meters from the dominant tenement, that access is
grossly inadequate. In the present case, the river bed route is traversed by a semi-concrete bridge and there
is no ingress nor egress from the highway. For the jeep to reach the level of the highway, it must literally jump
four (4) to five (5) meters up. Moreover, during the rainy season, the river bed is impassable due to the
floods. Thus, it can only be used at certain times of the year. With the inherent disadvantages of the river bed
which make passage difficult, if not impossible, it is as if there were no outlet at all. Where a private property
has no access to a public road, it has the right of easement over adjacent servient estates as a matter of law.

TOMAS ENCARNACION v. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 77628, March 11, 1991, Fernan, C.J.

Article 651 of the Civil Code provides that "(t)he width of the easement of right of way shall be that
which is sufficient for the needs of the dominant estate, and may accordingly be changed from time to time." This
is taken to mean that under the law, it is the needs of the dominant property which ultimately determine the
width of the passage. And these needs may vary from time to time.

Facts:

Petitioner Encarnacion and private respondent Heirs of the late Aniceta Magsino Viuda de Sagun are
the owners of two adjacent estates in Batangas. Petitioner owns the dominant estate while Private
Respondents owned the servient estate. The private respondents, without any compensation, provided a
roadpath to provide access to the highway. However, petitioners plant nursery business, where he uses the
pathway as passage to the highway for his family and for his customers, flourished. He then bought a jeep for
transporting his plants but that jeep could not pass through the roadpath. He approached the servient estate
owners and requested that they sell to him one and one-half meters of their property to be added to the
existing pathway so as to allow passage for his jeepney but his request was denied. Petitioner then instituted
a case to seek the issuance of a writ of easement of a right of way over an additional width of at least two (2)
meters over the De Saguns' land but the RTC and the CA rendered judgment dismissing petitioner's complaint.
Hence, the case.

Issue:

Whether or not petitioner is entitled to the easement.

Ruling:

YES. When petitioner started out as a plant nursery operator, he and his family could easily make do
with a few pushcarts to tow the plants to the national highway. But the business grew and with it the need for
the use of modern means of conveyance or transport. Manual hauling of plants and garden soil and use of
pushcarts have become extremely cumbersome and physically taxing. To force petitioner to leave his jeepney
in the highway, exposed to the elements and to the risk of theft simply because it could not pass through the
improvised pathway, is sheer pigheadedness on the part of the servient estate and can only be counter-

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productive for all the people concerned. Petitioner should not be denied a passageway wide enough to
accommodate his jeepney since that is a reasonable and necessary aspect of the plant nursery business.

Since petitioner has expressed willingness to exchange an equivalent portion of his land to
compensate private respondents for their loss; perhaps, it would be well for respondents to take the offer of
petitioner seriously. But unless and until that option is considered, the law decrees that petitioner must
indemnify the owners of the servient estate including Mamerto Magsino from whose adjoining lot 1/2 meter
was taken to constitute the original path several years ago. Since the easement to be established in favor of
petitioner is of a continuous and permanent nature, the indemnity shall consist of the value of the land
occupied and the amount of the damage caused to the servient estate pursuant to Article 649 of the Civil
Code.

ADRIANA DIONISIO, ET AL. v. JUDGE RODOLFO ORTIZ OF THE RTC OF QUEZON CITY
G.R. No. 95738 December 10, 1991, Gutierrez, Jr., J.

This easement is not compulsory if the isolation of the immovable is due to the proprietor's own acts.

Facts:

The petitioners are co-owners of lots contiguous to each other in Quezon City while private
respondents, who are members of Quezon City Industrial Estates Association (QCIEA), are also co-owners of
lots which are adjacent to the lots owned by the petitioners. A right of way was granted over Howmart Road
which is a private road traversing the contiguous lots owned by the petitioners, among others, in favor of the
QCIEA members by virue of an agreement entered by them. Eventually, under the instructions of Maxima
Dionisio, certain persons commenced the digging of four holes in front of the newly constructed gate of
private respondents amidst the latter's protestations. The petitioners claim that they surreptitiously
constructed gate opened directly into the house of Maxima Dionisio, exposing them to air and noise pollution
arising from the respondents' delivery trucks and service vehicles. The private respondents instituted a civil
action for damages against the petitioners. The complaint sought the immediate issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction ordering the petitioner to remove the barricade erected by them in front of the iron
gate. The Respondent Judge granted the writ thus petitioners filed a petition for certiorari before the CA;
however, 15 days later, petitioners removed the barricade in front of the private respondents after they failed
to obtain a TRO. The CA dismissed the petition. Hence, the petition.

Issue:

Whether or not the private respondents have an easement of right of way over Howmart Rd.

Ruling:

NO. There is no question that a right of way was granted in favor of the private respondents over
Howmart Road but the records disclose that such right of way expired in December, 1988. The continued use
of the easement enjoyed by QCIEA including the private respondents is by the mere tolerance of the owners
pending the renegotiation of the terms and conditions of said right of way. This is precisely shown by the two
letters to the QCIEA requesting for an increase in compensation for the use of Howmart Road. Absent an
agreement of the parties as to the consideration, among others, no contract of easement of right of way has
been validly entered into by the petitioners and QCIEA. Thus, the private respondents' claim of an easement
of right of way over Howmart Road has no legal or factual basis. Not having any right, the private respondents

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are not entitled to the injunctive relief granted by the lower court. Also, the private respondents have not
shown that there is an urgent and paramount necessity for the issuance of the writ. The records show that
there are two (2) gates through which the private respondents may pass to have direct access to EDSA: (1)
the northern gate which opens directly to EDSA; and (2) the southern gate along Howmart Road. The records
also disclose that the petitioners and the other lot owners previously prohibited and prevented members of
QCIEA from opening new gates. The claim that they were forced to open a new gate by reason of the
subdivision of Lot 272 where a wall was constructed between these 2 lots is untenable. The private
respondents cannot assert a right of way when by their own or voluntary act, they themselves have caused
the isolation of their property from the access road.

DONATIONS

GONZALO VILLANUEVA, represented by his heirs v. SPOUSES BRANOCO

G.R. No. 172804, January 24, 2011, Carpio, J.

Post-mortem dispositions typically (1) Convey no title or ownership to the transferee before the death
of the transferor; or, what amounts to the same thing, that the transferor should retain the ownership (full or
naked) and control of the property while alive; (2) That before the [donors] death, the transfer should be
revocable by the transferor at will, ad nutum; but revocability may be provided for indirectly by means of a
reserved power in the donor to dispose of the properties conveyed; (3) That the transfer should be void if the
transferor should survive the transferee. [4] [T]he specification in a deed of the causes whereby the act may be
revoked by the donor indicates that the donation is inter vivos, rather than a disposition mortis causa[;][5] That
the designation of the donation as mortis causa, or a provision in the deed to the effect that the donation is "to
take effect at the death of the donor" are not controlling criteria; such statements are to be construed together
with the rest of the instrument, in order to give effect to the real intent of the transferor[;] [and](6) That in case
of doubt, the conveyance should be deemed donation inter vivos rather than mortis causa, in order to avoid
uncertainty as to the ownership of the property subject of the deed.

Facts:

Petitioner sued respondents in the RTC to recover a 3,492 square-meter parcel of land in Leyte and
collect damages. Petitioner claimed ownership over the Property through purchase from Vere, who, in turn,
bought the Property from Rodrigo. Petitioner declared the Property in his name for tax purposes soon after
acquiring it while respondents also claimed ownership over the Property through purchase from Rodriguez
to whom Rodrigo donated the Property in May 1965. The question arises as to the nature of the transfer of
the property between Rodrigo and Rodriguez. If it is a donation, respondents hold superior title, having
bought the Property from Rodriguez. If it is a devise, petitioner prevails, having obtained title from Rodrigo
under a deed of sale the execution of which impliedly revoked the earlier devise to Rodriguez. The RTC ruled
for petitioner while the CA set aside the said decision. Hence, the case.

Issue:

Whether the contract between the parties predecessors-in-interest, Rodrigo and Rodriguez, was a
donation or a devise.

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Ruling:

It is immediately apparent that Rodrigo passed naked title to Rodriguez under a perfected
donation inter vivos. First. Rodrigo stipulated that "if the herein Donee predeceases me, the [Property] will
not be reverted to the Donor, but will be inherited by the heirs of x x x Rodriguez," signaling the irrevocability
of the passage of title to Rodriguezs estate, waiving Rodrigos right to reclaim title. This transfer of title was
perfected the moment Rodrigo learned of Rodriguezs acceptance of the disposition which, being reflected in
the Deed, took place on the day of its execution on 3 May 1965. Rodrigos acceptance of the transfer
underscores its essence as a gift in presenti, not in futuro, as only donations inter vivos need acceptance by
the recipient. Indeed, had Rodrigo wished to retain full title over the Property, she could have easily
stipulated, as the testator did in another case, that "the donor, may transfer, sell, or encumber to any person
or entity the properties here donated x x x" or used words to that effect. Instead, Rodrigo expressly waived
title over the Property in case Rodriguez predeceases her.

MA. ESTELA MAGLASANG v. THE HEIRS OF CORAZON CABATINGAN

G.R. No. 131953, June 5, 2002, Austria-Martinez, J.
In a donation mortis causa, the right of disposition is not transferred to the donee while the donor is still
alive. In determining whether a donation is one of mortis causa, the following characteristics must be taken into
account: (1) It conveys no title or ownership to the transferee before the death of the transferor; or what
amounts to the same thing, that the transferor should retain the ownership (full or naked) and control of the
property while alive; (2) That before his death, the transfer should be revocable by the transferor at will, ad
nutum; but revocability may be provided for indirectly by means of a reserved power in the donor to dispose of
the properties conveyed; and (3) That the transfer should be void if the transferor should survive the transferee.
Facts:
Conchita Cabatingan executed in favor of her brother, petitioner Nicolas Cabatingan, a Deed of
Conditional Donation Inter Vivos for House and Lot covering one-half portion of the formers house and
lot. Four other deeds of donation were subsequently executed by Conchita Cabatingan. The deeds of donation
contain similar provisions that it will be become effective upon the death of the donor provided that in the
event that the done should die before the donor, the present donation shall be deemed automatically
rescinded. When Conchita died, respondents filed with the RTC an action for Annulment of said four (4) deeds
of donation alleging that the documents are void for failing to comply with the provisions of the Civil Code
regarding formalities of wills and testaments, considering that these are donations mortis causa. The
RTC ruled that the donations are donations are mortis causa. Hence, the case.
Issue:
Whether the donations made by the late Conchita Cabatingan are donations inter vivos.
Ruling:
NO. The nature of the donations as mortis causa is confirmed by the fact that the donations do not
contain any clear provision that intends to pass proprietary rights to petitioners prior to Cabatingans death.
The phrase to become effective upon the death of the DONOR admits of no other interpretation but that
Cabatingan did not intend to transfer the ownership of the properties to petitioners during her lifetime. As
the donation is in the nature of a mortis causa disposition, the formalities of a will should have been complied
with under Article 728 of the Civil Code, otherwise, the donation is void and would produce no effect. The
deeds in question although acknowledged before a notary public of the donor and the donee, the documents
were not executed in the manner provided for under Article 805 and 806 of the Civil Code, thus it is void.

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IGNACIO GONZALES v. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 110335, June 18, 2001, Melo, J.

Article 749 of the Civil Code provides inter alia that "in order that the donation of an immovable may be
valid, it must be made in a public document, specifying therein the property donated and the value of the charges
which the donee must satisfy." Corollarily, Article 709 of the same Code explicitly states that "the titles of
ownership, or other rights over immovable property, which are not duly inscribed or annotated in the Registry of
property shall not prejudice third persons."

Facts:

Spouses Ignacio Gonzales and Marina Gonzales were the registered owners of the subject agricultural
land. They donated the said land to herein petitioners who are the children and grandchildren of said
Gonzales spouses. However, the donation was not registered. Thus, when P.D. No. 27 took effect, the
landholdings of the spouses Gonzales were placed under Operation Land Transfer by virtue of said decree,
and private respondents, who are farmers and tenants of said spouses, were accordingly issued the
corresponding Certificates of Land Transfer and Emancipation Patents. Later on, the administratrix Lilia
Gonzales filed an application for retention requesting that their property be excluded from the coverage of
Operation Land Transfer but it was denied and later affirmed by Assistant Secretary of Agrarian Reform
Labayen. Apparently, however, a reinvestigation was conducted and the DAR Secretary Leong issued an order
exempting the land from Operation Land Transfer, and cancelling the Certificates of Land Transfer issued in
favor of private respondents. The CA, on appeal by private respondents, reversed the action of the DAR.
Hence, the case.

Issue:

Whether the property subject of the deed of donation which was not registered when P.D. No. 27
took effect, should be excluded from the Operation Land Transfer.

Ruling:

NO. From the foregoing provisions, it may be inferred that as between the parties to a donation of an
immovable property, all that is required is for said donation to be contained in a public document.
Registration is not necessary for it to be considered valid and effective. However, in order to bind third
persons, the donation must be registered in the Registry of Property (now Registry of Land Titles and Deeds).
Although the non-registration of a deed of donation shall not affect its validity, the necessity of registration
comes into play when the rights of third persons are affected, as in the case at bar. It is undisputed in this case
that the donation executed by Ignacio Gonzales in favor of his grandchildren, although in writing and duly
notarized, has not been registered in accordance with law. For this reason, it shall not be binding upon
private respondents who did not participate in said deed or had no actual knowledge thereof. Hence, while
the deed of donation is valid between the donor and the donees, such deed, however, did not bind the
tenants-farmers who were not parties to the donation. So it is of no moment that the right of the tenants-
farmers in this case was created by virtue of a decree or law. They are still considered "third persons"
contemplated in our laws on registration, for the fact remains that these tenants-farmers had no actual
knowledge of the deed of donation. From the foregoing, the ineluctable conclusion drawn is that the
unregistered deed of donation cannot operate to exclude the subject land from the coverage of the Operation
Land Transfer of P.D. No. 27.

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REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. LEON SILIM and ILDEFONSA MANGUBAT

G.R. No. 140487, April 2, 2001, Kapunan, J.

Of all the foregoing classifications, donations of the onerous type are the most distinct. This is because,
unlike the other forms of donation, the validity of and the rights and obligations of the parties involved in an
onerous donation is completely governed not by the law on donations but by the law on contracts.

Facts:

Respondents donated a 5,600 square meter parcel of land in favor of the Bureau of Public Schools
with a condition that the said property should "be used exclusively and forever for school purposes only."
However, the Bagong Lipunan school building that was supposed to be allocated for the donated parcel of
land in Barangay Kauswagan could not be released since the government required that it be built upon a one
(1) hectare parcel of land. To remedy this predicament, Assistant School Division Superintendent of the
Province of Zamboanga del Sur entered into a transaction for the exchange of the one-half (1/2) hectare old
school site of Kauswagan Elementary School to a new and suitable location which would fit the specifications
of the government. Pursuant to this, District Supervisor Buendia and Teresita Palma entered into a Deed of
Exchange whereby the donated lot was exchanged with the bigger lot owned by the latter. Upon knowledge of
Respondent that the Vice Mayor Palma was constructing a house on the property he donated to BPS, the
former filed a Complaint for Revocation and Cancellation of Conditional Donation, Annulment of Deed of
Exchange and Recovery of Possession and Ownership of Real Property with damages. The RTC dismissed the
case for lack of merit which was overturned by the CA; hence, the case.

Issue:

Whether or not the donation was valid in view of the fact that the school, which it was conditioned
on, was never built thereon.

Ruling:

YES. What does the phrase "exclusively used for school purposes" convey? "School" is simply an
institution or place of education. "Purpose" is defined as "that which one sets before him to accomplish or
attain; an end, intention, or aim, object, plan, project. Term is synonymous with the ends sought, an object to
be attained, an intention, etc." "Exclusive" means "excluding or having power to exclude (as by preventing
entrance or debarring from possession, participation, or use); limiting or limited to possession, control or use.
Without the slightest doubt, the condition for the donation was not in any way violated when the lot donated
was exchanged with another one. The purpose for the donation remains the same, which is for the
establishment of a school. The exclusivity of the purpose was not altered or affected. In fact, the exchange of
the lot for a much bigger one was in furtherance and enhancement of the purpose of the donation. The
acquisition of the bigger lot paved the way for the release of funds for the construction of Bagong Lipunan
school building which could not be accommodated by the limited area of the donated lot.

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RICKY Q. QUILALA v. GLICERIA ALCANTARA

G.R. No. 132681, December 3, 2001, Ynares-Santiago, J.

Under Article 749 of the Civil Code, the donation of an immovable must be made in a public instrument
in order to be valid, specifying therein the property donated and the value of the charges which the donee must
satisfy. As a mode of acquiring ownership, donation results in an effective transfer of title over the property from
the donor to the donee, and is perfected from the moment the donor knows of the acceptance by the donee,
provided the donee is not disqualified or prohibited by law from accepting the donation. Once the donation is
accepted, it is generally considered irrevocable, and the donee becomes the absolute owner of the property. The
acceptance, to be valid, must be made during the lifetime of both the donor and the donee. It may be made in the
same deed or in a separate public document, and the donor must know the acceptance by the donee.

Facts:

Catalina Quilala executed a Donation of Real Property Inter Vivos" in favor of Violeta Quilala over a
parcel of land located in Sta. Cruz, Manila. The said deed of donation was registered with the Register of
Deeds. Subsequently, Catalina Quilala died. Violeta Quilala likewise died. Petitioner Ricky Quilala alleges that
he is the surviving son of Violeta Quilala. Meanwhile, Respondents, claiming to be Catalina's only surviving
relatives within the fourth civil degree of consanguinity, executed a deed of extrajudicial settlement of estate,
dividing and adjudicating unto themselves the above-described property. They instituted an action for the
declaration of nullity of the donation inter vivos, and for the cancellation of TCT No. 143015 in the name of
Violeta Quilala. The RTC found that the deed of donation, although signed by both Catalina and Violeta, was
acknowledged before a notary public only by the donor, Catalina. Consequently, there was no acceptance by
Violeta of the donation in a public instrument, thus rendering the donation null and void. Said decision was
affirmed by the CA. Hence, the case.

Issue:

Whether or not the donation made by Catalina to Violeta valid?

Ruling:

YES. In the case at bar, the deed of donation contained the number of the certificate of title as well as
the technical description of the real property donated. It stipulated that the donation was made for and in
consideration of the "love and affection which the DONEE inspires in the DONOR, and as an act of liberality
and generosity." This was sufficient cause for a donation. Indeed, donation is legally defined as "an act of
liberality whereby a person disposes gratuitously of a thing or right in favor of another, who accepts it."
Simply put, the specification of the location of the signature is merely directory. The fact that one of the
parties signs on the wrong side of the page, does not invalidate the document. The purpose of authenticating
the page is served, and the requirement in the above-quoted provision is deemed substantially complied with.
In the same vein, the lack of an acknowledgment by the donee before the notary public does not also render
the donation null and void. The instrument should be treated in its entirety. It cannot be considered a private
document in part and a public document in another part. The fact that it was acknowledged before a notary
public converts the deed of donation in its entirety a public instrument.

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THE ROMAN CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP OF MANILA v. HON. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 77425, June 19, 1991, Regalado, J.

When a deed of donation expressly provides for automatic revocation and reversion of the property
donated, the rules on contract and the general rules on prescription should apply, and not Article 764 of the Civil
Code. Since Article 1306 of said Code authorizes the parties to a contract to establish such stipulations, clauses,
terms and conditions not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy, we are of the
opinion that, at the very least, that stipulation of the parties providing for automatic revocation of the deed of
donation, without prior judicial action for that purpose, is valid subject to the determination of the propriety of
the rescission sought.

Facts:

Private respondents alleged that the spouses Eusebio de Castro and Martina Rieta, executed a deed of
donation in favor of therein defendant Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila covering a parcel of land with a
condition that the done shall not dispose the property within a period of one hundred years from execution of
the deed otherwise it would render ipso facto null and void the deed of donation. However, while still within
the prohibitive period, petitioner Roman Catholic Bishop of Imus, in whose administration of the properties
in Cavite was transferred, executed a deed of absolute sale in favor of Petitioner Ignao. The RTC ruled that the
action had already prescribed and dismissed the complaint but was reversed by the CA; hence, the case.

Issue:

Whether or not the action has prescribed.

Ruling:

NO. Although it is true that under Article 764 of the Civil Code an action for the revocation of a
donation must be brought within four (4) years from the non-compliance of the conditions of the donation,
the same is not applicable in the case at bar. The deed of donation involved herein expressly provides for
automatic reversion of the property donated in case of violation of the condition therein, hence a judicial
declaration revoking the same is not necessary. Article 732 of the Civil Code provides that donations inter
vivos shall be governed by the general provisions on contracts and obligations in all that is not determined in
Title III, Book III on donations. The rationale for the foregoing is that in contracts providing for automatic
revocation, judicial intervention is necessary not for purposes of obtaining a judicial declaration rescinding a
contract already deemed rescinded by virtue of an agreement providing for rescission even without judicial
intervention, but in order to determine whether or not the rescission was proper. On the foregoing
ratiocinations, the Court of Appeals committed no error in holding that the cause of action of herein private
respondents has not yet prescribed since an action to enforce a written contract prescribes in ten (10) years.
Article 764 was intended to provide a judicial remedy in case of non-fulfillment or contravention of
conditions specified in the deed of donation if and when the parties have not agreed on the automatic
revocation of such donation upon the occurrence of the contingency contemplated therein.

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REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. DAMIAN ERMITAO DE GUZMAN

G.R. No. 137887, February 28, 2000, Ynares_Santiago, J.

There are three (3) essential elements of a donation: (a) the reduction of the patrimony of the donor; (b)
the increase in the patrimony of the donee; and, (c) the intent to do an act of liberality or animus donandi. When
applied to a donation of an immovable property, the law further requires that the donation be made in a public
document and that there should be an acceptance thereof made in the same deed of donation or in a separate
public document. In cases where the acceptance is made in a separate instrument, it is mandated that the donor
should be notified thereof in an authentic form, to be noted in both instruments.

Facts:
David Rey Guzman, a natural-born American citizen, is the son of the spouses Simeon Guzman
(naturalized American) and Helen Meyers Guzman (American citizen). In 1968, Simeon died leaving to his
heirs, Helen and David, an estate consisting of several parcels of land in Bulacan. Thereafter, Helen and David
executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate, dividing and adjudicating to themselves all of the
property, and registered it to the RD a year after. In order to retain the property under their bloodline, Helen
executed a Deed of Quitclaim, assigning, transferring and conveying her share of the properties to David.
But since it was not registered, she executed another Deed of Quitclaim to confirm the first. Subsequently,
Atty. Batongbacal reported to the OSG that Davids ownership of of the estate was defective claiming that
the Deeds of Quitclaim executed by Helen were really donations inter vivos. Republic filed with RTC a Petition
for Escheat praying that of Davids interest be forfeited in its favor but it was dismissed and later on
affirmed by the CA. Hence, the case.

Issue:

Whether or not there was a donation inter vivos.

Ruling:

NO, not all the elements of a donation are present. Helens intention to perform an act of liberality in
favor of David was not sufficiently established. The 2 Quitclaims reveal that Helen intended to convey to her
son certain parcels of land and to re-affirm it through a waiver and renouncing her rights over the properties.
It is clear that Helen merely contemplated a waiver of her rights, title, and interest over the lands in favor of
David, not a donation. She is aware that the transfer through donation is not legally possible. Also, the
essential element of acceptance in the proper form and registration to make the donation valid is lacking. The
SPA executed by David in favor of Atty. Abela was not his acceptance, but is merely an acknowledgment that
David owns the property referred to and that he authorizes Atty. Abela to sell the same in his name.

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SPS. GESTOPA vs. COURT OF APPEALS and MERCEDES DANLAG y PILAPIL

G.R. No. 111904, October 5, 2000, Quisumbing, J.

Acceptance clause is a mark that the donation is inter vivos. Acceptance is a requirement for
donations inter vivos. Donations mortis causa, being in the form of a will, are not required to be accepted by the
donees during the donors' lifetime.
Facts:
Spouses Diego and Catalina Danlag were the owners of six parcels of land. They executed three deeds
of donation mortis causa in favor of respondent Mercedes Danlag-Pilapil, reserving donor's rights to amend,
cancel, or revoke the donation and to sell or encumber such properties. Years later, they executed another
donation, this time inter vivos, to six parcels of land in favor of respondents, reserving their rights to the
fruits of the land during their lifetime and for prohibiting the donee to sell or dispose the properties donated.
Subsequently, the spouses sold 2 parcels to herein petitioners, spouses Gestopa. Respondent Mercedes Pilapil
filed a petition to quiet title which ruled against her but on appeal reversed the said decision; hence, the case.
Issue:
Whether or not the donation was an inter vivos donation.
Ruling:
YES. The granting clause shows that Diego donated the properties out of love and affection for the
donee. Such is a mark of a donation inter vivos. Second, the reservation of lifetime usufruct indicates that the
donor intended to transfer the naked ownership over the properties. As correctly posed by the Court of
Appeals, what was the need for such reservation if the donor and his spouse remained the owners of the
properties? Third, the donor reserved sufficient properties for his maintenance in accordance with his
standing in society, indicating that the donor intended to part with the six parcels of land. Lastly, the donee
accepted the donation.
The attending circumstances in the execution of the subject donation also demonstrated the real intent
of the donor to transfer the ownership over the subject properties upon its execution. Prior to the execution
of donation inter vivos, the Danlag spouses already executed three donations mortis causa. As correctly
observed by the Court of Appeals, the Danlag spouses were aware of the difference between the two
donations. If they did not intend to donate inter vivos, they would not again donate the four lots already
donated mortis causa.

RODOLFO NOCEDA v. COURT OF APPEALS and AURORA ARBIZO DIRECTO

G.R. No. 119730, September 2, 1999, Gonzaga-Reyes, J.

The action to revoke by reason of ingratitude prescribes within one (1) year to be counted from the time
(a) the donor had knowledge of the fact; (b) provided that it was possible for him to bring the action. It is
incumbent upon petitioner to show proof of the concurrence of these two conditions in order that the one (1)
year period for bringing the action be considered to have already prescribed.

Facts:

Plaintiff Aurora Directo, defendant Rodolfo Noceda, and Maria Arbizo, the daughter, grandson, and
widow, respectively, of the late Celestino Arbizo extrajudicially settled a parcel of land located in Zambales,
which was said to have an area of 66,530 square meters. Plaintiff Directos share was 11,426 square meters,
defendant Noceda got 13,294 square meters, and the remaining 41,810 square meters went to Maria Arbizo.

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Plaintiff Directo donated 625 square meters of her share to defendant Noceda, who is her nephew. However,
another extrajudicial settlement-partition of Lot 1121 was executed by plaintiff Directo, defendant Noceda,
and Maria Arbizo. Three fifths of the said land went to Maria Arbizo while plaintiff Directo and defendant
Noceda got only one-fifth each. In said extrajudicial settlement-partition, the said parcel of land was said to
have an area of only 29,845 square meters. Thereafter, defendant Noceda constructed his house on the land
donated to him by plaintiff Directo. The latter fenced the portion allotted to her in the extrajudicial
settlement, excluding the donated portion, and constructed thereon three huts. But defendant Noceda
removed the fence earlier constructed by plaintiff Directo, occupied the three huts and fenced the entire land
of plaintiff Directo without her consent. Plaintiff Directo demanded from defendant Noceda to vacate her
land, but the latter refused. Plaintiff then filed a complaint for the annulment of donation against defendant
before the RTC which rendered the decision ordering the revocation of the donation. Hence, the case.

Issue:

Whether or not there is a sufficient reason to grant the revocation of donation.

Ruling:

YES. The action to revoke by reason of ingratitude prescribes within one (1) year to be counted from
the time (a) the donor had knowledge of the fact; (b) provided that it was possible for him to bring the
action. It is incumbent upon petitioner to show proof of the concurrence of these two conditions in order that
the one (1) year period for bringing the action be considered to have already prescribed. No competent proof
was adduced by petitioner to prove his allegation. In Civil Cases, the party having the burden of proof must
establish his case by preponderance of evidence. He who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it and a mere
allegation is not evidence.

ELOY IMPERIAL v. COURT OF APPEALS, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF LEGASPI CITY

G.R. No. 112483, October 8, 1999, Gonzaga-Reyes, J.

What is brought to collation is not the donated property itself, but the value of the property at the time
it was donated. The rationale for this is that the donation is a real alienation which conveys ownership upon its
acceptance, hence, any increase in value or any deterioration or loss thereof is for the account of the heir or
donee.

Facts:
Leoncio Imperial was the registered owner of a 32,837-square meter parcel of land. He then sold it to
his acknowledged natural son, petitioner, for a 1 peso per sq. m. Despite the contracts designation as one of
Absolute Sale, the parties admit that the transaction was in fact a donation. However, barely two years after
the donation, Leoncio filed a complaint for annulment of the said Deed of Absolute Sale on the ground that he
was deceived by petitioner herein into signing the said document but it was later on resolved through
compromise. Subsequently, Leoncio died and was substituted by his adopted son Victor who later on died
survived by his natural father Ricardo. Years after, Ricardo died, leaving as his only heirs his two children,
Cesar and Teresa Villalon. Five years thereafter, Cesar and Teresa filed a complaint for annulment of the
donation. The RTC held the donation to be inofficious and impairing the legitime of Victor, on the basis of its
finding that at the time of Leoncios death, he left no property other than the 32,837-square meter parcel of
land which he had donated to petitioner. The said decision was affirmed by the CA; hence, the case.

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Issue:
Whether or not the donation made by Leoncio Imperial in favor of petitioner inofficious and should
be reduced.
Ruling:
NO, unfortunately for private respondents, a claim for legitime does not amount to a claim of title.
What is brought to collation is not the donated property itself, but the value of the property at the time it was
donated. The rationale for this is that the donation is a real alienation which conveys ownership upon its
acceptance, hence, any increase in value or any deterioration or loss thereof is for the account of the heir or
donee.

SPOUSES EDUARTE v. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and PEDRO CALAPINE

G.R. No. 105944, February 9, 1996, Francisco, J.

All crimes which offend the donor show ingratitude and are causes for revocation. There is no doubt,
therefore, that the donee who commits adultery with the wife of the donor, gives cause for revocation by reason
of ingratitude. The crimes against the person of the donor would include not only homicide and physical injuries,
but also illegal detention, threats, and coercion; those against honor include offenses against chastity; and those
against the property, include robbery, theft, usurpation, swindling, arson, damages, etc.

Facts:

Pedro Calapine was the registered owner of a parcel of land located in San Pablo City; he executed a
deed entitled Pagbibigay-Pala ceding one-half portion thereof to his niece Helen S. Doria (Exhibit B) but
another identical deed was purportedly executed by Pedro Calapine ceding unto Helen S. Doria the whole of
the parcel of land (Exhibits C and D), was issued in her name. Helen then donated a portion the land to the
Calauan Christian Reformed Church, Inc. She also sold, transferred and conveyed unto the spouses Romulo
and Sally Eduarte the parcel of land covered by TCT No. T-24445, save the portion of 700 square meters on
which the vendors house had been erected. Upon noticing that the signature to the deed of donation (Exhibits
C and D) was a forgery and that, she was unworthy of his liberality, Pedro Calapine brought suit against Helen
S. Doria, the Calauan Christian Reformed Church, Inc. and the spouses Romulo and Sally Eduarte to revoke the
donation made in favor of Helen S. Doria (Exhibit B), to declare null and void the deeds of donation and sale.
The RTC ruled in favor of private respondent. Only the defendants Eduarte spouses took an appeal which was
denied. Hence, the case.

Issue:

Whether or not Helen Doria committed an act of ingratitude which is a valid ground for revocation of
the donation made in her favor in accordance with Article 765 of the Civil Code.
Ruling:
YES. Petitioners, in support of its contention, cite the following portions found in Tolentinos
Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code: Offense against Donor - x x x. The crimes against the
person of the donor would include not only homicide and physical injuries, but also illegal detention, threats
and coercion; and those against honor include offenses against chastity and those against the property,
include robbery, theft, usurpation, swindling, arson, damages, etc. This assertion, however, deserves scant
consideration. The full text of the very same commentary cited by petitioners belies their claim that
falsification of the deed of donation is not an act of ingratitude.

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Obviously, the first sentence was deleted by petitioners because it totally controverts their
contention. As noted in the aforecited opinion all crimes which offend the donor show ingratitude and are
causes for revocation. Petitioners attempt to categorize the offenses according to their classification under
the Revised Penal Code is therefore unwarranted considering that illegal detention, threats and coercion are
considered as crimes against the person of the donor despite the fact that they are classified as crimes against
personal liberty and security under the Revised Penal Code.

THE CITY OF ANGELES v. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 97882, August 28, 1996, Panganiban, J.

Any condition may be imposed in the donation, so long as the same is not contrary to law, morals, good
customs, public order or public policy.
Facts:
Private Respondent donated to the City of Angeles 51 parcels of land in the City of Angeles. The
donation was subject to number of conditions. Petitioners started the construction of a drug rehabilitation
center on a portion of the donated land. Upon learning thereof, private respondent protested such action for
being violative of the terms and conditions of the amended deed and prejudicial to its interest and to those of
its clients and residents. Petitioners claim they have the right to construct and operate a drug rehabilitation
center on the donated land in question, contrary to the provisions stated in the amended Deed of Donation.
On the other hand, private respondent, owner/developer of the Timog Park residential subdivision in Angeles
City, opposed the construction. The RTC and the CA ruled in favor of private respondent; hence, the case.

Issue:

Whether private respondent as subdivision owner/developer may validly impose conditions in the
Amended Deed of Donation regarding the use of the open space allocated exclusively for parks and
playgrounds.

Ruling:

YES. The general law on donations does not prohibit the imposition of conditions on a donation so
long as the conditions are not illegal or impossible. In regard to donations of open spaces, P.D. 1216 itself
requires among other things that the recreational areas to be donated be based, as aforementioned, on a
percentage (3.5%, 7%, or 9%) of the total area of the subdivision depending on whether the subdivision is
low -, medium -, or high-density. It further declares that such open space devoted to parks, playgrounds and
recreational areas are non-alienable public land and non-buildable. However, there is no prohibition in either
P.D. 957 or P.D. 1216 against imposing conditions on such donation. The contention of petitioners that the
donation should be unconditional because it is mandatory has no basis in law. P.D. 1216 does not provide that
the donation of the open space for parks and playgrounds should be unconditional. To rule that it should be
so is tantamount to unlawfully expanding the provisions of the decree.
In the case at bar, one of the conditions imposed in the Amended Deed of Donation is that the donee
should build a sports complex on the donated land. Since P.D. 1216 clearly requires that the 3.5% to 9% of the
gross area allotted for parks and playgrounds is non-buildable, then the obvious question arises whether or
not such condition was validly imposed and is binding on the donee. It is clear that the non-buildable
character applies only to the 3.5% to 9% area set by law. If there is any excess land over and above the 3.5%
to 9% required by the decree, which is also used or allocated for parks, playgrounds and recreational
purposes, it is obvious that such excess area is not covered by the non-buildability restriction. In the instant

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case, if there be an excess, then the donee would not be barred from developing and operating a sports
complex thereon, and the condition in the amended deed would then be considered valid and binding.

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