TodayisMonday,April24,2017

CustomSearch

RepublicofthePhilippines
SUPREMECOURT
Manila

FIRSTDIVISION

G.R.No.L42627February21,1980

EXALTACIONVDA.DETORBELA,petitioner,
vs.
EMPLOYEESCOMPENSATIONCOMMISSIONandGOVERNMENTSERVICEINSURANCESYSTEM(Bureauof
PublicSchools),respondents.

ExaltacionVda.deTorbelainherownbehalf.

RomuloP.Untalanforrespondents.

FERNANDEZ,J.:

This is a petition to review the decision of the Employees' Compensation Commission in ECC Case No. 0009
(Jose P. Torbela, Deceased) entitled "Exaltacion Vda. de Torbela, Appellant, versus, Government Service
InsuranceSystem"affirmingthedecisionoftheGovernmentServiceInsuranceSystemwhichdeniedtheclaimof
Exaltacion Vda. de Torbela on the ground that the death of her husband, Jose P. Torbela, Sr., is not
compensable."1

The petitioner, Exaltacion Vda. de Torbela, filed a claim for compensation dated March 20,1975 with Regional
OfficeVII,Workmen'sCompensationUnit,IloiloCity,forthedeathofherhusband,JoseP.Torbela,Sr.,whowasa
secondary school principal of the Bureau of Public Schools in Hinigaran, Negros Occidental when he died in a
vehicularaccidentonMarch3,1975.ThepetitioneralsofiledanapplicationforcompensationdatedApril4,1975
with the Government Service Insurance System. The claim was denied by the Government Service Insurance
SystemonthegroundthatthedeathofJoseP.Torbela,Sr.wasnottheresultofanemploymentaccident.

The claimant, petitioner herein, appealed to the Employees' Compensation Commission which affirmed the
decisionoftheGovernmentServiceInsuranceSystem.

Thefacts,asfoundbytheEmployees'CompensationCommission,are:

JoseP.Torbela,Sr.inhislifetime,wasemployedasaSecondarySchoolPrincipaloftheBureauof
PublicSchools.HediedonMarch3.1975atabout5:45o'clocka.m.duetoinjuriessustainedbyhim
in a vehicular accident while he was on his way to school from Bacolod City, where he lived, to
Hinigaran, Negros Occidental where the school of which he was the principal is located. In his
possessionatthetimeoftheaccidentwereofficialpapersheallegedlyworkedoninhisresidenceon
theeveofhisdeath.2

TheEmployees'CompensationCommissionaffirmedthedecisiondenyingtheclaimbecause:

The appealed decision denying the instant claim for compensation is hereby affirms Under
PresidentialDecreeNo.626anditsimplementingrules,fortheinjuryandtheresultingdeathtobe
compensable,theinjurymustbetheresultofanemploymentaccidentsatisfyingallofthefollowing
conditions: (1) the employee must have sustained the injury during his working hours (2) the
employee must have been injured at the place where his work required him to be and (3) the
employeemusthavebeenperforminghisofficialfunctions.Theevidenceonrecordunerringlypoints
tothefactthatnotevenoneoftheseconditions,whichmustallconcur,hasbeensatisfied.Onthe
contrary,theevidenceshowsthatthedeceasedwasmerelyengagedinordinarytravelfromhometo
work, during which time he was not even doing something related or incidental to his duties as
secondary School Principal that the accident occurred at a time not incompassed by his official
working hours and that the place of the accident is not where his work required him to be or so
 proximate thereto as to be deemed a part of his workplace, he being not on special errand for his
employer at the time he met his death, his possession of official papers notwithstanding. Thus, we
findthatthereissufficientfactualandlegalbasesfortheGSISconclusionatthedeathinquestionis
nottheresultofaninjuryfromanemploymentaccidentand,therefore,suchfindingsshouldnotbe
disturbed.3

It is a fact that Jose P. Torbela, Sr. died on March 3, 1975 at about 5:45 o'clock in the morning due to injuries
sustainedbyhiminavehicularaccidentwhilehewasonhiswaytoschoolfromBacolodCity,wherehelived,to
Hinigaran. Negros Occidental where the school of which he was the principal was and that at the time of the
accidenthehadinhispossessionofficialpapersheallegedlyworkedoninhisresidenceontheeveofhisdeath.

Theclaimiscompensable.Whenanemployeeisaccidentallyinjuredatapointreasonablyproximatetotheplace
ofwork,whileheisgoingtoandfromhiswork,suchinjuryisdeemedtohavearisenoutofandinthecourseof
hisemployment.4

WHEREFORE,thedecisionoftheEmployees'CompensationCommissionappealedfromisherebysetasideand
theGovernmentServiceInsuranceSystemisorderedtopaythepetitionerthesumofTwelveThousandPesos
(P12,000.00) as death benefit, the sum of One Thousand Pesos (P1,000.00) as funeral expenses pursuant to
Section19,P.D.No.1146,andthesumofOneThousandTwoHundredPesos(P1,200.00)asattorney'sfees.

SOORDERED.

Teehankee(Chairman),Makasiar,Guerrero,DeCastro,concur.

SeparateOpinions

MELENCIOHERRERA,J.,dissenting:

Iamconstrainedtodissent.

Petitioner'shusbanddiedinavehicularaccidentonMarch3,1975.TheprovisionsofthenewLaborCodePINo.
442),asamended),anditsimplementingRules,therefore,areapplicable.

ART.208.Applicability.ThisTitle(TitleII,BookIV)shallapplytoinjurysickness,disabilityordeath
occurringonorafterJanuary1,1975(NewLaborCode).

xxxxxxxxx

(c) Only injury or sickness that occurred on or after January 1, 1975 and the resulting disability or
deathshallbecompensableundertheseRulesonEmployee'sCompensation.

SectionI,RuleIII,oftheAmendedRulesonEmployees'Compensationprovides:

SECTION1.Grounds.(a)Fortheinjuryandtheresultingdisabilityordeathtobecompensable,
theinjurymustbetheresultofanemploymentaccidentsatisfyingallofthefollowingconditions:

(1)Theemployeemusthavesustainedtheinjuryduringhisworkinghours

(2)Theemployeemusthavebeeninjuredattheplacewherehisworkrequire9himtobeand

(3)Theemployeemusthavebeenperforminghisofficialfunctions.

In the light of the foregoing provision, petitioner's claim was correctly denied by the Government Service
Insurance System on the ground that the death of Jose P. Torbela, Sr. was not the result of an employment
accidentsatisfyingalltheconditionsenumerated.Hediedduetoinjuriessustainedbyhiminavehicularaccident
at5:45A.M.whilehewasonhiswaytoschool.

Thegeneralruleisthatanemployeeisnotentitledtorecoverforpersonalinjuriesresultingfromanaccidentthat
befallshimwhilegoingtoorreturningfromhisplaceofemploymentbecausesuchanaccidentdoesnotariseout
ofandinthecourseofhisemployment(Afablevs.SingerSewingMachineCo.,58Phil.39).ThecaseofOllero
vs.Workmen'sCompensation,etal.,(84SCRA695[1978])alsoheldthat:
 UnderAmericanJurisprudence,thegeneralruleisthatthehazardsencounteredbyemployeeswhile
goingtoorreturningfromtheirregularplaceofwork,beforereachingorafterleavingtheemployer's
premises, are not ordinarily incident to the employment. and for this reason injuries resulting from
suchhazardsareinmostinstancesheldnottobecompensableasarisingoutofandinthecourseof
theemployment(82AmJur2d,Sec.255,p.43,citing:Voehlv.IndemnityIns.Co.,288US162,77L
Ed67653SCt380,81ALR245,andahostofcases).

Theaforementionedgeneralrulehoweveradmitsvariousex.exceptionsinmostoftheStatesofthe
Union, and among these are: where the employer provides transportation or remunerates the
employeeforthetimeorexpenseinvolved,wheretheemployeeperformssometaskinconnection
withhisemploymentathomeorenroute,orisonaspecialmissionathisemployer'sbehest,andso
on(p.44,Ibid.).

The present case does not fall under any of the exceptions thus enumerated. Nor under any of the following
circumstances, which may well be considered as exceptions to the general rule that injuries sustained by an
employee outside the premises of the employer, while going to or returning from work, are not compensable.
Thus,whereanemployeewasaccidentallyinjuredwhilehewasrunningtohisplaceofworktoavoidrain,slipped
and fell into a ditch in front of the factory's main gate the ditch in itself being an obvious hazard owing to its
proximity to the gate and the employer's inaction to remove the same had contributed in a special way to the
occurrence of the accident (Philippine Fiber Processing Co. vs. Fermina Ampil, 99 Phil. 1050 [1956]): where
injuriesaresustainedbyaworkmanwhoisprovidedwithtransportationwhilegoingtoorcomingfromhiswork,
they are considered as arising out of and in the course of his employment and therefore, are compensable
(TalisaySilayMillingCo.Inc.vs.Workmen'sCompensationCommission,21SCRA366,367[1967])wherethe
employer remunerates the employee for transportation expenses and agreed to shoulder 75% of her
transportationexpenseswhenemployerassignedhertotaketheplaceofanotherteacherinadifferentplacenot
her regular place of work, said employee was entitled to a disability compensation for she was injured while
performing an acttravelling home from school, which was a necessary incident to her employment (Ollero vs.
Workmen'sCompensationCommission,84SCRA696[1978])orwhereaschoolteacherwasonherwayhome
from school and would continue to perform other school work in connection with her employment as school
teacher,hertakingtherideinthatfatalvehiclecanbetreatedasanecessaryincidenttoherschoolwork,thus
herheirswereentitledtothebenefitsarisingfromherdeathashavingoccurredinconnectionwithherdutyBael
vs. Workmen's Compensation Commission. 75 SCRA 181, 182 [1977]) or where the employee is on a special
mission(Unitevs.Workmen'sCompensationCommission,90SCRA289,313[1979]).

Todeterminewhetherornotaninjuryissustainedeither"inthecourseofemployment"or"outofemployment",
thecaseofPampanga Sugar Development Co., Inc. vs. Quiroz, 16 SCRA 785786 [1966], citing In re Mc Nicol
(102NE[1913]697),held:

...Itissufficienttosaythataninjuryisreceived'inthecourseofemploymentwhenitcomeswhilethe
workmanisdoingthedutywhichheisemployedtoperform.Itarises'outof'theemploymentwhen
thereisapparentintherationalmind...causalconnectionbetweentheconditionsunderwhichthe
work is required to be performed and the resulting injury... But it excludes an injury which cannot
fairly be traced to the employment as a contributing proximate cause and which comes from a
hazardto which the workman would have been equally exposed apart from the employment. The
causative danger must be peculiarto the work, and not common to the neighborhood. It must be
incidental to the character of the business, and not independent of the relation of master and
servant.Itneednothavebeenforeseenorexpected,butaftertheevent,itmustappeartohavehad
its origin on a risk connected with the employment, to have flowed from that source as a rational
consequence.

An injury or accident 'befalls a man in the course of' his employment, if it occurs while he is doing
whatamanmayreasonablydowithinatimeduringwhichheisemployed,andataplacewherehe
mayreasonablybeduringthattime.13NACCALAWJOURNAL2829.Andit"arisesoutof"thework
oftheemployer,whenitresultsfromariskorhazardwhichisnecessarilyorordinarilyorreasonably
inherentinorincidenttotheconductofsuchworkorbusiness.(Emphasissupplied).

Evidently,theinjuriesandtheresultingdeathsufferedbythepetitioner'sspousecausedbyavehicularaccident,
couldnotbedistinctlyattributedtothepeculiaritiesofhisemploymentasaschoolprincipal.Avehicularaccident
duringorordinarytraveltoandfromanemployee'splaceofworkisastreetperilorhazardcommontothepublic.
The deceased, apart from his employment, would have been equally exposed to the same hazard as anybody
commutingfromoneplacetoanother.Thus,asinPampangaSugarDevelopmentCo.,Inc.vs.Quiroz,supra,the
injurysustainedbypetitioner'shusbandisnotcompensable.

Lastly, the cases granting compensation under the "going toandcomingfrom rule", among them, Bael vs.
Workmen'sCompensationCommission,75SCRA182(1977)Unitevs.Workmen'sCompensationCommission,
90 SCRA 293 (1979) TalisaySilay Milling Co., Inc. vs. Workmen's Compensation Commission, 21 SCRA 366
(1967)PhilippineFiberProcessingCo.,Inc.vs.Ampil,99Phil.1050(1956)Onerovs.Workmen'sCompensation
Commission,84SCRA695(1978),werealldecidedundertheregimeoftheWorkmen'sCompensationAct(Act
No. 3428), section 2 of which provided as a ground for compensation "any accident arising out of and in the
courseofhisemployment",aclausethatiselasticandissusceptibleofinterpretation.Incontrast,notonlyhasthe
Workmen's Compensation Act been expressly repealed by the new Labor Code, but also, the grounds of
compensability in Rule III of the Amended Rules on Employee's Compensation (based on PD No. 626, as
amendedbyPD850,PD865AandPD891)arespecificandenumeratetheconditionsthatmustbesatisfiedin
orderthataninjuryandtheresultingdisabilityordeathcanbecompensable.

The province of the Courts is to apply the statutes and not to construe them beyond the intendment of the
legislative. The cases heretofore decided, therefore, must be viewed in the light of present, extant legislation
enacted despite full cognizance of doctrinal jurisprudence which has emanated from this Court. By this, there
need be no fear of violation of the Constitutional mandate of affording protection to labor and promoting social
justice. It is merely applying the clear provisions of the new Labor Laws. Moreover, enough leeway should be
giventoadministrativeagenciesapplyingthelawwithintheircompetence.Theiropinionsandrulingsareentitled
togreatrespect(Regaladovs.Yulo,61Phil.173[1935]Grapilonvs.MunicipalCouncilofCarigara,2SCRA103
[1961]Tanvs,MunicipalityofPagbilao,Quezon,7SCRA887,892[1963]).

Thiscontemporaneousconstructionishighlypersuasive:

The practice and interpretive regulations by officers, administrative agencies, departmental heads
and other officials charged with the duty of administering and enforcing a statute will carry great
weightindeterminingtheoperationofastatute.(2Sutherland,StatutoryConstruction,p.516).

SeparateOpinions

MELENCIOHERRERA,J.,dissenting:

Iamconstrainedtodissent.

Petitioner'shusbanddiedinavehicularaccidentonMarch3,1975.TheprovisionsofthenewLaborCodePINo.
442),asamended),anditsimplementingRules,therefore,areapplicable.

ART.208.Applicability.ThisTitle(TitleII,BookIV)shallapplytoinjurysickness,disabilityordeath
occurringonorafterJanuary1,1975(NewLaborCode).

xxxxxxxxx

(c)OnlyinjuryorsicknessthatoccurredonorafterJanuary1,1975andtheresultingdisabilityor
deathshallbecompensableundertheseRulesonEmployee'sCompensation.

SectionI,RuleIII,oftheAmendedRulesonEmployees'Compensationprovides:

SECTION1.Grounds.(a)Fortheinjuryandtheresultingdisabilityordeathtobecompensable,
theinjurymustbetheresultofanemploymentaccidentsatisfyingallofthefollowingconditions:

(1)Theemployeemusthavesustainedtheinjuryduringhisworkinghours

(2)Theemployeemusthavebeeninjuredattheplacewherehisworkrequire9himtobeand

(3)Theemployeemusthavebeenperforminghisofficialfunctions.

Inthelightoftheforegoingprovision,petitioner'sclaimwascorrectlydeniedbytheGovernmentService
InsuranceSystemonthegroundthatthedeathofJoseP.Torbela,Sr.wasnottheresultofanemployment
accidentsatisfyingalltheconditionsenumerated.Hediedduetoinjuriessustainedbyhiminavehicularaccident
at5:45A.M.whilehewasonhiswaytoschool.

Thegeneralruleisthatanemployeeisnotentitledtorecoverforpersonalinjuriesresultingfromanaccidentthat
befallshimwhilegoingtoorreturningfromhisplaceofemploymentbecausesuchanaccidentdoesnotariseout
ofandinthecourseofhisemployment(Afablevs.SingerSewingMachineCo.,58Phil.39).ThecaseofOllero
vs.Workmen'sCompensation,etal.,(84SCRA695[1978])alsoheldthat:
 UnderAmericanJurisprudence,thegeneralruleisthatthehazardsencounteredbyemployeeswhile
goingtoorreturningfromtheirregularplaceofwork,beforereachingorafterleavingtheemployer's
premises,arenotordinarilyincidenttotheemployment.andforthisreasoninjuriesresultingfrom
suchhazardsareinmostinstancesheldnottobecompensableasarisingoutofandinthecourseof
theemployment(82AmJur2d,Sec.255,p.43,citing:Voehlv.IndemnityIns.Co.,288US162,77L
Ed67653SCt380,81ALR245,andahostofcases).

Theaforementionedgeneralrulehoweveradmitsvariousex.exceptionsinmostoftheStatesofthe
Union,andamongtheseare:wheretheemployerprovidestransportationorremuneratesthe
employeeforthetimeorexpenseinvolved,wheretheemployeeperformssometaskinconnection
withhisemploymentathomeorenroute,orisonaspecialmissionathisemployer'sbehest,andso
on(p.44,Ibid.).

Thepresentcasedoesnotfallunderanyoftheexceptionsthusenumerated.Norunderanyofthefollowing
circumstances,whichmaywellbeconsideredasexceptionstothegeneralrulethatinjuriessustainedbyan
employeeoutsidethepremisesoftheemployer,whilegoingtoorreturningfromwork,arenotcompensable.
Thus,whereanemployeewasaccidentallyinjuredwhilehewasrunningtohisplaceofworktoavoidrain,slipped
andfellintoaditchinfrontofthefactory'smaingatetheditchinitselfbeinganobvioushazardowingtoits
proximitytothegateandtheemployer'sinactiontoremovethesamehadcontributedinaspecialwaytothe
occurrenceoftheaccident(PhilippineFiberProcessingCo.vs.FerminaAmpil,99Phil.1050[1956]):where
injuriesaresustainedbyaworkmanwhoisprovidedwithtransportationwhilegoingtoorcomingfromhiswork,
theyareconsideredasarisingoutofandinthecourseofhisemploymentandtherefore,arecompensable
(TalisaySilayMillingCo.Inc.vs.Workmen'sCompensationCommission,21SCRA366,367[1967])wherethe
employerremuneratestheemployeefortransportationexpensesandagreedtoshoulder75%ofher
transportationexpenseswhenemployerassignedhertotaketheplaceofanotherteacherinadifferentplacenot
herregularplaceofwork,saidemployeewasentitledtoadisabilitycompensationforshewasinjuredwhile
performinganacttravellinghomefromschool,whichwasanecessaryincidenttoheremployment(Ollerovs.
Workmen'sCompensationCommission,84SCRA696[1978])orwhereaschoolteacherwasonherwayhome
fromschoolandwouldcontinuetoperformotherschoolworkinconnectionwithheremploymentasschool
teacher,hertakingtherideinthatfatalvehiclecanbetreatedasanecessaryincidenttoherschoolwork,thus
herheirswereentitledtothebenefitsarisingfromherdeathashavingoccurredinconnectionwithherdutyBael
vs.Workmen'sCompensationCommission.75SCRA181,182[1977])orwheretheemployeeisonaspecial
mission(Unitevs.Workmen'sCompensationCommission,90SCRA289,313[1979]).

Todeterminewhetherornotaninjuryissustainedeither"inthecourseofemployment"or"outofemployment",
thecaseofPampangaSugarDevelopmentCo.,Inc.vs.Quiroz,16SCRA785786[1966],citingInreMcNicol
(102NE[1913]697),held:

...Itissufficienttosaythataninjuryisreceived'inthecourseofemploymentwhenitcomeswhilethe
workmanisdoingthedutywhichheisemployedtoperform.Itarises'outof'theemploymentwhen
thereisapparentintherationalmind...causalconnectionbetweentheconditionsunderwhichthe
workisrequiredtobeperformedandtheresultinginjury...Butitexcludesaninjurywhichcannot
fairlybetracedtotheemploymentasacontributingproximatecauseandwhichcomesfroma
hazardtowhichtheworkmanwouldhavebeenequallyexposedapartfromtheemployment.The
causativedangermustbepeculiartothework,andnotcommontotheneighborhood.Itmustbe
incidentaltothecharacterofthebusiness,andnotindependentoftherelationofmasterand
servant.Itneednothavebeenforeseenorexpected,butaftertheevent,itmustappeartohavehad
itsoriginonariskconnectedwiththeemployment,tohaveflowedfromthatsourceasarational
consequence.

Aninjuryoraccident'befallsamaninthecourseof'hisemployment,ifitoccurswhileheisdoing
whatamanmayreasonablydowithinatimeduringwhichheisemployed,andataplacewherehe
mayreasonablybeduringthattime.13NACCALAWJOURNAL2829.Andit"arisesoutof"thework
oftheemployer,whenitresultsfromariskorhazardwhichisnecessarilyorordinarilyorreasonably
inherentinorincidenttotheconductofsuchworkorbusiness.(Emphasissupplied).

Evidently,theinjuriesandtheresultingdeathsufferedbythepetitioner'sspousecausedbyavehicularaccident,
couldnotbedistinctlyattributedtothepeculiaritiesofhisemploymentasaschoolprincipal.Avehicularaccident
duringorordinarytraveltoandfromanemployee'splaceofworkisastreetperilorhazardcommontothepublic.
Thedeceased,apartfromhisemployment,wouldhavebeenequallyexposedtothesamehazardasanybody
commutingfromoneplacetoanother.Thus,asinPampangaSugarDevelopmentCo.,Inc.vs.Quiroz,supra,the
injurysustainedbypetitioner'shusbandisnotcompensable.

Lastly,thecasesgrantingcompensationunderthe"goingtoandcomingfromrule",amongthem,Baelvs.
Workmen'sCompensationCommission,75SCRA182(1977)Unitevs.Workmen'sCompensationCommission,
90SCRA293(1979)TalisaySilayMillingCo.,Inc.vs.Workmen'sCompensationCommission,21SCRA366
(1967)PhilippineFiberProcessingCo.,Inc.vs.Ampil,99Phil.1050(1956)Onerovs.Workmen'sCompensation
Commission,84SCRA695(1978),werealldecidedundertheregimeoftheWorkmen'sCompensationAct(Act
No.3428),section2ofwhichprovidedasagroundforcompensation"anyaccidentarisingoutofandinthe
courseofhisemployment",aclausethatiselasticandissusceptibleofinterpretation.Incontrast,notonlyhasthe
Workmen'sCompensationActbeenexpresslyrepealedbythenewLaborCode,butalso,thegroundsof
compensabilityinRuleIIIoftheAmendedRulesonEmployee'sCompensation(basedonPDNo.626,as
amendedbyPD850,PD865AandPD891)arespecificandenumeratetheconditionsthatmustbesatisfiedin
orderthataninjuryandtheresultingdisabilityordeathcanbecompensable.

TheprovinceoftheCourtsistoapplythestatutesandnottoconstruethembeyondtheintendmentofthe
legislative.Thecasesheretoforedecided,therefore,mustbeviewedinthelightofpresent,extantlegislation
enacteddespitefullcognizanceofdoctrinaljurisprudencewhichhasemanatedfromthisCourt.Bythis,there
needbenofearofviolationoftheConstitutionalmandateofaffordingprotectiontolaborandpromotingsocial
justice.ItismerelyapplyingtheclearprovisionsofthenewLaborLaws.Moreover,enoughleewayshouldbe
giventoadministrativeagenciesapplyingthelawwithintheircompetence.Theiropinionsandrulingsareentitled
togreatrespect(Regaladovs.Yulo,61Phil.173[1935]Grapilonvs.MunicipalCouncilofCarigara,2SCRA103
[1961]Tanvs,MunicipalityofPagbilao,Quezon,7SCRA887,892[1963]).

Thiscontemporaneousconstructionishighlypersuasive:

Thepracticeandinterpretiveregulationsbyofficers,administrativeagencies,departmentalheads
andotherofficialschargedwiththedutyofadministeringandenforcingastatutewillcarrygreat
weightindeterminingtheoperationofastatute.(2Sutherland,StatutoryConstruction,p.516).

Footnotes

1Annex"C",Rollo,pp.1517.

2Rollop.15.

3Rollo,pp.1516.

4PhilippineFiberProcessingCoInc.vs.FerminaAmpil,99Phil.1050TalisaySilayMillingCo.,Inc,
vs.Workmen'sCompensationCommission,21SCRA366.

TheLawphilProjectArellanoLawFoundation