Ilusorio vs. Bildner, GR No. 139789, May 12, 2000; 332 Baguio Country Club.
Country Club. In 1942, he married Erlinda Kalaw. They
SCRA 169
(Special Proceedings Husband cannot be forced to live with
his wife by Habeas Corpus)
Facts: Erlinda filed with the CA a petition for habeas corpus
to have the custody of her husband Potenciano alleging that
respondents refused petitioners demands to see and visit her
husband.
The CA allowed visitation rights to Erlinda for humanitarian
consideration but denied the petition for habeas corpus for
lack of unlawful restraint or detention of the subject of the
petition.
Erlinda seeks to reverse the CA decision dismissing the
application for habeas corpus to have the custody of her
husband and enforce consortium as the wife.
Potenciano seeks to annul that portion of the CA decision
giving Erlinda visitation rights.
Issue: May a wife secure a writ of habeas corpus to compel
her husband to live with her in their conjugal dwelling.
Held: No. Marital rights including coverture and living in
conjugal dwelling may not be enforced by the extra-ordinary
writ of habeas corpus.
A writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal
confinement or detention, or by which the rightful custody of a
person is withheld from the one entitled thereto. It is available
where a person continuous unlawfully denied of one or more
of his constitutional freedom. It is devised as a speedy and
effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful
restrainment, as the best and only sufficient defense of
personal freedom.
The essential object and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus
is to inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint and to
relieve a person therefrom if such restraint is illegal.
A person with full mental capacity coupled with the right
choice may not be the subject of visitation rights against free
choice. The CA exceeded its authority when it awarded
visitation rights in a petition for habeas corpus where Erlinda
never even prayed for such right.
No court is empowered as a judicial authority to compel a
husband to live with his wife. Coverture cannot be enforced by
compulsion of a writ of habeas corpus carried out by the
sheriffs or by any other mesne process.
Ilusorio vs. Bildner
GR No. 139789, May 12, 2000; 332 SCRA 169
Facts: Potenciano Ilusorio, a lawyer, is about 86 years of age
possessed of extensive property valued at millions of pesos. For
many years, he was Chairman of the Board and President of
lived together for a period of thirty (30) years until they
separated from bed and board in 1972 for undisclosed
reasons. Potenciano lived at Makati every time he was in
Manila and at Illusorio Penthouse, Baguio Country Club when
he was in Baguio City. Erlinda, on the other hand, lived in
Antipolo City.
In 1997, upon Potencianos arrival from the United States, he
stayed with Erlinda for about five (5) months in Antipolo City.
The children, Sylvia and Erlinda Ilusorio Bildner, alleged that
during this time, their mother gave Potenciano an overdose of
200 mg instead of 100 mg Zoloft, an antidepressant drug
prescribed by his doctor. As a consequence, Potencianos health
deteriorated.
On May 31, 1998, after attending a corporate meeting in Baguio
City, Potenciano did not return to Antipolo City and instead
lived in Makati. Erlinda filed with the CA a petition for habeas
corpus to have the custody of Potenciano alleging that
respondents Sylvia and Bildner refused her demands to see and
visit Potenciano. The CA allowed visitation rights to Erlinda
for humanitarian consideration but denied the petition for
habeas corpus.
Issue: May a wife secure a writ of habeas corpus to compel her
husband to live with her in their conjugal dwelling?
Held: No. a writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal
confinement or detention, or by which the rightful custody of a
person is withheld from the one entitled thereto. To justify the
grant of the petition, the restraint of liberty must be an illegal
and involuntary deprivation of freedom of action. The illegal
restraint of liberty must be actual and effective, not merely
nominal or moral.
The evidence shows that there was no actual and effective
detention or deprivation of lawyer Potenciano Ilusorios liberty
that would justify the issuance of the writ. The fact that
Potenciano Ilusorio is about 86 years of age, or under
medication does not necessarily render him mentally
incapacitated. Soundness of mind does not hinge on age or
medical condition but on the capacity of the individual to
discern his actions.
With his full mental capacity coupled with the right of choice,
Potenciano Ilusorio may not be the subject of visitation rights
against his free choice. Otherwise, we will deprive him of his
right to privacy. Needless to say, this will run against his
fundamental constitutional right.
The Court of Appeals missed the fact that the case did not
involve the right of a parent to visit a minor child but the right
of a wife to visit a husband. In case the husband refuses to see
his wife for private reasons, he is at liberty to do so without
threat of any penalty attached to the exercise of his right.
No court is empowered as a judicial authority to compel a
husband to live with his wife. Coverture cannot be enforced by
compulsion of a writ of habeas corpus carried out by sheriffs or
by any other mesne process. That is a matter beyond judicial
authority and is best left to the man and womans free choice.

SECOND DIVISION
ERLINDA I. BILDNER and MAXIMO K.
ILUSORIO,
Petitioners,
- versus -
ERLINDA K. ILUSORIO, RAMON K.
ILUSORIO, MARIETTA K. ILUSORIO,
SHEREEN K. ILUSORIO, CECILIA A. BISUA,
and ATTY. MANUEL R. SINGSON,
Respondents.
x--------------------------------------------------------------------------
---------------x
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
In this petition filed directly with the Court in
accordance with Rule 71, Section 5 of the Rules of Court,
Erlinda I. Bildner and Maximo K. Ilusorio pray that
respondents, one of them their mother and three their siblings,
be cited for indirect contempt for alleged contemptuous
remarks and acts directed against the Court, particularly the
then members of its First Division. By motion dated June 5,
2003, petitioners pray that the same petition be treated as a
formal complaint for disbarment or disciplinary action against
respondent Atty. Manuel R. Singson for alleged gross
misconduct, among other offenses.
The Undisputed Facts
Indirect Contempt
The resulting alleged contemptuous statements and
actions date back to proceedings before the Court, specifically
in G.R. Nos. 139789 and 139808 that were appeals from the
decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No.
51689, denying the petition for habeas corpus filed by
respondent Erlinda K. Ilusorio to have custody of her husband,
Potenciano Ilusorio. The appealed decision found Potenciano to
be of sound mind and not unlawfully restrained of his liberty.
The CA, however, granted Erlinda Ilusorio visitation rights, an
accommodation which the Court nullified in its Decision of
May 12, 2000 in G.R. Nos. 139789 and 139808.[1]
This May 12, 2000 ruling spawned several incidents.
First, Erlinda Ilusorio moved for its reconsideration, reiterating
her basic plea for a writ of habeas corpus and that daughters
petitioner Bildner and Sylvia Ilusorio be directed to desist from
preventing her from seeing Potenciano. Erlinda Ilusorio
followed this motion with a Motion to Set Case for Preliminary
Conference, requesting that she and Potenciano be [allowed to
be] by themselves together in front of the Honorable
Court.[2] She reiterated this request in an Urgent Manifestation
G.R. No. 157384
and Motion dated August 25, 2000.
Present: By Resolution of September 20, 2000, the Court set
the case for preliminary conference on October 11, 2000 but
QUISUMBING,
withoutJ.,requiring
Chairperson, YNARES- presence of the parties.[3] In
the mandatory
*
SANTIAGO,another resolution dated January 31, 2001, the Court denied
VELASCO, JR., Ilusorios manifestation and motion in which she prayed
Erlinda
*
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
that Potenciano and before, and be medically examined
be produced
BRION, JJ.
by a team of medical experts appointed by, the Court.[4] Erlinda
Ilusorio sought reconsideration of the January 31, 2001
Promulgated:
resolution.
June 5, 2009 On March 27, 2001, the Court denied with finality
Erlinda Ilusorios motion for reconsideration of the January 31,
2001 resolution.[5] Undaunted, she filed an Urgent
Manifestation and Motion for Clarification of the Courts
January 31, 2001 resolution. On May 30, 2001, the Court
merely noted the urgent manifestation and motion for
clarification.[6]
By Resolution of July 19, 2001,[7] the Court denied
Erlinda Ilusorios motion for reconsideration of the Decision
dated May 12, 2000. Thereafter, in another resolution dated
July 24, 2002, we resolved to expunge from the records her
repetitive motions, with the caveat that no further pleadings
shall be entertained.[8]
Barely over a month after, Erlinda Ilusorio, this time
represented by Dela Cruz Albano & Associates, sought leave to
file an urgent motion for reconsideration of the July 24, 2002
resolution.
In relation to the above habeas corpus case, Erlinda
Ilusorio addressed two letters to then Chief Justice Hilario G.
Davide, Jr. dated February 26, 2001 and April 16, 2001,
respectively. In the first, she sought assistance vis--vis her wish
to see Potenciano.[9] In the second, she chafed at what she
considered the Courts bent to adhere to forms and procedure
and, at the same time, urged the Court to personally see
Potenciano.[10]
Another letter of September 5, 2001 to Chief Justice
Davide drew attention to the Courts decision in G.R. No.
148985 entitled Ramon K. Ilusorio v. Baguio Country Club, in
which Erlinda Ilusorio tagged the decision
as appalling, unilaterally brazen, and unprecedented in the
annals of the Supreme Court decision-making process. In
her words, the decision denied and dismissed the petition of her
son, Ramon Ilusorio, through a four-page resolution by
unilaterally arguing and citing the arguments made by the
respondents in the case at the courts a quo, without even
giving the same respondents the proper hearing or
requiring a comment or a reply. In the same letter, she made
reference to the Court giving special treatment to particular
litigants.[11]
To petitioners, Erlinda Ilusorios filing of redundant
motions and pleadings, along with her act of writing the
aforementioned letters, constitutes contemptuous disrespect
and disobedience or defiance of lawful orders of the Court.
On top of the foregoing circumstances, petitioners
would also have respondents cited for contempt in view of the
publication of On the Edge of Heaven, a book carrying Erlinda
Ilusorios name as author and which contained her
commentaries on the aforesaid habeas corpus case. In this book,
published by PI-EKI Foundation[12] whose board of directors is
composed of respondents Ramon, Marietta K. Ilusorio, Shereen
K. Ilusorio, and Cecilia A. Bisua, the following excerpts from
the Postscript section captioned Where is Justice? appear:
I pursued my case in the Supreme Court at
Division I. There I was heard by Justice
Pardo, Davide, Puno, Kapunan,
and Santiago.
Just the same this highest court of the land did
not heed to my desperate
pleas. Conveniently, they omitted the state
of my husbands true desires; dismissed the
importance of my husbands presence in
the court; ignored the ultimate need to
check for themselves the true state of
Nanoys health; and after PIs recent death
in June 28, 2001, easily dismissed my case
as moot and academic. My husband was
referred to as another subject. (On the
Edge of Heaven, p. 180)[13]
In the same book, Erlinda Ilusorio denounced Justice
Bernardo P. Pardo, now retired, the ponente of the habeas
corpus case, the other members of the then First Division of the
Court, and the Court as a whole:
Where is justice?
Sadly, the Court of Appeals and, moreso,
the Supreme Court broke-up my
family. Doesnt our Constitution, our Civil
Code and our Family Code protect the
sanctity of marriage and the family?
Was justice for sale? Was justice
sold? Nasaan ang katarungan?
xxxx
August 29, 2001
To the Supreme Court of the Philippines,
Division One, Justice Bernardo Pardo,
Ponente on Case No. x x x
xxxx
You simply quoted an obiter dictum of the
Court of Appeals. There was no ruling on his
mental condition as this was not at issue at the
habeas corpus. How could you have made a
ruling based on an obiter? All the doctors
reports submitted were totally
disregarded. In reality it was his frailty, not
his mental competence that I raised. During
the last five years, he became increasingly
frail, almost blind and could barely talk. He
was not able to read nor write for almost
twenty years. x x x Our separation, three
years ago, cruel and inhuman that it was, was
made more painful by your ruling that I
may not even visit him.
xxxx
On May 30, 2001, you ruled that your
decision noted without action the
questions of my lawyers, in effect brushing
aside the Motion for Clarification without
any answers whatsoever. Why?
xxxx
If your decision becomes res
judicata havent you just provided a most
convenient venue to separate spouses from
each otherbased on individual
rightsparticularly when one spouse is
ailing and prone to manipulation and
needs the other spouse the most? Why did
you wait for more than one year and after
my husbands death to deny my motion for
reconsideration? Is it because it is easier to
do so now that it is academic? Does your
conscience bother you at all?
xxxx
I close by asking you: how can the highest
court of our land be a party to the break
up of my family and, disregarding the
Family Code, not let me take care of my
husband, permit my husband to die without
even heeding my desperate pleas, if not for
justice, at least your concern for a human
being?
xxxx
Looking back, I cannot fail to see thatif our
courts can render this kind of justice to one
like myself because I have lesser means,
and lesser connections than my well-
married daughters, what kind of justice is
given to those less privileged? To the poor,
with no meanswhat have they? I cry for
them[14] (Emphasis ours.)

Disbarment Complaint
The disbarment case against respondent Atty. Singson
stemmed from his alleged attempt, as counsel of Ramon in Civil
Case No. 4537-R, to exert influence on presiding Regional Trial
Court Judge Antonio Reyes to rule in Ramons favor. To
complainant-petitioners, the bid to influence, which allegedly
came in the form of a bribe offer, may be deduced from the
following exchanges during the May 31, 2000 hearing on
Ramons motion for Judge Reyes to inhibit himself from hearing
Civil Case No. 4537-R:
COURT: Do you have something to add to
your motion?
ATTY. JOSE: The purpose of this
representation basically, your honor
state the facts are already
established as a basis for tendency
or a perception correctly or
incorrectly that there is already a
possibility of partiality.
COURT: Who is your partner?
ATTY. JOSE: The counsel for the plaintiff is
Law Office of Singson and
Associates and I am the associate of
said Law Office, your honor.
COURT: And you are aware that Atty.
Manuel R. Singson is your boss?
xxxx
ATTY. JOSE: Yes, your honor?
COURT: Has he been telling you the truth in
this case?
ATTY. JOSE: Well, your honor my
appearance here for the purpose of
having this motion duly heard.
COURT: That is why Im asking you the
question, has he been telling you the
truth regarding this case?
ATTY. JOSE: Well, your honor in fact the
actual counsel here is Atty. Gepty
and I have been
COURT: Are you aware of the fact that
Atty. Singson has been calling my
residence in Baguio City for
about 20 to 50 times already?
ATTY. JOSE: I have no knowledge already.
COURT: Are you aware that he has
offered Atty. Oscar Sevilla his
classmate at Ateneo Law School
P500,000.00 to give it to me for the
purpose of ruling in favor of your
client[?]
ATTY. JOSE: I have no knowledge your
honor.
COURT: Ask him that tell him to face the
mirror and ask him if he is telling the
truth alright? I will summon the
records of PLDT. The audacity of
telling me to inhibit myself
here. It has been him who has
been trying to influence me.
xxxx
COURT: Tell him to look at his face in the
mirror, tell me if he is honest or
not.[15]
And to support their disbarment charge against Atty.
Singson on the grounds of attempted bribery and serious
misconduct, complainant-petitioners submitted an affidavit
executed on December 23, 2004 by Judge Reyes in which he
pertinently alleged:
2) That one of the cases I tried, heard and
decided was Civil Case No. 4537-R
entitled Ramon K. Ilusorio v. Baguio Country
Club for the Declaration of Nullity of
Limitations and/or Injunction x x x;
3) That the very minute that the case was
assigned by raffle to the undersigned, Atty.
Manuel Singson counsel of plaintiff Ramon
K. Ilusorio in the aforementioned case,
started working on his channels to the
undersigned to secure a favorable decision
for his client;
4) That Atty. Singsons foremost link to the
undersigned was Atty. Oscar Sevilla, my
family friend and who incidentally was a
classmate of Atty. Singson;
5) That Atty. Sevilla, being a close family
friend, immediately intimated to undersigned
that Atty. Singson wanted a favorable
decision and that there was a not so vague
an offer of a bribe from him (Atty.
Singson);
6) That I rejected every bit of illegal
insinuations and told Atty. Sevilla to assure
Atty. Singson that I am duty bound to decide
every case on the merits no matter who the
litigants are;
7) That even before the start of the hearing of
the case, Atty. Singson himself relentlessly
worked on undersigned by visiting him
about three times in his office. And not
being satisfied with those visits, he (Atty.
Singson) made more than a dozen calls to
undersigneds Manila and Baguio residenc
es, and worked on Atty. Sevilla x x x by
calling the latters cell phone even when we
were playing golf in Manila. These phone
calls were even admitted by Atty. Singson in
a Manifestation he filed in court citing
several ridiculous, unbelievable and
untruthful reasons for his phone calls;
8) That when Ramon K. Ilusorios plea for
injunctive relief was submitted for resolution,
Atty. Singson became more unrelenting in
throwing his professional ethics out of the
window and breached his lawyers oath
by personally calling many more times,
some of which were even made late
evenings, just trying to convince undersigned
to grant the injunctive relief his client Ramon
K. Ilusorio desperately needed in the case;
9) That because of his inability to influence
undersigned x x x, Atty. Singson filed a
motion to inhibit alleging that facts have been
established of undersigneds partiality for his
clients adversary, the defendant Baguio
Country Club;
10) That at the hearing on the motion to
inhibit x x x I declared in open court and in
public the dishonest and unprofessional
conduct of Atty. Singson in trying to
influence a judge to favor his client, no matter
how unmeritorious his prayer for injunction
was. In open court, undersigned scored Atty.
Singsons audacity of asking an inhibition
when it has always been him and him alone
who wanted and tried to influence the
undersigned.
11) That on January 12, 2000, undersigned
issued an Order in Civil Case No. 4537-R x x
x denying Atty. Singsons clients prayer for
the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction x x x;
12) That the undersigneds ruling against
Atty. Singsons client in the case was elevated
to the [CA] in G.R. No. 59353 where x x x
Atty. Singson never raised the issue of
undersigneds denial to inhibit;
13) That still unsatisfied with the [CAs]
adverse ruling against his client, Atty.
Singson went on to the Supreme Court in
G.R. No. 148985 questioning the [CAs]
affirmation of undersigneds decision. The
Supreme Court x x x dismissed the appeal of
Ramon K. Ilusorio and sustained
undersigneds decision.[16] (Emphasis ours.)
Complainant-petitioners also submitted Atty. Oscar
Sevillas affidavit to support the attempted bribery charge
against Atty. Singson. In its pertinent part, Atty. Sevillas
affidavit reads:
That sometime in late October of 1999 x x x,
I received a call from Atty. Singson x x x and
in the course of our conversation, I learned
that Ramon K. Ilusorio is his client who has
a civil case raffled to Judge Reyes;
That during said conversation, I mentioned to
Atty. Singson that Judge Reyes is a family
friend and x x x is a man of integrity;
That in the months that followed, Atty.
Singson made a call or two to my cellphone
requesting if I could mention to Judge Reyes
that he (Atty. Singson) is my classmate at the
Ateneo and also a good friend;
That I remember having mentioned this to
Judge Reyes who told me that he always
decides on the merits of all cases x x x and to
tell Atty. Singson that he need not worry if he
had a meritorious case.[17]
In view of the foregoing considerations, petitioners
prayed that respondents be adjudged guilty of criminal
contempt of court and punished in accordance with Sec. 7, Rule
71 of the Rules of Court. The censure of respondents was also
sought for using extrajudicial ways of influencing pending
cases in court. Lastly, petitioners asked for the disbarment or
discipline of Atty. Singson for attempted bribery and gross
misconduct.
By separate resolutions, the Court directed
respondents to submit their comment on the contempt aspect of
the petition and Atty. Singson to submit his comment on
petitioners motion to consider the same petition as a formal
complaint for disbarment or other disciplinary action.
Respondents Comments
Respondents admitted the fact of filing by Erlinda
Ilusorio of the various manifestations and motions mentioned
in the basic petition for contempt, her authorship of On the
Edge of Heaven, and her having written personal letters to then
Chief Justice Davide. They contended, however, that the
motions and manifestations, couched in a very respectful
language,[18] can hardly be considered contemptuous,
interposed as they were in the exercise of the litigants right to
avail herself of all legal remedies under the Rules of
Court.Erlinda Ilusorios acts, so respondents claimed, were all
made in good faith, motivated by the desire to secure custody x
x x of her husband, [and] to provide [him] adequate medical
care x x x and to prevent him from being an unwitting pawn to
illegally dissipate the properties of the conjugal properties of
the spouses.
As to Erlinda Ilusorios letters to Chief Justice Davide
and the members of the Court, respondents stated that these
letters, far from being contemptuous, tend to improve the
administration of justice and encourage the courts to decide
cases purely on the merits.
And in traversal of the allegation that On the Edge of
Heaven contains actionable matters, respondents claimed, inter
alia, that the comments Erlinda Ilusorio made in the book were
no more than reasonable reactions from a layperson aggrieved
by what she considers an unjust Court decision and who felt she
had to write a book that would rectify the erroneous findings of
the Court and put forth the truth about the so-called Ilusorio
family feud.[19] What is more, respondents
said, sisters Marietta and Shereen as well as Cecilia had no
hand in the contents of the book and its publication, as Erlinda
Ilusorio, as Chairperson and President of PI-EKI Foundation, is
authorized to perform acts on behalf of the foundation.
With regard to the bribery allegations against Atty.
Singson, respondents invited attention to the Manifestation in
Civil Case No. 4537-R to dispute the accusation of Judge
Reyes. The refutations, as reproduced in the respondents
Memorandum, run as follows:
(a) While it is true that Singson called
Judge Reyes numerous times the nature
and purpose of said calls were proper and
above board. The reason why the phone
calls were numerous is because
oftentimes, Judge Reyes was not in the
places where the calls were made.
(b) The phone calls were made either to
request for a postponement of a hearing
of the case or to inquire about the status
of the incident on the issuance of the
temporary restraining order applied for
in the case.
(c) It was Judge Reyes himself who
furnished the telephone numbers in his
office and his residence
in Baguio City. Apparently, Judge
Reyes did not find the telephone calls
improper as he answered most of them,
and that he never reported or complained
about the said calls to the appropriate
judicial authorities or to the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines if he had found the
actuations of Singson in violation of the
provisions of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
(d) As to the alleged bribery attempt, there
is absolutely no truth to the same. If it is
true that there was such an offer, there is
no reason why Singson could not have
made the offer himself, since he
personally knows Judge Reyes. The
allegations of Judge Reyes [are] purely
hearsay and imaginary. If the bribery
attempt had indeed happened, why did
Judge Reyes not report the matter to the
Supreme Court or to the IBP or even
better, cite Atty. Sevilla and/or Singson
in contempt of court, or file a criminal
case of attempted bribery against them,
or discipline them by himself in
accordance with the provisions of Rule
138 and 139 of the Revised Rules of
Court? The fact that Judge Reyes did not
do any of the foregoing clearly shows the
falsity of his claims.[20]
Respondents added that the bribery charge was based
on a hearsay account, since the alleged offer to Judge Reyes
emanated from Atty. Sevilla.
The Issues
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENTS
ARE GUILTY OF INDIRECT CONTEMPT
OF COURT
WHETHER OR NOT ATTY. SINGSON
SHOULD BE ADMINISTRATIVELY
DISCIPLINED OR DISBARRED FROM
THE PRACTICE OF LAW FOR ALLEGED
GROSS MISCONDUCT IN ATTEMPTING
TO BRIBE JUDGE ANTONIO REYES
The Courts Ruling
Indirect Contempt
The Courts dignity and authority would always be
prey to attack were it to treat with abject indifference and look
with complacent eyes on serious breaches of ethics and
denigrating utterances directed against it. To preserve their
authority and efficiency, safeguard the public confidence in
them, and keep inviolate their dignity, courts of justice should
not yield to the assaults of disrespect[21] and must, when
necessary, wield their inherent power to punish for contempt, a
power necessary for their own protection against improper
interference with the due administration of justice.[22]
Contempt, whether direct or indirect, may be civil or
criminal, depending on the nature and effect of the
contemptuous act.[23] Civil contempt is the failure to do
something ordered by the court for the benefit of the opposing
party. Criminal contempt, on the other hand, is conduct directed
against the dignity and authority of the court or a judge acting
judicially; it is an act obstructing the administration of justice
which tends to bring the court into disrepute or
disrespect.[24] On the basis of the foregoing principles, it can be
safely concluded that under Sec. 3(d) of Rule 71 on contempt,
any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede,
obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice constitutes
criminal contempt. This is what petitioners obviously would
have respondents cited for.
The contempt power, however plenary it may seem,
must be exercised judiciously and sparingly with utmost self-
restraint with the end in view of utilizing it for correction and
preservation of the dignity of the court, not for retaliation or
vindication.[25] To be sure, courts and judges, as institutions, are
neither sacrosanct nor immune to public criticisms of their
conduct.[26] And well-recognized is the right of citizens to
criticize in a fair and respectful manner and through legitimate
channels the acts of courts or judges,[27] who in turn ought to be
patient and tolerate as much as possible everything which
appears as hasty and unguarded expression of passion or
momentary outbreak of disappointment at the outcome of a
case. Even snide remarks, as People v. Godoy teaches, do not
necessarily partake the nature of contumacious utterance
actionable under Rule 71 of the Rules of Court.[28]
But as we have emphasized time and time again, [i]t
is the cardinal condition of all such criticism that it shall
be bona fide, and shall not spill over the walls of decency and
propriety. A wide chasm exists between fair criticism, on one
hand, and abuse and slander of courts and the judges thereof, on
the other.[29] Obstructing, by means of opprobrious words,
spoken or written, the administration of justice by the courts
will subject the abuser to punishment for contempt of court.
And regardless of whether or not the case of reference has been
terminated is of little moment. One may be cited for contempt
of court even after the case has ended where such punitive
action is necessary to protect the court and to vindicate it from
acts or conduct calculated to degrade, ridicule, or bring it into
disfavor and thereby erode public confidence in that court.[30]
In the case at bar, the various motions and
manifestations filed by Erlinda Ilusorio neither contained
offensively disrespectful language nor tended to besmirch the
dignity of the Court. In fact, the Court, mindful of the need to
clear its docket of what really is an unfortunate family
squabble, considered and ruled on each of her motions and
manifestations. For the nonce, the Court accords Erlinda
Ilusorio the benefit of the doubt and is inclined to think that her
numerous pleadings that reiterate the same issues were bona
fide attempts to resuscitate and salvage what she might have
sanguinely believed to be a meritorious case involving her
marital rights. This is not to say, however, that the Court views
with unqualified approval the obnoxious practice of filing
pleadings after pleadings that only substantially reiterate the
same issues that had already been passedupon and found to be
unmeritorious. The Court, as a matter of sound practice, will
not allow its precious time and resources to be eaten
unnecessarily.[31] Accordingly, Erlinda Ilusorio and/or counsel
is put on notice against trying the Courts patience and abusing
its forbearance by continuing with their taxing ways.
Erlinda Ilusorios personal letters to then Chief Justice
Davide were not contumacious in character. Neither do we find
them actionable, as a sleigh but sub-rosa attempt to influence
the letter-addressee, under the contempt provisions of the Rules
of Court. As we articulated in In Re: Wenceslao Laureta, letters
addressed to individual members of the Court, in connection
with the performance of their judicial functions, become part of
the judicial record and are a matter of concern for the entire
Court.[32] Although decisions of the Court are not based on
personal letters and pleas to individual justices, we nonetheless
discourage litigants from pursuing such unnecessary extra-legal
methods to secure relief. There are adequate remedies for the
purpose under the Rules of Court.
Unlike the contents of the pleadings and letters in
question, EKIs statements in On the Edge of Heaven, however,
pose a different threat to the Courts repute. For reference, the
following are the defining portions of what she wrote:
(1) The Supreme Court broke up my family.
(2) Was justice for sale? Was justice
sold? Nasaan ang katarungan?
(3) If your decision becomes res
judicata havent you just provided a most
convenient venue to separate spouses
from each other x x x?
(4) Why did you wait for more than one year
and after my husbands death to deny my
motion for reconsideration? Is it because
it is easier to do so now that it is
academic? Does your conscience bother
you at all?
(5) How can the highest court of our land be
a party to the break up of my family and,
disregarding the Family Code x x x?
(6) [I]f our courts can render this kind of
justice to one like myself because I have
lesser means, and lesser connections
than my well-married daughters, what
kind of justice is given to those less
privileged?
Taken together, the foregoing statements and their
reasonably deducible implications went beyond the permissible
bounds of fair criticism. Erlinda Ilusorio minced no words in
directly attacking the Court for its alleged complicity in the
break up of the Ilusorio family, sharply insinuating that the
Court intentionally delayed the resolution of her motion for
reconsideration, disregarded the Family Code, and unduly
favored wealthy litigants. But the worst cut is her suggestion
about the Court selling its decisions. She posed the
query, Nasaan ang katarungan? (Where is justice?), implying
that this Court failed to dispense justice in her case. While most
of her statements were in the form of questions instead of
categorical assertions, the effect is still the same: they constitute
a stinging affront to the honor and dignity of the Court and tend
to undermine the confidence of the public in the integrity of the
highest tribunal of the land.
Erlinda Ilusorio explains that she is a layperson
uninitiated in legal matters, an aggrieved widow who just wants
to be relieved of pain caused by the injustice of the decision of
this Court. She felt she had to write a book that would rectify
the erroneous findings of the Court x x x.[33] Obviously she had
achieved her goal of self-expression but to the detriment of the
orderly administration of justice. To be sure, she could have had
adequately expressed her disagreement with the Courts
disposition in the habeascorpus case without taking the low
road, without being insulting, without casting a cloud of
suspicion on the reputation of the Court. In some detail, the
Court, in People v. Godoy, set forth what is permissible and
when one is considered to have overstepped bounds:
Generally, criticism of a courts
rulings or decisions is not improper, and may
not be restricted after a case has been finally
disposed of and has ceased to be pending. So
long as critics confine their criticisms to facts
and base them on the decisions of the court,
they commit no contempt no matter how
severe the criticism may be; but when they
pass beyond that line and charge that judicial
conduct was influenced by improper, corrupt,
or selfish motives, or that such conduct was
affected by political prejudice or interest, the
tendency is to create distrust and destroy the
confidence of the people in their courts.
But criticism should be
distinguished from insult. A criticism after a
case has been disposed of can no longer
influence the court, and on that ground it does
not constitute contempt. On the other hand,
an insult hurled to the court, even after a case
is decided, can under no circumstance be
justified. Mere criticism or comment on the
correctness or wrongness, soundness or
unsoundness of the decision of the court in a
pending case made in good faith may be
tolerated; but to hurl the false charge that the
Supreme Court has been committing
deliberately so many blunders and injustices
would tend necessarily to undermine the
confidence of the people in the honesty and
integrity of its members, and consequently to
lower or degrade the administration of
justice, and it constitutes contempt.[34]
A becoming respect for the courts should always be
the norm. Litigants, no matter how aggrieved or dissatisfied
they may be of courts decision, do not have the unbridled
freedom in expressing their frustration or grievance in any
manner they want. Crossing the permissible line of fair
comment and legitimate criticism of the bench and its
actuations shall constitute contempt which may be visited with
sanctions from the Court as a measure of protecting and
preserving its dignity and honor.
We explained in Wicker v. Arcangel:
x x x [T]he power to punish for
contempt is to be exercised on the
preservative and not on the vindictive
principle. Only occasionally should it be
invoked to preserve that respect without
which the administration of justice will fail.
The contempt power ought not to be utilized
for the purpose of merely satisfying an
inclination to strike back at a party for
showing less than full respect for the dignity
of the court.[35]
As to the other members of the Board of Directors of
the PI-EKI Foundation, the publisher of On the Edge of
Heaven, we find no merit in the charge of indirect contempt
against them. True, except for Atty. Singson, respondents
Ramon, Marietta and Shereen Ilusorio, and Cecilia appear to be
officers of PI-EKI Foundation. There is no compelling reason,
however, to pierce, as petitioners urge, the veil of corporate
fiction in order to hold these officers liable, especially in light
of Erlinda Ilusorios assertion of being authorized, as
Chairperson and President of the said foundation, to perform
acts on behalf of the foundation without prior board
approval. Indirect contempt is a deliberate act to bring the court
or judge into disrepute. In this case, proof of the participation
of the board of directors and officers to willfully malign the
Court is utterly wanting. In this regard, there is authority
indicating that no one can be amenable to criminal contempt
unless the evidence makes it abundantly clear that one intended
to commit it.[36] It cannot plausibly be assumed that the said
officers shared Erlinda Ilusorios ill regard towards the judiciary
from the mere fact that the PI-EKI Foundation published the
book.
Disbarment
As to the complaint for disbarment, there is a well-
grounded reason to believe that Atty. Singson indeed attempted
to influence Judge Reyes decide a case in favor of Atty.
Singsons client. The interplay of the following documentary
evidence, earlier cited, provides the reason: (1) the transcript of
the stenographic notes of the May 31, 2000 hearing in the sala
of Judge Reyes in Civil Case 4537-R when the judge made it of
record about the attempt to bribe; (2) the affidavit of Judge
Reyes dated December 23, 2004 narrating in some detail how
and thru whom the attempt to bribe adverted to was made; and
(3) the affidavit of Atty. Sevilla who admitted having been
approached by Atty. Singson to intercede for his case pending
with Judge Reyes. Significantly, Atty. Singson admitted having
made phone calls to Judge Reyes, either in his residence or
office in Baguio Cityduring the period material. He offers the
lame excuse, however, that he was merely following up the
status of a temporary restraining order applied for and
sometimes asking for the resetting of hearings.
The Court finds the explanation proffered as puerile as
it is preposterous. Matters touching on case status could and
should be done through the court staff, and resetting is usually
accomplished thru proper written motion or in open court. And
going by Judge Reyes affidavit, the incriminating calls were
sometimes made late in the evening and sometimes in the most
unusual hours, such as while Judge Reyes was playing golf with
Atty. Sevilla. Atty. Sevilla lent corroborative support to Judge
Reyes statements, particularly about the fact that Atty. Singson
wanted Judge Reyes apprised that they, Singson and Sevilla,
were law school classmates.
The highly immoral implication of a lawyer
approaching a judgeor a judge evincing a willingnessto discuss,
in private, a matter related to a case pending in that judges sala
cannot be over-emphasized. The fact that Atty. Singson did talk
on different occasions to Judge Reyes, initially through a
mutual friend, Atty. Sevilla, leads us to conclude that Atty.
Singson was indeed trying to influence the judge to rule in his
clients favor. This conduct is not acceptable in the legal
profession. Canon 13 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility enjoins it:
Canon 13. A lawyer shall rely upon the
merits of his cause and refrain from any
impropriety which tends to influence or gives
the appearance of influencing the court.
At this juncture, the Court takes particular stock of the
ensuing statement Judge Reyes made in his affidavit: x x
x Atty. Sevilla, being a close family friend, immediately
intimated to [me] that Atty. Singson wanted a favorable
decision and that there was a not so vague an offer of a bribe
from him (Atty. Singson). Judge Reyes reiterated the bribe
attempt during the hearing on May 31, 2000, and made
reference to the figure PhP 500,000, the amount Atty. Singson
offered through Atty. Sevilla. As may be expected, Atty.
Singson dismissed Judge Reyes account as hearsay and
questioned the non-filing of any complaint for attempted
bribery or disciplinary action by Judge Reyes at or near the time
it was said to have been committed.
First, we must stress the difficulty of proving
bribery. The transaction is always done in secret and often only
between the two parties concerned. Indeed, there is no concrete
evidence in the records regarding the commission by Atty.
Singson of attempted bribery. Even Atty. Sevilla did not
mention any related matter in his affidavit.Nevertheless, Judge
Reyes disclosures in his affidavit and in open court deserve
some weight. The possibility of an attempted bribery is not far
from reality considering Atty. Singsons persistent phone calls,
one of which he made while Judge Reyes was with Atty.
Sevilla. Judge Reyes declaration may have been an emotional
outburst as described by Atty. Singson, but the spontaneity of
an outburst only gives it more weight.
While the alleged attempted bribery may perhaps not
be supported by evidence other than Judge Reyes statements,
there is nevertheless enough proof to hold Atty. Singson liable
for unethical behavior of attempting to influence a judge, itself
a transgression of considerable gravity. However, heeding the
injunction against decreeing disbarment where a lesser sanction
would suffice to accomplish the desired end, a suspension for
one year from the practice of law appears appropriate.
WHEREFORE, Erlinda K. Ilusorio is
adjudged GUILTY of INDIRECT CONTEMPT and is
ordered to pay a fine of ten thousand pesos (PhP 10,000). Atty.
Manuel R. Singson is SUSPENDED for ONE (1)
YEAR from the practice of law, effective upon his receipt of
this Decision. Costs against respondents.
Let all the courts, through the Office of the Court
Administrator, as well as the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines and the Office of the Bar Confidant be notified
of this Decision and be it duly recorded in the personal file of
respondent Manuel R. Singson.
SO ORDERED.
Duterte v. Sandiganbayan
Duterte v. Sandiganbayan, 289 SCRA 721 (1998)
FACTS: Petitioners were charged before the Sandiganbayan
for violating Sec. 3(g) of R.A. No. 3019, otherwise known as
the Anti-Graft And Corrupt Practices Act for allegedly
entering into an anomalous contract for the purchase of
computer hardware and accessories with the Systems Plus,
Incorporated.
It appears that four years prior to filing of the information
before the Sandiganbayan, petitioners were merely directed to
submit a point-by-point comment under oath on the
allegations in a civil case filed against them before the RTC
and on the allegations in an unverified complaint filed before
the Ombudsman by the Anti-Graft League. Petitioners had no
inkling that they were being subjected to a preliminary
investigation as in fact there was no indication in the order that
a preliminary investigation was being conducted.
Petitioners filed a motion a motion for reconsideration
alleging among others that they were deprived of their right to
a preliminary investigation, due process and the speedy
disposition of their case, which the Sandiganbayan denied.
They filed a motion to quash but the same was denied by the
Sandiganbayan.
Hence this petition.
ISSUE: W/N the petitioners right to speedy trial was violated
by the inordinate delay in the conduct of the preliminary
investigation?
HELD: YES. The preliminary investigation of the charges
against petitioners has been conducted not in the manner laid
down in Administrative Order No. 07. The inordinate delay in
the conduct of the preliminary investigation infringed upon
their constitutionally guaranteed right to a speedy disposition
of their case.[22] In Tatad vs. Sandiganbayan,[23] we held
that an undue delay of close to three (3) years in the
termination of the preliminary investigation in the light of the
circumstances obtaining in that case warranted the dismissal
of the case.
Petitioners in this case, however, could not have urged the
speedy resolution of their case because they were completely
unaware that the investigation against them was still on-
going. Peculiar to this case, we reiterate, is the fact that
petitioners were merely asked to comment, and not file
counter-affidavits which is the procedure to follow in a
preliminary investigation. After giving their explanation and
after four long years of being in the dark, petitioners,
naturally, had reason to assume that the charges against them
had already been dismissed.
Finally, under the facts of the case, there is no basis in the law
or in fact to charge petitioners for violation of Sec. 3(g) of
R.A. No. 3019. To establish probable cause against the
offender for violation of Sec. 3(g), the following elements
must be present: (1) the offender is a public officer; (2) he
entered into a contract or transaction in behalf of the
government; (3) the contract or transaction is grossly and
manifestly disadvantageous to the government.
[G.R. No. 130191. April 27, 1998]
RODRIGO R. DUTERTE and BENJAMIN C. DE
GUZMAN, petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE
SANDIGANBAYAN, respondent.
DECISION
KAPUNAN, J.:
The right to preliminary investigation is not a mere formal
right, it is a substantive right. To deny the accused of such right
would be to deprive him of due process.
In this special civil action for certiorari with preliminary
injunction, petitioners seek to set aside the Order of the
Sandiganbayan dated 27 June 1997 denying the Motion to
Quash the information filed against them for violating Sec. 3(g)
of R.A. No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft And
Corrupt Practices Act. Petitioners similarly impugn the
Resolution of the Sandiganbayan dated 5 August 1997 which
denied their Motion for Reconsideration thereof.
Pertinent to this case are the following facts:
In 1990, the Davao City Local Automation Project was
launched by the city government of Davao. The goal of said
project was to make Davao City a leading center for computer
systems and technology development. It also aimed to provide
consultancy and training services and to assist all local
government units in Mindanao set up their respective
computer systems.
To implement the project, a Computerization Program
Committee, composed of the following was formed:
Chairman : Atty. Benjamin C. de Guzman, City Administrator
Members : Mr. Jorge Silvosa, Acting City Treasurer
Atty. Victorino Advincula, City Councilor
Mr. Alexis Almendras, City Councilor\
Atty. Onofre Francisco, City Legal Officer
Mr. Rufino Ambrocio, Jr., Chief of Internal Control Office
Atty. Mariano Kintanar, COA Resident Auditor.[1]
The Committees duty was to conduct a thorough study of the
different computers in the market, taking into account the
quality and acceptability of the products, the reputation and
track record of the manufacturers and/or their Philippine
distributors, the availability of service centers in the country
that can undertake preventive maintenance of the computer
hardwares to ensure a long and uninterrupted use and, last but
not the least, the capability of the manufacturers and/or
Philippine distributors to design and put into place the
computer system complete with the flow of paperwork, forms
to be used and personnel required.[2]
Following these guidelines, the Committee recommended
the acquisition of Goldstar computers manufactured by
Goldstar Information and Communication, Ltd., South Korea
and exclusively distributed in the Philippines by Systems Plus,
Inc. (SPI).
After obtaining prior clearance from COA Auditor
Kintanar, the Committee proceeded to negotiate with SPI,
represented by its President Rodolfo V. Jao and Executive Vice
President Manuel T. Asis, for the acquisition and installation of
the computer hardware and the training of personnel for the
Electronic Data-Processing Center. The total contract cost
amounted to P11,656,810.00
On 5 November 1990, the City Council (Sangguniang
Panlungsod) of Davao unanimously passed Resolution No.
1402 and Ordinance No. 173 approving the proposed contract
for computerization between Davao City and SPI. The
Sanggunian, likewise, authorized the City Mayor (petitioner
Duterte) to sign the said contract for and in behalf of Davao
City.[3]
On the same day, the Sangguniang issued Resolution No.
1403 and Ordinance No. 174, the General Fund Supplemental
Budget No. 07 for CY 1990 appropriating P3,000,000.00 for
the citys computerization project.
 Given the go-signal, the contract was duly signed by the
parties thereto and on 8 November 1990, petitioner City
Administrator de Guzman released to SPI PNB Check No.
65521 in the amount of P1,748,521.58 as downpayment.
On 27 November 1990, the Office of the Ombudsman-
Mindanao received a letter-complaint from a concerned citizen,
stating that some city officials are going to make a killing in the
transaction.[4] The complaint was docketed as OMB-MIN-90-
0425. However, no action was taken thereon.[5]
Thereafter, sometime in February 1991, a complaint
docketed as Civil Case No. 20,550-91, was instituted before the
Regional Trial Court of Davao City, Branch 12 by Dean Pilar
Braga, Hospicio C. Conanan, Jr. and Korsung Dabaw
Foundation, Inc. against the petitioners, the City Council,
various city officials and SPI for the judicial declaration of
nullity of the aforestated resolutions and ordinances and the
computer contract executed pursuant thereto.
On 22 February 1991, Goldstar, through its agent, Mr.
S.Y. Lee sent a proposal to petitioner Duterte for the
cancellation of the computerization contract.
Consequently, on 8 April 1991, the Sangguniang issued
Resolution No. 449 and Ordinance No. 53 accepting Goldstars
offer to cancel the computerization contract provided the latter
return the advance payment of P1,748,521.58 to the City
Treasurers Office within a period of one month. Petitioner
Duterte, as city mayor, was thus authorized to take the proper
steps for the mutual cancellation of the said contract and to sign
all documents relevant thereto.[6]
Pursuant to the aforestated authority, on 6 May 1991,
petitioner Duterte, in behalf of Davao City, and SPI mutually
rescinded the contract and the downpayment was duly
refunded.
In the meantime, a Special Audit Team of the Commission
on Audit was tasked to conduct an audit of the Davao City Local
Automation Project to determine if said contract conformed to
government laws and regulations.
On 31 May 1991, the team submitted its Special Audit
Report (SAR) No. 91-05 recommending rescission of the
subject contract. A copy of the report was sent to petitioner
Duterte by COA Chairman Eufemio C. Domingo on 7 June
1991. In the latters transmittal letter, Chairman Domingo
summarized the findings of the special audit team, thus:
1. The award of the contract for the Davao City Local
Automation Project to Systems Plus, Inc.,
for P11,656,810 was done thru negotiated contract
rather than thru competitive public bidding in
violation of Sections 2 and 8 of PD 526. Moreover,
there was no sufficient appropriation for this
particular contract in violation of Sec. 85 of PD 1445.
2. Advance payment of P1.7M was made to Systems Plus, Inc.
covering 15% of the contract cost of P11.6M in
violation of Sec. 45 of PD 477 and Sec. 88 of PD
1445.
3. The cost of computer hardware and accessories under
contract with Systems Plus, Inc. (SPI) differed from
the teams canvass by as much as 1200% or a total
of P1.8M.
4. The City had no Information System Plan (ISP) prior to the
award of the contract to SPI in direct violation of
Malacaang Memo. Order No. 287 and NCC Memo.
Circular 89-1 dated June 22, 1989. This omission
resulted in undue disadvantage to the City
Government.
5. To remedy the foregoing deficiencies, the team
recommends that the contract with Systems Plus, Inc.
be rescinded in view of the questionable validity due
to insufficient funding. Further, the provisions of
NCC-Memorandum Circular 89-1 dated June 22,
1989 regarding procurement and/or installation of
computer hardware/system should be strictly adhered
to.[7]
The city government, intent on pursuing its
computerization plan, decided to follow the audit teams
recommendation and sought the assistance of the National
Computer Center (NCC).After conducting the necessary
studies, the NCC recommended the acquisition of Philips
computers in the amount of P15,792,150.00. Davao City
complied with the NCCs advice and hence, was finally able to
obtain the needed computers.
Subsequently, on 1 August 1991, the Anti-Graft League-
Davao City Chapter, through one Miguel C. Enriquez, filed an
unverified complaint with the Ombudsman-Mindanao against
petitioners, the City Treasurer, City Auditor, the whole city
government of Davao and SPI. The League alleged that the
respondents, in entering into the computerization contract,
violated R.A. No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act),
PD No. 1445 (Government Auditing Code of the Philippines),
COA circulars and regulations, the Revised Penal Code and
other pertinent laws. The case was docketed as OMB-3-91-
1768.[8]
On 9 October 1991, Graft Investigation Officer (GIO)
Pepito A. Manriquez of the Office of the Ombudsman sent a
letter[9] to COA Chairman Domingo requesting the Special
Audit Team to submit their joint affidavit to substantiate the
complaint in compliance with Section 4, par. (a) of the Rules of
Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman (A. O. No. 07).
On 14 October 1991, Judge Paul T. Arcangel, issued an
Order dismissing Civil Case No. 20,550-91. The dispositive
portion reads, thus:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, this case is
hereby dismissed on the ground of prematurity and that it has
become moot and academic with the mutual cancellation of
the contract. The other claims of the parties are hereby
denied. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.[10]
 On 12 November 1991, Graft Investigator Manriquez
issued an order in OMB-3-91-1768 directing petitioners, Jorge
Silvosa (City Treasurer), Mariano Kintanar (City Auditor) and
Manuel T. Asis of SPI to:
xxx file in ten (10) days (1) their respective verified point-by-
point comment under oath upon every allegation of the
complaint in Civil Case No. 20,550-91 in the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 12, Davao City Dean Pilar C. Braga, et
al. vs. Illegality of City Council of Davao Resolutions and
Ordinances, and the Computer Contract executed Pursuant
Thereto, for Recovery of Sum of Money, Professional Fees
and Costs with Injunctive Relief, including the Issuance of a
Restraining Order and/or a Writ of Preliminary Prohibitory
Injunction in which they filed a motion to dismiss, not an
answer and (2) the respective comments, also under oath, on
the Special Audit Report No. 91-05, a copy of which is
attached.[11]
On 4 December 1991, the Ombudsman received the
affidavits of the Special Audit Team but failed to furnish
petitioners copies thereof.
On 18 February 1992, petitioners submitted a
manifestation adopting the comments filed by their co-
respondents Jorge Silvosa and Mariano Kintanar dated 25
November 1991 and 17 January 1992, respectively.
Four years after, or on 22 February 1996, petitioners
received a copy of a Memorandum prepared by Special
Prosecution Officer I, Lemuel M. De Guzman dated 8 February
1996 addressed to Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto regarding
OMB-MIN-90-0425 and OMB-3-91-1768. Prosecutor De
Guzman recommended that the charges of malversation,
violation of Sec. 3(e), R.A. No. 3019 and Art. 177, Revised
Penal Code against petitioners and their co-respondents be
dismissed. He opined that any issue pertaining to unwarranted
benefits or injury to the government and malversation were
rendered moot and academic by the mutual rescission of the
subject contract before the COA submitted its findings (SAR
No. 91-05) or before the disbursement was
disallowed. However, Prosecutor De Guzman recommended
that petitioners be charged under Sec. 3(g) of R.A. No. 3019 for
having entered into a contract manifestly and grossly
disadvantageous to the government, the elements of profit,
unwarranted benefits or loss to government being
immaterial.[12]
Accordingly, the following information dated 8 February
1996 was filed against petitioners before the Sandiganbayan
(docketed as Criminal Case No. 23193):
That on or about November 5, 1990, in the City of Davao,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, both public officers, accused
Benjamin C. De Guzman being then the City Administrator of
Davao City, committing the crime herein charged in relation
to, while in the performance and taking advantage of their
official functions, and conspiring and confederating with each
other, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally
enter into a negotiated contract for the purchase of computer
hardware and accessories with the Systems Plus, Incorporated
for and in consideration of the amount of PESOS: ELEVEN
MILLION SIX HUNDRED FIFTY-SIX THOUSAND EIGHT
HUNDRED TEN (P11,656,810.00), which contract is
manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the government,
said accused knowing fully-well that the said acquisition cost
has been overpriced by as much as twelve hundred (1200%)
percent and without subjecting said acquisition to the required
public bidding.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[13]
On 27 February 1996, petitioners filed a motion for
reconsideration and on 29 March 1996, a Supplemental Motion
for Reconsideration on the following grounds:
1. Petitioners were deprived of their right to a preliminary
investigation, due process and the speedy disposition
of their case;
2. Petitioner Duterte acted in good faith and was clothed with
authority to enter into the subject contract;
3. There is no contract manifestly and grossly disadvantageous
to the government since the subject contract has been
duly rescinded.
On 19 March 1996, the Ombudsman issued a Resolution
denying petitioners motion for reconsideration.
On 18 June 1997, petitioners filed a Motion to Quash
which was denied by the Sandiganbayan in its Order dated 27
June 1997. The Sandiganbayan ruled:
It appears, however, that the accused were able to file motions
for the reconsideration of the Resolution authorizing the filing
of the Information herein with the Ombudsman in
Manila. This would mean, therefore, that whatever decision
which might have occurred with respect to the preliminary
investigation would have been remedied by the motion for
consideration in the sense that whatever the accused had to say
in their behalf, they were able to do in that motion for
reconsideration.
Considering the denial thereof by the Office of the
Ombudsman, the Court does not believe itself empowered to
authorize a reinvestigation on the ground of an inadequacy of
the basic preliminary investigation nor with respect to a
dispute as to the proper appreciation by the prosecution of the
evidence at that time.
In view hereof, upon further representation by Atty.
Medialdea that he represents not only Mayor Duterte but City
Administrator de Guzman as well, upon his commitment, the
arraignment hereof is now set for July 25, 1997 at 8:00 oclock
in the morning.[14]
On 15 July 1997, petitioners moved for reconsideration of
the above order but the same was denied by the Sandiganbayan
for lack of merit in its Resolution dated 5 August 1997. [15]
Hence, the present recourse.
 Petitioners allege that:
THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN COMMITTED
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO
LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN DENYING
PETITIONERS MOTION TO QUASH AND MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION, CONSIDERING THAT:
A
(1) PETITIONERS WERE EFFECTIVELY DEPRIVED
OF THEIR RIGHT TO A PRELIMINARY
INVESTIGATION PURSUANT TO SEC. 4,
RULE II OF ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO.
07 (RULES OF PROCEDURE OF THE
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN); AND
(2) ASSUMING THAT A PRELIMINARY
INVESTIGATION WAS PROPERLY
CONDUCTED, THERE WAS AN
INORDINATE DELAY IN TERMINATING
THE SAME THEREBY DEPRIVING THEM
OF THEIR RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS AND
SPEEDY DISPOSITION OF THE CASE.
B
THERE IS NO SUFFICIENT BASIS, IN FACT
AND IN LAW, TO CHARGE PETITIONERS
DUTERTE AND DE GUZMAN OF
VIOLATING SEC. 3 (G) OF R.A. 3019 IN
THAT:
(1) PETITIONER DUTERTE ACTED IN GOOD FAITH
AND WAS CLOTHED WITH FULL LEGAL
AUTHORITY FROM THE CITY COUNCIL
TO ENTER INTO A CONTRACT WITH
SYSTEMS PLUS, INC.,
(2) THERE IS NO CONTRACT MANIFESTLY AND
GROSSLY DISADVANTAGEOUS TO THE
GOVERNMENT TO SPEAK OF AS THE
SAME HAS BEEN RESCINDED AND NO
DAMAGE WAS SUFFERED BY THE CITY
GOVERNMENT;
(3) ASSUMING THAT THE CONTRACT WAS NOT
RESCINDED, THE SAME CANNOT BE
CONSIDERED AS MANIFESTLY AND
GROSSLY DISADVANTAGEOUS TO THE
GOVERNMENT.[16]
On 4 September 1997, the Court issued a Temporary
Restraining Order enjoining the Sandiganbayan from further
proceeding with Criminal Case No. 23193.
The Court finds the petition meritorious.
We have judiciously studied the case records and we find
that the preliminary investigation of the charges against
petitioners has been conducted not in the manner laid down in
Administrative Order No. 07.
In the 12 November 1991 Order of Graft Investigator
Manriquez, petitioners were merely directed to submit a point-
by-point comment under oath on the allegations in Civil Case
No. 20,550-91 and SAR No. 91-05. The said order
was not accompanied by a single affidavit of any person
charging petitioners of any offense as required by law.[17] They
were just required to comment upon the allegations in Civil
Case No. 20,550-91 of the Regional Trial Court of Davao City
which had earlier been dismissed and on the COA Special Audit
Report. Petitioners had no inkling that they were being
subjected to a preliminary investigation as in fact there was no
indication in the order that a preliminary investigation was
being conducted. If Graft Investigator Manriquez had intended
merely to adopt the allegations of the plaintiffs in the civil case
or the Special Audit Report (whose recommendation for the
cancellation of the contract in question had been complied with)
as his basis for criminal prosecution, then the procedure was
plainly anomalous and highly irregular. As a consequence,
petitioners constitutional right to due process was violated.
Sections (2) and (4), Rule II of Administrative Order No.
07 (Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman)
provide:
Sec. 2. Evaluation. Upon evaluating the complaint, the
investigating officer shall recommend whether or not it may
be:
a) dismissed outright for want of palpable merit;
b) referred to respondent for comment;
c) endorsed to the proper government office or agency which
has jurisdiction over the case;
d) forwarded to the appropriate office or official for fact-
finding investigation;
e) referred for administrative adjudication; or
f) subjected to a preliminary investigation
xxx
Sec. 4. Procedure. The preliminary investigation of cases
falling under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan and
Regional Trial Courts shall be conducted in the manner
prescribed in Section 3, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court,
subject to the following provisions:
a) If the complaint is not under oath or is based only on
official reports, the investigating officer shall require the
complainant or supporting witnesses to execute affidavits to
substantiate the complaints.
b) After such affidavits have been secured, the investigating
officer shall issue an order, attaching thereto a copy of the
affidavits and other supporting documents, directing the
respondent to submit, within ten (10) days from receipt
thereof, his counter-affidavits and controverting evidence with
proof of service thereof on the complainant. The complainant
may file reply affidavits within ten (10) days after service of
the counter-affidavits.
c) If the respondent does not file a counter-affidavit, the
investigating officer may consider the comment filed by him,
if any, as his answer to the complaint. In any event, the
respondent shall have access to the evidence on record.
d) No motion to dismiss shall be allowed except for lack of
jurisdiction. Neither may a motion for a bill of particulars be
entertained. If respondent desires any matter in the
complainants affidavit to be clarified, the particularization
thereof may be done at the time of clarificatory questioning in
the manner provided in paragraph (f) of this section.
e) If the respondent cannot be served with the order mentioned
in paragraph 6 hereof, or having been served, does not comply
therewith, the complaint shall be deemed submitted for
resolution on the basis of the evidence on record.
f) If, after the filing of the requisite affidavits and their
supporting evidences, there are facts material to the case
which the investigating officer may need to be clarified on, he
may conduct a clarificatory hearing during which the parties
shall be afforded the opportunity to be present but without the
right to examine or cross-examine the witness being
questioned. Where the appearance of the parties or witnesses
is impracticable, the clarificatory questioning may be
conducted in writing, whereby the questions desired to be
asked by the investigating officer or a party shall be reduced
into writing and served on the witness concerned who shall be
required to answer the same in writing and under oath.
g) Upon the termination of the preliminary investigation, the
investigating officer shall be forward the records of the case
together with his resolution to the designated authorities for
their appropriate action thereon.
No information may be filed and no complaint may be
dismissed without the written authority or approval of the
Ombudsman in cases falling within the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan, or the proper Deputy Ombudsman in all other
cases.
In what passes off as application of the foregoing rules, all
that petitioners were asked to do was merely to file their
comment upon every allegation of the complaint in Civil Case
No. 20,550-91 in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) and on the
COA Special Audit Report. The comment referred to in Section
2(b) Rule II, of A.O. No. 07 is not part of or is equivalent to the
preliminary investigation contemplated in Sec. 4, Rule II, of the
same Administrative Order. A plain reading of Sec. 2 would
convey the idea that upon evaluation of the complaint, the
investigating officer may recommend its outright dismissal for
palpable want of merit; otherwise, or if the complaint appears
to have some merit, the investigator may recommend action
under any of those enumerated from (b) to (f), that is, the
investigator may recommend that the complaint be: referred to
respondent for comment, or endorsed to the proper government
office or agency which has jurisdiction over the case; or
forwarded to the appropriate office of official for fact-finding
investigation. Now, if the investigator opts to recommend the
filing of a comment by the respondent, it is presumably because
he needs more facts and information for further evaluation of
the merits of the complaint. That being done, the investigating
officer shall again recommend any one of the actions
enumerated in Section 2, which include the conduct of a
preliminary investigation.
A preliminary investigation, on the other hand, takes on
an adversarial quality and an entirely different procedures
comes into play. This must be so because the purpose of a
preliminary investigation or a previous inquiry of some kind,
before an accused person is placed on trial, is to secure the
innocent against hasty, malicious and oppressive prosecution,
and to protect him from an open and public accusation of a
crime, from the trouble, expenses and anxiety of public
trial.[18] It is also intended to protect the state from having to
conduct useless and expensive trials.[19] While the right is
statutory rather than constitutional in its fundament, it is a
component part of due process in criminal justice. The right to
have a preliminary investigation conducted before being bound
over to trial for a criminal offense and hence, formally at risk of
incarceration or some other penalty, is not a mere formal or
technical right; it is a substantive right. To deny the accuseds
claim to a preliminary investigation would be to deprive him of
the full measure of his right to due process.[20]
Note that in preliminary investigation, if the complaint is
unverified or based only on official reports (which is the
situation obtaining in the case at bar), the complainant is
required to submit affidavits to substantiate the complaint. The
investigating officer, thereafter, shall issue an order, to which
copies of the complaint-affidavit are attached, requiring the
respondent to submit his counter-affidavits. In the preliminary
investigation, what the respondent is required to file is a
counter-affidavit, not a comment. It is only when the respondent
fails to file a counter-affidavit may the investigating officer
consider the respondents comment as the answer to the
complaint. Against the foregoing backdrop, there was a
palpable non-observance by the Office of the Ombudsman of
the fundamental requirements of preliminary investigation.
Apparently, in the case at bar, the investigating officer
considered the filing of petitioners comment as a substantial
compliance with the requirements of a preliminary
investigation. Initially, Graft Investor Manriquez directed the
members of the Special Audit Team on 9 October 1991 to
submit their affidavits relative to SAR No. 91-05. However, on
12 November 1991, before the affidavits were submitted,
Manriquez required petitioners to submit their respective
comments on the complaint in the civil case and on Special
Audit Report (SAR) 91-05. Even when the required affidavits
were filed by the audit team on 4 December 1991, petitioners
were still not furnished copies thereof. The Ombudsman
contends that failure to provide petitioners the complaint-
affidavits is immaterial since petitioners were well aware of the
existence of the civil complaint and SAR No. 91-05. We find
the Ombudsmans reasoning flawed. The civil complaint and the
COA Special Audit Report are not equivalent to the complaint-
affidavits required by the rules. Moreover, long before
petitioners were directed to file their comments, the civil
complaint (Civil Case No. 20, 550-91) was rendered moot and
academic and, accordingly, dismissed following the mutual
cancellation of the computerization contract. In SAR No. 91-
05, on the other hand, petitioners were merely advised to
rescind the subject contract which was accomplished even
before the audit report came out. In light of these circumstances,
the Court cannot blame petitioners for being unaware of the
proceedings conducted against them.
In Olivas vs. Office of the Ombudsman,[21] this Court,
speaking through Justice Vicente V. Mendoza, emphasized that
it is mandatory requirement for the complaint to submit his
affidavit and those of his witnesses before the respondent can
be compelled to submit his counter-affidavits and other
supporting documents. Thus:
Even in investigations looking to the prosecution of a party,
Rule I, 3 can only apply to the general criminal investigation,
which in the case at bar was already conducted by the PCGG.
But after the Ombudsman and his deputies have gathered
evidence and their investigation has ceased to be a general
exploratory one and they decide to bring the action against a
party, their proceedings become adversary and Rule II 4(a)
then applies. This means that before the respondent can be
required to submit counter-affidavits and other supporting
documents, the complaint must submit his affidavit and those
of his witnesses. This is true not only of prosecutions of graft
cases under Rep. Act No. 3019 but also of actions for the
recovery of unexplained wealth under Rep. Act No. 1379,
because 2 of this latter law requires that before a petition is
filed there must be a previous inquiry similar to preliminary
investigation in criminal cases.
Indeed, since a preliminary investigation is designed to screen
cases for trial, only evidence may be considered. While reports
and even raw information may justify the initiation of an
investigation, the stage of preliminary investigation can be
held only after sufficient evidence has been gathered and
evaluated warranting the eventual prosecution of the case in
court. As this Court held in Cojuangco, Jr. v. PCGG:
Although such a preliminary investigation is not a trial and is
not intended to usurp the function of the trial court, it is not a
casual affair. The officer conducting the same investigates or
inquires into the facts concerning the commission of the crime
with the end in view of determining whether or not an
information may be prepared against the accused. Indeed, a
preliminary investigation is in effect a realistic judicial
appraisal of the merits of the case. Sufficient proof of the guilt
of the accused must be adduced so that when the case is tried,
the trial court may not be bound as a matter of law to order an
acquittal. A preliminary investigation has then been called a
judicial inquiry. It is a judicial proceeding. An act becomes
judicial when there is opportunity to be heard and for the
production and weighing of evidence, and a decision is
rendered thereof.
II
Compounding the deprivation of petitioners of their right
to a preliminary investigation was the undue and unreasonable
delay in the termination of the irregularity conducted
preliminary investigation. Petitioners manifestation adopting
the comments of their co-respondents was filed on 18 February
1992. However, it was only on 22 February 1996 or four (4)
years later, that petitioners received a memorandum dated 8
February 1996 submitted by Special Prosecutor Officer I
Lemuel M. De Guzman recommending the filing of information
against them for violation of Sec. 3(g) of R.A. No. 3019 (Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act). The inordinate delay in the
conduct of the preliminary investigation infringed upon their
constitutionally guaranteed right to a speedy disposition of their
case.[22] In Tatad vs. Sandiganbayan,[23] we held that an undue
delay of close to three (3) years in the termination of the
preliminary investigation in the light of the circumstances
obtaining in that case warranted the dismissal of the case:
We find the long delay in the termination of the preliminary
investigation by the Tanodbayan in the instant case to be
violative of the constitutional right of the accused to due
process. Substantial adherence to the requirements of the law
governing the conduct of preliminary investigation, including
substantial compliance with the time limitation prescribed by
the law for the resolution of the case by the prosecutor, is part
of the procedural due process constitutionally guaranteed by
the fundamental law. Not only under the broad umbrella of the
due process clause, but under the constitutional guarantee of
speedy disposition of cases as embodied in Section 16 of the
Bill of Rights (both in the 1973 and 1987 Constitution), the
inordinate delay is violative of the petitioners constitutional
rights. A delay of close to three (3) years can not be deemed
reasonable or justifiable in the light of the circumstances
obtaining in the case at bar. We are not impressed by the
attempt of the Sandiganbayan to sanitize the long delay by
indulging in the speculative assumption that the delay may be
due to a painstaking and grueling scrutiny by the Tanodbayan
as to whether the evidence presented during the preliminary
investigation merited prosecution of a former high-ranking
government official. In the first place, such a statement
suggests a double standard of treatment, which must be
emphatically rejected. Secondly, three out of the five charges
against the petitioner were for his alleged failure to file his
sworn statement of assets and liabilities required by Republic
Act No. 3019, which certainly did not involve complicated
legal and factual issues necessitating such painstaking and
grueling scrutiny as would justify a delay of almost three years
in terminating the preliminary investigation. The other two
charges relating to alleged bribery and alleged giving of
unwarranted benefits to a relative, while presenting more
substantial legal and factual issues, certainly do not warrant or
justify the period of three years, which it took the Tanodbayan
to resolve the case.
It has been suggested that the long delay in terminating the
preliminary investigation should not be deemed fatal, for even
the complete absence of a preliminary investigation does not
warrant dismissal of the information. True but the absence of a
preliminary investigation can be corrected by giving the
accused such investigation. But an undue delay in the conduct
of the preliminary investigation can not be corrected, for until
now, man has not yet invented a device for setting back time.
In the recent case of Angchangco, Jr. vs.
Ombudsman,[24] the Court upheld Angchangcos right to the
speedy disposition of his case. Angchangco was a sheriff in the
Regional Trial Court of Agusan del Norte and Butuan City. In
1990 criminal complaints were filed against him which
remained pending before the Ombudsman even after his
retirement in 1994. The Court thus ruled:
Here, the Office of the Ombudsman, due to its failure to
resolve the criminal charges against petitioner for more than
six years, has transgressed on the constitutional right of
petitioner to due process and to a speedy disposition of the
cases against him, as well as the Ombudsmans own
constitutional duty to act promptly on complaints filed before
it. For all these past 6 years, petitioner has remained under a
cloud, and since his retirement in September 1994, he has
been deprived of the fruits of his retirement after serving the
government for over 42 years all because of the inaction of
respondent Ombusman. If we wait any longer, it may be too
late for petitioner to receive his retirement benefits, not to
speak of clearing his name. This is a case of plain injustice
which calls for the issuance of the writ prayed for. [25]
We are not persuaded by the Ombudsmans argument that
the Tatad ruling does not apply to the present case which is not
politically motivated unlike the former, pointing out the
following findings of the Court in the Tatad decision:
A painstaking review of the facts can not but leave the
impression that political motivations played a vital role in
activating and propelling the prosecutional process in this
case. Firstly, the complaint came to life, as it were, only after
petitioner Tatad had a falling out with President Marcos.
Secondly, departing from established procedures prescribed by
law for preliminary investigation, which require the
submission of affidavits and counter-affidavits by the
complainant and the respondent and their witnesses, the
Tanodbayan referred the complaint to the Presidential Security
Command for fact-finding investigation and report.
We find such blatant departure from the established procedure
as dubious, but revealing attempt to involve an office directly
under the President in the prosecutional process lending
credence to the suspicion that the prosecution was politically
motivated. We cannot emphasize too strongly that prosecutors
should not allow, and should avoid, giving the impression that
their noble office is being used or prostituted, wittingly or
unwittingly, for political ends, or other purposes alien to, or
subversive of, the basic and fundamental objective observing
the interest of justice evenhandedly, without fear or favor to
any and all litigants alike whether rich or poor, weak or strong,
powerless or mighty. Only by strict adherence to the
established procedure may be publics perception of the
impartiality of the prosecutor be enhanced.[26]
The Ombudsman endeavored to distinguish the present
suit from the Angchangco case by arguing that in the latter,
Angchangco filed several motions for early resolution,
implying that in the case at bar petitioners were not as vigilant
in asserting or protecting their rights.
We disagree. The constitutional right to speedy
disposition of cases does not come into play only when political
considerations are involved. The Constitution makes no such
distinction.While political motivation in Tatad may have been
a factor in the undue delay in the termination of the preliminary
investigation therein to justify the invocation of their right to
speedy disposition of cases, the particular facts of each case
must be taken into consideration in the grant of the relief
sought. In the Tatad case, we are reminded:
In a number of cases, this Court has not hesitated to grant the
so-called radical relief and to spare the accused from the
undergoing the rigors and expense of a full-blown trial where
it is clear that he has been deprived of due process of law or
other constitutional guaranteed rights. Of course, it goes
without saying that in the application of the doctrine
enunciated in those cases, particularly regard must be taken of
the facts and circumstances peculiar to its case.[27]
In Alviso vs. Sandiganbayan,[28] the Court observed that
the concept of speedy disposition of cases is a relative term and
must necessarily be a flexible concept and that the factors that
may be considered and balanced are the length of the delay, the
assertion or failure to assert such right by the accused, and the
prejudice caused by the delay.
Petitioners in this case, however, could not have urged the
speedy resolution of their case because they were completely
unaware that the investigation against them was still on-
going.Peculiar to this case, we reiterate, is the fact that
petitioners were merely asked to comment, and not file counter-
affidavits which is the procedure to follow in a preliminary
investigation.After giving their explanation and after four long
years of being in the dark, petitioners, naturally, had reason to
assume that the charges against them had already been
dismissed.
On the other hand, the Office of the Ombudsman failed to
present any plausible, special or even novel reason which could
justify the four-year delay in terminating its investigation. Its
excuse for the delay-the many layers of review that the case had
to undergo and the meticulous scrutiny it had to entail has lost
its novelty and is no longer appealing, as was the invocation in
the Tatad case. The incident before us does not involve
complicated factual and legal issues, specially in view of the
fact that the subject computerization contract had been mutually
cancelled by the parties thereto even before the Anti-Graft
League filed its complaint.
The Office of the Ombudsman capitalizes on petitioners
three motions for extension of the time to file comment which
it imputed for the delay. However, the delay was not caused by
the motions for extension. The delay occurred after petitioners
filed their comment. Between 1992-1996, petitioners were
under no obligation to make any move because there was no
preliminary investigation within the contemplation of Section
4, Rule II of A.O. No. 07 to speak of in the first place.
III
Finally, under the facts of the case, there is no basis in the
law or in fact to charge petitioners for violation of Sec. 3(g) of
R.A. No. 3019. To establish probable cause against the offender
for violation of Sec. 3(g), the following elements must be
present: (1) the offender is a public officer; (2) he entered into
a contract or transaction in behalf of the government; (3) the
contract or transaction is grossly and manifestly
disadvantageous to the government. The second element of the
crime that the accused public officers entered into a contract in
behalf of the government is absent. The computerization
contract was rescinded on 6 May 1991 before SAR No. 91-05
came out on 31 May 1991 and before the Anti-Graft League
filed its complaint with the Ombudsman on 1 August
1991. Hence, at that time the Anti-Graft League instituted their
complaint and the Ombudsman issued its Order on 12
November 1991, there was no longer any contract to speak
of. The contract, after 6 May 1991 became in contemplation of
the law, non-existent, as if no contract was ever executed.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is
GRANTED and Criminal Case No. 23193 is hereby
DISMISSED. The temporary restraining order issued on 4
September 1997 is made PERMANENT.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 108595. May 18, 1999]
ELPIDIO C. CERVANTES, petitioner, vs. THE
SANDIGANBAYAN, FIRST DIVISION, THE
SPECIAL PROSECUTOR, and PEDRO
ALMENDRAS, respondents.
DECISION
PARDO, J.:
The case before the Court is a special civil action
for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction
seeking to annul and set aside the resolution of the
Sandiganbayan, First Division,[1] that denied petitioner's
motion to quash the information against him for violation of
Section 3 (e), Republic Act 3019, and to restrain or enjoin the
Sandiganbayan from proceeding with his arraignment and
trial.The motion is based on the ground that the filing of the
information against petitioner over six (6) years after the initial
complaint with the Tanodbayan (predecessor of the
Ombudsman) violated his right to speedy disposition of the
case, and that the acts charged in the information do not
constitute an offense.
We grant the petition.
The facts are as follows:
On March 6, 1986, one Pedro Almendras filed with the
Office of the Tanodbayan (predecessor of the Ombudsman) a
sworn complaint[2] against Alejandro Tapang for falsification of
complainant's "salaysay" alleging that Alejandro Tapang made
complainant sign a piece of paper in blank on which paper a
"salaysay" was later inscribed stating that complainant had been
paid his claim in the amount of P17,594.00, which was not true.
In the said complaint, Pedro Almendras mentioned that he
sought the help of petitioner Elpidio C. Cervantes who worked
as analyst in the office of labor arbiter Teodorico L. Ruiz. [3]
On October 2, 1986, Alejandro Tapang submitted to the
Office of the Tanodbayan a counter-affidavit stating that the
letter complaint of Almendras was the subject of a labor case
decided by Arbiter Teodorico L. Ruiz; that the letter "is full of
lies and improbabilities" and "that it is vague." [4]
On October 16, 1986, petitioner Elpidio C. Cervantes filed
with the office of the Tanodbayan an affidavit stating that he
had nothing to do with the blank paper that Almendras signed,
as admitted by the latter in a confrontation in the presence of
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) vice chairman
Diego Atienza.[5]
On May 18, 1992, more than six (6) years after the filing
of the initiatory complaint with the Tanodbayan, Special
Prosecution Officer II, Office of the Special Prosecutor Luz L.
Quinones-Marcos filed with the Sandiganbayan, assigned to the
First Division, an Information charging petitioner Elpidio C.
Cervantes, together with Teodorico L. Ruiz and Alejandro
Tapang with violation of Section 3 (e), Republic Act 3019,
committed as follows:
That on or about June 16, 1984, or for sometime subsequent
thereto, in Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused Teodorico L.
Ruiz, a public officer, being then a Labor Arbiter, National
Labor Relations Commission, NCR, Department of Labor and
Elpidio Cervantes, also a public officer, being then a Labor
Analyst, National Labor Relations Commission, NCR,
Department of Labor, in the exercise of their official and
administrative functions, conspiring, confederating and
conniving with private respondent Alejandro Tapang, did then
and there, wilfully, unlawfully and criminally with evident bad
faith and manifest partiality cause undue injury to one Pedro
Almendras by then and there inducing Pedro Almendras to
sign a blank paper, on which a statement was later typed and
attributed as his (Almendras) statement in which statement
Almendras allegedly acknowledged that the whole amount
awarded to him by the NLRC in a decision in NCR Case No.
10-731-81 had been paid by Alejandro Tapang and therefore,
he is no longer pursuing any claim against Tapang, thereby
giving said Alejandro Tapang unwarranted benefits and
advantage to the damage and prejudice of Pedro Almendras.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[6]
On May 28, 1992, petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration with the Office of the Special Prosecutor
reiterating that he never met complainant Almendras on June
29, 1984, that complainant filed a case before the City Fiscal of
Quezon City, claiming that his counsel together with Tapang Constitutional right of speedy disposition of cases because
conspired to deprive him of his monetary award and that the political motivations played a vital role in activating and
case was dismissed.[7] propelling the prosecutorial process in this case.
On October 2, 1992, petitioner filed with the The Special Prosecutor also cited Alvizo vs.
Sandiganbayan, Manila, a "motion to defer arraignment due to Sandiganbayan (footnote 220 SCRA 55, 64) alleging that, as in
pendency of reinvestigation or motion to quash and motion to Alvizo, the petitioner herein was insensitive to the implications
recall warrant of arrest" on the ground that (a) petitioner filed and contingencies thereof by not taking any step whatsoever to
with the office of the Special Prosecutor a motion for accelerate the disposition of the matter.
reinvestigation; (b) that the case against Cervantes "has
prescribed" due to unreasonable delay in the resolution of the We cannot accept the Special Prosecutors ratiocination. It
preliminary investigation, and (c) that the acts charged in the is the duty of the prosecutor to speedily resolve the complaint,
information do not constitute an offense.[8] as mandated by the Constitution, regardless of whether the
petitioner did not object to the delay or that the delay was with
On October 2, 1992, the Ombudsman denied petitioners his acquiescence provided that it was not due to causes directly
motion for reconsideration,[9] and simultaneously filed with the attributable to him.
Sandiganbayan an amended information. The amendment
consisted of the insertion of the total amount involved.[10] Consequently, we rule that the Sandiganbayan gravely
abused its discretion in not quashing the information for
By minute resolution dated December 24, 1992, the violation of petitioners Constitutional right to the speedy
Sandiganbayan denied petitioner's motion, ruling that there was disposition of the case in the level of the Special Prosecutor,
no "unwarranted postponement nor any denial by the Office of the Ombudsman.[14]
Tanodbayan or of the Ombudsman of any step taken by the
accused to accelerate the disposition on the matter."[11] We deem it unnecessary to resolve the first issue in view
of the foregoing ruling.
Hence, this petition.
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby GRANTS the petition
On February 22, 1993, the Court required respondents to and ANNULS the minute resolution of the
comment on the petition (not to file a motion to dismiss) within Sandiganbayan, dated December 24, 1992, in Criminal Case
ten (10) days from notice, and issued a temporary restraining No. 17673. The Court directs the Sandiganbayan to dismiss the
order enjoiningrespondent Sandiganbayan from continuing case, with costs de oficio.
with the arraignment and trial or from further proceeding with
Criminal Case No. 17673. On December 14, 1993, respondents The temporary restraining order heretofore issued is made
filed their comment. On March 10, 1994, petitioner filed a reply permanent.
to comment. On November 22, 1994, respondents filed a No costs in this instance.
rejoinder.
SO ORDERED.
We resolve to give due course to the petition and decide
the case.
The issues raised are (a) whether the acts charged in the
information filed against petitioner for violation of Section 3
(e), R. A. 3019 do not constitute an offense; and (b) whether the
Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse of discretion in denying
his motion to quash for violation of the right to speedy
disposition of the case.
We shall first resolve the second issue. We find
petitioner's contention meritorious. He was deprived of his right
to a speedy disposition of the case, a right guaranteed by the
Constitution.[12] It took the Special Prosecutor (succeeding the
Tanodbayan) six (6) years from the filing of the initiatory
complaint before he decided to file an information for the
offense with the Sandiganbayan. The letter complaint was filed [G.R. Nos. 116259-60. February 20, 1996]
with the Tanodbayan on March 6, 1986. The affidavit of the
petitioner was filed therein on October 16, 1986. The Special
Prosecutor resolved the case on May 18, 1992. In their
comment to the petition at bar,[13] the Sandiganbayan and the SALVADOR P. SOCRATES, petitioner,
Special Prosecutor try to justify the inordinate delay in the vs. SANDIGANBAYAN, Third Division, and
resolution of the complaint by stating that no political PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
motivation appears to have tainted the prosecution of the case
in apparent reference to the case of Tatad vs. Sandiganbayan,
(footote: 159 SCRA 70, 81-82.) where the Court ruled that the
long delay (three years) in the termination of the preliminary [G.R. Nos. 118896-97. February 20, 1996]
investigation by the Tanodbayan" was violative of the
SALVADOR P. SOCRATES, petitioner,
vs. SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
DECISION
REGALADO, J.:
Before us are two consolidated original actions for
certiorari and prohibition filed by petitioner Salvador P.
Socrates assailing the orders and resolution issued by
respondent Sandiganbayan in Criminal Cases Nos. 18027 and
18028, both entitled People of the Philippines vs. Salvador
P. Socrates. In G.R. Nos. 116259-60, petitioner assails the
legality of (a) the order dated February 9, 1994 denying
petitioners Amended and Consolidated Motion to Quash the
Informations;1 (b) the order dated May 24, 1994 denying the
Motion for Reconsideration and/or Reinvestigation;2 and (c) the
order dated July 20, 1994 denying the Motion for Partial
Reconsideration of the Order of May 24, 1994. 3 On the other
hand, in G.R. Nos. 118896-97 petitioner seeks the annulment of
the Resolution dated December 23, 19944 ordering the
preventive suspension of petitioner as Provincial Governor
of Palawan for a period of ninety (90) days, and to enjoin
respondent court from enforcing the same.
The antecedent facts, as may be culled from the Comment
filed by the Solicitor General in G.R. Nos. 116259-60, are as
follows:
Petitioner who is the incumbent governor of Palawan, was
first elected governor of the said province in 1968 and was
again reelected in both the 1971 and 1980 elections, until he
was replaced by private complainant Victoriano Rodriguez as
Officer-In-Charge Governor after the EDSA Revolution in
February 1986. Subsequently, both petitioner and Rodriguez
ran for governor in the 1988 elections where the latter
emerged victorious. In the 1992 synchronized national and
local elections, the two again contested the gubernatorial post;
and this time, it was petitioner who won.
Meanwhile, at the time Rodriguez was still the OIC Governor
of the province, the Provincial Government of Palawan, as
represented by Rodriguez and the Provincial Board Members
of Palawan, filed before the Office of the Tanodbayan two (2)
complaints both dated December 5, 1986 and docketed as TBP
No. 86-01119. The first complaint charged petitioner with
violation of Section 3(b) of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise
known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, and the
second charged petitioner, together with several other
provincial officers, with violation of Section 3(a) and (g) of
the same law (Annexes A & A-I , respectively, Petition).
Instead of filing a counter-affidavit as directed, petitioner filed
a Motion to Suspend Preliminary investigation dated
September 3, 1987 on the ground that upon the ratification of
the 1987 Constitution, the present Tanodbayan has been
transformed into the Office of the Special Prosecutor and has,
therefore, lost his power to conduct preliminary investigation
(Annex C, ibid).
In a letter to the Honorable Tanodbayan dated June 23, 1988,
however, Nelia Yap-Fernandez, the Deputized Tanodbayan
Prosecutor from the Office of the City Prosecutor of Puerto
Princesa City, requested that she be allowed to inhibit herself
from handling the preliminary investigation of the present case
considering that petitioner appears to be her co-principal
sponsor in a wedding ceremony held last May 28, 1988
(Annex C-3, ibid.).
On January 16, 1989, the Office of the Ombudsman received a
letter from Rodriguez, who was then the incumbent governor
of the province, inquiring about the present status of TBP No.
86-01 119 (Annex D, ibid.). In its 4th Indorsement dated
February 7, 1989, the Ombudsman referred the matter of
continuing and terminating the investigation of the present
case to the newly deputized Tanodbayan Prosecutor, Sesinio
Belen from the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor (Annex D-
1, ibid.). However, the latter, in his 5th Indorsement dated
February 27, 1989 to the Ombudsman, requested that the
present case be reassigned to another Prosecutor considering
that he is a long time close friend and compadre of petitioner
and that one of the complainants therein Eustaquio Gacott, Jr.,
who was formerly a member of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan, is now the Provincial Prosecutor of Palawan,
his present superior (Annex D-2, ibid.).
On April 25, 1989, petitioner was directed by the Ombudsman
to comment on the letter-manifestation dated April 4, 1989
filed by Rodriguez requesting that an amendment be effected
on certain portions of the present complaint (Annexes E & E-
2, ibid.). No comment having been received by the
Ombudsman as of May 24, 1989, petitioner, on an even date,
was again directed to comment thereon (Annex E-
1, ibid.). Finally, petitioner filed his required comment
dated June 2, 1989 (Annex E-3, ibid.).
Based on the Resolution dated August 27, 1992 of Special
Prosecution Officer I Wendell Barreras-Sulit (Annex F-
2, ibid.), which affirmed the Resolution dated February 21,
1992 rendered by Ombudsman Investigator Ernesto Nocos
recommending the filing of appropriate charges against
petitioner, the Office of the Special Prosecutor filed on
September 16, 1992 with the respondent Court two (2)
Informations against petitioner, docketed as Criminal Cases
Nos. 18027 and 18028. The first was for violation of Section
3(h) of Republic Act No. 3019, and the second for violation of
Section 3(e) of the same law (Annexes F & F-1, ibid.).
Before his arraignment could be set, petitioner initially filed
an Urgent Motion for Quashal of Information and/or
Reinvestigation in the Light of Supervening Facts. However,
when the said motion was subsequently called for hearing,
petitioners counsel was made to choose which of the aforesaid
two (2) conflicting motions he preferred to take up with
respondent Court. Thus, on January 18, 1993, petitioner filed
an Amended and Consolidated Motion to Quash the
Information in the Above-entitled Cases. After an Opposition
and a Reply were filed by the prosecution and petitioner,
respectively, respondent court issued its first assailed
Resolution on February 9, 1994, denying the same (Annex
G, ibid.).
On March 15, 1994, petitioner filed a Motion for
Reconsideration and/or Reinvestigation, which was
subsequently denied by respondent court in its second assailed
Resolution issued on May 24, 1992 (Annex H-1 , ibid.).5
Petitioner then filed a petition for certiorari and
prohibition, docketed as G.R. Nos. 116259-60, challenging the
aforementioned orders of the Sandiganbayan for allegedly
having been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction. It was likewise prayed that
respondent court be enjoined from taking cognizance of and
from proceeding with the arraignment of petitioner and the trial
and hearing of Criminal Cases Nos. 18027-28 pending before
it. Respondents thereafter filed their Comment to which a Reply
was submitted by petitioner.
In the meantime, no temporary restraining order having
been issued by this Court in G.R. Nos. 116259-60, respondent
court proceeded with the arraignment of herein petitioner
on October 5, 1994 wherein a plea of not guilty was entered for
him by the court after he refused to do so. Thereafter, with the
denial of petitioners motion to quash the informations, the
prosecution filed on October 11, 1994 before respondent court
a Motion to Suspend Accused Pendente Lite6 pursuant to
Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019. Petitioner opposed said
motion on the ground that the validity of the informations filed
against him is still pending review before the Supreme Court.
He further contended therein that Section 13 of Republic Act
No. 3019, on which the motion to suspend is based, is
unconstitutional in that it constitutes an undue delegation of
executive power and is arbitrary and discriminatory.
In view of the filing of the motion for his suspension,
petitioner filed on October 14, 1994 in G.R. Nos. 116259-60 a
Supplemental Petition7 questioning the veracity of and seeking
to restrain respondent court from acting on said motion to
suspend pendente lite, the hearing of which was scheduled
on October 17, 1994. However, before respondents could file
their comment thereto as required by this Court, petitioner, who
initially sought the holding in abeyance of further action on his
supplemental petition until after respondent court shall have
resolved the motion to suspend pendente lite, eventually
decided to withdraw the same purportedly in order not to delay
the disposition of the main petition. Hence, on January 16,
1995, this Court issued a resolution8 granting the motion to
withdraw the supplemental petition and considering the petition
in G.R. Nos. 116259-60 as submitted for resolution.
In the interim, petitioner filed before respondent court on
November 28, 1994 an amended motion to include as co-
principals: (a) in Criminal Case No. 18028, the members of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan who authorized the purchase and
repair of the vessel in question; and (b) in Criminal Case No.
18027, the Board of Directors of ERA Technology and
Resources Corporation which entered into a contract with the
Province of Palawan.9 Petitioner argued that the non-inclusion
of these co-principals violates his right to due process and equal
protection of the laws which thus rendered the informations null
and void. It appears that the prosecution did not oppose nor
object to this amended motion.
On December 23, 1994, respondent court, without ruling
on petitioners motion to include co-principals, issued its
questioned resolution granting the motion to suspend pendente
lite and ordering the suspension of petitioner as Provincial
Governor of Palawan for a period of ninety (90) days from
notice.
His motion for the reconsideration thereof having been
denied, another petition for certiorari and prohibition with
prayer for a restraining order was filed by petitioner on
February 20, 1995 against the same respondents, docketed as
G.R. Nos. 118896-97, and which seeks to annul as well as to
enjoin respondent court from enforcing its resolution dated
December 23, 1994 ordering his
suspension pendente lite. On March 8, 1995, the Court resolved
to consolidate this second petition with G.R. Nos. 116259-60.
From the mosaic of the foregoing events and the incidents
interjected therein, the following pattern of contentious issues
has emerged:
In G.R. Nos. 116259-60, the validity of the informations
filed in Criminal Cases Nos. 18027-28 is being contested on
three grounds, viz.: (1) the respondent court did not acquire
jurisdiction over the case on the ground that an inordinate delay
of six (6) years between the conduct of the preliminary
investigation and the subsequent filing of the informations
against petitioner constitutes a violation of his constitutional
rights to a speedy disposition of the case and due process of law
pursuant to the Tatad doctrine; (2) the facts charged do not
constitute an offense; and (3) since the acts charged in the
complaints filed before the Tanodbayan are different from the
charges contained in the informations, another preliminary
investigation should have been conducted, in the absence of
which there is a denial of due process.
In G.R. Nos. 118896-97, petitioner questions the validity
of the suspension order in that: (1) he may not be suspended
while the issue on the validity of the informations filed against
him is still pending review before the Supreme Court; and (2)
Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019, which forms the basis of
the order of suspension, is unconstitutional on the ground that
it constitutes an undue delegation of the authority to suspend
which is essentially an executive power. Petitioner contends
that the jurisprudential doctrines relied upon by respondent
court in upholding the constitutionality of Section 13 are not
applicable to the cases at bar which involve an issue not yet
passed upon by this Court. In addition, petitioner again attacks
the legality of the subject informations for having been filed in
violation of the due process and equal protection clauses by
reason of the non-inclusion therein, as co-principals, of the
members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan who approved the
purchase of the vessel, as well as the board of directors of ERA
Technology and Resource Corporation which entered into a
contract with the Province of Palawan.
I. G.R. Nos. 116259-60
1. In asserting that there was a violation of his right to a
speedy trial by reason of the unreasonable delay of six (6) years
between the conduct of the preliminary investigation and the
filing of the informations, petitioner invokes the doctrine laid
down in the leading case of Tatad vs. Sandiganbayan, et al.10 In
said case, all the affidavits and counter-affidavits had already
been filed with the Tanodbayan for final disposition as of
October 25, 1982 but it was only on June 12, 1985, or three (3)
years thereafter, that the informations accusing Tatad of a
violation of Republic Act No. 3019 were filed before the
Sandiganbayan. The Court held there that an inordinate delay
of three (3) years in the conduct and termination of the
preliminary investigation is violative of the constitutional rights
of the accused to due process and speedy disposition of his case,
by reason of which the informations filed against the accused
therein were ordered dismissed. It must be emphasized,
however, that in the Tatad case, no explanation or ratiocination
was advanced by the prosecution therein as to the cause of the
delay.
In the present case, as distinguished from the factual
milieu obtaining in Tatad, respondent court found that the six-
year delay in the termination of the preliminary investigation
was caused by petitioners own acts. Thus:
In the cases at bar, the record shows that delay in the filing of
the Informations in these cases was caused, not by inaction of
the prosecution, but by the following actuations of the
accused:
(1) Sometime after the complaint of private complainant was
filed with the Office of the City Fiscal of the City of Puerto
Princesa, preliminary investigation was held in abeyance on
account of the motion of accused Salvador P. Socrates,
entitled Motion to Suspend Preliminary Investigation.
Suspension was prayed for until an Ombudsman, as provided
in Executive Order No. 243, shall have been appointed;
(2) Preliminary investigation was interrupted when private
complainant, then Governor Victoriano J. Rodriguez, filed
on April 24, 1989, a letter-manifestation correcting the
complaint;
(3) Only on September 22, 1989 did the accused in these cases
file with the Office of the Ombudsman a reply to complainants
manifestation;
(4) In view of the foregoing actuations of the parties,
preliminary investigation of these cases was started in earnest
only on June 25, 1990. Respondents then, including the
accused herein, were required to submit counter-affidavits;
(5) Interrupting preliminary proceedings again, accused
Governor Salvador P. Socrates, on August 13, 1990, filed a
motion to dismiss the complaint upon the following grounds:
(a) That the Honorable Ombudsman has no jurisdiction over
the person of respondent; and
(b) That the complaint does not conform substantially to the
prescribed form.
The private complainant was, as a matter of right, granted a
period of time within which to oppose the motion. The
prosecution necessarily had to ponder on the motion after
protracted deliberations;
(6) On April 1, 1991, counsel for the accused filed an
Appearance and Motion for Extension of Time to File
Appropriate Pleading. Counsel prayed that respondents be
granted an extension of twenty (20) days within which to
comply with the order of March 11, 1991;
(7) The accused Governor Salvador P. Socrates, through
counsel, filed a motion to quash/dismiss on December 17,
1991. This pleading was received by the Office of the Deputy
Ombudsman only on January 13, 1992. It took some time for
the prosecution to resolve the motion and there never was any
intimation on the part of the accused that the accused was
invoking his right to a speedy disposition of the complaint
against him. The motion to quash/dismiss was in fact denied
by the prosecution in an order dated January 20, 1990;
(8) A motion for reconsideration having been filed thereafter,
the Informations in these cases were after all filed on
September 16, 1992, but only after the ruling of the
prosecution on the motion to quash/dismiss.11
Petitioner, in a futile attempt to refute the foregoing
factual findings of respondent court, could only raise the
defense that the motion to suspend the preliminary investigation
did not affect the proceedings therein; that the preliminary
investigation really started on February 18, 1987 when the
Tanodbayan issued subpoenas to the respondents; that the
motion to dismiss/quash the complaints was purposely for the
early termination of the preliminary investigation; that the filing
of the complaint was politically motivated, as may be gleaned
from the affidavit of complainant Rodriguez; and that pursuant
to Section 3, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, the case should
have been resolved within ten (10) days from the time the
investigation was concluded.
Clearly, the facts of the case at bar are diametrically
opposed to the factual situation in Tatad because the obviously
delaying tactics resorted to by herein petitioner were not present
in the latter case. Furthermore, the allegation that the filing of
the complaint was politically motivated does not serve to justify
the nullification of the informations where the existence of such
motive has not been sufficiently established nor substantial
evidence presented in support thereof. The situation
in Tatad was quite to the contrary since the accused therein
successfully proved that the charges were filed against him only
after it became widely known that he actually had a falling out
with the late President Marcos.
That scenario impelled the Court to make the admonition
therein that prosecutors should not allow, and should avoid,
giving the impression that their noble office is being used or
prostituted, wittingly or unwittingly, for political ends or other
purposes alien to, or subversive of, the basic and fundamental
objective of serving the interest of justice evenhandedly,
without fear or favor to any and all litigants alike, whether rich
or poor, weak or strong, powerless or mighty. Such an exigency
apparently does not obtain in the case at bar. There is nothing
in the records from which it can be conclusively inferred,
expressly or impliedly, that the investigating prosecutors were
politically motivated or even coerced into filing these criminal
charges against petitioner.
 We likewise do not adhere to petitioners asseveration that
the orders issued by Branches 51 and 52 of the Regional Trial
Court of Puerto Princesa City quashing the informations for
technical malversation filed against herein petitioner, on the
ground that the inordinate delay in the termination of the
preliminary investigation constitutes a violation of petitioners
right to due process and speedy disposition of his case which
thereby ousted said courts of jurisdiction thereover, have
become final and conclusive by reason of the prosecutions
failure to file an appeal therefrom. We have carefully
scrutinized the orders adverted to and we find and so hold that
the same cannot effectively deter the prosecution herein from
proceeding with the trial before the Sandiganbayan.
First, the criminal cases for technical malversation filed
before said Regional Trial Court are different from the charges
for violation of Republic Act No. 3019 filed with the
Sandiganbayan. The former is covered by a general law while
the latter involves a special law, with variant elements of the
offenses being required, hence double jeopardy cannot set
in. Second, and more importantly, it will be noted that the trial
court in the malversation case hastily concluded that there was
an inordinate delay of six (6) years in the termination of the
preliminary investigation through the mere expedient of
counting the number of years that had elapsed from the
institution of the complaint with the Ombudsman until the filing
of the informations in court, without bothering to inquire into
the pertinent factual considerations and procedural
technicalities involved.
In arriving at such a self-serving conclusion, the trial court
confined itself strictly to a mathematical reckoning of the time
involved, instead of undertaking a more substantive
appreciation of the circumstances and particulars which could
have possibly caused the delay. On the contrary, herein
respondent court has convincingly shown that the preliminary
investigation dragged on for several years owing, ironically, to
petitioners evident propensity to resort to dilatory tactics. In the
cases now before us, it cannot be successfully and validly
contended that petitioners right to speedy trial has been
violated.
We have only to reiterate the declaration made in Tatad to
the effect that in the application of the constitutional guaranty
of the right to speedy disposition of cases, particular regard
must also be taken of the facts and circumstances peculiar to
each case. It is palpably clear that the application of
the Tatad doctrine should not be made to rely solely on the
length of time that has passed but equal concern should likewise
be accorded to the factual ambiance and considerations. It can
easily be deduced from a complete reading of the adjudicatory
discourse in Tatad that the three-year delay was specifically
considered vis--vis all the facts and circumstances which
obtained therein. Perforce, even on this ground alone, the
instant petition for certiorari should be dismissed.
A speedy trial is one conducted according to the law of
criminal procedure and the rules and regulations, free from
vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays. The primordial
purpose of this constitutional right is to prevent the oppression
of an accused by delaying criminal prosecution for an indefinite
period of time.12 In the cases at bar, while there may have been
some delay, it was petitioner himself who brought about the
situation of which he now complains.
2. Petitioner then questions the sufficiency of the
allegations in the informations in that the same do not constitute
an offense supposedly because (a) in Criminal Case No. 18027,
there is no statement that herein petitioner actually intervened
and participated, as a board member of ERA Technology and
Resources Corporation, in the latters contract with the Province
of Palawan, which is allegedly an element necessary to
constitute a violation of Section 3(h) of Republic Act No. 3019;
and (b) in Criminal Case No. 18028, the information failed to
show a causal relation between the act done by the accused and
the undue injury caused to the provincial government of
Palawan.
With respect to the alleged defects in the information filed
in Criminal Case No. 18027 for violation of Section 3(h) of the
anti-graft law, petitioner invokes the ruling in the case
of Trieste, Sr. vs. Sandiganbayan13 where it was held that
what is contemplated in Section 3(h) of the anti-graft law is the
actual intervention in the transaction in which one has financial
or pecuniary interest in order that liability may attach. In the
cited case, however, the Court found that the petitioner therein
did not, in any way, intervene in making the awards and
payment of the purchases in question since he signed the
voucher only after all the purchases had already been made,
delivered and paid for by the municipal treasurer.
The purchases involved therein were previously ordered
by the municipal treasurer without the knowledge and consent
of the accused municipal mayor, were subsequently delivered
by the supplier, and were thereafter paid by the treasurer again
without the knowledge and consent of the mayor. The only
participation of the accused mayor in the transaction involved
the mechanical act of signing the disbursement vouchers for
record purposes only. Thus, the Court did not consider the act
therein of the accused mayor to be covered by the prohibition
under Section 3(h) of the law.
Contrariwise, in the present cases, petitioner Socrates
stands charged with a violation of Section 3(h) for intervening
in his official capacity as Governor of Palawan in reviewing and
approving the disbursement voucher dated August 2, 1982 for
payment in favor of ERA Technology Resources Corporation
where he was one of the incorporators and members of the
board of directors. Such allegation clearly indicates the nature
and extent of petitioners participation in the questioned
transaction. Without petitioners approval, payment could not
possibly have been effected.
We likewise do not find any flaw in the information filed
in Criminal Case No. 18028, for violation of Section 3(e),
which would warrant the dismissal thereof. Evidentiary facts
need not be alleged in the information because these are matters
of defense. Informations need only state the ultimate facts; the
reasons therefor could be proved during the trial.14 Hence, there
is no need to state facts in the information which would prove
the causal relation between the act done by the accused and the
undue injury caused to the Province of Palawan. Antipodal to
petitioners contention, a reading of the information in Criminal
Case No. 18028 will readily disclose that the essential elements
of the offense charged have been sufficiently alleged therein. It
is not proper, therefore, to resolve the charges right at the outset
without the benefit of a full-blown trial. The issues require a
fuller ventilation and examination. Given all the circumstances
of this case, we feel it would be unwarranted to cut off the
prosecutory process at this stage of the proceedings and to
dismiss the information.15
3. It is likewise asserted by petitioner that the elements of
the offenses charged in the complaints are different from those
stated in the informations which were filed before the
Sandiganbayan, and that since there was no preliminary
investigation conducted with respect to the latter, such
informations should be declared null and void for lack of due
process.
The first complaint for violation of Section 3(b) became
the basis for the filing of an information in Criminal Case No.
18027 for a violation of Section 3(h). In both, petitioner is
accused of intervening in his official capacity as Provincial
Governor in the contracts for the installation and construction
of waterwork projects, with the ERA Technology and
Resources Corporation, where he was an incorporator and a
member of the board of directors, thereby directly or indirectly
benefiting from said transactions. In Criminal Case No. 18028,
petitioner was charged with a violation of Section 3(e) as a
result of the complaint filed against him and several others for
a violation of Section 3(a) and (g). In both instances, petitioner
is charged with the disbursement of public funds for the
purchase of a motor launch which was grossly and manifestly
disadvantageous to the provincial government
of Palawan because the same broke down only after its maiden
voyage.
It is thus clearly apparent that the complaints and the
informations are based on substantially the same factual
settings, except that the respective designations are different.
Axiomatic is the rule that what controls is not the designation
of the offense but its description in the complaint or
information.16 The real nature of the criminal charge is
determined not from the caption or preamble of the information
nor from the specification of the provision of law alleged to
have been violated, they being conclusions of law, but by the
actual recital of facts in the complaint or information. It is not
the technical name given by the fiscal appearing in the title of
the information that determines the character of the crime but
the facts alleged in the body of the information.17
This Court has repeatedly held that when the facts, acts
and circumstances are set forth in the body of an information
with sufficient certainty to constitute an offense and to apprise
the defendant of the nature of the charge against him, a
misnomer or innocuous designation of a crime in the caption or
other parts of the information will not vitiate it. In such a case,
the facts set forth in the charge controls the erroneous
designation of the offense and the accused stands indicted for
the offense charged in the statement of facts. The erroneous
designation may be disregarded as surplusage.18
Furthermore, it will be observed that it is the same section
of the law which is involved in the present case, that is, Section
3 of Republic Act No. 3019, albeit it defines several modes of
committing the same offense. It is an old and well-settled rule
in the appreciation of indictments that where an offense may be
committed in any of several different modes, and the offense,
in any particular instance, is alleged to have been committed in
two or more of the modes specified, it is sufficient to prove the
offense committed through any one of them, provided that it be
such as to constitute the substantive offense. Thereafter, a
judgment of conviction must be sustained if it appears from the
evidence in the record that the accused was guilty as charged of
any one of these modes of the offense.19
Neither will the absence of a preliminary investigation,
assuming that it is necessary to conduct a new one, affect the
validity of the informations filed against petitioner. It has been
consistently held that the absence of a preliminary investigation
does not impair the validity of the criminal information or
render it defective. Dismissal of the case is not the remedy.20 It
is not a ground for the quashal of a complaint or information.
The proper course of action that should be taken is for the
Sandiganbayan to hold in abeyance the proceedings upon such
information and to remand the case to the office of the
Ombudsman for him or the Special Prosecutor to conduct a
preliminary investigation,21 if the accused actually makes out a
case justifying such relief.
On the bases of the foregoing disquisitions, therefore, we
rule and so hold that the informations filed against petitioner are
valid and legal.
II. G.R. Nos. 118896-97
The main issue submitted herein for resolution is the
legality of the petitioners preventive suspension, which is
premised on several grounds.
1. Initially, petitioner claims that the Sandiganbayan
committed a grave abuse of discretion in ordering his
suspension despite the fact that the validity of the informations
filed against him is still pending review before the Supreme
Court. In support thereof, he invokes the rule laid down
in Eternal Gardens Memorial Park Corporation vs. Court of
Appeals, et al.22 that even if no temporary restraining order was
issued by the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals could have
refrained from taking any action while the petition for certiorari
was pending with the Supreme Court. Petitioner insists that this
is what respondent court should have done. Under this
particular issue, petitioner is in effect seeking a review of the
order issued by the Sandiganbayan, dated February 9, 1994,
denying his amended and consolidated motion to quash the
information.
We have but to reiterate the fundamental rule that an order
denying a motion to quash is interlocutory and therefore not
appealable, nor can it be the subject of a petition for certiorari.
Such order may only be reviewed in the ordinary course of law
by an appeal from the judgment after trial.23 In other words, it
cannot be the subject of appeal until the judgment or a final
order is rendered. The ordinary procedure to be followed in that
event is to enter a plea, go to trial and if the decision is adverse,
reiterate the issue on appeal from the final judgment.24Although
the special civil action for certiorari may be availed of in case
there is a grave abuse of discretion or lack of jurisdiction, that
vitiating error is not attendant in the present case.
Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019 provides that:
SEC. 13. Suspension and Loss of Benefits. - Any incumbent
public officer against whom any criminal prosecution under a
valid information under this Act or under Title 7, Book II of
the Revised Penal Code or for any offense involving fraud
upon government or public funds or property whether as a
simple or as complex offense and in whatever stage of
execution and mode of participation, is pending in court, shall
be suspended from office. Should he be convicted by final
judgment, he shall lose all retirement or gratuity
benefits under any law, but if he is acquitted, he shall be
entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits which
he failed to receive during suspension, unless in the meantime
administrative proceedings have been filed against him.25
This Court has ruled that under Section 13 of the anti-graft
law, the suspension of a public officer is mandatory after the
validity of the information has been upheld in a pre-suspension
hearing conducted for that purpose. This pre-suspension
hearing is conducted to determine basically the validity of the
information, from which the court can have a basis to either
suspend the accused and proceed with the trial on the merits of
the case, or withhold the suspension of the latter and dismiss the
case, or correct any part of the proceeding which impairs its
validity. That hearing may be treated in the same manner as a
challenge to the validity of the information by way of a motion
to quash.26
In the leading case of Luciano, et al. vs. Mariano, et
al.27 we have set out the guidelines to be followed by the lower
courts in the exercise of the power of suspension under Section
13 of the law, to wit:
(c) By way of broad guidelines for the lower courts in the
exercise of the power of suspension from office of public
officers charged under a valid information under the
provisions of Republic Act No. 3019 or under the provisions
of the Revised Penal Code on bribery, pursuant to Section 13
of said Act, it may be briefly stated that upon the filing of such
information, the trial court should issue an order with proper
notice requiring the accused officer to show cause at a specific
date of hearing why he should not be ordered suspended from
office pursuant to the cited mandatory provisions of the Act.
Where either the prosecution seasonably files a motion for an
order of suspension or the accused in turn files a motion to
quash the information or challenges the validity thereof, such
show-cause order of the trial court would no longer be
necessary. What is indispensable is that the trial court duly
hear the parties at a hearing held for determining the validity
of the information, and thereafter hand down its ruling, issuing
the corresponding order or suspension should it uphold the
validity of the information or withhold such suspension in the
contrary case.
(d) No specific rules need be laid down for such pre-
suspension hearing. Suffice it to state that the accused should
be given a fair and adequate opportunity to challenge the
validity of the criminal proceedings against him, e.g., that he
has not been afforded the right of due preliminary
investigation; that the acts for which he stands charged do not
constitute a violation of the provisions of Republic Act No.
3019 or of the bribery provisions of the Revised Penal Code
which would warrant his mandatory suspension from office
under Section 13 of the Act; or he may present a motion to
quash the information on any of the grounds provided in Rule
117 of the Rules of Court. The mandatory suspension decreed
by the Act upon determination of the pendency in court of a
criminal prosecution for violation of the Anti-Graft Act or for
bribery under a valid information requires at the same time
that the hearing be expeditious, and not unduly protracted such
as to thwart the prompt suspension envisioned by the Act.
Hence, if the trial court, say, finds the ground alleged in the
quashal motion not to be indubitable, then it shall be called
upon to issue the suspension order upon its upholding the
validity of the information and setting the same for trial on the
merits.
With the aforequoted jurisprudential authority as the
basis, it is evident that upon a proper determination of the
validity of the information, it becomes mandatory for the court
to immediately issue the suspension order. The rule on the
matter is specific and categorical. It leaves no room for
interpretation. It is not within the courts discretion to hold in
abeyance the suspension of the accused officer on the pretext
that the order denying the motion to quash is pending review
before the appellate courts. Its discretion lies only during the
pre-suspension hearing where it is required to ascertain whether
or not (1) the accused had been afforded due preliminary
investigation prior to the filing of the information against him,
(2) the acts for which he was charged constitute a violation of
the provisions of Republic Act No. 3019 or of the provisions of
Title 7, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, or (3) the
informations against him can be quashed, under any of the
grounds provided in Section 2, Rule 117 of the Rules of
Court. 28
Once the information is found to be sufficient in form and
substance, then the court must issue the order of suspension as
a matter of course. There are no ifs and buts about it. This is
because a preventive suspension is not a penalty. It is not
imposed as a result of judicial proceedings. In fact, if acquitted,
the official concerned shall be entitled to reinstatement and to
the salaries and benefits which he failed to receive during
suspension. In view of this latter provision, the accused elective
public officer does not stand to be prejudiced by the immediate
enforcement of the suspension order in the event that the
information is subsequently declared null and void on appeal
and the case dismissed as against him. Taking into
consideration the public policy involved in preventively
suspending a public officer charged under a valid information,
the protection of public interest will definitely have to prevail
over the private interest of the accused.29
To further emphasize the ministerial duty of the court
under Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019, it is said that the
court trying a case has neither discretion nor duty to determine
whether or not a preventive suspension is required to prevent
the accused from using his office to intimidate witnesses or
frustrate his prosecution or continue committing malfeasance in
office. The presumption is that unless the accused is suspended,
he may frustrate his prosecution or commit further acts of
malfeasance or do both, in the same way that upon a finding
that there is probable cause to believe that a crime has been
committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof, the
law requires the judge to issue a warrant for the arrest of the
accused. The law does not require the court to determine
whether the accused is likely to escape or evade the jurisdiction
of the court.30
Applying now the procedure outlined in Luciano, the
records of the instant case do not show that the proceedings
leading to the filing of the informations against petitioner were
tainted with any irregularity so as to invalidate the same.
Likewise, the informations show that the allegations contained
therein meet the essential elements of the offense as defined by
the substantive law. The record is also bereft of undisputed facts
to warrant the quashal of the informations under any of the
grounds provided in Section 2, Rule 117 of the Rules of
Court.31Finally, a cursory reading of the order dated February
9, 1994 issued by respondent court will show that petitioner was
given the opportunity to be heard on his motion to quash.
Veritably, the Sandiganbayan did not commit a grave abuse of
discretion in denying the motion to quash and ordering the
preventive suspension of herein petitioner.
2. Additionally, petitioner avers that the informations filed
against him on which the order of suspension was based, are
null and void in view of the non-inclusion of his co-principals
which thus constitutes a violation of petitioners right to due
process and equal protection of the law and, therefore, ousted
respondent court of its jurisdiction over the case. Petitioner
alleges that in Criminal Case No. 18027, the board of directors
of ERA Technology Corporation should have been included as
principals by indispensable cooperation because without them
he could not possibly have committed the offense.
Also, he claims that in Criminal Case No. 18028, the
members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan who issued the
resolutions authorizing the purchase and repair of the motor
launch should likewise have been included as principals by
inducement or indispensable cooperation, considering that
petitioner was allegedly merely implementing their resolutions.
Hence, according to him, since the informations are null and
void, the suspension order which is based thereon should
necessarily also be declared null and void. We find no merit in
petitioners arguments.
First, the rule under Section 1, Rule 110 of the Rules of
Court, as reformulated in Section 2, Rule 110 of the 1985 Rules
on Criminal Procedure, is that all criminal actions must be
commenced either by complaint or information in the name of
the People of the Philippines against all persons who appear to
be responsible for the offense involved. The law makes it a legal
duty for prosecuting officers to file the charges against
whomsoever the evidence may show to be responsible for an
offense. This does not mean, however, that they shall have no
discretion at all; their discretion lies in determining whether the
evidence submitted justify a reasonable belief that a person has
committed an offense. What the rule demands is that all persons
who appear responsible shall be charged in the information,
which conversely implies that those against whom no sufficient
evidence of guilt exists are not required to be included. 32
This notwithstanding, it has equally been ruled that the
failure of the fiscal to include the other public officials who
appear to be responsible for the offense charged as co-accused
in the information filed against the accused does not in any way
vitiate the validity of the information under the Rules.33
Second, a failure to include other persons who appear to
be responsible for the crime charged is not one of the grounds
provided under Section 3, Rule 117 for which a motion to quash
the information against the accused may be filed, most
especially in the case at bar where there is prima facie proof that
petitioner is probably guilty of the offense charged, aside from
the fact that there is no allegation of conspiracy in the
informations. Besides, such an infirmity would neither have the
effect of extinguishing or mitigating petitioners liability if he is
subsequently found guilty of the offense charged. No one would
contend that if for lack of knowledge of the facts, by mistake or
for any other reason the prosecuting officer fails to include the
names of one or more persons in an information filed by him,
who were in fact guilty participants in the commission of the
crime charged therein, such persons will be relieved of criminal
liability; or that those accused who have been charged with the
offense, brought to trial, and found guilty will be permitted to
escape punishment merely because it develops in the course of
the trial, or after the trial, that there were other guilty
participants in the crime.34
Granting arguendo that this plaint of petitioner may be
invoked as a ground for the quashal of the informations, the
motion to quash must still be denied for having been filed only
after petitioner had been arraigned. Section 8, Rule 117 of the
1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure provides that (t)he failure of
the accused to assert any ground of a motion to quash before he
pleads to the complaint or information, either because he did
not file a motion to quash or failed to allege the same in said
motion, shall be deemed a waiver of the grounds of a motion to
quash, except the grounds of no offense charged, lack of
jurisdiction over the offense charged, extinction of the offense
or penalty and jeopardy. The failure to include a co-accused is
not covered by the exception; hence, the same is deemed
waived.
Third, where the government prosecutor unreasonably
refuses to file an information or to include a person as an
accused therein despite the fact that the evidence clearly
warrants such action, the offended party has the following
remedies: (1) in case of grave abuse of discretion, he may file
an action for mandamus to compel the prosecutor to file such
information; (2) he may lodge a new complaint against the
offenders before the Ombudsman and have a new examination
conducted as required by law; (3) he may institute
administrative charges against the erring prosecutor, or a
criminal complaint under Article 208 of the Revised Penal
Code, or a civil action for damages under Article 27 of the Civil
Code; (4) he may secure the appointment of another prosecutor;
or (5) he may institute another criminal action if no double
jeopardy is involved.
Fourth, it is significant and demonstrative of petitioners
strategy that from the inception of the criminal complaint before
the Ombudsman and during the conduct of the preliminary
investigation, until the filing of the informations before the
Sandiganbayan and up to the denial of his amended and
consolidated motion to quash, herein petitioner has not been
heard to complain about the alleged non-inclusion of the other
supposed offenders. Indeed, it is now much too late for
petitioner to invoke and exploit this particular unfounded issue.
Prescinding from the averments raised in the complaint
and information, from the facts and evidence of record, we do
not deem it necessary to include the members of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Palawan and the board members
of the ERA Technology and Resources Corporation as co-
accused in the informations filed against herein petitioner.
Insofar as the board members of said corporation are concerned,
they may be prosecuted only under Section 4(b) of Republic
Act No. 3019 which provides that (i)t shall be unlawful for any
person knowingly to induce or cause any public official to
commit any of the offenses defined in Section 3 thereof. In the
information filed in Criminal Case No. 18027, petitioner stands
charged with a violation of Section 3(h). It does not contain any
allegation to the effect that the board members knowingly
induced or caused herein petitioner to commit the offense
defined therein, which is an essential element of the crime in
Section 4(b). Indubitably, therefore, the board members cannot
be included as co-principals in Criminal Case No. 18027.
On the other hand, the members of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan cannot likewise be included in the information for
violation of Section 3(e) filed in Criminal Case No. 18028, for
the simple reason that it is not the validity of their resolution
which is in issue here. While it is true that
said sanggunian passed a resolution authorizing the allocation
of funds for the purchase of a motor launch, and that petitioner
merely acted on the strength thereof, it is not the fact of such
authorization which is the subject of the charges against
petitioner but rather the manner by which that resolution was
implemented by the latter. There is nothing in the averments in
the information from which it could be inferentially deduced
that the members of the sanggunian participated, directly or
indirectly, in the purchase of the vessel, and which fact could
be the basis for their indictment.
3. Lastly, petitioner questions the legality of his
suspension on the ground that Section 13 of Republic Act No.
3019, which is the basis thereof, is unconstitutional for being an
undue delegation of executive power to the Sandiganbayan. He
postulates that the power of suspension, which is an incident of
the power of removal, is basically administrative and executive
in nature. He further submits that the power of removal vested
in the court under Section 9 of Republic Act No. 3019 is an
incident of conviction, that is, it can only be exercised after a
conviction has been handed down. Hence, according to
petitioner, since the power to suspend is merely incidental to
the power of removal, the former can only be exercised as an
incident to conviction. Also, considering that Section 13
authorizes the court to exercise the power of suspension even
prior to conviction of the accused, it cannot be considered as an
exercise of judicial power because it is not within the ambit of
the courts power of removal. In addition, petitioner avers that
Section 13 is arbitrary and discriminatory because it serves no
purpose at all, in that it does not require a proceeding to
determine if there is sufficient ground to suspend, except for the
fact that it is required by law.
Although presented differently, the issue on the courts
power of suspension under Section 13 has been squarely and
directly raised and adjudicated in the case of Luciano vs.
Provincial Governor, et al.,35 the pronouncements wherein we
quote in extenso:
3. Proceeding from our holding that suspension is not
automatic, who should exercise the mandatory act of
suspension under Section 13 of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act?
Three theories have been advanced. One is that the power
of suspension - where a criminal case has already been filed in
court - still is with the Provincial Governor, relying on Section
2188 of the Revised Administrative Code. Another is that,
following the ruling in Sarcos vs. Castillo x x x, because the
main respondents are elective municipal officials, that power of
suspension must be held to repose in the Provincial Board,
under Section 5 of the Decentralization Act of 1967 (Republic
Act 5185). The third is that, by Section 13 of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, solely the court in which the criminal
case has been filed shall wield the power of suspension.
We opt for the third. Common sense and the scheme of the
law so dictate.
It is true that nothing in Section 13 of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act grants with specificity upon the Court of
First Instance the power to suspend an official charged with a
violation thereof. It would seem to us though that
suspensions by virtue of criminal proceedings are separate and
distinct from suspensions in administrative cases. An accurate
reading of Section 13 yields two methods of investigation, one
separate from the other: one criminal before the courts of
justice, and the other administrative. This is the plain import
of the last sentence of Section 13, which says that if acquitted,
defendant in an Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices case shall be
entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits which
he failed to receive during suspension, unless in the meantime
administrative proceedings have been filed against him. Our
interpretation but preserves, as it should, the substantial
symmetry between the first part of Section 13 and the last part
thereof just quoted.
And so, there is in this legal provision a recognition that once
a case is filed in court, all other acts connected with the
discharge of court functions - which here include suspension -
should be left to the Court of First Instance.
Not that this view finds no statutory support. By Section 9 of
the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, the court is
empowered to punish any public official committing any of
the unlawful acts or omissions enumerated in Sections 3, 4, 5
and 6 of the law, amongst others, to perpetual disqualification
from public office. Here, the Makati elective officials
heretofore named have been charged with and found guilty of
a violation of Section 3(g) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act and were sentenced by the court below, amongst
others to be perpetually disqualified to hold office. Article 30
of the Revised Penal Code declares that the penalty of
perpetual absolute disqualification entails (t)he deprivation of
the public offices and employments which the offender may
have held, even if conferred by popular election. No stretch of
the imagination is necessary to show that perpetual absolute
disqualification - which, in effect, is encompassed in the
punishment set forth in Section 9 of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act - covers that of removal from the office
which each of the respondent municipal official holds.
Since removal from office then is within the power of the
court, no amount of judicial legerdemain would deprive the
court of the power to suspend. Reason for this is that
suspension necessarily is included in the greater power of
removal. It is without doubt that Congress has power to
authorize courts to suspend public officers pending court
proceedings for removal and that the congressional grant is not
violative of the separation of powers. For, our Constitution
being silent, we are not to say that from Congress is withheld political life. There is indeed the dispiriting lesson that in a
the power to decide the mode or procedure of suspension and clash between political considerations and conscience it is the
removal of public officers. latter that quite often gets dented. xxx

A look into the legislative intent, along with the legislative xxx xxx xxx
scheme, convinces us the more that the power of suspension
should be lodged with the court. While the law may not be a Therefore, since suspension is incident to removal and should
model of precise verbal structure, the intent is there. Section proceed from one who should logically do so, and considering
13 requires as a pre-condition of the power to suspend that that in the operation of a given statute fairness must have been
there be a valid information. Validity of information, of in the mind of the legislators, we brush aside needless
course, is determined by the Court of First Instance where the refinements, and rule that under Section 13 of the Anti-Graft
criminal case is pending. That is essentially a judicial function. and Corrupt Practices Act, once a valid information upon the
Suspension is a sequel to that finding, an incident to the provisions thereof is lodged with the Court of First Instance,
criminal proceedings before the court. Indeed, who can that court has the inescapable duty to suspend the public
suspend except one who knows the facts upon which official indicted thereunder.
suspension is based? We draw support from Lacson vs. Roque,
supra, at page 469: We are certain that no authority or good
These cases have long been on the line, unduly stretched
reason can be found in support of a proposition that the Chief
beyond their logical parameters and the permissible time frame.
Executive can suspend an officer facing criminal charges for Indeed, it is high time, ironically in fairness to petitioner
the sole purpose of aiding the court in the administration of himself, that the same be now calcined in the judicial crucible
justice. Independent of the other branches of the Government,
into their ultimate configuration.
the courts can well take care of their own administration of the
law. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petitions in
G.R. Nos. 116259-60 and 118896-97 are hereby DISMISSED
The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, an important for lack of merit, with costs against the petitioner.
legislation, should not be artificially construed so as to exclude
SO ORDERED.
the courts from the power to suspend - a prime tool designed by
Congress to prevent the power which an official wields from
frustrating the purity and certainty of the administration of
justice. Surely, we should not be pedantically exacting in
reading its provisions. We should rather say that if the courts
power of suspension incident to the court proceedings is to be
withheld or narrowed by construction, Congress should have
spelled it out in no uncertain terms x x x.
The Court then hastened to clarify that such a view may
not be taken as an encroachment upon the power of suspension
given other officials, reiterating in the process that a line should
be drawn between administrative proceedings and criminal
actions in court, that one is apart from the other. Elucidating
further on the possible danger which may arise if the power of
suspension, in consequence of a criminal action under Republic Binay v. Sandiganbayan
Act No. 3019 is vested in any authority other than the court, it
declared that: G.R. Nos. 120681-83
October 1, 1999
There is reasonable ground to believe that Congress did really
apprehend danger should the power of suspension in Article III Section 16 Right to speedy disposition of cases
consequence of a criminal case under the Anti-Graft and FACTS
Corrupt Practices Act be lodged in any authority other than the
court. Quite apart from the fact that the court has a better grasp Cases were filed by the Ombudsman in the Sandiganbayan
of the situation, there is one other factor, and that is, the rights (SB for brevity) against Mayor Binay of
of the person accused. The court could very well serve as a
lever to balance in one equation the public interests involved Makati for Illegal Use of Public Funds(RPC A220) and
and the interests of the defendant. And then, there is the Violation of Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
danger that partisan politics may creep in. The hand of Act(RA 3019) on September 1994. The informations filed
political oppression cannot just be ignored especially if the constituted crimes which were committed by
majority members of the Provincial Board and the defendant
public local elective officer are on opposite sides of the the petitioner in his incumbency in the year 1987.The
political fence. Power may be abused. Conversely, if both are petitioner filed a motion to quash alleging that the
of the same political persuasion, the suspending authority will
display reluctance in exercising the power of suspension. It is delay of more than 6 years constituted a violation of his
thus that the statute should catch up with the realities of constitutional right of due process. His
arraignment therefore was held in abeyance pending the Ombudsman.
resolution of the motions. Subsequently, the SB
The right to a speedy disposition of a case, like the right to
issued a resolution denying petitioners motion to speedy trial, is deemed violated only when the
quash and further the latters motion for
proceedings is attended by vexatious, capricious, and
reconsideration. In the meantime, the prosecution filed a oppressive delays; or when unjustified
motion to suspend the accused pendente lite
postponements of the trial are asked for and secured, or when
(benefits) which was later granted and ordered for a 90-day without cause or justifiable motive a long period of time is
suspension. Petition for certiorari was filed by allowed to elapse without the party having his case tried.
Equally applicable is
Mayor Binay in the SC praying that the resolution denying his
motion for reconsideration be set aside and the balancing test used to determine whether a defendant has
been denied his right to a speedy trial, or a
claimed that he was denied of his rights when the suspension
was ordered even before he could file his speedy disposition of a case for that matter, in which the
conduct of both the prosecution and the
reply to the petitioners opposition. SC then, directed the SB
to permit petitioner to file said reply. The SB defendant is weighed, and such factors as the length of the
delay, the reasons for such delay, the
nonetheless reiterated its previous resolutions and order after
the submission of the reply. Meanwhile, RA assertion or failure to assert such right by the accused, and the
prejudice caused by the delay. The
7975 redefining the jurisdiction of SB took effect on May
1995 so much so that the petitioner filed before concept of speedy disposition is a relative term and must
necessarily be a flexible concept.
SB a motion to refer his cases to the RTC of Makati alleging
that the SB has no jurisdiction over said A mere mathematical reckoning of the time involved,
therefore, would not be sufficient. In the
cases when it issued its resolutions and suspension order on
June 1995. The SB in a follow-up resolution application of the constitutional guarantee of the right to
speedy disposition of cases, particular regard
denied the petitioners motion. Hence this present petition,
prohibition and mandamus questioning the must also be taken of the facts and circumstances peculiar to
each case.
jurisdiction of SB over the criminal cases.
ISSUE
(issue relevant to our discussion on Sec. 16)
Whether or not the petitioners right to speedy disposition has
been violated NO.
HELD
The Court finds that there was no undue delay in the
disposition of the subject cases.
The prosecution is not bound by the findings of the [G.R. Nos. 120681-83. October 1, 1999]
Commission on Audit (COA); it must rely on its own
independent judgment in the determination of probable cause.
Accordingly, the prosecution had to
JEJOMAR C. BINAY, petitioner, vs. HON.
conduct its own review of the COA findings. Judging from SANDIGANBAYAN (Third Division) and the
said findings, we find that the cases were DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENT, respondents.
sufficiently complex, thus justifying the length of time for
their resolution.
Whether or not there is probable cause to warrant the filing of
the subject cases is a question best left to [G.R. No. 128136. October 1, 1999]

the discretion of the Ombudsman. Absent any grave abuse of

such discretion, the Court will not interfere
MARIO C. MAGSAYSAY, FRANCISCO B. CASTILLO,
in the exercise thereof. Petitioner in this case has failed to
CRISTINA D. MABIOG, REGINO E. MALAPIT,
establish any such abuse on the part of the
ERLINDA I. MASANGCAY and VICENTE DE
 LA ROSA, petitioners, vs. HON.
SANDIGANBAYAN, HON. OMBUDSMAN and
its PROSECUTOR WENDELL BARERRAS-
SULIT and STATE PROSECUTORS ERIC
HENRY JOSEPH F. MALLONGA and GIDEON
C. MENDOZA, respondents.
DECISION
KAPUNAN, J.:
Pursuant to Section 4, Article XIII of the 1973
Constitution, Presidential Decree No. 1486 created an Anti-
Graft Court known as the Sandiganbayan. Since then the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan has under gone various
changes,[1] the most recent of which were effected through
Republic Act Nos. 7975[2] and 8249.[3] Whether the
Sandiganbayan, under these laws, exercises exclusive original
jurisdiction over criminal cases involving municipal mayors
accused of violations of Republic Act No. 3019 [4] and Article
220 of the Revised Penal Code[5] is the central issue in these
consolidated petitions.
In G.R. Nos. 120681-83, petitioner Jejomar Binay seeks
to annul, among others, the Resolution of the Sandiganbayan
denying his motion to refer Criminal Case Nos. 21001, 21005
and 21007 to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati and
declaring that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over said
cases despite the enactment of R.A. No. 7975.
In G.R. No. 128136, petitioner Mario C. Magsaysay, et
al. assail the October 22, 1996 Resolution of the
Sandiganbayan, reversing its Order of June 21, 1996 which
suspended the proceedings in Criminal Case No. 23278 in
deference to whatever ruling this Court will lay down in the
Binay cases.
The facts, as gathered from t he records, are as follows:
G.R. Nos. 120681-83
On September 7, 1994, the Office of the Ombudsman filed
before the Sandiganbayan three separate informations against
petitioner Jejomar Binay, one for violation of Article 220 of the
Revised Penal Code,[6] and two for violation of Section 3(e) of
R.A. No. 3019.[7] The informations, which were subsequently
amended on September 15, 1994, all alleged that the acts
constituting these crimes were committed in 1987 during
petitioners incumbency as Mayor of Makati, then a
municipality of Metro Manila.
Thereafter, petitioner moved to quash the
informations. He contended that the six-year delay from the
time the charges were filed in the Office of the Ombudsman on
July 27, 1988 to the time the informations were filed in the
Sandiganbayan on September 7, 1994 constituted a violation of
his right to due process. Arraignment of the accused was held
in abeyance pending the resolution of this motion.
On March 29, 1995, the Sandiganbayan issued a
Resolution denying petitioners motion to quash. Petitioners
motion for reconsideration, which was opposed by the
prosecution, was likewise denied by the Sandiganbayan. The
resolution denying the motion for reconsideration, however,
was issued before the petitioner could file a reply to the
prosecutions opposition to the motion for reconsideration.
In the meantime, on March 31, 1995, the prosecution filed
a Motion to Suspend Accused Pendente Lite. The
Sandiganbayan, in a Resolution dated April 25, 1995, granted
the motion and ordered the suspension of petitioner for ninety
days from receipt of the resolution. The court ruled that the
requisites for suspension pendente lite were present as
petitioner was charged with one of the offenses under Section
13 of R.A. No. 3019[8] and the informations containing these
charges had previously been held valid in the resolution
denying the motion to quash and the resolution denying the
motion for reconsideration.
Petitioner thus filed before this Court a petition
for certiorari,[9] to set aside the resolution denying his motion
for reconsideration, claiming that he was denied due process
when the Sandiganbayan ordered his suspension pendente
lite before he could file a reply to the prosecutions opposition
to his motion for reconsideration of the resolution denying the
motion to quash. In a Resolution dated April 28, 1995, the
Court directed the Sandiganbayan to, among other things,
permit petitioner to file said reply.
After allowing and considering petitioners reply, the
Sandiganbayan, on June 6, 1995, issued a Resolution reiterating
the denial of his motion for reconsideration of the denial of the
motion to quash. On the same day, the Sandiganbayan issued
another resolution reiterating the order suspending
petitioner pendente lite.
Meanwhile, R.A. No. 7975, redefining the jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan, took effect on May 16, 1995. [10]
On June 13, 1995, petitioner filed before the
Sandiganbayan a motion to refer his cases to the proper court
for further proceedings, alleging that when the two Resolutions,
both dated June 6, 1995, were issued by the Anti-Graft Court,
it had already lost jurisdiction over the subject cases. The
Sandiganbayan, in a Resolution dated July 4, 1995, denied
petitioners motion, holding thus:
There is no question that Municipal Mayors are classified as
Grade 27 under the compensation & Position Classification
Act of 1989. Since, at the time of the commission of the
offenses charged in he above-entitled cases, the accused
Mayor Jejomar C. Binay was a Municipal Mayor, although in
an acting or interim capacity, the Sandiganbayan, has, under
Section 4 (e) 5, original jurisdiction over the cases therein
filed against him. The allegation that Mayor Binay ought to
have been classified with a salary grade lower than Grade 27,
because at the time of the commission of the offenses charged
he was paid a salary which merits a grade lower than Grade 27
does not hold water. In 1986 when the herein offenses were
committed by the accused, the Compensation & Position
Classification Act of 1989 was not as yet in existence. From
the very definition of he very Act itself, it is evident that the
Act was passed and had been effective only in 1989. The
Grade classification of a public officer, whether at the time of
the commission of the offense or thereafter, is determined by
his classification under the Compensation & Position
Classification Act of 1989. Thus since the accused Mayor
Jejomar C. Binay was a Municipal Mayor at the time of the
commission of the offenses and the Compensation & Position
Classification Act of 1989 classifies Municipal Mayors as
Grade 27, it is a conclusion beyond cavil that the
Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the accused herein.
As of July 1, 1989, when Republic Act No. 6758 took effect,
Municipal Mayor Jejomar C. Binay had begun receiving a
monthly salary of P15,180.00 which is equivalent to Grade 28
under the salary scale provided for in Section 27 of the said
Act. Under the Index of Occupational Services, the position
titles and salary grades of the Compensation & Position
classification system prepared by the Department of Budget
and Management pursuant to Section 6 of Republic [A]ct No.
6758, the position of Municipal Mayor had been classified as
Grade 27.[11]
On July 7, 1995, petitioner filed the present petition
for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus questioning the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over Criminal Case Nos.
21001, 21005 and 21007. He prayed, among others, that the
Court annul and set aside: (1) the Resolution of the
Sandiganbayan dated June 6, 1995 reiterating the denial of the
motion for reconsideration of the motion to quash; (2) the
Resolution of the same court also dated June 6, 1995 reiterating
the order suspending petitioner pendente lite; and (3) the
Resolution of the Sandiganbayan dated July 4, 1995 denying
the motion to refer case to the RTC. Petitioner also asked that
the Court issue a temporary restraining order preventing the
suspension and arraignment of petitioner. The Court on July 7,
1995, resolved, among others, to issue the temporary restraining
order prayed for.
On July 14, 1995, petitioner filed an Addendum to Petition
(To allow the introduction of alternative reliefs), praying that,
should this Court hold that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction
over the cases, the criminal cases filed against him be dismissed
just the same on the ground that the long delay of the
preliminary investigation before the Ombudsman prior to the
filing of the informations, deprived him of his right to due
process; and that, moreover, there was no probable cause to
warrant the filing of the informations.
G.R. No. 128136
Petitioner Mario Magsaysay is the Mayor of the
Municipality of San Pascual, Batangas. Save for petitioner
Vicente dela Rosa, all of Mayor Magsaysays co-petitioners are
officials of the same municipality.
In a complaint dated April 16, 1994, Victor Cusi, then
Vice-Mayor of San Pascual, Batangas, charged petitioners
along with Elpidia Amada, Jovey C. Babago, and Brigido H.
Buhain, also officials of San Pascual Batangas, with violation
of R.A. No. 3019, as amended. The complaint charged the
respondent municipal officials of overpaying Vicente de la
Rosa of TDR Construction for the landscaping project of the
San Pascual Central School. This was docketed in the Office of
the Ombudsman as OMB-1-94-1232.
In a Resolution dated June 14, 1995, Graft Investigation
Officer Lourdes A. Alarilla recommended the filing of an
information for violation of Section 3(e) and (g) of R.A. No.
3019, as amended, against petitioners with the
Sandiganbayan. Director Elvis John S. Asuncion concurred in
the resolution, and Manuel C. Domingo, Deputy Ombudsman
for Luzon, recommended approval of the same. The resolution
was approved by then Acting Ombudsman Francisco A. Villa
with the following marginal note:
Authority is given to the deputy Ombudsman for Luzon to
cause the preparation of the information and to approve the
same for filing with the proper court.[12]
On August 11, 1995, an Information for violation of
Section 3 (e) and (g) was filed against petitioners and Jovey C.
Babago, not with the Sandiganbayan per the June 14, 1995
Resolution, but with the RTC of Batangas City. The
information was signed by a Lourdes A. Alarilla, the same Graft
Investigation Officer who recommended the filing of the
information with the Sandiganbayan.
In the meantime, a group denominated as the Concerned
Citizens of San Pascual, Batangas filed a complaint before the
Ombudsman against petitioners, and Elpidia Amada and
Brigido Buhain, with violations of R.A. No. 3019. The
complaint also alleged, among others, the overpricing of the
landscaping project of San Pascual Central School. The case
was docketed as OMB-0-94-0149.
In a Resolution dated July 27, 1995, Graft Investigation
Officer Ernesto M. Nocos recommended the filing of an
information charging petitioners with violation of Section 3(e)
and (g) of R.A. No. 3019, as amended with proper court. The
resolution, which was recommended for approval by Nicanor J.
Cruz, OIC-Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon, and approved by
Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto, adopted the findings and
conclusions in the resolution in OMB-1-94-1232 that the
landscaping project was overpriced.
On February 9, 1996, another Information for violation of
Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, as amended, was filed against
petitioners for the overpricing of the landscaping project, this
time before the Sandiganbayan. The information was
subsequently amended on May 17, 1996. Except for the date the
alleged crime was committed, the information charged
essentially the same inculpatory facts as the information filed
in the RTC. The case was docketed in the Sandiganbayan as
Crim. Case No. 22378.
On June 1, 1996, the accused filed with the
Sandiganbayan a motion to quash the information in Crim. Case
No. 22378 on the following grounds: that the Sandiganbayan
had no jurisdiction over the case; that the accused were charged
with the same offense in two informations; and that the
proceedings in the Sandiganbayan would expose petitioners to
double jeopardy. The Sandiganbayan denied the accuseds
motion to quash in a Resolution dated June 21, 1996. The court,
however, suspended proceedings in the case until the Supreme
Court resolved the question of the Sandiganbayans jurisdiction
involved in the Binay petition.
 Meanwhile, on June 7, 1996, Prosecutor Eric Mallonga
filed a motion before the RTC to refer the R.A. No. 3019 case
pending therein to the Sandiganbayan, arguing that under R.A.
No. 7975 the Sandiganbayan, not the RTC, had jurisdiction
over the case. On July 3, 1996, the RTC issued an order holding
in abeyance the resolution of the motion to refer the case since
the issue of jurisdiction was pending before the Sandiganbayan.
Back at the Sandiganbayan, the prosecution, on July 24,
1996, filed a motion for reconsideration of the Sandiganbayans
Order dated June 21, 1996. On August 2, 1996, filed their own
motion for the reconsideration of the same order. On October
22, 1996, the Sandiganbayan granted the motion for
reconsideration filed by the prosecution and set the case for
arraignment. Petitioners moved for a reconsideration of the
October 22, 1996 Resolution ordering their arraignment, which
motion was denied on February 17, 1997.
On February 27, 1997, the accused filed the present
petition.
On October 1, 1997, the Court resolved to issue a
temporary restraining order to prevent respondents from further
proceeding with Crim. Case No. 23278 of the Sandiganbayan.
The petition raises the following issues:
I
Had the Sandiganbayan been ousted of its jurisdiction over the
case of municipal mayor after the passage of Republic Act No.
7975, coupled with the filing earlier of an information for the
same offense before the Regional Trial Court having territorial
jurisdiction and venue of the commission of the offense?
II
Are the respondents Ombudsman and the prosecutors estopped
by laches or waiver from filing and prosecuting the case
before respondent Sandiganbayan after the filing earlier of the
information in the proper court, thereafter repudiating it,
seeking another court of the same category and finally to
respondent court?
III
Whether or not the filing of two (2) informations for the same
offense violated the rule on duplicity of information?
IV
Whether or not the trial to be conducted by respondent court,
if the case shall not be dismissed, will expose the petitioners
who are accused therein to double jeopardy?
V otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act,
Under the circumstances, are the respondent Ombudsman and
the prosecutors guilty of forum shopping? [13]
On October 6, 1997, the Court resolved to consolidate
G.R. No. 128136 (the Magsaysay petition) with G.R. Nos.
120681-83 (the Binay petition).
In resolving these consolidated petitions, the Court shall
first address the common question of the Sandiganbayans
jurisdiction.
I
The Court rules that it is the Sandiganbayan which has
jurisdiction over the subject cases.
The informations against Mayor Binay were filed in the
Sandiganbayan on July 7, 1994, pursuant to Presidential Decree
No. 1606,[14] as amended by Presidential Decree No.
1861,[15] the pertinent provisions of which state:
SEC. 4. Jurisdiction. - The Sandiganbayan shall exercise:
(a) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving:
(1) Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended,
otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act,
Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of
the Revised Penal Code;
(2) Other offenses or felonies committed by public officers
and employees in relation to their office, including those
employed in government-owned or controlled corporations,
whether simple or complexed with other crimes, where the
penalty prescribed by law is higher than prision
correccional or imprisonment for six (6) years, or a fine of
P6,000.00; PROVIDED, HOWEVER, that offenses or
felonies mentioned in this paragraph where the penalty
prescribed by law does not exceed prision correccional or
imprisonment for six (6) years or a fine of P6,000.00 shall be
tried by the proper Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial
Court, Municipal Trial Court and Municipal Circuit Trial
Court.
xxx.
On May 16, 1995, R.A. No. 7975 took effect. At this time,
Mayor Binay had not yet been arraigned in the
Sandiganbayan. On the other hand, R.A. No. 7975 was already
in effect when the information against Mayor Magsaysay et al.,
was filed on August 11, 1995 in the RTC of Batangas City.
Section 2 of R.A. No. 7975 amended Section 4 of P.D. No.
1606 to read as follows:
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. -- The Sandiganbayan shall exercise
original jurisdiction in all cases involving:
a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended,
Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of
the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the principal
accused are officials occupying the following positions in the
government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim
capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense:
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions
of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as grade
27 and higher, of the Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758),
specifically including:
(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of
the sangguniang panlalawigan, and provincial treasurers,
assessors, engineers, and other provincial department heads;
(b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang
panlungsod, city treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other
city department heads;
(c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position
of consul and higher;
(d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and
all officers of higher rank;
(e) PNP chief superintendent and PNP officers of higher rank;
(f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and
officials and prosecutors in the Office of the Ombudsman and
special prosecutor;
(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of
government-owned or controlled corporations, state
universities or educational institutions or foundations;
(2) Members of Congress and officials thereof classified as
Grade 27 and up under the Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989;
(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the
provisions of the Constitution;
(4) Chairmen and members of Constitutional Commissions,
without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution; and
(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade 27
and higher under the Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989.
b. Other offenses or felonies committed by the public officials
and employees mentioned in subsection (a) of this section in
relation to their office.
c. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection
with Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A.
In cases where none of the principal accused are occupying
positions corresponding to salary grade 27 or higher, as
prescribed in the said Republic Act No. 6758, or PNP officers
occupying the rank of superintendent or higher, or their
equivalent, exclusive jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the
proper Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court,
Municipal Trial Court, and Municipal Circuit Trial Court, as
the case may be, pursuant to their respective jurisdiction as
provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.
xxx.
While the cases against petitioners were pending in this
Court, congress enacted R.A. No. 8249, again redefining the
jurisdiction of the Anti-Graft Court. This law took effect, per
Section 10 thereof, on February 23, 1997, fifteen days after its
complete publication on February 8, 1997 in
the Journal and Malaya, two newspapers of general
circulation.
As further amended by Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249,
Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606 now reads:
SEC. 4. Jurisdiction. - The Sandiganbayan shall exercise
exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving:
a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended,
otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act,
Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII,
Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the
accused are officials occupying the following positions in the
government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim
capacity, at he time of the commission of the offense:
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the position of
regional director and higher, otherwise classified as grade 27
and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification
Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including:
(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of
the sangguniang panlalawigan, and provincial treasurers,
assessors, engineers, and other provincial department heads;
(b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang
panlungsod, city treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other
city department heads;
(c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position
of consul and higher;
(d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and
all officers of higher rank;
(e) Officers of the Philippine National Police while occupying
the position of provincial director and those holding the rank
of senior superintendent or higher;
(f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and
officials and prosecutors in the office of the Ombudsman and
special prosecutor;
(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of
government-owned or controlled corporations, state
universities or educational institutions or foundations.
(2) Members of Congress and officials thereof classified as
Grade 27 and up under the Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989;
(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the
provisions of the Constitution;
(4) Chairmen and members of Constitutional Commissions,
without prejudice to the provisions of he Constitution; and
(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade 27
and higher under the Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989.
b. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed
with other crimes committed by the public officials and
employees mentioned in subsection (a) of this section in
relation to heir office.
d. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection
with Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986.
In cases where none of the accused are occupying positions
corresponding to salary grade 27 or higher, as prescribed in
the said Republic Act No. 6758, or military and PNP officers
mentioned above, exclusive original jurisdiction thereof shall
be vested in the proper regional trial court, metropolitan trial
court, municipal trial court, and municipal circuit trial court,
as the case may be, pursuant to their respective jurisdictions as
provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended.
Petitioners contend that they do not come under the
exclusive original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan because:
(1) At the alleged time of the commission of the crimes
charged, petitioner municipal mayors were not classified as
Grade 27.
(2) Municipal mayors are not included in the enumeration
in Section 4a(1) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by R.A. No.
7975.
(3) Congressional records reveal that the law did not
intend municipal mayors to come under the exclusive original
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
A Consistent with these policies, the law employs the
In support of his contention that his position was not that
of Grade 27, Mayor Binay argues:
xxx. The new laws consistent and repeated reference to
salary grade show[s] an intention to base the separation of
jurisdiction between the Sandiganbayan and the regular
courts on pay scale.Grades are determined by
compensation. The essence of grades is pay
scales. Therefor, pay scales determine grades.[16]
Mayor Binay, thus, presented a Certification[17] from the
City Personnel Officer of Makati stating that petitioner as
mayor received a monthly salary of only P10,793.00 from
March 1987 to December 31, 1988. This amount was
supposedly equivalent to Grade 22 under R.A. No. 6758.
Mayor Magsaysay, for his part, submitted a similar
Certification[18] from the Municipal Treasurer of San Pascual,
Batangas, stating:
x x x that the basic monthly salary received by Mario C.
Magsaysay, Municipal Mayor of San Pascual, Batangas with
Salary Grade 27 is ELEVEN THOUSAND EIGHT
HUNDRED TWENTY EIGHT PESOS (P11,828.00) per
month as of November 3, 1993 equivalent only to Grade 25,
Step 5 of RA 6758, the Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989.
Section 444(1) (Grad[e] 27) of RA 6758 is not as yet
implemented due to budgetary constraints. This certification is
issued to Mayor Mario C. Magsaysay this 30th day of May
1996 at San Pascual, Batangas for whatever legal purpose
and/or purposes it may serve.
The Court does not subscribe to the manner by which
petitioners classify Grades.
The Constitution[19] states that in providing for the
standardization of compensation of government officials and
employees, Congress shall take into account the nature of the
responsibilities pertaining to, and the qualifications required for
their positions, thus:
The Congress shall provide for the standardization of
compensation of government officials, including those in
government-owned or controlled corporations with original
charters, taking into account the nature of the responsibilities
pertaining to, and the qualifications required for their
positions.
Corollary thereto, Republic Act No. 6758[20] provides in
Section 2 thereof that differences in pay are to be based upon
substantive differences in duties and responsibilities, and
qualification requirements of the positions. In short, the nature
of an officials position should be the determining factor in the
fixing of his or her salary. This is not only mandated by law but
dictated by logic as well.
scheme known as the grade defined in Presidential Decree No.
985[21] as including
xxx all classes of positions which, although different with
respect to kind or subject matter of work, are sufficiently
equivalent as to level of difficulty and responsibilities and
level of qualification requirements of the work to warrant the
inclusion of such classes of positions within one range of basic
compensation.[22]
The grade, therefore, depends upon the nature of ones
position -- the level of difficulty, responsibilities, and
qualification requirements thereof -- relative to that of another
position. It is the officials Grade that determines his or her
salary, not the other way around.
It is possible that a local government officials salary may
be less than that prescribed for his Grade since his salary
depends also on the class and financial capability of his or her
respective local government unit.[23] Nevertheless, it is the law
which fixes the officials grade.
Thus, Section 8 of R.A. 6758 fixes the salary grades of the
President, Vice-President, Senate President, Speaker, Chief
Justice, Senators, Members of the House of Representatives,
Associate Justices of the Supreme Court, as well as the
Chairmen and Members of the Constitutional
Commissions. Section 8 also authorizes the Department of
Budget and Management (DBM) to determine the officials who
are of equivalent rank to the foregoing officials, where
applicable and to assign such officials the same Salary Grades
subject to a set of guidelines found in said section.
For positions below those mentioned under Section 8,
Section 9 instructs the DBM to prepare the Index of
Occupational Services guided by the Benchmark Position
prescribed in Section 9 and the factors enumerated therein.
To determine whether an official is within the exclusive
original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, therefore, reference
should be made to R.A. No. 6758 and the Index of Occupational
Services, Position Titles and Salary Grades. Salary level is not
determinative. An officials grade is not a matter of proof, but a
matter of law of which the Court must take judicial notice.[24]
As both the 1989 and 1997 versions of the Index of
Occupational Services, Position Titles and Salary Grades list
the municipal Mayor under Salary Grade 27, petitioner mayors
come within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan. Petitioner mayors are local officials classified
as Grade 27 and higher under the Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989, under the catchall provision, Section
4a(5) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by R.A. No. 7975. More
accurately, petitioner mayors are [o]fficials of the executive
branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher,
otherwise classified as grade 27 and higher, of the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989, under
Section 4a(1) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by R.A. No.
7975.[25]
B Sandiganbayans exclusive original jurisdiction to relieve these
Petitioners, however, argue that they are not included in
the enumeration in Section 4a(1). They invoke the rule in
statutory construction expressio unius est expressio alterius. As
what is not included in those enumerated is deemed excluded,
municipal officials are excluded from the Sandiganbayans
exclusive original jurisdiction.
Resort to statutory construction, however, is not
appropriate where the law is clear and unambiguous.[26] The law
is clear in this case. As stated earlier, Section 4a(1) of P.D. No.
1606, as amended by R.A. No. 7975, speaks of [o]fficials of the
executive branch occupying the positions of regional director
and higher, otherwise classified as grade 27 and higher, of the
compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.
The Court fails to see how a different interpretation could
arise even if the plain meaning rule were disregarded and the
law subjected to interpretation.
The premise of petitioners argument is that the
enumeration in Section 4a(1) is exclusive. It is not. The phrase
specifically including after [o]fficials of the executive branch
occupying the positions of regional director and higher,
otherwise classified as grade 27 and higher, of the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989
necessarily conveys the very idea of non-exclusivity of the
enumeration.The principle of expressio unius est exclusio
alterius does not apply where other circumstances indicate that
the enumeration was not intended to be exclusive,[27] or where
the enumeration is by way of example only.[28] In Conrado B.
Rodrigo, et al. vs. The Honorable Sandiganbayan (First
Division), supra, the Court held that the catchall in Section
4a(5) was necessary for it would be impractical, if not
impossible, for Congress to list down each position created or
will be created pertaining to grades 27 and above. The same
rationale applies to the enumeration in Section 4a(1). Clearly,
the law did not intend said enumeration to be an exhaustive list.
Should there be any doubts as to whether petitioner
mayors are under the category of Grade 27, Section 444(d) of
the Local Government Code settles the matter:
The municipal mayor shall receive a minimum monthly
compensation corresponding to Salary Grade twenty-seven
(27) as prescribed under R.A. No. 6758 and the implementing
guidelines issued pursuant thereto.
In the Courts Resolution in Rodrigo dated July 2, 1999
denying the motion for reconsideration, we treated the above
provision as confirmatory of the Salary Grade assigned by the
DBM to Municipal Mayors.
C
Petitioner Binay cites previous bills[29] in Congress
dealing with the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. These bills
supposedly sought to exclude municipal officials from the
officials ,especially those from the provinces, of the financial
burden brought about by trials in Manila.
The resort to congressional records to determine the
proper application of the law in this case is unwarranted in this
case for the same reason that the resort to the rule of inclusio
unius est expressio alterius is inappropriate.
Verily, the interpretation of the law desired by the petitioner
may be more humane but it is also an elementary rule in
statutory construction that when the words and phrases of the
statute are clear and unequivocal, their meaning must be
determined from language employed and the statute must be
taken to mean exactly what it says. (Baranda v. Gustilo, 165
SCRA 758-759 [1988]). The courts may not speculate as to
the probable intent of the legislature apart from the words
(Aparri v. CA, 127 SCRA 233 [1984]). When the law is clear,
it is not susceptible to interpretation. It must be applied
regardless of who may be affected, even if the law may be
harsh or onerous. (Nepomuceno, et al. v. FC, 110 Phil.
42). And even granting that exceptions may be conceded, the
same as a general rule, should be strictly but reasonably
construed; they extend only so far as their language fairly
warrants, and all doubts should be resolved in favor of the
general provisions rather than the exception. Thus, where a
general rule is established by statute, the court will not curtail
the former nor add to the latter by implication (Samson v.
CA., 145 SCRA 654 [1986]).[30]
Thus, in Rodrigo, petitioners therein argued in their
motion for reconsideration:
x x x that the inclusion of Municipal Mayors within the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan would be inconvenient since
the witness in their case would come from Baguio City and
San Nicolas, Pangasinan.This, according to petitioners, would
defeat one of the purposes of R.A. No. 7975, that is, the
convenience of the accused.
The Court, in denying the motion for reconsideration,
held, among others, that:
The legislature has nevertheless chosen the mode and standard
by which to implement its intent, and courts have no choice
but to apply it. Congress has willed that positions with Grade
27 and above shall come within the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan and this Court is duty-bound to obey the
congressional will.
Petitioner Binay also quotes the Sponsorship Speech of
Senator Roco, stating:
Since February 1979, when the Sandiganbayan was
established up to the present, the Court has been confronted
with the problem of those accused who are of limited means
who stand trial for petty crimes, the so-called small fry -- the
barangay officials, the municipal officials and
employees, postal clerks and letter carriers and the like -- who
are involved with nickel-and-dime cases and money-related
cases such as malversation, estafa and theft. xxx
xxx xxx xxx
Senate Bill No. 1353 modifies the present jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan such that only those occupying high
positions in Government and the military fall under the
jurisdiction of the court.[31]
It is not clear, however, whether Senator Roco meant
that all municipal officials are excluded from the jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan. In any case, courts are not bound by a
legislators opinion in congressional debates regarding the
interpretation of a particular legislation. It is deemed a mere
personal opinion of the legislator.[32] Such opinions do not
necessarily reflect the view of the entire Congress.[33]
D
From the foregoing discussion, it is clear that the cases
against petitioner Binay cannot be referred to the regular courts
under Section 7 of R.A. No. 7975, which provides:
Sec. 7. Upon effectivity of this Act, all criminal cases in which
trial has not begun in the Sandiganbayan shall be referred to
the proper courts.
In construing the correct import of Section 7, it may be
helpful to refer to the guidelines in determining jurisdiction laid
down in Bengzon vs. Inciong:[34]
The rule is that where a court has already obtained and is
exercising jurisdiction over a controversy, its jurisdiction to
proceed to the final determination of the cause is not affected
by new legislation placing jurisdiction over such proceedings
in another tribunal. The exception to the rule is where the
statute expressly provides, or is construed to the effect that it
is intended to operate as to actions pending before its
enactment. Where a statute changing the jurisdiction of a court
has no retroactive effect, it cannot be applied to a case that
was pending prior to the enactment of the statute.
R.A. No. 7975, by virtue of Section 7, belongs to the
exception rather than the rule. The provision is transitory in
nature and expresses the legislatures intention to apply its
provisions on jurisdiction to criminal cases in which trial has
not begun in the Sandiganbayan. To this extent, R.A. 7975 is
retroactive.
Such a transitory provision is not peculiar to R.A. No.
7975; similar provisions are found in other laws reallocating the
jurisdiction of the courts.[35] There is no reason why Section 7
of R.A. No. 7975 should be any different.
The term proper courts, as used in Section 7, means courts
of competent jurisdiction, and such jurisdiction is defined in
Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by R.A. No. 7975. The
former should not be read in isolation but construed in
conjunction with the latter.
The term proper courts as used in Section 7, therefore, is
not restricted to regular courts, but includes as well the
Sandiganbayan, a special court. If the intent of Congress were
to refer all cases the trials of which have not begun to the regular
courts, it should have employed the term proper regular courts
or regular courts instead of proper courts. Accordingly, the law
in the third paragraph of Section 4 P.D. No. 1606, as amended
by Section 2 of R.A. No. 7975, uses the term regular courts, not
proper courts:
The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate
jurisdiction on appeals from the final judgments, resolutions or
orders of regular courts where all the accused are occupying
positions lower than salary grade 27, or not otherwise covered
by the preceding enumeration. [Underscoring supplied.]
Construed thus, the effects of Section 7 may be
summarized as follows:
1. If trial of cases before the Sandiganbayan has already begun
as of the approval of R.A. No. 7975, R.A. No. 7975 does not
apply.
2. If trial of cases before the Sandiganbayan has not begun as
of the approval of R.A. No. 7975, then R.A. No. 7975 applies.
(a) If by virtue of Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by
Section 2 of R.A. No. 7975, the Sandiganbayan has
jurisdiction over a case before it, then the case shall be
referred to the Sandiganbayan.
(b) If by virtue of Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by
Section 2 of R.A. No. 7975, the Sandiganbayan
has no jurisdiction over a case before it, the case shall be
referred to the regular courts.
The trial of the cases involving Mayor Binay had not yet
begun as of the date of the approval of R.A. 7975; consequently,
the Anti-Graft Court retains jurisdiction over the said cases.
In any case, whatever seeming ambiguity or doubt
regarding the application of Section 7 of R.A. No. 7975 should
be laid to rest by Section 7 of R.A. No. 8249, which states:
Sec. 7. Transitory Provision. - This Act shall apply to all cases
pending in any court over which trial has not begun as of the
approval hereof.
The latter provision more accurately expresses the legislatures
intent and in any event should be applied in this case, R.A. No.
8249 having superseded R.A. No. 7975.
In Panfilo M. Lacson vs. The Executive Secretary, et
al.,[36] The Court explained the purpose of the foregoing
provision.
x x x it can be reasonably anticipated that an alteration of
[Sandiganbayans] jurisdiction would necessarily affect
pending cases, which is why it has to provide for a remedy in
the form of a transitory provision. x x x. The transitory
provision does not only cover cases which are in the
Sandiganbayan but also in any court. x x x. Moreover, those
cases where trial had already begun are not affected by the
transitory provision under Section 7 of the new law (RA
8249). [Emphasis in the original.]
The possible disruptive effect of the amendments to the
Sandiganbayans jurisdiction on pending cases was, therefore,
not lost on the legislature. Congress has, furthermore, deemed
the commencement of the trial as the crucial point in
determining whether a court retains a case pending before it or
lose the same on the ground of lack of jurisdiction per the
provisions of R.A. 8249. The law obviously does not want to
waste the time and effort already devoted to the presentation of
evidence if trial had already begun. On the other hand, not much
disruption would be caused if the amendment were made to
apply to cases the trials of which have not yet to start.
The ramifications of Section 7 of R.A. No. 8249 may be
stated as follows:
1. If trial of the cases pending before whatever court has
already begun as of the approval of R.A. No. 8249, said law
does not apply.
2. If trial of cases pending before whatever court
has not begun as of the approval of R.A. No. 8249, then said
law applies.
(a) If the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over a case pending
before it, then it retains jurisdiction.
(b) If the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over a case
pending before it, the case shall be referred to the regular
courts.
(c) If the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over a case pending
before a regular court, the latter loses jurisdiction and the same
shall be referred to the Sandiganbayan.
(d) If a regular court has jurisdiction over a case pending
before it, then said court retains jurisdiction.
Thus, under both R.A. Nos. 7975 and 8429, the
Sandiganbayan retains jurisdiction over said cases.
II
Petitioner Binay avers in his Addendum to Petition that
his right to speedy disposition has been violated by the
inordinate delay in the resolution of the subject cases by the
Ombudsman.
Article III of the Constitution provides that:
Sec. 16. All persons shall have the right to a speedy
disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or
administrative bodies.
The constitutional right to a speedy disposition of cases is
not limited to the accused in criminal proceedings but extends
to all parties in all cases, including civil and administrative
cases, and in all proceedings, including judicial and quasi-
judicial hearings.[37] Hence, under the Constitution, any party to
a case may demand expeditious action on all officials who are
tasked with the administration of justice.[38]
However, the right to a speedy disposition of a case, like
the right to speedy trial,[39] is deemed violated only when the
proceedings is attended by vexatious, capricious, and
oppressive delays; or when unjustified postponements of the
trial are asked for and secured, or when without cause or
justifiable motive a long period of time is allowed to elapse
without the party having his case tried.[40] Equally applicable is
the balancing test used to determine whether a defendant has
been denied his right to a speedy trial, or a speedy disposition
of a case for that matter, in which the conduct of both the
prosecution and the defendant is weighed, and such factors as
the length of the delay, the reasons for such delay, the assertion
or failure to assert such right by the accused, and the prejudice
caused by the delay.[41] The concept of speedy disposition is a
relative term and must necessarily be a flexible concept.[42]
 A mere mathematical reckoning of the time involved,
therefore, would not be sufficient.[43] In the application of the
constitutional guarantee of the right to speedy disposition of
cases, particular regard must also be taken of the facts and
circumstances peculiar to each case.[44]
In Tatad vs.Sandiganbayan,[45] the Court held that the
length of delay and the simplicity of the issues did not justify
the delay in the disposition of the cases therein. The
unexplained inaction[46] of the prosecutors called for the
dismissal of the cases against petitioner Tatad.
In Alvizo vs. Sandiganbayan,[47] the Court also ruled that
there was no violation of the right to speedy disposition. The
Court took into account the reasons for the delay, i.e., the
frequent amendments of procedural laws by presidential
decrees, the structural reorganizations in existing prosecutorial
agencies and the creation of new ones by executive fiat,
resulting in changes of personnel, preliminary jurisdiction, and
the functions and powers of prosecuting agencies. The Court
likewise considered the failure of the accused to assert such
right, and the lack of prejudice caused by the delay to the
accused.
In Santiago vs. Garchitorena,[48] the complexity of the
issues and the failure of the accused to invoke her right to
speedy disposition at the appropriate time spelled defeat to her
claim to the constitutional guarantee.
In Cadalin vs. POEAs Administrator,[49] the Court,
considering also the complexity of the cases (not run-of-the-
mill variety) and the conduct of the parties lawyers, held that
the right to speedy disposition was not violated therein.
In petitioner Binays case, the Court finds that there was no
undue delay in the disposition of the subject cases. The
proceedings conducted before the Office of the Tanodbayan,
and later with the Office of the Ombudsman, adequately
explains the length of the delay:
1. That on July 27, 1988 Bobby Brillante filed with
the Office of the Tanodbayan an affidavit-
complaint charging, Jejomar Binay, Sergio
Santos, Roberto Chang, Delfin Almeda, Nelson
Irasga, Nicasio Santiago, Feliciano Basam,
Maria Chan, Romeo Barrios, Azucena Diaz,
Virgilio Clarete, Godofredo Marcelo, Armando
San Miguel, Salvador Pangilinan and John Does
of the following offenses: (a) Massive
Malversation of Public Funds; (b) Multiple
Falsification of Public Documents; (c)
Usurpation of Official Functions; (d) Violation
of Election Law; and (e) Violation of Sec. 3(e) of
R.A. 3019.
1.1. Brillantes complaint was based on the
initial findings and observations of the
COA on the examination of the cash and
accounts covering transactions from April
1, 1987 to January 4, 1988 and Post-Audit
of Selected Accounts for the last quarter
of 1987 of the Municipality of Makati
contained in its Report dated January 11,
1988. The COA furnished the
Tanodbayan a copy of this report on
August 1, 1988 upon request of the latter.
1.2. In the letter of the COA transmitting a
copy of the report, the Tanodbayan was
informed that this COA audit report of
January 11, 1988 is not yet released since
the Mayor of Makati was given thirty days
within which to explain/clarify the
findings in the report and is subject to
change or modification depending upon
the explanation/clarification to be
submitted by the Mayor of
Makati. Because of this information from
the COA the preliminary investigation
was held in abeyance until the submission
of the final report.
1.3. On March 1, 1989, the first part of the
Final Report on Audit of Makati was
received by the Office of the Ombudsman
and was transmitted for purposes of the
ensuring preliminary investigation to the
Tanodbayan which received the same on
March 22, 1989.
1.4. This first part of the Final Report
contained the fifteen (15) adverse
findings, above elsewhere stated as the
basis of Bobby Brillantes complaint.
1.5. Eleven (11) COA auditors participated
in the documentation and analysis of its
findings and preparation of the final
report.
1.6. The first part of the final report was
followed by a Supplemental Report on
Findings No. 1 and 3. This Supplemental
Report is dated July 3, 1989.
2. After securing machine copies of the voluminous
documents supporting the COA findings, Pros.
Margarito Gervacio, Chairman of the Panel of
Prosecutors, issued the corresponding subpoena
directing the respondents to submit their
respective counter-affidavits.
2.1. In compliance with the subpoena,
Mayor Jejomar Binay submitted his
counter-affidavit on May 18, 1990,
Marissa Chan, Feliciano Bascon, Nicanor
Santiago, Jr. on June 19, 1990, Renato
Manrique on June 4, 1990, Alfredo
Ignacio on June 6, 1990, Roberto Chang
on August 27, 1990. Feliciano Bascon
submitted his Supplemental Affidavit on
November 22, 1990.
2.2. Thereafter, clarificatory examinations
were conducted on September 27, 1990,
October 26, 1990, November 8, 9, 14, 22,
1990.
 3. On January 15, 1991 Mayor Jejomar Binay
submitted a copy of this Petition for Certiorari in
G.R. No. 92380 which he and the municipality of
Makati filed with the Supreme Court against
COA Chairman, Eufemio Domingo and the
Commission on Audit, with a manifestation that
said petition is submitted to support Binays stand
as regard COA Finding No. 9 aforestated.
4. On April 2, 1992 respondent Marissa Chan filed
an affidavit containing allegations incriminating
Jejomar Binay;
5. Upon being ordered to comment on the said April
2, 1992 affidavit of Marissa Chan, Jejomar Binay
submitted his comment thereto on April 30,
1992.
6. On August 4, 1993, the Investigation Panel
submitted to the Deputy Special Prosecutor its
Resolution disposing the preliminary
investigation of the case.
6.1. On August 10, 1993 the said Resolution
was approved by the Special Prosecutor,
who forwarded the same and the entire
records to the Office of the Ombudsman
for review and/or final action.
6.2. On August 16, 1994, the Review Panel
of the Ombudsman submitted to the latter
its review action for approval.
6.3. On August 19, 1994, the Ombudsman
approved some of the recommendations
of the Review Panel and directed the
preparation and filing of the
informations.[50]
Furthermore, the prosecution is not bound by the findings
of the Commission on Audit (COA); it must rely on its own
independent judgment in the determination of probable
cause. Accordingly, the prosecution had to conduct it s own
review of the COA findings. Judging from said findings, we
find that the cases were sufficiently complex, thus justifying the
length of time for their resolution. As held by the
Sandiganbayan in its Resolution dated March 29, 1995 denying
the Motion to Quash:
2. Ten charges are involved in these cases and the
prosecution, unable to rely on the raw findings of
the Commission on Audit in 15 reports caused
the investigation and examination of thousands
of vouchers, payrolls, and supporting documents
considering that no less than the Chairman of the
Commission on Audit, assisted by a team
supervisor and 10 team members had to take part
in the conduct of a final audit consisting of
evaluation and analysis of the initial findings in
the 15 raw reports, the cases must have involved
complicated legal and factual issues which do
warrant or justify a longer period of time for
preliminary investigation.
xxx
5. In the TATAD case, the preliminary investigation
was resolved close to three (3) years from the
time all the counter-affidavits were submitted to
the Tanodbayan, notwithstanding the fact that
very few documentary and testimonial evidence
were involved. In the above-entitled cases, the
preliminary investigation of all ten (10) cases
was terminated in merely two (2) years and four
(4) months from the date Mayor Binay filed his
last pleading, on April 30, 1992.[51]
Petitioner claims that the Resolution of the Sandiganbayan
ordering his suspension pendente lite is unwarranted since the
informations charging him were not valid. This contention,
however, must fail in view of our pronouncement that there was
no delay in the resolution of the subject cases in violation of his
right to speedy disposition. Accordingly, the informations in
question are valid an petitioners suspension pendente lite must
be upheld.
Finally, whether or not there is probable cause to warrant
the filing of the subject cases is a question best left to the
discretion of the Ombudsman. Absent any grave abuse of such
discretion, the Court will not interfere in the exercise
thereof.[52] Petitioner in this case has failed to establish any such
abuse on the part of the Ombudsman.
III
Having ruled that the criminal case against petitioners in
G.R. No. 128136 is within the exclusive original jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan, the Court will now dispose of the following
issues raised by them:
(1) The Sandiganbayan was ousted of its jurisdiction by
the filing of an information alleging the same facts with the
Regional Trial Court.
(2) Respondents are estopped from filing an information
before the Sandiganbayan considering that they had already
filed another information alleging the same facts before the
Regional Trial Court.
(3) The filing of the information before the
Sandiganbayan constitutes double jeopardy.
The Court tackles these arguments successively then deals
with the questions of duplicity of information and forum
shopping.
Petitioners invoke the rule that the jurisdiction of a court
once it attaches cannot be ousted by subsequent happenings or
events, although of such character which would have prevented
jurisdiction from attaching in the first instance.[53] They claim
that the filing of the information in the Sandiganbayan was a
subsequent happening or event which cannot oust the RTC of
its jurisdiction.
This rule has no application here for the simple reason that
the RTC had no jurisdiction over the case. Jurisdiction never
attached to the RTC. When the information was filed before the
RTC, R.A. No. 7975 was already in effect and, under said law,
jurisdiction over the case pertained to the Sandiganbayan.
Neither can estoppel be successfully invoked. First,
jurisdiction is determined by law, not by the consent or
agreement of the parties or by estoppel.[54] As a consequence of
this principle, the Court held inZamora vs. Court of
Appeals[55] that:
It follows that as a rule the filing of a complaint with one court
which has no jurisdiction over it does not prevent the plaintiff
from filing the same complaint later with the competent
court. The plaintiff is not estopped from doing so simply
because it made a mistake before in the choice of the proper
forum. In such a situation, the only authority the first court can
exercise is to dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction. This has
to be so as a contrary conclusion would allow a party to divest
the competent court of its jurisdiction, whether erroneously or
even deliberately, in derogation of the law.
It is true that the Court has ruled in certain cases[56] that
estoppel prevents a party from questioning the jurisdiction of
the court that the party himself invoked. Estoppel, however,
remains the exception rather than the rule, the rule being that
jurisdiction is vested by law.[57] Even in those instances where
the Court applied estoppel, the party estopped consistently
invoked the jurisdiction of the court and actively participated in
the proceedings, impugning such jurisdiction only when faced
with an adverse decision. This is not the case here. After
discovering that a similar information had earlier been filed in
the RTC, respondents promptly asked the trial court to refer the
case to the Sandiganbayan, which motion was followed by a
motion to resolve the previous motion. There was no consistent
invocation of the RTCs jurisdiction. There were no further
proceedings after the filing of the information save for the
motion to refer the case precisely on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction, and the motion to resolve the earlier
motion. Finally, the trial court had not rendered any decision,
much less one adverse to petitioners.
Second, petitioners cannot hold respondents in estoppel
for the latter are not themselves party to the criminal action. In
a criminal action, the State is the plaintiff, for the commission
of a crime is an offense against the State. Thus, the complaint
or information filed in court is required to be brought in the
name of the People of the Philippines.[58] Even then, the
doctrine of estoppel does not apply as against the people in
criminal prosecutions.[59] Violations of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, like attempted murder,[60] is a public
offense. Social and public interest demand the punishment of
the offender; hence, criminal actions for public offenses can not
be waived or condoned, much less barred by the rules of
estoppel.[61]
The filing of the information in the Sandiganbayan did not
put petitioners in double jeopardy even though they had already
pleaded not guilty to the information earlier filed in the
RTC. The first jeopardy never attached in the first place, the
RTC not being a court of competent jurisdiction. There can be
no double jeopardy where the accused entered a plea in a court
that had no jurisdiction.[62] The remedy of petitioners, therefore,
was not to move for the quashal of the information pending in
the Sandiganbayan on the ground of double jeopardy.[63] Their
remedy was to move for the quashal of the information pending
in the RTC on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.[64]
The contention that the filing of the information in the
Sandiganbayan violated the rule against duplicitous
informations is patently unmeritorious. That rule presupposes
that there is one complaint or information charging not one
offense, but two or more offenses. Thus, Rule 110 of the Rules
of Court states:
Sec. 13. Duplicity of offense. - A complaint or information
must charge but one offense, except only in those cases in
which existing laws prescribed a single punishment for
various offenses.
Non-compliance with this rule is a ground for quashing the
duplicitous complaint or information under Rule 117:
Sec. 3. Grounds. - The accused may move to quash the
complaint or information on any of the following grounds:
xxx
(e) That more than one offense is charged except in those
cases in which existing laws prescribe a single punishment for
various offenses;
xxx
Here, petitioners are faced not with one
information charging more than one offense but with more than
one information charging one offense.
The Court does not find the prosecution guilty of forum-
shopping. Broadly speaking, forum shopping exists when, as a
result of an adverse opinion in one forum, a party seeks a
favorable opinion (other than by appeal or certiorari) in
another, or when he institutes two or more actions or
proceedings grounded on the same cause, on the gamble that
one or the other court would make a favorable
disposition.[65]We discern no intent on the part of the State, in
filing two informations in two different courts, to gamble that
one or the other court would make a favorable disposition.
Obviously, respondents got their signals crossed. One set
of officials, after investigating a complaint filed by the Vice-
Mayor of San Pascual, Batangas charging petitioners of
overpricing, filed the information for violation of Section 3(e)
of R.A. No. 3019 in the RTC. Another set of officials
investigated another complaint from the Concerned Citizens
Group accusing petitioners of, among others, overpricing the
same project subject of the previous complaint. Finding
probable cause, the second set of officials instituted the criminal
action, charging the same offense and alleging essentially the
same facts as the first, this time in the Sandiganbayan. Later
learning of the procedural faux pas, respondents without undue
delay asked the RTC to refer the case to the Sandiganbayan.
WHEREFORE, the consolidated petitions are
hereby DISMISSED.

EN BANC
G.R. No. L-39115 May 26, 1975
In the Matter of the Petition for Habeas Corpus.
SEGIFREDO L. ACLARACION, petitioner,
vs.
HON. MAGNO S. GATMAITAN, HON. HOSE N.
LEUTERIO, COLONEL RUPERTO B. ACLE, Chief of
Police, and Lieutenant FRANCISCO CRUZ, Warden,
Makati, Rizal, respondents.
AQUINO, J.:+.wph!1
Segifredo L. Aclaracion functioned as a temporary
stenographer in the Gapan branch of the Court of First
Instance of Nueva Ecija from October 1, 1969 to November
21, 1971. His appointment expired on November 21, 1972
while he was working as a temporary stenographer in the
Court of First Instance of Manila. Thereafter, he was
employed as a stenographer in the Public Assistance and
Claims Adjudication Division of the Insurance Commission,
where he is now working.
After Aclaracion had ceased to be a court stenographer, the
Court of Appeals required him to transcribe his stenographic
notes in two cases decided by the Gapan court which had been
appealed: Muncal vs. Eugenio, CA-G. R. No. 49711-R
and Paderes vs. Domingo, CA-G. R. No. 52367-R. He failed
to comply with the resolutions of the Court of Appeals. He
was declared in contempt of court.
On May 29 and July 29, 1974 Justice Magno S. Gatmaitan and
Justice Jose N. Leuterio, Chairmen of the Third and Seventh
Divisions of the Court of Appeals, respectively, ordered the
Chief of Police of Makati, Rizal, to arrest Aclaracion, a
resident of that municipality, and to confine him in jail until he
submits a complete transcript of his notes in the said cases.
Aclaracion was arrested on June 21, 1974 and incarcerated in
the municipal jail. In a petition dated July 12, 1974 he asked
the Court of Appeals that he be not required to transcribe his
notes in all the cases tried in the Gapan court. He suggested
that the testimonies in the said cases be retaken.
The Third Division of the Court of Appeals in its resolution of
August 7, 1974 ordered the release of Aclaracion. Later, he
transcribed his notes in the Muncal case. However, the warden
did not release him because of the order of arrest issued by the
Seventh Division.
On August 9, 1974 Aclaracion filed in this Court a petition
for habeas corpus. He advanced the novel contention that to
compel him to transcribe his stenographic notes, after he
ceased to be a stenographer, would be a transgression of the
rule that "no involuntary servitude in any form shall exist
except as a punishment for a crime whereof the party shall
have been duly convicted" (Sec. 14, Art. IV, Bill of Rights,
1972 Constitution). He was averse to being subjected "to
involuntary servitude sans compensation". He desired to be
released from the obligation of transcribing his notes. (He
filed his petition in forma pauperis).
The petition was heard on August 20, 1974. It was already
moot because, as already noted, the Third Division of the
Court of Appeals had ordered his release on August 7th.
Another hearing was held on September 3, 1974 in connection
with the detention of Aclaracion at the instance of Justice
Leuterio. At that hearing, this Court resolved to order
Aclaracion's provisional release on condition that within
twenty days thereafter he would complete the transcription of
his notes in the Paderes case in his office at the Insurance
Commission, Manila.
So, he was provisionally released without prejudice to the
final ruling on his contention that he could not be compelled to
transcribe his notes in the other cases because he was no
longer connected with the judiciary and because his stenotype
machine notes were standard notes which could be transcribed
by stenographers trained in stenotype machine shorthand.
On September 4, 1974 Aclaracion was released from the
Makati jail. Upon representations made by the Clerk of Court
of this Court with the Insurance Commissioner, the latter
interposed no objection to Aclaracion's transcription of his
stenographic notes either in this Court or in his office in the
Insurance Commission.
On November 19, 1974 Aclaracion manifested that he had
transcribed his notes in the Paderes case in his office at the
Insurance Commission after he was provided by the Clerk of
Court of this Court with the requisite supplies.
We have given Aclaracion's petition the attention and study
which it deserves. The habeas corpus aspect of his petition has
become moot in view of his release from jail during the
pendency of his case. After much reflection, we have come to
the conclusion that his request that he be relieved from
transcribing his notes in the other cases cannot be granted.
We hold that an Appellate Court may compel a former court
stenographer to transcribe his stenographic notes. That
prerogative is ancillary or incidental to its appellate
jurisdiction and is a part of its inherent powers which are
necessary to the ordinary and efficient exercise of its
jurisdiction and essential to the due administration of justice
(See State vs. Superior Court of Maricopa County, 5 Pac. 2d
192, 39 Ariz. 242, Note 74, 21 C. J. S. 41; 20 Am. Jur. 2d 440;
Fuller vs. State, 57 So. 806, 100 Miss. 811).
The provision of section 12, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court that
"upon the approval of the record on appeal the clerk shall
direct the stenographer or stenographers concerned to attach to
the record of the case five (5) copies of the transcript of the
oral evidence referred to in the record on appeal" includes
stenographers who are no longer in the judiciary. (See sec. 7,
Rule 122 and sec. 7, R. A. No. 3749).
The traditional mode of exercising the court's coercive power
is to hold the recalcitrant or negligent stenographer in
contempt of court if he does not comply with the order for the
transcription of his notes and imprison him until he obeys the
order (Sec. 7, Rule 71, Rules of Court).
However, in view of the fact that Aclaracion might have acted
in good faith in not complying with the resolution of the Court
of appeals in the Paterno case, due to the pendency of the
instant habeas corpus case (a fact which is inferable from his
letter to this Court dated March 11, 1975), the fine of one
hundred fifty pesos imposed on him is hereby remitted.
WHEREFORE, the petition for habeas corpus is dismissed.
No Costs.
SO ORDERED.

Another sanction to compel the transcription is to hold in

abeyance the transfer, promotion, resignation or clearance of a
stenographer until he completes the transcription of his notes.
This is provided for in Circular No. 63 of the Secretary of
Justice.

In the instant case, Aclaracion transcribed his notes in

the Muncal and Paderes cases while he was an employee of
the Insurance Commission. During the time that he made the
transcription, he received his salary as such employee.

We hold that he could be required to transcribe his notes in

other cases, particularly in the case of Heirs of the Late Pacita
Sicioco Cruz, etc. vs. La Mallorca Pambusco, et al, CA-G. R.
No. 49687-R. The Court of Appeals, in its resolution of
November 24, 1972, required him to transcribe his notes in
that case.

The same Court in its resolution of February 20, 1975

in Paterno vs. Tumibay, CA-G. R. No. 51330-R imposed on
Aclaracion a fine of one hundred fifty pesos for his failure to
transcribe his notes in the said case and warned him that he
would be arrested if he failed to submit his transcript within
ten days from notice.

The same arrangement should be made by the Clerk of Court

of this Court with the Insurance Commissioner that Aclaracion
should be allowed to receive his salary while making the
transcription.

Aclaracion's contention that to compel him to transcribe his

stenographic notes would constitute involuntary servitude is
not tenable. Involuntary servitude denotes a condition of
enforced, compulsory service of one to another (Hodges vs.
U.S., 203 U.S. 1; Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro, 39
Phil. 660, 708) or the condition of one who is compelled by
force, coercion, or imprisonment, and against his will, to labor
for another, whether he is paid or not (Black's Law Dictionary,
4th Ed., p. 961). That situation does not obtain in this case.

Also untenable is Aclaracion's argument that the

imprisonment of a stenographer who had defied the court's
resolution for the transcription of the notes constitutes illegal
detention. The incarceration of the contemning stenographer is
lawful because it is the direct consequence of his disobedience
of a court order. *