Section14_Right to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation (19 pages)
(1) (People v. Quitlong, G.R. No. 121562, July 10, 1998)
(9) (Pecho v. People, G.R. No. 111399, September 27, 1996)
(15) (Soriano, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. L-65952, July 31, 1984)
(17) (Borja v. Mendoza, G.R. No. L-45667, June 20, 1977)
(People v. Quitlong, G.R. No. 121562, July 10, 1998)
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 121562. July 10, 1998.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
RONNIE QUITLONG y FRIAS, SALVADOR QUITLONG y
FRIAS and EMILIO SENOTO, Jr., y PASCUA, accused-
appellants.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Joy B. Labiaga for accused-appellants.
SYNOPSIS
The information for murder filed against the
appellants failed to avert that they conspired with
each other in the commission of the offense
charged. But then, after trial, the Regional Trial
Court of Baguio City, Branch 5 convicted the
appellants as charged, finding that there was
conspiracy between and among them in the
commission of the crime and the indeterminate
penalty of twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal,
as minimum to forty (40) years of reclusion
perpetua, as maximum was imposed. The
conviction was based on the evidence presented
by the prosecution that in the evening of October
20, 1994, while the victim Jonathan Calpito and
Jonathan Gosil were confronting the fishball vendor
who did not admit that he had short-changed
Calpito, eight men approached and aggressively
confronted Calpito and Gosil. Appellant Emilio then
embraced Calpito from behind and appellants
Salvador Quitlong and Ronnie Quitlong held
Calpito's right hand and left hand, respectively.
Calpito struggled unsuccessfully to free himself.
Suddenly, Ronnie Quitlong stabbed Calpito at the
left side of his body just below the nipple which
became the cause of his death. On the other
hand, the appellants gave no alibi and admitted
their presence at the vicinity of the crime scene,
however, they denied any participation in the
commission of the crime.
Hence, this appeal.
The Court ruled that in the absence of conspiracy,
so averred and proved, an accused can only be
made liable for the acts committed by him alone
and his criminal responsibility is individual and not
collective. As so it is that must be so held in this
case. The conflicting claims of the prosecution and
the defense on who stabbed the victim is an issue
that ultimately and unvoidably goes into the
question of whom to believe among the witnesses.
This issue of credibility requires a determination that
1|CONSTI2_Section14_Right to be informed of the nature and cause
of accusation
is concededly best left to the trial court with its
unique position of having been enabled to observe
that elusive and incommunicable evidence of the
deportment of witnesses on the stand. Findings of
the trial court, following that assessment, must be
given the highest degree of respect absent
compelling reasons to conclude otherwise.
Appellant Ronnie Quitlong is found guilty of the
crime of murder for the killing of Jonathan Calpito
and sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua.
Appellants Salvador Quitlong and Emilio Senoto, Jr.
are found guilty as accomplices in the commission
of the crime.
SYLLABUS
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; RIGHTS OF
THE ACCUSED; TO BE INFORMED OF THE NATURE
AND CAUSE OF THE ACCUSATION AGAINST HIM;
RIGHT OF ACCUSED EXPLAINED. Overwhelming,
such as it may have been thought of by the trial
court, evidence of conspiracy is not enough for an
accused to bear and to respond to all its grave
legal consequences; it is equally essential that such
accused has been apprised when the charge is
made conformably with prevailing substantive and
procedural requirements. Article III, Section 14, of
the 1987 Constitution, in particular, mandates that
no person shall be held answerable for a criminal
offense without due process of law and that in all
criminal prosecutions the accused shall first be
informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him. The right to be informed of
any such indictment is likewise explicit in procedural
rules. The practice and object of informing an
accused in writing of the charges against him has
been explained as early as the 1904 decision of the
Court in U.S. vs. Karelsen.
2. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE;
INFORMATION; MUST SET FORTH THE FACTS AND
CIRCUMSTANCES THAT HAVE A BEARING ON THE
CULPABILITY AND LIABILITY OF THE ACCUSED. In
embodying the essential elements of the crime
charged, the information must set forth the facts
and circumstances that have a bearing on the
culpability and liability of the accused so that the
accused can properly prepare for and undertake
his defense. One such fact or circumstance in a
complaint against two or more accused persons is
that of conspiracy.
3. ID.; EVIDENCE; CONSPIRACY; MUST BE ALLEGED IN
INFORMATION. Quite unlike the omission of an
ordinary recital of fact which, if not excepted from
or objected to during trial, may be corrected or
supplied by competent proof, an allegation,
however, of conspiracy, or one that would impute
criminal liability to an accused for the act of
another or others is indispensable in order to hold
such person, regardless of the nature and extent of
his own participation, equally guilty with the other
or others in the commission of the crime. Where
conspiracy exists and can rightly be appreciated,
the individual acts done to perpetrate the felony
becomes of secondary importance, the act of one
being imputable to all the others. Verily, an
accused must know from the information whether
he faces a criminal responsibility not only for his acts
but also for the acts of his co-accused as well.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; A CONSPIRACY INDICTMENT NEED
NOT AVER ALL THE COMPONENTS AND ALLEGE ALL
THE DETAILS THEREOF. A conspiracy indictment
need not, of course, aver all the components of
conspiracy or allege all the details thereof, like the
part that each of the parties therein have
performed, the evidence proving the common
design or the facts connecting all the accused with
one another in the web of the conspiracy. Neither is
it necessary to describe conspiracy with the same
degree of particularity required in describing a
substantive offense. It is enough that the indictment
contains a statement of the facts relied upon to be
constitutive of the offense in ordinary and concise
language, with as much certainty as the nature of
the case will admit, in a manner that can enable a
person of common understanding to know what is
intended, and with such precision that the accused
may plead his acquittal or conviction to a
subsequent indictment based on the same facts. It
is said, generally, that an indictment may be held
sufficient "if it follows the words of the statute and
reasonably informs the accused of the character of
the offense he is charged with conspiring to
commit, or, following the language of the statute,
contains a sufficient statement of an overt act to
effect the object of the conspiracy, or alleges both
the conspiracy and the contemplated crime in the
language of the respective statutes defining them."
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; CONSPIRACY MUST BE ALLEGED, NOT
JUST INFERRED. Verily, the information must state
that the accused have confederated to commit
the crime or that there has been a community of
design, a unity of purpose or an agreement to
commit the felony among the accused. Such an
allegation, in the absence of the usual usage of the
words "conspired" or "confederated" or the phrase
"acting in conspiracy," must aptly appear in the
information in the form of definitive acts constituting
conspiracy. In fine, the agreement to commit the
crime, the unity of purpose or the community of
design among the accused must be conveyed
such as either by the use of the term "conspire" or its
derivatives and synonyms or by allegations of basic
facts constituting the conspiracy. Conspiracy must
be alleged, not just inferred, in the information on
which basis an accused can aptly enter his plea, a
matter that is not to be confused with or likened to
the adequacy of evidence that may be required to
2|CONSTI2_Section14_Right to be informed of the nature and cause
of accusation
prove it. In establishing conspiracy when properly
alleged, the evidence to support it need not
necessarily be shown by direct proof but may be
inferred from shown acts and conduct of the
accused.
6. ID.; ID.; CONSPIRACY; DEFINED. Conspiracy
arises when two or more persons come to an
agreement concerning the commission of a felony
and decide to commit it. Conspiracy comes to life
at the very instant the plotters agree, expressly or
impliedly, to commit the felony and forthwith to
actually pursue it.
7. ID.; ID.; FOR FAILURE TO ALLEGE CONSPIRACY IN
THE INFORMATION, THE CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY OF
THE ACCUSED IS INDIVIDUAL AND NOT COLLECTIVE.
In the absence of conspiracy, so averred and
approved as heretofore explained, an accused
can only be made liable for the acts committed by
him alone and this criminal responsibility is individual
and not collective.
8. ID.; ID.; ID.; APPLICATION IN CASE AT BAR.
Appellant Ronnie Quitlong was a principal by his
own act of stabbing Calpito that caused the latter's
death. Appellants Salvador Quitlong and Emilio
Senoto, Jr., were holding the hands of Calpito at
the precise time that Ronnie Quitlong was in the act
of executing his criminal intent. Simultaneity,
however, would not itself demonstrate the
concurrence of will or the unity of action and
purpose that could be a basis for collective
responsibility of two or more individuals; indeed,
from all indications, the incident would appear to
have occurred at the spur of moment. Appellants
Salvador Quitlong and Emilio Senoto, Jr., shall
therefore be held to be mere accomplices
conformably with Article 18 of the Revised Penal
Code.
9. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; CREDIBILITY OF
WITNESSES; FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT, GIVEN
HIGHEST DEGREE OF RESPECT. This issue of
credibility requires a determination that is
concededly best left to the trial court with its unique
position of having been enabled to observe that
elusive and incommunicable evidence of the
deportment of witnesses on the stand. Findings of
the trial court, following that assessment, must be
given the highest degree of respect absent
compelling reasons to conclude otherwise.
10. ID.; ID.; ID.; A WITNESS WHO TESTIFIES IN A
CATEGORICAL, STRAIGHTFORWARD AND
SPONTANEOUS MANNER IS A CREDIBLE WITNESS;
CASE AT BAR. In the first place, Lito Adjaro, the
eyewitness in the stabbing of Calpito, has
steadfastly stood by, even on rebuttal, to his story
on the commission of the crime. A witness who
testifies in a categorical, straightforward and
spontaneous manner, as well as remains consistent
on cross and rebuttal examination, is not likely to be
an incredible witness.

11. ID.; ID.; ID.; NO IMPROPER MOTIVE TO TESTIFY
AGAINST THE APPELLANT; CASE AT BAR. Secondly,
the defense has failed to establish any ill motive on
the part of Adjaro that would have prompted him
to testify wrongly against appellants. Where there is
no evidence to indicate that the prosecution
witness has been actuated by any improper
motive, it would be hard to reject the supposition
that a person will not prevaricate and cause
damnation to one who has brought him no harm.
12. CRIMINAL LAW; QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE;
ABUSE OF SUPERIORITY; SUPERIORITY IN NUMBER
WOULD NOT PER SE MEAN SUPERIORITY IN
STRENGTH; NOT APPLICABLE IN CASE AT BAR. The
crime committed was qualified by abuse of
superiority. While superiority in number would not
per se mean superiority in strength, enough proof
was adduced, however, to show that the attackers
had cooperated in such a way as to secure
advantage of their superiority in strength certainly
out of proportion to the means of defense available
to the person attacked.
13. ID.; AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE;
TREACHERY; THE MODE OF ATTACK MUST
CONSCIOUSLY BE ADOPTED. Treachery may not
be here considered as a generic aggravating
circumstance although it might have ensured the
commission of the crime. In order that treachery
may be taken as an aggravating circumstance,
there must be proof that the accused has
consciously adopted a mode of attack to facilitate
the perpetration of the killing without risk to himself.
14. ID.; MURDER; IMPOSABLE PENALTY TO THE
PRINCIPAL. Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal
Code, the crime of murder is punishable by
reclusion temporal maximum to death. There being
neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstances
to appropriately appreciate in this case, appellant
Ronnie Quitlong, as principal, shall suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua.
15 ID.; ID.; IMPOSABLE PENALTY TO THE
ACCOMPLICE. The two accomplices, appellants
Salvador Quitlong and Emilio Senoto, Jr., shall be
subject to the imposition of the penalty next lower
in degree than reclusion temporal maximum to
death or, accordingly, prision mayor in its maximum
period to reclusion temporal in its medium period.
Absent any mitigating or aggravating
circumstance, the penalty that may be imposed is
reclusion temporal minimum. Applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law to them, each may
be held to suffer the indeterminate sentence of
anywhere from prision correccional in its maximum
period to prision mayor in its medium period, as the
minimum penalty, to anywhere within the range of
reclusion temporal minimum, as the maximum
penalty.
3|CONSTI2_Section14_Right to be informed of the nature and cause
of accusation
16. ID.; PENALTY; RECLUSION PERPETUA; INDIVISIBLE
PENALTY. In the Court's Resolution of 09 January
1995, clarifying its decision in People vs. Lucas, the
Court has said that ". . . although Section 17 of
R.A. NO. 7659 has fixed the duration of reclusion
perpetua from twenty (20) years and one (1) day to
forty (40) years, there was no clear legislative intent
to alter its original classification as an indivisible
penalty. It shall then remain as an indivisible
penalty."
DECISION
VITUG, J p:
The Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, Branch 5, 1
disposed of Criminal Case No. 13336-R; thus: LLjur
"WHEREFORE, the Court finds and declares the
accused RONNIE QUITLONG Y FRIAS, SALVADOR
QUITLONG Y FRIAS and EMILIO SENOTO, JR. Y
PASCUA guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of murder as charged and hereby sentences
EACH of them to suffer an indeterminate penalty of
TWENTY (20) YEARS of reclusion temporal as
minimum, to FORTY (40) YEARS of reclusion
perpetua, as maximum; to indemnify, jointly and
severally, the heirs of the deceased Jonathan
Calpito y Castro in the sums of P50,000.00 for the
latter's death; P35,700.00 as consequential
damages; and P100,000.00 as moral damages, plus
their proportionate shares in the costs.
"In the service of their sentence, the said accused
shall be credited with their preventive imprisonment
under the terms and conditions prescribed in Article
29 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.
"Conformably with Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985
Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended, the
corresponding filing fee for the P100,000.00 moral
damages herein awarded shall constitute a first lien
on this judgment.
"The evidence knife, Exhibit 'B', is hereby declared
forfeited in favor of the Government.
"Pursuant to Circular No. 4-92-A of the Court
Administrator, the Warden of the City Jail of Baguio
is directed to immediately transfer the same
accused to the custody of the Bureau of
Corrections, Muntinlupa, Metro Manila.
"Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the
Warden of the City Jail of Baguio for his information
and guidance.
"There being no indication that the remaining
accused, Jesus Mendoza, and several John Does
could be arrested/identified and arrested shortly,
let the case against them be, as it is hereby,
archived without prejudice to its prosecution upon
their apprehension.
"SO ORDERED." 2

The case was generated by an information for
murder filed on 25 October 1994 against accused-
appellants Salvador Quitlong, Ronnie Quitlong,
Emilio Senoto, Jr., and several other unidentified
persons following the killing of Jonathan Calpito.
Accused-appellants, shortly after the filing of the
information, submitted a motion for reinvestigation
alleging that "it was a certain Jesus Mendoza who
stabbed the victim after getting irked when the
latter urinated near and in front" 3 of his wife. The
trial court acted favorably on the motion. On 12
December 1994, the City Prosecutor filed a motion
to admit an amended information on the basis of
affidavits 4 executed by Nonita F. delos Reyes,
Nicanor Ellamil, Lydia Q. Cultura, as well as
accused-appellants Salvador and Ronnie Quitlong
themselves, to the effect that it was Jesus Mendoza
who had been responsible for the death of the
victim. The information, as amended, included
Jesus Mendoza among the named accused. 5
Unlike accused-appellants who were immediately
arrested after the commission of the crime, Jesus
Mendoza remained at large. At their arraignment,
the detained accused pleaded not guilty to the
crime charged. prLL
The evidence of the prosecution has narrated how
a simple misunderstanding and relatively so small a
matter could lead to so dastardly and unfortunate
an outcome.
At around six o'clock in the evening of 20 October
1994, Lito Adjaro, who had just come from work as
a dispatcher of passenger jeepneys plying the
Baguio City-Loakan route, repaired to a nearby
game parlor where he saw 19-year-old University of
Baguio medical technology student Jonathan
Calpito playing billiards with Jonathan Gosil. Adjaro
was Calpito's neighbor and barkada (gangmate) in
Loakan. At past eight o'clock, Calpito decided that
it was time to go home. Since at that hour there
were no longer passenger jeepneys bound for
Loakan, the three friends decided to walk down to
Harrison Road behind the Melvin Jones grandstand
to grab a taxicab. The area was well-lighted.
Wanting to partake of some "fishballs," Calpito and
Gosil approached a fishball vendor about three to
four meters away. The two returned with three sticks
of fishballs worth fifteen pesos. When Calpito
counted the change for his 100-peso bill, he saw
that he had only been handed back thirty five
pesos. Confronted by Calpito and Gosil, the fishball
vendor would not admit that he had short-
changed Calpito.
Herbert Soriano, a civil engineer driving a
passenger-type jeep on his way to Loakan from the
Dominican Hill, was seen passing by. Adjaro, his
neighbor, hailed him. Soriano positioned his jeep
around four or five meters from where Gosil and
Calpito were still having an argument with the
fishball vendor. Soriano called out to the two to
board the jeep but they ignored him. Moments
later, Soriano saw eight men rushing towards Gosil
4|CONSTI2_Section14_Right to be informed of the nature and cause
of accusation
and Calpito from the direction of the taxicab-stand
behind his jeep. Some of the men later backed out
but four of them pursued Calpito who, meanwhile,
had started to retreat from the group. The four men,
however, succeeded in cornering Calpito. Soriano
saw Calpito fall to the ground and thought that the
latter had just been weakened by the men's
punches but, when Calpito was carried on board
his jeep, Soriano realized that Calpito had been
stabbed.
Adjaro saw no less than eight men approach and
aggressively confront Calpito and Gosil. Seeing that
his friends were outnumbered, Adjaro shouted at
Calpito and Gosil to run posthaste. Adjaro promptly
boarded Soriano's jeep. From where he sat, Adjaro
could see appellant Emilio Senoto embracing
Calpito from behind and appellants Salvador
Quitlong and Ronnie Quitlong holding Calpito's right
hand and left hand, respectively. Calpito struggled
unsuccessfully to free himself. Suddenly, appellant
Ronnie Quitlong stabbed Calpito at the left side of
the body just below the nipple. Once the three
men had released their hold on Calpito, the latter
fell to the ground. Despite the condition that
Calpito was already in, his assailants still went on
hitting him with their feet.
Police officers Jerry Patacsil, Arthur Viado and Nito
Revivis were on foot patrol that evening. Attracted
by the commotion along Harrison Road, the police
officers hurriedly proceeded to the brightly-lighted
place and saw Calpito lying on the ground. Three
of the malefactors started to flee upon seeing the
approaching police officers but the rest kept on
with their attack on Calpito. Patacsil drew out his
service firearm and told the attackers to freeze.
Seeing that the victim had bloodstains on his left
chest, Patacsil advised the victim's companions to
rush him to the hospital. Soriano, Gosil and Adjaro
took Calpito to the Baguio General Hospital on
board Soriano's jeep.
The police officers brought accused-appellants to
the police station. SPO1 Gabriel Isican prepared the
complaint assignment sheet 6 before turning them
over to the investigation division. SPO4 Avelino
Tolean, officer-in-charge of the police investigation
division on the 4:00 p.m. to 12:00 midnight shift, also
received a call from the Baguio General Hospital
about the incident. SPO4 Tolean, along with SPO1
Rafael Ortencio, Jr., and two "Bombo" radio
reporters, went to the hospital where Calpito was
by then in the operating room. The police officers
interviewed Adjaro and Gosil at the hospital's
emergency room and then repaired to the crime
scene and searched the area. Recovered near the
flowering plants beside the electric post was a
"stainless knife" 7 with bloodstains on its blade.
Adjaro recognized the knife to be the one used in
stabbing Calpito. SPO4 Gerardo Tumbaga
prepared Form 1 of the National Crime Reporting
System indicating that accused-appellants were
arrested and that a certain Mendoza escape and
went into hiding. The report also disclosed that
Adjaro and Gosil had a drinking spree with the
victim at the Genesis Folkden before the stabbing
incident. SPO4 Tumbaga based his findings on the
documents attached to the records of the case.
That same evening of 20 October 1994, at 8:55,
Calpito died at the Baguio General Hospital. Dr.
Kathryna Ayro, the hospital's medico-legal officer,
conducted the autopsy on the victim upon the
request of Dr. Samuel Cosme, the attending
surgeon, and of First Assistant City Prosecutor
Herminio Carbonell, with the consent of a brother of
Calpito. 8 Dr. Ayro found a solitary stab wound that
penetrated Calpito's left thoracic cavity at the level
of the 5th intercostal space that caused a "through
and through" laceration of his anterior pericardium
and the apex of the left ventricle of his heart. 9 Dr.
Ayro indicated the cause of Calpito's death as
being one of hypovolemic shock secondary to stab
wound. 10 She opined that a knife, single or double
bladed, must have been used in inflicting the stab
wound. Abrasions were also found on different
parts of Calpito's body.
Precy Calpito, the mother of the victim, testified
that the family had spent the amount of P37,500.00
11 for his wake, burial and 9-day prayers. Her
youngest son's death left her losing hope in life and
"feeling very badly."
The defense gave no alibi and admitted the
presence of accused-appellants at the vicinity of
the crime scene; however, it interposed denial by
appellants of any participation in the commission of
the crime.
Appellant Emilio Senoto, Jr., a taxicab driver,
testified that out of curiosity, after parking his cab to
buy some cigarettes and getting attracted by the
commotion, went near the scene and saw the
victim lying on the ground beside a cart. He was
about to leave the place when several policemen
arrived and arrested him.
Appellant Salvador Quitlong, a food vendor at the
Burnham Park and father of five children, denied
having had any participation in the stabbing
incident nor having been acquainted with Jesus
Mendoza. He admitted, however, that on the night
in question when he was selling "fishballs" at the
park, around eighty meters away from where
Mendoza was selling his wares, the latter's
daughter, who was a classmate of his own
daughter, asked for help yelling that her father was
in trouble. He rushed over to Mendoza's place
(puesto) but barely in time to witness the stabbing
of Calpito by Mendoza.
Appellant Ronnie Quitlong, Salvador Quitlong's 26-
year-old younger brother, was also a sidewalk
vendor at the waiting shed along Harrison Road. He
learned of the trouble Mendoza got himself into
when the latter's daughter summoned for help.
5|CONSTI2_Section14_Right to be informed of the nature and cause
of accusation
When he and his brother responded, Mendoza had
by then already stabbed Calpito.
Nonita de los Reyes and Lydia Cultura, both
sidewalk vendors, corroborated the story of the
Quitlong brothers. According to Nonita, it was
Mendoza who stabbed Calpito. She witnessed the
incident from a distance of ten meters away.
Nonita explained that she did not immediately
reveal what she saw to the authorities because of
shock. Lydia Cultura, on her part, said that she saw
Jesus Mendoza in the "rumble" with five or six men
who had come from the Genesis Folkden. She saw
Mendoza embrace and stab the man in white t-
shirt. Nonita and Alma Balubar followed appellants
to the police station but did not tell the police what
she knew because she was busy attending to the
crying pregnant wife of appellant Ronnie Quitlong.
Cdpr
On 21 April 1995, the trial court, following his
evaluation of the respective submissions of the
prosecution and the defense, including their
rebuttal and sur-rebuttal evidence, rendered its
now assailed decision.
In their assignment of errors, the Quitlong brothers
would have it
"1. That the Honorable Lower Court gravely abused
its discretion and/or acted in excess of or without
jurisdiction in finding that conspiracy may readily be
inferred inspite of explicit failure to allege in the
information or complaint;
"2. That the Honorable Lower Court gravely abused
its discretion and/or acted in excess of or without
jurisdiction in finding that there was conspiracy
between and among the accused-appellants in
the commission of the crime;
"3. That the Honorable Lower Court gravely abused
its discretion and/or acted in excess of or without
jurisdiction in finding the accused-appellants guilty
of the crime of Murder instead of Homicide." 12
In his case, appellant Senoto contends that the trial
court has erred in finding conspiracy among the
accused and argues that the crime committed is
homicide, not murder, given the circumstances.
On the particular issue of conspiracy, the trial court
had this to say:
"The question is whether or not the herein three
accused participated in, and may be held guilty as
co-principals by reason of conspiracy for, the fatal
stabbing of the victim, Calpito, there being no
dispute that the latter died due to the solitary stab
inflicted on him.
"But before proceeding any further, the Court takes
notice of the lapse committed, perhaps
inadvertently, by the prosecution in drafting the
indictment. Both the original and amended
Informations fail to explicitly allege conspiracy. This
could have been timely cured if obeisance had
been observed of the admonition, often given, that
the prosecution should not take the arraignment
stage for granted but, instead, treat the notice
thereof as a reminder to review the case and
determine if the complaint or information is in due
form and the allegations therein contained are
sufficient vis-a-vis the law involved and the
evidence on hand. It is fortunate that in the case at
bench conspiracy may readily be inferred from the
way the allegation of abuse of superior strength has
been phrased, to wit: '. . . the above-named
accused, being then armed with a knife, with intent
to kill . . . and taking advantage of their numerical
superiority and combined strength did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack,
assault and stab JONATHAN CALPITO y CASTRO . . .
."' 13 prLL
Citing Balmadrid vs. Sandiganbayan 14 the trial
court has opined that "conspiracy may be deemed
adequately alleged if the averments in the
Information logically convey that several persons
(have been) animated with the single purpose of
committing the offense charged and that they
(have) acted in concert in pursuance of that
purpose." 15 Holding that no direct proof is essential
and that it suffices that the existence of a common
design to commit the offense charged is shown by
the acts of the malefactors and attendant
circumstances, the trial court has concluded:
"In the case on hand, it bears repeating that Ronnie
Quitlong and Salvador Quitlong were admittedly
responding to Jesus Mendoza's call for help through
the latter's daughter. They must have, therefore,
been disposed, out of empathy with a fellow
sidewalk vendor, to lend Mendoza all the
assistance the latter needed under the
circumstances. They were joined, according to
prosecution witnesses Lito Adjaro and Herbert
Soriano, by no less than six others, including Emilio
Senoto, Jr. They came upon Mendoza engaged in
a heated altercation with the victim Calpito. When
they reached Calpito, they pushed him and started
beating him up and his companion Jonathan Gosil.
Four to five men manhandled Calpito who kept on
retreating and even went around Soriano's parked
jeep until he was cornered. Senoto then held
Calpito's body from behind; Ronnie, his left hand;
and Salvador, his right hand, and they mauled him.
Calpito struggled to free himself but that proved
futile and, instead, Ronnie stabbed him once. It was
only then that he was released and when he fell
down on his back, his attackers still kicked him. Only
the arrival of some policemen made some of the
assailants stop and run away. However, Ronnie,
Salvador and Senoto, kept on kicking the victim
and they were restrained and arrested.
"Guided by the jurisprudential authorities heretofore
cited, it becomes ineluctable for the Court to
conclude that Ronnie, Salvador and Senoto acted
6|CONSTI2_Section14_Right to be informed of the nature and cause
of accusation
in a conspiracy and may thus be held liable as co-
principals for the death of Calpito." 16
Overwhelming, such as it may have been thought
of by the trial court, evidence of conspiracy is not
enough for an accused to bear and to respond to
all its grave legal consequences; it is equally
essential that such accused has been apprised
when the charge is made conformably with
prevailing substantive and procedural
requirements. Article III, Section 14, of the 1987
Constitution, in particular, mandates that no person
shall be held answerable for a criminal offense
without due process of law and that in all criminal
prosecutions the accused shall first be informed of
the nature and cause of the accusation against
him. 17 The right to be informed of any such
indictment is likewise explicit in procedural rules. 18
The practice and object of informing an accused in
writing of the charges against him has been
explained as early as the 1904 decision of the Court
in U .S. vs. Karelsen; 19 viz:
"First. To furnish the accused with such a description
of the charge against him as will enable him to
make his defense; and second, to avail himself of
his conviction or acquittal for protection against a
further prosecution for the same cause, and third,
to inform the court of the facts alleged, so that it
may decide whether they are sufficient in law to
support a conviction, if one should be had. (United
States vs. Cruikshank, 92 U.S., 542). In order that this
requirement may be satisfied, facts must be stated,
not conclusions of law. Every crime is made up of
certain acts and intent; these must be set forth in
the complaint with reasonable particularity of times,
place, names (plaintiff and defendant), and
circumstances. In short, the complaint must contain
a specific allegation of every fact and
circumstance necessary to constitute the crime
charged."
An information, in order to ensure that the
constitutional right of the accused to be informed
of the nature and cause of his accusation is not
violated, must state the name of the accused; the
designation given to the offense by the statute; a
statement of the acts or omissions so complained of
as constituting the offense; the name of the
offended party; the approximate time and date of
the commission of the offense;. and the place
where the offense has been committed. 20 In
embodying the essential elements of the crime
charged, the information must set forth the facts
and circumstances that have a bearing on the
culpability and liability of the accused so that the
accused can properly prepare for and undertake
his defense. One such fact or circumstance in a
complaint against two or more accused persons is
that of conspiracy. Quite unlike the omission of an
ordinary recital of fact which, if not excepted from
or objected to during trial, may be corrected or
supplied by competent proof, an allegation,
however, of conspiracy, or one that would impute
criminal liability to an accused for the act of
another or others, is indispensable in order to hold
such person, regardless of the nature and extent of
his own participation, equally guilty with the other
or others in the commission of the crime. Where
conspiracy exists and can rightly be appreciated,
the individual acts done to perpetrate the felony
becomes of secondary importance, the act of one
being imputable to all the others. 21 Verily, an
accused must know from the information whether
he faces a criminal responsibility not only for his acts
but also for the acts of his co-accused as well.
A conspiracy indictment need not, of course, aver
all the components of conspiracy or allege all the
details thereof, like the part that each of the parties
therein have performed, the evidence proving the
common design or the facts connecting all the
accused with one another in the web of the
conspiracy. Neither is it necessary to describe
conspiracy with the same degree of particularity
required in describing a substantive offense. It is
enough that the indictment contains a statement
of the facts relied upon to be constitutive of the
offense in ordinary and concise language, with as
much certainty as the nature of the case will admit,
in a manner that can enable a person of common
understanding to know what is intended, and with
such precision that the accused may plead his
acquittal or conviction to a subsequent indictment
based on the same facts. It is said, generally, that
an indictment may be held sufficient "if it follows the
words of the statute and reasonably informs the
accused of the character of the offense he is
charged with conspiring to commit, or, following
the language of the statute, contains a sufficient
statement of an overt act to effect the object of
the conspiracy, or alleges both the conspiracy and
the contemplated crime in the language of the
respective statutes defining them." 22
The information charging herein appellants for the
death of Jonathan Calpito, as amended, has but
simply stated:
"That on or about the 20th day of October 1994, in
the City of Baguio, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, being then armed with a knife,
with intent to kill and with treachery and taking
advantage of their numerical superiority and
combined strength, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab
JONATHAN CALPITO Y CASTRO suddenly and
unexpectedly, without any warning whatsoever,
inflicting upon him a stab wound at the left thorax
at the level of the 7th rib, left medclavicular line,
penetrating the pereduum and left ventricle
causing left remothones of 700 cc and
hemoperecuduum of 250 cc, which directly
caused his death.
"CONTRARY TO LAW." 23
7|CONSTI2_Section14_Right to be informed of the nature and cause
of accusation
The opinion of the trial court to the effect that
conspiracy may be inferred from the allegation of
abuse of superior strength and with the aid of
armed men, i.e., that ". . . the above-named
accused, being then armed with a knife, with intent
to kill . . . and taking advantage of their numerical
superiority and combined strength, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack,
assault and stab JONATHAN CALPITO Y CASTRO . . ."
24 is difficult to accept. Conspiracy arises when two
or more persons come to an agreement
concerning the commission of a felony and decide
to commit it. Conspiracy comes to life at the very
instant the plotters agree, expressly or impliedly, to
commit the felony and forthwith to actually pursue
it. 25 Verily, the information must state that the
accused have confederated to commit the crime
or that there has been a community of design, a
unity of purpose or an agreement to commit the
felony among the accused. Such an allegation, in
the absence of the usual usage of the words
"conspired" or "confederated" or the phrase "acting
in conspiracy," must aptly appear in the information
in the form of definitive acts constituting
conspiracy. In fine, the agreement to commit the
crime, the unity of purpose or the community of
design among the accused must be conveyed
such as either by the use of the term "conspire" or its
derivatives and synonyms or by allegations of basic
facts constituting the conspiracy. Conspiracy must
be alleged, not just inferred, in the information on
which basis an accused can aptly enter his plea, a
matter that is not to be confused with or likened to
the adequacy of evidence that may be required to
prove it. In establishing conspiracy when properly
alleged, the evidence to support it need not
necessarily be shown by direct proof but may be
inferred from shown acts and conduct of the
accused.
In the absence of conspiracy, so averred and
proved as heretofore explained, an accused can
only be made liable for the acts committed by him
alone and this criminal responsibility is individual
and not collective. 26 And so it is that must be so
held in this case. The conflicting claims of the
prosecution and the defense on who stabbed the
victim is an issue that ultimately and unavoidably
goes into the question of whom to believe among
the witnesses. This issue of credibility requires a
determination that is concededly best left to the
trial court with its unique position of having been
enabled to observe that elusive and
incommunicable evidence of the deportment of
witnesses on the stand. 27 Findings of the trial court,
following that assessment, must be given the
highest degree of respect absent compelling
reasons to conclude otherwise. 28
The Court is not, at this time and in this instance,
disposed to deviate from the foregoing rule. In the
first place, Lito Adjaro, the eyewitness in the
stabbing of Calpito, has steadfastly stood by, even
on rebuttal, to his story on the commission of the
crime. A witness who testifies in a categorical,
straightforward and spontaneous manner, as well
as remains consistent on cross and rebuttal
examination, is not likely to be an incredible witness.
29 Secondly, the defense has failed to establish any
ill motive on the part of Adjaro that would have
prompted him to testify wrongly against appellants.
Where there is no evidence to indicate that the
prosecution witness has been actuated by any
improper motive, it would be hard to reject the
supposition that a person will not prevaricate and
cause damnation to one who has brought him no
harm. 30 Finally, Herbert Soriano and the police,
who have testified seeing the already wounded
Calpito lying on the ground and still being
attacked, both corroborate Adjaro's positive
identification of appellants as the persons who did
maul Calpito.
After positively pointing to appellants in open court
to be the persons who ganged up on Calpito,
Adjaro testified on their respective participation's in
the commission of the crime; thus:
"PROSECUTOR:
"Q Now, you pointed to Emilio Senoto, Jr. as one of
the persons who held the deceased Jonathan
Calpito. What part of the body of Jonathan Calpito
did he hold? llcd
"A His body, sir.
"Q How about Salvador Quitlong whom you also
identified in Court. What part of the body of
Jonathan Calpito did he hold?
"A I saw him hold his hand.
"Q What hand was held by Salvador Quitlong?
"A Right hand, sir.
"Q How about Ronnie Quitlong?
"A His left hand.
"Q After Jonathan Calpito was held by these three
persons and other, what happened next?
"A They mauled ("binugbog") Jonathan Calpito.
"Q Did you notice what part of the body was hit
and boxed by these three persons?
"A His body and his face.
"Q What did Jonathan Calpito do, if any, when he is
being held by these three persons and others?
"A He was struggling, sir.
"Q Was he able to free himself from the helds (sic)
of these persons?
"A No more, sir.
8|CONSTI2_Section14_Right to be informed of the nature and cause
of accusation
"Q What do you mean no more?
"A He was not able to free himself.
"Q Yes, why was he not able to free himself
anymore?
"A They held him tightly, he could not struggle.
"Q And what happened next when you said he
could no longer struggle?
"A They boxed him, and also stabbed him, sir.
"Q Did you see the person who stabbed him?
"A I saw sir.
"Q Will you be able to identify him?
"A Yes, sir.
"Q I will request you to again look inside the
courtroom and point to the person whom you saw
stab Jonathan Calpito?
"WITNESS:
The person wearing white jacket.
"INTERPRETER:
Witness pointing to a gentleman inside the
courtroom wearing cream jacket who gave his
name as Ronnie Quitlong." 31
Appellant Ronnie Quitlong was a principal by his
own act of stabbing Calpito that caused the latter's
death. 32 Appellants Salvador Quitlong and Emilio
Senoto, Jr., were holding the hands of Calpito at
the precise time that Ronnie Quitlong was in the act
of executing his criminal intent. Simultaneity,
however, would not itself demonstrate the
concurrence of will or the unity of action and
purpose that could be a basis for collective
responsibility of two or more individuals; 33 indeed,
from all indications, the incident would appear to
have occurred at the spur of moment. Appellants
Salvador Quitlong and Emilio Senoto, Jr., shall
therefore be held to be mere accomplices
conformably with Article 18 34 of the Revised Penal
Code.
The crime committed was qualified by abuse of
superiority. 35 While superiority in number would not
per se mean superiority in strength, enough proof
was adduced, however, to show that the attackers
had cooperated in such a way as to secure
advantage of their superiority in strength certainly,
out of proportion to the means of defense available
to the person attacked. 36
Treachery may not be here considered as a
generic aggravating circumstance although it
might have ensured the commission of the crime. In
order that treachery may be taken as an
aggravating circumstance, there must be proof
that the accused has consciously adopted a mode
of attack to facilitate the perpetration of the killing
without risk to himself, i.e., appellant Ronnie
Quitlong in this case. 37 No such proof has been
adequately shown.
Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, the
crime of murder is punishable by reclusion temporal
maximum to death. There being neither
aggravating nor mitigating circumstances to
appropriately appreciate in this case, appellant
Ronnie Quitlong, as principal, shall suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua. The indeterminate
penalty of twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal,
as minimum to forty (40) years of reclusion
perpetua, as maximum, has been imposed by the
trial court on the premise that reclusion perpetua is
a divisible penalty. In the Court's Resolution of 09
January 1995 clarifying its decision 38 in People vs.
Lucas, 39 the Court has said that
". . . although Section 17 of R.A. NO. 7659 has fixed
the duration of reclusion perpetua from twenty (20)
years and one (1) day to forty (40) years, there was
no clear legislative intent to alter its original
classification as an indivisible penalty. It shall then
remain as an indivisible penalty." 40 prcd
The two accomplices, appellants Salvador Quitlong
and Emilio Senoto, Jr., shall be subject to the
imposition of the penalty next lower in degree than
reclusion temporal maximum to death or,
accordingly, prision mayor in its maximum period to
reclusion temporal in its medium period. Absent any
mitigating or aggravating circumstance, the
penalty that may be imposed is reclusion temporal
minimum. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence
Law to them, each may be held to suffer the
indeterminate sentence of anywhere from prision
correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor
in its medium period, as the minimum penalty, to
anywhere within the range of reclusion temporal
minimum, as the maximum penalty.
The trial court correctly imposed the payment of a
civil indemnity of P50,000.00 in favor of the heirs of
the victim. The consequential (actual) damages in
the amount of P35,700.00 not having been
substantiated, except for the amount P12,000.00
paid to the memorial chapel, is disallowed. The
award of moral damages recoverable under Article
2219(1), in relation to Article 2206, of the Civil Code
is reduced from P100,000.00 to P20,000.00
WHEREFORE, appellant Ronnie Quitlong is found
guilty of the crime of murder for the killing of
Jonathan Calpito and sentenced to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua and further ordered
to indemnify the heirs of the victim in the amount of
P50,000.00, to reimburse them the actual damages
9|CONSTI2_Section14_Right to be informed of the nature and cause
of accusation
of P12,000.00 and to pay moral damages of
P50,000.00. Appellants Salvador Quitlong and Emilio
Senoto, Jr., are found guilty as accomplices in the
commission of the crime, and each shall suffer the
indeterminate sentence of nine (9) years and four
(4) months of prision mayor minimum period, as
minimum penalty, to thirteen (13) years and nine (9)
months and ten (10) days of reclusion temporal
minimum period, as maximum penalty. Appellants
Salvador Quitlong and Emilio Senoto, Jr., are also
hereby held solidarity liable with appellant Ronnie
Quitlong in the payment of the damages
hereinabove mentioned. Costs against appellants.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the
Philippine National Police and the Department of
Justice in order that the other participants in the
killing of Jonathan Calpito, specifically Jesus
Mendoza, be arrested and made to face the force
of the law. prcd
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, Panganiban and Quisumbing,
JJ ., concur.
(Pecho v. People, G.R. No. 111399, September 27,
1996)
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 111399. September 27, 1996.]
ODON PECHO, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES and the SANDIGANBAYAN,
respondents.
A.M. Navarro Law Office for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; RIGHTS OF
THE ACCUSED; TO BE INFORMED OF THE NATURE
AND CAUSE OF ACCUSATION; ORIGIN AND
OBJECTIVES. On the assumption that the
prosecution's evidence had satisfied the quantum
of proof for conviction for the complex crime of
attempted estafa through falsification of public
and commercial documents, there is absolutely no
merit in the petitioner's claim that he could not be
convicted of the said crime without offending his
right to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him, which is guaranteed by the
Bill of Rights. Such right, an ancient bulwark of the
liberties of men, has its origin in the Bill of Rights
which the people of Great Britain demanded and
received from the Prince and Princess of Orange on
13 February 1688. It was adopted by the
Constitution of the United States and was extended
to the Philippines by Act No. 235, or the Philippine
Bill of 1902. It was later carried into the Jones Law
and, ultimately, enshrined in the Constitutions of
1935, 1973, and 1987. It has the following objectives:
First. To furnish the accused with such a description
of the charge against him as will enable him to
make his defense; second, to avail himself of his
conviction or acquittal for protection against a
further prosecution for the same cause; and third,
to inform the court of the facts alleged, so that it
may decide whether they are sufficient in law to
support a conviction, if one should be had (United
States vs. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542). In order that this
requirement may be satisfied, facts must be stated;
not conclusions of law. Every crime is made up of
certain acts and intent; these must be set forth in
the complaint with reasonable particularity of time,
place, names (plaintiff or defendant), and
circumstances. In short, the complaint must contain
a specific allegation of every fact and
circumstance necessary to constitute the crime
charged. ASHaTc
2. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE;
PROSECUTION OF OFFENSES; NATURE AND CAUSE
OF ACCUSATION; DETERMINED BY THE ACTUAL
RECITAL OF FACTS STATED IN THE INFORMATION OR
COMPLAINT. What determines the real nature
and cause of accusation against an accused is the
actual recital of facts stated in the information or
complaint and not the caption or preamble of the
information or complaint nor the specification of
the provision of law alleged to have been violated,
they being conclusions of law. An incorrect caption
is not a fatal mistake. It follows then that an
accused may be convicted of a crime which,
although not the one charged, is necessarily
included in the latter as provided by Section 4, Rule
120 of the Rules of Court. The succeeding Section 5
prescribes the rule in determining when an offense
includes or is included in another. We have shown
in the challenged decision why the complex crime
of attempted estafa through falsification of public
and commercial documents is included in the
offense charged. Moreover, we held that the
information in this case "can also be considered as
charging two offenses: the violation of Section 3(e)
of R.A. No. 3019 and the complex crime of
attempted estafa through falsification of official
and commercial documents," and since the
petitioner failed to object before trial to such
duplicity, he could be validly convicted of both or
either of the offenses charged and proved.
3. ID.; EVIDENCE; CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE; WHEN
SUFFICIENT TO CONVICT. Under Section 4, Rule
133 of the Rules of Court, circumstantial evidence
would be sufficient to convict if (a) there is more
than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which
the inferences are derived are proven; and (c) the
combination of all the circumstances is such as to
produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
As jurisprudentially formulated, a judgment of
conviction based on circumstantial evidence can
be upheld only if the circumstances proven
constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one
fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the
accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty
person, i.e., the circumstances proven must be
10 | C O N S T I 2 _ S e c t i o n 1 4 _ R i g h t t o b e i n f o r m e d o f t h e n a t u r e a n d c a u s e
of accusation
consistent with each other, consistent with the
hypothesis that the accused is guilty, and at the
same time inconsistent with any other hypothesis
except that of guilty.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; PROOF BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT;
REQUIRED TO OVERCOME ACCUSED'S RIGHT TO BE
PRESUMED INNOCENT. The evidence for the
prosecution likewise failed to prove that the
petitioner (1) personally represented himself as an
agent of Eversun Commercial Trading; (2) knew of
the falsity of any of the public and commercial
documents in question; and (3) had, at any time,
possession of all or some of the said documents.
Otherwise stated, there is no sufficient
circumstantial evidence to prove conspiracy
between the petitioner and Catre to commit the
complex crime of estafa through falsification of
public and commercial documents. Neither is there
evidence of petitioner's active participation in the
commission of the crime. The concordant
combination and cumulative effect of the acts of
the petitioner as proven by the prosecution's
evidence fails to satisfy the requirements of Section
4, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court. There is reasonable
doubt as to his guilt. And since his constitutional
right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty
can be overthrown only by proof beyond
reasonable doubt, the petitioner must then be
acquitted even though his innocence may be
doubted.
5. CRIMINAL LAW; CONSPIRACY; DEFINED; WHEN
PRESENT. There is conspiracy when two or more
persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a felony and decide to commit it.
Direct proof of previous agreement to commit a
crime is not necessary. Conspiracy may be
deduced from the mode and manner in which the
offense was perpetrated, or inferred from the acts
of the accused themselves when such point to a
joint purpose and design, concerted action, and
community of interest. It is, however, settled that the
same degree of proof required for establishing the
crime is likewise required to support a finding of
conspiracy. In other words, conspiracy must be
shown to exist as clearly and as convincingly as the
commission of the offense itself in order to uphold
the fundamental principle that no one shall be
found guilty of a crime except upon proof beyond
reasonable doubt.
6. ID.; ID.; THE ACT OF ONE IS THE ACT OF ALL. The
information charges the petitioner and his co-
accused Joe Catre as principals who "conspir[ed],
confabulat[ed], conniv[ed], confederat[ed], and
mutually help[ed] one another," with Catre
"representing himself to be a representative of
Everson Commercial Trading of Cotabato City, a
corporation, firm or partnership which turned out to
be non-existent, fake or fictitious." The evidence for
the prosecution, as admitted by the respondent,
only showed that it was Catre who possessed the
falsified documents, contracted the services of
Calica, and delivered the documents to the latter
for processing. In the absence of satisfactory
explanation, Catre, being the one in possession of
the forged documents, is presumed to be the
forger. Catre, however, could not provide the
explanation because only the petitioner was tried.
The information states that his address is "unknown,"
and the record does not show that a warrant for his
arrest was issued. The only warrant of arrest that was
issued was that for the petitioner. Assuming that
such evidence and the others adduced by the
prosecution are to be admitted to prove the
commission of the crime, a prima facie case
enough to prove the guilt of Catre with moral
certainty was duly established against Catre as a
principal. Accordingly, if conspiracy were proven,
the petitioner would be equally guilty of the offense
proved. For, in a conspiracy, every act of one of
the conspirators in furtherance of a common
design or purpose of such a conspiracy is, in
contemplation of law, the act of each of them.
7. ID.; ID.; TO BE A PARTY THERETO, THE
CONSPIRATOR SHOULD HAVE PERFORMED SOME
OVERT ACT AS A DIRECT OR INDIRECT
CONTRIBUTION IN THE EXECUTION OF THE CRIME.
It is also essential for one to be a party to a
conspiracy as to be liable for the acts of the others
that there be intentional participation in the
transaction with a view to the furtherance of the
common design. Except when he is the mastermind
in a conspiracy, it is necessary that a conspirator
should have performed some overt act as a direct
or indirect contribution in the execution of the crime
planned to be committed. The overt act may
consist of active participation in the actual
commission of the crime itself, or it may consist of
moral assistance to his co-conspirators by being
present at the commission of the crime or by
exerting moral ascendancy over the other co-
conspirators. IDaCcS
RESOLUTION
DAVIDE, JR., J p:
In our decision of 14 November 1994, we modified
the appealed judgment of the Sandiganbayan in
Criminal Case No. 14844 by holding the petitioner
guilty of the complex crime of attempted estafa
through falsification of official and commercial
documents, and sentencing him to suffer an
indeterminate penalty ranging from two (2) years,
four (4) months, and one (1) day of prision
correccional as minimum to ten (10) years and one
(1) day of prision mayor as maximum and to pay a
fine of Two Thousand Pesos (P2,000.00).
In short, we held that although the petitioner could
not be convicted of the crime charged, viz.,
violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, as
amended because the said section penalizes
only consummated offenses and the offense
charged in this case was not consummated he
could, nevertheless, be convicted of the complex
crime of attempted estafa through falsification of
11 | C O N S T I 2 _ S e c t i o n 1 4 _ R i g h t t o b e i n f o r m e d o f t h e n a t u r e a n d c a u s e
of accusation
official and commercial documents, which is
necessarily included in the crime charged.
Unable to accept our verdict, the petitioner
seasonably filed a motion for reconsideration on
the ground that after having been acquitted of the
violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, a special
law, he could not be convicted anymore of
attempted estafa through falsification of official
and commercial documents, an offense
punishable under the Revised Penal Code, a
general law; otherwise, the constitutional provision
on double jeopardy would be violated. In other
words, his acquittal of the crime charged precludes
conviction for the complex crime of attempted
estafa through falsification of official and
commercial documents, because both offenses
arose from the same overt act as alleged in the
information in Criminal Case No. 14844.
In its Comment on the motion for reconsideration
signed only by Assistant Solicitor General Romeo C.
de la Cruz and Solicitor Josette Sonia Holgado-
Marcilla, the Office of the Solicitor General
disagrees with the petitioner and asserts that the
rule on double jeopardy cannot be successfully
invoked in this case considering that no new
information for estafa through falsification of public
document was filed against the petitioner; only one
information was filed against him and his co-
accused. For double jeopardy to exist, there must
be such new information and the accused must be
able to show that (1) he has been previously
brought to trial, (2) in a court of competent
jurisdiction, (3) upon a valid complaint or
information sufficient in form and substance, (4) for
the same offense or an attempt to or frustration
thereof as that charged in the new information,
and that (5) the case has been dismissed or
terminated without his consent or after he had
pleaded to the information but before judgment
was rendered. 1
Nevertheless, the Office of the Solicitor General
joins the petitioner in the latter's plea for his
acquittal, but for another ground, namely,
insufficiency of evidence.
In the resolution of 22 August 1995, we directed the
Solicitor General to inform the Court whether he
agrees with the recommendation of Assistant
Solicitor General De la Cruz and Solicitor Holgado-
Marcilla. In his Manifestation of 14 September 1995,
the Solicitor General not only expressed full
agreement with the said recommendation, but
even added the following observations:
10. After reading the Court's Decision, the Solicitor
General has noted that petitioner's conviction is
based on circumstantial evidence.
11. The law and a host of the Court's ruling declare
that circumstantial evidence is sufficient for
conviction if the following conditions concur:
(1) There is more that one circumstance;
(2) The facts from which the inferences are derived
are proven; and
(3) The combination of all the circumstances is such
as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable
doubt (Section 3, Rule 133, Rules of Court).
12. In this case, it should be stressed that the
inference that petitioner falsified documents
appears to be based on another inference, i.e.,
that he was in possession of the same because he
accompanied his co-accused Catre in the
transactions. However, other than accompanying
Catre, there is no evidence on record that
petitioner had custody of the falsified documents.
13. As to the conspiracy angle, there is likewise no
showing that petitioner interceded for Catre. In
fact, it was Catre who talked to Calica. (p. 19-20,
TSN, August 26, 1991) Neither was it shown that
petitioner had a hand in the processing of the
import entry declaration for the release of the
shipment from the Bureau of Customs. It was not
also proven that he was instrumental in the
approval of the import entry declaration.
14. The elements of conspiracy, like the physical
acts constituting the crime itself, must be proven
beyond reasonable doubt. (People vs. Manuel, 234
SCRA 532). To hold an accused guilty as co-
principal by reason of conspiracy, it must be shown
that he performed an overt act in pursuance or
furtherance of the conspiracy. (People vs. Roxas,
241 SCRA 369). In this regard, it is respectfully
submitted that there is no overt act conclusively
attributable to petitioner which would pin him down
as a co-conspirator.
15. Thus, it is the inexorable duty of the Solicitor
General to recommend petitioner's acquittal, as he
so recommends, inasmuch as the People was not
able to adduce evidence sufficient to overcome
the constitutional presumption of petitioner's
innocence.
We then required the parties to submit their
respective memoranda on the following issues:
(a) the sufficiency of the evidence for the complex
crime of attempted estafa through falsification of
public and commercial documents, and
(b) the validity of the conviction therefor under an
information for the violation of Section 3(e) of R.A.
No. 3019, as amended, vis-a-vis the constitutional
right of the accused to be informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation against him.
12 | C O N S T I 2 _ S e c t i o n 1 4 _ R i g h t t o b e i n f o r m e d o f t h e n a t u r e a n d c a u s e
of accusation
In their respective memoranda, the petitioner and
the Office of the Solicitor General are one in
asserting that the petitioner could not be convicted
based entirely on circumstantial evidence because
of the failure of the prosecution to satisfy the
requisites set forth in Section 4, Rule 133 of the Rules
of Court, namely, (a) there is more than one
circumstance; (b) the facts from which the
inferences are derived are proven; and (c) the
combination of all the circumstances is such as to
produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
The petitioner further cited portions of the transcripts
of the stenographic notes of the testimony of
Customs Broker Constantino Calica which prove
that it was Catre alone who made the introduction
to Calica that they were agents of Eversun
Commercial Trading, and that it was Catre who did
all the talking and directly transacted with Calica
regarding the terms and conditions of the particular
engagement and who actually delivered the
documents to him. There is no evidence that the
petitioner had a hand in the processing of the
import entry declaration for the release of the
shipment from the Bureau of Customs or was
instrumental in the approval of the import entry
declaration. Thus:
Q Now, did Mr. Odon Pecho actually engage your
services?
A They are two, sir, Mr. Joe Catre and Mr. Odon
Pecho.
Q Who actually transacted with you with regards to
your services, is it Mr. Catre or Mr. Pecho?
A Mr. Joe Catre, sir.
Q So it was Joe Catre?
A Yes, sir.
Q And not Odon Pecho, is that right?
A Well, he is the companion of Mr. Catre and they
introduced themselves to me that they are the
authorized representative of the importer.
Q That is right. Who introduced to you?
A Mr. Catre was the one who talks [sic] to me, sir.
Q But in your testimony, the person who delivered
to you the documents, the bill of lading, the
commercial invoices, the packing list, the importer's
sworn statement, etc. which was made the basis of
the, of your preparation for the processing of the
import entry, who delivered to you these
documents that you mentioned?
A Mr. Catre, sir.
Q And who talked to you about the terms and
conditions of this engagement or contracts?
A Mr. Catre, sir.
Q And not Mr. Odon Pecho?
A Yes, sir.
Q Who actually delivered to you the documents,
Mr. Catre or Mr. Pecho?
A It was Mr. Catre, sir, he was the one handling the
case.
AJ ESCAREAL
Q [To] Whom did you talk first?
A Mr. Catre, Your Honor, he was the one handling
the case, the documents, Your Honor.
Q Do you know how they introduced themselves to
you?
A That is the only thing that I remember Your Honor
that they came to my office and told me that they
are the importer's representatives and that they are
engaging my services.
Q Who said that?
A Mr. Catre, Your Honor.
Q How about Mr. Pecho?
A No, Your Honor.
Q Did he say anything?
A At that time your Honor, it was Mr. Catre who was
doing that talking.
Q Did Mr. Catre give his name to you?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q How did he introduce himself?
A That he is Mr. Joe Catre, Your Honor.
Q How about his companion, did his companion
introduce himself to you or he was introduced by
Mr. Catre to you?
A He did not introduce himself to me Your Honor.
Q So during that meeting you do not know that the
name of the companion of Mr. Catre is Odon
Pecho.
A Yes, your Honor.
Q And how did your son attend to it?
A Two days after Your Honor, Mr. Catre called our
office to assist and help them in the preparation of
the cargo at the arrastre operator because that is
13 | C O N S T I 2 _ S e c t i o n 1 4 _ R i g h t t o b e i n f o r m e d o f t h e n a t u r e a n d c a u s e
of accusation
usually being done by the broker when the
shipment goes for examination. (t.s.n., Hearing of
August 26, 1991)
As to the second issue, the Office of the Solicitor
General rejects the theory of the petitioner and
submits that the information in this case contains
the essential ingredients of estafa through
falsification of public and commercial documents;
therefore, assuming there is sufficient evidence, the
petitioner could be convicted of the complex
crime of attempted estafa through falsification of
public and commercial documents without
violating Section 14(2), Article III of the Constitution
on the right of the accused to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him.
I
We shall first take up the second issue since it
involves a constitutional right of the accused.
On the assumption that the prosecution's evidence
had satisfied the quantum of proof for conviction
for the complex crime of attempted estafa through
falsification of public and commercial documents,
there is absolutely no merit in the petitioner's claim
that he could not be convicted of the said crime
without offending his right to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him,
which is guaranteed by the Bill of Rights. 2 Such
right, an ancient bulwark of the liberties of men, has
its origin in the Bill of Rights which the people of
Great Britain demanded and received from the
Prince and Princess of Orange on 13 February 1688.
It was adopted by the Constitution of the United
States and was extended to the Philippines by Act
No. 235, or the Philippine Bill of 1902. 3 It was later
carried into the Jones Law and, ultimately,
enshrined in the Constitutions of 1935, 1973, and
1987. It has the following objectives:
First. To furnish the accused with such a description
of the charge against him as will enable him to
make his defense; second, to avail himself of his
conviction or acquittal for protection against a
further prosecution for the same cause; and third,
to inform the court of the facts alleged, so that it
may decide whether they are sufficient in law to
support a conviction, if one should be had (United
States vs. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542). In order that this
requirement may be satisfied, facts must be stated;
not conclusions of law. Every crime is made up of
certain acts and intent: these must be set forth in
the complaint with reasonable particularity of time,
place, names (plaintiff or defendant), and
circumstances. In short, the complaint must contain
a specific allegation of every fact and
circumstance necessary to constitute the crime
charged. 4
Conformably therewith, the Rules of Court has
prescribed the appropriate rules. 5
What determines the real nature and cause of
accusation against an accused is the actual recital
of facts stated in the information or complaint and
not the caption or preamble of the information or
complaint nor the specification of the provision of
law alleged to have been violated, they being
conclusions of law. 6 An incorrect caption is not a
fatal mistake. 7
It follows then that an accused may be convicted
of a crime which, although not the one charged, is
necessarily included in the latter. Section 4, Rule 120
of the Rules of Court thus provides:
SEC. 4. Judgment in case of variance between
allegation and proof. When there is variance
between the offense charged in the complaint or
information, and that proved or established by the
evidence, and the offense as charged is included
in or necessarily includes the offense proved, the
accused shall be convicted of the offense proved
included in that which is charged, or of the offense
charged included in that which is proved.
The succeeding Section 5 prescribes the rule in
determining when an offense includes or is included
in another. We have shown in the challenged
decision why the complex crime of attempted
estafa through falsification of public and
commercial documents is included in the offense
charged. Moreover, we held that the information in
this case "can also be considered as charging two
offenses: the violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No.
3019 and the complex crime of attempted estafa
through falsification of official and commercial
documents," and since the petitioner failed to
object before trial to such duplicity, 8 he could be
validly convicted of both or either of the offenses
charged and proved. 9
II
We shall now turn to the first issue: whether the
evidence adduced by the prosecution had
established beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of
the petitioner for the complex crime of attempted
estafa through falsification of public and
commercial documents. In light of the consistent
and persistent negative stance of the Office of the
Solicitor General, personally confirmed and
reinforced by the Solicitor General in his separate
Manifestation, we re-evaluated the evidence.
In our decision of 14 November 1994, we based the
conviction of the petitioner on conspiracy.
The question that logically crops up then is not
whether the combination of the circumstantial
evidence proved in this case against the petitioner
had established beyond reasonable doubt that he
is guilty of the complex crime of attempted estafa
through falsification of public and commercial
documents, as asseverated by him and the public
respondent. Rather, the question is whether the
prosecution had discharged its duty to establish
conspiracy between the petitioner and Catre.
14 | C O N S T I 2 _ S e c t i o n 1 4 _ R i g h t t o b e i n f o r m e d o f t h e n a t u r e a n d c a u s e
of accusation
The information 10 charges the petitioner and his
co-accused Joe Catre as principals 11 who
"conspir[ed], confabulat[ed], conniv[ed],
confederat[ed], and mutually help[ed] one
another," with Catre "representing himself to be a
representative of Eversun Commercial Trading of
Cotabato City, a corporation, firm or partnership
which turned out to be non-existent, fake or
fictitious." The evidence for the prosecution, as
admitted by the respondent, only showed that it
was Catre who possessed the falsified documents,
contracted the services of Calica, and delivered
the documents to the latter for processing. In the
absence of satisfactory explanation, Catre, being
the one in possession of the forged documents, is
presumed to be the forger. 12 Catre, however,
could not provide the explanation because only
the petitioner was tried. The information states that
his address is "unknown," and the record does not
show that a warrant for his arrest was issued. The
only warrant of arrest that was issued was that for
the petitioner. 13 Assuming that such evidence and
the others adduced by the prosecution are to be
admitted to prove the commission of the crime, a
prima facie case enough to prove the guilt of Catre
with moral certainty was duly established against
Catre as a principal. Accordingly, if conspiracy
were proven, the petitioner would be equally guilty
of the offense proved. For, in a conspiracy, every
act of one of the conspirators in furtherance of a
common design or purpose of such a conspiracy is,
in contemplation of law, the act of each of them.
14
There is conspiracy when two or more persons
come to an agreement concerning the commission
of a felony and decide to commit it. 15 Direct proof
of previous agreement to commit a crime is not
necessary. Conspiracy may be deduced from the
mode and manner in which the offense was
perpetrated, or inferred from the acts of the
accused themselves when such point to a joint
purpose and design, concerted action, and
community of interest. 16 It is, however, settled that
the same degree of proof required for establishing
the crime is likewise required to support a finding of
conspiracy. It other words, conspiracy must be
shown to exist as clearly and as convincingly as the
commission of the offense itself in order to uphold
the fundamental principle that no one shall be
found guilty of a crime except upon proof beyond
reasonable doubt. 17
It is also essential for one to be a party to a
conspiracy as to be liable for the acts of the others
that there be intentional participation in the
transaction with a view to the furtherance of the
common design. 18 Except when he is the
mastermind in a conspiracy, it is necessary that a
conspirator should have performed some overt act
as a direct or indirect contribution in the execution
of the crime planned to be committed. 19 The
overt act may consist of active participation in the
actual commission of the crime itself, or it may
consist of moral assistance to his co-conspirators by
being present at the commission of the crime or by
exerting moral ascendancy over the other co-
conspirators. 20
Since conspiracy must be established by proof
beyond reasonable doubt, then the next inquiry
would be whether the prosecution was able to
adduce such proof against the petitioner. It is in this
respect that we agree with the People and the
petitioner that the prosecution had only
circumstantial evidence against the petitioner.
Under Section 4, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court,
circumstantial evidence would be sufficient to
convict if (a) there is more than one circumstance;
(b) the facts from which the inferences are derived
are proven; and (c) the combination of all the
circumstances is such as to produce a conviction
beyond reasonable doubt. As jurisprudentially
formulated, a judgment of conviction based on
circumstantial evidence can be upheld only if the
circumstances proven constitute an unbroken
chain which leads to one fair and reasonable
conclusion pointing to the accused, to the
exclusion of all others, as the guilty person, i.e., the
circumstances proven must be consistent with each
other, consistent with the hypothesis that the
accused is guilty, and at the same time inconsistent
with any other hypothesis except that of guilty. 21
In the instant case, all that the prosecution was
able to prove insofar as the petitioner is concerned
is that he and co-accused Catre are from Surigao
del Norte; that he accompanied Catre in
contracting the services of customs broker
Constantino Calica; and that he also was with
Catre when the latter went with Dennis Calica, son
of Constantino Calica, to the Manila International
Container Port. In all these instances, however, it
was Catre who transacted the business and did all
the talking. As a matter of fact, the petitioner was
not even introduced to Calica. As recapitulated by
the Office of the Solicitor General in its
Memorandum:
[T]here is no evidence that petitioner interceded for
Catre. Prosecution witness Calica testified that it
was Catre and not petitioner, who introduced
themselves as agents of Eversun Commercial
Trading. He also testified that it was Catre who did
all the talking and directly transacted with him
(Calica) regarding the terms and conditions of the
particular engagement and it was also Catre, and
not petitioner, who actually delivered the
documents to him (tsn, August 26, 1991). There is no
evidence that petitioner had a hand in the
processing of the import entry declaration for the
release of the shipment from the Bureau of
Customs. There is also no evidence that petitioner
was instrumental in the approval of the import entry
declaration. In short, there is no showing that
petitioner performed an overt act in furtherance of
alleged conspiracy. 22
15 | C O N S T I 2 _ S e c t i o n 1 4 _ R i g h t t o b e i n f o r m e d o f t h e n a t u r e a n d c a u s e
of accusation
The evidence for the prosecution likewise failed to
prove that the petitioner (1) personally represented
himself as an agent of Eversun Commercial Trading;
(2) knew of the falsity of any of the public and
commercial documents in question; and (3) had, at
any time, possession of all or some of the said
documents.
Otherwise stated, there is no sufficient
circumstantial evidence to prove conspiracy
between the petitioner and Catre to commit the
complex crime of estafa through falsification of
public and commercial documents. Neither is there
evidence of petitioner's active participation in the
commission of the crime. The concordant
combination and cumulative effect of the acts of
the petitioner as proven by the prosecution's
evidence fails to satisfy the requirements of Section
4, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court. There is reasonable
doubt as to his guilt. And since his constitutional
right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty 23
can be overthrown only by proof beyond
reasonable doubt, 24 the petitioner must then be
acquitted even though his innocence may be
doubted. 25
WHEREFORE, the petitioner's motion for
reconsideration is GRANTED. Our decision of 14
November 1994 is SET ASIDE, and another is hereby
rendered REVERSING the challenged decision of 28
June 1993 and resolution of 12 August 1993 of the
Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 14844 and
ACQUITTING petitioner ODON PECHO of the
complex crime of attempted estafa through
falsification of official and commercial documents,
without, however, prejudice to any appropriate
administrative action which his office may take
against him as may be warranted by the
circumstances in this case.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Regalado, Romero, Bellosillo,
Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Francisco,
Hermosisima, Jr., Panganiban and Torres, Jr., JJ.,
concur.
Mendoza, J., on leave.
(Soriano, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. L-65952,
July 31, 1984)
EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-65952. July 31, 1984.]
LAURO G. SORIANO, JR., petitioners, vs. THE
HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN AND THE PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Dakila F. Castro for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for respondents.
DECISION
ABAD SANTOS, J p:
The principal issue in this petition to review a
decision of the Sandiganbayan is whether or not
the preliminary investigation of a criminal complaint
conducted by a Fiscal is a "contract or transaction"
so as to bring it within the ambit of Section 3 (b) of
Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
The factual background is as follows:
Thomas N. Tan was accused of qualified theft in a
complaint lodged with the City Fiscal of Quezon
City. The case was docketed as I.S. No. 82-2964 and
assigned for investigation to the petitioner who was
then an Assistant City Fiscal. In the course of the
investigation the petitioner demanded P4,000.00
from Tan as the price for dismissing the case. Tan
reported the demand to the National Bureau of
Investigation which set up an entrapment. Because
Tan was hard put to raise the required amount only
P2,000.00 in bills were marked by the NBI which had
to supply one-half thereof. The entrapment
succeeded and an information was filed with the
Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 7393 which
reads as follows:
"The undersigned Tanodbayan Special Prosecutor
accuses LAURO G. SORIANO, for Violation of
Section 3, paragraph (b) of Republic Act 3019,
otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act, committed as follows:
That on or about the 21st day of March 1983, at
Quezon City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, a public officer, being then and still is an
Assistant City Fiscal of the Quezon City Fiscal's
Office, detailed as the Investigating Fiscal in the
case of MARIANNE Z. LACAMBRA versus THOMAS N.
TAN, docketed as I.S. No. 82-2964, for Qualified
Theft, taking advantage of his official position and
with grave abuse of authority, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously demand and
request from Thomas N. Tan the amount of FOUR
THOUSAND PESOS (P4,000.00) Philippine Currency,
and actually received from said Thomas N. Tan the
amount of TWO THOUSAND PESOS (P2,000.00)
Philippine Currency, in consideration for a favorable
resolution by dismissing the above-mentioned case,
wherein said accused has to intervene in his official
capacity as such Investigating Fiscal.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Manila, Philippines, March 22, 1983.
(SGD.) EDGARDO C. LABELLA
Special Prosecutor"
After trial the Sandiganbayan rendered a decision
with the following dispositive portion:
"WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused Lauro G.
Soriano, Jr., GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt, as
Principal, in the Information, for Violation of Section
3, paragraph (b), of Republic Act No. 3019, as
amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, and hereby sentences him to
suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment
16 | C O N S T I 2 _ S e c t i o n 1 4 _ R i g h t t o b e i n f o r m e d o f t h e n a t u r e a n d c a u s e
of accusation
ranging from SIX (6) YEARS and ONE (1) MONTH, as
minimum, to NINE (9) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY, as
maximum; to suffer perpetual disqualification from
public office; to suffer loss of all retirement or
gratuity benefits under any law; and, to pay costs.
"Of the sum of Two Thousand Pesos (P2,000.00) used
in the entrapment operations, and which was fully
recovered from the accused, One Thousand Pesos
(P1,000.00) shall be returned to private complainant
Thomas N. Tan, and the other half, to the National
Bureau of Investigation, National Capital Region."
A motion to reconsider the decision was denied by
the Sandiganbayan; hence the instant petition.
The petitioner has raised several legal questions plus
one factual question. The latter is to the effect that
the Sandiganbayan convicted him on the
weakness of his defense and not on the strength of
the prosecution's evidence, This claim is not
meritorious not only because it is not for Us to review
the factual findings of the court a quo but also
because a reading of its decision shows that it
explicitly stated the facts establishing the guilt of
the petitioner and the competence of the
witnesses who testified against him.
As stated above, the principal issue is whether or
not the investigation conducted by the petitioner
can be regarded as a "contract or transaction"
within the purview of Sec. 3 (b) of R.A. No. 3019. On
this issue the petition is highly impressed with merit.
The afore-mentioned provision reads as follows:
"SEC. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. In
addition to acts or omissions of public officers
already penalized by existing law, the following
shall constitute corrupt practices of any public
officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
prcd
(a) . . .
(b) Directly or indirectly requesting or receiving any
gift, present, share, percentage, or benefit, for
himself or for any other person, in connection with
any contract or transaction between the
Government and any other party, wherein the
public officer in his official capacity has to intervene
under the law."
The petitioner states:
"Assuming in gratia argumenti, petitioner's guilt, the
facts make out a case of Direct Bribery defined and
penalized under the provision of Article 210 of the
Revised Penal Code and not a violation of Section
3, subparagraph (b) of Rep. Act 3019, as amended.
"The evidence for the prosecution clearly and
undoubtedly support, if at all, the offense of Direct
Bribery, which is not the offense charged and is not
likewise included in or is necessarily included in the
offense charged, which is for violation of Section 3,
subparagraph (b) of Rep. Act 3019, as amended.
The prosecution showed that: the accused is a
public officer; in consideration of P4,000.00 which
was allegedly solicited, P2,000.00 of which was
allegedly received, the petitioner undertook or
promised to dismiss a criminal complaint pending
preliminary investigation before him, which may or
may not constitute a crime; that the act of
dismissing the criminal complaint pending before
petitioner was related to the exercise of the
function of his office. Therefore, it is with pristine
clarity that the offense proved, if at all, is Direct
Bribery." (Petition, p. 5.)
Upon the other hand, the respondents claim:
"A reading of the above-quoted provision would
show that the term 'transaction' as used thereof is
not limited in its scope or meaning to a commercial
or business transaction but includes all kinds of
transaction, whether commercial, civil or
administrative in nature, pending with the
government. This must be so, otherwise, the Act
would have so stated in the 'Definition of Terms',
Section 2 thereof. But it did not, perforce leaving no
other interpretation than that the expressed
purpose and object is to embrace all kinds of
transaction between the government and other
party wherein the public officer would intervene
under the law." (Comment, p. 8.)
It is obvious that the investigation conducted by the
petitioner was not a contract. Neither was it a
transaction because this term must be construed as
analogous to the term which precedes it. A
transaction, like a contract, is one which involves
some consideration as in credit transactions and
this element (consideration) is absent in the
investigation conducted by the petitioner.
In the light of the foregoing, We agree with the
petitioner that it was error for the Sandiganbayan to
have convicted him of violating Sec. 3 (b) of R.A.
No. 3019.
The petitioner also claims that he cannot be
convicted of bribery under the Revised Penal Code
because to do so would be violative of his
constitutional right to be informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation against him. Wrong. A
reading of the information which has been
reproduced herein clearly makes out a case of
bribery so that the petitioner cannot claim
deprivation of the right to be informed.
IN THE LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, the judgment of
the Sandiganbayan is modified in that the
petitioner is deemed guilty of bribery as defined
and penalized by Article 210 of the Revised Penal
Code and is hereby sentenced to suffer an
indeterminate penalty of six (6) months of arresto
mayor, as minimum, to two (2) years of prision
correccional, as maximum, and to pay a fine of
Two Thousand (P2,000.00) Pesos. The rest of the
17 | C O N S T I 2 _ S e c t i o n 1 4 _ R i g h t t o b e i n f o r m e d o f t h e n a t u r e a n d c a u s e
of accusation
judgment is hereby affirmed. Costs against the
petitioner. Cdpr
SO ORDERED.
Fernando, C.J., Teehankee, Makasiar, Aquino,
Concepcion, Jr., Guerrero, Melencio-Herrera,
Plana, Escolin Relova, Gutierrez, Jr., De la Fuente
and Cuevas, JJ., concur.
(Borja v. Mendoza, G.R. No. L-45667, June 20, 1977)
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. L-45667. June 20, 1977.]
MANUEL BORJA, petitioner, vs. HON. RAFAEL T.
MENDOZA, Judge of the Court of First Instance of
Cebu (Branch VI) and HON. ROMULO R. SENINING,
Judge of the City Court of Cebu (Branch I),
respondents.
Hermis I. Montecillo for petitioner.
Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, Assistant
Solicitor Jose F. Racela, Jr. and Solicitor Carlos N.
Ortega for respondents.
DECISION
FERNANDO, J p:
The jurisdictional infirmity imputed to respondent
Judge Romulo R. Senining of the City Court of Cebu
which was not remedied by respondent Judge
Rafael T. Mendoza of the Court of First Instance of
Cebu in this certiorari proceeding was the absence
of an arraignment of petitioner Manuel Borja, who
was accused of slight physical injuries. This
notwithstanding, respondent Judge Senining
proceeded with the trial in absentia and thereafter,
in a decision promulgated on August 18, 1976,
found him guilty of such offense and sentenced him
to suffer imprisonment for a period of twenty days
of arresto menor. 1 Thereafter, an appeal was duly
elevated to the Court of First Instance of Cebu
presided by respondent Judge Mendoza. 2 It was
then alleged that without any notice to petitioner
and without requiring him to submit his
memorandum, a decision on the appealed case
was rendered on November 16, 1976 affirming the
judgment of the City Court. It is the contention of
petitioner that the failure to arraign him is violative
of his constitutional right to procedural due process,
3 more specifically of his right to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him
and of his right to be heard by himself and counsel.
4 There was thus, at the very least, a grave abuse of
discretion. The Solicitor General, 5 when asked to
comment, agreed that the procedural defect was
of such gravity as to render void the decision of the
City Court affirmed by the Court of First Instance.
The comment was considered as answer, with the
case being submitted for decision.
Respect for the constitutional rights of an accused
as authoritatively construed by this Court, duly
taken note of in the comment of the Solicitor
General, thus calls for the grant of the writ of
certiorari prayed for.
1. The plea of petitioner to nullify the proceedings
had in the criminal case against him finds support in
the procedural due process mandate of the
Constitution. It requires that the accused be
arraigned so that he may be informed as to why he
was indicted and what penal offense he has to
face, to be convicted only on a showing that his
guilt is shown beyond reasonable doubt with full
opportunity to disprove the evidence against him.
Moreover, the sentence to be imposed in such a
case is to be in accordance with a valid law. 6 This
Court, in People v. Castillo, 7 speaking through
Justice De Joya and following the language of the
American Supreme Court, identified due process
with the accused having "been heard in a court of
competent jurisdiction, and proceeded against
under the orderly processes of law, and only
punished after inquiry and investigation, upon
notice to him, with an opportunity to be heard, and
a judgment awarded with the authority of a
constitutional law, . . . ." 8 An arraignment thus
becomes indispensable as the means "for bringing
the accused into court and notifying him of the
cause he is required to meet . . ." 9 Its importance
was stressed by Justice Moreland as early as 1916 in
the leading case of United States v. Binayoh. 10 He
pointed out that upon the accused being
arraigned, "there is a duty laid by the Code [now
the Rules of Court] upon the court to inform [him] of
certain rights and to extend to him, on his demand,
certain others. This duty is an affirmative one which
the court, on its own motion, must perform, unless
waived." 11 To emphasize its importance, he
added: "No such duty, however, is laid on the court
with regard to the rights of the accused which he
may be entitled to exercise during the trial. Those
are rights which he must assert himself and the
benefits of which he himself must demand. In other
words, in the arraignment the court must act of its
own volition, . . . ." 12 In the terse and apt language
of the Solicitor General: "Arraignment is an
indispensable requirement in any criminal
prosecution." 13 Procedural due process demands
no less.
2. Nor is it only the due process guarantee that calls
for the accused being duly arraigned. As noted, it is
at that stage where in the mode and manner
required by the Rules, an accused, for the first time,
is granted the opportunity to know the precise
charge that confronts him. It is imperative that he is
thus made fully aware of possible loss of freedom,
even of his life, depending on the nature of the
crime imputed to him. At the very least then, he
must be fully informed of why the prosecuting arm
of the state is mobilized against him. An
arraignment serves that purpose. Thereafter, he is
no longer in the dark. It is true, the complaint or
information may not be worded with sufficient
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clarity. He would be in a much worse position
though if he does not even have such an
opportunity to plead to the charge. With his
counsel by his side, he is thus in a position to enter
his plea with full knowledge of the consequences.
He is not even required to do so immediately. He
may move to quash. What is thus evident is that an
arraignment assures that he be fully acquainted
with the nature of the crime imputed to him and
the circumstances under which it is allegedly
committed. It is thus a vital aspect of the
constitutional rights guaranteed him. It is not useless
formality, much less an idle ceremony.
3. An equally fatal defect in the proceeding had
before respondent Judge Senining was that
notwithstanding its being conducted in the
absence of petitioner, he was convicted. It was
shown that after one postponement due to his
failure to appear, the case was reset for hearing.
When that date came, December 14, 1973, without
petitioner being present, although his bondsmen
were notified, respondent Judge, as set forth in the
comment of the Solicitor General, "allowed the
prosecution to present its evidence invoking Letter
of Instruction No. 40. Only one witness testified, the
offended party herself, and three documents were
offered in evidence after which the prosecution
rested its case. Thereupon, respondent City Court
set the promulgation of the decision on December
28, 1973." 14 It could then conclude: "Verily, the
records clearly show that petitioner was not
arraigned at all and was not represented by
counsel throughout the whole proceedings in the
respondent City Court." 15 It is indisputable then
that there was a denial of petitioner's constitutional
right to be heard by himself and counsel. As
categorically affirmed by Justice Ozaeta for this
Court in the leading case of Abriol v. Homeres: 16 "It
is the constitutional right of the accused to be
heard in his defense before sentence is
pronounced on him." 17 He added further that such
"constitutional right is inviolate." 18 There is no doubt
that it could be waived, but here there was no such
waiver, whether express or implied. It suffices to
refer to another leading case, People v. Holgado,
19 where the then Chief Justice Moran
emphatically took note of the importance of the
right to counsel: "In criminal cases there can be no
fair hearing unless the accused be given an
opportunity to be heard by counsel. The right to be
heard would be of little avail if it does not include
the right to be heard by counsel. Even the most
intelligent or educated man may have no skill in the
science of the law, particularly in the rules of
procedure, and, without counsel, he may be
convicted not because he is guilty but because he
does not know how to establish his innocence." 20
With the violation of the constitutional right to be
heard by himself and counsel being thus manifest, it
is easily understandable why the Solicitor General
agreed with petitioner that the sentence imposed
on him should be set aside for being null.
4. The provision in the present Constitution allowing
trial to be held in absentia is unavailing. It cannot
justify the actuation of respondent Judge Senining.
Its language is clear and explicit. What is more, it is
mandatory. Thus: "However, after arraignment, trial
may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the
accused provided that he has been duly notified
and his failure to appear is unjustified." 21 As
pointed out then by the Solicitor General, the
indispensable requisite for trial in absentia is that it
should come "after arraignment." The express
mention in the present Constitution of the need for
such a step emphasizes its importance in the
procedural scheme to accord an accused due
process. Without the accused having been
arraigned, it becomes academic to discuss the
applicability of this exception to the basic
constitutional right that the accused should be
heard by himself and counsel.

5. Nor did the appeal to the Court of First Instance

presided by respondent Judge Mendoza possess
any curative aspect. To quote anew from the
comment of the Solicitor General: "Respondent
Court of First Instance . . . considered the appeal
taken by the petitioner as waiver of the defects in
the proceedings in the respondent City Court.
Precisely, the appeal itself is tantamount to
questioning those defects. In fact, the
Memorandum in support of the appeal
unmistakably raised as error the absence of
petitioner at the arraignment and cited
jurisprudence, commentaries and the rules to
bolster his position. Specifically, the absence of an
arraignment can be invoked at anytime in view of
the requirements of due process to ensure a fair
and impartial trial." 22

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is granted.

The decision of respondent Judge Romulo R.
Senining dated December 28, 1973, finding the
accused guilty of the crime of slight physical injuries,
is nullified and set aside. Likewise, the decision of
respondent Judge Rafael T. Mendoza dated
November 16, 1976, affirming the aforesaid decision
of Judge Senining, is nullified and set aside. The
case is remanded to the City Court of Cebu for the
prosecution of the offense of slight physical injuries,
with due respect and observance of the provisions
of the Rules of Court, starting with the arraignment
of petitioner.

Barredo, Antonio, Aquino and Fernandez, JJ.,

concur.

Concepcion Jr., J., is on leave.

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