CONSTI2_Section14_Right to Speedy, Impartial and Public Trial (50 pages)

(1) (People v. Tee, G.R. Nos. 140546-47, January 20, 2003)

(11) (Flores v. People, G.R. No. L-25769, December 10, 1974)
(13) (Conde v. Rivera, G.R. No. 21741, January 25, 1924)
(14) (Speedy Trial Act of 1998, REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8493 [1998])
(17) (Mateo, Jr. v. Villaluz, G.R. Nos. L-34756-59, March 31, 1973)
(21) (Garcia v. Domingo, G.R. No. L-30104 (Resolution), July 25, 1973)
(23) (People v. Mapalao, G.R. No. 92415, May 14, 1991)
(30) (People v. Valeriano y Tumahig, G.R. Nos. 103604-05, September 23, 1993)
(38) (Perez v. Estrada, A.M. No. 01-4-03-SC (Resolution), September 13, 2001)
(43) (In re Ampatuan, A.M. No. 10-11-5-SC, 10-11-6-SC, 10-11-7-SC, June 14, 2011)
(47) (In re Ampatuan, A.M. No. 10-11-5-SC, 10-11-6-SC, 10-11-7-SC, October 23, 2012)

perpetua as neither mitigating nor aggravating

(People v. Tee, G.R. Nos. 140546-47, January 20,
2003)
EN BANC
[G.R. Nos. 140546-47. January 20, 2003.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
MODESTO TEE a.k.a. ESTOY TEE, accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Jose Mencio Molintas for accused-appellant.
SYNOPSIS
Appellant is a Chinese national in his forties, a
businessman, and a resident of Baguio City. A raid
conducted by the operatives of the NBI and the
PNP NARCOM at the premises allegedly leased by
appellant and at his residence yielded huge
quantities of marijuana. The City Prosecutor of
Baguio City charged appellant with illegal
possession of marijuana, which later on resulted to
the filing of two separate informations which were
docketed to Criminal Cases Nos. 15800-R and
15822-R. In Criminal Case No. 15822-R, the trial court
agreed with appellant that the taking of marijuana
from appellant's rented premises was the result of
an illegal search and hence, inadmissible in
evidence against appellant. Appellant was
accordingly acquitted of the charge. However, the
trial court found that the evidence for the
prosecution was more than ample to prove
appellant's guilt in Criminal Case No. 15800-R and
duly convicted him of illegal possession of
marijuana and sentenced him to death. Hence, this
automatic review.
According to the Court, there was no grave abuse
of discretion committed by the trial court when it
ordered the so-called reopening of the case to
complete the testimony of the prosecution witness.
Appellant was never deprived of his day in court.
Appellant was given every opportunity to support
his case or to refute the prosecution's evidence
after the prosecution rested its case. The physical
evidence in this case corroborated what the
prosecution's witness testified to. Hence, the
Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's finding that
appellant was guilty of the crime charged. The
penalty, however; was reduced to reclusion
1|CONSTI2_Section14_Right to Speedy, Impartial and Public Trial
circumstance was present in the instant case.
SYLLABUS
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; SEARCHES
AND SEIZURES; WARRANT ISSUED SHOULD DESCRIBE
WITH PARTICULARITY THE THINGS TO BE SEIZED;
RATIONALE. The constitutional requirement of
reasonable particularity of description of the things
to be seized is primarily meant to enable the law
enforcers serving the warrant to: (1) readily identify
the properties to be seized and thus prevent them
from seizing the wrong items; and (2) leave said
peace officers with no discretion regarding the
articles to be seized and thus prevent unreasonable
searches and seizures. What the Constitution seeks
to avoid are search warrants of broad or general
characterization or sweeping descriptions, which
will authorize police officers to undertake a fishing
expedition to seize and confiscate any and all kinds
of evidence or articles relating to an offense.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; WHEN TECHNICAL DESCRIPTION IS
NOT NECESSARY; APPLICATION IN CASE AT BAR.
However, it is not required that technical precision
of description be required, particularly, where by
the nature of the goods to be seized, their
description must be rather general, since the
requirement of a technical description would mean
that no warrant could issue. Thus, it has been held
that the term "narcotics paraphernalia" is not so
wanting in particularity as to create a general
warrant. Nor is the description "any and all
narcotics" and "all implements, paraphernalia,
articles, papers and records pertaining to" the use,
possession, or sale of narcotics or dangerous drugs
so broad as to be unconstitutional. A search
warrant commanding peace officers to seize "a
quantity of loose heroin" has been held sufficiently
particular. Tested against the foregoing
precedents, the description "an undetermined
amount of marijuana" must be held to satisfy the
requirement for particularity in a search warrant:
Noteworthy, what is to be seized in the instant case
is property of a specified character, i.e., marijuana,
an illicit drug. By reason of its character and the
circumstances under which it would be found, said
article is illegal. A further description would be
unnecessary and ordinarily impossible, except as to
such character, the place, and the circumstances.
Thus, this Court has held that the description
"illegally in possession of undetermined
quantity/amount of dried marijuana leaves and
Methamphetamine Hydrochloride (Shabu) and sets
of paraphernalia" particularizes the things to be
seized.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; SEARCH WARRANT; REQUIRES THAT THE
JUDGE MUST PERSONALLY EXAMINE THE
COMPLAINANT AND HIS WITNESSES UNDER OATH OR
AFFIRMATION BEFORE THE ISSUANCE THEREOF.
Before a valid search warrant is issued, both the
Constitution and the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure require that the judge must personally
examine the complainant and his witnesses under
oath or affirmation. The personal examination must
not be merely routinary or pro forma, but must be
probing and exhaustive. . . . It is presumed that a
judicial function has been regularly performed,
absent a showing to the contrary. A magistrate's
determination of probable cause for the issuance
of a search warrant is paid great deference by a
reviewing court, as long as there was substantial
basis for that determination. Substantial basis
means that the questions of the examining judge
brought out such facts and circumstances as would
lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to
believe that an offense has been committed, and
the objects in connection with the offense sought
to be seized are in the place sought to be
searched. IAEcaH
4. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; MOTION
TO QUASH; GROUNDS AND OBJECTIONS NOT
RAISED THEREIN PRESUMED WAIVED. But it is
settled that when a motion to quash a warrant is
filed, all grounds and objections then available;
existent or known, should be raised in the original or
subsequent proceedings for the quashal of the
warrant, otherwise they are deemed waived.
5. ID.; ID.; RIGHT TO SPEEDY TRIAL; DEFINED AND
CONSTRUED. A speedy trial means a trial
conducted according to the law of criminal
procedure and the rules and regulations, free from
vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays. In
Conde v. Rivera and Unson, 45 Phil. 650, 652 (1924),
the Court held that "where a prosecuting officer,
without good cause, secures postponements of the
trial of a defendant against his protest beyond a
reasonable period of time, as in this instance, for
more than a year, the accused is entitled to relief
by a proceeding in mandamus to compel a
dismissal of the information, or if he be restrained of
his liberty, by habeas corpus to obtain his freedom."
The concept of speedy trial is necessarily relative. A
determination as to whether the right has been
violated involves the weighing of several factors
such as the length of the delay, the reason for the
delay, the conduct of the prosecution and the
accused, and the efforts exerted by the defendant
to assert his right, as well as the prejudice and
damage caused to the accused.
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; WHEN DEEMED VIOLATED. The
Speedy Trial Act of 1998, provides that the trial
period for criminal cases in general shall be one
hundred eighty (180) days. However, in determining
2|CONSTI2_Section14_Right to Speedy, Impartial and Public Trial
the right of an accused to speedy trial, courts
should do more than a mathematical computation
of the number of postponements of the scheduled
hearings of the case. The right to a speedy trial is
deemed violated only when: (1) the proceedings
are attended by vexatious, capricious, and
oppressive delays; or (2) when unjustified
postponements are asked for and secured; or (3)
when without cause or justifiable motive a long
period of time is allowed to elapse without the
party having his case tried.
7. ID.; ID.; REOPENING OF CASES; RESTS UPON THE
DISCRETION OF THE TRIAL COURT; RESTRICTIONS
THEREOF, NOT PRESENT IN CASE AT BAR. As a rule,
the matter of reopening of a case for reception of
further evidence after either prosecution or defense
has rested its case is within the discretion of the trial
court. However, a concession to a reopening must
not prejudice the accused or deny him the
opportunity to introduce counter evidence. Strictly
speaking, however, there was no reopening of the
cases in the proceedings below. A motion to
reopen may properly be presented only after either
or both parties have formally offered and closed
their evidence, but before judgment.
8. ID.; EVIDENCE; TESTIMONY OF WITNESS; CANNOT
BE DISREGARDED ENTIRELY EVEN WHEN ONLY PART
THEREOF WERE FOUND TRUE; APPLICATION IN CASE
AT BAR. It is the bounden duty of the courts to
test the prosecution evidence rigorously, so that no
innocent person is made to suffer the unusually
severe penalties meted out for drug offenses.
Though we scrutinized minutely the testimony of
Abratique, we find no cogent reason to disbelieve
him. From his account, Abratique might appear
aware of treading the thin line between innocence
and feeling guilty, with certain portions of his story
tending to be self-exculpatory. However, his whole
testimony could not be discredited. The established
rule is that testimony of a witness may be believed
in part and disbelieved in other parts, depending
on the corroborative evidence and the
probabilities and improbabilities of the case. But it is
accepted, as a matter of common sense, that if
certain parts of a witness' testimony are found true,
his testimony cannot be disregarded entirely.
9. CRIMINAL LAW; ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF
DANGEROUS DRUGS; ELEMENTS; CONSTRUED. In a
prosecution for illegal possession of dangerous
drugs, the following facts must be proven with
moral certainty: (1) that the accused is in possession
of the object identified as prohibited or regulated
drug; (2) that such possession is not authorized by
law; and (3) that the accused freely and
consciously possessed the said drug. . . . In People
v. de los Reyes, 239 SCRA 439 (1994), we held that
the Dangerous Drugs Act applies generally to all
persons and proscribes the sale of dangerous drugs
by any person, and no person is authorized to sell
such drugs. Said doctrine is equally applicable with
respect to possession of prohibited drugs. REPUBLIC
ACT NO. 6425, which penalizes the possession of
prohibited drugs, applies equally to all persons in
this jurisdiction and no person is authorized to
possess said articles, without authority of law. Anent
the third element, we have held that to warrant
conviction, possession of illegal drugs must be with
knowledge of the accused or that animus
possidendi existed together with the possession or
control of said articles. Nonetheless, this dictum
must be read in consonance with our ruling that
possession of a prohibited drug per se constitutes
prima facie evidence of knowledge or animus
possidendi sufficient to convict an accused absent
a satisfactory explanation of such possession. In
effect, the onus probandi is shifted to the accused
to explain the absence of knowledge or animus
possidendi in this situation.
10. ID.; ID.; PENALTY. The legislature never
intended that where the quantity involved exceeds
those stated in Section 20 of REPUBLIC ACT NO.
6425 the maximum penalty of death shall
automatically be imposed. The statute prescribes
two indivisible penalties: reclusion perpetua and
death. Hence, the penalty to be imposed must
conform with Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code.
As already held, the death penalty law, Republic
Act No. 7659 did not amend Article 63 of the
Revised Penal Code. The rules in Article 63 apply
although the prohibited drugs involved are in
excess of the quantities provided for in Section 20 of
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6425. Thus, finding neither
mitigating nor aggravating circumstances in the
present case, appellant's possession of 591.81
kilograms of marijuana in Criminal Case No. 15800-
R, does not merit capital punishment but only the
lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J p:
For automatic review is the consolidated judgment
1 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Baguio City,
Branch 6, dated September 17, 1999, in Criminal
Cases Nos. 15800-R and 15822-R, involving violations
of Section 8, Article II, of the Dangerous Drugs Law.
2 Since appellant was acquitted in the second
case, we focus on the first case, where appellant
has been found guilty and sentenced to death and
fined one million pesos.
The decretal portion of the trial court's decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, as
follows:
1. In Crim. Case No. 15800-R, the Court finds the
accused Modesto Tee guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the offense of illegal possession of
marijuana of about 591.81 kilos in violation of
Section 8, Article II of RA 6425 as amended by
Section 13 of RA 7659 as charged in the
Information, seized by virtue of a search warrant
and sentences him to the supreme penalty of
3|CONSTI2_Section14_Right to Speedy, Impartial and Public Trial
death and to pay a fine of 1 million pesos without
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
The 591.81 kilos of marijuana contained in 26 boxes
and one yellow sack (Exhibits U-1 to U-27) are
ordered forfeited in favor of the State to be
destroyed immediately in accordance with law.
2. In Crim. Case No. 15822-R, the Court finds that
the prosecution failed to prove the guilt of accused
Modesto Tee beyond reasonable doubt and
hereby acquits him of the charge of illegal
possession of marijuana in violation of Section 8, Art.
2 of RA 6425 as amended by Section 13 of RA 7659
as charged in the Information since the marijuana
confiscated have to be excluded in evidence as a
product of unreasonable search and seizure.
The 336.93 kilos of marijuana contained in 13 sacks
and four boxes (Exh. B to S and their component
parts) although excluded in evidence as the
product(s) of unreasonable search and seizure, are
nevertheless ordered forfeited in favor of the State
to be destroyed immediately in accordance with
law considering that they are prohibited articles.
The City Jail Warden is, therefore, directed to
release the accused Modesto Tee in connection
with Crim. Case No. 15822-R unless held on other
charges.
COST(S) DE OFICIO.
SO ORDERED. 3
Appellant is a Chinese national in his forties, a
businessman, and a resident of Baguio City. A raid
conducted by operatives of the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) and Philippine National Police
Narcotics Command (PNP NARCOM) at premises
allegedly leased by appellant and at his residence
yielded huge quantities of marijuana.
On July 20, 1998, appellant moved to quash the
search warrant on the ground that it was too
general and that the NBI had not complied with the
requirements for the issuance of a valid search
warrant. The pendency of said motion, however,
did not stop the filing of the appropriate charges
against appellant. In an information dated July 24,
1998, docketed as Criminal Case No. 15800-R, the
City Prosecutor of Baguio City charged Modesto
Tee, alias "Estoy Tee," with illegal possession of
marijuana, allegedly committed as follows:
That on or about the 1st day of July, 1998 in the City
of Baguio, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully, feloniously
and knowingly have in his possession the following,
to wit:
1. Ninety-two (92) bricks of dried flowering tops
separately contained in four (4) boxes; and
2. One hundred fifty-eight (158) bricks, twenty-one
(21) blocks, and twenty-three (23) bags of dried
flowering tops separately contained in thirteen (13)
sacks, with a total weight of 336.93 kilograms; and
3. Six hundred two (602) bricks of dried flowering
tops separately contained in twenty-six (boxes) and
a yellow sack, weighing 591.81 kilograms,
all having a grand total weight of 928.74 kilograms,
a prohibited drug, without the authority of law to
possess, in violation of the above-cited provision of
law.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 4
On August 7, 1998, the prosecution moved to
"amend" the foregoing charge sheet "considering
that subject marijuana were seized in two (2)
different places." 5
As a result, the information in Criminal Case No.
15800-R was amended to read as follows:
That on or about the 1st day of July, 1998, in the
City of Baguio, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully,
feloniously and knowingly have in his possession the
following, to wit:
- Six hundred two (602) bricks of dried flowering tops
separately contained in twenty-six (26) boxes and a
yellow sack, weighing 591.81 kilograms
a prohibited drug, without the authority of law to
possess, in violation of the above-cited provision of
law.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 6
A separate amended information docketed as
Criminal Case No. 15822-R was likewise filed, the
accusatory portion of which reads:
That on or about the 1st day of July, 1998 in the City
of Baguio, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully, feloniously
and knowingly have in his possession the following,
to wit:
1. Ninety-two (92) bricks of dried flowering tops
separately contained in four (4) boxes; and
2. hundred fifty-eight (158) bricks, twenty-one (21)
blocks, and twenty-three (23) bags of dried
flowering tops separately contained in thirteen (13)
sacks, with a total weight of 336.93 kilograms;
a prohibited drug, without the authority of law to
possess, in violation of the above-cited provision of
law.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 7
4|CONSTI2_Section14_Right to Speedy, Impartial and Public Trial
On September 4, 1998, the trial court denied the
motion to quash the search warrant and ordered
appellant's arraignment.
When arraigned in Criminal Cases Nos. 15800-R and
15822-R, appellant refused to enter a plea. The trial
court entered a plea of not guilty for him. 8 Trial on
the merits then ensued.
The facts of this case, as gleaned from the records,
are as follows:
Prosecution witness Danilo Abratique, a Baguio-
based taxi driver, and the appellant Modesto Tee
are well acquainted with each other, since
Abratique's wife is the sister of Tee's sister-in-law. 9
Sometime in late June 1998, appellant asked
Abratique to find him a place for the storage of
smuggled cigarettes. 10 Abratique brought
appellant to his friend, Albert Ballesteros, who had a
house for rent in Bakakeng, Baguio City. After
negotiating the terms and conditions, Ballesteros
agreed to rent out his place to appellant. Appellant
then brought several boxes of purported "blue seal"
cigarettes to the leased premises.
Shortly thereafter, however, Ballesteros learned that
the boxes stored in his place were not "blue seal"
cigarettes but marijuana. Fearful of being involved,
Ballesteros informed Abratique. Both later prevailed
upon appellant to remove them from the premises.
11
Appellant then hired Abratique's taxi and
transported the boxes of cannabis from the
Ballesteros place to appellant's residence at Km. 6,
Dontogan, Green Valley, Sto. Tomas, Baguio City.
12
On June 30, 1998, appellant hired Abratique to
drive him to La Trinidad, Benguet on the pretext of
buying and transporting strawberries. Upon
reaching La Trinidad, however, appellant directed
Abratique to proceed to Sablan, Benguet, where
appellant proceeded to load several sacks of
marijuana in Abratique's taxi. He then asked
Abratique to find him a place where he could store
the contraband. 13
Abratique brought appellant to his grandmother's
house at No. 27 Dr. Cario St., QM Subdivision,
Baguio City, which was being managed by
Abratique's aunt, Nazarea Abreau. Nazarea
agreed to rent a room to appellant. Abratique and
appellant unloaded and stored there the sacks of
marijuana brought from Sablan. 14 Abratique was
aware that they were transporting marijuana as
some of the articles in the sacks became exposed
in the process of loading. 15
Eventually, Abratique and Nazarea were bothered
by the nature of the goods stored in the rented
room. She confided to her daughter, Alice Abreau
Fianza, about their predicament. As Alice Fianza's
brother-in-law, Edwin Fianza, was an NBI agent,
Alice and Abratique phoned him and disclosed
what had transpired. 16
On the morning of July 1, 1998, alerted by
information that appellant would retrieve the sacks
of prohibited drugs that day, Edwin Fianza and
other NBI operatives conducted a stake out at No.
27, Dr. Cario St. While the NBI agents were
conducting their surveillance, they noticed that
several PNP NARCOM personnel were also
watching the place. 17 The NBI then learned that
the PNP NARCOM had received a tip from one of
their informers regarding the presence of a huge
amount of drugs in that place. The NBI and PNP
NARCOM agreed to have a joint operation.
As the day wore on and appellant did not show up,
the NBI agents became apprehensive that the
whole operation could be jeopardized. They sought
the permission of Nazarea Abreau to enter the
room rented by appellant. She acceded and
allowed them entry. The NBI team then searched
the rented premises and found four (4) boxes and
thirteen (13) sacks of marijuana, totaling 336.93
kilograms. 18
Later that evening, NBI Special Agent Darwin Lising,
with Abratique as his witness, applied for a search
warrant from RTC Judge Antonio Reyes at his
residence. 19 Judge Reyes ordered the NBI agents
to fetch the Branch Clerk of Court, Atty. Delilah
Muoz, so the proceedings could be properly
recorded. After Atty. Muoz arrived, Judge Reyes
questioned Lising and Abratique. Thereafter, the
judge issued a warrant directing the NBI to search
appellant's residence at Km. 6, Dontogan, Green
Valley, Baguio City, for marijuana. 20
The NBI operatives, with some PNP NARCOM
personnel in tow, proceeded to appellant's
residence where they served the warrant upon
appellant himself. 21 The search was witnessed by
appellant, members of his family, barangay
officials, and members of the media. 22
Photographs were taken during the actual search.
23 The law enforcers found 26 boxes and a sack of
dried marijuana 24 in the water tank, garage, and
storeroom of appellant's residence. 25 The total
weight of the haul was 591.81 kilograms. 26
Appellant was arrested for illegal possession of
marijuana.
The seized items were then submitted to the NBI
laboratory for testing. NBI Forensic Chemist Maria
Carina Madrigal conducted the tests. Detailed
microscopic and chromatographic examinations of
the items taken from appellant's rented room at No.
27, Dr. Cario St., as well as those from his residence
at Green Valley, showed these to be marijuana. 27
In his defense, appellant contended that the
physical evidence of the prosecution was illegally
obtained, being the products of an unlawful
search, hence inadmissible. Appellant insisted that
5|CONSTI2_Section14_Right to Speedy, Impartial and Public Trial
the search warrant was too general and the
process by which said warrant was acquired did
not satisfy the constitutional requirements for the
issuance of a valid search warrant. Moreover,
Abratique's testimony, which was heavily relied
upon by the judge who issued the warrant, was
hearsay.
In Criminal Case No. 15822-R, the trial court agreed
with appellant that the taking of the 336.93
kilograms of marijuana was the result of an illegal
search and hence, inadmissible in evidence
against appellant. Appellant was accordingly
acquitted of the charge. However, the trial court
found that the prosecution's evidence was more
than ample to prove appellant's guilt in Criminal
Case No. 15800-R and as earlier stated, duly
convicted him of illegal possession of marijuana
and sentenced him to death.
Hence, this automatic review.
Before us, appellant submits that the trial court
erred in:
1. . . . UPHOLDING THE LEGALITY OF THE SEARCH
WARRANT DESPITE LACK OF COMPLIANCE OF (sic)
SEVERAL REQUIREMENTS BEFORE IT SHOULD HAVE
BEEN ISSUED AND IT BEING A GENERAL WARRANT;
2. . . . GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN
REOPENING THE CASE AND ALLOWING ABRATIQUE
TO TESTIFY AGAINST APPELLANT;
3. . . . GIVING CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONY OF
ABRATIQUE;
4. . . .NOT ACQUITTING THE ACCUSED IN BOTH
CASES AND SENTENCING HIM TO DEATH DESPITE THE
ILLEGALLY OBTAINED EVIDENCE AS FOUND IN THE
FIRST CASE. 28
We find that the pertinent issues for resolution
concern the following: (1) the validity of the search
conducted at the appellant's residence; (2) the
alleged prejudice caused by the reopening of the
case and absences of the prosecution witness, on
appellant's right to speedy trial; (3) the sufficiency
of the prosecution's evidence to sustain a finding of
guilt with moral certainty; and (4) the propriety of
the penalty imposed.
1. On the Validity of the Search Warrant; Its
Obtention and Execution
Appellant initially contends that the warrant, which
directed the peace officers to search for and seize
"an undetermined amount of marijuana," was too
general and hence, void for vagueness. He insists
that Abratique could already estimate the amount
of marijuana supposed to be found at appellant's
residence since Abratique helped to transport the
same.
For the appellee, the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG) counters that a search warrant is issued if a
judge finds probable cause that the place to be
searched contains prohibited drugs, and not that
he believes the place contains a specific amount
of it. The OSG points out that, as the trial court
observed, it is impossible beforehand to determine
the exact amount of prohibited drugs that a person
has on himself.
Appellant avers that the phrase "an undetermined
amount of marijuana" as used in the search warrant
fails to satisfy the requirement of Article III, Section 2
29 of the Constitution that the things to be seized
must be particularly described. Appellant's
contention, in our view, has no leg to stand on. The
constitutional requirement of reasonable
particularity of description of the things to be seized
is primarily meant to enable the law enforcers
serving the warrant to: (1) readily identify the
properties to be seized and thus prevent them from
seizing the wrong items; 30 and (2) leave said
peace officers with no discretion regarding the
articles to be seized and thus prevent unreasonable
searches and seizures. 31 What the Constitution
seeks to avoid are search warrants of broad or
general characterization or sweeping descriptions,
which will authorize police officers to undertake a
fishing expedition to seize and confiscate any and
all kinds of evidence or articles relating to an
offense. 32 However, it is not required that technical
precision of description be required, 33 particularly,
where by the nature of the goods to be seized, their
description must be rather general, since the
requirement of a technical description would mean
that no warrant could issue. 34
Thus, it has been held that term "narcotics
paraphernalia" is not so wanting in particularity as
to create a general warrant. 35 Nor is the
description "any and all narcotics" and "all
implements, paraphernalia, articles, papers and
records pertaining to" the use, possession, or sale of
narcotics or dangerous drugs so broad as to be
unconstitutional. 36 A search warrant commanding
peace officers to seize "a quantity of loose heroin"
has been held sufficiently particular. 37
Tested against the foregoing precedents, the
description "an undetermined amount of
marijuana" must be held to satisfy the requirement
for particularity in a search warrant. Noteworthy,
what is to be seized in the instant case is property of
a specified character, i.e., marijuana, an illicit drug.
By reason of its character and the circumstances
under which it would be found, said article is illegal.
A further description would be unnecessary and
ordinarily impossible, except as to such character,
the place, and the circumstances. 38 Thus, this
Court has held that the description "illegally in
possession of undetermined quantity/amount of
dried marijuana leaves and Methamphetamine
Hydrochloride (Shabu) and sets of paraphernalia"
particularizes the things to be seized. 39
The search warrant in the present case, given its
nearly similar wording, "undetermined amount of
marijuana or Indian hemp," in our view, has satisfied
the Constitution's requirements on particularity of
6|CONSTI2_Section14_Right to Speedy, Impartial and Public Trial
description. The description therein is: (1) as specific
as the circumstances will ordinarily allow; (2)
expresses a conclusion of fact not of law by
which the peace officers may be guided in making
the search and seizure; and (3) limits the things to
be seized to those which bear direct relation to the
offense for which the warrant is being issued. 40
Said warrant imposes a meaningful restriction upon
the objects to be seized by the officers serving the
warrant. Thus, it prevents exploratory searches,
which might be violative of the Bill of Rights.
Appellant next assails the warrant for merely stating
that he should be searched, as he could be guilty
of violation of REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6425. Appellant
claims that this is a sweeping statement as said
statute lists a number of offenses with respect to
illegal drugs. Hence, he contends, said warrant is a
general warrant and is thus unconstitutional.
For the appellee, the OSG points out that the
warrant clearly states that appellant has in his
possession and control marijuana or Indian hemp, in
violation of Section 8 of REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6425.
We have carefully scrutinized Search Warrant No.
415 (7-98), 41 and we find that it is captioned "For
Violation of R.A. 6425, as amended." 42 It is clearly
stated in the body of the warrant that "there is
probable cause to believe that a case for violation
of R.A. 6425, as amended, otherwise known as the
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as further amended
by R.A. 7659 has been and is being committed by
one MODESTO TEE a.k.a. ESTOY TEE of Km. 6,
Dontogan Bgy., Green Valley, Sto. Tomas, Baguio
City by having in his possession and control an
UNDETERMINED AMOUNT OF MARIJUANA or INDIAN
HEMP in violation of the aforementioned law." 43 In
an earlier case, we held that though the specific
section of the Dangerous Drugs Law is not
pinpointed, "there is no question at all of the
specific offense alleged to have been committed
as a basis for the finding of probable cause." 44
Appellant's averment is, therefore, baseless. Search
Warrant No. 415 (7-98) appears clearly issued for
one offense, namely, illegal possession of
marijuana.
Appellant next faults the Judge who issued Search
Warrant No. 415 (7-98) for his failure to exhaustively
examine the applicant and his witness. Appellant
points out that said magistrate should not have
swallowed all of Abratique's statements hook,
line, and sinker. He points out that since Abratique
consented to assist in the transport of the
marijuana, the examining judge should have
elicited from Abratique his participation in the crime
and his motive for squealing on appellant.
Appellant further points out that the evidence of
the NBI operative who applied for the warrant is
merely hearsay and should not have been given
credit at all by Judge Reyes.
Again, the lack of factual basis for appellant's
contention is apparent. The OSG points out that
Abratique personally assisted appellant in loading
and transporting the marijuana to the latter's house
and to appellant's rented room at No. 27 Dr. Cario
St., Baguio City. Definitely, this indicates personal
knowledge on Abratique's part. Law enforcers
cannot themselves be eyewitnesses to every crime;
they are allowed to present witnesses before an
examining judge. In this case, witness Abratique
personally saw and handled the marijuana. Hence,
the NBI did not rely on hearsay information in
applying for a search warrant but on personal
knowledge of the witness, Abratique.
Before a valid search warrant is issued, both the
Constitution 45 and the 2000 Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure 46 require that the judge must
personally examine the complainant and his
witnesses under oath or affirmation. The personal
examination must not be merely routinary or pro
forma, but must be probing and exhaustive. 47 In
the instant case, it is not disputed that Judge
Antonio Reyes personally examined NBI Special
Investigator III Darwin A. Lising, the applicant for the
search warrant as well as his witness, Danilo G.
Abratique. Notes of the proceedings were taken by
Atty. Delilah Muoz, Clerk of Court, RTC of Baguio
City, Branch 61, whom Judge Reyes had ordered to
be summoned. In the letter of transmittal of the
Clerk of Court of the RTC of Baguio City, Branch 61
to Branch 6 of said court, mention is made of
"notes" at "pages 711." 48 We have thoroughly
perused the records of Search Warrant No. 415 (7-
98) and nowhere find said "notes." The depositions
of Lising and Abratique were not attached to
Search Warrant No. 415 (7-98) as required by the
Rules of Court. We must stress, however, that the
purpose of the Rules in requiring depositions to be
taken is to satisfy the examining magistrate as to
the existence of probable cause. 49 The Bill of
Rights does not make it an imperative necessity that
depositions be attached to the records of an
application for a search warrant. Hence, said
omission is not necessarily fatal, for as long as there
is evidence on the record showing what testimony
was presented. 50 In the testimony of witness
Abratique, Judge Reyes required Abratique to
confirm the contents of his affidavit; 51 there were
instances when Judge Reyes questioned him
extensively. 52 It is presumed that a judicial function
has been regularly performed, 53 absent a showing
to the contrary. A magistrate's determination of
probable cause for the issuance of a search
warrant is paid great deference by a reviewing
court, 54 as long as there was substantial basis for
that determination. 55 Substantial basis means that
the questions of the examining judge brought out
such facts and circumstances as would lead a
reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe
that an offense has been committed, and the
objects in connection with the offense sought to be
seized are in the place sought to be searched.
On record, appellant never raised the want of
adequate depositions to support Warrant No. 415
7|CONSTI2_Section14_Right to Speedy, Impartial and Public Trial
(7-98) in his motion to quash before the trial court.
Instead, his motion contained vague generalities
that Judge Reyes failed to ask searching questions
of the applicant and his witness. Belatedly,
however, he now claims that Judge Reyes
perfunctorily examined said witness. 56 But it is
settled that when a motion to quash a warrant is
filed, all grounds and objections then available,
existent or known, should be raised in the original or
subsequent proceedings for the quashal of the
warrant, otherwise they are deemed waived. 57
In this case, NBI Special Investigator Lising's
knowledge of the illicit drugs stored in appellant's
house was indeed hearsay. But he had a witness,
Danilo Abratique, who had personal knowledge
about said drugs and their particular location.
Abratique's statements to the NBI and to Judge
Reyes contained credible and reliable details. As
the NBI's witness, Abratique was a person on whose
statements Judge Reyes could rely. His detailed
description of appellant's activities with respect to
the seized drugs was substantial. In relying on
witness Abratique, Judge Reyes was not depending
on casual rumor circulating in the underworld, but
on personal knowledge Abratique possessed.
In Alvarez vs. Court of First Instance of Tayabas, 64
Phil. 33, 44 (1937), we held that:
The true test of sufficiency of a deposition or
affidavit to warrant issuance of a search warrant is
whether it has been drawn in such a manner that
perjury could be charged thereon and affiant be
held liable for damages caused. 58
Appellant argues that the address indicated in the
search warrant did not clearly indicate the place to
be searched. The OSG points out that the address
stated in the warrant is as specific as can be. The
NBI even submitted a detailed sketch of the
premises prepared by Abratique, thus ensuring that
there would be no mistake.
A description of the place to be searched is
sufficient if the officer serving the warrant can, with
reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the place
intended 59 and distinguish it from other places in
the community. 60 A designation or description that
points out the place to be searched to the
exclusion of all others, and on inquiry unerringly
leads the peace officers to it, satisfies the
constitutional requirement of definiteness.
Appellant finally harps on the use of unnecessary
force during the execution of the search warrant.
Appellant fails, however, to point to any evidentiary
matter in the record to support his contention.
Defense witness Cipriana Tee, appellant's mother,
testified on the search conducted but she said
nothing that indicated the use of force on the part
of the NBI operatives who conducted the search
and seizure. 61 What the record discloses is that the
warrant was served on appellant, 62 who was given
time to read it, 63 and the search was witnessed by
the barangay officials, police operatives, members
of the media, and appellant's kith and kin. 64 No
breakage or other damage to the place searched
is shown. No injuries sustained by appellant, or any
witness, appears on record. The execution of the
warrant, in our view, has been orderly and
peaceably performed. EHIcaT
2. On The Alleged Violation of Appellant's
Substantive Rights
Appellant insists that the prosecution's unjustified
and willful delay in presenting witness Abratique
unduly delayed the resolution of his case. He points
out that a total of eight (8) scheduled hearings had
to be reset due to the failure or willful refusal of
Abratique to testify against him. Appellant insists
that said lapse on the prosecution's part violated
Supreme Court Circular No. 38-98. 65 Appellant
now alleges that the prosecution deliberately
resorted to delaying the case to cause him untold
miseries.
For the appellee, the OSG points out that the two-
month delay in the trial is not such a great length of
time as to amount to a violation of appellant's right
to a speedy trial. A trial is always subject to
reasonable delays or postponements, but absent
any showing that these delays are capricious and
oppressive, the State should not be deprived of a
reasonable opportunity to prosecute the criminal
action.
On record, the trial court found that prosecution
witness Danilo G. Abratique failed to appear in no
less than eighteen (18) hearings, namely those set
for February 1, 2, 3, 4, 8, 9, 10, and 24; March 9, 15,
22, and 23; April 6, 7, 8, 16, and 19, all in 1999. 66 No
less than four (4) warrants of arrest were issued
against him to compel him to testify. 67 The NBI
agent who supposedly had him in custody was
found guilty of contempt of court for failing to
produce Abratique at said hearings and
sanctioned. 68 The prosecution had to write the NBI
Regional Director in Baguio City and NBI Director in
Manila regarding the failure of the Bureau's agents
to bring Abratique to court. 69 Nothing on record
discloses the reason for Abratique's aforecited
absences. On the scheduled hearing of June 7,
1999, he was again absent thus causing the trial
court to again order his arrest for the fifth time. 70
He also failed to show up at the hearing of June 8,
1999. 71
Appellant now stresses that the failure of Abratique
to appear and testify on twenty (20) hearing dates
violated appellant's constitutional 72 and statutory
right to a speedy trial.
A speedy trial means a trial conducted according
to the law of criminal procedure and the rules and
regulations, free from vexatious, capricious, and
oppressive delays. 73 In Conde v. Rivera and Unson,
45 Phil. 650, 652 (1924), the Court held that "where a
prosecuting officer, without good cause, secures
postponements of the trial of a defendant against
his protest beyond a reasonable period of time, as
in this instance, for more than a year, the accused is
8|CONSTI2_Section14_Right to Speedy, Impartial and Public Trial
entitled to relief by a proceeding in mandamus to
compel a dismissal of the information, or if he be
restrained of his liberty, by habeas corpus to obtain
his freedom."
The concept of speedy trial is necessarily relative. A
determination as to whether the right has been
violated involves the weighing of several factors
such as the length of the delay, the reason for the
delay, the conduct of the prosecution and the
accused, and the efforts exerted by the defendant
to assert his right, as well as the prejudice and
damage caused to the accused. 74
The Speedy Trial Act of 1998, provides that the trial
period for criminal cases in general shall be one
hundred eighty (180) days. 75 However, in
determining the right of an accused to speedy trial,
courts should do more than a mathematical
computation of the number of postponements of
the scheduled hearings of the case. 76 The right to
a speedy trial is deemed violated only when: (1) the
proceedings are attended by vexatious, capricious,
and oppressive delays; 77 or (2) when unjustified
postponements are asked for and secured; 78 or (3)
when without cause or justifiable motive a long
period of time is allowed to elapse without the
party having his case tried. 79
In the present case, although the absences of
prosecution witness Abratique totaled twenty (20)
hearing days, there is no showing whatsoever that
prosecution capriciously caused Abratique's
absences so as to vex or oppress appellant and
deny him his rights. On record, after Abratique
repeatedly failed to show up for the taking of his
testimony, the prosecution went to the extent of
praying that the trial court order the arrest of
Abratique to compel his attendance at trial. The
prosecution likewise tried to get the NBI to produce
Abratique as the latter was in the Bureau's custody,
but to no avail. Eventually, the trial court ordered
the prosecution to waive its right to present
Abratique and rest its case on the evidence
already offered. 80
Nor do we find a delay of twenty (20) hearing days
to be an unreasonable length of time. Delay of less
than two months has been found, in fact, to be not
an unreasonably lengthy period of time. 81
Moreover, nothing on record shows that appellant
Modesto Tee objected to the inability of the
prosecution to produce its witness. Under the Rules,
appellant could have moved the trial court to
require that witness Abratique post bail to ensure
that the latter would testify when required. 82
Appellant could have moved to have Abratique
found in contempt and duly sanctioned. Appellant
did neither. It is a bit too late in the day for
appellant to invoke now his right to speedy trial.
No persuasive reason supports appellant's claim
that his constitutional right to speedy trial was
violated. One must take into account that a trial is
always subject to postponements and other causes
of delay. But in the absence of a showing that
delays were unreasonable and capricious, the
State should not be deprived of a reasonable
opportunity of prosecuting an accused. 83
Appellant next contends that the trial court gravely
abused its discretion, and exhibited partiality, when
it allowed the reopening of the case after the
prosecution had failed to present Abratique on
several occasions and had been directed to rest its
case. Appellant stresses that the lower court's order
to reopen the case to receive Abratique's further
testimony is an indication that the trial court
favored the prosecution and unduly prejudiced
appellant.
On appellee's behalf, the Solicitor General points
out that the trial court's order was in the interest of
substantial justice and hence, cannot be termed as
an abuse of discretion. The OSG points out that the
prosecution had not formally rested its case and
had yet to present its formal offer of evidence,
hence, the submission of additional testimony by
the same witness cannot be prejudicial to the
accused, it being but the mere continuation of an
uncompleted testimony. Furthermore, appellant did
not properly oppose the prosecution's motion to
reopen the case.
At the time Criminal Cases Nos. 15800-R and 15822-
R were being tried, the 1985 Rules of Criminal
Procedure were in effect. There was no specific
provision at that time governing motions to reopen.
84 Nonetheless, long and established usage has led
to the recognition and acceptance of a motion to
reopen. In view of the absence of a specific
procedural rule, the only controlling guideline
governing a motion to reopen was the paramount
interests of justice. As a rule, the matter of
reopening of a case for reception of further
evidence after either prosecution or defense has
rested its case is within the discretion of the trial
court. 85 However, a concession to a reopening
must not prejudice the accused or deny him the
opportunity to introduce counter evidence. 86
Strictly speaking, however, there was no reopening
of the cases in the proceedings below. A motion to
reopen may properly be presented only after either
or both parties have formally offered and closed
their evidence, but before judgment. 87 In the
instant case, the records show that on April 19,
1999, the prosecution was directed to close its
evidence and given 15 days to make its formal
offer of evidence. 88 This order apparently arose
from the manifestation of the prosecution on April
16, 1999 that should they fail to produce witness
Abratique on the next scheduled hearing the
prosecution would rest its case. 89 On April 19, 1999,
which was the next scheduled hearing after April
16, 1999, Abratique was absent notwithstanding
notices, orders, and warrants of arrest. However, on
April 27, 1999, or before the prosecution had
formally offered its evidence, Abratique was
9|CONSTI2_Section14_Right to Speedy, Impartial and Public Trial
brought to the trial court by the NBI. In its order of
said date, the trial court pointed out that the
prosecution could move to "reopen" the case for
the taking of Abratique's testimony. 90 On May 7,
1999, the prosecution so moved, stressing that it
had not yet formally offered its evidence and that
the substantial rights of the accused would not be
prejudiced inasmuch as the latter had yet to
present his evidence. Appellant filed no opposition
to the motion. The trial court granted the motion six
days later. Plainly, there was nothing to reopen, as
the prosecution had not formally rested its case.
Moreover, the taking of Abratique's testimony was
not for the purpose of presenting additional
evidence, but more properly for the completion of
his unfinished testimony. In U.S. vs. Base, 91 we held
that a trial court is not in error, if it opts to reopen
the proceedings of a case, even after both sides
had rested and the case submitted for decision, by
the calling of additional witnesses or recalling of
witnesses so as to satisfy the judge's mind with
reference to particular facts involved in the case. A
judge cannot be faulted should he require a
material witness to complete his testimony, which is
what happened in this case. It is but proper that the
judge's mind be satisfied on any and all questions
presented during the trial, in order to serve the
cause of justice.
Appellant's claim that the trial court's concession to
"reopen" the case unduly prejudiced him is not well
taken. We note that appellant had every
opportunity to present his evidence to support his
case or to refute the prosecution's evidence point-
by-point, after the prosecution had rested its case.
In short, appellant was never deprived of his day in
court. A day in court is the touchstone of the right
to due process in criminal justice. 92 Thus, we are
unable to hold that a grave abuse of discretion was
committed by the trial court when it ordered the so-
called "reopening" in order to complete the
testimony of a prosecution witness.
3. On the Sufficiency of the Prosecution's Evidence
In bidding for acquittal, appellant assails the
credibility of Abratique as a witness. Appellant insists
that Abratique's testimony is profuse with lies,
contrary to human nature, hence incredible.
According to appellant, Abratique was evasive
from the outset with respect to certain questions of
the trial court. He adds that it appeared the court
entertained in particular the suspicion that witness
Abratique had conspired with appellant in
committing the crime charged. Appellant questions
Abratique's motive in informing the NBI about his
activities related to the marijuana taking, transfer,
and warehousing.
The OSG contends that Abratique's testimony,
taken as a whole, is credible. It points out that
Abratique testified in a straightforward manner as
to his knowledge of the huge cache of prohibited
drugs stashed by appellant in two different places.
His testimony, said the OSG, when fused with the
physical evidence consisting of 591.81 kilograms of
marijuana found by law enforcers at appellant's
residence, inexorably leads to the inculpation of
appellant.
It is the bounden duty of the courts to test the
prosecution evidence rigorously, so that no
innocent person is made to suffer the unusually
severe penalties meted out for drug offenses. 93
Though we scrutinized minutely the testimony of
Abratique, we find no cogent reason to disbelieve
him. From his account, Abratique might appear
aware treading the thin line between innocence
and feeling guilty, with certain portions of his story
tending to be self-exculpatory. However, his whole
testimony could not be discredited. The established
rule is that testimony of a witness may be believed
in part and disbelieved in other parts, depending
on the corroborative evidence and the
probabilities and improbabilities of the case. But it is
accepted, as a matter of common sense, that if
certain parts of a witness' testimony are found true,
his testimony cannot be disregarded entirely. 94
Abratique testified in open court that appellant
rented the taxicab he was driving, and he helped
appellant transport huge amounts of marijuana to
appellant's rented room at No. 27 Dr. Cario St.,
Baguio City and to appellant's residence at Km. 6,
Dontogan, Green Valley, Sto. Tomas, Baguio City.
He also declared on the witness stand that out of
fear of being involved, he decided to divulge his
knowledge of appellant's possession of large
caches of marijuana to the NBI. When the places
referred to by Abratique were searched by the
authorities, marijuana in staggering quantities was
found and seized by the law enforcers. Stated
plainly, the physical evidence in this case
corroborated Abratique's testimony on material
points.
Appellant imputes questionable motives to
Abratique in an effort to discredit him. He demands
that Abratique should likewise be prosecuted.
However, by no means is the possible guilt of
Abratique a tenable defense for appellant. Nor
would Abratique's prosecution mean appellant's
absolution.
In a prosecution for illegal possession of dangerous
drugs, the following facts must be proven with
moral certainty: (1) that the accused is in possession
of the object identified as prohibited or regulated
drug; (2) that such possession is not authorized by
law; and (3) that the accused freely and
consciously possessed the said drug. 95
We find the foregoing elements proven in Criminal
Case No. 15800-R beyond reasonable doubt.
In said case, the testimony of Abratique and the
recovery of 591.81 kilograms of marijuana from
appellant's residence served to prove appellant's
possession of a prohibited drug. Tests conducted by
the NBI forensic chemist proved the seized articles
to be marijuana. These articles were seized
10 | C O N S T I 2 _ S e c t i o n 1 4 _ R i g h t t o S p e e d y , I m p a r t i a l a n d P u b l i c T r i a l
pursuant to a valid search warrant and hence, fully
admissible in evidence.
In People v. de los Reyes, 239 SCRA 439 (1994), we
held that the Dangerous Drugs Act applies
generally to all persons and proscribes the sale of
dangerous drugs by any person, and no person is
authorized to sell such drugs. Said doctrine is
equally applicable with respect to possession of
prohibited drugs. REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6425, which
penalizes the possession of prohibited drugs, applies
equally to all persons in this jurisdiction and no
person is authorized to possess said articles, without
authority of law.
Anent the third element, we have held that to
warrant conviction, possession of illegal drugs must
be with knowledge of the accused or that animus
possidendi existed together with the possession or
control of said articles. 96 Nonetheless, this dictum
must be read in consonance with our ruling that
possession of a prohibited drug per se constitutes
prima facie evidence of knowledge or animus
possidendi sufficient to convict an accused absent
a satisfactory explanation of such possession. 97 In
effect, the onus probandi is shifted to accused to
explain the absence of knowledge or animus
possidendi 98 in this situation.
Appellant Modesto Tee opted not to testify in his
defense. Instead, he presented his mother as his
lone witness, who testified on matters totally
irrelevant to his case. We can only conclude that,
failing to discharge the burden of the evidence on
the possession of prohibited drug, appellant's guilt
in Criminal Case No. 15800-R was established
beyond reasonable doubt.
4. On The Proper Penalty
Under REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6425 as amended by
Republic Act No. 7659, the penalty of reclusion
perpetua to death and a fine ranging from five
hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) to ten million
pesos (P10,000,000.00) 99 shall be imposed if the
quantity of marijuana involved in a conviction for
possession of marijuana or Indian hemp shall be 750
grams or more. 100
In the present case, the quantity of marijuana
involved has been shown by the prosecution to be
far in excess of 750 grams, as stressed by the trial
court:
The volume is rather staggering. It is almost one
whole house or one whole room. In fact, when they
were first brought to the court, it took hours to load
them on the truck and hours also to unload them
prompting the court to direct that the boxes and
sack of marijuana be instead kept at the NBI office
in Baguio. And the identification of said marijuana
during the trial was made in the NBI premises itself
by the witnesses since it was physically
cumbersome and inconvenient to keep bringing
them to the court during every trial. 101
In sentencing appellant to death, the trial court
noted not only the huge quantity of marijuana
bales involved, but also "the acts of accused of
hiding them in different places . . . and transferring
them from place to place and making them
appear as boxes of cigarettes to avoid and evade
apprehension and detection." They showed his
being a big supplier, said the trial court, [whose]
criminal perversity and craft that "deserve the
supreme penalty of death." 102
We are unable to agree, however, with the penalty
imposed by the trial court. The legislature never
intended that where the quantity involved exceeds
those stated in Section 20 of REPUBLIC ACT NO.
6425 the maximum penalty of death shall
automatically be imposed. 103 The statute
prescribes two indivisible penalties: reclusion
perpetua and death. Hence, the penalty to be
imposed must conform with Article 63 104 of the
Revised Penal Code. As already held, the death
penalty law, Republic Act No. 7659 did not amend
Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code. 105 The rules
in Article 63 apply although the prohibited drugs
involved are in excess of the quantities provided for
in Section 20 of REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6425. 106 Thus,
finding neither mitigating nor aggravating
circumstances in the present case, appellant's
possession of 591.81 kilograms of marijuana in
Criminal Case No. 15800-R, does not merit capital
punishment but only the lesser penalty of reclusion
perpetua.
The trial court imposed a fine on appellant in the
sum of One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00), without
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. The
imposition of a fine is mandatory in cases of
conviction of possession of illegal drugs. This being
within the limits allowed by the law, the amount of
the fine must be sustained. All these sanctions might
not remedy all the havoc wrought by prohibited
drugs on the moral fiber of our society, especially
the youth. 107 But these penalties should warn
peddlers of prohibited drugs that they cannot ply
their trade in our streets with impunity.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court
of Baguio City, Branch 6, in Criminal Case No.
15800-R, convicting appellant MODESTO TEE alias
"ESTOY" TEE of violation of Section 8 of REPUBLIC ACT
NO. 6425, as amended, is AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATION that appellant is hereby sentenced
to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The fine
of ONE MILLION (P1,000,000.00) PESOS imposed on
him is sustained. Appellant is likewise directed to
pay the costs of suit. IEHTaA
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug, Mendoza,
Panganiban, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez,
Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales,
Callejo, Sr. and Azcuna, JJ ., concur.
11 | C O N S T I 2 _ S e c t i o n 1 4 _ R i g h t t o S p e e d y , I m p a r t i a l a n d P u b l i c T r i a l
(Flores v. People, G.R. No. L-25769, December 10,
1974)
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. L-25769. December 10, 1974.]
FRANCISCO FLORES and FRANCISCO ANGEL,
petitioners, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
respondent.
Arturo Zialcita for petitioner Francisco Flores.
Zosimo Rivas for petitioner Francisco Angel.
Solicitor General Antonio P. Barredo and Solicitor
Vicente A. Torres for respondent.
DECISION
FERNANDO, J p:
A plea based on the constitutional right to a
speedy trial 1 led this Court to act affirmatively on a
certiorari proceeding for the dismissal of a case
then pending in the Court of Appeals. Considering
the length of time that had elapsed, it is readily
discernible why an inquiry into the matter is well-
nigh unavoidable. The accusation for robbery
against petitioners Francisco Flores and Francisco
Angel was filed as far back as December 31, 1951.
The decision rendered on November 29, 1955 found
them guilty of the crime charged. The notice of
appeal was filed on December 8, 1955. 2 For a
period of three years, until February 10, 1958, no
action was taken by the Court of Appeals. On that
day, there was a resolution remanding the records
of the case to the lower court for a rehearing of the
testimony of a certain witness deemed material for
the disposition of the case. 3 Such a resolution was
amended by a second resolution dated August 5,
1959, which granted the motion for counsel of
appellants, now petitioners, to set aside the
decision so that evidence for the defense on
certain new facts or matters may be received and
that a new decision in lieu of the old one may be
rendered in accordance with the facts as found. 4
Accordingly, the case was returned to the lower
court with the former decision set aside so that the
trial could be had, but nothing was done for about
a year because the offended party failed to
appear notwithstanding the six or seven dates set
for such hearing. 5 It was further alleged that when
thereafter he did take the witness stand, his
testimony was far from satisfactory, characterized
as a mere "fiasco" as he could no longer remember
the details of the alleged crime, there was even a
failure to identify the two accused. 6 Instead of
rendering a new decision, the former one having
been set aside as required by the Court of Appeals,
the lower court merely sent back the records to the
appellate tribunal. 7 At that stage, five more years
having elapsed without anything being done,
petitioners sought the dismissal of the cases against
them due to such inordinate delay in their
disposition, which covered the period of December
8, 1955 to May 10, 1965, a period of almost a
decade; thus did they invoke their constitutional
right to a speedy trial. 8 Respondent Court of
Appeals was unresponsive, notwithstanding the
vigorous plea on the part of counsel for petitioners,
its last order being a denial of a second motion for
reconsideration dated January 28, 1966. In the
answer on behalf of the People of the Philippines,
the facts as above set forth were substantially
admitted. However, a special and affirmative
defense raised was that the case was not properly
captioned, as the People of the Philippines, against
whom it is filed, is not a tribunal or an office
exercising Judicial functions and that without the
Court of Appeals being made a party to the
petition, it cannot be said that it stated facts
sufficient to constitute a cause of action. Moreover,
on the merits, the view was expressed that under
the circumstances, it was not adequately shown
that the right to a speedy trial had been violated,
as the Court of Appeals had taken all the steps
necessary to complete the transcript of
stenographic notes of the original trial.
On the above undisputed facts, there is more than
sufficient warrant for the conclusion that the right to
a speedy trial, so zealously guarded in both the
1935 and the present Constitutions, had not been
accorded due respect. There is thus merit in the
petition.
1. The constitutional right to a speedy trial, as was
noted in a recent decision, Acebedo v. Sarmiento,
9 "means one free from vexatious, capricious and
oppressive delays, . . ." 10 Thus, if the person
accused were innocent, he may within the shortest
time possible be spared from anxiety and
apprehension arising from a prosecution, and if
culpable, he will not be kept long in suspense as to
the fate in store for him, within a period of course
compatible with his opportunity to present any valid
defense. As was also pointed out in Sarmiento: "The
remedy in the event of a non-observance of this
right is by habeas corpus if the accused were
restrained of his liberty, or by certiorari, prohibition,
or mandamus for the final dismissal of the case." 11
The above ruling is a reiteration of the doctrine
announced, even before the 1935 Constitution, in
Conde v. Rivera, 12 a 1924 decision. In that case,
Justice Malcolm announced categorically that the
trial, to comply with the requirement of the then
organic law, the Philippine Autonomy Act, must be
"free from vexatious, capricious, and oppressive
delays." 13 Further: "We lay down the legal
proposition that, where a prosecuting officer,
without good cause, secures postponements of the
trial of a defendant against his protest beyond a
reasonable period of time, as in this instance for
more than a year, the accused is entitled to relief
by a proceeding in mandamus to compel a
dismissal of the information, or if he be restrained of
his liberty, by habeas corpus to obtain his freedom."
14
In the first Supreme Court decision after the 1935
Constitution took effect, People v. Castaeda, 15
12 | C O N S T I 2 _ S e c t i o n 1 4 _ R i g h t t o S p e e d y , I m p a r t i a l a n d P u b l i c T r i a l
where it was shown that the criminal case had
been dragging on for almost five years and that
when the trial did finally take place, it was tainted
by irregularities, this Court set aside the appealed
decision of conviction and acquitted the accused.
As was pointed out by the ponente, Justice Laurel:
"The Government should be the last to set an
example of delay and oppression in the
administration of justice and it is the moral and legal
obligation of this court to see that the criminal
proceedings against the accused come to an end
and that they be immediately discharged from the
custody of the law." 16 It was on the basis of the
above judgment that the dismissal of a second
information for frustrated homicide was ordered by
this Court, where the evidence disclosed that the
first information had been dismissed after a lapse of
one year and seven months from the time the
original complaint was filed during which time on
the three occasions the case was set for trial, the
private prosecutor twice asked for postponements
and once the trial court itself cancelled the entire
calendar for the month it was supposed to have
been heard. 17 The same result followed in Esguerra
v. De la Costa, 18 where the first complaint was
filed on August 29, 1936, the accused having been
criminally prosecuted for an alleged abuse of
chastity in a justice of the peace court but after
over a year and three months, with the lower court
twice dismissing the case, he still had to face trial for
the same offense on a new information, thus
compelling him to resort to a mandamus suit to
compel the lower court to terminate the case was
his right to a speedy trial was violated, a remedy
deemed appropriate by this Court.
There was another occasion where Justice Laurel
spoke for this Court on this specific issue. That was in
Mercado v. Santos. 19 Here, for a period of about
twenty months, the accused was arrested four
times on the charge of falsifying his deceased wife's
will. Twice, the complaints were subsequently
withdrawn. The third time he was prosecuted on the
same charge, he was able to obtain a dismissal.
Then came on the part of the provincial fiscal, a
motion for reinvestigation. The lower court was in a
receptive mood. It ordered that the case be heard
on the merits. The accused moved to dismiss, but
he did not succeed. He tried the Court of Appeals,
but he failed again. He elevated the matter to this
Court; he prevailed. It was stressed in Justice
Laurel's opinion: "An accused person is entitled to a
trial at the earliest opportunity. . . . He cannot be
oppressed by delaying the commencement of trial
for an unreasonable length of time. If the
proceedings pending trial are deferred, the trial
itself is necessarily delayed." 20 The opinion likewise
considered as not decisive the fact that the
provincial fiscal did not intervene until an
information was filed charging the accused with
the crime of falsification the third time. Thus: "The
Constitution does not say that the right to a speedy
trial may be availed of only where the prosecution
for crime is commenced and undertaken by the
fiscal. It does not exclude from its operation cases
commenced by private individuals. Where once a
person is prosecuted criminally, he is entitled to a
speedy trial, irrespective of the nature of the
offense or the manner in which it is authorized to be
commenced." 21 The latest decision in point,
Acebedo v. Sarmiento, 22 presented an even
clearer case. The information for damage to
property was filed on August 3, 1959. There the
matter rested until May 19, 1965, when the accused
moved to dismiss. The lower court denied the
motion in his order of July 10, 1965. Two more years
elapsed, the period now covering almost eight
years, when the trial was commenced. When one
of the witnesses for the prosecution failed to
appear, the provincial fiscal sought the
postponement, but the accused countered with a
motion for dismissal. The lower court acceded, and
this Court sustained him, even if thereafter it
changed its mind and reinstated the case.
Petitioners can thus invoke the constitutional
guarantee that the trial should be speedy. In the
absence of any valid decision, the stage of trial has
not been completed. In this case then, as of May
10, 1965, when they moved to dismiss in the Court
of Appeals, petitioners could validly contend that
they had not been accorded their right to be tried
as promptly as circumstances permit. It was not the
pendency in the Court of Appeals of their cases
that should be deemed material. It is at times
unavoidable that appellate tribunals cannot, even
with due diligence, put an end to suits elevated to
them. What is decisive is that with the setting aside
of the previous decision in the resolution of August
5, 1959, petitioners could validly premise their plea
for dismissal on this constitutional safeguard. That is
the sole basis for the conclusion reached by us
considering the controlling doctrine announced
with such emphasis by this Court time and time
again.
2. That is about all that needs be said. The crucial
issue has been met. The decisive question has been
answered. There is an affirmation of the worth of the
constitutional right to a speedy trial. Not too much
significance should be attached to the procedural
defect pointed out in the answer of the People of
the Philippines that the Court of Appeals should
have been made the party respondent. What
cannot be sanctioned was its failure to accord
respect to this particular constitutional right. It did
amount at the very least to a grave abuse of
discretion. Whatever deficiency in the pleading
may then be singled out, it cannot obscure the
obvious disregard of one of the most important
safeguards granted an accused. To deny
petitioners the remedy sought would be to exalt
form over substance. At any rate, the petition could
be considered, and rightly so, as being directed at
the Court of Appeals. Moreover, the defenses that
could have interposed to justify the action taken
were invoked by the People of the Philippines. They
certainly did not avail. Our decisions on the right to
a speedy Trial speak too categorically to be
misread. This is one of those situations then where, in
13 | C O N S T I 2 _ S e c t i o n 1 4 _ R i g h t t o S p e e d y , I m p a r t i a l a n d P u b l i c T r i a l
the apt language of the then Justice, now Chief
Justice, Makalintal, "technicalities should give way
to the realities of the situation." 23
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is granted,
and the order of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR No.
16641-R entitled, People v. Francisco Flores, et al., of
September 28, 1965 denying the motion to dismiss
as well as its order of January 8, 1966 denying the
motion for reconsideration, and the order of
January 28, 1966 denying the second motion for
reconsideration are hereby set aside, nullified, and
considered of no force and effect. The criminal
case against petitioners in the aforesaid CA-GR No.
16641-R are ordered dismissed. Costs de oficio.
Makalintal, C.J., Fernandez and Aquino, JJ., concur.
Barredo, J., did not take part.
(Conde v. Rivera, G.R. No. 21741, January 25, 1924)
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 21741. January 25, 1924.]
AURELIA CONDE, petitioner, vs. PABLO RIVERA,
acting provincial fiscal of Tayabas, and FEDERICO
M. UNSON, justice of the peace of Lucena,
Tayabas, respondents.
Godofredo Reyes for petitioner.
Attorney-General Villa-Real for respondents
SYLLABUS
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE;
SPEEDY TRIAL. Philippine organic and statutory
law expressly guarantee that in all criminal
prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to
have a speedy trial.
2. ID.; ID. The Government of the Philippine
Islands should be the last to set an example of
delay and oppression in the administration of
justice.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; MANDAMUS; HABEAS CORPUS.
WHERE A Prosecuting officer, without good cause,
secures postponements of the trial of a defendant
against his protest beyond a reasonable period of
time, as in this instance for more than a year, the
accused is entitled to relief by a proceeding in
mandamus to compel a dismissal of the
information, or if he be restrained of his liberty, by
habeas corpus to obtain his freedom.
DECISION
MALCOLM, J p:
Aurelia Conde, formerly a municipal midwife in
Lucena, Tayabas, has been forced to respond to
no less the five information for various crimes and
misdemeanors, has appeared with her witnesses
and counsel at hearings no less than on eight
different occasions only to see the cause
postponed, has twice been required to come to
the Supreme Court for protection, and now, after
the passage of more than one year from the time
when the first information was filed, seems as far
away from a definite resolution of her troubles as
she was when originally charged.
Philippine organic and statutory law expressly
guarantee that in all criminal prosecutions the
accused shall enjoy the right to have a speedy trial.
Aurelia Conde, like all other accused persons, has a
right to a speedy trial in order that if innocent she
may go free, and she has been deprived of that
right in defiance of law. Dismissed from her humble
position, and compelled to dance attendance on
courts while investigations and trials are arbitrarily
postponed without her consent, is pal palpably and
openly unjust to her and a detriment to the public.
By the use of upon the appropriate information,
could have attended to the formal preliminary
examination, and could have prepared the case
for a trial free from vexatious, capricious, and
oppressive delays.
Once before, as intimated, the petitioner had to
come to us for redress of her grievances. We
thought then we had pointed out the way for the
parties. We hope propose to do all in our power to
assist this poor woman to obtain justice. On the one
hand has been the petitioner, of humble station,
without resources, but fortunately assisted by a
persistent lawyer, while on the other hand has been
the Government of the Philippine Island s which
should be the last to set an example of delay and
oppression in the administration of justice. The Court
is thus under a moral and legal obligation to see
that these proceedings come to an end and that
the accused is discharged from the custody of the
law.
We lay down the legal proposition that, where a
prosecuting officer, without good cause, secures
postponements of the trial of a defendant against
his protest beyond a reasonable period of time, as
in this instance for more than a year, the accused is
entitled to relief by a proceeding in mandamus to
compel a dismissal of the information, or if he be
restrained of his liberty, by habeas corpus to obtain
his freedom. (16 C.J., 439 et seq.; In the matter of
Ford [1911], 160 Cal., 334; U.S. vs. Fox [1880], 3
Montana, 512. See further our previous decision in
Conde vs. Judge of First Instance, Fourteenth
Judicial District, and the Provincial Fiscal of
Tayabas, No. 21236. 1
The writ prayed for shall issue and the Provincial
Fiscal of Tayabas shall abstain from further attempts
to prosecute the accused pursuant to informations
growing out of the facts set forth in previous in
formations, and the charges now pending before
the justice of the of Lucena, Tayabas, are ordered
dismissed, with costs against the respondent fiscal.
We append to our order the observation that,
without doubt, the Attorney-General, being fully
cognizant of the facts of record, will take such
administrative action as to him seems proper to the
end that incidents of this character may not recur.
So ordered.
Araullo, C. J., Johnson, Street, Avancea, Ostrand,
Johns, and Romualdez, JJ., concur.
14 | C O N S T I 2 _ S e c t i o n 1 4 _ R i g h t t o S p e e d y , I m p a r t i a l a n d P u b l i c T r i a l
(Speedy Trial Act of 1998, REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8493
[1998])
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8493
AN ACT TO ENSURE A SPEEDY TRIAL OF ALL
CRIMINAL CASES BEFORE THE SANDIGANBAYAN,
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, METROPOLITAN TRIAL
COURT, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT, AND MUNICIPAL
CIRCUIT TRIAL COURT, APPROPRIATING FUNDS
THEREFOR, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
SECTION 1. Title. This Act shall be known as the
"Speedy Trial Act of 1998."
SECTION 2. Mandatory Pre-Trial in Criminal Cases.
In all criminal cases cognizable by the Municipal
Trial Court, Municipal Circuit Trial Court,
Metropolitan Trial Court, Regional Trial Court, and
the Sandiganbayan, the justice or judge shall, after
arraignment, order a pre-trial conference to
consider the following:
(a) Plea bargaining;
(b) Stipulation of Facts;
(c) Marking for identification of evidence of parties;
(d) Waiver of objections to admissibility of
evidence; and
(e) Such other matters as will promote a fair and
expeditious trial.
SECTION 3. Pre-Trial Agreement. All agreements
or admissions made or entered into during the pre-
trial conference shall be reduced to writing and
signed by the accused and counsel, otherwise the
same shall not be used in evidence against the
accused. The agreements in relation to matters
referred to in Section 2 hereof is subject to the
approval of the court: Provided, That the
agreement on the plea of the accused to a lesser
offense may only be revised, modified, or annulled
by the court when the same is contrary to law,
public morals, or public policy.
SECTION 4. Nonappearance at Pre-Trial
Conference. Where counsel for the accused or
the prosecutor does not appear at the pre-trial
conference and does not offer an acceptable
excuse for his/her lack of cooperation, the pre-trial
justice or judge may impose proper sanctions or
penalties.
SECTION 5. Pre-Trial Order. After the pre-trial
conference, the court shall issue an order reciting
the actions taken, the facts stipulated, and
evidence marked. Such order shall bind the parties,
limit the trial to matters not disposed of and control
the course of action during the trial, unless modified
by the court to prevent manifest injustice.
SECTION 6. Time Limit for Trial. In criminal cases
involving persons charged of a crime, except those
subject to the Rules on Summary Procedure, or
where the penalty prescribed by law does not
exceed six (6) months imprisonment, or a fine of
One thousand pesos (P1,000.00) or both,
irrespective of other imposable penalties, the justice
or judge shall, after consultation with the public
prosecutor and the counsel for the accused, set
the case for continuous trial on a weekly or other
short-term trial calendar at the earliest possible time
so as to ensure speedy trial. In no case shall the
entire trial period exceed one hundred eighty (180)
days from the first day of trial, except as otherwise
authorized by the Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court pursuant to Section 3, Rule 22 of the Rules of
Court.
SECTION 7. Time Limit Between Filing of Information
and Arraignment, and Between Arraignment and
Trial. The arraignment of an accused shall be
held within thirty (30) days from the filing of the
information, or from the date the accused has
appeared before the justice, judge or court in
which the charge is pending, whichever date last
occurs. Thereafter, where a plea of not guilty is
entered, the accused shall have at least fifteen (15)
days to prepare for trial. Trial shall commence within
thirty (30) days from arraignment as fixed by the
court.
If the accused pleads not guilty to the crime
charged, he/she shall state whether he/she
interposes a negative or affirmative defense. A
negative defense shall require the prosecution to
prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable
doubt, while an affirmative defense may modify the
order of trial and require the accused to prove such
defense by clear and convincing evidence.
SECTION 8. Time Limit Following an Order for New
Trial. If the accused is to be tried again following
an order of a court for a new trial, the trial shall
commence within thirty (30) days from the date the
order for a new trial becomes final, except that the
court retrying the case may extend such period but
in any case shall not exceed one hundred eighty
(180) days from the date the order for a new trial
becomes final if unavailability of witnesses or other
factors resulting from passage of time shall make
trial within thirty (30) days impractical.
SECTION 9. Extended Time Limit. Notwithstanding
the provisions of Section 7 of this Act, for the first
twelve-calendar-month period following its
effectivity, the time limit with respect to the period
from arraignment to trial imposed by Section 7 of
this Act shall be one hundred eighty (180) days. For
the second twelve-month period the time limit shall
be one hundred twenty (120) days, and for the third
twelve-month period the time limit with respect to
the period from arraignment to trial shall be eighty
(80) days.
SECTION 10. Exclusions. The following periods of
delay shall be excluded in computing the time
within which trial must commence:
15 | C O N S T I 2 _ S e c t i o n 1 4 _ R i g h t t o S p e e d y , I m p a r t i a l a n d P u b l i c T r i a l
(a) Any period of delay resulting from other
proceedings concerning the accused, including
but not limited to the following:
(1) delay resulting from an examination of the
accused, and hearing on his/her mental
competency, or physical incapacity;
(2) delay resulting from trials with respect to charges
against the accused;
(3) delay resulting from interlocutory appeals;
(4) delay resulting from hearings on pre-trial
motions: Provided, That the delay does not exceed
thirty (30) days;
(5) delay resulting from orders of inhibition, or
proceedings relating to change of venue of cases
or transfer from other courts;
(6) delay resulting from a finding of the existence of
a valid prejudicial question; and
(7) delay reasonably attributable to any period, not
to exceed thirty (30) days, during which any
proceeding concerning the accused is actually
under advisement.
(b) Any period of delay resulting from the absence
or unavailability of the accused or an essential
witness.
For purposes of this subparagraph, an accused or
an essential witness shall be considered absent
when his/her whereabouts are unknown and, in
addition, he/she is attempting to avoid
apprehension or prosecution or his/her
whereabouts cannot be determined by due
diligence. An accused or an essential witness shall
be considered unavailable whenever his/her
whereabouts are known but his/her presence for
trial cannot be obtained by due diligence or
he/she resists appearing at or being returned for
trial.
(c) Any period of delay resulting from the fact that
the accused is mentally incompetent or physically
unable to stand trial.
(d) If the information is dismissed upon motion of the
prosecution and thereafter a charge is filed against
the accused for the same offense, or any offense
required to be joined with that offense, any period
of delay from the date the charge was dismissed to
the date the time limitation would commence to
run as to the subsequent charge had there been
no previous charge.
(e) A reasonable period of delay when the
accused is joined for trial with a co-accused over
whom the court has not acquired jurisdiction, or as
to whom the time for trial has not run and no
motion for severance has been granted.
(f) Any period of delay resulting from a continuance
granted by any justice or judge motu propio or on
motion of the accused or his/her counsel or at the
request of the public prosecutor, if the justice or
judge granted such continuance on the basis of
his/her findings that the ends of justice served by
taking such action outweigh the best interest of the
public and the defendant in a speedy trial. No such
period of delay resulting from a continuance
granted by the court in accordance with this
subparagraph shall be excludable under this
section unless the court sets forth, in the record of
the case, either orally or in writing, its reasons for
finding that the ends of justice served by the
granting of such continuance outweigh the best
interests of the public and the accused in a speedy
trial.
SECTION 11. Factors for Granting Continuance.
The factors, among others, which a justice or judge
shall consider in determining whether to grant a
continuance under subparagraph (f) of Section 10
of this Act are as follows:
(a) Whether the failure to grant such a continuance
in the proceeding would be likely to make a
continuation of such proceeding impossible, or
result in a miscarriage of justice. cdtai
(b) Whether the case taken as a whole is so novel,
so unusual and so complex, due to the number of
accused or the nature of the prosecution or
otherwise, that it is unreasonable to expect
adequate preparation within the periods of time
established by this Act.
No continuance under subparagraph (f) of Section
10 shall be granted because of general congestion
of the court's calendar, or lack of diligent
preparation or failure to obtain available witnesses
on the part of the public prosecutor.
SECTION 12. Public Attorney's Duties Where
Accused is Imprisoned. If the public attorney
knows that a person charged of a crime is
preventively detained, either because he/she is
charged of a bailable crime and has no means to
post bail, or is charged of a non-bailable crime, or is
serving a term of imprisonment in any penal
institution, the public attorney shall promptly:
(a) Undertake to obtain the presence of the
prisoner for trial, or cause a notice to be served on
the person having custody of the prisoner
mandating such person to so advise the prisoner of
his/her right to demand trial.
(b) Upon receipt of a notice, the person having
custody of the prisoner shall promptly advise the
prisoner of the charge and of his/her right to
demand trial. If at any time thereafter the prisoner
informs the person having custody that he/she
demands trial, such person shall cause notice to
that effect to be sent promptly to the public
attorney.
16 | C O N S T I 2 _ S e c t i o n 1 4 _ R i g h t t o S p e e d y , I m p a r t i a l a n d P u b l i c T r i a l
(c) Upon receipt of such notice, the public attorney
shall promptly seek to obtain the presence of the
prisoner for trial.
(d) When the person having custody of the prisoner
receives from the public attorney a properly
supported request for temporary custody of the
prisoner for trial, the prisoner shall be made
available to that public attorney.
SECTION 13. Remedy Where Accused is Not Brought
to Trial Within the Time Limit. If an accused is not
brought to trial within the time limit required by
Section 7 of this Act as extended by Section 9, the
information shall be dismissed on motion of the
accused. The accused shall have the burden of
proof of supporting such motion but the
prosecution shall have the burden of going forward
with the evidence in connection with the exclusion
of time under Section 10 of this Act.
In determining whether to dismiss the case with or
without prejudice, the court shall consider, among
other factors, the seriousness of the offense, the
facts and circumstances of the case which led to
the dismissal, and the impact of a reprosecution on
the implementation of this Act and on the
administration of justice. Failure of the accused to
move for dismissal prior to trial or entry of a plea of
guilty shall constitute a waiver of the right to
dismissal under this section.
SECTION 14. Sanctions. In any case in which
counsel for the accused, the public prosecution or
public attorney:
(a) knowingly allows the case to be set for trial
without disclosing the fact that a necessary witness
would be unavailable for trial;
(b) files a motion solely for the purpose of delay
which he/she knows is totally frivolous and without
merit;
(c) makes a statement for the purpose of obtaining
continuance which he/she knows to be false and
which is material to the granting of a continuance;
or
(d) otherwise willfully fails to proceed to trial without
justification consistent with the provisions of this Act,
the court may, without prejudice to any
appropriate criminal and/or administrative charges
to be instituted by the proper party against the
erring counsel if and when warranted, punish any
such counsel or attorney, as follows:
(1) in the case of a counsel privately retained in
connection with the defense of an accused, by
imposing a fine not exceeding fifty percent (50%) of
the compensation to which he/she is entitled in
connection with his/her defense of the accused;
(2) by imposing on any appointed counsel de
officio or public prosecutor a fine not exceeding
Ten thousand pesos (10,000.00); and
(3) by denying any defense counsel or public
prosecutor the right to practice before the court
considering the case for a period not exceeding
thirty (30) days.
The authority to punish provided for by this section
shall be in addition to any other authority or power
available to the court. The court shall follow the
procedures established in the Rules of Court in
punishing any counsel or public prosecutor
pursuant to this section.
SECTION 15. Rules and Regulations. The Supreme
Court shall promulgate rules, regulations,
administrative orders and circulars which shall seek
to accelerate the disposition of criminal cases. The
rules, regulations, administrative orders and circulars
formulated shall provide sanctions against justices
and judges who willfully fail to proceed to trial
without justification consistent with the provisions of
this Act.
SECTION 16. Funding. For the effective
implementation of the rules, regulations,
administrative orders and circulars promulgated
under this Act, the amount of Twenty million pesos
(P20,000,000.00) annually shall be appropriated
from the allocation of the Supreme Court under the
General Appropriations Act. Thereafter, such
additional amounts as may be necessary for its
continued implementation shall be included in the
annual General Appropriations Act.
SECTION 17. Act Not a Bar to Speedy Trial Claim
Under the Constitution. No provision of this Act
shall be interpreted as a bar to any claim of denial
of speedy trial as required by Article III, Section 14(2)
of the 1987 Constitution. Cdpr
SECTION 18. Repealing Clause. All laws,
presidential decrees, executive orders, rules and
regulations or parts thereof inconsistent with the
provisions of this Act are hereby repealed or
modified accordingly.
SECTION 19. Separability Clause. In case any
provision of this Act is declared unconstitutional, the
other provisions shall remain in effect.
SECTION 20. Effectivity. This Act shall take effect
after fifteen (15) days following its publication in the
Official Gazette or in any newspaper of general
circulation: Provided, That Section 7 of this Act shall
become effective after the expiration of the
aforementioned third-calendar-month period
provided in Section 9 of this Act.
Approved: February 12, 1998
17 | C O N S T I 2 _ S e c t i o n 1 4 _ R i g h t t o S p e e d y , I m p a r t i a l a n d P u b l i c T r i a l
(Mateo, Jr. v. Villaluz, G.R. Nos. L-34756-59, March
31, 1973)
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. Nos. L-34756-59. March 31, 1973.]
MANUEL MATEO, JR., ROBERTO MARTINEZ alias
RUBEN MARTINEZ, ENRIQUE CONCEPClON and
ESMERALDO CRUZ, petitioners, vs. HON. ONOFRE
VILLALUZ, as Judge of the Circuit Criminal Court,
Seventh Judicial District, respondents.
Jose W. Diokno, Apolinar S. Fojas, Sixto F. Santiago
and Damian S. Villaseca for petitioners.
Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, Assistant
Solicitor General Octavio R. Ramierz and Solicitor
Guillermo C. Nakar, Jr. for respondent.
DECISION
FERNANDO, J p:
The novel issue presented in this prohibition
proceeding arose from the gnawing fear that the
prized ideal of "the cold neutrality of an impartial
judge" 1 implicit in the due process guarantee may
be set at naught. Petitioners are among being tried
by respondent Judge for the offense of robbery in
band with homicide. Thereafter, an extrajudicial
statement by one Rolando Reyes, who was later on
likewise indicted for the same offense, implicating
petitioners, was subscribed before respondent
Judge. That was the background of a motion for his
disqualification, as the aforesaid Rolando Reyes,
when called upon to testify as an additional witness
for the prosecution impugned his written
declaration stating that it was executed as a result
of a threat by a government agent. It is now
contended that such a repudiation would not sit
well with respondent Judge, who had thus placed
himself in a position of being unable to pass on such
question with that degree of objectivity required by
due process, although admittedly, such a move did
not fall squarely within one of the specific grounds
to inhibit judges. 2 Respondent Judge turned down
this plea for disqualification. Hence this petition,
based on the asserted violation of a constitutional
right not to be convicted of an offense without due
process of law. This Court, after t careful
consideration of the matter and in the light of past
decisions to be hereafter noted, looks upon such
failure of respondent Judge to disqualify himself as
a grave abuse of discretion correctible by
prohibition. The petition is meritorious.
The facts, in the language of the petition, follow:
"On or about June 4, 1971, the American Express
Bank at Sangley Point, Cavite, was robbed and an
American serviceman was killed. In connection with
that robbery, and the death of the serviceman, four
(4) criminal actions were filed against petitioners
and docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. CCC-VII-843
to 846, Cavite, for robbery in band with homicide,
all captioned 'People of the Philippines, Plaintiff, vs.
Manuel Mateo, et al., Accused' . . . The Information
fell in the sala of the Honorable Respondent Judge
because the complaints were filed there; and, in
fact, it was the Honorable Respondent Judge who
ordered District State Prosecutor Cornelio
Melendres [or] Assistant City Fiscal Enrique A. Cube
to conduct the preliminary investigation. Petitioners
Manuel Mateo, Jr. and Esmeraldo Cruz were
arraigned on June 24, 1971 while petitioners
Roberto Martinez @ Ruben Martinez filed a Motion
To Dismiss on the ground of "insufficiency of
evidence for failure of prosecution (1) to prove the
existence of conspiracy, and (2) to identify the
accused by competent evidence.' On September
25, 1971, petitioner Roberto Martinez @ Ruben
Martinez amplified his motion to dismiss with a
Supplemental Motion based on the claim that 'the
pre-trial identification by prosecution witness Elliot
Grey of your accused Roberto Martinez in a police
line-up in the absence of defendant's counsel is
unconstitutional; and the in-court testimony of said
Elliot Grey identifying your accused Roberto
Martinez is inadmissible in evidence and should be
stricken out from the records'. The prosecution
opposed the motion to dismiss. To date, the motions
to dismiss have not been decided by the
Honorable Respondent Judge . . . In the meantime,
another suspect in the Sangley Point Robbery
one Rolando Reyes was arrested. On October 5,
1971, when petitioner's Motion to Dismiss together
with the Opposition thereto were submitted for
resolution, the Honorable Presiding Judge in an
Order ruled that 'pursuant to Sec. 6, Rule 135 of the
New Rules of Court, let the Motion to Dismiss be
resolved until after the prosecution has presented
and rested its evidence as against Rolando Reyes . .
. It appears that the said Rolando Reyes had
executed an extrajudicial statement on October 1,
1971 and had signed and sworn to its truth before
the Honorable Respondent Judge; and, in that
statement had implicated petitioners; evidently, the
Honorable Respondent Judge was aware of this,
and it was for this reason that he had deferred
ruling on petitioner Ruben Martinez' motions and
supplemental motion to dismiss 'until after the
prosecution has presented and rested its evidence
as against Rolando Reyes.' Rolando Reyes,
however, was tried separately from and in absence
of petitioners; so that the proceedings against him
did not constitute evidence against petitioner. So,
on November 26, 1971, while petitioner Martinez'
Motion and Supplemental Motion to Dismiss
remained unresolved, the prosecution filed a
'Motion to Present Additional Evidence.' . . . On
December 4, 1971, petitioner Manuel Mateo filed
an Opposition to the prosecution's Motion to
Present Additional Evidence on the ground that 'to
allow the prosecution to present additional
evidence in favor of the State after the prosecution
has rested, while the accused has a pending
motion to dismiss under consideration would be
prejudicial to the substantial rights of herein
accused because it would effectively deprive him
of a fair trial.' . . . On December 24, 1971,
respondent Judge granted the prosecution's
'Motion to Present Additional Evidence' ruling that 'it
18 | C O N S T I 2 _ S e c t i o n 1 4 _ R i g h t t o S p e e d y , I m p a r t i a l a n d P u b l i c T r i a l
is well settled jurisprudence in this jurisdiction and
elsewhere that it is within the sound discretion of the
court whether or not to allow the presentation of
additional evidence after the parties have rested
their case.' . . . On February 3, 1972, the prosecution
called Rolando Reyes as an additional witness, and
in the course of his testimony, marked an
extrajudicial statement purportedly executed by
him on October 1, 1971 as Exh. 'P' . . . Rolando
Reyes repudiated it, stated that he had executed it
because he had been threatened by a
government agent. The statement, Exh. 'P' . . . ,
purports to have been subscribed and sworn to
before the respondent Judge on October 1, 1971.
As soon as the foregoing facts were made of
record in the case, defendants [petitioners herein]
verbally moved to suspend the proceedings to
enable them to file a motion to disqualify the
Honorable Respondent Judge; and the motion for
suspension was granted. On February 5, 1971,
petitioners filed a Joint Motion for Disqualification of
respondent Judge contending that respondent
Judge 'in the exercise of his sound discretion
[should] disqualify himself from sitting in this case
under the second paragraph of Section 1 of Rule
137 of the Rules of Court,' because Rolando Reyes
had repudiated the statement that he, Reyes, had
sworn to before the Honorable Respondent Judge
and the latter perforce would have to pass upon
that repudiation . . . On February 11, 1972, the
prosecution filed an Opposition to petitioners' Joint
Motion for Disqualification . . . On February 12, 1972,
respondent Judge denied petitioners' Joint Motion
for Disqualification." 3
The specific question raised not having been
passed upon previously, coupled with the
exhaustive petition submitted by counsel for
petitioners, Senator Jose W. Diokno, led this Court, in
its resolution of February 25, 1972 to require
comment from respondent Judge, with a
temporary restraining order likewise being issued.
The then Solicitor General, now Associate Justice,
Felix Antonio, did so in an equally well-researched
pleading on March 16, 1972 which, by our resolution
of March 22, was considered his answer. Thereafter,
with memoranda being submitted by both parties,
the case was deemed submitted for decision on
August 4 last year. There is, to repeat, a highly
persuasive and scholarly quality in the manner in
which the plea for petitioners was made.
Nonetheless, with due recognition of the imperative
character of the safeguard of due process
connoting, at the very least, an impartial tribunal.
the Court cannot consider the circumstances
disclosed a sufficient to call for the disqualification
of respondent Judge.
1.It is now beyond dispute that due process cannot
be satisfied in the absence of that degree of
objectivity on the part of a judge sufficient to
reassure litigants of his being fair al being just.
Thereby there is the legitimate expectation that the
decision arrived at would be the application of the
law to the facts as found by a judge who does not
play favorites. For him, the parties stand on equal
footing. In the language of Justice Dizon: "It has
been said, in fact, that due process of law requires
a hearing before an impartial and disinterested
tribunal, and that every litigant is entitled to nothing
less than the cold neutrality of an impartial judge." 4
He should, to quote from another decision "at all
times manifest depth commitment and concern to
the cause of justice according to legal norms, a
cerebral man who deliberately holds in check the
tug and pull of purely personal preferences and
prejudices which he shares with the rest of his fellow
mortals." 6 penned by Justice Castro, should strive
to be at all times "wholly free, disinterested,
impartial and independent. Elementary due
process requires a hearing before an impartial and
disinterested tribunal. A judge has both the duty of
rendering a just decision and the duty of doing it in
a manner completely free from suspicion as to its
fairness and as to his integrity." 7 Nor is this to imply
that prior to Gutierrez, there had been no
awareness of the due process aspect of an
impartial tribunal even if not explicitly referred to. As
noted by Justice Street as far back as 1926 in
Government v. Abella, 8 a 1926 decision, if the
Supreme Court "were of the opinion that the litigant
had not had a fair trial, a new trial could be
granted." 9 There was a reiteration of such a view in
a case decided in 1933, Dais v. Torres, 10 with
Justice Vickers as ponente, in these words:
"Although a judge may not have been disqualified
[according to the Code of Civil Procedure],
nevertheless if it appears to this court that the
appellant was not given a fair and impartial trial
because of the trial judge's bias or prejudice, this
court will order a new trial, if it deems it necessary,
in the interest of justice." 11
2. Conformably to what was so emphatically
asserted in Gutierrez as the fundamental requisite of
impartiality for due process to be satisfied, the Rules
of Court provision on disqualification when revised
three years later in 1964 contains this additional
paragraph: "A judge may, in the exercise of his
sound discretion, disqualify himself from sitting in a
case, for just or valid reasons other than those
mentioned above." 12 Thereby, it is made clear to
the occupants of the bench that outside of
pecuniary interest, relationship or previous
participation in the matter that calls for
adjudication, there may be other causes that could
conceivably erode the trait of objectivity, thus
calling for inhibition. That is to betray a sense of
realism, for the factors that lead to preferences or
predilections are many and varied. It is well,
therefore, that if any such should make its
appearance and prove difficult to resist, the better
course for a judge is to disqualify himself. That way,
he avoids being misunderstood. His reputation for
probity and objectivity is preserved. What is even
more important, the ideal of an impartial
administration of justice is lived up to. Thus is due
process vindicated. There is relevance to what was
said by Justice Sanchez in Pimentel v. Salanga, 13
drawing "attention of all judges to appropriate
19 | C O N S T I 2 _ S e c t i o n 1 4 _ R i g h t t o S p e e d y , I m p a r t i a l a n d P u b l i c T r i a l
guidelines in a situation where their capacity to try
and decide a case fairly and judiciously comes to
the fore by way of challenge from any one of the
parties. A judge may not be legally prohibited from
sitting in a litigation. But when suggestion is made of
record that he might be induced to act in favor of
one party or with bias or prejudice against a litigant
arising out of circumstance reasonably capable of
inciting such a state of mind, he should conduct a
careful self-examination. He should exercise his
discretion in a way that the peoples faith in the
courts of justice is not impaired. A salutary norm is
that he reflect the probability that a losing party
might nurture at the back of his mind the thought
that the judge had unmeritoriously tilted the scales
of justice against him. That passion on the part
judge may be generated because of serious
charges misconduct against him by a suitor or his
counsel, is not altogether remote. He is a man,
subject to the frailties of other men. He should,
therefore, exercise great care and caution before
making up his mind to act or withdraw from a suit
where that party or counsel is involved. He could in
good grace inhibit himself where that case could
be heard by another judge and where no
appreciable prejudice would be occasioned to
others involved therein. On the result of his decisions
to sit or not to sit may depend to a great extent the
all-important confidence in the impartiality of the
judiciary. If after reflection he should resolve to
voluntarily desist from sit a case where his motives or
fairness might be seriously impugned, his action is to
be interpreted as giving meaning and substance to
the second paragraph of Section 1, Rule 137. He
serves the cause of the law who forestalls
miscarriage of justice." 14
3. The imperfections of human institutions being
such, what is fit and proper is not always achieved.
The invitation to judges to disqualify themselves is
not always heeded. For that matter, it is not always
desirable that they should do so. It could amount in
certain cases to their being recreant to their trust.
Justice Perfecto's warning is not to be ignored; "to
shirk the responsibility" entails "the risk of being
called upon to account for his dereliction." 15 It
could be an instrument whereby a party could
inhibit a judge in the hope of getting another more
amenable to his persuasive skill. With all such
considerations in mind, there is still cogency in the
approach that would look with favor on the
exercise of discretion in favor of disqualification,
given the likelihood that bias or prejudice is
unavoidable. Even before the amendment of
Section 1 of Rule 137, this Court, in at least two
decisions, 16 gave its approval to such a move.
Then came People v. Gomez, 17 where this Court,
the ponente being Justice J. P. Bengzon, held: "Now
considering that the Revised Rules of Court, already
in effect when respondent Judge filed his answer
herein containing the prayer to be disqualified from
the case, although not yet in effect when the
proceedings at issue were taken in the court below,
states in Section 1 of Rule 137 that, 'A judge may, in
the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify
himself from sitting in a case, for just or valid reasons'
other than the usual grounds for disqualification, this
Court, after considering all the circumstances of the
case, finds as reasonable, respondent Judge's
afore-stated request for disqualification from further
sitting in the Richard case, and We rule that he is
thereby deemed, in light of the new Rules, to have
inhibited himself from further taking cognizance of
the case." 18
There is even greater deference paid to the due
process requirement of impartiality when, in Luque
v. Kayanan, 19 decided in 1969, this Court, through
Justice Sanchez, could categorically rule: "All
suitors, we must say, are entitled to nothing short of
the cold neutrality of an independent, wholly-free,
disinterested and impartial tribunal. It has been said
that 'next in importance to the duty of rendering a
righteous judgment is that of doing it in such a
manner as will beget no suspicion of the fairness
and integrity of the judge.' Let it not be said that the
administration of justice in this country suffers from
too many human imperfections. To our mind,
respondent judge should inhibit himself since it has
become apparent that his further continuance in
Case 4871 would not be in the best interest of
justice, which he is bound to serve." 20 There was a
reiteration of such a principle in Paredes v.
Gopengco, 21 where the following appears in the
opinion of Justice Teehankee for the Court: "It is
pertinent to state that the restriction provided in the
Rule against appeal or stay of the proceedings
where the trial judge denies a motion for his
disqualification is not an absolute rule even in civil
cases, and has not been taken as precluding a
resort in appropriate cases to the special civil
actions of prohibition and certiorari before the
higher courts for determination, ahead of the
judgment on the merits, whether the trial judge
committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction refusing to disqualify
himself." 22 There is thus respectable authority for
the view that with the possibility of a trial being
tainted by partiality, this Court can step in to assure
respect for the demands of due process.
4. Petitioners can assert then, and rightly so, that we
have the power to set aside the order denying the
motion for disqualification. While the discretion in
the first instance belongs to respondent Judge, its
exercise is subject to our corrective authority.
Certainly, there can be no question its being
considered abused if it can be shown that to refuse
inhibition is to cast valid doubts as to a court's
impartiality. The specific issue then that must be
resolved is whether the circumstance of a party
having subscribed before respondent Judge an
extra-judicial statement purporting to describe the
manner in which an offense was committed, later
on repudiated by him as the product of intimidation
in the course of his having been asked to testify
against petitioners, would suffice to negate that
degree of objectivity the Constitution requires? The
answer must be in the affirmative. Petitioners are
thus entitled to the relief sought. Respondent Judge
could not be totally immune to what apparently
was asserted before him in such extrajudicial
20 | C O N S T I 2 _ S e c t i o n 1 4 _ R i g h t t o S p e e d y , I m p a r t i a l a n d P u b l i c T r i a l
statement. Moreover, it is unlikely that he was not in
the slightest bit offended by the affiant's turnabout
with his later declaration that there was intimidation
by a government agent exerted on him. That was
hardly flattering to respondent Judge. It is not only
that. His sense of fairness under the circumstances
could easily be blunted. The absence of the
requisite due process element is thus noticeable.
There is this circumstance even more telling. It was
he who attested to its due execution on October 1,
1971 wherein Rolando Reyes admitted his
participation in the crime and in addition
implicated petitioners. At that time, their motion for
dismissal of the charges against them was pending;
its resolution was deferred by respondent Judge
until after the prosecution had presented and
rested its evidence against affiant, who was himself
indicted and tried for the same offense, but in a
separate proceeding. It cannot be doubted then
that respondent Judge in effect ruled that such
extra-judicial statement was executed freely. With
its repudiation on the ground that it was not so at
all, coercion having come into the picture there is
apparent the situation of a judge having to pass on
a question that by implication had already been
answered by him. Such a fact became rather
obvious. For respondent Judge was called upon to
review a matter on which he had previously given
his opinion. It is this inroad in one's, objectivity that is
sought to be avoided by the law on
disqualification. The misgivings then as to the
requirement of due process for "the cold neutrality
of an impartial judge" not being met are more than
justified. Hence the conclusion reached by us.
5. To avoid any further controversies of this nature,
lower court judges are well-advised to limit
themselves to the task of adjudication and to leave
to others the role of notarizing declarations. The less
an occupant of the bench fritters away his time
and energy in tasks more incumbent on officials of
the executive branch, the less the danger of his
being a participant in any event that might lend
itself to the interpretation that his impartiality has
been compromised. There is much to be said for
displaying zeal and eagerness in stamping out
criminality, but that role is hardly fit for a judge who
must bide his time until the case is before him. He
must ever be on guard lest what is done by him,
even from the best of motives, may be thought of
as eroding that objectivity and sobriety which are
the hallmarks of judicial conduct. Thus should he
attend to the performance of the sacred trust that
is his.
WHEREFORE, the petition for prohibition is granted.
The restraining order is issued by this Court on
February 25, 1972 is made permanent. Without
pronouncement as to costs.
Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Barredo, Makasiar,
Antonio and Esguerra, JJ., concur.
Concepcion, C.J., concurs in this and the separate
concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Teehankee.
Teehankee, J., concurs in a separate opinion.
 (Garcia v. Domingo, G.R. No. L-30104 (Resolution),
July 25, 1973)
EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-30104. July 25, 1973.]
HON. GREGORIO N. GARCIA City Court of Manila,
and FRANCISCO LORENZANA, petitioners, vs. HON.
FELIX DOMINGO, Judge of the Court of First
Instance of Manila, EDGARDO CALO and SIMEON
CARBONNEL, respondents.
Andres R. Narvasa, Manuel V . Chico and Felipe B.
Pagkanlungan for petitioners.
Rafael S. Consengco for respondent Calo, et al.
Respondent Judge in his own behalf.
RESOLUTION
FERNANDO, J p:
The pivotal question in this petition for certiorari and
prohibition, one which thus far has remained
unresolved, is the meaning to be accorded the
constitutional right to public trial. 1 More
specifically, did respondent Judge commit a grave
abuse of discretion in stigmatizing as violative of
such a guarantee the holding of the trial of the
other respondents 2 inside the chambers of city
court Judge Gregorio Garcia named as petitioner.
3 That was done in the order now impugned in this
suit, although such a procedure had been agreed
to beforehand by the other respondents as
defendants, the hearings have been thus
conducted on fourteen separate occasions without
objection on their part, and without an iota of
evidence offered to substantiate any claim as to
any other person so minded being excluded from
the premises. It is thus evident that what took place
in the chambers of the city court judge was devoid
of haste or intentional secrecy. For reasons to be
more fully explained in the light of the facts
ascertained the unique aspect of this case
having arisen from what turned out to be an
unseemly altercation, force likewise being
employed, due to the mode in which the arrest of
private petitioner for a traffic violation was sought
to be effected by the two respondent policemen
thus resulting in charges and counter-charges with
eight criminal cases being tried jointly by city court
Judge in the above manner we rule that there
was no transgression of the right to a public trial,
and grant the petition.
It was alleged and admitted in the petition: "In
Branch I of the City Court of Manila presided over
by petitioner Judge, there were commenced, by
appropriate informations all dated January 16,
1968, eight (8) criminal actions against respondents
Edgardo Calo, and Simeon Carbonnel and
Petitioner Francisco Lorenzana, as follows: a.
Against Edgardo Calo (on complaint of Francisco
Lorenzana) (1) Criminal Case No. F-109191, for slight
physical injuries; (2) Criminal Case No. F-109192, also
21 | C O N S T I 2 _ S e c t i o n 1 4 _ R i g h t t o S p e e d y , I m p a r t i a l a n d P u b l i c T r i a l
for slight physical injuries; and (3) Criminal Case No.
F-109193, for maltreatment; b. Against Simeon
Carbonnel (id.) (1) Criminal Case No. F-109197, for
maltreatment; (2) Criminal Case No. F-109196, for
slight physical injuries; and (3) Criminal Case No. F-
109198 for light threats; (c) Against Francisco
Lorenzana (on complaint of Calo and Carbonnel)
(1) Criminal Case No. F-109201, for violation of Sec.
887 of the Revised Ordinances of Manila (resisting
an officer); and (2) Criminal Case No. F-109200, for
slander." 4 The above was followed by this recital:
"The trial of the aforementioned cases was jointly
held on March 4, 1968, March 18, 1968, March 23,
1968, March 30, 1968, April 17, 1968, April 20, 1968,
May 4, 1968, May 11, 1968, June 1, 1968, June 15,
1968, June 22, 1968, June 29, 1968, August 3, 1968
and August 10, 1968. All the fourteen (14) trial dates
except March 4 and 18, and April 17, 1968 fell
on a Saturday. This was arranged by the parties and
the Court upon the insistence of respondents Calo
and Carbonnel who, as police officers under
suspension because of the cases, desired the same
to be terminated as soon as possible and as there
were many cases scheduled for trial on the usual
criminal trial days (Monday, Wednesday and
Friday), Saturday was agreed upon as the
invariable trial day for said eight (8) criminal cases."
5 Also this: "The trial of the cases in question was
held, with the conformity of the accused and their
counsel, in the chambers of Judge Garcia." 6 Then
came these allegations in the petition: "During all
the fourteen (14) days of trial, spanning a period of
several months (from March to August, 1968), the
accused were at all times represented by their
respective counsel, who acted not only in defense
of their clients, but as prosecutors of the
accusations filed at their clients' instance. There was
only one (1) day when Atty. Consengco,
representing respondent Calo and Carbonnel, was
absent. This was on April 20, 1968. But at the
insistence of Pat. Carbonnel, the trial proceeded,
and said respondent cross-examined one of the
witnesses presented by the adverse party. In any
case, no pretense has been made by the
respondents that this constituted an irregularity
correctible on certiorari. At the conclusion of the
hearings the accused, thru counsel, asked for and
were granted time to submit memoranda.
Respondents Calo and Carbonnel, thru counsel,
Atty. Rafael Consengco, submitted a 14-page
memorandum with not less than 35 citations of
relevant portions of the transcript of stenographic
notes in support of their prayer for exoneration, and
for the conviction of petitioner Lorenzana in respect
of their countercharges against the latter. It is
worthy of note that up to this date, said
respondents Calo and Carbonnel had not
objected to pointed out any supposed
irregularity in the proceedings thus far; the
memorandum submitted in their behalf is confined
to a discussion of the evidence adduced in, and
the merits of the cases." 7 It was stated next in the
petition: "The promulgation of judgment was first
scheduled on September 23, 1968. This was
postponed to September 28, 1968, at the instance
of Atty. Rafael Consengco, as counsel for
respondents Calo and Carbonnel, and again to
October 1, 1968 at 11 o'clock in the morning, this
time at the instance of Atty. Consengco and Atty.
Francisco Koh who had, in the meantime, also
entered his appearance as counsel for respondents
Calo and Carbonnel. The applications for
postponement were not grounded upon and
supposed defect or irregularity of the proceedings."
8 Philippine Autonomy Act of 1916, popularly known
Mention was then made of when a petition for
certiorari was filed with respondent Judge: "Early in
the morning of October 1, 1968, Edgardo Calo and
Simeon Carbonnel, thru their counsel, Atty. Rafael S.
Consengco, filed with the Court of First Instance a
petition for certiorari and prohibition, with
application for preliminary prohibitory and
mandatory injunction . . . [alleging jurisdictional
defects]." 9 Respondent Judge acting on such
petition forthwith issued a restraining order thus
causing the deferment of the promulgation of the
judgment. After proceedings duly had, there was
an order from him "declaring that 'the constitutional
and statutory rights of the accused' had been
violated, adversely affecting their 'right to a free
and impartial trial' [noting] ;that the trial of these
cases lasting several weeks were held exclusively in
chambers and not in the court room open to the
public';" and ordering the city court Judge, now
petitioner, "to desist from reading or causing to be
read or promulgated the decisions he may have
rendered already in the criminal cases (in question)
. . . pending in his Court, until further orders of this
Court.'" 10
A motion for reconsideration proving unavailing,
petitioners on January 28, 1969, elevated the
matter to this Tribunal by means of the present suit
for certiorari and prohibition. In its resolution of
February 3, 1969, respondents were required to
answer, with a preliminary injunction likewise being
issued. As was to be expected the answer filed by
respondent Judge on March 11, 1969 and that by
the other respondents on March 19, 1969 did
attempt to justify the validity of the finding that
there was a failure to respect the right to a public
trial of accused persons. Neither in such pleadings
nor in the memorandum filed, although the
diligence displayed by counsel was quite evident,
was there any persuasive showing of a violation of
the constitutional guarantee of a public trial, the
basic issue to be resolved. Rather it was the mode
of approach followed by counsel Andres R.
Narvasa for petitioners that did manifest a deeper
understanding of its implications and ramifications.
Accordingly, as previously stated, it is for us to grant
the merits prayed for.
1. The 1935 Constitution which was in force at the
time of the antecedents of this petition, as set forth
at the outset, explicitly enumerated the right to a
public trial to which an accused was entitled. So it
is, as likewise made clear, under the present
dispensation. As a matter of fact, that was one
constitutional provision that needed only a single,
terse summation from the Chairman of the
22 | C O N S T I 2 _ S e c t i o n 1 4 _ R i g h t t o S p e e d y , I m p a r t i a l a n d P u b l i c T r i a l
Committee on the Bill of Rights, Delegate, later
Justice, Jose P. Laurel, to gain acceptance. As was
stressed by him: "Trial should also be public in order
to offset any danger of conducting it in an illegal
and unjust manner." 11 It would have been
surprising if its proposed inclusion in the Bill of Rights
had provoked any discussion, much less a debate.
It was merely a reiteration of what appeared in the
as the Jones Law. 12 Earlier, such a right found
expression in the Philippine Bill of 1902, likewise an
organic act of the then government of this country
as an unincorporated territory of the United States.
13 Historically, as was pointed out by Justice Black,
speaking for the United States Supreme Court in the
leading case of In re Oliver: 14 "This nation's
accepted practice of guaranteeing a public trial to
an accused has its roots in [the] English common
law heritage." 15 He then observed that the exact
date of its origin is obscure, "but it likely evolved
long before the settlement of [the United States] as
an accompaniment of the ancient institution of jury
trial." 16 It was then noted by him that there, "the
guarantee to an accused of the right to a public
trial first appeared in a state constitution in 1776." 18
He could conclude his historical survey thus: "Today
almost without exception every state by
constitution, statute, or judicial decision, requires
that all criminal trials be open to the public." 19
Such is the venerable, historical lineage of the right
to a public trial.
2. The crucial question of the meaning to be
attached this provision remains. The Constitution
guarantees an accused the right to a public trial.
What does it signify? Offhand it does seem fairly
obvious that here is an instance where language is
to be given a literal application. There is no
ambiguity in the words employed. The trial must be
public. It possesses that character when anyone
interested in observing the manner a judge
conducts the proceedings in his courtroom may do
so. There is to be no ban on such attendance. His
being a stranger to the litigants is of no moment. No
relationship to the parties need be shown. The
thought that lies behind this safeguard is the belief
that thereby the accused is afforded further
protection, that his trial is likely to be conducted
with regularity and not tainted with any impropriety.
It is not amiss to recall that Delegate Laurel in his
terse summation of the importance of this right
singled out its being a deterrence to arbitrariness. It
is thus understandable why such a right is deemed
embraced in procedural due process. 20 Where a
trial takes place, as is quite usual, in the courtroom
and a calendar of what cases are to be heard is
posted, no problem arises. It is the usual course of
events that individuals desirous of being present are
free to do so. There is the well recognized exception
though that warrants the exclusion of the public
where the evidence may be characterized as
"offensive to decency or public morals." 21
What did occasion difficulty in this suit was that for
the convenience of the parties, and of the city
court Judge, it was in the latter's air-conditioned
chambers that the trial was held. Did that suffice to
vitiate the proceedings as violative of this right? The
answer must be in the negative. There is no showing
that the public was thereby excluded. It is to be
admitted that the size of the room allotted the
Judge would reduce the number of those who
could be present. Such a fact though is not
indicative of any transgression of this right.
Courtrooms are not of uniform dimensions. Some
are smaller than others. Moreover, as admitted by
Justice Black in his masterly In re Oliver opinion, it
suffices to satisfy the requirement of a trial being
public if the accused could "have his friends,
relatives and counsel present, no matter with what
offense he may be charged." 22
Then, too, reference may also be made to the
undisputed fact at least fourteen hearings had
been held in chambers of the city court Judge,
without objection on the part of respondent
policemen. What was said by former Chief Justice
Moran should erase any doubt as to the weight to
be accorded, more appropriate]y the lack of
weight, to any such objection now raised. Thus: "In
one case, the trial of the accused was held in Bilibid
prison. The accused, invoking his right to a public
trial, assigned the procedure thus taken as error.
The Supreme Court held that as it affirmatively
appears on the record that the accused offered no
objection to the trial of his case in the place where
it was held, his right is deemed waived." 23 The
decision referred to, United States v. Mercado, 24
was handed down sixty-eight years ago in 1905.
It does seem that the challenged order of
respondent is far from being invulnerable.
3. That is all that need be said as to the obvious
merit of this petition. One other objection to the
conduct of the proceedings by the city court
Judge may be briefly disposed of. Respondent
Judge would seek to lend support to an order at
war with the obvious meaning of a constitutional
provision by harping on the alleged abdication by
an assistant fiscal of his control over the
prosecution. Again here there was a failure to
abide by settled law. If any party could complain at
all, it is the People of the Philippines for whom a
fiscal speaks and acts. The accused cannot in law
be termed an offended party for such an alleged
failure to comply with official duty. Moreover, even
assuming that respondent policemen could be
heard to raise such a grievance, respondent Judge
ought to have been aware that thereby no
jurisdictional defect was incurred by the city court
Judge. As was so emphatically declared by Justice
J.B.L. Reyes in Cariaga v. Justo-Guerrero: 25 "The
case below was commenced and prosecuted
without the intervention, mediation or participation
of the fiscal or any of his deputies. This,
notwithstanding, the jurisdiction of the court was
not affected . . . but the court should have cited
the public prosecutor to intervene . . . ," 26
23 | C O N S T I 2 _ S e c t i o n 1 4 _ R i g h t t o S p e e d y , I m p a r t i a l a n d P u b l i c T r i a l
4. There is much to be said of course for the
concern displayed by respondent Judge to assure
the reality as against the mere possibility of a trial
being truly public. If it were otherwise, such a right
could be reduced to a barren form of words. To the
extent then that the conclusion reached by him
was motivated by an apprehension that there was
an evasion of a constitutional command, he
certainly lived up to what is expected of a man of
the robe. Further reflection ought to have
convinced him though that such a fear was
unjustified. An objective appraisal of conditions in
municipal or city courts would have gone far in
dispelling such misgivings. The crowded daily
calendar, the nature of the cases handled, civil as
well as criminal, the relaxed attitude on procedural
rules not being strictly adhered to all make for a less
tense atmosphere. As a result the attendance of
the general public is much more in evidence; nor is
its presence unwelcome. When it is remembered
further that the occupants of such courts are not
chosen primarily for their legal acumen, but taken
from that portion of the bar more considerably
attuned to the pulse of public life, it is not to be
rationally expected that an accused would be
denied whatever solace and comfort may come
from the knowledge that a judge, with the eyes of
the persons in court alert to his demeanor and his
rulings, would run the risk of being unjust, unfair, or
arbitrary. Nor does it change matters, just because,
as did happen here, it was in the air-conditioned
chambers of a city court judge rather than in the
usual place that the trial took place.
WHEREFORE, the writ of certiorari prayed for is
granted nullifying, setting aside, and declaring
bereft of any legal force or effect the order of
respondent Judge Felix Domingo, dated November
29, 1968 for being issued with grave abuse of
discretion. The writ of prohibition sought by
petitioner is likewise granted, commanding
respondent Judge or any one acting in his place to
desist from any further action in Civil Case No. 74830
of the Court of First Instance of Manila, except that
of dismissing the same. The preliminary writ of
injunction issued by this Court in its resolution of
February 26, 1969 against the actuation of
respondent Judge is made permanent. With costs
against respondent policemen, Edgardo Calo and
Simeon Carbonnel.
Makalintal, Actg. C .J ., Teehankee, Makasiar,
Antonio and Esquerra, JJ ., concur.
Castro, J ., did not take part.
Zaldivar and Barredo, JJ ., are on leave.
(People v. Mapalao, G.R. No. 92415, May 14, 1991)
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 92415. May 14, 1991.]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs. OMAR MAPALAO and REX MAGUMNANG,
defendants-appellants.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Paterno Aquino for defendants-appellants.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; APPEAL;
APPELLANT'S APPEAL MUST BE DISMISSED SINCE HE
REMAINED AT LARGE WHILE HIS APPEAL WAS
PENDING; REASON FOR RULE UNDER SECTION 8,
RULE 122 OF THE 1985 RULES ON CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE. Under Section 8, Rule 122 of the
1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, the Court, may
"upon motion of the appellee or on its own motion,
dismiss the appeal if the appellant escapes from
prison or confinement or jumps bail or flees to a
foreign country during the pendency of the
appeal." In this case, appellant Magumnang
remained at large even as his appeal was pending.
Hence, by analogy his appeal must be dismissed.
The reason for this rule is because once an accused
escapes from prison or confinement or jumps bail or
flees to a foreign country, he loses his standing in
court and unless he surrenders or submits to the
jurisdiction of the court he is deemed to have
waived any right to seek relief from the court.
2. ID.; ID.; JUDGMENT; SECTION 6, RULE 120 OF THE
1985 RULES ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE SHOULD BE
MODIFIED TO READ THAT ACCUSED WAIVES HIS
RIGHT TO APPEAL IF UPON PROMULGATION OF
JUDGMENT HE FAILS TO APPEAL WITHOUT JUSTIFIABLE
CAUSE. Section 6, Rule 120 of the 1985 Rules of
Criminal Procedure should be modified to read that
if upon promulgation of the judgment, the accused
fails to appeal without justifiable cause, despite due
notice to him, his bondsmen or counsel, he is
thereby considered to have waived his right to
appeal. However, if within the fifteen (15) day
period of appeal he voluntarily surrenders to the
court or is otherwise arrested, then he may avail of
the right to appeal within said period of appeal.
3. ID.; ID.; BAIL; ACCUSED WHO IS AT LARGE
CANNOT APPLY FOR BAIL OR BE GRANTED ANY
OTHER RELIEF BY THE COURTS UNTIL HE SUBMITS
HIMSELF TO ITS JURISDICTION OR IS ARRESTED. By
the same token, an accused who, after the filing of
an information, is at large and had not been
apprehended or otherwise has not submitted
himself to the jurisdiction of the court, cannot apply
for bail or be granted any other relief by the courts
until he submits himself to its jurisdiction or is
arrested.
24 | C O N S T I 2 _ S e c t i o n 1 4 _ R i g h t t o S p e e d y , I m p a r t i a l a n d P u b l i c T r i a l
4. ID.; EVIDENCE; PROOF OF GUILT; ESCAPE OF
ACCUSED IS EVIDENCE OF THEIR GUILT. Contrary
to the claim of appellant that he is innocent as he
did not escape together with Edris who was
allegedly the principal player in the holdup, the
fact remains that the appellant escaped to the
mountains together with his co-accused
Magumnang and Gumanak Ompa. Their escape is
evidence of their guilt.
DECISION
GANCAYCO, J p:
Highway robbery with homicide is a heinous
offense. It is condemnable enough for a person to
commit robbery by way of a holdup but if in the
process human life is taken, the criminal act is
certainly detestable. No less than the death penalty
provided by law should be meted out if we are to
contain the proliferation of this odious offense.
Unfortunately, unless Congress and Malacaang
act accordingly to consider by law this class of
crimes as heinous offenses, the Courts must have to
comply with the constitutional injunction against
the imposition of the supreme penalty. Cdpr
The facts are accurately related by the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Baguio City as follows:
"It appears from the Evidence that Adolfo
Quiambao is a businessman selling textile materials.
He has a stall in the Hilltop Market in Baguio where
he sells his goods. But sometimes on weekends, he
goes to Abatan, Buguias, Benguet to sell his goods.
On September 19, 1987 at about 3:00 to 4:00 A.M.,
he went to Abatan, Buguias, Benguet using his Ford
Fiera with his driver Felizardo Galves and a certain
Jimmy Jetwani (a bombay), where he sold his
goods in the afternoon until at night and so, stayed
overnight thereat.
The next day, at about 7:00 A.M. of September 20,
1987, after breakfast, Adolfo Quiambao, his driver
Felizardo Galvez, and Jimmy Jetwani proceeded to
Mankayan, Benguet. This time four Muslims rode
with them, namely: Omar Mapalao, Rex
Magumnang, Aliman Bara-akal, and a certain
Anwar Hadji Edris. Incidentally, Omar Mapalao and
Rex Magumnang had previously rode once with
Adolfo Quiambao in the latter's vehicle sometime
September 13, 1987 while Anwar Hadji Edris (alias
Randy) was known to Adolfo Quiambao for
sometime already. They arrived in Mankayan at
about 8:00 A.M. They stayed 4 hours in Mankayan
to sell goods and collect from customers.
At about 12:00 noon of the same day of September
20, 1987, they, the same passengers previously,
started from Mankayan going back to Abatan,
Buguias, Benguet, with one passenger added,
Simeon Calama. At Abatan, Adolfo Quiambao
collected amounts from his customers for about an
hour.
At about 1:00 to 2:00 P.M. on September 20, 1987,
Adolfo Quiambao proceeded on his way back to
Baguio. They were 10 in all who rode in his Ford
Fiera, namely: (1) his driver Felizardo Galves; (2)
Jimmy Jetwani; (3) Simeon Calama, a son of his
customer in Mankayan; (4) Rene Salonga, a friend
with whom he stayed in Abatan when he started his
business; (5) Eduardo Lopez, a co-vendor who sells
also goods in Abatan; (6) Omar Mapalao; (7) Rex
Magumnang; (8) Aliman Bara-akal; (9) Anwar Hadji
Edris; and (10) Adolfo Quiambao himself.
On the way, they stopped at Natubleng, Buguias,
Benguet at about 3:00 P.M. where Jimmy Jetwani
and Adolfo Quiambao collected their credits for
less than an hour.
From there, they proceeded to Sayangan, Atok,
Benguet where they stopped at about 5:00 P.M. for
Adolfo Quiambao and Jimmy Jetwani to collect
their credits. At Sayangan, too, they ate in a
restaurant.
It was about 6:00 P.M. already when they left
Sayangan to proceed to Baguio. But when they left
Sayangan, Adolfo Quiambao noticed that there
were now 5 Muslims with apparently Gumanak
Ompa joining them making them 11 passengers in
all in his Ford Fiera.
On the way back to Baguio, after about an hour of
driving, one of the passengers stopped the vehicle
in order to urinate. So they all alighted to urinate. At
this point, Adolfo Quiambao took over driving
telling his driver Felizardo Galvez to rest.
After about 30 minutes of driving from the time
Adolfo Quiambao took over, one of the Muslims
stopped the vehicle at Km. 24, Caliking, Atok,
Benguet, in order to urinate. And so again they
stopped with the Muslims alighting to urinate.
Thereafter, when Adolfo Quiambao was about to
start the vehicle to proceed to Baguio, while
waiting for the Muslims to board, Omar Mapalao
went to the left side of the vehicle near the driver's
seat, pointed a gun (Exh. G) at Adolfo Quiambao
and announced 'This is a holdup.' Another Muslim
went to the other side of the front seat while
another Muslim went to the back to guard the back
door of the Ford Fiera. And Gumanak Ompa and
Rex Magumnang, each armed with a knife, went
inside the back of the Ford Fiera and pointed their
knives on the passengers. Forthwith, Omar
Mapalao, while pointing the gun, ordered all
passengers in front to go inside the back of the
vehicle. Adolfo Quiambao and Jimmy Jetwani
complied. But as Adolfo Quiambao went inside the
back of the vehicle, he heard arguing outside and
noticed a rumble and a commotion by the left side
of the vehicle involving his driver, Felizardo Galvez,
and the Muslims. As a consequence, the driver
Galves was injured. Adolfo Quiambao pleaded
that they are willing to give their money and
valuables provided they (the Muslims) will not harm
them. Rex Magumnang and Gumanak Ompa,
25 | C O N S T I 2 _ S e c t i o n 1 4 _ R i g h t t o S p e e d y , I m p a r t i a l a n d P u b l i c T r i a l
while poking their knives on the passengers,
divested Adolfo Quiambao of P40,000.00, Jimmy
Jetwani of P14,000.00, and Simeon Calama of
P3,700.00 in cash, watch and clothes.
After divesting the passengers of their money, Rex
Magumnang went to the driver's seat to start the
vehicle but could not and so he called for Adolfo
Quiambao to start it. But Adolfo Quiambao, too,
could not start the vehicle. Angered, Omar
Mapalao started counting 1 to 3 threatening to
shoot Quiambao if the vehicle would not start.
Adolfo Quiambao pleaded that he was not the
driver and so called for Felizardo Galvez, despite
the latter being injured, to start the vehicle. After
Galvez was able to start the engine, immediately
Rex Magumnang went by the side of the driver,
Galvez, and took hold of the steering wheel while
ordering the latter to step on the accelerator and
proceed to the direction of the left side of the road
towards the precipice (bangin) indicating an
intention to have the vehicle driven to the
precipice. It was at this point when Galvez
struggled and fought with Rex Magumnang for
control of the steering wheel as it was being
directed to the ravine. It was good Galvez was able
to step on the brakes on time to prevent it from
falling into the precipice. It was then that Rex
Magumnang stabbed and thrust the knife on
Galvez with the latter jerking saying 'aray' in pain. At
this point, too, the passengers panicked and
jumped out of the vehicle scampering in different
directions for safety. Adolfo Quiambao jumped out
into the ground first and when he saw Mapalao
pointing a gun at him, he jumped into the precipice
thinking it was better than to be shot at and in
doing so hurt himself. The driver Galvez fell to the
ravine upon being stabbed. Jimmy Jetwani jumped
out of the vehicle and ran to the mountains without
looking back. Simeon Calama and Eduardo Lopez
and Rene Salonga, too, jumped out and sought
safety on the road.
Meantime, a vegetable truck passed by and
immediately Aliman Bara-akal boarded the same
on the front seat with the driver. Eduardo Lopez also
ran after the same truck and boarded it at the
back. Not far behind the first vegetable truck was
another vegetable truck following it. Simeon
Calama stopped it asking for help but Omar
Mapalao, with gun in his hand, prevented him. And
so the second vegetable truck went on but before
it could fully pass by, Simeon Calama took the
chance of boarding it when Omar Mapalao's
attention was diverted.
Thus, the two vegetable trucks proceeded on their
way till they stopped at the toll gate at Acop,
Tublay, Benguet. Immediately, Simeon Calama and
Eduardo Lopez alighted and reported to the Police
Station near the toll gate that they were held up
and that one of the Muslims who held them up was
in the first truck parked near the toll gate. Aliman
Bara-akal was, thus, arrested by the Tublay Police
and the amount of P4,015.00 was recovered from
him when frisked at the Police Station.
Meanwhile, at the crime scene, the 3 Muslims left
thereat, Omar Mapalao, Rex Magumnang and
Gumanak Ompa, fled to the mountains leaving
their victims and avoided the road so as not to be
seen.
It is not clear on record where Anwar Hadji Edris
(alias Randy) went after the holdup but in any case
he eluded arrest.
After the Muslims have left, Adolfo Quiambao went
up to the road level and by then saw also his driver
Galvez wounded lying in the precipice.
Thereafter, another vegetable truck passed by, and
Adolfo Quiambao asked the driver to help them
bring his wounded driver, Felizardo Galvez, from the
ravine. Thus, Galvez was brought up to the road
and placed inside the Ford Fiera. The vegetable
truck driver helped in starting the Ford Fiera. And
from there, they proceeded immediately to the
Benguet Hospital at La Trinidad, Benguet, but when
there was no doctor, they brought Galvez to the
Baguio General Hospital.
At the Baguio General Hospital, efforts to save the
life of Felizardo Galvez proved futile as the next
morning he died of his stab wounds.
Dr. Wi submitted an Autopsy Report (Exh. A) as
follows:
'I. STAB WOUNDS:
1. Right Mid-clavicular area, 7th Intercostal Space,
penetrating with round edges, 0.5 x 0.5 cm.
2. Left Lumbar area, level 11th Intercostal Space,
penetrating, with clean cut edges, 1.9 cm.
3. Anterior-superior right pre-auricular area, with
clean cut edges, 3.5 cm., and 2 cm. deep.
4. Right Mid-clavicular area level 2nd rib, non
penetrating, 3 x 0.7 cm., and 2 cm. deep.
5. Left anterior Deltoid area, 9.5 cm. (extended
Surgically).
6. Posterior leaf of the left Diaphragm 3 cm. with
hemorrhages around the wound.
7. Through and through, Right lower lobe of the
Lung, 0.5 x 0.5 cm. with round edges.
'II. INCISED WOUNDS:
1. Right lateral neck, superficial, 2 cm.
2. Left supraclavicular to left submandibular area,
superficial, 12.5 cm.
26 | C O N S T I 2 _ S e c t i o n 1 4 _ R i g h t t o S p e e d y , I m p a r t i a l a n d P u b l i c T r i a l
3. Left upper arm, lateral area, 2 cm. and 2 mm.
deep.'
Dr. Wi, also, submitted a sketch of the human body
showing the stab wounds sustained in the body of
Felizardo Galvez (Exh. B and Exh. C) and the Death
Certificate (Exh. D) showing the cause of death as
'Hypovolemic Shock secondary to Multiple Stab
wounds at the right anterior superior and auricular
area, right anterior chest, left deltoid area, left
lumbar area, posterior with laceration of the right
lower lobe of the lung, etc.'
Adolfo Quiambao was also treated of his injuries as
shown in his Medical Certificate (Exh. E).
Subsequently, the Tublay Police were able to locate
and apprehend on September 21, 1987 at Sto.
Nio, Tublay, Omar Mapalao, Rex Magumnang
and Gumanak Ompa.
Also, Jimmy Jetwani, who fled to the mountains at
the scene of the incident was found and rescued
the next morning after the holdup.
In a confrontation at the Tublay Police Station on
September 22, 1987, Adolfo Quiambao, Jimmy
Jetwani and Simeon Calama positively identified
the four (4) Muslims in custody, Omar Mapalao, Rex
Magumnang, Gumanak Ompa and Aliman Bara-
akal as among those who held them up at the
Halsema Road (mountain trail), Km. 24, Caliking,
Atok, Benguet.
Adolfo Quiambao, Jimmy Jetwani and Simeon
Calama gave their statements (Exhs. F, M and N) to
the police.
At the Tublay Police Station, too, the gun caliber .38
paltik (Exh. G) with 5 live ammunitions (Exhs. G-1 to
G-5) and the knife (Exh. G-6) used in the holdup
were recovered from the possession of Gumanak
Ompa.
Finally, the policemen who apprehended Aliman
Bara-akal at the toll gate executed a joint affidavit
(Exhs. O and P) and the policemen who
apprehended Mapalao, Ompa and Magumnang
at Sto. Nio, Tublay, executed a joint affidavit (Exh.
R)." 1
In due course, an amended information was filed in
the RTC of Baguio City charging Rex Magumnang,
Aliman Bara-akal, Anwar Hadji Edris, Gumanak
Ompa and Omar Mapalao of the crime of Highway
Robbery with Homicide, defined and penalized
under Presidential Decree No. 532, which was
allegedly committed on September 20, 1987 at Km.
24 along Halsema Road, Caliking, Atok, Benguet.
Upon arraignment, accused Omar Mapalao,
Gumanak Ompa, Rex Magumnang and Aliman
Bara-akal, assisted by their counsel, pleaded not
guilty.
Accused Anwar Hadji Edris had not been arrested
and remained at large. On March 17, 1988,
accused Aliman Bara-akal died in jail during the
trial so the case was dismissed as to him on April 4,
1988. Accused Rex Magumnang, after being
positively identified by witnesses Adolfo Quiambao,
Jimmy Jetwani and Simeon Calama during the trial,
escaped from detention on September 25, 1988
when brought for medical treatment to the Baguio
General Hospital, so the trial in absentia continued
as to him. LLpr
After the trial on the merits, a decision was
rendered by the trial court on January 12, 1990
convicting the accused of the offense charged as
follows
"WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused Omar
Mapalao y Dianalan, Gumanak Ompa, and Rex
Magumnang guilty beyond reasonable doubt as
principals by direct participation, of the offense of
Robbery with Homicide in a Highway in violation of
PD 532, as charged, and hereby sentences each of
them to suffer imprisonment of Reclusion Perpetua,
to indemnify jointly and severally the heirs of
deceased Felizardo Galvez the sum of Sixty
Thousand (P60,000.00) Pesos for his death; to
indemnify jointly and severally the offended parties
Adolfo Quiambao the sum of Forty Thousand
(P40,000.00) Pesos; Jimmy Jetwani the sum of
Fourteen Thousand (P14,000.00) Pesos; and Simeon
Calama, the sum of Three Thousand Seven
Hundred (P3,700.00) Pesos as actual damages, all
indemnifications being without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the
costs.
The accused Omar Mapalao and Gumanak Ompa
being detention prisoners are entitled to 4/5 of their
preventive imprisonment in accordance with Article
29 of the Revised Penal Code in the service of their
sentence.
The gun caliber .38 paltik (Exh. G) with 5 live
ammunitions (Exhs. G-1 to G-5), and the knife (Exh.
G-6) being instruments of the crime are hereby
declared forfeited and confiscated in favor of the
State.
SO ORDERED." 2
Not satisfied therewith the accused Omar Mapalao
and Rex Magumnang appealed the decision to this
Court alleging the following errors:
"I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO CONSIDER
SIGNIFICANT EXCULPATORY FACTS AND
CIRCUMSTANCES.
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO APPLY THE
CONSTITUTIONAL MANDATE ON THE PRESUMPTION
27 | C O N S T I 2 _ S e c t i o n 1 4 _ R i g h t t o S p e e d y , I m p a r t i a l a n d P u b l i c T r i a l
OF INNOCENCE AND PROOF BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT.
III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-
APPELLANTS GUILTY AS PRINCIPALS IN THE CRIME
CHARGED AND SENTENCING THEM TO SUFFER AN
INDETERMINATE SENTENCE OF FROM 17 YEARS, 4
MONTHS AND 1 DAY OF RECLUSION TEMPORAL AS
MINIMUM TO 20 YEARS OF RECLUSION TEMPORAL AS
MAXIMUM." 3
Parenthetically, the appeal of appellant Rex
Magumnang should be struck down. After
arraignment and during the trial, he escaped from
confinement and had not been apprehended
since then. Accordingly, as to him the trial in
absentia proceeded and thereafter the judgment
of conviction was promulgated.
Nevertheless, through counsel, he appealed to this
Court. Under Section 8, Rule 122 of the 1985 Rules of
Criminal Procedure, the Court, may "upon motion
of the appellee or on its own motion, dismiss the
appeal if the appellant escapes from prison or
confinement or jumps bail or flees to a foreign
country during the pendency of the appeal." In this
case, appellant Magumnang remained at large
even as his appeal was pending. Hence, by
analogy his appeal must be dismissed.
The reason for this rule is because once an accused
escapes from prison or confinement or jumps bail or
flees to a foreign country, he loses his standing in
court and unless he surrenders or submits to the
jurisdiction of the court he is deemed to have
waived any right to seek relief from the court.
Thus when as in this case he escaped from
confinement during the trial on the merits and after
his arraignment, and so the trial in absentia
proceeded and the judgment against him was
promulgated in accordance with Section 14(2)
Article III of the 1987 Constitution, nonetheless, as he
remained at large, he should not be afforded the
right to appeal therefrom unless he voluntarily
submits to the jurisdiction of the court or is otherwise
arrested, within fifteen (15) days from the notice of
the judgment against him. While at large as above
stated he cannot seek relief from the Court as he is
deemed to have waived the same and he has no
standing in court.
To this effect a modification is in order of the
provision of the last sentence of Section 6, Rule 120
of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure which
provides:
"If the judgment is for conviction, and the accused's
failure to appear was without justifiable cause, the
court shall further order the arrest of the accused,
who may appeal within fifteen (15) days from
notice of the decision to him or his counsel."
It should provide instead that if upon promulgation
of the judgment, the accused fails to appear
without justifiable cause, despite due notice to him,
his bondsmen or counsel, he is thereby considered
to have waived his right to appeal. However, if
within the fifteen (15) day period of appeal he
voluntarily surrenders to the court or is otherwise
arrested, then he may avail of the right to appeal
within said period of appeal.
By the same token, an accused who, after the filing
of an information, is at large and has not been
apprehended or otherwise has not submitted
himself to the jurisdiction of the court, cannot apply
for bail or be granted any other relief by the courts
until he submits himself to its jurisdiction or is
arrested. prLL
In Gimenez vs. Nazareno, 4 this Court had occasion
to rule on a similar case in this wise
"First of all, it is not disputed that the lower court
acquired jurisdiction over the person of the
accused-private respondent when he appeared
during the arraignment on August 22, 1973 and
pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. In criminal
cases, jurisdiction over the person of the accused is
acquired either by his arrest for voluntary
appearance in court. Such voluntary appearance
is accomplished by appearing for arraignment as
what accused-private respondent did in this case.
But the question is this was that jurisdiction lost
when the accused escaped from the custody of
the law and failed to appear during the trial? We
answer this question in the negative. As We have
consistently ruled in several earlier cases, jurisdiction
once acquired is not lost upon the instance of
parties but continues until the case is terminated.
To capsulize the foregoing discussion, suffice it to
say that where the accused appears at the
arraignment and pleads not guilty to the crime
charged, jurisdiction is acquired by the court over
his person and this continues until the termination of
the case, notwithstanding his escape from the
custody of the law.
Going to the second part of Section 19, Article IV of
the 1973 Constitution aforecited a 'trial in absentia'
may be had when the following requisites are
present; (1) that there has been an arraignment; (2)
that the accused has been notified; and (3) that he
fails to appear and his failure to do so is unjustified.
In this case, all the above conditions were
attendant calling for a trial in absentia. As the facts
show, the private respondent was arraigned on
August 22, 1973 and in the said arraignment he
pleaded not guilty. He was also informed of the
scheduled hearings set on September 18 and 19,
1973 and this is evidenced by his signature on the
notice issued by the lower court. It was also proved
by a certified copy of the Police Blotter that private
28 | C O N S T I 2 _ S e c t i o n 1 4 _ R i g h t t o S p e e d y , I m p a r t i a l a n d P u b l i c T r i a l
respondent escaped from his detention center. No
explanation for his failure to appear in court in any
of the scheduled hearings was given. Even the trial
court considered his absence unjustified.
The lower court in accordance with the aforestated
provisions of the 1973 Constitution, correctly
proceeded with the reception of the evidence of
the prosecution and the other accused in the
absence of private respondent, but it erred when it
suspended the proceedings as to the private
respondent and rendered a decision as to the
other accused only.
Upon the termination of a trial in absentia, the court
has the duty to rule upon the evidence presented
in court. The court need not wait for the time until
the accused who escaped from custody finally
decides to appear in court to present his evidence
and cross-examine the witnesses against him. To
allow the delay of proceedings for this purpose is to
render ineffective the constitutional provision on
trial in absentia. As it has been aptly explained:
'. . . The Constitutional Convention felt the need for
such a provision as there were quite a number of
reported instances where the proceedings against
a defendant had to be stayed indefinitely because
of his non-appearance. What the Constitution
guarantees him is a fair trial, not continued
enjoyment of his freedom even if his guilt could be
proved. With the categorical statement in the
fundamental law that his absence cannot justify a
delay provided that he has been duly notified and
his failure to appear is unjustified, such an abuse
could be remedied. That is the way it should be, for
both society and the offended party have a
legitimate interest in seeing to it that crime should
not go unpunished.'
The contention of the respondent judge that the
right of the accused to be presumed innocent will
be violated if a judgment is rendered as to him is
untenable. He is still presumed innocent. A
judgment of conviction must still be based upon the
evidence presented in court. Such evidence must
prove him guilty beyond reasonable doubt. Also,
there can be no violation of due process since the
accused was given the opportunity to be heard.
Nor can it be said that an escapee who has been
tried in absentia retains his rights to cross-examine
and to present evidence on his behalf. By his failure
to appear during the trial of which he had notice,
he virtually waived these rights. This Court has
consistently held that the right of the accused to
confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses is
a personal right and may be waived. In the same
vein, his right to present evidence on his behalf, a
right given to him for his own benefit and
protection, may be waived by him.
Finally, at this point, We note that Our
pronouncement in this case is buttressed by the
provisions of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure,
particularly Section 1(c) of Rule 115 which clearly
reflects the intention of the framers of
Constitution, to wit:
'. . . The absence of the accused without any
justifiable cause at the trial on a particular date of
which he had notice shall be considered a waiver
of his right to be present during that trial. When an
accused under custody had been notified of the
date of the trial and escapes, he shall be deemed
to have waived his right to be present on said date
and on all subsequent trial dates until custody is
regained . . .'
Accordingly, it is Our considered opinion, and We
so hold, that an escapee who has been duly tried
in absentia waives his right to present evidence on
his own behalf and to confront and cross-examine
witnesses who testified against him."
Now to the appeal of appellant Omar Mapalao.
The main thrust of his appeal is a denial of his
complicity. While he admitted to be among the
passengers of the vehicle on that fateful day and
to be present during the holdup, he alleged that he
did not participate at all in the commission of the
crime and that he did not know anything about its
commission as in fact he left with Magumnang after
the alleged holdup. He also asserted that the
prosecution witnesses could not have identified him
in view of the darkness of the night then. He said
that when they were apprehended by the police
no firearm or money was found in his possession.
The Court finds that the appeal is devoid of merit.
The evidence shows very clearly that on the date of
the holdup the appellant was already a passenger
in the vehicle of Adolfo Quiambao since 7:00 A.M.
of September 20, 1987 which was driven by
Felizardo Galvez, with Jimmy Jetwani, Quiambao,
Rex Magumnang, Aliman Bara-akal, Anwar Hadji
Edris and Calama. They were together the whole
day up to the evening in going to Abatan, Buguias,
Benguet and in the afternoon of the same day they
were also together on the way back to Baguio from
Abatan until the holdup occurred in the early
evening of the same day at Km. 24, Caliking, Atok,
Benguet. The Muslims stopped the vehicle to
urinate at said place. Appellant went to the left
side of the vehicle near the driver's seat and
pointed a gun at Quiambao and announced "this is
a holdup." A Muslim went to the other side of the
front sea while another Muslim went to the back to
stand guard. Gumanak Ompa and Rex
Magumnang, each armed with a knife, went inside
the back of the Ford Fiera and pointed their knives
at the passengers. Appellant while pointing the gun
ordered the passengers to go to the back of the
vehicle so Quiambao and Jetwani complied. After
Quiambao went to the back of the vehicle he
noticed a commotion near the left side of the
vehicle involving his driver Galvez and the Muslims.
Galvez was harmed. Quiambao pleaded that they
are willing to give their money and valuables
provided the Muslims will not harm them. Rex
29 | C O N S T I 2 _ S e c t i o n 1 4 _ R i g h t t o S p e e d y , I m p a r t i a l a n d P u b l i c T r i a l
our Magumnang and Gumanak Ompa divested
Quiambao of P40,000.00, Jetwani of P14,000.00 and
Calama of P3,700.00 in cash, a watch and clothes
while poking their knives at them. cdrep
Magumnang tried to start the vehicle but as he
could not he called Quiambao to start it but the
latter also failed. Angered, the appellant started
counting 1 to 3 threatening to shoot Quiambao if
the vehicle did not start. Quiambao called Galvez
who was able to start the engine. Magumnang
went by the side of Galvez and took the steering
wheel and drove towards the precipice. Galvez
struggled and fought with Magumnang for control
of the steering wheel as it was directed to the
ravine. Magumnang stabbed and thrust the knife at
Galvez. The passengers panicked and jumped and
ran away in different directions. Mapalao,
Magumnang and Ompa fled to the mountains.
From the foregoing evidence of the prosecution
there can be no question as to the participation of
the appellant in the robbery holdup. He was
positively identified by witnesses who were together
with the appellant from the morning up to the
evening of the same day in the Ford Fiera.
Quiambao categorically testified that it was the
appellant who was holding the gun with two hands
ordered them to give their cash collections and
personal belongings to them. 5 Jimmy Jetwani
corroborated Quiambao's testimony in that it was
the appellant who ordered them at gunpoint to get
down from the vehicle and to go to the back and
to give their money to them. Although it was
already dark there was a light inside the vehicle. 6
On cross-examination Jetwani stuck to his
identification of the appellant as one of the culprits
as he saw not only his face but the gun he used by
the side of the door facing him and Quiambao. 7
Another prosecution witness, Simeon Calama, also
identified appellant as the one who pointed a gun
at them in front. He stated he is familiar with his
voice as during the journey they were joking with
each other. 8
The identification of the culprits in offenses of this
nature is vital and decisive. In this case the
identification was made by eyewitnesses who were
together with the appellant practically the whole
day in the same vehicle, and who themselves are
the victims of the holdup staged by the appellant
with his other co-accused. Although it was already
dark there was light in the vehicle. Moreover, there
were no other persons in the vicinity at the time of
the holdup except the appellant, his co-accused
and the victims. LLphil
Contrary to the claim of appellant that he is
innocent as he did not escape together with Edris
who was allegedly the principal player in the
holdup, the fact remains that the appellant
escaped to the mountains together with his co-
accused Magumnang and Gumanak Ompa. Their
escape is evidence of their guilt.
As the Court observed at the opening paragraph of
this decision, robbery attended by homicide or
murder is certainly a heinous offense, more so when
in this case it is committed in the highway. There is
hardly any justification for the court to share the
leniency of the trial court by imposing only the life
imprisonment as penalty. The circumstances of the
commission of the offense do not justify at all or
require any killing or injury to be inflicted on any of
the victims. The appellant and his confederates
were all armed while the victims were not. They
were at their mercy. None of them attempted to
fight back or to resist. They gave all their valuables
and personal belongings. All they were pleading for
was that their lives be spared. It fell on deaf ears. It
was a senseless killing for no valid reason. The
appellant and his confederates deserve the
supreme penalty of death and no less. Cdpr
But as the Court said, this is not possible under the
Constitution.
Our peace and order situation today is very volatile.
We have experienced several attempted coups
and we are warned of other possible coups. Our
peace and order problem is a continuing one. The
division in our society is obvious and gaping. Our
country is suffering from the economic depression
caused not only by the recent calamities that
visited us which were compounded by the Gulf
War. Thus, measures should be undertaken in order
to minimize if not entirely prevent serious crimes
against life, chastity and of property resulting in the
wanton taking of human life. Our hope is for a
lasting peace and order in our society. A law must
now be enacted defining what are the heinous
offenses punishable with the death penalty. We
should not tarry too long.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED in
toto, with costs against the defendants-appellants.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan (C.J.), Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez,
Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Grio-
Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado and Davide, Jr., JJ.,
concur.
Sarmiento, J., concurs in the result. I am against the
death penalty.
30 | C O N S T I 2 _ S e c t i o n 1 4 _ R i g h t t o S p e e d y , I m p a r t i a l a n d P u b l i c T r i a l
(People v. Valeriano y Tumahig, G.R. Nos. 103604-
05, September 23, 1993)
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. Nos. 103604-05. September 23, 1993.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
ENGRACIO VALERIANO Y TUMAHIG, MACARIO E.
ACABAL @ "MOMONG," JUANITO RISMUNDO,
ABUNDIO NAHID and JOHN DOES, accused.
MACARIO E. ACABAL, JUANITO RISMUNDO and
ABUNDIO NAHID, accused-appellants.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Marcelo G. Flores for accused-appellants.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE;
JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION; RULE FOR VALIDITY
THEREOF; SUBSTANTIALLY COMPLIED WITH IN CASE
AT BAR. We find that the decision substantially
complies with the Rules of Court on judgments as it
did sentence the accused-appellants to reclusion
perpetua. A judgment of conviction shall state (a)
the legal qualification of the offense constituted by
the acts committed by the accused, and the
aggravating or mitigating circumstances attending
the commission, if there are any; (b) the
participation of the accused in the commission of
the offense, whether as principal, accomplice or
accessory after the fact; (c) the penalty imposed
upon the accused; and (d) the civil liability or
damages caused by the wrongful act to be
recovered from the accused by the offended
party, if there is any, unless the enforcement of the
civil liability by a separate action has been reserved
or waived. As we earlier observed, the challenged
decision does not contain the usual dispositive
portion. The last two paragraphs of the decision
merely embody its conclusions that: (1) the
appellants are guilty of murder, and (2) taking into
account the "attendant qualifying aggravating
circumstances of nighttime, use of fire by burning
the house of the victim, . . . the abuse of superior
strength," "the penalty imposable . . . will be in its
maximum degree, that is reclusion perpetua"
considering that "the penalty now for murder is
reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua." While the
decision leaves much to be desired, it nevertheless
contains the court's findings of facts, the law
applicable to the set of facts and what it believes
to be the imposable penalty under the law, that is,
reclusion perpetua which is actually the penalty
imposed on the accused-appellants. It is obvious
that they clearly understood that they were found
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
murder and were sentenced to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua in Criminal Case No. 4585. Were
it otherwise, they would not have declared in open
court their intention to appeal immediately after
the promulgation of the decision and would not
have subsequently filed their written notice of
appeal.

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; NOTICE OF APPEAL FILED BEFORE THE
PROMULGATION THEREOF WILL NOT DIVEST THE
COURT'S JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON OF THE
ACCUSED; CASE AT BAR. Accused-appellants
contend that the trial court did not impose any
sentence and so cannot cancel anymore their bail
bonds and direct their arrest and immediate
commitment because it already lost jurisdiction
over their persons when they perfected their
appeal. In connection with Section 3, Rule 114 of
the Revised Rules of Court on bail, we ruled in
People vs. Cortez that: ". . . an accused who is
charged with a capital offense or an offense
punishable by reclusion perpetua, and is thereafter
convicted of the offense charged, shall no longer
be entitled to bail as a matter of right even if he
appeals the case to this Court since his conviction
clearly imports that the evidence of his guilt of the
offense charged is strong." We have already said
that the decision did impose the penalty of
reclusion perpetua. Since the order cancelling their
bail bonds and directing their arrest is contained in
the decision itself, it is apparent that their
abovementioned contention is highly illogical. At
the time the order in question was made, the trial
court still had jurisdiction over the persons of the
accused-appellants. For too obvious reasons, their
notices of appeal which they claim have put an
end to the trial court's jurisdiction over them could
not have been filed before the promulgation of the
decision. The order is therefore valid and
enforceable. Also, it may be recalled that the
accused-appellants had earlier raised this issue
before us in a petition for habeas corpus dated 16
January 1992 and docketed as G.R. Nos. 103602-03.
We dismissed that petition on 17 February 1992 for
failure to comply with requirement no. (2) of
Revised Circular No. 1-88 and Circular No. 28-91 on
forum shopping. Their motion for reconsideration
was denied on 27 May 1993.
3. ID.; EVIDENCE; BURDEN OF PROOF IN CRIMINAL
CASES; LIES WITH THE PROSECUTION. The
testimony of the other witnesses for the prosecution
likewise do not provide sufficient proof of the
accused-appellant's guilt. Visitacion Silvano's
testimony that she saw and identified the accused-
appellants at the scene of the crime taxes the
imagination. It was humanly impossible for her to
see the accused-appellants even if she were aided
by the light from the truck as she herself said that
she was then in her house, three kilometers away
from the house of her parents-in-law. Wilson Silvano
did not testify at all that he saw the persons who
hacked and killed his mother. In conclusion,
because of reasonable doubt as to their guilt, the
accused-appellants must be acquitted. Every
accused is presumed innocent until the contrary is
proved; that presumption is solemnly guaranteed
by the Bill of Rights. The contrary requires proof
beyond reasonable doubt, or that degree of proof
which produces conviction in an unprejudiced
mind. Short of this, it is not only the right of the
accused to be freed; it is even the constitutional
duty of the court to acquit him. Accordingly, unless
31 | C O N S T I 2 _ S e c t i o n 1 4 _ R i g h t t o S p e e d y , I m p a r t i a l a n d P u b l i c T r i a l
the prosecution discharges its burden of proving
the guilt of the accused-appellants beyond
reasonable doubt, they need not even offer
evidence in their behalf. The weakness of their
defense of alibi thus becomes irrelevant.
4. CRIMINAL LAW; AGGRAVATING
CIRCUMSTANCES; WHEN ALLEGED AS GENERIC
AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES, COURT CANNOT
ELEVATE THE SAME AS QUALIFYING
CIRCUMSTANCES. The trial court, however, erred
in considering nighttime, use of fire and abuse of
superior strength as "attendant qualifying
aggravating circumstances." The information in
Criminal Case No. 4585 alleged only treachery and
evident premeditation as qualifying aggravating
circumstances. Nighttime, band, use of fire, craft,
fraud or disguise and ignominy were alleged as
generic aggravating circumstances only. The trial
court cannot elevate the status of any of the
generic aggravating circumstances and consider
them as qualifying circumstances for the crime of
murder. Moreover, nighttime is not a qualifying
circumstance under Article 248 of the Revised
Penal Code.
5. ID.; MURDER; IMPOSABLE PENALTY. It was an
error for the trial court to state that "the penalty now
for murder is reclusion temporal to reclusion
perpetua." The penalty for murder remains to be
reclusion temporal maximum to death. But in view
of paragraph (1), Section 19, Article III of the
Constitution prohibiting the imposition of the
penalty of death, where death would have been
the proper penalty instead of reclusion perpetua.
6. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; TRIAL IN
ABSENTIA; WHEN AVAILABLE. The trial court further
erred in holding that no penalty could be imposed
on accused Engracio Valeriano in Criminal Case
No. 4584 because he "is nowhere to be found,
hence, not brought to the bar of justice, he being a
fugitive or at large." The court ignored the fact that
Engracio jumped bail after he had been arraigned,
just before the retaking of evidence commenced.
Paragraph (2), Section 14, Article III of the
Constitution permits trial in absentia after the
accused has been arraigned provided he has
been duly notified of the trial and his failure to
appear thereat is unjustified. One who jumps bail
can never offer a justifiable reason for his non-
appearance during the trial. Accordingly, after the
trial in absentia, the court can render judgment in
the case and promulgation may be made by
simply recording the judgment in the criminal
docket with a copy thereof served upon his
counsel, provided that the notice requiring him to
be present at the promulgation is served through his
bondsmen or warden and counsel.
DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., J p:
In two separate informations dated 28 February
1981 and filed with the then Court of First Instance,
now Regional Trial Court, of Negros Oriental,
Engracio Valeriano, Juanito Rismundo, Macario
Acabal, Abundio Nahid and several John Does
were charged with the crimes of Murder and
Frustrated Murder. The accusatory portion in the
information for murder, 1 docketed as Criminal
Case No. 4585, reads as follows:
"That sometime in the evening of the 28th of
January, 1980, at Nagbinlod, Municipality of Sta.
Catalina, Province of Negros Oriental, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, including several 'John
Does', conspiring and confederating with one
another, with intent to kill, and with treachery and
evident premeditation and being then armed with
bolos and 'pinuti', did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and use
personal violence on the person of one Rizalina
Apatan Silvano while the latter was about to leave
her house and inflicting upon her injuries, to wit:
'right leg amputated below the knee; left leg
hacked behind the knee; abdomen hacked with
viscerae evacerated,' and did then and there set
the house on fire while the aforementioned Rizalina
Apatan Silvano was inside said house trying to
escape therefrom, and allowing her to be burned
inside said house which was burned to the ground,
thereby causing upon said Rizalina Apatan Silvano
her death and burning her beyond recognition.
That the crime was committed with attendant
aggravating circumstances of nighttime, by a
band, by means of fire, craft [,] fraud or disguise
employed; and that means have been employed
which brought added ignominy to the natural
effects of their acts.
Contrary to Article 248 in relation to Article 14 of the
Revised Penal Code."
The information for frustrated murder, 2 docketed
as Criminal Case No. 4584, alleged that in the
evening of the 28th of January 1980 immediately
after the commission of the murder charged in
Criminal Case No. 4585 the accused hacked
and struck Wilson Silvano, son of the victim in the
murder case, with bladed weapons such as bolos
and pinuti thereby inflicting upon him multiple hack
wounds which would have produced the crime of
murder were it not for the timely and able medical
assistance given to him. It further alleged that the
crime was committed with the qualifying
circumstance of alevosia or treachery and the
aggravating circumstances of nighttime, by a
band, with the aid of armed men or persons who
insure or afford impunity, and that craft, fraud or
disguise were employed.
At the arraignment, all the accused, except the
John Does who remained unidentified and at large,
pleaded not guilty in both cases. 3 Thereafter, upon
agreement of the parties, joint trial was ordered by
the trial court. 4
32 | C O N S T I 2 _ S e c t i o n 1 4 _ R i g h t t o S p e e d y , I m p a r t i a l a n d P u b l i c T r i a l
Trial on the merits was conducted by Branch 37 of
the court a quo presided over by Judge Temistocles
B. Diez. But on 16 May 1987, a fire gutted the
building where Branch 37 was located and the
records of these two cases were burned. The
records were subsequently reconstituted upon
petition of the prosecuting fiscal. 5 The testimonies
of the witnesses were retaken, however, before it
could commence, accused Engracio Valeriano
jumped bail and the warrant for his arrest issued on
16 November 1987 was returned unserved because
he could not be found. 6 An alias warrant for his
arrest was issued on 26 June 1989, 7 but he remains
at large up to the present.
The evidence for the prosecution, as disclosed by
the testimonies of its witnesses, is as follows:
Antonio Silvano, then the barangay captain of
Barangay Nagbinlud, Sta. Catalina, Negros
Oriental, testified that at about 8:30 o'clock in the
evening of 28 January 1980, or two nights before
the 30 January 1980 local election, three men
entered his yard. He recognized these men as
Juanito Rismundo, his neighbor since 1964, Engracio
Valeriano, also another neighbor, and Macario
Acabal, his sub-barangay captain. 8 The three men
called him, but he did not answer. Instead, his wife,
Rizalina, did and she told them that he was
attending a meeting "in the town." They did not
believe her and replied that they just saw Antonio
enter the house. Juanito asked her whether they
(Antonio and Rizalina) were selling their votes
because they will buy them but Rizalina answered
in the negative. Juanito then said, "You choose, if
you want something to happen to you or not [sic]."
Another man, Abundio Nahid, asked Antonio to
come down because they have something to tell
him. As Antonio was about to kick the door open,
he saw the men outside his house increasing in
number and were armed with bladed weapons
(pinuti). When he turned around, Antonio smelled
gasoline and he saw Abundio Nahid set fire to his
store located at the right side of his house. 9 He and
his wife Rizalina escaped to the roof of the kitchen
while the other members of their family who were in
that house their son Elmer Silvano and eldest
daughter Celsita Legaspina with her two children -
escaped towards the sugarcane field which was
about thirty meters away. When Rizalina fell from
the roof to the floor, Macario Acabal, Juanito
Rismundo and Engracio Valeriano hacked her.
Each of them delivered a single blow with Abundio
Nahid hitting her four times. 10
On cross-examination, Antonio Silvano admitted
that, as barangay captain of Nagbinlud, Sta.
Catalina, and as trusted man of Mrs. Clotilde
Carballo in whose land his house is built, he
supported the latter as the official candidate of the
KBL for Mayor of Sta. Catalina, as well as the other
candidates of her party for the local election of 30
January 1980, including Lorenzo Teves, the KBL's
candidate for Governor of the Province of Negros
Oriental. On the other hand, the accused
supported and campaigned hard for Mrs.
Carballo's opponent, a certain Jose Napigkit who
was a candidate of the Pusyon Bisaya and who
eventually won in the election. In his barrio, Mrs.
Carballo lost heavily to Napigkit. 11 He further
admitted that although he first reported the
incident to the Philippine Constabulary (PC) which
investigated him, he cannot remember if he was
made to sign anything by the PC investigator. On
15 February 1980, he was again investigated but
this time in the office of Governor Teves. There, he
was made to subscribe and swear to an affidavit 12
that, as admitted by the prosecuting fiscal, was
made the basis for the filing of the information. No
statement by the PC was presented to the fiscal. 13
Visitacion Silvano, wife of Wilson who is the son of
Antonio and Rizalina, testified that she heard the
shouts for help of her mother-in-law 14 so she woke
up Wilson. He then went down the house and
turned on the headlights of the truck parked in front
of their house facing his parents' house which was
located three kilometers away. He ran towards the
burning house of his parents but before he reached
it, he was met by Engracio Valeriano and the latter
hacked him. When he ran away, Engracio's
companions, Juanito Rismundo, Macario Acabal
and Abundio Nahid, chased him until he reached
the sugarcane fields. 15 Visitacion stayed in her
house and saw Engracio Valeriano hack her
husband. She also saw the other accused-
appellants in the vicinity of the house of her
parents-in-law. 16
Dr. Avelino Torres, Chief of Hospital of Bayawan
District Hospital, examined the body of Rizalina
Silvano at 1:00 o'clock in the early morning of 29
January 1980 and was presented as a witness for
the prosecution. According to him, the body was
burned and charred beyond recognition but the
parts thereof were still intact. It was still warm and
smelt of freshly burned flesh. 17 He found the
following "evidence of hacking:"
"(1) right leg amputated below the knee;
(2) left leg hacked behind the knee;
(3) abdomen hacked with viscerae eviscerated." 18
He concluded that the wounds were inflicted
before the body was burned. 19 He also examined
Wilson Silvano at about 1:30 o'clock that same
morning and found seven hack wounds on Wilson.
He testified at the trial that without medical
attention, Wilson could have bled to death. 20
Atty. Castulo Caballes, then the Clerk of Court of
the Court of First Instance of Negros Oriental, stated
in court that on 7 February 1980, he was fetched
from his house by someone from the office of
Governor Lorenzo Teves and was asked to assist the
Governor in taking the affidavit of Juanito
Rismundo. 21 After the latter "admitted that was his
affidavit," he "subscribed to him the oath and so
[he] signed as a notary public." 22 In this affidavit,
Rismundo implicated Jose Napigkit as having
33 | C O N S T I 2 _ S e c t i o n 1 4 _ R i g h t t o S p e e d y , I m p a r t i a l a n d P u b l i c T r i a l
ordered the kidnapping and killing of KBL leaders
and the burning of their houses.
Also on 7 February 1980, according to Atty. Elson
Bustamante, then Assistant Provincial Attorney, he
was called by Governor Teves to assist in the taking
of the statements also of Juanito Rismundo. The
Governor himself propounded the questions to
Juanito who was accompanied by the son of Mrs.
Carballo and a PC soldier named Lodove.
Bustamante heard Mrs. Carballo's son tell the
Governor that Juanito went to their (Carballos')
house and "confessed" to a certain incident which
happened in Sta. Catalina on 28 January 1980, and
since there were PC soldiers still assigned to the
Carballos' residence at that time, they brought
Juanito to Governor Teves, the Provincial Chairman
of the KBL. 23
Another prosecution witness, Jufelinito Pareja, then
Provincial Fiscal of Negros Oriental, told the court
that on 18 February 1980, accused Macario Acabal
was brought to his office. Acabal subscribed and
swore to a statement before him. The latter first
read it to Acabal and after ascertaining that
Acabal voluntarily executed the statement, he
administered the oath to said affiant. 24 This sworn
statement also implicated Jose Napigkit.
Accused-appellants put up the defense of alibi.
They allege that they were in different places when
the incident in question occurred. Macario Acabal
was in sitio Canggabok, Nagbinlud, Sta. Catalina,
attending the wake for deceased barangay
captain Filomeno Cumahig. 25 On 29 January 1980,
he was arrested by military men in the house of his
aunt at the breakwater of Poblacion Sta. Catalina.
One of them struck him three times on his left and
right chest with an armalite rifle. Thereafter, he was
loaded into a pick-up truck owned by Mrs. Clotilde
Carballo and taken to her house. On 7 February
1980, he was brought to Bayawan and was again
manhandled, causing injuries to him which required
treatment at the Bayawan District Hospital, as
certified by Dr. Torres. From the hospital, he was
brought to the municipal jail of Bayawan and then
to the Provincial Jail in Dumaguete City. Later, he
was taken to the office of the Governor and was
forced to sign an affidavit (Exhibit "F"). Prior to 28
January 1989, he did not know the other accused in
this case. 26
Juanito Rismundo was in Sitio Dinapo, Bgy.
Alangilan, Sta. Catalina, graining corn in the house
of Alfreda Ortega. 27 On 6 February 1980, he met a
PC soldier named Boy Gudobe (Lodove), who was
then stationed in Bgy. Kawitan, Sta. Catalina,
accompanied by Diosdado Silvano, grandson of
Antonio Silvano, at the Sta. Catalina market.
Gudobe allegedly hit him and, together with
Diosdado and a Boy Carballo, the son of Mrs.
Clotilde Carballo, brought him to the Capitol
Building in Dumaguete City. While there, he averred
that he was forced by a lawyer to sign an affidavit
(Exhibit "D") in the office of the Governor after he
was struck with the handle of a revolver at the back
of his head. 28
Abundio Nahid was in his house in Sugong Milagros,
Sta. Catalina, Negros Oriental, about 20 kilometers
from Nagbinlud. He charged that Wilson Silvano
testified against him because the Silvanos
supported Mrs. Carballo of the KBL while he led the
supporters of Mrs. Carballo's opponent Jose
Napigkit of the Pusyon Bisaya. 29
The prosecution presented on rebuttal Mrs. Clotilde
Carballo and Fiscal Wilfredo Salmin. The former
testified that on 7 February 1980 accused Juanito
Rismundo voluntarily surrendered to her at her
residence in Sta. Catalina and told her that he
wanted to see the Governor. She then asked her
son to bring Juanito to Dumaguete City. 30
Fiscal Wilfredo Salmin belied the claim of Acabal
that he (Salmin) went to the Provincial Jail on 10
February 1980 and forced Acabal to sign a
document. He alleged that on 16 February 1980,
not on 10 February 1980 as claimed by Acabal,
Acabal came to his office at the Provincial
Attorney's Office and executed a sworn statement,
but Acabal did not sign the same upon the advice
of Atty. Geminiano Eleccion. 31
After the completion of the re-taking of the
testimonies of the witnesses in Branch 37, Criminal
Cases Nos. 4584 and 4585 were re-raffled to Branch
33 of the trial court, then presided over by Judge
Pacifico S. Bulado. 32
The decision 33 of the trial court, per Judge Pacifico
S. Bulado, dated 31 October 1991 but promulgated
on 20 December 1991, contained no specific
dispositive portion. Its rulings are found in the last
two paragraphs which read as follows:
"The elements of murder in this case, Criminal Case
No. 4585 for the killing of Rizalina Apatan-Silvano
having been proved by the prosecution beyond
doubt, the accused JUANITO RISMUNDO, MACARIO
ACABAL and ABUNDIO NAHID, considering the
attendant qualifying aggravating circumstances of
nighttime, use of fire by burning the house of victim
Rizalina Apatan-Silvano in order to forcibly drive her
out of her house and hack her to death, the abuse
of superior strength, the penalty impossable [sic]
here will be in its maximum degree, that is reclusion
perpetua taking into account Article 248 of the
Revised Penal Code, the penalty now for murder is
Reclusion Temporal to Reclusion Perpetua, and for
all the accused to indemnify the heirs of the victim
the sum of Thirty Thousand (P30,000.00) Pesos since
this case occurred [sic] in 1980. For the wounding of
the victim Wilson A. Silvano, this Court believes that
simple frustrated homicide only is committed by the
accused Engracio Valeriano only. But since the
person who actually inflicted the injuries of victim
Wilson Silvano, accused Engracio Valeriano only is
nowhere to be found, hence, not brought to the
34 | C O N S T I 2 _ S e c t i o n 1 4 _ R i g h t t o S p e e d y , I m p a r t i a l a n d P u b l i c T r i a l
bar of justice, he being a fugitive or at large, no
penalty could be imposed on him since he is
beyond the jurisdiction of this court to reach. All the
other two (2) accused, JUANITO RISMUNDO and
ABUNDIO NAHID are hereby ordered and declared
absolved from any criminal responsibility from
frustrated homicide.
The bail bond put up by the three accused,
namely: Juanito Rismundo, Macario Acabal and
Abundio Nahid are hereby ordered cancelled and
let a warrant of arrest be issued for their immediate
confinement." 34
The trial court rejected the defense of alibi because
"[i]t was not shown by plausible and convincing
evidence . . . that it was physically impossible for
them to go to the scene of the crime and to return
to the place of residence (People vs. Solis, 182
SCRA 182)." Upon the other hand, it ruled that "the
prosecution witnesses . . . clearly, positively
identified them as the culprits, they being neighbors
for a long time and co-workers." 35
Immediately after the promulgation of the decision,
counsel for the accused manifested in open court
their intention to appeal the decision. On the same
day, counsel for accused Abundio Nahid filed a
notice of appeal with a motion for the immediate
release of his client, which was opposed by the
prosecution. The court a quo denied the motion
also on the same day. 36
On 31 December 1991, all the convicted accused
filed a motion for the reconsideration of the denial
of the motion for immediate release. The later
motion was denied on 3 January 1992. A day earlier
or on 2 January 1992, accused Macario Acabal
and Juanito Rismundo had filed their notice of
appeal. 37
The records of both cases were transmitted to us
and we accepted the appeal on 26 February 1992.
The accused-appellants raise in their Brief 38 the
following assignment of errors:
"I. THAT THE HONORABLE LOWER COURT ERRED IN
CANCELLING THE BAIL BONDS OF ACCUSED-
APPELLANTS AND ORDERING THEIR IMMEDIATE
ARRESTS WHEN THE ONLY PENALTY IMPOSED BY IT
FOR ALL THE ACCUSED IS "TO INDEMNIFY THE HEIRS
OF THE VICTIM THE SUM OF THIRTY THOUSAND
(P30,000.00) PESOS.
II. THE HONORABLE LOWER COURT GRAVELY ERRED
IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS GUILTY
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME OF
MURDER AS DEFINED AND PUNISHED UNDER ARTICLE
248 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE.
III. THE HONORABLE COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN
FINDING THAT THE PROSECUTION WITNESSES
(ANTONIO SILVANO, WILSON SILVANO, AND
VISITACION SILVANO), HUSBAND AND CHILDREN,
RESPECTIVELY, OF THE DECEASED RIZALINA APATAN-
SILVANO, HAVE POSITIVELY IDENTIFIED THE ACCUSED
AS THE CULPRITS WHEN ONLY ANTONIO SILVANO
TESTIFIED AS TO WHO ALLEGEDLY KILLED HIS WIFE,
AND WHILE OTHER TWO (2) WITNESSES ONLY
TESTIFIED AS TO THE WOUNDING OF WILSON
SILVANO BY ENGRACIO VALERIANO AND ALL THESE
WITNESSES WERE VERY VOCAL IN THEIR SILENCE AS
TO THE IDENTITIES OF THE ACCUSED FOR A LONG
TIME.
IV. AND, THAT THE HONORABLE LOWER COURT
GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING ALL THE
ACCUSED FOR INSUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE
AND/OR AT LEAST ON THE HYPOTHESIS OF
REASONABLE DOUBT."
In support of the first assigned error, they claim that:
(a) the trial court could not have ordered the
cancellation of their bail bonds and their arrest and
immediate confinement because the only penalty
it imposed on them was "to indemnify the heirs of
the victim the sum of thirty thousand (P30,000.00)
pesos" without imposing any sentence; it merely
suggested that ". . . the penalty impossable [sic]
here will be in its maximum degree, that is reclusion
perpetua . . ."; and (b) since they already perfected
their appeal immediately after the promulgation of
the sentence, the trial court lost jurisdiction over the
case and could not validly cancel their bail bonds
and order their arrest. 39
In its Brief, 40 the Appellee asserts that the judgment
appealed from is valid and enforceable. Although
the word "impossable" [sic] is "imprecise," it is clear
that what the judge actually meant was that the
penalty of reclusion perpetua was what the law
allowed or mandated him to impose. As to the
grant of bail, since they committed a capital
offense and the court had already found that the
evidence of their guilt is strong, the accused-
appellants should not be entitled to bail.
We find that the decision substantially complies with
the Rules of Court on judgments as it did sentence
the accused-appellants to reclusion perpetua. A
judgment of conviction shall state (a) the legal
qualification of the offense constituted by the acts
committed by the accused, and the aggravating
or mitigating circumstances attending the
commission, if there are any; (b) the participation of
the accused in the commission of the offense,
whether as principal, accomplice or accessory
after the fact; (c) the penalty imposed upon the
accused; and (d) the civil liability or damages
caused by the wrongful act to be recovered from
the accused by the offended party, if there is any,
unless the enforcement of the civil liability by a
separate action has been reserved or waived. 41
As we earlier observed, the challenged decision
does not contain the usual dispositive portion. The
last two paragraphs of the decision merely embody
its conclusions that: (1) the appellants are guilty of
murder, and (2) taking into account the "attendant
qualifying aggravating circumstances of nighttime,
use of fire by burning the house of the victim, . . .
the abuse of superior strength," "the penalty
35 | C O N S T I 2 _ S e c t i o n 1 4 _ R i g h t t o S p e e d y , I m p a r t i a l a n d P u b l i c T r i a l
imposable . . . will be in its maximum degree, that is
reclusion perpetua" considering that "the penalty
now for murder is reclusion temporal to reclusion
perpetua." While the decision leaves much to be
desired, it nevertheless contains the court's findings
of facts, the law applicable to the set of facts and
what it believes to be the imposable penalty under
the law, that is, reclusion perpetua which is actually
the penalty imposed on the accused-appellants. It
is obvious that they clearly understood that they
were found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of murder and were sentenced to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua in Criminal Case No.
4585. Were it otherwise, they would not have
declared in open court their intention to appeal
immediately after the promulgation of the decision
and would not have subsequently filed their written
notice of appeal.
Accused-appellants contend that the trial court did
not impose any sentence and so cannot cancel
anymore their bail bonds and direct their arrest and
immediate commitment because it already lost
jurisdiction over their persons when they perfected
their appeal.
In connection with Section 3, Rule 114 of the
Revised Rules of Court on bail, we ruled in People
vs. Cortez 42 that:
". . . an accused who is charged with a capital
offense or an offense punishable by reclusion
perpetua, and is thereafter convicted of the
offense charged, shall no longer be entitled to bail
as a matter of right even if he appeals the case to
this Court since his conviction clearly imports that
the evidence of his guilt of the offense charged is
strong."
We have already said that the decision did impose
the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Since the order
cancelling their bail bonds and directing their arrest
is contained in the decision itself, it is apparent that
their abovementioned contention is highly illogical.
At the time the order in question was made, the trial
court still had jurisdiction over the persons of the
accused-appellants. For too obvious reasons, their
notices of appeal which they claim have put an
end to the trial court's jurisdiction over them could
not have been filed before the promulgation of the
decision. The order is therefore valid and
enforceable. Also, it may be recalled that the
accused-appellants had earlier raised this issue
before us in a petition for habeas corpus dated 16
January 1992 and docketed as G.R. Nos. 103602-03.
We dismissed that petition on 17 February 1992 for
failure to comply with requirement no. (2) of
Revised Circular No. 1-88 and Circular No. 28-91 on
forum shopping. 43 Their motion for reconsideration
was denied on 27 May 1993.
The trial court, however, erred in considering
nighttime, use of fire and abuse of superior strength
as "attendant qualifying aggravating
circumstances." The information in Criminal Case
No. 4585 alleged only treachery and evident
premeditation as qualifying aggravating
circumstances. Nighttime, band, use of fire, craft,
fraud or disguise and ignominy were alleged as
generic aggravating circumstances only. The trial
court cannot elevate the status of any of the
generic aggravating circumstances and consider
them as qualifying circumstances for the crime of
murder. Moreover, nighttime is not a qualifying
circumstance under Article 248 of the Revised
Penal Code.
It was likewise an error for the trial court to state that
"the penalty now for murder is reclusion temporal to
reclusion perpetua." The penalty for murder remains
to be reclusion temporal maximum to death. But in
view of paragraph (1), Section 19, Article III of the
Constitution prohibiting the imposition of the
penalty of death, where death would have been
the proper penalty in a case, the court must instead
impose the penalty of reclusion perpetua. 44
The trial court further erred in holding that no
penalty could be imposed on accused Engracio
Valeriano in Criminal Case No. 4584 because he "is
nowhere to be found, hence, not brought to the
bar of justice, he being a fugitive or at large." The
court ignored the fact that Engracio jumped bail
after he had been arraigned, just before the
retaking of evidence commenced. Paragraph (2),
Section 14, Article III of the Constitution permits trial
in absentia after the accused has been arraigned
provided he has been duly notified of the trial and
his failure to appear thereat is unjustified. One who
jumps bail can never offer a justifiable reason for his
non-appearance during the trial. Accordingly, after
the trial in absentia, the court can render judgment
in the case 45 and promulgation may be made by
simply recording the judgment in the criminal
docket with a copy thereof served upon his
counsel, provided that the notice requiring him to
be present at the promulgation is served through his
bondsmen or warden and counsel. 46
Having disposed of the first issue raised by the
accused-appellants, we now come to the second,
third and fourth assigned errors which shall be
discussed jointly, considering that they are
interrelated and deal with the question of whether
or not the guilt of the accused-appellants was
proven beyond reasonable doubt.
The accused-appellants contend that the trial court
erred in relying on the testimonies of prosecution
witnesses Antonio Silvano, Wilson Silvano and
Visitacion Silvano and in concluding that they
clearly and positively identified the accused-
appellants as the culprits. According to them, only
Antonio Silvano testified that he saw the accused
burn his house, kill his wife Rizalina and drag her into
the fire. Neither Visitacion Silvano nor Wilson Silvano
testified that they saw what occurred in the elder
Silvanos' house. But even the testimony of Antonio
Silvano is not reliable because it lacks truthfulness
and validity. They singled out his testimony that
while the fire was raging, his wife told him to save
himself as she will also save herself, then the
36 | C O N S T I 2 _ S e c t i o n 1 4 _ R i g h t t o S p e e d y , I m p a r t i a l a n d P u b l i c T r i a l
direction of the wind changed and he jumped from
the roof of the house into the bushes. They
concluded that he could not have seen who killed
his wife. 47 Also, the ruling that conclusions and
findings of the lower court are entitled to great
weight is not applicable in this case because the
judge who heard the testimonies of the witnesses in
its entirety was not the same judge who penned
the decision. They further stressed the delay
incurred by Antonio in reporting the crime to the
authorities. The crime was committed on 28 January
1980 but he reported it to the Office of the
Governor of Negros Oriental in Dumaguete City
only on 18 February 1980 or some 21 days after its
commission. Finally, they maintain that they have
sufficiently established their defense of alibi.
On the other hand, the Appellee seeks the
affirmance of the judgment convicting the
accused. The Appellee reasons out that the
accused-appellants were positively identified by
prosecution witness Antonio Silvano; and that even
while it is true that only Antonio Silvano saw the
murderers, Visitacion and Wilson Silvano testified on
the presence of the accused-appellants at the
scene of the crime.
As the Appellee admits, however, the most
damning testimony against the accused-appellants
in this case is only that of Antonio Silvano who
claimed that he actually saw them hack and kill his
wife. To us, whether such testimony could be relied
upon is altogether a different matter. Although it is
a settled rule that the findings of the trial court on
the credibility of witnesses should be given the
highest respect because it had the advantage of
observing the demeanor of the witnesses and can
discern if such witnesses are telling the truth or lying
through their teeth, 48 we cannot rely on that rule in
this appeal because the judge who heard the
testimonies of the witnesses was not the same judge
who penned the decision. Judge Temistocles Diez
of Branch 37 received and heard the testimonies of
the witnesses but it was Judge Pacifico S. Bulado
who rendered the decision. The latter had no
opportunity to observe the witnesses' deportment
and manner of testifying, which are important
considerations in assessing credibility. 49
We have carefully read the transcripts of the
testimony of Antonio Silvano. We cannot give him
full faith and credit for the following reasons:
1. Although he testified on cross-examination that
he first reported the incident to and was
investigated by the PC, it is clear to this Court that it
was only on 15 February 1980, or on the eighteenth
day after the incident that he was investigated at
the office of the Governor. Being the barangay
captain of Nagbinlud, the owner of a house that
was intentionally set on fire, the father of the man
who was hacked several times and almost died,
and the husband of the murder victim whose body
was charred beyond recognition, the compelling
call of duty and the mournful cry for justice cannot
tolerate any delay in reporting the incident to the
proper authorities. The prosecution was hard put for
an explanation for this delay; it did not even
attempt to make any. If Antonio Silvano could offer
no explanation therefor, it could only mean that he
was either unable to identify the real perpetrators of
the crime against his family or he was afraid to do
so. For whichever reason, such failure only bolsters
the claim of the defense that the crime was
committed by the "Salvatore" group whose
operations Antonio admitted he was very much
aware of, thus:
"Q As such barangay captain you remember that in
the month of January, 1980 there was such a group
of armed men referred to or commonly called as
Salvatore, is that correct that used to roam around
in the interior part of Sta. Catalina?
A Yes, that is true.
Q And this group of men used to plunder or steal
from houses, kill certain persons and burn also
houses, is that correct?
A Yes, that is true.
Q And this group of men known as 'Salvatore'
continued to exist even after January 1980?
A That was only up to 1980.
Q Yes, but after January 1980 this 'Salvatore' group
continued to exist for sometime up to or beyond
the year 1980, is that correct?
A They were only about 2 weeks because they
were arrested by the authorities.
Q That is two weeks after January 28, 1980?
A Yes." 50
Furthermore, it is doubtful whether Antonio did
report the incident to the PC as no PC personnel
corroborated him thereon and according to him,
he did not sign any statement during the said
investigation, which is unusual. The fiscal himself
admitted in open court that no statement taken by
the PC was submitted to his office. 51 If indeed
Antonio was investigated by the PC, the
investigator should have formally taken his
statement in view of its importance. As no such
statement was proved to exist, it is logical to
presume that Antonio did not or could not disclose
to the investigator the names of the perpetrators.
2. Antonio admitted on cross-examination that he
had no quarrel and misunderstanding 52 or grudges
53 whatsoever with the accused-appellants. If that
were so, it is odd that he could not explain why he,
a barangay captain who was expected to attend
to the requests and problems of his constituents,
deliberately chose not to respond to the alleged
call of the accused-appellants on the night of the
incident and instead allowed his wife to lie to them
by saying that he was attending a meeting. Again,
37 | C O N S T I 2 _ S e c t i o n 1 4 _ R i g h t t o S p e e d y , I m p a r t i a l a n d P u b l i c T r i a l
the only plausible explanation for his behavior was
that the men who came belonged to the
"Salvatore" group and this terrified him, for he knew
that the group had been roaming around, killing
people and burning houses in his area.
3. Also, on cross-examination, Antonio affirmed as
true the contents of his sworn statement 54 taken
two weeks after the incident. In it, he failed to state
the fact that he witnessed the killing of his wife and
to identify her killers. 55 Since his sworn statement
was precisely taken to obtain from him vital facts
relative to the incident, more specifically on the
killing of his wife, and considering that he had
already stated therein that he saw the accused-
appellants, it is contrary to human nature and
inconsistent with experience for him to fail to
identify them as the killers of his wife, if such is the
fact. It has been said that where the omission in the
affidavit refers to a very important detail such that
the affiant would not have failed to mention it, the
omission could affect the affiant's credibility. 56
Verily, it was obvious from his answer to Question
No. 16 of the investigator that he had no
opportunity to identify the killers:
"Q Question No. 16, 'Q-What else did you do?', and
you answered, 'A-My wife told me to just save
myself because she will also save herself. Thereafter
the wind changed it(s) course and (the) fire grew
big and because of this, I had the occasion to
jumped (sic) from our house and thereafter I ran
towards the bushes.' . . .
A Yes, sir, that is true.
Q How far is that bush to which you ran from your
house which was burning?
A It is about thirty (30) meters because it is a
sugarcane field." 57
4. Antonio categorically declared that Engracio
Valeriano, Juanito Rismundo and Macario Acabal
each hacked her once hitting her on the forehead,
right leg and left arm, respectively, while Abundio
Nahid hacked her four times, hitting her at the
forehead, left arm, right leg and stomach. 58 In
other words, from his testimony, his wife sustained
seven wounds. Yet, the medical evidence belies
this. Per the findings of Dr. Avelino Torres, 59 there
were only three "evidence" of hacking, viz.: at the
right leg, left leg and abdomen.
5. Nowhere in his sworn statement did Antonio
mention the name of accused-appellant Abundio
Nahid. If in fact he saw the latter who he claimed in
his direct testimony hacked his wife four times,
Nahid's name would have occupied a prominent
place in his sworn statement.
The testimony of the other witnesses for the
prosecution likewise do not provide sufficient proof
of the accused-appellants' guilt. Visitacion Silvano's
testimony that she saw and identified the accused-
appellants at the scene of the crime taxes the
imagination. It was humanly impossible for her to
see the accused-appellants even if she were aided
by the light from the truck as she herself said that
she was then in her house, three kilometers away
from the house of her parents-in-law. Wilson Silvano
did not testify at all that he saw the persons who
hacked and killed his mother.
In conclusion, because of reasonable doubt as to
their guilt, the accused-appellants must be
acquitted. Every accused is presumed innocent
until the contrary is proved; that presumption is
solemnly guaranteed by the Bill of Rights. The
contrary requires proof beyond reasonable doubt,
or that degree of proof which produces conviction
in an unprejudiced mind. Short of this, it is not only
the right of the accused to be freed; it is even the
constitutional duty of the court to acquit him. 60
Accordingly, unless the prosecution discharges its
burden of proving the guilt of the accused-
appellants beyond reasonable doubt, they need
not even offer evidence in their behalf. 61 The
weakness of their defense of alibi thus becomes
irrelevant.
WHEREFORE, the challenged Decision of Branch 33
of the Regional Trial Court of Negros Oriental in
Criminal Case No. 4585 is hereby REVERSED.
Accused-appellants MACARIO ACABAL, JUANITO
RISMUNDO and ABUNDIO NAHID are ACQUITTED on
ground of reasonable doubt, and their immediate
release from confinement is hereby ordered, unless
other lawful and valid grounds exist for their further
detention.
The trial court is directed to render judgment
against accused-appellant ENGRACIO VALERIANO
in Criminal Case No. 4584.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Cruz, Bellosillo and Quiason, JJ ., concur.
Grio-Aquino, J ., is on leave.
(Perez v. Estrada, A.M. No. 01-4-03-SC (Resolution),
September 13, 2001)
EN BANC
[A.M. No. 01-4-03-SC. September 13, 2001.]
RE: REQUEST FOR LIVE RADIO-TV COVERAGE OF THE
TRIAL IN THE SANDIGANBAYAN OF THE PLUNDER
CASES AGAINST FORMER PRESIDENT JOSEPH E.
ESTRADA
SECRETARY OF JUSTICE HERNANDO PEREZ,
KAPISANAN NG MGA BRODKASTER NG PILIPINAS,
CESAR SARINO, RENATO CAYETANO, and ATTY.
RICARDO ROMULO, petitioners, vs. JOSEPH E.
ESTRADA and INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES,
oppositors.
Fortun Narvasa & Salazar Law Offices and Saguisag
and Associates Law Offices for J. Estrada.
38 | C O N S T I 2 _ S e c t i o n 1 4 _ R i g h t t o S p e e d y , I m p a r t i a l a n d P u b l i c T r i a l
SYNOPSIS
This is a motion for reconsideration of the decision of
the Court denying petitioners' request for permission
to televise and broadcast live the trial of former
President Joseph E. Estrada before the
Sandiganbayan. This motion was filed by the
Secretary of Justice, as one of the petitioners, who
argued that there is really no conflict between the
right of the people to public information and the
freedom of the press, on one hand, and, on the
other, the right of the accused to a fair trial. He
further elaborated that if there is a clash between
these rights, it must be resolved in favor of the right
of the people and the press because the people,
as the repository of sovereignty, are entitled to
information, and live media coverage is a
safeguard against attempts by any party to use the
courts as instruments for the pursuit of selfish
interests. On the other hand, former President
Joseph E. Estrada reiterated his objection to the live
TV and radio coverage of his trial on the ground
that its allowance will violate the sub judice rule.
ETHSAI
The Court ruled that considering the significance of
the trial before the Sandiganbayan of former
President Estrada and the importance of preserving
the records thereof, the Court believes that there
should be an audio-visual recording of the
proceedings. The recordings will not be for live or
real time broadcast but for documentary purposes.
Only later will they be available for public showing,
after the Sandiganbayan shall have promulgated
its decision in every case to which the recording
pertains. The master film shall be deposited in the
National Museum and in the Records Management
and Archives Office for historical preservation and
exhibition pursuant to law.
SYLLABUS
1. POLITICAL LAW; CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF
RIGHTS; RIGHT OF PEOPLE TO INFORMATION ON
MATTERS OF PUBLIC CONCERN; AUDIO-VISUAL
RECORDING OF THE PLUNDER CASES AGAINST
FORMER PRESIDENT JOSEPH E. ESTRADA WILL BE FOR
DOCUMENTARY PURPOSES ONLY. Considering the
significance of the trial before the Sandiganbayan
of former President Estrada and the importance of
preserving the records thereof, the Court believes
that there should be an audio-visual recording of
the proceedings. The recordings will not be for live
or real time broadcast but for documentary
purposes. Only later will they be available for public
showing, after the Sandiganbayan shall have
promulgated its decision in every case to which the
recording pertains. The master film shall be
deposited in the National Museum and the Records
Management and Archives Office for historical
preservation and exhibition pursuant to law.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; RULES FOR AUDIO-VISUAL
RECORDING INSIDE THE COURTROOM. For the
purpose of recording the proceedings, cameras will
be inconspicuously installed in the courtroom and
the movement of TV crews will be regulated,
consistent with the dignity and solemnity of the
proceedings. The trial shall be recorded in its
entirety, except such portions thereof as the
Sandiganbayan may decide should not be held
public pursuant to Rule 119, 21 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure. No comment shall be
included in the documentary except annotations
which may be necessary to explain certain scenes
which are depicted. The audio-visual recordings
shall be made under the supervision and control of
the Sandiganbayan or its Division as the case may
be.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; REASONS FOR TELEVISED
RECORDING. There are several reasons for such
televised recording. First, the hearings are of historic
significance. They are an affirmation of our
commitment to the rule that "the King is under no
man, but he is under God and the law." (Quod Rex
non debet esse sub homine, sed sub Deo et Lege.)
Second, the Estrada cases involve matters of vital
concern to our people who have a fundamental
right to know how their government is conducted.
This right can be enhanced by audio-visual
presentation. Third, audio-visual presentation is
essential for the education and civic training of the
people. Above all, there is the need to keep audio-
visual records of the hearings for documentary
purposes. The recordings will be useful in preserving
the essence of the proceedings in a way that the
cold print cannot quite do because it cannot
capture the sights and sounds of events. They will
be primarily for the use of appellate courts in the
event a review of the proceedings, rulings, or
decisions of the Sandiganbayan is sought or
becomes necessary. The accuracy of the
transcripts of stenographic notes taken during the
trial can be checked by reference to the tapes.
SEIacA
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; PURPOSE FOR THE DELAY OF
THE RELEASE OF THE TAPES FOR BROADCAST. On
the other hand, by delaying the release of the
tapes for broadcast, concerns that those taking
part in the proceedings will be playing to the
cameras and will thus be distracted from the proper
performance of their roles whether as counsel,
witnesses, court personnel, or judges will be
allayed. The possibility that parallel trials before the
bar of justice and the bar of public opinion may
jeopardize, or even prevent, the just determination
of the cases can be minimized. The possibility that
judgment will be rendered by the popular tribunal
before the court of justice can render its own will be
avoided. At the same time, concerns about the
regularity and fairness of the trial which, it may
be assumed, is the concern of those opposed to, as
much as of those in favor of, televised trials will
be addressed since the tapes will not be released
for public showing until after the decision of the
cases by the Sandiganbayan. By delaying the
release of the tapes, much of the problem posed
by real time TV and radio broadcast will be
avoided.
39 | C O N S T I 2 _ S e c t i o n 1 4 _ R i g h t t o S p e e d y , I m p a r t i a l a n d P u b l i c T r i a l
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; RIGHT OF PRIVACY OF THE
ACCUSED IS NOT A BAR TO THE PRODUCTION OF
SUCH DOCUMENTARY. Nor is the right of privacy
of the accused a bar to the production of such
documentary. In Ayer Productions Pty. Ltd. v.
Capulong, this Court set aside a lower court's
injunction restraining the filming of "Four Day
Revolution," a documentary film depicting, among
other things, the role of then Minister of National
Defense Juan Ponce Enrile in the 1986 EDSA people
power. This Court held: "A limited intrusion into a
person's privacy has long been regarded as
permissible where that person is a public figure and
the information sought to be elicited from him or to
be published about him constitute matters of a
public character."
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; MAKING OF A MOVIE BASED ON
THE TRIAL COULD NOT BE PREVENTED. No one
can prevent the making of a movie based on the
trial. But, at least, if a documentary record is made
of the proceedings, any movie that may later be
produced can be checked for its accuracy against
such documentary and any attempt to distort the
truth can thus be averted.
7. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; DOCUMENTARY RECORDING OF
CELEBRATED CASES; EXPLAINED. Indeed, a
somewhat similar proposal for documentary
recording of celebrated cases or causes clbres
was made way back in 1971 by Paul Freund of the
Harvard Law School. As he explained: "In fairness let
me refer to an American experience many of my
lay friends found similarly moving. An educational
television network filmed a trial in Denver of a Black
Panther leader on charges of resisting arrest, and
broadcast the document in full, in four installments,
several months after the case was concluded
concluded incidentally, with a verdict of acquittal.
No one could witness the trial without a feeling of
profound respect for the painstaking way in which
the truth was searched for, for the ways whereby
law copes with uncertainties and ambiguities
through presumptions and burden of proof, and the
sense of gravity with which judge and jury carried
out their responsibilities. I agree in general with the
exclusion of television from the courtroom, for the
familiar good reasons. And yet the use of television
at a trial for documentary purposes, not for the
broadcast of live news, and with the safeguards of
completeness and consent, is an educational
experiment that I would be prepared to welcome.
Properly safeguarded and with suitable
commentary, the depiction of an actual trial is an
agency of enlightenment that could have few
equals in its impact on the public understanding.
Understanding of our legal process, so rarely
provided by our educational system, is now a
desperate need." Professor Freund's observation is
as valid today as when it was made thirty years
ago. It is perceptive for its recognition of the serious
risks posed to the fair administration of justice by live
TV and radio broadcasts, especially when emotions
are running high on the issues stirred by a case,
while at the same time acknowledging the
necessity of keeping audio-visual recordings of the
proceedings of celebrated cases, for public
information and exhibition, after passions have
subsided.
8. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CONDITIONS FOR AUDIO-VISUAL
RECORDING OF THE TRIAL. [A]n audio-visual
recording of the trial of former President Estrada
before the Sandiganbayan is hereby ordered to be
made, for the account of the Sandiganbayan,
under the following conditions: (a) the trial shall be
recorded in its entirety, excepting such portions
thereof as the Sandiganbayan may determine
should not be held public under Rule 119, 21 of the
Rules of Criminal Procedure; (b) cameras shall be
installed inconspicuously inside the courtroom and
the movement of TV crews shall be regulated
consistent with the dignity and solemnity of the
proceedings; (c) the audio-visual recordings shall
be made for documentary purposes only and shall
be made without comment except such
annotations of scenes depicted therein as may be
necessary to explain them; (d) the live broadcast of
the recordings before the Sandiganbayan shall
have rendered its decision in all the cases against
the former President shall be prohibited under pain
of contempt of court and other sanctions in case of
violations of the prohibition; (e) to ensure that the
conditions are observed, the audio-visual recording
of the proceedings shall be made under the
supervision and control of the Sandiganbayan or its
Division concerned and shall be made pursuant to
rules promulgated by it; and (f) simultaneously with
the release of the audio-visual recordings for public
broadcast, the original thereof shall be deposited in
the National Museum and the Records
Management and Archives Office for preservation
and exhibition in accordance with law.
VITUG, J., Separate Opinion:
1. POLITICAL LAW; CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF
RIGHTS; DUE PROCESS; NOT DIMINISHED BY
ADVANCES IN SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY. Due
process is timeless. It is a precious fundamental right
that secures and protects, under a rule of law, the
life and liberty of a person from the oppression of
power. A cherished fixture in our bill of rights, its
encompassing guarantee will not be diminished by
advances in science and technology.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; RIGHT OF PEOPLE TO INFORMATION
ON MATTERS OF PUBLIC CONCERN; CAN BE
ACHIEVED VIA OTHER MEDIA COVERAGE OTHER
THAN LIVE RADIO/TV COVERAGE. I see it as being
an implicit retreat, unwisely, from an age-old
struggle of the individual against the tyranny of the
sovereign. The right of the public to information, in
any event, is not here really being sacrificed. The
right to know can very well be achieved via other
media coverage; the windows of information
through which the public might observe and learn
are not closed.
40 | C O N S T I 2 _ S e c t i o n 1 4 _ R i g h t t o S p e e d y , I m p a r t i a l a n d P u b l i c T r i a l
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; AUDIO-VISUAL RECORDING OF
THE PLUNDER CASES AGAINST FORMER PRESIDENT
JOSEPH E. ESTRADA WILL BE FOR DOCUMENTARY
PURPOSES ONLY; REASONS. In addressing the
present motion for reconsideration, colleagues on
the Court opine that there should be an audio-
visual recording of the proceedings for
documentary purposes because, first, the hearings
are of historic significance; second, the Estrada
cases involve matters of vital concern to our people
who have a fundamental right to know how their
government works; third, the audio-visual
presentation is essential for education and civic
training of the people; and fourth, such recording
can be used by appellate courts in the event that
the review of the proceedings, ruling, or decisions
of the Sandiganbayan is sought or becomes
necessary.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; EXPERIENCE ATTESTS TO THE
INTIMIDATING EFFECT OF CAMERAS AND
ELECTRONIC DEVICES IN COURTROOMS. The
proposition has novel features; regrettably, I still find
it hard to believe that the presence of the cameras
inside the courtroom will not have an untoward
impact on the court proceedings. No empirical
data has been shown to suggest otherwise. To the
contrary, experience attests to the intimidating
effect of cameras and electronic devices in
courtrooms on the litigants, witnesses and jurors. In
addition, the natural reticence of witnesses at the
stand can even easily be exacerbated by placing
them on camera in contravention of normal
experience. The demeanor of the witnesses can
also have an abstruse effect on the ability of the
judge to accurately assess the credibility of such
witnesses. The presence of cameras, for whatever
reason, may not adequately address the dangers
mentioned in the Court's decision of 29 June 2001.
There are just too many imponderables.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; IT IS NOT PRIVACY THAT CAN
CAUSE CONCERN MORE THAN THE EROSION OF
REALITY THAT CAMERAS TEND TO CAST. Most
importantly, it does not seem right to single out and
make a spectacle of the cases against Mr. Estrada.
Dignity is a precious part of personality innate in
every human being, and there can be no cogent
excuse for impinging it even to the slightest degree.
It is not the problem of privacy that can cause
concern more than the erosion of reality that
cameras tend to cast. TcEDHa
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; THE RULE MUST BE OF GENERAL
APPLICATION. In the petition, albeit entitled an
administrative matter, the only issue raised is
whether the cases of a former President pending
before the Sandiganbayan can be covered by live
television and radio broadcast. The matter now
being sought to be addressed by my esteemed
colleagues is not even an issue. If it has to be
considered at all, the rule must be of general
application and promulgated after a thorough
study and deliberation, certainly far more than
what have been said and done in this case.
Hearings, where expert opinion is sought and given,
should prove to be helpful and of value.
RESOLUTION
MENDOZA, J p:
This is a motion for reconsideration of the decision
denying petitioners' request for permission to
televise and broadcast live the trial of former
President Estrada before the Sandiganbayan. The
motion was filed by the Secretary of Justice, as one
of the petitioners, who argues that there is really no
conflict between the right of the people to public
information and the freedom of the press, on the
one hand, and, on the other, the right of the
accused to a fair trial; that if there is a clash
between these rights, it must be resolved in favor or
of the right of the people and the press because
the people, as the repository of sovereignty, are
entitled to information; and that live media
coverage is a safeguard against attempts by any
party to use the courts as instruments for the pursuit
of selfish interests. STCDaI
On the other hand, former President Joseph E.
Estrada reiterates his objection to the live TV and
radio coverage of his trial on the ground that its
allowance will violate the sub judice rule and that,
based on his experience with the impeachment
trial, live media coverage will only pave the way for
so-called "expert commentary" which can trigger
massive demonstrations aimed at pressuring the
Sandiganbayan to render a decision one way or
the other. Mr. Estrada contends that the right of the
people to information may be served through other
means less distracting, degrading, and prejudicial
than live TV and radio coverage.
The Court has considered the arguments of the
parties on this important issue and, after due
deliberation, finds no reason to alter or in any way
modify its decision prohibiting live or real time
broadcast by radio or television of the trial of the
former president. By a vote of nine (9) to six (6) of its
members, 1 the Court denies the motion for
reconsideration of the Secretary of Justice.
In lieu of live TV and radio coverage of the trial, the
Court, by the vote of eight (8) Justices, 2 has
resolved to order the audio-visual recording of the
trial for documentary purposes. Seven (7) Justices 3
vote against the audio-visual recording of the trial.
What follows is the opinion of the majority.
Considering the significance of the trial before the
Sandiganbayan of former President Estrada and
the importance of preserving the records thereof,
the Court believes that there should be an audio-
visual recording of the proceedings. The recordings
will not be for live or real time broadcast but for
documentary purposes. Only later will they be
available for public showing, after the
Sandiganbayan shall have promulgated its decision
in every case to which the recording pertains. The
41 | C O N S T I 2 _ S e c t i o n 1 4 _ R i g h t t o S p e e d y , I m p a r t i a l a n d P u b l i c T r i a l
master film shall be deposited in the National
Museum and the Records Management and
Archives Office for historical preservation and
exhibition pursuant to law. 4
For the purpose of recording the proceedings,
cameras will be inconspicuously installed in the
courtroom and the movement of TV crews will be
regulated, consistent with the dignity and solemnity
of the proceedings. The trial shall be recorded in its
entirety, except such portions thereof as the
Sandiganbayan may decide should not be held
public pursuant to Rule 119, 21 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure. No comment shall be
included in the documentary except annotations
which may be necessary to explain certain scenes
which are depicted. The audio-visual recordings
shall be made under the supervision and control of
the Sandiganbayan or its Division as the case may
be.
There are several reasons for such televised
recording. First, the hearings are of historic
significance. They are an affirmation of our
commitment to the rule that "the King is under no
man, but he is under God and the law." (Quod Rex
non debet esse sub homine, sed sub Deo et Lege.)
Second, the Estrada cases involve matters of vital
concern to our people who have a fundamental
right to know how their government is conducted.
This right can be enhanced by audio-visual
presentation. Third, audio-visual presentation is
essential for the education and civic training of the
people.
Above all, there is the need to keep audio-visual
records of the hearings for documentary purposes.
The recordings will be useful in preserving the
essence of the proceedings in a way that the cold
print cannot quite do because it cannot capture
the sights and sounds of events. They will be
primarily for the use of appellate courts in the event
a review of the proceedings, rulings, or decisions of
the Sandiganbayan is sought or becomes
necessary. The accuracy of the transcripts of
stenographic notes taken during the trial can be
checked by reference to the tapes.
On the other hand, by delaying the release of the
tapes for broadcast, concerns that those taking
part in the proceedings will be playing to the
cameras and will thus be distracted from the proper
performance of their roles whether as counsel,
witnesses, court personnel, or judges will be
allayed. The possibility that parallel trials before the
bar of justice and the bar of public opinion may
jeopardize, or even prevent, the just determination
of the cases can be minimized. The possibility that
judgment will be rendered by the popular tribunal
before the court of justice can render its own will be
avoided.
At the same time, concerns about the regularity
and fairness of the trial which, it may be
assumed, is the concern of those opposed to, as
much as of those in favor of, televised trials will
be addressed since the tapes will not be released
for public showing until after the decision of the
cases by the Sandiganbayan. By delaying the
release of the tapes, much of the problem posed
by real time TV and radio broadcast will be
avoided.
Thus, many important purposes for preserving the
record of the trials can be served by audio-visual
recordings without impairing the right of the
accused to a fair trial.
Nor is the right of privacy of the accused a bar to
the production of such documentary. In Ayer
Productions Pty. Ltd. v. Capulong, 5 this Court set
aside a lower court's injunction restraining the
filming of "Four Day Revolution," a documentary film
depicting, among other things, the role of then
Minister of National Defense Juan Ponce Enrile in
the 1986 EDSA. people power. This Court held: "A
limited intrusion into a person's privacy has long
been regarded as permissible where that person is
a public figure and the information sought to be
elicited from him or to be published about him
constitute matters of a public character." 6
No one can prevent the making of a movie based
on the trial. But, at least, if a documentary record is
made of the proceedings, any movie that may
later be produced can be checked for its
accuracy against such documentary and any
attempt to distort the truth can thus be averted.
Indeed, a somewhat similar proposal for
documentary recording of celebrated cases or
causes clbres was made way back in 1971 by
Paul Freund of the Harvard Law School. As he
explained:
In fairness let me refer to an American experience
many of my lay friends found similarly moving. An
educational television network filmed a trial in
Denver of a Black Panther leader on charges of
resisting arrest, and broadcast the document in full,
in four installments, several months after the case
was concluded concluded incidentally, with a
verdict of acquittal.
No one could witness the trial without a feeling of
profound respect for the painstaking way in which
the truth was searched for, for the ways whereby
law copes with uncertainties and ambiguities
through presumptions and burden of proof, and the
sense of gravity with which judge and jury carried
out their responsibilities.
I agree in general with the exclusion of television
from the courtroom, for the familiar good reasons.
And yet the use of television at a trial for
documentary purposes, not for the broadcast of
live news, and with the safeguards of completeness
and consent, is an educational experiment that I
would be prepared to welcome. Properly
safeguarded and with suitable commentary, the
42 | C O N S T I 2 _ S e c t i o n 1 4 _ R i g h t t o S p e e d y , I m p a r t i a l a n d P u b l i c T r i a l
depiction of an actual trial is an agency of
enlightenment that could have few equals in its
impact on the public understanding.
Understanding of our legal process, so rarely
provided by our educational system, is now a
desperate need. 7
Professor Freund's observation is as valid today as
when it was made thirty years ago. It is perceptive
for its recognition of the serious risks posed to the fair
administration of justice by live TV and radio
broadcasts, especially when emotions are running
high on the issues stirred by a case, while at the
same time acknowledging the necessity of keeping
audio-visual recordings of the proceedings of
celebrated cases, for public information and
exhibition, after passions have subsided.
WHEREFORE, an audio-visual recording of the trial of
former President Estrada before the
Sandiganbayan is hereby ordered to be made, for
the account of the Sandiganbayan, under the
following conditions: (a) the trial shall be recorded
in its entirety, excepting such portions thereof as the
Sandiganbayan determine should not be held
public under Rule 119, 21 of the Rules of Criminal
Procedure; (b) cameras shall be installed
inconspicuously inside the courtroom and the
movement of TV crews shall be regulated
consistent with the dignity and solemnity of the
proceedings; (c) the audio-visual recordings shall
be made for documentary purposes only and shall
be made without comment except such
annotations of scenes depicted therein as may be
necessary to explain them; (d) the live broadcast of
the recordings before the Sandiganbayan shall
have rendered its decision in all the cases against
the former President shall be prohibited under pain
of contempt of court and other sanctions in case of
violations of the prohibition; (e) to ensure that the
conditions are observed, the audio-visual recording
of the proceedings shall be made under the
supervision and control of the Sandiganbayan or its
Division concerned and shall be made pursuant to
rules promulgated by it; and (f) simultaneously with
the release of the audio-visual recordings for public
broadcast, the original thereof shall be deposited in
the National Museum and the Records
Management and Archives Office for preservation
and exhibition in accordance with law.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Melo, Puno, Panganiban and
Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.
Bellosillo, J., I am for full live coverage hence I
maintain my original view; nevertheless, I concur.
Vitug, J., pls. see Separate Opinion.
Kapanun, J., I maintain my original view prohibiting
live T.V. and radio coverage and concur with the
separate opinion of Justice Vitug.
Quisumbing, J., although earlier I respectfully
Dissented, as I favor live TV coverage I now
concur in the Result.
Pardo, J., I concur with the denial of the motion for
reconsideration only. The conditions are
inadequate. I join J. Vitug's opinion.
Buena, Ynares-Santiago and De Leon, JJ., concur
with the Separate Opinion of Justice Vitug.
Sandoval-Gutierrez, J., I concur but only in the
denial with finality of the MR.
(In re Ampatuan, A.M. No. 10-11-5-SC, 10-11-6-SC,
10-11-7-SC, June 14, 2011)
EN BANC
[A.M. No. 10-11-5-SC. June 14, 2011.]
RE: PETITION FOR RADIO AND TELEVISION
COVERAGE OF THE MULTIPLE MURDER CASES
AGAINST MAGUINDANAO GOVERNOR ZALDY
AMPATUAN, ET AL.
[A.M. No. 10-11-6-SC. June 14, 2011.]
RE: PETITION FOR THE CONSTITUTION OF THE PRESENT
COURT HANDLING THE TRIAL OF THE MASSACRE OF
57 PERSONS, INCLUDING 32 JOURNALISTS, IN
AMPATUAN, MAGUINDANAO INTO A SPECIAL
COURT HANDLING THIS CASE ALONE FOR THE
PURPOSE OF ACHIEVING GENUINE SPEEDY TRIAL and
FOR THE SETTING UP OF VIDEOCAM AND MONITOR
JUST OUTSIDE THE COURT FOR JOURNALISTS TO
COVER AND FOR THE PEOPLE TO WITNESS THE "TRIAL
OF THE DECADE" TO MAKE IT TRULY PUBLIC AND
IMPARTIAL AS COMMANDED BY THE CONSTITUTION
[A.M. No. 10-11-7-SC. June 14, 2011.]
RE: LETTER OF PRESIDENT BENIGNO S. AQUINO III FOR
THE LIVE MEDIA COVERAGE OF THE MAGUINDANAO
MASSACRE TRIAL
RESOLUTION
CARPIO MORALES, J p:
On November 23, 2009, 57 people including 32
journalists and media practitioners were killed while
on their way to Shariff Aguak in Maguindanao.
Touted as the worst election-related violence and
the most brutal killing of journalists in recent history,
the tragic incident which came to be known as the
"Maguindanao Massacre" spawned charges for 57
counts of murder and an additional charge of
rebellion against 197 accused, docketed as
Criminal Case Nos. Q-09-162148-72, Q-09-162216-31,
Q-10-162652-66, and Q-10-163766, commonly
entitled People v. Datu Andal Ampatuan, Jr., et al.
Following the transfer of venue and the reraffling of
the cases, the cases are being tried by Presiding
Judge Jocelyn Solis-Reyes of Branch 221 of the
43 | C O N S T I 2 _ S e c t i o n 1 4 _ R i g h t t o S p e e d y , I m p a r t i a l a n d P u b l i c T r i a l
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City inside
Camp Bagong Diwa in Taguig City.
Almost a year later or on November 19, 2010, the
National Union of Journalists of the Philippines
(NUJP), ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation, GMA
Network, Inc., relatives of the victims, 1 individual
journalists 2 from various media entities, and
members of the academe 3 filed a petition before
this Court praying that live television and radio
coverage of the trial in these criminal cases be
allowed, recording devices (e.g., still cameras, tape
recorders) be permitted inside the courtroom to
assist the working journalists, and reasonable
guidelines be formulated to govern the broadcast
coverage and the use of devices. 4 The Court
docketed the petition as A.M. No. 10-11-5-SC.
In a related move, the National Press Club of the
Philippines 5 (NPC) and Alyansa ng Filipinong
Mamamahayag 6 (AFIMA) filed on November 22,
2010 a petition praying that the Court constitute
Branch 221 of RTC-Quezon City as a special court to
focus only on the Maguindanao Massacre trial to
relieve it of all other pending cases and assigned
duties, and allow the installation inside the
courtroom of a sufficient number of video cameras
that shall beam the audio and video signals to the
television monitors outside the court. 7 The Court
docketed the petition as A.M. No. 10-11-6-SC.
President Benigno S. Aquino III, by letter of
November 22, 2010 8 addressed to Chief Justice
Renato Corona, came out "in support of those who
have petitioned [this Court] to permit television and
radio broadcast of the trial." The President
expressed "earnest hope that [this Court] will, within
the many considerations that enter into such a
historic deliberation, attend to this petition with the
dispatch, dispassion and humaneness, such a
petition merits." 9 The Court docketed the matter as
A.M. No. 10-11-7-SC. AHCaES
By separate Resolutions of November 23, 2010, 10
the Court consolidated A.M. No. 10-11-7-SC with
A.M. No. 10-11-5-SC. The Court shall treat in a
separate Resolution A.M. No. 10-11-6-SC.
Meanwhile, various groups 11 also sent to the Chief
Justice their respective resolutions and statements
bearing on these matters.
The principal accused in the cases, Andal
Ampatuan, Jr. (Ampatuan), filed a Consolidated
Comment of December 6, 2010 in A.M. No. 10-11-5-
SC and A.M. No. 10-11-7-SC. The President, through
the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), and NUJP,
et al. filed their respective Reply of January 18, 2011
and January 20, 2011. Ampatuan also filed a
Rejoinder of March 9, 2011.
On Broadcasting the Trial of the Maguindanao
Massacre Cases
Petitioners seek the lifting of the absolute ban on
live television and radio coverage of court
proceedings. They principally urge the Court to
revisit the 1991 ruling in Re: Live TV and Radio
Coverage of the Hearing of President Corazon C.
Aquino's Libel Case 12 and the 2001 ruling in Re:
Request Radio-TV Coverage of the Trial in the
Sandiganbayan of the Plunder Cases Against the
Former President Joseph E. Estrada 13 which rulings,
they contend, violate the doctrine that proposed
restrictions on constitutional rights are to be
narrowly construed and outright prohibition cannot
stand when regulation is a viable alternative.
Petitioners state that the trial of the Maguindanao
Massacre cases has attracted intense media
coverage due to the gruesomeness of the crime,
prominence of the accused, and the number of
media personnel killed. They inform that reporters
are being frisked and searched for cameras,
recorders, and cellular devices upon entry, and
that under strict orders of the trial court against live
broadcast coverage, the number of media
practitioners allowed inside the courtroom has
been limited to one reporter for each media
institution.
The record shows that NUJP Vice-Chairperson Jose
Jaime Espina, by January 12, 2010 letter 14 to
Judge Solis-Reyes, requested a dialogue to discuss
concerns over media coverage of the proceedings
of the Maguindanao Massacre cases. Judge Solis-
Reyes replied, however, that "matters concerning
media coverage should be brought to the Court's
attention through appropriate motion." 15 Hence,
the present petitions which assert the exercise of
the freedom of the press, right to information, right
to a fair and public trial, right to assembly and to
petition the government for redress of grievances,
right of free access to courts, and freedom of
association, subject to regulations to be issued by
the Court.
The Court partially GRANTS pro hac vice petitioners'
prayer for a live broadcast of the trial court
proceedings, subject to the guidelines which shall
be enumerated shortly. IaEASH
Putt's Law 16 states that "technology is dominated
by two types of people: those who understand
what they do not manage, and those who
manage what they do not understand." Indeed,
members of this Court cannot strip their judicial
robe and don the experts' gown, so to speak, in a
pretense to foresee and fathom all serious
prejudices or risks from the use of technology inside
the courtroom.
A decade after Estrada and a score after Aquino,
the Court is once again faced with the same task of
striking that delicate balance between seemingly
competing yet certainly complementary rights.
The indication of "serious risks" posed by live media
coverage to the accused's right to due process, left
unexplained and unexplored in the era obtaining in
Aquino and Estrada, has left a blow to the exercise
of press freedom and the right to public
information.
44 | C O N S T I 2 _ S e c t i o n 1 4 _ R i g h t t o S p e e d y , I m p a r t i a l a n d P u b l i c T r i a l
The rationale for an outright total prohibition was
shrouded, as it is now, inside the comfortable
cocoon of a feared speculation which no scientific
study in the Philippine setting confirms, and which
fear, if any, may be dealt with by safeguards and
safety nets under existing rules and exacting
regulations.
In this day and age, it is about time to craft a win-
win situation that shall not compromise rights in the
criminal administration of justice, sacrifice press
freedom and allied rights, and interfere with the
integrity, dignity and solemnity of judicial
proceedings. Compliance with regulations, not
curtailment of a right, provides a workable solution
to the concerns raised in these administrative
matters, while, at the same time, maintaining the
same underlying principles upheld in the two
previous cases.
The basic principle upheld in Aquino is firm "[a]
trial of any kind or in any court is a matter of serious
importance to all concerned and should not be
treated as a means of entertainment[, and t]o so
treat it deprives the court of the dignity which
pertains to it and departs from the orderly and
serious quest for truth for which our judicial
proceedings are formulated." The observation that
"[m]assive intrusion of representatives of the news
media into the trial itself can so alter and destroy
the constitutionally necessary atmosphere and
decorum" stands.
The Court concluded in Aquino:
Considering the prejudice it poses to the
defendant's right to due process as well as to the
fair and orderly administration of justice, and
considering further that the freedom of the press
and the right of the people to information may be
served and satisfied by less distracting, degrading
and prejudicial means, live radio and television
coverage of court proceedings shall not be
allowed. Video footages of court hearings for news
purposes shall be restricted and limited to shots of
the courtroom, the judicial officers, the parties and
their counsel taken prior to the commencement of
official proceedings. No video shots or photographs
shall be permitted during the trial proper.
Accordingly, in order to protect the parties' right to
due process, to prevent the distraction of the
participants in the proceedings and in the last
analysis, to avoid miscarriage of justice, the Court
resolved to PROHIBIT live radio and television
coverage of court proceedings. Video footage of
court hearings for news purposes shall be limited
and restricted as above indicated. 17 SHTaID
The Court had another unique opportunity in
Estrada to revisit the question of live radio and
television coverage of court proceedings in a
criminal case. It held that "[t]he propriety of
granting or denying the instant petition involve[s]
the weighing out of the constitutional guarantees of
freedom of the press and the right to public
information, on the one hand, and the
fundamental rights of the accused, on the other
hand, along with the constitutional power of a
court to control its proceedings in ensuring a fair
and impartial trial." The Court disposed:
The Court is not all that unmindful of recent
technological and scientific advances but to
chance forthwith the life or liberty of any person in
a hasty bid to use and apply them, even before
ample safety nets are provided and the concerns
heretofore expressed are aptly addressed, is a price
too high to pay.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED. 18
In resolving the motion for reconsideration, the
Court in Estrada, by Resolution of September 13,
2001, provided a glimmer of hope when it ordered
the audio-visual recording of the trial for
documentary purposes, under the following
conditions:
. . . (a) the trial shall be recorded in its entirety,
excepting such portions thereof as the
Sandiganbayan may determine should not be held
public under Rule 119, 21 of the Rules of Criminal
Procedure; (b) cameras shall be installed
inconspicuously inside the courtroom and the
movement of TV crews shall be regulated
consistent with the dignity and solemnity of the
proceedings; (c) the audio-visual recordings shall
be made for documentary purposes only and shall
be made without comment except such
annotations of scenes depicted therein as may be
necessary to explain them; (d) the live broadcast of
the recordings before the Sandiganbayan shall
have rendered its decision in all the cases against
the former President shall be prohibited under pain
of contempt of court and other sanctions in case of
violations of the prohibition; (e) to ensure that the
conditions are observed, the audio-visual recording
of the proceedings shall be made under the
supervision and control of the Sandiganbayan or its
Division concerned and shall be made pursuant to
rules promulgated by it; and (f) simultaneously with
the release of the audio-visual recordings for public
broadcast, the original thereof shall be deposited in
the National Museum and the Records
Management and Archives Office for preservation
and exhibition in accordance with law. 19
Petitioners note that the 1965 case of Estes v. Texas
20 which Aquino and Estrada heavily cited, was
borne out of the dynamics of a jury system, where
the considerations for the possible infringement of
the impartiality of a jury, whose members are not
necessarily schooled in the law, are different from
that of a judge who is versed with the rules of
evidence. To petitioners, Estes also does not
represent the most contemporary position of the
United States in the wake of latest jurisprudence 21
and statistical figures revealing that as of 2007 all 50
45 | C O N S T I 2 _ S e c t i o n 1 4 _ R i g h t t o S p e e d y , I m p a r t i a l a n d P u b l i c T r i a l
states, except the District of Columbia, allow
television coverage with varying degrees of
openness.
Other jurisdictions welcome the idea of media
coverage. Almost all the proceedings of United
Kingdom's Supreme Court are filmed, and
sometimes broadcast. 22 The International Criminal
Court broadcasts its proceedings via video
streaming in the internet. 23
On the media coverage's influence on judges,
counsels and witnesses, petitioners point out
thatAquino and Estrada, like Estes, lack empirical
evidence to support the sustained conclusion. They
point out errors of generalization where the
conclusion has been mostly supported by studies
on American attitudes, as there has been no
authoritative study on the particular matter dealing
with Filipinos.
Respecting the possible influence of media
coverage on the impartiality of trial court judges,
petitioners correctly explain that prejudicial
publicity insofar as it undermines the right to a fair
trial must pass the "totality of circumstances" test,
applied in People v. Teehankee, Jr. 24 and Estrada
v. Desierto, 25 that the right of an accused to a fair
trial is not incompatible to a free press, that
pervasive publicity is not per se prejudicial to the
right of an accused to a fair trial, and that there
must be allegation and proof of the impaired
capacity of a judge to render a bias-free decision.
Mere fear of possible undue influence is not
tantamount to actual prejudice resulting in the
deprivation of the right to a fair trial. caSDCA
Moreover, an aggrieved party has ample legal
remedies. He may challenge the validity of an
adverse judgment arising from a proceeding that
transgressed a constitutional right. As pointed out
by petitioners, an aggrieved party may early on
move for a change of venue, for continuance until
the prejudice from publicity is abated, for
disqualification of the judge, and for closure of
portions of the trial when necessary. The trial court
may likewise exercise its power of contempt and
issue gag orders.
One apparent circumstance that sets the
Maguindanao Massacre cases apart from the
earlier cases is the impossibility of accommodating
even the parties to the cases the private
complainants/families of the victims and other
witnesses inside the courtroom. On public trial,
Estrada basically discusses:
An accused has a right to a public trial but it is a
right that belongs to him, more than anyone else,
where his life or liberty can be held critically in
balance. A public trial aims to ensure that he is fairly
dealt with and would not be unjustly condemned
and that his rights are not compromised in secrete
conclaves of long ago. A public trial is not
synonymous with publicized trial; it only implies that
the court doors must be open to those who wish to
come, sit in the available seats, conduct
themselves with decorum and observe the trial
process. In the constitutional sense, a courtroom
should have enough facilities for a reasonable
number of the public to observe the proceedings,
not too small as to render the openness negligible
and not too large as to distract the trial participants
from their proper functions, who shall then be totally
free to report what they have observed during the
proceedings. 26 (underscoring supplied) IaHAcT
Even before considering what is a "reasonable
number of the public" who may observe the
proceedings, the peculiarity of the subject criminal
cases is that the proceedings already necessarily
entail the presence of hundreds of families. It
cannot be gainsaid that the families of the 57
victims and of the 197 accused have as much
interest, beyond mere curiosity, to attend or monitor
the proceedings as those of the impleaded parties
or trial participants. It bears noting at this juncture
that the prosecution and the defense have listed
more than 200 witnesses each.
The impossibility of holding such judicial
proceedings in a courtroom that will
accommodate all the interested parties, whether
private complainants or accused, is unfortunate
enough. What more if the right itself commands
that a reasonable number of the general public be
allowed to witness the proceeding as it takes place
inside the courtroom. Technology tends to provide
the only solution to break the inherent limitations of
the courtroom, to satisfy the imperative of a
transparent, open and public trial.
In so allowing pro hac vice the live broadcasting by
radio and television of the Maguindanao Massacre
cases, the Court lays down the following guidelines
toward addressing the concerns mentioned in
Aquino and Estrada:
(a)An audio-visual recording of the Maguindanao
massacre cases may be made both for
documentary purposes and for transmittal to live
radio and television broadcasting.
(b)Media entities must file with the trial court a letter
of application, manifesting that they intend to
broadcast the audio-visual recording of the
proceedings and that they have the necessary
technological equipment and technical plan to
carry out the same, with an undertaking that they
will faithfully comply with the guidelines and
regulations and cover the entire remaining
proceedings until promulgation of judgment.
No selective or partial coverage shall be allowed.
No media entity shall be allowed to broadcast the
proceedings without an application duly approved
by the trial court.
(c)A single fixed compact camera shall be installed
inconspicuously inside the courtroom to provide a
single wide-angle full-view of the sala of the trial
46 | C O N S T I 2 _ S e c t i o n 1 4 _ R i g h t t o S p e e d y , I m p a r t i a l a n d P u b l i c T r i a l
court. No panning and zooming shall be allowed to
avoid unduly highlighting or downplaying incidents
in the proceedings. The camera and the necessary
equipment shall be operated and controlled only
by a duly designated official or employee of the
Supreme Court. The camera equipment should not
produce or beam any distracting sound or light
rays. Signal lights or signs showing the equipment is
operating should not be visible. A limited number of
microphones and the least installation of wiring, if
not wireless technology, must be unobtrusively
located in places indicated by the trial court.
The Public Information Office and the Office of the
Court Administrator shall coordinate and assist the
trial court on the physical set-up of the camera and
equipment. ISAcHD
(d)The transmittal of the audio-visual recording from
inside the courtroom to the media entities shall be
conducted in such a way that the least physical
disturbance shall be ensured in keeping with the
dignity and solemnity of the proceedings and the
exclusivity of the access to the media entities.
The hardware for establishing an interconnection or
link with the camera equipment monitoring the
proceedings shall be for the account of the media
entities, which should employ technology that can
(i) avoid the cumbersome snaking cables inside the
courtroom, (ii) minimize the unnecessary ingress or
egress of technicians, and (iii) preclude undue
commotion in case of technical glitches.
If the premises outside the courtroom lack space for
the set-up of the media entities' facilities, the media
entities shall access the audio-visual recording
either via wireless technology accessible even from
outside the court premises or from one common
web broadcasting platform from which streaming
can be accessed or derived to feed the images
and sounds.
At all times, exclusive access by the media entities
to the real-time audio-visual recording should be
protected or encrypted.
(e)The broadcasting of the proceedings for a
particular day must be continuous and in its
entirety, excepting such portions thereof where
Sec. 21 of Rule 119 of the Rules of Court 27 applies,
and where the trial court excludes, upon motion,
prospective witnesses from the courtroom, in
instances where, inter alia, there are unresolved
identification issues or there are issues which involve
the security of the witnesses and the integrity of
their testimony (e.g., the dovetailing of
corroborative testimonies is material, minority of the
witness).
The trial court may, with the consent of the parties,
order only the pixelization of the image of the
witness or mute the audio output, or both.
(f)To provide a faithful and complete broadcast of
the proceedings, no commercial break or any
other gap shall be allowed until the day's
proceedings are adjourned, except during the
period of recess called by the trial court and during
portions of the proceedings wherein the public is
ordered excluded.
(g)To avoid overriding or superimposing the audio
output from the on-going proceedings, the
proceedings shall be broadcast without any voice-
overs, except brief annotations of scenes depicted
therein as may be necessary to explain them at the
start or at the end of the scene. Any commentary
shall observe the sub judice rule and be subject to
the contempt power of the court;
(h)No repeat airing of the audio-visual recording
shall be allowed until after the finality of judgment,
except brief footages and still images derived from
or cartographic sketches of scenes based on the
recording, only for news purposes, which shall
likewise observe the sub judice rule and be subject
to the contempt power of the court;
(i)The original audio-recording shall be deposited in
the National Museum and the Records
Management and Archives Office for preservation
and exhibition in accordance with law. TSADaI
(j)The audio-visual recording of the proceedings
shall be made under the supervision and control of
the trial court which may issue supplementary
directives, as the exigency requires, including the
suspension or revocation of the grant of application
by the media entities.
(k)The Court shall create a special committee
which shall forthwith study, design and recommend
appropriate arrangements, implementing
regulations, and administrative matters referred to it
by the Court concerning the live broadcast of the
proceedings pro hac vice, in accordance with the
above-outlined guidelines. The Special Committee
shall also report and recommend on the feasibility,
availability and affordability of the latest
technology that would meet the herein
requirements. It may conduct consultations with
resource persons and experts in the field of
information and communication technology.
(l)All other present directives in the conduct of the
proceedings of the trial court (i.e., prohibition on
recording devices such as still cameras, tape
recorders; and allowable number of media
practitioners inside the courtroom) shall be
observed in addition to these guidelines.
Indeed, the Court cannot gloss over what
advances technology has to offer in distilling the
abstract discussion of key constitutional precepts
into the workable context. Technology per se has
always been neutral. It is the use and regulation
thereof that need fine-tuning. Law and technology
can work to the advantage and furtherance of the
various rights herein involved, within the contours of
defined guidelines.
47 | C O N S T I 2 _ S e c t i o n 1 4 _ R i g h t t o S p e e d y , I m p a r t i a l a n d P u b l i c T r i a l
WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing disquisition, the
Court PARTIALLY GRANTS PRO HAC VICE the request
for live broadcast by television and radio of the trial
court proceedings of the Maguindanao Massacre
cases, subject to the guidelines herein outlined.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio, Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-de Castro, Brion,
Peralta, Bersamin, Del Castillo, Abad, Villarama, Jr.,
Perez, Mendoza and Sereno, JJ., concur.
Corona, C.J., is on official leave.
(In re Ampatuan, A.M. No. 10-11-5-SC, 10-11-6-SC,
10-11-7-SC, October 23, 2012)
EN BANC
[A.M. No. 10-11-5-SC. October 23, 2012.]
IN RE: PETITION FOR RADIO AND TELEVISION
COVERAGE OF THE MULTIPLE MURDER CASES
AGAINST MAGUINDANAO GOVERNOR ZALDY
AMPATUAN, ET AL.
[A.M. No. 10-11-6-SC. October 23, 2012.]
RE: PETITION FOR THE CONSTITUTION OF THE PRESENT
COURT HANDLING THE TRIAL OF THE MASSACRE OF
57 PERSONS, INCLUDING 32 JOURNALISTS, IN
AMPATUAN, MAGUINDANAO INTO A SPECIAL
COURT HANDLING THIS CASE ALONE FOR THE
PURPOSE OF ACHIEVING GENUINE SPEEDY TRIAL;
AND FOR THE SETTING UP OF VIDEOCAM AND
MONITOR OUTSIDE THE COURT FOR THE JOURNALISTS
TO COVER AND FOR THE PEOPLE TO WITNESS THE
"TRIAL OF THE DECADE" TO MAKE IT TRULY PUBLIC
AND IMPARTIAL AS COMMANDED BY THE
CONSTITUTION.
[A.M. No. 10-11-7-SC. October 23, 2012.]
RE: LETTER OF PRESIDENT BENIGNO S. AQUINO III FOR
THE "LIVE MEDIA COVERAGE OF THE
MAGUINDANAO MASSACRE TRIAL".
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court en banc issued a
Resolution dated OCTOBER 23, 2012 which reads as
follows:
"A.M. No. 10-11-5-SC (In re: Petition for Radio and
Television Coverage of the Multiple Murder Cases
against Maguindanao Governor Zaldy Ampatuan,
et al.); A.M. No. 10-11-6-SC (Re: Petition for the
constitution of the present court handling the trial of
the massacre of 57 persons, including 32 journalists,
in Ampatuan, Maguindanao into a Special Court
handling this case alone for the purpose of
achieving genuine speedy trial; and for the setting
up of videocam and monitor outside the court for
the journalists to cover and for the people to
witness the "Trial of the Decade" to make it truly
public and impartial as commanded by the
Constitution); A.M. No. 10-11-7-SC (Re: Letter of
President Benigno S. Aquino III for the "Live Media
Coverage of the Maguindanao Massacre Trial").
On June 14, 2011, this Court, through Associate
Justice Conchita Carpio-Morales, promulgated a
Resolution 1 (the June 14, 2011 Resolution) partially
granting pro hac vice the request for live broadcast
by television and radio of the trial court
proceedings of the "Maguindanao massacre"
cases, 2 subject to specific guidelines fully set forth
in said Resolution.
Subsequently, counsels for petitioners Editha
Mirandilla Tiamzon (Tiamzon) and Glenna Legarta
(Legarta) filed a Partial Motion for Reconsideration
dated June 29, 2011 alleging that "the provisos (1)
prohibiting broadcasts on the trial without any
voice-overs, except brief annotations of scenes
depicted in the proceeding that may be necessary
to explain them at the start or at the end of the
scene; (2) prohibiting the repeat airing of the audio-
visual recording except upon finality of judgment or
of brief footage and still images derived from or
cartographic sketches of scenes based on the
recording, and only for news purposes; and (3)
requiring continuous broadcast without any
commercial break or any other gap except when
the day's proceedings are adjourned, or during the
period of recess called by the trial court and during
portions of the proceedings wherein the public is
ordered excluded, all substitute the Court's editorial
judgment for media's own and therefore constitute
prior restraint that infringes the constitutional right to
free expression." 3 HECaTD
Petitioners Tiamzon and Legarta take issue on
provisos (f), (g), and (h) of the enumerated
guidelines in the June 14, 2011 Resolution and
allege that these must be struck down for being
unconstitutional, as they constitute prior restraint on
free expression because they dictate what media
can and cannot report about the "Maguindanao
massacre" trial. Petitioners Tiamzon and Legarta
maintain that the restriction and penalty sought to
be imposed on media produce a "chilling effect"
on all forms of expression about the court
proceedings. Petitioners Tiamzon and Legarta also
add that proviso (h) constitutes an undue taking of
property rights as it "forces media outfits to commit
practically [a] big chunk of their resources to the
coverage of the trial without any commercial
breaks except under allowable situations . . . ." 4
Accused Andal Ampatuan, Jr. (Ampatuan) also
filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated June 27,
2011, alleging that the June 14, 2011 Resolution
"deprives him of his rights to due process, equal
protection, presumption of innocence, and to be
shielded from degrading psychological
punishment." 5
Ampatuan contends that this Court should accord
more vigilance in safeguarding his rights as an
accused because the immense publicity and
48 | C O N S T I 2 _ S e c t i o n 1 4 _ R i g h t t o S p e e d y , I m p a r t i a l a n d P u b l i c T r i a l
adverse public opinion which live media coverage
can produce would affect everyone, including the
judge, witnesses for the accused, and the families
and relatives of all concerned parties. Ampatuan
states that this Court should not bend to the
clamour of pressure groups, such as media
journalists, but should push for the basic judicial and
democratic principles of fair play and balanced
judicial process. Ampatuan asserts that "live media
coverage of the trial is cruel and degrading
punishment for the accused even before he is
convicted by final judgment." 6
In a Resolution dated July 5, 2011, this Court
required Ampatuan to comment on the Partial
Motion for Reconsideration by petitioners Tiamzon
and Legarta, and also required the petitioners to
comment on Ampatuan's Motion for
Reconsideration.
Ampatuan filed an Opposition dated August 1,
2011, alleging that "petitioners want to secure
conviction by maximizing whatever opportunity
mass communications media will extend to them." 7
Ampatuan asserts that there is "no content-based
restriction, only responsible journalism" 8 with the
guidelines provided by this Court when it mandated
that no voice-overs be made during the live
telecast of the hearings. Ampatuan also contends
that there was no undue taking of private property
as the coverage is voluntary and only those who
are serious enough may avail of the opportunity to
report on the hearings. Ampatuan maintains that
"media coverage must not be allowed as it infringes
on his constitutional rights to fair trial, presumption of
innocence and to an impartial tribunal . . . ." 9
Petitioners National Union of Journalists of the
Philippines (NUJP), et al. filed a Motion for Leave of
Court to File Comment (to Tiamzon and Legarta's
Partial Motion for Reconsideration) dated August
15, 2011, alleging that while they were not directed
by this Court to comment on their co-petitioners'
partial motion for reconsideration, they deemed it
necessary to file a comment in order to clarify some
matters that may affect its resolution. IDTSaC
In their Consolidated Comment (to Tiamzon and
Legarta's Partial Motion for Reconsideration and
Ampatuan's Motion for Reconsideration) dated
August 15, 2011, petitioners NUJP, et al. allege that
Ampatuan's motion for reconsideration has failed to
present new and convincing arguments that would
merit reversal of this Court's ruling in the June 14,
2011 Resolution.
Petitioners NUJP, et al. declare that they opted not
to file a motion for reconsideration since they
recognize the good faith underlying the gestures of
this Court, specifically in providing in paragraph (k)
of the guidelines that called for the creation of a
special committee. This, according to petitioners
NUJP, et al. shows that this Court is "giving room for
flexibility and experimentation and is aware that the
guidelines cannot possibly anticipate all the
problems and concerns that live television
coverage of the Ampatuan trial will encounter." 10
Moreover, petitioners NUJP, et al. aver that this
Court, through the Court Administrator, has already
addressed some of the concerns of the petitioner-
media practitioners through a dialogue on June 22,
2011.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a
Comment dated August 24, 2011, for President
Benigno S. Aquino III, alleging that the arguments
raised in Ampatuan's motion for reconsideration are
a mere rehash of the issues which have already
been judiciously passed upon by this Court. The
OSG maintains that "the coverage by live media of
hearings neither constitutes a barbarous act nor
inflicts upon the accused inhuman physical harm or
torture that is shocking to the conscience. The fact
that more than the usual number of court
attendees could witness the criminal trial will not
convert the attendance thereto into a degrading
and cruel punishment." 11 The OSG avers that
Ampatuan failed to adduce any new matter to
modify the Resolution of this Court. DcITaC
Upon reconsideration, and after weighing once
more the rights guaranteed by the Constitution that
are involved in this case, this Court partially grants
reconsideration of the June 14, 2011 Resolution. For
reasons to be discussed below, this Court is now
disallowing the live media broadcast of the trial of
the "Maguindanao massacre" cases but is still
allowing the filming of the proceedings for (1) the
real-time transmission to specified viewing areas,
and (2) documentation.
The Court in the June 14, 2011 Resolution
recognized "the impossibility of accommodating
even the parties to the cases the private
complainants/families of the victims and other
witnesses inside the courtroom," as there were 57
victims and 197 accused that were involved, and
under strict guidelines, made use of modern
technology "to provide the only solution to break
the inherent limitations of the courtroom, to satisfy
the imperative of a transparent, open and public
trial." 12
Upon review of the matter, however, the Court has
sought a way to provide a public trial as required
by the Constitution 13 and the Rules, 14 which is a
right granted to the accused, without inviting
media frenzy that affect the due process rights of
the accused in this high-profile case.
While this Court recognizes the freedom of the press
and the right to public information, which, by the
way, are rights that belong to non-direct parties to
the case, the rights of the direct parties should not
be forgotten. In a clash among these competing
interests and in terms of the values the Constitution
recognizes, jurisprudence makes it clear that the
balance should always be weighed in favor of the
accused. 15
The constitutional rights specific to the accused
under Section 14, Article III of the Constitution such
49 | C O N S T I 2 _ S e c t i o n 1 4 _ R i g h t t o S p e e d y , I m p a r t i a l a n d P u b l i c T r i a l
as the right to due process of law, 16 to be
presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, 17
and to an impartial and public trial 18 and the
requirement of the highest quantum of proof 19 to
justify deprivation of his liberty (or even of his life)
provide more than ample justification to take a
second look at the view that a camera that
broadcasts the proceedings live on television has
no place in a criminal trial because of its prejudicial
effects on the rights of accused individuals. DTcASE
This Court, in Re: Live TV and Radio Coverage of the
Hearing of President Corazon C. Aquino's Libel
Case, 20 found that the live coverage of judicial
proceedings involve an inherent denial of due
process, which we quote:
Experience likewise has established the prejudicial
effect of telecasting on witnesses. Witnesses might
be frightened, play to the camera, or become
nervous. They are subject to extraordinary out-of-
court influences which might affect their testimony.
Also, telecasting not only increases the trial judge's
responsibility to avoid actual prejudice to the
defendant, it may as well affect his own
performance. Judges are human beings also and
are subject to the same psychological reactions as
laymen. For the defendant, telecasting is a form of
mental harassment and subjects him to excessive
public exposure and distracts him from the effective
presentation of his defense.
The television camera is a powerful weapon which
intentionally or inadvertently can destroy an
accused and his case in the eyes of the public. 21
In this case that has achieved notoriety and
sensational status, a greater degree of care is
required to safeguard the constitutional rights of the
accused. To be in the best position to weigh the
conflicting testimonies of the witnesses, the judge
must not be affected by any outside force or
influence. Like any human being, however, a judge
is not immune from the pervasive effects of media.
22
So must the witnesses be shielded from the pressure
of being aware that their testimony is broadcasted
live over television and radio, to be scrutinized and
judged by the court of public opinion. A witness'
behavior and self-consciousness before the camera
in a high-profile case such as this case might
compromise the reliability of the fact-finding
process, which in turn could skew the judge's
assessment of his or her credibility, necessarily
affecting the resolution of the case. cEaCTS
In a constitutional sense, public trial is not
synonymous with publicized trial. 23 The right to a
public trial belongs to the accused. The
requirement of a public trial is satisfied by the
opportunity of the members of the public and the
press to attend the trial and to report what they
have observed. 24 The accused's right to a public
trial should not be confused with the freedom of the
press and the public's right to know as a justification
for allowing the live broadcast of the trial. The
tendency of a high profile case like the subject
case to generate undue publicity with its
concomitant undesirable effects weighs heavily
against broadcasting the trial. Moreover, the fact
that the accused has legal remedies after the fact
is of no moment, since the damage has been done
and may be irreparable. It must be pointed out that
the fundamental right to due process of the
accused cannot be afforded after the fact but
must be protected at the first instance.
To address the physical impossibility of
accommodating the large number of interested
parties inside the courtroom in Camp Bagong Diwa,
it is not necessary to allow the press to broadcast
the proceedings here and abroad, but the Court
may allow the opening of closed-circuit viewing
areas outside the courtroom where those who may
be so minded can come and watch the
proceedings. This out-of-court, real-time viewing
grants to a larger audience the opportunity to
monitor the proceedings as if they were inside the
trial court but at the same time obviates the
massive publicity entailed in media broadcasting.
This is similar to the procedure adopted by this
Court in allowing members of the public to watch
its oral arguments at a viewing area outside of the
Session Hall where a large monitor projects the
images and sounds from inside the Session Hall in
real time.
Aside from providing a viewing area outside the
courtroom in Camp Bagong Diwa, closed-circuit
viewing areas can also be opened in selected trial
courts in Maguindanao, Koronadal, South
Cotabato, and General Santos City where most of
the relatives of the accused and the victims reside,
enabling them to watch the trial without having to
come to Camp Bagong Diwa. These viewing areas
will, at all times, be under the control of the trial
court judges involved, subject to this Court's
supervision.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court
resolves to:
1.DENY the Partial Motion for Reconsideration
dated June 29, 2011 of petitioners Editha Mirandilla
Tiamzon and Glenna Legarta;
2.PARTIALLY GRANT the Motion for Reconsideration
dated June 27, 2011 filed by accused Andal
Ampatuan, Jr. and to MODIFY this Court's Resolution
dated June 14, 2011, by disallowing the live media
broadcast of the trial in Criminal Case Nos. Q-09-
162148-72, Q-09-162216-31, Q-10-162652-66, and Q-
10-163766, subject to the following guidelines on
audio-visual recording and streaming of the video
coverage:
a.An audio-visual recording of the Maguindanao
massacre cases may be made both for
documentary purposes and for transmittal to
specified closed-circuit viewing areas: (i) outside
the courtroom, within the Camp Bagong Diwa's
50 | C O N S T I 2 _ S e c t i o n 1 4 _ R i g h t t o S p e e d y , I m p a r t i a l a n d P u b l i c T r i a l
premises; and (ii) selected trial courts in
Maguindanao, Koronadal, South Cotabato, and
General Santos City where the relatives of the
accused and the victims reside. Said trial courts
shall be identified by the Office of the Court
Administrator. These viewing areas shall be under
the control of the trial court judges involved, subject
to this Court's supervision. aIcDCH
b.The viewing area will be installed to
accommodate the public who want to observe the
proceedings within the Camp Bagong Diwa
premises. The streaming of this video coverage
within the different court premises in Mindanao will
be installed so that the relatives of the parties and
the interested public can watch the proceedings in
real time.
c.A single fixed compact camera shall be installed
inconspicuously inside the courtroom to provide a
single wide-angle full-view of the sala of the trial
court. No panning and zooming shall be allowed to
avoid unduly highlighting or downplaying incidents
in the proceedings. The camera and the necessary
equipment shall be operated and controlled only
by a duly designated official or employee of the
Supreme Court.
d.The transmittal of the audio-visual recording from
inside the courtroom to the closed-circuit viewing
areas shall be conducted in such a way that the
least physical disturbance shall be ensured in
keeping with the dignity and solemnity of the
proceedings. CHATEa
e.The Public Information Office and the Office of
the Court Administrator shall coordinate and assist
the trial courts involved on the physical set-up of
the camera and equipment.
f.The original audio-recording shall be deposited in
the National Museum and the Records
Management and Archives Office for preservation
and exhibition in accordance with law.
g.The audio-visual recording of the proceedings
and its transmittal shall be made under the control
of the trial court which may issue supplementary
directives, as the exigency requires, subject to this
Court's supervision.
h.In all cases, the witnesses should be excluded
from watching the proceedings, whether inside the
courtroom or in the designated viewing areas. The
Presiding Judge shall issue the appropriate orders to
insure compliance with this directive and for the
imposition of appropriate sanctions for its violation."
Carpio, J., on official leave. Del Castillo, J., on
leave. Perez, J., on official leave. (adv98)
Very truly yours,
(SGD.) ENRIQUETA E. VIDAL
Clerk of Court