1.
Republic of the Philippines entitled to the full benefit, use and enjoyment of the natural resource treasure
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 101083 July 30, 1993
JUAN ANTONIO, ANNA ROSARIO and JOSE ALFONSO, all surnamed OPOSA,
minors, and represented by their parents ANTONIO and RIZALINA OPOSA,
ROBERTA NICOLE SADIUA, minor, represented by her parents CALVIN and
ROBERTA SADIUA, CARLO, AMANDA SALUD and PATRISHA, all surnamed
FLORES, minors and represented by their parents ENRICO and NIDA FLORES,
GIANINA DITA R. FORTUN, minor, represented by her parents SIGRID and
DOLORES FORTUN, GEORGE II and MA. CONCEPCION, all surnamed MISA,
minors and represented by their parents GEORGE and MYRA MISA,
BENJAMIN ALAN V. PESIGAN, minor, represented by his parents ANTONIO
and ALICE PESIGAN, JOVIE MARIE ALFARO, minor, represented by her
parents JOSE and MARIA VIOLETA ALFARO, MARIA CONCEPCION T. CASTRO,
minor, represented by her parents FREDENIL and JANE CASTRO, JOHANNA
DESAMPARADO,
minor, represented by her parents JOSE and ANGELA DESAMPRADO, CARLO
JOAQUIN T. NARVASA, minor, represented by his parents GREGORIO II and
CRISTINE CHARITY NARVASA, MA. MARGARITA, JESUS IGNACIO, MA.
ANGELA and MARIE GABRIELLE, all surnamed SAENZ, minors, represented by
their parents ROBERTO and AURORA SAENZ, KRISTINE, MARY ELLEN, MAY,
GOLDA MARTHE and DAVID IAN, all surnamed KING, minors, represented by
their parents MARIO and HAYDEE KING, DAVID, FRANCISCO and THERESE
VICTORIA, all surnamed ENDRIGA, minors, represented by their parents
BALTAZAR and TERESITA ENDRIGA, JOSE MA. and REGINA MA., all surnamed
ABAYA, minors, represented by their parents ANTONIO and MARICA ABAYA,
MARILIN, MARIO, JR. and MARIETTE, all surnamed CARDAMA, minors,
represented by their parents MARIO and LINA CARDAMA, CLARISSA, ANN
MARIE, NAGEL, and IMEE LYN, all surnamed OPOSA, minors and represented
by their parents RICARDO and MARISSA OPOSA, PHILIP JOSEPH, STEPHEN
JOHN and ISAIAH JAMES, all surnamed QUIPIT, minors, represented by their
parents JOSE MAX and VILMI QUIPIT, BUGHAW CIELO, CRISANTO, ANNA,
DANIEL and FRANCISCO, all surnamed BIBAL, minors, represented by their
parents FRANCISCO, JR. and MILAGROS BIBAL, and THE PHILIPPINE
ECOLOGICAL NETWORK, INC., petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE FULGENCIO S. FACTORAN, JR., in his capacity as the
Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, and
THE HONORABLE ERIBERTO U. ROSARIO, Presiding Judge of the RTC, Makati,
Branch 66, respondents.
Oposa Law Office for petitioners.
The Solicitor General for respondents.
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
In a broader sense, this petition bears upon the right of Filipinos to a balanced
and healthful ecology which the petitioners dramatically associate with the
twin concepts of "inter-generational responsibility" and "inter-generational
justice." Specifically, it touches on the issue of whether the said petitioners
have a cause of action to "prevent the misappropriation or impairment" of
Philippine rainforests and "arrest the unabated hemorrhage of the country's
vital life support systems and continued rape of Mother Earth."
The controversy has its genesis in Civil Case No. 90-77 which was filed before
Branch 66 (Makati, Metro Manila) of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), National
Capital Judicial Region. The principal plaintiffs therein, now the principal
petitioners, are all minors duly represented and joined by their respective
parents. Impleaded as an additional plaintiff is the Philippine Ecological
Network, Inc. (PENI), a domestic, non-stock and non-profit corporation
organized for the purpose of, inter alia, engaging in concerted action geared
for the protection of our environment and natural resources. The original
defendant was the Honorable Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., then Secretary of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). His substitution in
this petition by the new Secretary, the Honorable Angel C. Alcala, was
subsequently ordered upon proper motion by the petitioners.1 The
complaint2 was instituted as a taxpayers' class suit3 and alleges that the
plaintiffs "are all citizens of the Republic of the Philippines, taxpayers, and
that is the country's virgin tropical forests." The same was filed for themselves
and others who are equally concerned about the preservation of said resource
but are "so numerous that it is impracticable to bring them all before the
Court." The minors further asseverate that they "represent their generation as
well as generations yet unborn."4 Consequently, it is prayed for that judgment
be rendered:
. . . ordering defendant, his agents, representatives and other persons acting
in his behalf to
(1) Cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country;
(2) Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or
approving new timber license agreements.
and granting the plaintiffs ". . . such other reliefs just and equitable under the
premises."5
The complaint starts off with the general averments that the Philippine
archipelago of 7,100 islands has a land area of thirty million (30,000,000)
hectares and is endowed with rich, lush and verdant rainforests in which
varied, rare and unique species of flora and fauna may be found; these
rainforests contain a genetic, biological and chemical pool which is
irreplaceable; they are also the habitat of indigenous Philippine cultures which
have existed, endured and flourished since time immemorial; scientific
evidence reveals that in order to maintain a balanced and healthful ecology,
the country's land area should be utilized on the basis of a ratio of fifty-four
per cent (54%) for forest cover and forty-six per cent (46%) for agricultural,
residential, industrial, commercial and other uses; the distortion and
disturbance of this balance as a consequence of deforestation have resulted
in a host of environmental tragedies, such as (a) water shortages resulting
from drying up of the water table, otherwise known as the "aquifer," as well
as of rivers, brooks and streams, (b) salinization of the water table as a result
of the intrusion therein of salt water, incontrovertible examples of which may
be found in the island of Cebu and the Municipality of Bacoor, Cavite, (c)
massive erosion and the consequential loss of soil fertility and agricultural
productivity, with the volume of soil eroded estimated at one billion
(1,000,000,000) cubic meters per annum approximately the size of the
entire island of Catanduanes, (d) the endangering and extinction of the
country's unique, rare and varied flora and fauna, (e) the disturbance and
dislocation of cultural communities, including the disappearance of the
Filipino's indigenous cultures, (f) the siltation of rivers and seabeds and
consequential destruction of corals and other aquatic life leading to a critical
reduction in marine resource productivity, (g) recurrent spells of drought as is
presently experienced by the entire country, (h) increasing velocity of typhoon
winds which result from the absence of windbreakers, (i) the floodings of
lowlands and agricultural plains arising from the absence of the absorbent
mechanism of forests, (j) the siltation and shortening of the lifespan of multi-
billion peso dams constructed and operated for the purpose of supplying
water for domestic uses, irrigation and the generation of electric power, and
(k) the reduction of the earth's capacity to process carbon dioxide gases which
has led to perplexing and catastrophic climatic changes such as the
phenomenon of global warming, otherwise known as the "greenhouse effect."
Plaintiffs further assert that the adverse and detrimental consequences of
continued and deforestation are so capable of unquestionable demonstration
that the same may be submitted as a matter of judicial notice. This
notwithstanding, they expressed their intention to present expert witnesses
as well as documentary, photographic and film evidence in the course of the
trial.
As their cause of action, they specifically allege that:
CAUSE OF ACTION
7. Plaintiffs replead by reference the foregoing allegations.
8. Twenty-five (25) years ago, the Philippines had some sixteen (16) million
hectares of rainforests constituting roughly 53% of the country's land mass.
9. Satellite images taken in 1987 reveal that there remained no more than 1.2
million hectares of said rainforests or four per cent (4.0%) of the country's land
area.
10. More recent surveys reveal that a mere 850,000 hectares of virgin old-
growth rainforests are left, barely 2.8% of the entire land mass of the
Philippine archipelago and about 3.0 million hectares of immature and
uneconomical secondary growth forests.
11. Public records reveal that the defendant's, predecessors have granted
timber license agreements ('TLA's') to various corporations to cut the
aggregate area of 3.89 million hectares for commercial logging purposes.
A copy of the TLA holders and the corresponding areas covered is hereto
attached as Annex "A".
12. At the present rate of deforestation, i.e. about 200,000 hectares per
annum or 25 hectares per hour nighttime, Saturdays, Sundays and holidays
included the Philippines will be bereft of forest resources after the end of
this ensuing decade, if not earlier.
13. The adverse effects, disastrous consequences, serious injury and
irreparable damage of this continued trend of deforestation to the plaintiff
minor's generation and to generations yet unborn are evident and
incontrovertible. As a matter of fact, the environmental damages enumerated
in paragraph 6 hereof are already being felt, experienced and suffered by the
generation of plaintiff adults.
14. The continued allowance by defendant of TLA holders to cut and deforest
the remaining forest stands will work great damage and irreparable injury to
plaintiffs especially plaintiff minors and their successors who may never
see, use, benefit from and enjoy this rare and unique natural resource
treasure.
This act of defendant constitutes a misappropriation and/or impairment of the
natural resource property he holds in trust for the benefit of plaintiff minors
and succeeding generations.
15. Plaintiffs have a clear and constitutional right to a balanced and healthful
ecology and are entitled to protection by the State in its capacity as the parens
patriae.
16. Plaintiff have exhausted all administrative remedies with the defendant's
office. On March 2, 1990, plaintiffs served upon defendant a final demand to
cancel all logging permits in the country.
A copy of the plaintiffs' letter dated March 1, 1990 is hereto attached as Annex
"B".
17. Defendant, however, fails and refuses to cancel the existing TLA's to the
continuing serious damage and extreme prejudice of plaintiffs.
18. The continued failure and refusal by defendant to cancel the TLA's is an act
violative of the rights of plaintiffs, especially plaintiff minors who may be left
with a country that is desertified (sic), bare, barren and devoid of the
wonderful flora, fauna and indigenous cultures which the Philippines had been
abundantly blessed with.
19. Defendant's refusal to cancel the aforementioned TLA's is manifestly
contrary to the public policy enunciated in the Philippine Environmental Policy
which, in pertinent part, states that it is the policy of the State
(a) to create, develop, maintain and improve conditions under which man and
nature can thrive in productive and enjoyable harmony with each other;
(b) to fulfill the social, economic and other requirements of present and future
generations of Filipinos and;
(c) to ensure the attainment of an environmental quality that is conductive to
a life of dignity and well-being. (P.D. 1151, 6 June 1977)
20. Furthermore, defendant's continued refusal to cancel the aforementioned
TLA's is contradictory to the Constitutional policy of the State to
a. effect "a more equitable distribution of opportunities, income and wealth"
and "make full and efficient use of natural resources (sic)." (Section 1, Article
XII of the Constitution);
b. "protect the nation's marine wealth." (Section 2, ibid);
c. "conserve and promote the nation's cultural heritage and resources (sic)"
(Section 14, Article XIV, id.);
d. "protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful
ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature." (Section 16, Article
II, id.)
21. Finally, defendant's act is contrary to the highest law of humankind the
natural law and violative of plaintiffs' right to self-preservation and
perpetuation.
22. There is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in law other than the
instant action to arrest the unabated hemorrhage of the country's vital life
support systems and continued rape of Mother Earth. 6
On 22 June 1990, the original defendant, Secretary Factoran, Jr., filed a Motion
to Dismiss the complaint based on two (2) grounds, namely: (1) the plaintiffs
have no cause of action against him and (2) the issue raised by the plaintiffs is
a political question which properly pertains to the legislative or executive
branches of Government. In their 12 July 1990 Opposition to the Motion, the
petitioners maintain that (1) the complaint shows a clear and unmistakable
cause of action, (2) the motion is dilatory and (3) the action presents a
justiciable question as it involves the defendant's abuse of discretion.
On 18 July 1991, respondent Judge issued an order granting the
aforementioned motion to dismiss.7 In the said order, not only was the
defendant's claim that the complaint states no cause of action against him
and that it raises a political question sustained, the respondent Judge
further ruled that the granting of the relief prayed for would result in the
impairment of contracts which is prohibited by the fundamental law of the
land.
Plaintiffs thus filed the instant special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65
of the Revised Rules of Court and ask this Court to rescind and set aside the
dismissal order on the ground that the respondent Judge gravely abused his
discretion in dismissing the action. Again, the parents of the plaintiffs-minors
not only represent their children, but have also joined the latter in this case.8
On 14 May 1992, We resolved to give due course to the petition and required
the parties to submit their respective Memoranda after the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG) filed a Comment in behalf of the respondents and the
petitioners filed a reply thereto.
Petitioners contend that the complaint clearly and unmistakably states a cause
of action as it contains sufficient allegations concerning their right to a sound
environment based on Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Civil Code (Human
Relations), Section 4 of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 192 creating the DENR,
Section 3 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1151 (Philippine Environmental
Policy), Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution recognizing the right of
the people to a balanced and healthful ecology, the concept of generational
genocide in Criminal Law and the concept of man's inalienable right to self-
preservation and self-perpetuation embodied in natural law. Petitioners
likewise rely on the respondent's correlative obligation per Section 4 of E.O.
No. 192, to safeguard the people's right to a healthful environment.
It is further claimed that the issue of the respondent Secretary's alleged grave
abuse of discretion in granting Timber License Agreements (TLAs) to cover
more areas for logging than what is available involves a judicial question.
Anent the invocation by the respondent Judge of the Constitution's non-
impairment clause, petitioners maintain that the same does not apply in this
case because TLAs are not contracts. They likewise submit that even if TLAs
may be considered protected by the said clause, it is well settled that they may
still be revoked by the State when the public interest so requires.
On the other hand, the respondents aver that the petitioners failed to allege
in their complaint a specific legal right violated by the respondent Secretary
for which any relief is provided by law. They see nothing in the complaint but
vague and nebulous allegations concerning an "environmental right" which
supposedly entitles the petitioners to the "protection by the state in its
capacity as parens patriae." Such allegations, according to them, do not reveal
a valid cause of action. They then reiterate the theory that the question of
whether logging should be permitted in the country is a political question
which should be properly addressed to the executive or legislative branches of
Government. They therefore assert that the petitioners' resources is not to file
an action to court, but to lobby before Congress for the passage of a bill that
would ban logging totally.
As to the matter of the cancellation of the TLAs, respondents submit that the
same cannot be done by the State without due process of law. Once issued, a
TLA remains effective for a certain period of time usually for twenty-five
(25) years. During its effectivity, the same can neither be revised nor cancelled
unless the holder has been found, after due notice and hearing, to have
violated the terms of the agreement or other forestry laws and regulations.
Petitioners' proposition to have all the TLAs indiscriminately cancelled without
the requisite hearing would be violative of the requirements of due process.
Before going any further, We must first focus on some procedural matters.
Petitioners instituted Civil Case No. 90-777 as a class suit. The original
defendant and the present respondents did not take issue with this matter.
Nevertheless, We hereby rule that the said civil case is indeed a class suit. The
subject matter of the complaint is of common and general interest not just to
several, but to all citizens of the Philippines. Consequently, since the parties
are so numerous, it, becomes impracticable, if not totally impossible, to bring
all of them before the court. We likewise declare that the plaintiffs therein are
numerous and representative enough to ensure the full protection of all
concerned interests. Hence, all the requisites for the filing of a valid class suit
under Section 12, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court are present both in the
said civil case and in the instant petition, the latter being but an incident to the
former.
This case, however, has a special and novel element. Petitioners minors assert
that they represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn. We
find no difficulty in ruling that they can, for themselves, for others of their
generation and for the succeeding generations, file a class suit. Their
personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding generations can only be based
on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a
balanced and healthful ecology is concerned. Such a right, as hereinafter
expounded, considers
the "rhythm and harmony of nature." Nature means the created world in its
entirety.9 Such rhythm and harmony indispensably include, inter alia, the
judicious disposition, utilization, management, renewal and conservation of
the country's forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, off-shore areas
and other natural resources to the end that their exploration, development
and utilization be equitably accessible to the present as well as future
generations. 10Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility to the
next to preserve that rhythm and harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced
and healthful ecology. Put a little differently, the minors' assertion of their
right to a sound environment constitutes, at the same time, the performance
of their obligation to ensure the protection of that right for the generations to
come.
The locus standi of the petitioners having thus been addressed, We shall now
proceed to the merits of the petition.
After a careful perusal of the complaint in question and a meticulous
consideration and evaluation of the issues raised and arguments adduced by
the parties, We do not hesitate to find for the petitioners and rule against the
respondent Judge's challenged order for having been issued with grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. The pertinent portions of the
said order reads as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
After a careful and circumspect evaluation of the Complaint, the Court cannot
help but agree with the defendant. For although we believe that plaintiffs have
but the noblest of all intentions, it (sic) fell short of alleging, with sufficient
definiteness, a specific legal right they are seeking to enforce and protect, or
a specific legal wrong they are seeking to prevent and redress (Sec. 1, Rule 2,
RRC). Furthermore, the Court notes that the Complaint is replete with vague
assumptions and vague conclusions based on unverified data. In fine, plaintiffs
fail to state a cause of action in its Complaint against the herein defendant.
Furthermore, the Court firmly believes that the matter before it, being
impressed with political color and involving a matter of public policy, may not
be taken cognizance of by this Court without doing violence to the sacred
principle of "Separation of Powers" of the three (3) co-equal branches of the
Government.
The Court is likewise of the impression that it cannot, no matter how we
stretch our jurisdiction, grant the reliefs prayed for by the plaintiffs, i.e., to
cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country and to cease and
desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new
timber license agreements. For to do otherwise would amount to "impairment
of contracts" abhored (sic) by the fundamental law. 11
We do not agree with the trial court's conclusions that the plaintiffs failed to
allege with sufficient definiteness a specific legal right involved or a specific
legal wrong committed, and that the complaint is replete with vague
assumptions and conclusions based on unverified data. A reading of the
complaint itself belies these conclusions.
The complaint focuses on one specific fundamental legal right the right to
a balanced and healthful ecology which, for the first time in our nation's
constitutional history, is solemnly incorporated in the fundamental law.
Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides:
Sec. 16. The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a
balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of
nature.
This right unites with the right to health which is provided for in the preceding
section of the same article:
Sec. 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people
and instill health consciousness among them.
While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be found under the
Declaration of Principles and State Policies and not under the Bill of Rights, it
does not follow that it is less important than any of the civil and political rights
enumerated in the latter. Such a right belongs to a different category of rights
altogether for it concerns nothing less than self-preservation and self-
perpetuation aptly and fittingly stressed by the petitioners the
advancement of which may even be said to predate all governments and
constitutions. As a matter of fact, these basic rights need not even be written
in the Constitution for they are assumed to exist from the inception of
humankind. If they are now explicitly mentioned in the fundamental charter,
it is because of the well-founded fear of its framers that unless the rights to a
balanced and healthful ecology and to health are mandated as state policies
by the Constitution itself, thereby highlighting their continuing importance
and imposing upon the state a solemn obligation to preserve the first and
protect and advance the second, the day would not be too far when all else
would be lost not only for the present generation, but also for those to come
generations which stand to inherit nothing but parched earth incapable of
sustaining life.
The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it the correlative
duty to refrain from impairing the environment. During the debates on this
right in one of the plenary sessions of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, the
following exchange transpired between Commissioner Wilfrido Villacorta and
Commissioner Adolfo Azcuna who sponsored the section in question:
MR. VILLACORTA:
Does this section mandate the State to provide sanctions against all forms of
pollution air, water and noise pollution?
MR. AZCUNA:
Yes, Madam President. The right to healthful (sic) environment necessarily
carries with it the correlative duty of not impairing the same and, therefore,
sanctions may be provided for impairment of environmental balance. 12
The said right implies, among many other things, the judicious management
and conservation of the country's forests.
Without such forests, the ecological or environmental balance would be
irreversiby disrupted.
Conformably with the enunciated right to a balanced and healthful ecology
and the right to health, as well as the other related provisions of the
Constitution concerning the conservation, development and utilization of the
country's natural resources, 13 then President Corazon C. Aquino promulgated
on 10 June 1987 E.O. No. 192, 14 Section 4 of which expressly mandates that
the Department of Environment and Natural Resources "shall be the primary
government agency responsible for the conservation, management,
development and proper use of the country's environment and natural
resources, specifically forest and grazing lands, mineral, resources, including
those in reservation and watershed areas, and lands of the public domain, as
well as the licensing and regulation of all natural resources as may be provided
for by law in order to ensure equitable sharing of the benefits derived
therefrom for the welfare of the present and future generations of Filipinos."
Section 3 thereof makes the following statement of policy:
Sec. 3. Declaration of Policy. It is hereby declared the policy of the State to
ensure the sustainable use, development, management, renewal, and
conservation of the country's forest, mineral, land, off-shore areas and other
natural resources, including the protection and enhancement of the quality of
the environment, and equitable access of the different segments of the
population to the development and the use of the country's natural resources,
not only for the present generation but for future generations as well. It is also
the policy of the state to recognize and apply a true value system including
social and environmental cost implications relative to their utilization,
development and conservation of our natural resources.
This policy declaration is substantially re-stated it Title XIV, Book IV of the
Administrative Code of 1987,15 specifically in Section 1 thereof which reads:
Sec. 1. Declaration of Policy. (1) The State shall ensure, for the benefit of
the Filipino people, the full exploration and development as well as the
judicious disposition, utilization, management, renewal and conservation of
the country's forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, off-shore areas
and other natural resources, consistent with the necessity of maintaining a
sound ecological balance and protecting and enhancing the quality of the
environment and the objective of making the exploration, development and
utilization of such natural resources equitably accessible to the different
segments of the present as well as future generations.
(2) The State shall likewise recognize and apply a true value system that takes
into account social and environmental cost implications relative to the
utilization, development and conservation of our natural resources.
The above provision stresses "the necessity of maintaining a sound ecological
balance and protecting and enhancing the quality of the environment."
Section 2 of the same Title, on the other hand, specifically speaks of the
mandate of the DENR; however, it makes particular reference to the fact of
the agency's being subject to law and higher authority. Said section provides:
Sec. 2. Mandate. (1) The Department of Environment and Natural
Resources shall be primarily responsible for the implementation of the
foregoing policy.
(2) It shall, subject to law and higher authority, be in charge of carrying out the
State's constitutional mandate to control and supervise the exploration,
development, utilization, and conservation of the country's natural resources.
Both E.O. NO. 192 and the Administrative Code of 1987 have set the objectives
which will serve as the bases for policy formulation, and have defined the
powers and functions of the DENR.
It may, however, be recalled that even before the ratification of the 1987
Constitution, specific statutes already paid special attention to the
"environmental right" of the present and future generations. On 6 June 1977,
P.D. No. 1151 (Philippine Environmental Policy) and P.D. No. 1152 (Philippine
Environment Code) were issued. The former "declared a continuing policy of
the State (a) to create, develop, maintain and improve conditions under which
man and nature can thrive in productive and enjoyable harmony with each
other, (b) to fulfill the social, economic and other requirements of present and
future generations of Filipinos, and (c) to insure the attainment of an
environmental quality that is conducive to a life of dignity and well-
being." 16 As its goal, it speaks of the "responsibilities of each generation as
trustee and guardian of the environment for succeeding generations." 17 The
latter statute, on the other hand, gave flesh to the said policy.
Thus, the right of the petitioners (and all those they represent) to a balanced
and healthful ecology is as clear as the DENR's duty under its mandate and
by virtue of its powers and functions under E.O. No. 192 and the
Administrative Code of 1987 to protect and advance the said right.
A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the corelative duty or
obligation to respect or protect the same gives rise to a cause of action.
Petitioners maintain that the granting of the TLAs, which they claim was done
with grave abuse of discretion, violated their right to a balanced and healthful
ecology; hence, the full protection thereof requires that no further TLAs
should be renewed or granted.
A cause of action is defined as:
. . . an act or omission of one party in violation of the legal right or rights of the
other; and its essential elements are legal right of the plaintiff, correlative
obligation of the defendant, and act or omission of the defendant in violation
of said legal right. 18
It is settled in this jurisdiction that in a motion to dismiss based on the ground
that the complaint fails to state a cause of action, 19 the question submitted to
the court for resolution involves the sufficiency of the facts alleged in the
complaint itself. No other matter should be considered; furthermore, the truth
of falsity of the said allegations is beside the point for the truth thereof is
deemed hypothetically admitted. The only issue to be resolved in such a case
is: admitting such alleged facts to be true, may the court render a valid
judgment in accordance with the prayer in the complaint? 20 In Militante vs.
Edrosolano, 21 this Court laid down the rule that the judiciary should "exercise
the utmost care and circumspection in passing upon a motion to dismiss on
the ground of the absence thereof [cause of action] lest, by its failure to
manifest a correct appreciation of the facts alleged and deemed hypothetically
admitted, what the law grants or recognizes is effectively nullified. If that
happens, there is a blot on the legal order. The law itself stands in disrepute."
After careful examination of the petitioners' complaint, We find the
statements under the introductory affirmative allegations, as well as the
specific averments under the sub-heading CAUSE OF ACTION, to be adequate
enough to show, prima facie, the claimed violation of their rights. On the basis
thereof, they may thus be granted, wholly or partly, the reliefs prayed for. It
bears stressing, however, that insofar as the cancellation of the TLAs is
concerned, there is the need to implead, as party defendants, the grantees
thereof for they are indispensable parties.
The foregoing considered, Civil Case No. 90-777 be said to raise a political
question. Policy formulation or determination by the executive or legislative
branches of Government is not squarely put in issue. What is principally
involved is the enforcement of a right vis-a-vis policies already formulated and
expressed in legislation. It must, nonetheless, be emphasized that the political
question doctrine is no longer, the insurmountable obstacle to the exercise of
judicial power or the impenetrable shield that protects executive and
legislative actions from judicial inquiry or review. The second paragraph of
section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution states that:
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable,
and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.
Commenting on this provision in his book, Philippine Political Law, 22 Mr.
Justice Isagani A. Cruz, a distinguished member of this Court, says:
The first part of the authority represents the traditional concept of judicial
power, involving the settlement of conflicting rights as conferred as law. The
second part of the authority represents a broadening of judicial power to
enable the courts of justice to review what was before forbidden territory, to
wit, the discretion of the political departments of the government.
As worded, the new provision vests in the judiciary, and particularly the
Supreme Court, the power to rule upon even the wisdom of the decisions of
the executive and the legislature and to declare their acts invalid for lack or
excess of jurisdiction because tainted with grave abuse of discretion. The
catch, of course, is the meaning of "grave abuse of discretion," which is a very
elastic phrase that can expand or contract according to the disposition of the
judiciary.
In Daza vs. Singson, 23 Mr. Justice Cruz, now speaking for this Court, noted:
In the case now before us, the jurisdictional objection becomes even less
tenable and decisive. The reason is that, even if we were to assume that the
issue presented before us was political in nature, we would still not be
precluded from revolving it under the expanded jurisdiction conferred upon
us that now covers, in proper cases, even the political question. Article VII,
Section 1, of the Constitution clearly provides: . . .
The last ground invoked by the trial court in dismissing the complaint is the
non-impairment of contracts clause found in the Constitution. The court a
quo declared that:
The Court is likewise of the impression that it cannot, no matter how we
stretch our jurisdiction, grant the reliefs prayed for by the plaintiffs, i.e., to
cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country and to cease and
desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new
timber license agreements. For to do otherwise would amount to "impairment
of contracts" abhored (sic) by the fundamental law. 24
We are not persuaded at all; on the contrary, We are amazed, if not shocked,
by such a sweeping pronouncement. In the first place, the respondent
Secretary did not, for obvious reasons, even invoke in his motion to dismiss
the non-impairment clause. If he had done so, he would have acted with
utmost infidelity to the Government by providing undue and unwarranted
benefits and advantages to the timber license holders because he would have
forever bound the Government to strictly respect the said licenses according
to their terms and conditions regardless of changes in policy and the demands
of public interest and welfare. He was aware that as correctly pointed out by
the petitioners, into every timber license must be read Section 20 of the
Forestry Reform Code (P.D. No. 705) which provides:
. . . Provided, That when the national interest so requires, the President may
amend, modify, replace or rescind any contract, concession, permit, licenses
or any other form of privilege granted herein . . .
Needless to say, all licenses may thus be revoked or rescinded by executive
action. It is not a contract, property or a property right protested by the due
process clause of the Constitution. In Tan vs. Director of Forestry, 25 this Court
held:
. . . A timber license is an instrument by which the State regulates the
utilization and disposition of forest resources to the end that public welfare is
promoted. A timber license is not a contract within the purview of the due
process clause; it is only a license or privilege, which can be validly withdrawn
whenever dictated by public interest or public welfare as in this case.
A license is merely a permit or privilege to do what otherwise would be
unlawful, and is not a contract between the authority, federal, state, or
municipal, granting it and the person to whom it is granted; neither is it
property or a property right, nor does it create a vested right; nor is it taxation
(37 C.J. 168). Thus, this Court held that the granting of license does not create
irrevocable rights, neither is it property or property rights (People vs. Ong Tin,
54 O.G. 7576).
We reiterated this pronouncement in Felipe Ysmael, Jr. & Co., Inc. vs. Deputy
Executive Secretary: 26
. . . Timber licenses, permits and license agreements are the principal
instruments by which the State regulates the utilization and disposition of
forest resources to the end that public welfare is promoted. And it can hardly
be gainsaid that they merely evidence a privilege granted by the State to
qualified entities, and do not vest in the latter a permanent or irrevocable right
to the particular concession area and the forest products therein. They may
be validly amended, modified, replaced or rescinded by the Chief Executive
when national interests so require. Thus, they are not deemed contracts
within the purview of the due process of law clause [See Sections 3(ee) and 20
of Pres. Decree No. 705, as amended. Also, Tan v. Director of Forestry, G.R. No.
L-24548, October 27, 1983, 125 SCRA 302].
Since timber licenses are not contracts, the non-impairment clause, which
reads:
Sec. 10. No law impairing, the obligation of contracts shall be passed. 27
cannot be invoked.
In the second place, even if it is to be assumed that the same are contracts,
the instant case does not involve a law or even an executive issuance declaring
the cancellation or modification of existing timber licenses. Hence, the non-
impairment clause cannot as yet be invoked. Nevertheless, granting further
that a law has actually been passed mandating cancellations or modifications,
the same cannot still be stigmatized as a violation of the non-impairment
clause. This is because by its very nature and purpose, such as law could have
only been passed in the exercise of the police power of the state for the
purpose of advancing the right of the people to a balanced and healthful
ecology, promoting their health and enhancing the general welfare. In Abe vs.
Foster Wheeler
Corp. 28 this Court stated:
The freedom of contract, under our system of government, is not meant to be
absolute. The same is understood to be subject to reasonable legislative
regulation aimed at the promotion of public health, moral, safety and welfare.
In other words, the constitutional guaranty of non-impairment of obligations
of contract is limited by the exercise of the police power of the State, in the
interest of public health, safety, moral and general welfare.
The reason for this is emphatically set forth in Nebia vs. New York, 29 quoted
in Philippine American Life Insurance Co. vs. Auditor General,30 to wit:
Under our form of government the use of property and the making of
contracts are normally matters of private and not of public concern. The
general rule is that both shall be free of governmental interference. But
neither property rights nor contract rights are absolute; for government
cannot exist if the citizen may at will use his property to the detriment of his
fellows, or exercise his freedom of contract to work them harm. Equally
fundamental with the private right is that of the public to regulate it in the
common interest.
In short, the non-impairment clause must yield to the police power of the
state. 31
Finally, it is difficult to imagine, as the trial court did, how the non-impairment
clause could apply with respect to the prayer to enjoin the respondent
Secretary from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new
timber licenses for, save in cases of renewal, no contract would have as of yet
existed in the other instances. Moreover, with respect to renewal, the holder
is not entitled to it as a matter of right.
WHEREFORE, being impressed with merit, the instant Petition is hereby
GRANTED, and the challenged Order of respondent Judge of 18 July 1991
dismissing Civil Case No. 90-777 is hereby set aside. The petitioners may
therefore amend their complaint to implead as defendants the holders or
grantees of the questioned timber license agreements.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Cruz, Padilla, Bidin, Grio-Aquino, Regalado, Romero, Nocon, Bellosillo, Melo
and Quiason, JJ., concur.
Narvasa, C.J., Puno and Vitug, JJ., took no part.
Separate Opinions
FELICIANO, J., concurring
I join in the result reached by my distinguished brother in the Court, Davide,
Jr., J., in this case which, to my mind, is one of the most important cases
decided by this Court in the last few years. The seminal principles laid down in
this decision are likely to influence profoundly the direction and course of the
protection and management of the environment, which of course embraces
the utilization of all the natural resources in the territorial base of our polity. I
have therefore sought to clarify, basically to myself, what the Court appears
to be saying.
The Court explicitly states that petitioners have the locus standi necessary to
sustain the bringing and, maintenance of this suit (Decision, pp. 11-12). Locus
standi is not a function of petitioners' claim that their suit is properly regarded
as a class suit. I understand locus standi to refer to the legal interest which a
plaintiff must have in the subject matter of the suit. Because of the very
broadness of the concept of "class" here involved membership in this
"class" appears to embrace everyone living in the country whether now or in
the
future it appears to me that everyone who may be expected to benefit from
the course of action petitioners seek to require public respondents to take, is
vested with the necessary locus standi. The Court may be seen therefore to be
recognizing a beneficiaries' right of action in the field of environmental
protection, as against both the public administrative agency directly
concerned and the private persons or entities operating in the field or sector
of activity involved. Whether such beneficiaries' right of action may be found
under any and all circumstances, or whether some failure to act, in the first
instance, on the part of the governmental agency concerned must be shown
("prior exhaustion of administrative remedies"), is not discussed in the
decision and presumably is left for future determination in an appropriate
case.
The Court has also declared that the complaint has alleged and focused upon
"one specific fundamental legal right the right to a balanced and healthful
ecology" (Decision, p. 14). There is no question that "the right to a balanced
and healthful ecology" is "fundamental" and that, accordingly, it has been
"constitutionalized." But although it is fundamental in character, I suggest,
with very great respect, that it cannot be characterized as "specific," without
doing excessive violence to language. It is in fact very difficult to fashion
language more comprehensive in scope and generalized in character than a
right to "a balanced and healthful ecology." The list of particular claims which
can be subsumed under this rubic appears to be entirely open-ended:
prevention and control of emission of toxic fumes and smoke from factories
and motor vehicles; of discharge of oil, chemical effluents, garbage and raw
sewage into rivers, inland and coastal waters by vessels, oil rigs, factories,
mines and whole communities; of dumping of organic and inorganic wastes on
open land, streets and thoroughfares; failure to rehabilitate land after strip-
mining or open-pit mining; kaingin or slash-and-burn farming; destruction of
fisheries, coral reefs and other living sea resources through the use of
dynamite or cyanide and other chemicals; contamination of ground water
resources; loss of certain species of fauna and flora; and so on. The other
statements pointed out by the Court: Section 3, Executive Order No. 192 dated
10 June 1987; Section 1, Title XIV, Book IV of the 1987 Administrative Code;
and P.D. No. 1151, dated 6 June 1977 all appear to be formulations of policy,
as general and abstract as the constitutional statements of basic policy in
Article II, Section 16 ("the right to a balanced and healthful ecology") and
15 ("the right to health").
P.D. No. 1152, also dated 6 June 1977, entitled "The Philippine Environment
Code," is, upon the other hand, a compendious collection of more "specific
environment management policies" and "environment quality standards"
(fourth "Whereas" clause, Preamble) relating to an extremely wide range of
topics:
(a) air quality management;
(b) water quality management;
(c) land use management;
(d) natural resources management and conservation embracing:
(i) fisheries and aquatic resources;
(ii) wild life;
(iii) forestry and soil conservation;
(iv) flood control and natural calamities;
(v) energy development;
(vi) conservation and utilization of surface and ground water
(vii) mineral resources
Two (2) points are worth making in this connection. Firstly, neither petitioners
nor the Court has identified the particular provision or provisions (if any) of
the Philippine Environment Code which give rise to a specific legal right which
petitioners are seeking to enforce. Secondly, the Philippine Environment Code
identifies with notable care the particular government agency charged with
the formulation and implementation of guidelines and programs dealing with
each of the headings and sub-headings mentioned above. The Philippine
Environment Code does not, in other words, appear to contemplate action on
the part of private persons who are beneficiaries of implementation of that
Code.
As a matter of logic, by finding petitioners' cause of action as anchored on a
legal right comprised in the constitutional statements above noted, the Court
is in effect saying that Section 15 (and Section 16) of Article II of the
Constitution are self-executing and judicially enforceable even in their present
form. The implications of this doctrine will have to be explored in future cases;
those implications are too large and far-reaching in nature even to be hinted
at here.
My suggestion is simply that petitioners must, before the trial court, show a
more specific legal right a right cast in language of a significantly lower order
of generality than Article II (15) of the Constitution that is or may be violated
by the actions, or failures to act, imputed to the public respondent by
petitioners so that the trial court can validly render judgment granting all or
part of the relief prayed for. To my mind, the Court should be understood as
simply saying that such a more specific legal right or rights may well exist in
our corpus of law, considering the general policy principles found in the
Constitution and the existence of the Philippine Environment Code, and that
the trial court should have given petitioners an effective opportunity so to
demonstrate, instead of aborting the proceedings on a motion to dismiss.
It seems to me important that the legal right which is an essential component
of a cause of action be a specific, operable legal right, rather than a
constitutional or statutory policy, for at least two (2) reasons. One is that
unless the legal right claimed to have been violated or disregarded is given
specification in operational terms, defendants may well be unable to defend
themselves intelligently and effectively; in other words, there are due process
dimensions to this matter.
The second is a broader-gauge consideration where a specific violation of
law or applicable regulation is not alleged or proved, petitioners can be
expected to fall back on the expanded conception of judicial power in the
second paragraph of Section 1 of Article VIII of the Constitution which reads:
Section 1. . . .
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable,
and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch
or instrumentality of the Government. (Emphasis supplied)
When substantive standards as general as "the right to a balanced and healthy
ecology" and "the right to health" are combined with remedial standards as
broad ranging as "a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction," the result will be, it is respectfully submitted, to propel courts
into the uncharted ocean of social and economic policy making. At least in
respect of the vast area of environmental protection and management, our
courts have no claim to special technical competence and experience and
professional qualification. Where no specific, operable norms and standards
are shown to exist, then the policy making departments the legislative and
executive departments must be given a real and effective opportunity to
fashion and promulgate those norms and standards, and to implement them
before the courts should intervene.
My learned brother Davide, Jr., J., rightly insists that the timber companies,
whose concession agreements or TLA's petitioners demand public
respondents should cancel, must be impleaded in the proceedings below. It
might be asked that, if petitioners' entitlement to the relief demanded
is not dependent upon proof of breach by the timber companies of one or
more of the specific terms and conditions of their concession agreements (and
this, petitioners implicitly assume), what will those companies litigate about?
The answer I suggest is that they may seek to dispute the existence of the
specific legal right petitioners should allege, as well as the reality of the
claimed factual nexus between petitioners' specific legal rights and the
claimed wrongful acts or failures to act of public respondent administrative
agency. They may also controvert the appropriateness of the remedy or
remedies demanded by petitioners, under all the circumstances which exist.
I vote to grant the Petition for Certiorari because the protection of the
environment, including the forest cover of our territory, is of extreme
importance for the country. The doctrines set out in the Court's decision issued
today should, however, be subjected to closer examination.
# Separate Opinions
FELICIANO, J., concurring
I join in the result reached by my distinguished brother in the Court, Davide,
Jr., J., in this case which, to my mind, is one of the most important cases
decided by this Court in the last few years. The seminal principles laid down in
this decision are likely to influence profoundly the direction and course of the
protection and management of the environment, which of course embraces
the utilization of all the natural resources in the territorial base of our polity. I
have therefore sought to clarify, basically to myself, what the Court appears
to be saying.
The Court explicitly states that petitioners have the locus standi necessary to
sustain the bringing and, maintenance of this suit (Decision, pp. 11-12). Locus
standi is not a function of petitioners' claim that their suit is properly regarded
as a class suit. I understand locus standi to refer to the legal interest which a
plaintiff must have in the subject matter of the suit. Because of the very
broadness of the concept of "class" here involved membership in this
"class" appears to embrace everyone living in the country whether now or in
the
future it appears to me that everyone who may be expected to benefit from
the course of action petitioners seek to require public respondents to take, is
vested with the necessary locus standi. The Court may be seen therefore to be
recognizing a beneficiaries' right of action in the field of environmental
protection, as against both the public administrative agency directly
concerned and the private persons or entities operating in the field or sector
of activity involved. Whether such beneficiaries' right of action may be found
under any and all circumstances, or whether some failure to act, in the first
instance, on the part of the governmental agency concerned must be shown
("prior exhaustion of administrative remedies"), is not discussed in the
decision and presumably is left for future determination in an appropriate
case.
The Court has also declared that the complaint has alleged and focused upon
"one specific fundamental legal right the right to a balanced and healthful
ecology" (Decision, p. 14). There is no question that "the right to a balanced
and healthful ecology" is "fundamental" and that, accordingly, it has been
"constitutionalized." But although it is fundamental in character, I suggest,
with very great respect, that it cannot be characterized as "specific," without
doing excessive violence to language. It is in fact very difficult to fashion
language more comprehensive in scope and generalized in character than a
right to "a balanced and healthful ecology." The list of particular claims which
can be subsumed under this rubic appears to be entirely open-ended:
prevention and control of emission of toxic fumes and smoke from factories
and motor vehicles; of discharge of oil, chemical effluents, garbage and raw
sewage into rivers, inland and coastal waters by vessels, oil rigs, factories,
mines and whole communities; of dumping of organic and inorganic wastes on
open land, streets and thoroughfares; failure to rehabilitate land after strip-
mining or open-pit mining; kaingin or slash-and-burn farming; destruction of
fisheries, coral reefs and other living sea resources through the use of
dynamite or cyanide and other chemicals; contamination of ground water
resources; loss of certain species of fauna and flora; and so on. The other
statements pointed out by the Court: Section 3, Executive Order No. 192 dated
10 June 1987; Section 1, Title XIV, Book IV of the 1987 Administrative Code;
and P.D. No. 1151, dated 6 June 1977 all appear to be formulations of policy,
as general and abstract as the constitutional statements of basic policy in
Article II, Section 16 ("the right to a balanced and healthful ecology") and
15 ("the right to health").
P.D. No. 1152, also dated 6 June 1977, entitled "The Philippine Environment
Code," is, upon the other hand, a compendious collection of more "specific
environment management policies" and "environment quality standards"
(fourth "Whereas" clause, Preamble) relating to an extremely wide range of
topics:
(a) air quality management;
(b) water quality management;
(c) land use management;
(d) natural resources management and conservation embracing:
(i) fisheries and aquatic resources;
(ii) wild life;
(iii) forestry and soil conservation;
(iv) flood control and natural calamities;
(v) energy development;
(vi) conservation and utilization of surface and ground water
(vii) mineral resources
Two (2) points are worth making in this connection. Firstly, neither petitioners
nor the Court has identified the particular provision or provisions (if any) of
the Philippine Environment Code which give rise to a specific legal right which
petitioners are seeking to enforce. Secondly, the Philippine Environment Code
identifies with notable care the particular government agency charged with
the formulation and implementation of guidelines and programs dealing with
each of the headings and sub-headings mentioned above. The Philippine
Environment Code does not, in other words, appear to contemplate action on
the part of private persons who are beneficiaries of implementation of that
Code.
As a matter of logic, by finding petitioners' cause of action as anchored on a
legal right comprised in the constitutional statements above noted, the Court
is in effect saying that Section 15 (and Section 16) of Article II of the
Constitution are self-executing and judicially enforceable even in their present
form. The implications of this doctrine will have to be explored in future cases;
those implications are too large and far-reaching in nature even to be hinted
at here.
My suggestion is simply that petitioners must, before the trial court, show a
more specific legal right a right cast in language of a significantly lower order
of generality than Article II (15) of the Constitution that is or may be violated
by the actions, or failures to act, imputed to the public respondent by
petitioners so that the trial court can validly render judgment granting all or
part of the relief prayed for. To my mind, the Court should be understood as
simply saying that such a more specific legal right or rights may well exist in
our corpus of law, considering the general policy principles found in the
Constitution and the existence of the Philippine Environment Code, and that
the trial court should have given petitioners an effective opportunity so to
demonstrate, instead of aborting the proceedings on a motion to dismiss.
It seems to me important that the legal right which is an essential component
of a cause of action be a specific, operable legal right, rather than a
constitutional or statutory policy, for at least two (2) reasons. One is that
unless the legal right claimed to have been violated or disregarded is given
specification in operational terms, defendants may well be unable to defend
themselves intelligently and effectively; in other words, there are due process
dimensions to this matter.
The second is a broader-gauge consideration where a specific violation of
law or applicable regulation is not alleged or proved, petitioners can be
expected to fall back on the expanded conception of judicial power in the
second paragraph of Section 1 of Article VIII of the Constitution which reads:
Section 1. . . .
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable,
and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch
or instrumentality of the Government. (Emphasis supplied)
When substantive standards as general as "the right to a balanced and healthy
ecology" and "the right to health" are combined with remedial standards as
broad ranging as "a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction," the result will be, it is respectfully submitted, to propel courts
into the uncharted ocean of social and economic policy making. At least in
respect of the vast area of environmental protection and management, our
courts have no claim to special technical competence and experience and
professional qualification. Where no specific, operable norms and standards
are shown to exist, then the policy making departments the legislative and
executive departments must be given a real and effective opportunity to
fashion and promulgate those norms and standards, and to implement them
before the courts should intervene.
My learned brother Davide, Jr., J., rightly insists that the timber companies,
whose concession agreements or TLA's petitioners demand public
respondents should cancel, must be impleaded in the proceedings below. It
might be asked that, if petitioners' entitlement to the relief demanded
is not dependent upon proof of breach by the timber companies of one or
more of the specific terms and conditions of their concession agreements (and
this, petitioners implicitly assume), what will those companies litigate about?
The answer I suggest is that they may seek to dispute the existence of the
specific legal right petitioners should allege, as well as the reality of the
claimed factual nexus between petitioners' specific legal rights and the
claimed wrongful acts or failures to act of public respondent administrative
agency. They may also controvert the appropriateness of the remedy or
remedies demanded by petitioners, under all the circumstances which exist.
I vote to grant the Petition for Certiorari because the protection of the
environment, including the forest cover of our territory, is of extreme
importance for the country. The doctrines set out in the Court's decision issued
today should, however, be subjected to closer examination.
2. Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. Nos. 171947-48 February 15, 2011
METROPOLITAN MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, DEPARTMENT OF
ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES, DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION,
CULTURE AND SPORTS,1 DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, DEPARTMENT OF
AGRICULTURE, DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS AND HIGHWAYS,
DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, PHILIPPINE COAST GUARD,
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE MARITIME GROUP, and DEPARTMENT OF THE
INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, Petitioners,
vs.
CONCERNED RESIDENTS OF MANILA BAY, represented and joined by DIVINA
V. ILAS, SABINIANO ALBARRACIN, MANUEL SANTOS, JR., DINAH DELA PEA,
PAUL DENNIS QUINTERO, MA. VICTORIA LLENOS, DONNA CALOZA, FATIMA
QUITAIN, VENICE SEGARRA, FRITZIE TANGKIA, SARAH JOELLE LINTAG,
HANNIBAL AUGUSTUS BOBIS, FELIMON SANTIAGUEL, and JAIME AGUSTIN R.
OPOSA,Respondents.
RESOLUTION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
On December 18, 2008, this Court rendered a Decision in G.R. Nos. 171947-48
ordering petitioners to clean up, rehabilitate and preserve Manila Bay in their
different capacities. The fallo reads:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The September 28, 2005 Decision of the
CA in CA-G.R. CV No. 76528 and SP No. 74944 and the September 13, 2002
Decision of the RTC in Civil Case No. 1851-99 are AFFIRMED but with
MODIFICATIONS in view of subsequent developments or supervening events
in the case. The fallo of the RTC Decision shall now read:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the abovenamed
defendant-government agencies to clean up, rehabilitate, and preserve
Manila Bay, and restore and maintain its waters to SB level (Class B sea waters
per Water Classification Tables under DENR Administrative Order No. 34
[1990]) to make them fit for swimming, skin-diving, and other forms of contact
recreation.
In particular:
(1) Pursuant to Sec. 4 of EO 192, assigning the DENR as the primary agency
responsible for the conservation, management, development, and proper use
of the countrys environment and natural resources, and Sec. 19 of RA 9275,
designating the DENR as the primary government agency responsible for its
enforcement and implementation, the DENR is directed to fully implement its
Operational Plan for the Manila Bay Coastal Strategy for the rehabilitation,
restoration, and conservation of the Manila Bay at the earliest possible time.
It is ordered to call regular coordination meetings with concerned government
departments and agencies to ensure the successful implementation of the
aforesaid plan of action in accordance with its indicated completion schedules.
(2) Pursuant to Title XII (Local Government) of the Administrative Code of 1987
and Sec. 25 of the Local Government Code of 1991, the DILG, in exercising the
Presidents power of general supervision and its duty to promulgate guidelines
in establishing waste management programs under Sec. 43 of the Philippine
Environment Code (PD 1152), shall direct all LGUs in Metro Manila, Rizal,
Laguna, Cavite, Bulacan, Pampanga, and Bataan to inspect all factories,
commercial establishments, and private homes along the banks of the major
river systems in their respective areas of jurisdiction, such as but not limited
to the Pasig-Marikina-San Juan Rivers, the NCR (Paraaque-Zapote, Las Pias)
Rivers, the Navotas-Malabon-Tullahan-Tenejeros Rivers, the Meycauayan-
Marilao-Obando (Bulacan) Rivers, the Talisay (Bataan) River, the Imus (Cavite)
River, the Laguna De Bay, and other minor rivers and waterways that
eventually discharge water into the Manila Bay; and the lands abutting the
bay, to determine whether they have wastewater treatment facilities or
hygienic septic tanks as prescribed by existing laws, ordinances, and rules and
regulations. If none be found, these LGUs shall be ordered to require non-
complying establishments and homes to set up said facilities or septic tanks
within a reasonable time to prevent industrial wastes, sewage water, and
human wastes from flowing into these rivers, waterways, esteros, and the
Manila Bay, under pain of closure or imposition of fines and other sanctions.
(3) As mandated by Sec. 8 of RA 9275, the MWSS is directed to provide, install,
operate, and maintain the necessary adequate waste water treatment
facilities in Metro Manila, Rizal, and Cavite where needed at the earliest
possible time.
(4) Pursuant to RA 9275, the LWUA, through the local water districts and in
coordination with the DENR, is ordered to provide, install, operate, and
maintain sewerage and sanitation facilities and the efficient and safe
collection, treatment, and disposal of sewage in the provinces of Laguna,
Cavite, Bulacan, Pampanga, and Bataan where needed at the earliest possible
time.
(5) Pursuant to Sec. 65 of RA 8550, the DA, through the BFAR, is ordered to
improve and restore the marine life of the Manila Bay. It is also directed to
assist the LGUs in Metro Manila, Rizal, Cavite, Laguna, Bulacan, Pampanga, and
Bataan in developing, using recognized methods, the fisheries and aquatic
resources in the Manila Bay.
(6) The PCG, pursuant to Secs. 4 and 6 of PD 979, and the PNP Maritime Group,
in accordance with Sec. 124 of RA 8550, in coordination with each other, shall
apprehend violators of PD 979, RA 8550, and other existing laws and
regulations designed to prevent marine pollution in the Manila Bay.
(7) Pursuant to Secs. 2 and 6-c of EO 513 and the International Convention for
the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, the PPA is ordered to immediately
adopt such measures to prevent the discharge and dumping of solid and liquid
wastes and other ship-generated wastes into the Manila Bay waters from
vessels docked at ports and apprehend the violators.
(8) The MMDA, as the lead agency and implementor of programs and projects
for flood control projects and drainage services in Metro Manila, in
coordination with the DPWH, DILG, affected LGUs, PNP Maritime Group,
Housing and Urban Development Coordinating Council (HUDCC), and other
agencies, shall dismantle and remove all structures, constructions, and other
encroachments established or built in violation of RA 7279, and other
applicable laws along the Pasig-Marikina-San Juan Rivers, the NCR (Paraaque-
Zapote, Las Pias) Rivers, the Navotas-Malabon-Tullahan-Tenejeros Rivers,
and connecting waterways and esteros in Metro Manila. The DPWH, as the
principal implementor of programs and projects for flood control services in
the rest of the country more particularly in Bulacan, Bataan, Pampanga, Cavite,
and Laguna, in coordination with the DILG, affected LGUs, PNP Maritime
Group, HUDCC, and other concerned government agencies, shall remove and
demolish all structures, constructions, and other encroachments built in
breach of RA 7279 and other applicable laws along the Meycauayan-Marilao-
Obando (Bulacan) Rivers, the Talisay (Bataan) River, the Imus (Cavite) River,
the Laguna De Bay, and other rivers, connecting waterways, and esteros that
discharge wastewater into the Manila Bay.
In addition, the MMDA is ordered to establish, operate, and maintain a
sanitary landfill, as prescribed by RA 9003, within a period of one (1) year from
finality of this Decision. On matters within its territorial jurisdiction and in
connection with the discharge of its duties on the maintenance of sanitary
landfills and like undertakings, it is also ordered to cause the apprehension and
filing of the appropriate criminal cases against violators of the respective penal
provisions of RA 9003, Sec. 27 of RA 9275 (the Clean Water Act), and other
existing laws on pollution.
(9) The DOH shall, as directed by Art. 76 of PD 1067 and Sec. 8 of RA 9275,
within one (1) year from finality of this Decision, determine if all licensed septic
and sludge companies have the proper facilities for the treatment and disposal
of fecal sludge and sewage coming from septic tanks. The DOH shall give the
companies, if found to be non-complying, a reasonable time within which to
set up the necessary facilities under pain of cancellation of its environmental
sanitation clearance.
(10) Pursuant to Sec. 53 of PD 1152, Sec. 118 of RA 8550, and Sec. 56 of RA
9003, the DepEd shall integrate lessons on pollution prevention, waste
management, environmental protection, and like subjects in the school
curricula of all levels to inculcate in the minds and hearts of students and,
through them, their parents and friends, the importance of their duty toward
achieving and maintaining a balanced and healthful ecosystem in the Manila
Bay and the entire Philippine archipelago.
(11) The DBM shall consider incorporating an adequate budget in the General
Appropriations Act of 2010 and succeeding years to cover the expenses
relating to the cleanup, restoration, and preservation of the water quality of
the Manila Bay, in line with the countrys development objective to attain
economic growth in a manner consistent with the protection, preservation,
and revival of our marine waters.
(12) The heads of petitioners-agencies MMDA, DENR, DepEd, DOH, DA, DPWH,
DBM, PCG, PNP Maritime Group, DILG, and also of MWSS, LWUA, and PPA, in
line with the principle of "continuing mandamus," shall, from finality of this
Decision, each submit to the Court a quarterly progressive report of the
activities undertaken in accordance with this Decision.
SO ORDERED.
The government agencies did not file any motion for reconsideration and the
Decision became final in January 2009.
The case is now in the execution phase of the final and executory December
18, 2008 Decision. The Manila Bay Advisory Committee was created to receive
and evaluate the quarterly progressive reports on the activities undertaken by
the agencies in accordance with said decision and to monitor the execution
phase.
In the absence of specific completion periods, the Committee recommended
that time frames be set for the agencies to perform their assigned tasks. This
may be viewed as an encroachment over the powers and functions of the
Executive Branch headed by the President of the Philippines.
This view is misplaced.
The issuance of subsequent resolutions by the Court is simply an exercise of
judicial power under Art. VIII of the Constitution, because the execution of the
Decision is but an integral part of the adjudicative function of the Court. None
of the agencies ever questioned the power of the Court to implement the
December 18, 2008 Decision nor has any of them raised the alleged
encroachment by the Court over executive functions.
While additional activities are required of the agencies like submission of plans
of action, data or status reports, these directives are but part and parcel of the
execution stage of a final decision under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. Section
47 of Rule 39 reads:
Section 47. Effect of judgments or final orders.The effect of a judgment or
final order rendered by a court of the Philippines, having jurisdiction to
pronounce the judgment or final order, may be as follows:
xxxx
(c) In any other litigation between the same parties of their successors in
interest, that only is deemed to have been adjudged in a former judgment or
final order which appears upon its face to have been so adjudged, or which
was actually and necessarily included therein or necessary thereto. (Emphasis
supplied.)
It is clear that the final judgment includes not only what appears upon its face
to have been so adjudged but also those matters "actually and necessarily
included therein or necessary thereto." Certainly, any activity that is needed
to fully implement a final judgment is necessarily encompassed by said
judgment.
Moreover, the submission of periodic reports is sanctioned by Secs. 7 and 8,
Rule 8 of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental cases:
Sec. 7. Judgment.If warranted, the court shall grant the privilege of the writ
of continuing mandamus requiring respondent to perform an act or series of
acts until the judgment is fully satisfied and to grant such other reliefs as may
be warranted resulting from the wrongful or illegal acts of the respondent. The
court shall require the respondent to submit periodic reports detailing the
progress and execution of the judgment, and the court may, by itself or
through a commissioner or the appropriate government agency, evaluate and
monitor compliance. The petitioner may submit its comments or observations
on the execution of the judgment.
Sec. 8. Return of the writ.The periodic reports submitted by the respondent
detailing compliance with the judgment shall be contained in partial returns
of the writ. Upon full satisfaction of the judgment, a final return of the writ
shall be made to the court by the respondent. If the court finds that the
judgment has been fully implemented, the satisfaction of judgment shall be
entered in the court docket. (Emphasis supplied.)
With the final and executory judgment in MMDA, the writ of continuing
mandamus issued in MMDA means that until petitioner-agencies have shown
full compliance with the Courts orders, the Court exercises continuing
jurisdiction over them until full execution of the judgment.
There being no encroachment over executive functions to speak of, We shall
now proceed to the recommendation of the Manila Bay Advisory Committee.
Several problems were encountered by the Manila Bay Advisory
Committee.2 An evaluation of the quarterly progressive reports has shown
that (1) there are voluminous quarterly progressive reports that are being
submitted; (2) petitioner-agencies do not have a uniform manner of reporting
their cleanup, rehabilitation and preservation activities; (3) as yet no definite
deadlines have been set by petitioner DENR as to petitioner-agencies
timeframe for their respective duties; (4) as of June 2010 there has been a
change in leadership in both the national and local levels; and (5) some
agencies have encountered difficulties in complying with the Courts
directives.
In order to implement the afore-quoted Decision, certain directives have to be
issued by the Court to address the said concerns.
Acting on the recommendation of the Manila Bay Advisory Committee, the
Court hereby resolves to ORDER the following:
(1) The Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), as lead
agency in the Philippine Clean Water Act of 2004, shall submit to the Court on
or before June 30, 2011 the updated Operational Plan for the Manila Bay
Coastal Strategy.
The DENR is ordered to submit summarized data on the overall quality of
Manila Bay waters for all four quarters of 2010 on or before June 30, 2011.
The DENR is further ordered to submit the names and addresses of persons
and companies in Metro Manila, Rizal, Laguna, Cavite, Bulacan, Pampanga and
Bataan that generate toxic and hazardous waste on or before September 30,
2011.
(2) On or before June 30, 2011, the Department of the Interior and Local
Government (DILG) shall order the Mayors of all cities in Metro Manila; the
Governors of Rizal, Laguna, Cavite, Bulacan, Pampanga and Bataan; and the
Mayors of all the cities and towns in said provinces to inspect all factories,
commercial establishments and private homes along the banks of the major
river systemssuch as but not limited to the Pasig-Marikina-San Juan Rivers,
the National Capital Region (Paranaque-Zapote, Las Pinas) Rivers, the Navotas-
Malabon-Tullahan-Tenejeros Rivers, the Meycauayan-Marilao-Obando
(Bulacan) Rivers, the Talisay (Bataan) River, the Imus (Cavite) River, and the
Laguna De Bayand other minor rivers and waterways within their
jurisdiction that eventually discharge water into the Manila Bay and the lands
abutting it, to determine if they have wastewater treatment facilities and/or
hygienic septic tanks, as prescribed by existing laws, ordinances, rules and
regulations. Said local government unit (LGU) officials are given up to
September 30, 2011 to finish the inspection of said establishments and
houses.
In case of non-compliance, the LGU officials shall take appropriate action to
ensure compliance by non-complying factories, commercial establishments
and private homes with said law, rules and regulations requiring the
construction or installment of wastewater treatment facilities or hygienic
septic tanks.
The aforementioned governors and mayors shall submit to the DILG on or
before December 31, 2011 their respective compliance reports which will
contain the names and addresses or offices of the owners of all the non-
complying factories, commercial establishments and private homes, copy
furnished the concerned environmental agency, be it the local DENR office or
the Laguna Lake Development Authority.
The DILG is required to submit a five-year plan of action that will contain
measures intended to ensure compliance of all non-complying factories,
commercial establishments, and private homes.
On or before June 30, 2011, the DILG and the mayors of all cities in Metro
Manila shall consider providing land for the wastewater facilities of the
Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System (MWSS) or its
concessionaires (Maynilad and Manila Water, Inc.) within their respective
jurisdictions.
(3) The MWSS shall submit to the Court on or before June 30, 2011 the list of
areas in Metro Manila, Rizal and Cavite that do not have the necessary
wastewater treatment facilities. Within the same period, the concessionaires
of the MWSS shall submit their plans and projects for the construction of
wastewater treatment facilities in all the aforesaid areas and the completion
period for said facilities, which shall not go beyond 2037.
On or before June 30, 2011, the MWSS is further required to have its two
concessionaires submit a report on the amount collected as sewerage fees in
their respective areas of operation as of December 31, 2010.
(4) The Local Water Utilities Administration is ordered to submit on or before
September 30, 2011 its plan to provide, install, operate and maintain sewerage
and sanitation facilities in said cities and towns and the completion period for
said works, which shall be fully implemented by December 31, 2020.
(5) The Department of Agriculture (DA), through the Bureau of Fisheries and
Aquatic Resources, shall submit to the Court on or before June 30, 2011 a
report on areas in Manila Bay where marine life has to be restored or improved
and the assistance it has extended to the LGUs in Metro Manila, Rizal, Cavite,
Laguna, Bulacan, Pampanga and Bataan in developing the fisheries and aquatic
resources in Manila Bay. The report shall contain monitoring data on the
marine life in said areas. Within the same period, it shall submit its five-year
plan to restore and improve the marine life in Manila Bay, its future activities
to assist the aforementioned LGUs for that purpose, and the completion
period for said undertakings.
The DA shall submit to the Court on or before September 30, 2011 the baseline
data as of September 30, 2010 on the pollution loading into the Manila Bay
system from agricultural and livestock sources.
(6) The Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) shall incorporate in its quarterly
reports the list of violators it has apprehended and the status of their cases.
The PPA is further ordered to include in its report the names, make and
capacity of the ships that dock in PPA ports. The PPA shall submit to the Court
on or before June 30, 2011 the measures it intends to undertake to implement
its compliance with paragraph 7 of the dispositive portion of the MMDA
Decision and the completion dates of such measures.
The PPA should include in its report the activities of its concessionaire that
collects and disposes of the solid and liquid wastes and other ship-generated
wastes, which shall state the names, make and capacity of the ships serviced
by it since August 2003 up to the present date, the dates the ships docked at
PPA ports, the number of days the ship was at sea with the corresponding
number of passengers and crew per trip, the volume of solid, liquid and other
wastes collected from said ships, the treatment undertaken and the disposal
site for said wastes.
(7) The Philippine National Police (PNP) Maritime Group shall submit on or
before June 30, 2011 its five-year plan of action on the measures and activities
it intends to undertake to apprehend the violators of Republic Act No. (RA)
8550 or the Philippine Fisheries Code of 1998 and other pertinent laws,
ordinances and regulations to prevent marine pollution in Manila Bay and to
ensure the successful prosecution of violators.
The Philippine Coast Guard shall likewise submit on or before June 30, 2011 its
five-year plan of action on the measures and activities they intend to
undertake to apprehend the violators of Presidential Decree No. 979 or the
Marine Pollution Decree of 1976 and RA 9993 or the Philippine Coast Guard
Law of 2009 and other pertinent laws and regulations to prevent marine
pollution in Manila Bay and to ensure the successful prosecution of violators.
(8) The Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA) shall submit to
the Court on or before June 30, 2011 the names and addresses of the informal
settlers in Metro Manila who, as of December 31, 2010, own and occupy
houses, structures, constructions and other encroachments established or
built along the Pasig-Marikina-San Juan Rivers, the NCR (Paraaque-Zapote,
Las Pias) Rivers, the Navotas-Malabon-Tullahan-Tenejeros Rivers, and
connecting waterways and esteros, in violation of RA 7279 and other
applicable laws. On or before June 30, 2011, the MMDA shall submit its plan
for the removal of said informal settlers and the demolition of the aforesaid
houses, structures, constructions and encroachments, as well as the
completion dates for said activities, which shall be fully implemented not later
than December 31, 2015.
The MMDA is ordered to submit a status report, within thirty (30) days from
receipt of this Resolution, on the establishment of a sanitary landfill facility for
Metro Manila in compliance with the standards under RA 9003 or the
Ecological Solid Waste Management Act.
On or before June 30, 2011, the MMDA shall submit a report of the location of
open and controlled dumps in Metro Manila whose operations are illegal after
February 21, 2006,3 pursuant to Secs. 36 and 37 of RA 9003, and its plan for
the closure of these open and controlled dumps to be accomplished not later
than December 31, 2012. Also, on or before June 30, 2011, the DENR
Secretary, as Chairperson of the National Solid Waste Management
Commission (NSWMC), shall submit a report on the location of all open and
controlled dumps in Rizal, Cavite, Laguna, Bulacan, Pampanga and Bataan.
On or before June 30, 2011, the DENR Secretary, in his capacity as NSWMC
Chairperson, shall submit a report on whether or not the following landfills
strictly comply with Secs. 41 and 42 of RA 9003 on the establishment and
operation of sanitary landfills, to wit:
National Capital Region
1. Navotas SLF (PhilEco), Brgy. Tanza (New Site), Navotas City
2. Payatas Controlled Dumpsite, Barangay Payatas, Quezon City
Region III
3. Sitio Coral, Brgy. Matictic, Norzagaray, Bulacan
4. Sitio Tiakad, Brgy. San Mateo, Norzagaray, Bulacan
5. Brgy. Minuyan, San Jose del Monte City, Bulacan
6. Brgy. Mapalad, Santa Rosa, Nueva Ecija
7. Sub-zone Kalangitan, Clark Capas, Tarlac Special Economic Zone
Region IV-A
8. Kalayaan (Longos), Laguna
9. Brgy. Sto. Nino, San Pablo City, Laguna
10. Brgy. San Antonio (Pilotage SLF), San Pedro, Laguna
11. Morong, Rizal
12. Sitio Lukutan, Brgy. San Isidro, Rodriguez (Montalban), Rizal (ISWIMS)
13. Brgy. Pintong Bukawe, San Mateo, Rizal (SMSLFDC)
On or before June 30, 2011, the MMDA and the seventeen (17) LGUs in Metro
Manila are ordered to jointly submit a report on the average amount of
garbage collected monthly per district in all the cities in Metro Manila from
January 2009 up to December 31, 2010 vis--vis the average amount of
garbage disposed monthly in landfills and dumpsites. In its quarterly report for
the last quarter of 2010 and thereafter, MMDA shall report on the
apprehensions for violations of the penal provisions of RA 9003, RA 9275 and
other laws on pollution for the said period.
On or before June 30, 2011, the DPWH and the LGUs in Rizal, Laguna, Cavite,
Bulacan, Pampanga, and Bataan shall submit the names and addresses of the
informal settlers in their respective areas who, as of September 30, 2010, own
or occupy houses, structures, constructions, and other encroachments built
along the Meycauayan-Marilao-Obando (Bulacan) Rivers, the Talisay (Bataan)
River, the Imus (Cavite) River, the Laguna de Bay, and other rivers, connecting
waterways and esteros that discharge wastewater into the Manila Bay, in
breach of RA 7279 and other applicable laws. On or before June 30, 2011, the
DPWH and the aforesaid LGUs shall jointly submit their plan for the removal
of said informal settlers and the demolition of the aforesaid structures,
constructions and encroachments, as well as the completion dates for such
activities which shall be implemented not later than December 31, 2012.
(9) The Department of Health (DOH) shall submit to the Court on or before
June 30, 2011 the names and addresses of the owners of septic and sludge
companies including those that do not have the proper facilities for the
treatment and disposal of fecal sludge and sewage coming from septic tanks.
The DOH shall implement rules and regulations on Environmental Sanitation
Clearances and shall require companies to procure a license to operate from
the DOH.
The DOH and DENR-Environmental Management Bureau shall develop a toxic
and hazardous waste management system by June 30, 2011 which will
implement segregation of hospital/toxic/hazardous wastes and prevent
mixing with municipal solid waste.
On or before June 30, 2011, the DOH shall submit a plan of action to ensure
that the said companies have proper disposal facilities and the completion
dates of compliance.1avvphi1
(10) The Department of Education (DepEd) shall submit to the Court on or
before May 31, 2011 a report on the specific subjects on pollution prevention,
waste management, environmental protection, environmental laws and the
like that it has integrated into the school curricula in all levels for the school
year 2011-2012.
On or before June 30, 2011, the DepEd shall also submit its plan of action to
ensure compliance of all the schools under its supervision with respect to the
integration of the aforementioned subjects in the school curricula which shall
be fully implemented by June 30, 2012.
(11) All the agencies are required to submit their quarterly reports
electronically using the forms below. The agencies may add other key
performance indicators that they have identified.
SO ORDERED.
DISSENTING OPINION
CARPIO, J.:
The Resolution contains the proposed directives of the Manila Bay Advisory
Committee to the concerned agencies1and local government units (LGUs) for
the implementation of the 18 December 2008 Decision of the Court in this
case.
Among the directives stated in the Resolution is for the affected agencies to
submit to the Court their plans of action and status reports, thus:
The Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), as lead
agency in the Philippine Clean Water Act of 2004, shall submit to the Court on
or before June 30, 2011 the updated Operational Plan for the Manila Bay
Coastal Strategy (OPMBCS);2
The DILG is required to submit a five-year plan of action that will contain
measures intended to ensure compliance of all non-complying factories,
commercial establishments, and private homes;3
The MWSS shall submit to the Court on or before June 30, 2011 the list of areas
in Metro Manila, Rizal and Cavite that do not have the necessary wastewater
treatment facilities. Within the same period, the concessionaires of the
MWSS shall submit their plans and projects for the construction of
wastewater treatment facilities in all the aforesaid areas and the completion
period for said facilities, which shall not go beyond 2020;4
The Local Water Utilities Administration (LWUA) shall submit to the Court on
or before June 30, 2011 the list of cities and towns in Laguna, Cavite, Bulacan,
Pampanga, and Bataan that do not have sewerage and sanitation
facilities. LWUA is further ordered to submit on or before September 30,
2011 its plan to provide, install, operate and maintain sewerage and
sanitation facilities in said cities and towns and the completion period for
said works which shall be fully implemented by December 31, 2020;5
The Department of Agriculture (DA), through the Bureau of Fisheries and
Aquatic Resources (BFAR), shall submit to the Court on or before June 30, 2011
a report on areas in Manila Bay where marine life has to be restored or
improved and the assistance it has extended to the LGUs in Metro Manila,
Rizal, Cavite, Laguna, Bulacan, Pampanga and Bataan in developing the
fisheries and aquatic resources in Manila Bay. The report shall contain
monitoring data on the marine life in said areas. Within the same period, it
shall submit its five-year plan to restore and improve the marine life in
Manila Bay, its future activities to assist the aforementioned LGUs for that
purpose, and the completion period for said undertakings;6
The Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) shall incorporate in its quarterly reports
the list of violators it has apprehended and the status of their cases. The PPA
is further ordered to include in its report the names, make and capacity of the
ships that dock in PPA ports. The PPA shall submit to the Court on or before
June 30, 2011 the measures it intends to undertake to implement its
compliance with paragraph 7 of the dispositive portion of the MMDA
Decision and the completion dates of such measures;7
The Philippine National Police (PNP) Maritime Group shall submit on or
before June 30, 2011 its five-year plan of action on the measures and
activities they intend to undertake to apprehend the violators of RA 8550 or
the Philippine Fisheries Code of 1998 and other pertinent laws, ordinances and
regulations to prevent marine pollution in Manila Bay and to ensure the
successful prosecution of violators;8
The Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) shall likewise submit on or before June 30,
2011 its five-year plan of action on the measures and activities they intend
to undertake to apprehend the violators of Presidential Decree (PD) 979 or
the Marine Pollution Decree of 1976 and RA 9993 or the Philippine Coast
Guard Law of 2009 and other pertinent laws and regulations to prevent
marine pollution in Manila Bay and to ensure the successful prosecution of
violators;9
The Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA) shall submit to the
Court on or before June 30, 2011 the names and addresses of the informal
settlers in Metro Manila who own and occupy houses, structures,
constructions and other encroachments established or built in violation of
RA 7279 and other applicable laws along the Pasig-Marikina-San Juan Rivers,
the NCR (Paraaque-Zapote, Las Pias) Rivers, the Navotas-Malabon-Tullahan-
Tenejeros Rivers, and connecting waterways and esteros as of December 31,
2010. On or before the same date, the MMDA shall submit its plan for the
removal of said informal settlers and the demolition of the aforesaid houses,
structures, constructions and encroachments, as well as the completion
dates for said activities which shall be fully implemented not later than
December 31, 2015;10
[T]he DPWH and the aforesaid LGUs shall jointly submit its plan for the
removal of said informal settlers and the demolition of the aforesaid
structures, constructions and encroachments, as well as the completion
dates for such activities which shall be implemented not later than
December 31, 2012;11
[T]he DOH shall submit a plan of action to ensure that the said companies
have proper disposal facilities and the completion dates of compliance;12
On or before June 30, 2011, the DepEd shall also submit its plan of action to
ensure compliance of all the schools under its supervision with respect to the
integration of the aforementioned subjects in the school curricula which
shall be fully implemented by June 30, 2012;13 (Emphasis supplied)
What is the purpose of requiring these agencies to submit to the Court their
plans of action and status reports? Are these plans to be approved or
disapproved by the Court? The Court does not have the competence or even
the jurisdiction to evaluate these plans which involves technical matters14 best
left to the expertise of the concerned agencies.
The Resolution also requires that the concerned agencies shall "submit [to the
Court] their quarterly reports electronically x x x."15 Thus, the directive for
the concerned agencies to submit to the Court their quarterly reports is a
continuing obligation which extends even beyond the year 2011.16
The Court is now arrogating unto itself two constitutional powers exclusively
vested in the President. First, the Constitution provides that "executive power
shall be vested in the President."17 This means that neither the Judiciary nor
the Legislature can exercise executive power for executive power is the
exclusive domain of the President. Second, the Constitution provides that the
President shall "have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and
offices."18 Neither the Judiciary nor the Legislature can exercise control or
even supervision over executive departments, bureaus, and offices.
Clearly, the Resolution constitutes an intrusion of the Judiciary into the
exclusive domain of the Executive. In the guise of implementing the 18
December 2008 Decision through the Resolution, the Court is in effect
supervising and directing the different government agencies and LGUs
concerned.
In Noblejas v. Teehankee,19 it was held that the Court cannot be required to
exercise administrative functions such as supervision over executive officials.
The issue in that case was whether the Commissioner of Land Registration may
only be investigated by the Supreme Court, in view of the conferment upon
him by law (Republic Act No. 1151) of the rank and privileges of a Judge of the
Court of First Instance. The Court, answering in the negative, stated:
To adopt petitioner's theory, therefore, would mean placing upon the
Supreme Court the duty of investigating and disciplining all these officials
whose functions are plainly executive and the consequent curtailment
by mere implication from the Legislative grant, of the President's power to
discipline and remove administrative officials who are presidential appointees,
and which the Constitution expressly place under the President's supervision
and control.
xxx
But the more fundamental objection to the stand of petitioner Noblejas is that,
if the Legislature had really intended to include in the general grant of
"privileges" or "rank and privileges of Judges of the Court of First Instance" the
right to be investigated by the Supreme Court, and to be suspended or
removed only upon recommendation of that Court, then such grant of
privilege would be unconstitutional, since it would violate the fundamental
doctrine of separation of powers, by charging this court with the
administrative function of supervisory control over executive officials, and
simultaneously reducing pro tanto the control of the Chief Executive over
such officials.20 (Boldfacing supplied)
Likewise, in this case, the directives in the Resolution are administrative in
nature and circumvent the constitutional provision which prohibits Supreme
Court members from performing quasi-judicial or administrative functions.
Section 12, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution provides:
SEC. 12. The members of the Supreme Court and of other courts established
by law shall not be designated to any agency performing quasi-judicial or
administrative functions.
Thus, in the case of In Re: Designation of Judge Manzano as Member of the
Ilocos Norte Provincial Committee on Justice,21 the Court invalidated the
designation of a judge as member of the Ilocos Norte Provincial Committee on
Justice, which was tasked to receive complaints and to make
recommendations for the speedy disposition of cases of detainees. The Court
held that the committee performs administrative functions22 which are
prohibited under Section 12, Article VIII of the Constitution.
As early as the 1932 case of Manila Electric Co. v. Pasay Transportation
Co.,23 this Court has already emphasized that the Supreme Court should only
exercise judicial power and should not assume any duty which does not
pertain to the administering of judicial functions. In that case, a petition was
filed requesting the members of the Supreme Court, sitting as a board of
arbitrators, to fix the terms and the compensation to be paid to Manila Electric
Company for the use of right of way. The Court held that it would be improper
and illegal for the members of the Supreme Court, sitting as a board of
arbitrators, whose decision of a majority shall be final, to act on the petition
of Manila Electric Company. The Court explained:
We run counter to this dilemma. Either the members of the Supreme Court,
sitting as a board of arbitrators, exercise judicial functions, or as members of
the Supreme Court, sitting as a board of arbitrators, exercise administrative
or quasi judicial functions. The first case would appear not to fall within the
jurisdiction granted the Supreme Court. Even conceding that it does, it would
presuppose the right to bring the matter in dispute before the courts, for any
other construction would tend to oust the courts of jurisdiction and render the
award a nullity. But if this be the proper construction, we would then have the
anomaly of a decision by the members of the Supreme Court, sitting as a board
of arbitrators, taken therefrom to the courts and eventually coming before the
Supreme Court, where the Supreme Court would review the decision of its
members acting as arbitrators. Or in the second case, if the functions
performed by the members of the Supreme Court, sitting as a board of
arbitrators, be considered as administrative or quasi judicial in nature, that
would result in the performance of duties which the members of the Supreme
Court could not lawfully take it upon themselves to perform. The present
petition also furnishes an apt illustration of another anomaly, for we find the
Supreme Court as a court asked to determine if the members of the court may
be constituted a board of arbitrators, which is not a court at all.
The Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands represents one of the three
divisions of power in our government. It is judicial power and judicial power
only which is exercised by the Supreme Court. Just as the Supreme Court, as
the guardian of constitutional rights, should not sanction usurpations by any
other department of the government, so should it as strictly confine its own
sphere of influence to the powers expressly or by implication conferred on it
by the Organic Act. The Supreme Court and its members should not and cannot
be required to exercise any power or to perform any trust or to assume any
duty not pertaining to or connected with the administering of judicial
functions.24
Furthermore, the Resolution orders some LGU officials to inspect the
establishments and houses along major river banks and to "take appropriate
action to ensure compliance by non-complying factories, commercial
establishments and private homes with said law, rules and regulations
requiring the construction or installment of wastewater treatment facilities
or hygienic septic tanks."25 The LGU officials are also directed to "submit to
the DILG on or before December 31, 2011 their respective compliance reports
which shall contain the names and addresses or offices of the owners of all the
non-complying factories, commercial establishments and private
homes."26 Furthermore, the Resolution mandates that on or before 30 June
2011, the DILG and the mayors of all cities in Metro Manila should "consider
providing land for the wastewater facilities of the Metropolitan Waterworks
and Sewerage System (MWSS) or its concessionaires (Maynilad and Manila
Water Inc.) within their respective jurisdictions."27 The Court is in effect
ordering these LGU officials how to do their job and even gives a deadline
for their compliance. Again, this is a usurpation of the power of the President
to supervise LGUs under the Constitution and existing laws.
Section 4, Article X of the 1987 Constitution provides that: "The President of
the Philippines shall exercise general supervision over local governments x x
x."28 Under the Local Government Code of 1991,29 the President exercises
general supervision over LGUs, thus:
SECTION 25. National Supervision over Local Government Units. (a)
Consistent with the basic policy on local autonomy, the President shall
exercise general supervision over local government units to ensure that their
acts are within the scope of their prescribed powers and functions.
The President shall exercise supervisory authority directly over provinces,
highly urbanized cities and independent component cities; through the
province with respect to component cities and municipalities; and through the
city and municipality with respect to barangays. (Emphasis supplied)
The Resolution constitutes judicial overreach by usurping and performing
executive functions. The Court must refrain from overstepping its boundaries
by taking over the functions of an equal branch of the government the
Executive. The Court should abstain from exercising any function which is not
strictly judicial in character and is not clearly conferred on it by the
Constitution.30 Indeed, as stated by Justice J.B.L. Reyes in Noblejas v.
Teehankee,31 "the Supreme Court of the Philippines and its members should
not and can not be required to exercise any power or to perform any trust or
to assume any duty not pertaining to or connected with the administration of
judicial functions."32
The directives in the Resolution constitute a judicial encroachment of an
executive function which clearly violates the system of separation of powers
that inheres in our democratic republican government. The principle of
separation of powers between the Executive, Legislative, and Judicial branches
of government is part of the basic structure of the Philippine Constitution.
Thus, the 1987 Constitution provides that: (a) the legislative power shall be
vested in the Congress of the Philippines;33 (b) the executive power shall be
vested in the President of the Philippines;34 and (c) the judicial power shall be
vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established.35
Since the Supreme Court is only granted judicial power, it should not attempt
to assume or be compelled to perform non-judicial functions.36 Judicial power
is defined under Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution as that which
"includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the government." The Resolution contains directives which
are outside the ambit of the Court's judicial functions.
The principle of separation of powers is explained by the Court in the leading
case of Angara v. Electoral Commission:37
The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of
government. It obtains not through express provision but by actual division in
our Constitution. Each department of the government has exclusive
cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own
sphere. But it does not follow from the fact that the three powers are to be
kept separate and distinct that the Constitution intended them to be
absolutely unrestrained and independent of each other. The Constitution has
provided for an elaborate system of checks and balances to secure
coordination in the workings of the various departments of the government. x
x x And the judiciary in turn, with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter,
effectively checks the other department in its exercise of its power to
determine the law, and hence to declare executive and legislative acts void if
violative of the Constitution.38
Even the ponente is passionate about according respect to the system of
separation of powers between the three equal branches of the government.
In his dissenting opinion in the 2008 case of Province of North Cotabato v.
Government of the Republic of the Philippines Peace Panel on Ancestral
Domain (GRP),39 Justice Velasco emphatically stated:
Separation of Powers to be Guarded
Over and above the foregoing considerations, however, is the matter of
separation of powers which would likely be disturbed should the Court
meander into alien territory of the executive and dictate how the final shape
of the peace agreement with the MILF should look like. The system of
separation of powers contemplates the division of the functions of
government into its three (3) branches: the legislative which is empowered
to make laws; the executive which is required to carry out the law; and the
judiciary which is charged with interpreting the law. Consequent to actual
delineation of power, each branch of government is entitled to be left alone
to discharge its duties as it sees fit. Being one such branch, the judiciary, as
Justice Laurel asserted in Planas v. Gil, "will neither direct nor restrain
executive [or legislative action]." Expressed in another perspective, the
system of separated powers is designed to restrain one branch from
inappropriate interference in the business, or intruding upon the central
prerogatives, of another branch; it is a blend of courtesy and caution, "a self-
executing safeguard against the encroachment or aggrandizement of one
branch at the expense of the other." x x x
Under our constitutional set up, there cannot be any serious dispute that the
maintenance of the peace, insuring domestic tranquility and the suppression
of violence are the domain and responsibility of the executive. Now then, if it
be important to restrict the great departments of government to the exercise
of their appointed powers, it follows, as a logical corollary, equally
important, that one branch should be left completely independent of the
others, independent not in the sense that the three shall not cooperate in
the common end of carrying into effect the purposes of the constitution, but
in the sense that the acts of each shall never be controlled by or subjected
to the influence of either of the branches.40 (Emphasis supplied)
Indeed, adherence to the principle of separation of powers which is enshrined
in our Constitution is essential to prevent tyranny by prohibiting the
concentration of the sovereign powers of state in one body.41 Considering that
executive power is exclusively vested in the President of the Philippines, the
Judiciary should neither undermine such exercise of executive power by the
President nor arrogate executive power unto itself. The Judiciary must confine
itself to the exercise of judicial functions and not encroach upon the functions
of the other branches of the government.
ACCORDINGLY, I vote against the approval of the Resolution.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
DISSENTING OPINION
SERENO, J.:
"The judicial whistle needs to be blown for a purpose and with caution. It
needs to be remembered that the Court cannot run the government. The
Court has the duty of implementing constitutional safeguards that protect
individual rights but they cannot push back the limits of the Constitution to
accommodate the challenged violation."1
These are the words of Justice Anand of the Supreme Court of India, from
which court the idea of a continuing mandatory injunction for environmental
cases was drawn by the Philippine Supreme Court. These words express alarm
that the Indian judiciary has already taken on the role of running the
government in environmental cases. A similar situation would result in the
Philippines were the majority Resolution to be adopted. Despite having the
best of intentions to ensure compliance by petitioners with their
corresponding statutory mandates in an urgent manner, this Court has
unfortunately encroached upon prerogatives solely to be exercised by the
President and by Congress.
On 18 December 2008, the Court promulgated its decision in MMDA v.
Concerned Residents of Manila Bay, G.R. Nos. 171947-48, denying the petition
of the government agencies, defendants in Civil Case No. 1851-99. It held that
the Court of Appeals, subject to some modifications, was correct in affirming
the 13 September 2002 Decision of the Regional Trial Court in Civil Case No.
1851-99. It ordered "the abovenamed defendant-government agencies to
clean up, rehabilitate, and preserve Manila Bay, and restore and maintain its
waters to SB level (Class B sea waters per Water Classification Tables under
DENR Administrative Order No. 34 [1990]) to make them fit for swimming,
skin-diving, and other forms of contact recreation."
The Court further issued each of the aforementioned agencies specific orders
to comply with their statutory mandate.2 Pursuant to the judgment above, the
Court established its own Manila Bay Advisory Committee. Upon the
recommendations of the said Committee, the present Resolution was issued.
It encompasses several of the specific instructions laid out by the court in the
original case, but also goes further by requiring reports and updates from the
said government agencies, and setting deadlines for the submission thereof.
I find these directives in the Majority Resolution patently irreconcilable with
basic constitutional doctrines and with the legislative mechanisms already in
place, such as the Administrative Code and the Local Government Code, which
explicitly grant control and supervision over these agencies to the President
alone, and to no one else. For these reasons, I respectfully dissent from the
Majority Resolution.
In issuing these directives, the Court has encroached upon the exclusive
authority of the Executive Department and violated the doctrine of Separation
of Powers
The Resolution assigned the Department of Natural Resources as the primary
agency for environment protection and required the implementation of its
Operational Plan for the Manila Bay Coastal Strategy. It ordered the DENR to
submit the updated operational plan directly to the Court; to summarize data
on the quality of Manila Bay waters; and to "submit the names and addresses
of persons and companiesthat generate toxic or hazardous waste on or
before September 30, 2011."
The Department of the Interior and Local Government is directed to "order the
Mayors of all cities in Metro Manila; the Governors of Rizal, Laguna, Cavite,
Bulacan, Pampanga and Bataan; and the Mayors of all the cities and towns in
said provinces to inspect all factories, commercial establishments and private
homes along the banks of the major river systems" to determine if they have
wastewater treatment facilities, on or before 30 June 2011. The LGUs are given
a deadline of 30 September 2011 to finish the inspection. In cooperation with
the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH), these local
governments are required to submit their plan for the removal of informal
settlers and encroachments which are in violation of Republic Act No. 7279.
The said demolition must take place not later than 31 December 2012.
The Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System (MWSS) is required to
submit its plans for the construction of wastewater treatment facilities in
areas where needed, the completion period for which shall not go beyond the
year 2020. On or before 30 June 2011, the MWSS is further required to have
its two concessionaires submit a report on the amount collected as sewerage
fees. The Local Water Utilities Administration (LWUA) is ordered to submit on
or before 30 September 2011 its plan to install and operate sewerage and
sanitation facilities in the towns and cities where needed, which must be fully
implemented by 31 December 2020.
The Department of Agriculture and the Bureau of Aquatic Fisheries and
Resources are ordered to submit on or before 30 June 2011 a list of areas
where marine life in Manila Bay has improved, and the assistance extended to
different Local Government Units in this regard. The Philippine Ports Authority
(PPA) is ordered to report the names, make, and capacity of each ship that
would dock in PPA ports; the days they docked and the days they were at sea;
the activities of the concessionaire that would collect solid and liquid ship-
generated waste, the volume, treatment and disposal sites for such wastes;
and the violators that PPA has apprehended.
The Department of Health (DOH) is required to submit the names and
addresses of septic and sludge companies that have no treatment facilities.
The said agency must also require companies to procure a "license to operate"
issued by the DOH. The Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA)
and the seventeen (17) LGUs in Metro Manila must submit a report on the
"amount of garbage collected per districtvis--vis the average amount of
garbage disposed monthly in landfills and dumpsites." MMDA must also
submit a plan for the removal of informal settlers and encroachments along
NCR Rivers which violate R.A. No. 7279.
Clearly, the Court has no authority to issue these directives. They fall squarely
under the domain of the executive branch of the state. The issuance of specific
instructions to subordinate agencies in the implementation of policy mandates
in all laws, not just those that protect the environment, is an exercise of the
power of supervision and control the sole province of the Office of the
President.
Both the 1987 Constitution and Executive Order No. 292, or the Administrative
Code of the Philippines, state:
Exercise of Executive Power. - The Executive power shall be vested in the
President.3
Power of Control.- The President shall have control of all the executive
departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully
executed.4
In Anak Mindanao Party-list Group v. Executive Secretary,5 this Court has
already asserted that the enforcement of all laws is the sole domain of the
Executive. The Court pronounced that the express constitutional grant of
authority to the Executive is broad and encompassing, such that it justifies
reorganization measures6 initiated by the President. The Court said:
While Congress is vested with the power to enact laws, the President executes
the laws. The executive power is vested in the President. It is generally defined
as the power to enforce and administer the laws. It is the power of carrying
the laws into practical operation and enforcing their due observance.
As head of the Executive Department, the President is the Chief Executive. He
represents the government as a whole and sees to it that all laws are enforced
by the officials and employees of his department. He has control over the
executive department, bureaus and offices. This means that he has the
authority to assume directly the functions of the executive department,
bureau and office, or interfere with the discretion of its officials. Corollary to
the power of control, the President also has the duty of supervising and
enforcement of laws for the maintenance of general peace and public order.
Thus, he is granted administrative power over bureaus and offices under his
control to enable him to discharge his duties effectively.
To herein petitioner agencies impleaded below, this Court has given very
specific instructions to report the progress and status of their operations
directly to the latter. The Court also required the agencies to apprise it of any
noncompliance with the standards set forth by different laws as to
environment protection. This move is tantamount to making these agencies
accountable to the Court instead of the President. The very occupation
streamlined especially for the technical and practical expertise of the
Executive Branch is being usurped without regard for the delineations of
power in the Constitution. In fact, the issuance of the Resolution itself is in
direct contravention of the Presidents exclusive power to issue administrative
orders, as shown thus:
Administrative Orders. - Acts of the President which relate to particular aspect
of governmental operations in pursuance of his duties as administrative head
shall be promulgated in administrative orders.7
The Courts discussion in Ople v. Torres8 pertaining to the extent and breadth
of administrative power bestowed upon the President is apt:
Administrative power is concerned with the work of applying policies and
enforcing orders as determined by proper governmental organs. It enables the
President to fix a uniform standard of administrative efficiency and check the
official conduct of his agents. To this end, he can issue administrative orders,
rules and regulations.
An administrative order is an ordinance issued by the President which relates
to specific aspects in the administrative operation of government. It must be
in harmony with the law and should be for the sole purpose of implementing
the law and carrying out the legislative policy.
The implementation of the policy laid out by the legislature in the Philippine
Clean Water Act of 2004, the Toxic and Hazardous Waste Act or Republic Act
6969, the Environment Code, and other laws geared towards environment
protection is under the competence of the President. Achieved thereby is a
uniform standard of administrative efficiency. And since it is through
administrative orders promulgated by the President that specific operational
aspects for these policies are laid out, the Resolution of this Court overlaps
with the Presidents administrative power. No matter how urgent and
laudatory the cause of environment protection has become, it cannot but yield
to the higher mandate of separation of powers and the mechanisms laid out
by the people through the Constitution.
One of the directives is that which requires local governments to conduct
inspection of homes and establishments along the riverbanks, and to submit a
plan for the removal of certain informal settlers. Not content with arrogating
unto itself the powers of "control" and "supervision" granted by the
Administrative Code to the President over said petitioner administrative
agencies, the Court is also violating the latters general supervisory authority
over local governments:
Sec. 18. General Supervision Over Local Governments. - The President shall
exercise general supervision over local governments.9
Sec. 25. National Supervision over Local Government Units.(a) Consistent
with the basic policy on local autonomy, the President shall exercise general
supervision over local government units to ensure that their acts are within
the scope of their prescribed powers and functions.10
The powers expressly vested in any branch of the Government shall not be
exercised by, nor delegated to, any other branch of the Government, except
to the extent authorized by the Constitution.11
As has often been repeated by this Court, the doctrine of separation of powers
is the very wellspring from which the Court draws its legitimacy. Former Chief
Justice Reynato S. Puno has traced its origin and rationale as inhering in the
republican system of government:
The principle of separation of powers prevents the concentration of
legislative, executive, and judicial powers to a single branch of government by
deftly allocating their exercise to the three branches of government...
In his famed treatise, The Spirit of the Laws, Montesquieu authoritatively
analyzed the nature of executive, legislative and judicial powers and with a
formidable foresight counselled that any combination of these powers would
create a system with an inherent tendency towards tyrannical actions
Again, there is no liberty, if the judiciary power be not separated from the
legislative and the executive. Were it joined with the legislative, the life and
liberty of the subject would be exposed to arbitrary control; for the judge
would be then the legislator. Were it joined to the executive power, the judge
might behave with violence and oppression.
There would be an end of everything, were the same man or the same body,
whether of the nobles or of the people, to exercise those three powers, that
of enacting laws, that of executing the public resolutions, and that of trying
the causes of individuals. 12
Nor is there merit in the contention that these directives will speed up the
rehabilitation of Manila Bay better than if said rehabilitation were left to the
appropriate agencies. Expediency is never a reason to abandon legitimacy.
"The Separation of Powers often impairs efficiency, in terms of dispatch and
the immediate functioning of government. It is the long-term staying power of
government that is enhanced by the mutual accommodation required by the
separation of powers."13
Mandamus does not lie to compel a discretionary act.
In G.R. Nos. 171947-48, the Court explicitly admitted that "[w]hile the
implementation of the MMDAs mandated tasks may entail a decision-making
process, the enforcement of the law or the very act of doing what the law
exacts to be done is ministerial in nature and may be compelled by
mandamus."14 In denying the appeal of petitioners and affirming the Decision
of the RTC, the Court of Appeals stressed that the trial courts Decision did not
require petitioners to do tasks outside of their usual basic functions under
existing laws.15
In its revised Resolution, the Court is now setting deadlines for the
implementation of policy formulations which require decision-making by the
agencies. It has confused an order enjoining a duty, with an order
outlining specific technical rules on how to perform such a duty. Assuming
without conceding that mandamus were availing under Rule 65, the Court can
only require a particular action, but it cannot provide for the means to
accomplish such action. It is at this point where the demarcation of the general
act of "cleaning up the Manila Bay" has become blurred, so much so that the
Court now engages in the slippery slope of overseeing technical details.
In Sps. Abaga v. Sps. Panes16 the Court said:
From the foregoing Rule, there are two situations when a writ
of mandamus may issue: (1) when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or
person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law
specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station; or (2)
when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully excludes
another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which the other is
entitled. The "duty" mentioned in the first situation is a ministerial duty, not a
discretionary duty, requiring the exercise of judgmentIn short, for
mandamus to lie, the duty sought to be compelled to be performed must be
a ministerial duty, not a discretionary duty, and the petitioner must show that
he has a well-defined, clear and certain right.
Discretion, on the other hand, is a faculty conferred upon a court or official by
which he may decide the question either way and still be right.17
The duty being enjoined in mandamus must be one according to the terms
defined in the law itself. Thus, the recognized rule is that, in the performance
of an official duty or act involving discretion, the corresponding official can
only be directed by mandamus to act, but not to act one way or the other. This
is the end of any participation by the Court, if it is authorized to participate at
all.
In setting a deadline for the accomplishment of these directives, not only has
the Court provided the means of accomplishing the task required, it has
actually gone beyond the standards set by the law. There is nothing in the
Environment Code, the Administrative Code, or the Constitution which grants
this authority to the judiciary. It is already settled that, "If the law imposes a
duty upon a public officer and gives him the right to decide when and how the
duty shall be performed, such duty is not ministerial."18
In Alvarez v. PICOP Resources,19 the Court ruled that,
As an extraordinary writ, the remedy of mandamus lies only to compel an
officer to perform a ministerial duty, not a discretionary one; mandamus will
not issue to control the exercise of discretion of a public officer where the law
imposes upon him the duty to exercise his judgment in reference to any
manner in which he is required to act, because it is his judgment that is to be
exercised and not that of the court.
The Constitution does not authorize the courts to "monitor" the execution of
their decisions.
It is an oft-repeated rule that the Court has no power to issue advisory
opinions, much less "directives" requiring progress reports from the parties
respecting the execution of its decisions. The requirements of "actual case or
controversy" and "justiciability" have long been established in order to limit
the exercise of judicial review. While its dedication to the implementation of
the fallo in G.R. 171947-48 is admirable, the Courts power cannot spill over to
actual encroachment upon both the "control" and police powers of the State
under the guise of a "continuing mandamus."
In G.R. 171947-48, the Court said: "Under what other judicial discipline
describes as continuing mandamus, the Court may, under extraordinary
circumstances, issue directives with the end in view of ensuring that its
decision would not be set to naught by administrative inaction or
indifference."
Needless to say, the "continuing mandamus" in this case runs counter to
principles of "actual case or controversy" and other requisites for judicial
review. In fact, the Supreme Court is in danger of acting as a "super-
administrator"20 the scenario presently unfolding in India where the
supposed remedy originated. There the remedy was first used in Vineet Narain
and Others v. Union of India,21 a public interest case for corruption filed
against high-level officials. Since then, the remedy has been applied to
environmental cases as an oversight and control power by which the Supreme
Court of India has created committees (i.e. the Environment Pollution
Authority and the Central Empowered Committee in forest cases) and allowed
these committees to act as the policing agencies.22 But the most significant
judicial intervention in this regard was the series of orders promulgated by the
Court in T.N. Godavarman v. Union of India.23
Although the Writ Petition filed by Godavarman was an attempt to seek
directions from the Court regarding curbing the illegal felling of trees, the
Supreme Court went further to make policy determinations in an attempt to
improve the countrys forests. The Court Order suspending felling of trees that
did not adhere to state government working plans resulted in effectively
freezing the countrys timber industry. The Supreme Court completely banned
tree felling in certain north-eastern states to any part of the country. The
courts role was even more pronounced in its later directions. While
maintaining the ban on felling of trees in the seven northeast states, the court
directed the state governments to gather, process, sell, and otherwise manage
the already felled timber in the manner its specified the Supreme Court
became the supervisor of all forest issues, ranging from controlling, pricing and
transport of timber to management of forest revenue, as well as
implementation of its orders.24
Thus, while it was originally intended to assert public rights in the face of
government inaction and neglect, the remedy is now facing serious criticism
as it has spiraled out of control.25 In fact, even Justice J. S. Verma, who penned
the majority opinion in Vineet Narain in which continuing mandamus first
made its appearance, subsequently pronounced that "judicial activism should
be neither judicial ad hocism nor judicial tyranny."26 Justice B.N. Srikrishna
observed that judges now seem to want to engage themselves with boundless
enthusiasm in complex socio-economic issues raising myriads of facts and
ideological issues that cannot be managed by "judicially manageable
standards."27 Even Former Chief Justice A. S. Anand, a known defender of
judicial activism, has warned against the tendency towards "judicial
adventurism," reiterating the principle that "the role of the judge is that of a
referee. I can blow my judicial whistle when the ball goes out of play; but when
the game restarts I must neither take part in it nor tell the players how to
play."28
Unless our own Supreme Court learns to curb its excesses and apply to this
case the standards for judicial review it has developed over the years and
applied to co-equal branches, the scenario in India could very well play out in
the Philippines. The Court must try to maintain a healthy balance between the
departments, precisely as the Constitution mandates, by delineating its "deft
strokes and bold lines,"29 ever so conscious of the requirements of actual case
and controversy. While, admittedly, there are certain flaws in the operation
and implementation of the laws, the judiciary cannot take the initiative to
compensate for such perceived inaction.
The Court stated in Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance:30
Disregard of the essential limits imposed by the case and controversy
requirement can in the long run only result in undermining our authority as a
court of law. For, as judges, what we are called upon to render is judgment
according to law, not according to what may appear to be the opinion of the
day
Hence, "over nothing but cases and controversies can courts exercise
jurisdiction, and it is to make the exercise of that jurisdiction effective that
they are allowed to pass upon constitutional questions."31 Admirable though
the sentiments of the Court may be, it must act within jurisdictional limits.
These limits are founded upon the traditional requirement of a cause of action:
"the act or omission by which a party violates a right of another."32 In
constitutional cases, for every writ or remedy, there must be a clear
pronouncement of the corresponding right which has been infringed. Only
then can there surface that "clear concreteness provided when a question
emerges precisely framed and necessary for decision from a clash of adversary
argument exploring every aspect of a multifaceted situation embracing
conflicting and demanding interests."33
Unfortunately, the Court fails to distinguish between a pronouncement on
violation of rights on one hand, and non-performance of duties vis--vis
operational instructions, on the other. Moreover, it also dabbles in an
interpretation of constitutional rights in a manner that is dangerously pre-
emptive of legally available remedies.
The "continuing mandamus" palpably overlaps with the power of
congressional oversight.
Article 6, Section 22 of the 1987 Constitution states:
The heads of department may upon their own initiative, with the consent of
the President, or upon the request of either House, or as the rules of each
House shall provide, appear before and be heard by such House on any matter
pertaining to their departments. Written questions shall be submitted to the
President of the Senate or the Speaker of the House of Representatives at least
three days before their scheduled appearance. Interpellations shall not be
limited to written questions, but may cover matters related thereto. When the
security of the state or the public interest so requires and the President so
states in writing, the appearance shall be conducted in executive session.
This provision pertains to the power to conduct a question hour, the objective
of which is to obtain information in pursuit of Congress oversight function.
Macalintal v. Comelec34 discussed the scope of congressional oversight in full.
Oversight refers to the power of the legislative department to check, monitor
and ensure that the laws it has enacted are enforced:
The power of Congress does not end with the finished task of
legislation. Concomitant with its principal power to legislate is the auxiliary
power to ensure that the laws it enacts are faithfully executed. As well
stressed by one scholar, the legislature "fixes the main lines of substantive
policy and is entitled to see that administrative policy is in harmony with it; it
establishes the volume and purpose of public expenditures and ensures their
legality and propriety; it must be satisfied that internal administrative controls
are operating to secure economy and efficiency; and it informs itself of the
conditions of administration of remedial measure.
Clearly, oversight concerns post-enactment measures undertaken by
Congress: (a) to monitor bureaucratic compliance with program objectives, (b)
to determine whether agencies are properly administered, (c) to eliminate
executive waste and dishonesty, (d) to prevent executive usurpation of
legislative authority, and (d) to assess executive conformity with the
congressional perception of public interest.
Congress, thus, uses its oversight power to make sure that the administrative
agencies perform their functions within the authority delegated to them.
Macalintal v. Comelec further discusses that legislative supervision under the
oversight power connotes a continuing and informed awareness on the part
of Congress regarding executive operations in a given administrative area.
Because the power to legislate includes the power to ensure that the laws are
enforced, this monitoring power has been granted by the Constitution to the
legislature. In cases of executive non-implementation of statutes, the courts
cannot justify the use of "continuing mandamus," as it would by its very
definition overlap with the monitoring power under congressional oversight.
The Resolution does not only encroach upon the general supervisory function
of the Executive, it also diminished and arrogated unto itself the power of
congressional oversight.
Conclusion
This Court cannot nobly defend the environmental rights of generations of
Filipinos enshrined in the Constitution while in the same breath eroding the
foundations of that very instrument from which it draws its power. While the
remedy of "continuing mandamus" has evolved out of a Third World
jurisdiction similar to ours, we cannot overstep the boundaries laid down by
the rule of law. Otherwise, this Court would rush recklessly beyond the
delimitations precisely put in place to safeguard excesses of power. The
tribunal, considered by many citizens as the last guardian of fundamental
rights, would then resemble nothing more than an idol with feet of clay: strong
in appearance, but weak in foundation.
The Court becomes a conscience by acting to remind us of limitation on
power, even judicial power, and the interrelation of good purposes with good
means. Morality is not an end dissociated from means. There is a morality of
morality, which respects the limitation of office and the fallibility of the human
mindself-limitation is the first mark of the master. That, too is part of the role
of the conscience.35
The majority Resolution would, at the same time, cast the light of scrutiny
more harshly on judicial action in which the Courts timely exercise of its
powers is called for as in the cases of prisoners languishing in jail whose cases
await speedy resolution by this Court. There would then be nothing to stop
the executive and the legislative departments from considering as fair game
the judiciarys own accountability in its clearly delineated department.
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Associate Justice
3. Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 2869 March 25, 1907
MATEO CARIO, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
THE INSULAR GOVERNMENT, respondent-appellee.
Coudert Brothers for appellant.
Office of the Solicitor-General Araneta for appellee.
ARELLANO, C.J.:
Mateo Cario, the appellant herein, on the 23d of February, 1904, filed his
petition in the Court of Land Registration praying that there be granted to him
title to a parcel of land consisting of 40 hectares, 1 are, and 13 centares, and
situated in the town of Baguio, Province of Benguet, together with a house
erected thereon and constructed of wood and roofed with rimo, and bounded
as follows: On the north, in lines running 1,048 metes and 20 decimeters with
the lands of Sepa Cario, H. Phelps Whitmarsh, and Calsi; on the east, in lines
running 991 meters and 50 decimeters with the land of Kuidno, Esteban
Gonzales, and of the Civil Government; on the south, in lines of 115 meters
and 60 decimeters, with the lands of Talaca; and on the west, in lines running
982 meters and 20 decimeters, with the lands of Sisco Cario and
Mayengmeng.
By order of the court the hearing of this petition, No. 561, and that of Antonio
Rebollo and Vicente Valpiedad filed under No. 834, were heard together for
the reason that the latter petition claimed a small portion of land included in
the parcel set out in the former petition.
The Insular Government opposed the granting of these petitions, alleging that
the whole parcel of land is public property of the Government and that the
same was never acquired in any manner or through any title of egresionfrom
the State.
After trial, and the hearing of documentary and oral proof, the court of Land
Registration rendered its judgment in these terms:
Therefore the court finds that Cario and his predecessors have not possessed
exclusively and adversely any part of the said property prior to the date on
which Cario constructed the house now there that is to say, for the years
1897 and 1898, and Cario held possession for some years afterwards of but
a part of the property to which he claims title. Both petitions are dismissed
and the property in question is adjudged to be public land. (Bill of exceptions,
p. 15.)
The conclusions arrived at the set forth in definite terms in the decision of the
court below are the following:
From the testimony given by Cario as well as from that of several of the
witnesses for the Government it is deduced, that in or about the year 1884
Cario erected and utilized as a domicile a house on the property situated to
the north of that property now in question, property which, according to the
plan attached to expediente No. 561, appears to be property belonging to
Donaldson Sim; that during the year 1893 Cario sold said house to one
Cristobal Ramos, who in turn sold the same to Donaldson Sim, moving to and
living on the adjoining property, which appears on the plan aforesaid to be the
property of H. Phelps Whitmarsh, a place where the father and the
grandfather of his wife, that is to say, Ortega and Minse, had lived . . ..
In or about the years 1898 Cario abandoned the property of Whitmarsh and
located on the property described in the plan attached to expediente No. 561,
having constructed a house thereon in which he now lives, and which house is
situated in the center of the property, as is indicated on the plan; and since
which time he has undoubtedly occupied some portion of the property now
claimed by him. (Bill of exceptions, pp. 11 and 12.)
1. Therefore it is evident that this court can not decree the registration of all
of the superficial extension of the land described in the petition and as appears
on the plan filed herein, such extension containing 40 hectares, 1 are, and 13
centares, inasmuch as the documentary evidence accompanying the petition
is conclusive proof against the petitioners; this documentary proof consists of
a possessory information under date of March 7, 1901, and registered on the
11th day of the same month and year; and, according to such possessory
information, the land therein described contains an extension of only 28
hectares limited by "the country road to the barrio of Pias," a road appearing
on the plan now presented and cutting the land, as might be said, in half, or
running through its center from north to south, a considerable extension of
land remaining on the other side of the said road, the west side, and which
could not have been included in the possessory information mentioned.
2. As has been shown during the trial of this case, this land, of which mention
is made in said possessory information, and upon which is situated the house
now actually occupied by the petitioner, all of which is set forth as argument
as to the possession in the judgment, is "used for pasture and sowing," and
belongs to the class called public lands.
3. Under the express provisions of law, a parcel of land, being of common
origin, presumptively belonged to the State during its sovereignty, and, in
order to perfect the legitimate acquisition of such land by private persons, it
was necessary that the possession of the same pass from the State. And there
is no evidence or proof of title of egresionof this land from the domain of the
Spanish Government, nor is there any possessory information equivalent to
title by composicion or under agreement. 4, The possessory information filed
herein is not the title to property authorized in substitution for that of
adjustment by the royal decree of February 13, 1894, this being the last law or
legal disposition of the former sovereignty applicable to the present subject-
matter of common lands: First, for the reason that the land referred to herein
is not covered nor does it come within any one of the three conditions
required by article 19 of the said royal decree, to wit, that the land has been
in an uninterrupted state of cultivation during a period of six years last past;
or that the same has been possessed without interruption during a period of
twelve years and has been in a state of cultivation up to the date of the
information and during the three years immediately preceding such
information; or that such land had been possessed openly without
interruption during a period of thirty or more years, notwithstanding the land
had not been cultivated; nor is it necessary to refer to the testimony given by
the two witnesses to the possessory information for the following reason:
Second, because the possessory information authorized by said royal decree
or last legal disposition of the Spanish Government, as title or for the purpose
of acquiring actual proprietary right, equivalent to that of adjustment with the
Spanish Government and required and necessary at all times until the
publication of said royal decree was limited in time to one year, in accordance
with article 21, which is as follows: " A period of one year, not to be extended,
is allowed to verify the possessory informations which are referred to in
articles 19 and 20. After the expiration of this period of the right of the
cultivators and persons in possession to obtain gratuitous title thereto lapses
and the land together with full possession reverts to the state, or, as the case
may be, to the community, and the said possessors and cultivators or their
assigns would simply have rights under universal or general title of average in
the event that the land is sold within a period of five years immediately
following the cancellation. The possessors not included under this chapter can
only acquire by time the ownership and title to unappropriated or royal lands
in accordance with common law."
5. In accordance with the preceding provisions, the right that remained to
Cario, if it be certain that he was the true possessor of the land in question,
was the right of average in case the Government or State could have sold the
same within the period of five years immediately following for example, if the
denouncement of purchase had been carried out by Felipe Zafra or any other
person, as appears from the record of the trial of the case. Aside from this
right, in such event, his possession as attested in the possessory information
herein could not, in accordance with common law, go to show any right of
ownership until after the expiration of twenty years from the expiration of
twenty years from the verification and registry of the same in conformity with
the provisions of article 393 of the Mortgage Law and other conditions
prescribe by this law.
6. The right of possession in accordance with common law that is to say,
civil law remains at all times subordinate to the Spanish administrative law,
inasmuch as it could only be of force when pertaining to royal transferable or
alienable lands, which condition and the determination thereof is reversed to
the government, which classified and designated the royal alienable lands for
the purpose of distinguishing them from those lands strictly public, and from
forestry lands which could at no time pass to private ownership nor be
acquired through time even after the said royal decree of February 13, 1894.
7. The advent of the new sovereignty necessarily brought a new method of
dealing with lands and particularly as to the classification and manner of
transfer and acquisition of royal or common lands then appropriated, which
were thenceforth merely called public lands, the alienation of which was
reserved to the Government, in accordance with section 12 and 13 of the act
of Congress of July 1, 1902,1 and in conformity with other laws enacted under
this act of Congress by the Philippine Commission prescribing rules for the
execution thereof, one of which is Act No. 648,2herein mentioned by the
petitioner, in connection with Act No. 627,3 which appears to be the law upon
which the petition herein is founded.
8. Section 6 of Act No. 627 admits prescription, in accordance with the
provisions contained in Act No. 190, as a basis for obtaining the right of
ownership. "The petitioners claims title under the period of prescription of ten
years established by that act, as well as by reason of his occupancy and use
thereof from time immemorial." (Allegation 1.) But said act admits such
prescription for the purpose of obtaining title and ownership to lands "not
exceeding more that sixteen hectares in extent." (Sec. 6 of said act.) The land
claimed by Cario is 40 hectares in extent, if we take into consideration his
petition, or an extension of 28 hectares, according to the possessory
information, the only thing that can be considered. Therefore, it follows that
the judgment denying the petition herein and now appealed from was strictly
in accordance with the law invoked herein.
9. And of the 28 hectares of land as set out in the possessory information, one
part of same, according to the testimony of Cario, belongs to Vicente
Valpiedad, the extent of which is not determined. From all of which it follows
that the precise extent has not been determined in the trial of this case on
which judgment might be based in the event that the judgment and title be
declared in favor of the petitioner, Mateo Cario. And we should not lose sight
of the fact that, considering the intention of Congress in granting ownership
and title to 16 hectares, that Mateo Cario and his children have already
exceeded such amount in various acquirements of lands, all of which is shown
in different cases decided by the said Court of Land Registration, donations or
gifts of land that could only have been made efficacious as to the conveyance
thereof with the assistance of these new laws.
By reason of the findings set forth it is clearly seen that the court below did
not err:
1. In finding that Mateo Cario and those from whom he claims his right had
not possessed and claimed as owners the lands in question since time
immemorial;
2. In finding that the land in question did not belong to the petitioner, but that,
on the contrary, it was the property of the Government. (Allegation 21.)
Wherefore, the judgment appealed from is affirmed with the costs of this
instance against the appellant. After the expiration of twenty days from the
notification of this decision let judgment be entered in accordance herewith,
and ten days thereafter let the case be remanded to the court from whence it
came for proper action. So ordered.
Torres, Mapa, Willard, and Tracey, JJ., concur.
Johnson, J., reserves his vote.
4. EN BANC
[G.R. No. 135385. December 6, 2000]
ISAGANI CRUZ and CESAR EUROPA, petitioners, vs. SECRETARY OF
ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES, SECRETARY OF BUDGET AND
MANAGEMENT and CHAIRMAN and COMMISSIONERS OF THE NATIONAL
COMMISSION ON INDIGENOUS PEOPLES, respondents.
HON. JUAN M .FLAVIER, HON. PONCIANO BENNAGEN, BAYANI ASCARRAGA,
EDTAMI MANSAYANGAN, BASILIO WANDAG, EVELYN DUNUAN, YAOM
TUGAS, ALFREMO CARPIANO, LIBERATO A. GABIN, MATERNIDAD M. COLAS,
NARCISA M. DALUPINES, BAI KIRAM-CONNIE SATURNO, BAE MLOMO-
BEATRIZ T. ABASALA, DATU BALITUNGTUNG-ANTONIO D. LUMANDONG,
DATU MANTUMUKAW TEOFISTO SABASALES, DATU EDUAARDO BANDA,
DATU JOEL UNAD, DATU RAMON BAYAAN, TIMUAY JOSE ANOY, TIMUAY
MACARIO D. SALACAO, TIMUAY EDWIN B. ENDING, DATU SAHAMPONG
MALANAW VI, DATU BEN PENDAO CABIGON, BAI NANAPNAY-LIZA SAWAY,
BAY INAY DAYA-MELINDA S. REYMUNDO, BAI TINANGHAGA HELINITA T.
PANGAN, DATU MAKAPUKAW ADOLINO L. SAWAY, DATU MAUDAYAW-
CRISPEN SAWAY, VICKY MAKAY, LOURDES D. AMOS, GILBERT P. HOGGANG,
TERESA GASPAR, MANUEL S. ONALAN, MIA GRACE L. GIRON, ROSEMARIE G.
PE, BENITO CARINO, JOSEPH JUDE CARANTES, LYNETTE CARANTES-VIVAL,
LANGLEY SEGUNDO, SATUR S. BUGNAY, CARLING DOMULOT, ANDRES
MENDIOGRIN, LEOPOLDO ABUGAN, VIRGILIO CAYETANO, CONCHITA G.
DESCAGA, LEVY ESTEVES, ODETTE G. ESTEVEZ, RODOLFO C. AGUILAR,
MAURO VALONES, PEPE H. ATONG, OFELIA T. DAVI, PERFECTO B.
GUINOSAO, WALTER N. TIMOL, MANUEL T. SELEN, OSCAR DALUNHAY, RICO
O. SULATAN, RAFFY MALINDA, ALFREDO ABILLANOS, JESSIE ANDILAB,
MIRLANDO H. MANGKULINTAS, SAMIE SATURNO, ROMEO A. LINDAHAY,
ROEL S. MANSANG-CAGAN, PAQUITO S. LIESES, FILIPE G. SAWAY, HERMINIA
S. SAWAY, JULIUS S. SAWAY, LEONARDA SAWAY, JIMMY UGYUB, SALVADOR
TIONGSON, VENANCIO APANG, MADION MALID, SUKIM MALID, NENENG
MALID, MANGKATADONG AUGUSTO DIANO, JOSEPHINE M. ALBESO,
MORENO MALID, MARIO MANGCAL, FELAY DIAMILING, SALOME P. SARZA,
FELIPE P. BAGON, SAMMY SALNUNGAN, ANTONIO D. EMBA, NORMA
MAPANSAGONOS, ROMEO SALIGA, SR., JERSON P. GERADA, RENATO T.
BAGON, JR., SARING MASALONG, SOLEDAD M. GERARDA, ELIZABETH L.
MENDI, MORANTE S. TIWAN, DANILO M. MALUDAO, MINORS MARICEL
MALID, represented by her father CORNELIO MALID, MARCELINO M. LADRA,
represented by her father MONICO D. LADRA, JENNYLYN MALID,
represented by her father TONY MALID, ARIEL M. EVANGELISTA,
represented by her mother LINAY BALBUENA, EDWARD M. EMUY, SR.,
SUSAN BOLANIO, OND, PULA BATO BLAAN TRIBAL FARMERS ASSOCIATION,
INTER-PEOPLES EXCHANGE, INC. and GREEN FORUM-WESTERN
VISAYAS, intervenors.
COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, intervenor.
IKALAHAN INDIGENOUS PEOPLE and HARIBON FOUNDATION FOR THE
CONSERVATION OF NATURAL RESOURCES, INC., intervenor.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa brought this suit for prohibition and
mandamus as citizens and taxpayers, assailing the constitutionality of certain
provisions of Republic Act No. 8371 (R.A. 8371), otherwise known as the
Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA), and its Implementing Rules and
Regulations (Implementing Rules).
In its resolution of September 29, 1998, the Court required respondents to
comment.[1] In compliance, respondents Chairperson and Commissioners of
the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP), the government
agency created under the IPRA to implement its provisions, filed on October
13, 1998 their Comment to the Petition, in which they defend the
constitutionality of the IPRA and pray that the petition be dismissed for lack of
merit.
On October 19, 1998, respondents Secretary of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) and Secretary of the Department
of Budget and Management (DBM) filed through the Solicitor General a
consolidated Comment. The Solicitor General is of the view that the IPRA is
partly unconstitutional on the ground that it grants ownership over natural
resources to indigenous peoples and prays that the petition be granted in part.
On November 10, 1998, a group of intervenors, composed of Sen. Juan Flavier,
one of the authors of the IPRA, Mr. Ponciano Bennagen, a member of the 1986
Constitutional Commission, and the leaders and members of 112 groups of
indigenous peoples (Flavier, et. al), filed their Motion for Leave to
Intervene. They join the NCIP in defending the constitutionality of IPRA and
praying for the dismissal of the petition.
On March 22, 1999, the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) likewise filed a
Motion to Intervene and/or to Appear as Amicus Curiae. The CHR asserts that
IPRA is an expression of the principle of parens patriae and that the State has
the responsibility to protect and guarantee the rights of those who are at a
serious disadvantage like indigenous peoples. For this reason it prays that the
petition be dismissed.
On March 23, 1999, another group, composed of the Ikalahan Indigenous
People and the Haribon Foundation for the Conservation of Natural Resources,
Inc. (Haribon, et al.), filed a motion to Intervene with attached Comment-in-
Intervention. They agree with the NCIP and Flavier, et al. that IPRA is
consistent with the Constitution and pray that the petition for prohibition and
mandamus be dismissed.
The motions for intervention of the aforesaid groups and organizations were
granted.
Oral arguments were heard on April 13, 1999. Thereafter, the parties and
intervenors filed their respective memoranda in which they reiterate the
arguments adduced in their earlier pleadings and during the hearing.
Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the following provisions of the IPRA
and its Implementing Rules on the ground that they amount to an unlawful
deprivation of the States ownership over lands of the public domain as well as
minerals and other natural resources therein, in violation of the regalian
doctrine embodied in Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution:
(1) Section 3(a) which defines the extent and coverage of ancestral domains, (4) The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the Secretary of Budget and
and Section 3(b) which, in turn, defines ancestral lands; Management to cease and desist from disbursing public funds for the
(2) Section 5, in relation to section 3(a), which provides that ancestral domains implementation of the assailed provisions of R.A. 8371; and
including inalienable public lands, bodies of water, mineral and other (5) The issuance of a writ of mandamus commanding the Secretary of
resources found within ancestral domains are private but community property Environment and Natural Resources to comply with his duty of carrying out
of the indigenous peoples; the States constitutional mandate to control and supervise the exploration,
(3) Section 6 in relation to section 3(a) and 3(b) which defines the composition development, utilization and conservation of Philippine natural resources.[7]
of ancestral domains and ancestral lands; After due deliberation on the petition, the members of the Court voted as
(4) Section 7 which recognizes and enumerates the rights of the indigenous follows:
peoples over the ancestral domains; Seven (7) voted to dismiss the petition. Justice Kapunan filed an opinion, which
(5) Section 8 which recognizes and enumerates the rights of the indigenous the Chief Justice and Justices Bellosillo, Quisumbing, and Santiago join,
peoples over the ancestral lands; sustaining the validity of the challenged provisions of R.A. 8371. Justice Puno
(6) Section 57 which provides for priority rights of the indigenous peoples in also filed a separate opinion sustaining all challenged provisions of the law
the harvesting, extraction, development or exploration of minerals and other with the exception of Section 1, Part II, Rule III of NCIP Administrative Order
natural resources within the areas claimed to be their ancestral domains, and No. 1, series of 1998, the Rules and Regulations Implementing the IPRA, and
the right to enter into agreements with nonindigenous peoples for the Section 57 of the IPRA which he contends should be interpreted as dealing
development and utilization of natural resources therein for a period not with the large-scale exploitation of natural resources and should be read in
exceeding 25 years, renewable for not more than 25 years; and conjunction with Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. On the other
(7) Section 58 which gives the indigenous peoples the responsibility to hand, Justice Mendoza voted to dismiss the petition solely on the ground that
maintain, develop, protect and conserve the ancestral domains and portions it does not raise a justiciable controversy and petitioners do not have standing
thereof which are found to be necessary for critical watersheds, mangroves, to question the constitutionality of R.A. 8371.
wildlife sanctuaries, wilderness, protected areas, forest cover or Seven (7) other members of the Court voted to grant the petition. Justice
reforestation.[2] Panganiban filed a separate opinion expressing the view that Sections 3 (a)(b),
Petitioners also content that, by providing for an all-encompassing definition 5, 6, 7 (a)(b), 8, and related provisions of R.A. 8371 are unconstitutional. He
of ancestral domains and ancestral lands which might even include private reserves judgment on the constitutionality of Sections 58, 59, 65, and 66 of
lands found within said areas, Sections 3(a) and 3(b) violate the rights of the law, which he believes must await the filing of specific cases by those
private landowners.[3] whose rights may have been violated by the IPRA. Justice Vitug also filed a
In addition, petitioners question the provisions of the IPRA defining the separate opinion expressing the view that Sections 3(a), 7, and 57 of R.A. 8371
powers and jurisdiction of the NCIP and making customary law applicable to are unconstitutional.Justices Melo, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, and De
the settlement of disputes involving ancestral domains and ancestral lands on Leon join in the separate opinions of Justices Panganiban and Vitug.
the ground that these provisions violate the due process clause of the As the votes were equally divided (7 to 7) and the necessary majority was not
Constitution.[4] obtained, the case was redeliberated upon. However, after redeliberation, the
These provisions are: voting remained the same.Accordingly, pursuant to Rule 56, Section 7 of the
(1) sections 51 to 53 and 59 which detail the process of delineation and Rules of Civil Procedure, the petition is DISMISSED.
recognition of ancestral domains and which vest on the NCIP the sole authority Attached hereto and made integral parts thereof are the separate opinions of
to delineate ancestral domains and ancestral lands; Justices Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, and Panganiban.
(2) Section 52[i] which provides that upon certification by the NCIP that a SO ORDERED.
particular area is an ancestral domain and upon notification to the following Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Quisumbing, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes,
officials, namely, the Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources, Ynares-Santiago, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
Secretary of Interior and Local Governments, Secretary of Justice and Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza and Panganiban JJ., see separate opinion
Commissioner of the National Development Corporation, the jurisdiction of
said officials over said area terminates;
(3) Section 63 which provides the customary law, traditions and practices of
indigenous peoples shall be applied first with respect to property rights, claims
of ownership, hereditary succession and settlement of land disputes, and that
any doubt or ambiguity in the interpretation thereof shall be resolved in favor
of the indigenous peoples;
(4) Section 65 which states that customary laws and practices shall be used to
resolve disputes involving indigenous peoples; and
(5) Section 66 which vests on the NCIP the jurisdiction over all claims and
disputes involving rights of the indigenous peoples.[5]
Finally, petitioners assail the validity of Rule VII, Part II, Section 1 of the NCIP
Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1998, which provides that the
administrative relationship of the NCIP to the Office of the President is
characterized as a lateral but autonomous relationship for purposes of policy
and program coordination. They contend that said Rule infringes upon the
Presidents power of control over executive departments under Section 17,
Article VII of the Constitution.[6]
Petitioners pray for the following:
(1) A declaration that Sections 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 52[I], 57, 58, 59, 63, 65 and 66 and
other related provisions of R.A. 8371 are unconstitutional and invalid;
(2) The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the Chairperson and
Commissioners of the NCIP to cease and desist from implementing the assailed
provisions of R.A. 8371 and its Implementing Rules;
(3) The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the Secretary of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources to cease and desist from
implementing Department of Environment and Natural Resources Circular No.
2, series of 1998;