RULE 99 G.R. No. 148311.
March 31, 2005 Adoption is defined as the process of making a child, whether
IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF STEPHANIE
NATHY ASTORGA GARCIA vs. HONORATO B. CATINDIG
FACTS: Honorato B. Catindig, herein petitioner, filed a
petition to adopt his minor illegitimate child Stephanie
Nathy Astorga Garcia. He alleged therein, among others,
that Stephanie was born on June 26, 1994; that her mother
is Gemma Astorga Garcia; that Stephanie has been using
her mothers middle name and surname; and that he is now a
widower and qualified to be her adopting parent. He prayed
that Stephanies middle name Astorga be changed to
"Garcia," her mothers surname, and that her surname
"Garcia" be changed to "Catindig," his surname.
TC - petitioner possesses all the qualifications and none of the
disqualification provided for by law as an adoptive parent, and
that as such he is qualified to maintain, care for and educate
the child to be adopted; that the grant of this petition would
redound to the best interest and welfare of the minor
Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia. The Court further holds that
the petitioners care and custody of the child since her birth
up to the present constitute more than enough compliance
with the requirement of Article 35 of Presidential Decree No.
603.
Petitioner filed a motion for clarification and/or
reconsideration praying that Stephanie should be allowed to
use the surname of her natural mother (GARCIA) as her
middle name.
TC - denied petitioners MR holding that there is no law or
jurisprudence allowing an adopted child to use the surname of
his biological mother as his middle name.
ISSUE: May an illegitimate child, upon adoption by her
natural father, use the surname of her natural mother as her
middle name? YES
HELD: The Republic, through the OSG, agrees with petitioner
that Stephanie should be permitted to use, as her middle
name, the surname of her natural mother for the following
reasons:
First, it is necessary to preserve and maintain Stephanies
filiation with her natural mother because under Article 189 of
the Family Code, she remains to be an intestate heir of the
latter. Thus, to prevent any confusion and needless hardship
in the future, her relationship or proof of that relationship
with her natural mother should be maintained.
Second, there is no law expressly prohibiting Stephanie to use
the surname of her natural mother as her middle name. What
the law does not prohibit, it allows.
Last, it is customary for every Filipino to have a middle name,
which is ordinarily the surname of the mother. This custom
has been recognized by the Civil Code and Family Code. In
fact, the Family Law Committees agreed that"the initial or
surname of the mother should immediately precede the
surname of the father so that the second name, if any, will be
before the surname of the mother."
The Underlying Intent of
Adoption Is In Favor of the
Adopted Child
related or not to the adopter, possess in general, the rights
accorded to a legitimate child. It is a juridical act, a
proceeding in rem which creates between two persons a
relationship similar to that which results from legitimate
paternity and filiation. The modern trend is to consider
adoption not merely as an act to establish a relationship of
paternity and filiation, but also as an act which endows the
child with a legitimate status. This was, indeed, confirmed in
1989, when the Philippines, as a State Party to the
Convention of the Rights of the Child initiated by the
United Nations, accepted the principle that adoption is
impressed with social and moral responsibility, and
that its underlying intent is geared to favor the adopted
child. Republic Act No. 8552, otherwise known as the
"Domestic Adoption Act of 1998," secures these rights and
privileges for the adopted.
One of the effects of adoption is that the adopted is deemed
to be a legitimate child of the adopter for all intents and
purposes pursuant to Article 189 of the Family Code and
Section 17 Article V of RA 8552.
Being a legitimate child by virtue of her adoption, it
follows that Stephanie is entitled to all the rights
provided by law to a legitimate child without
discrimination of any kind, including the right to bear
the surname of her father and her mother, as discussed
above. This is consistent with the intention of the members
of the Civil Code and Family Law Committees as earlier
discussed. In fact, it is a Filipino custom that the initial or
surname of the mother should immediately precede the
surname of the father.
Additionally, as aptly stated by both parties, Stephanies
continued use of her mothers surname (Garcia) as her
middle name will maintain her maternal lineage. It is to be
noted that Article 189(3) of the Family Code and Section 18 24,
Article V of RA 8552 (law on adoption) provide that the
adoptee remains an intestate heir of his/her biological parent.
Hence, Stephanie can well assert or claim her hereditary
rights from her natural mother in the future.
Moreover, records show that Stephanie and her mother are
living together in the house built by petitioner for them at 390
Tumana, San Jose, Baliuag, Bulacan. Petitioner provides for
all their needs. Stephanie is closely attached to both her
mother and father. She calls them "Mama" and "Papa".
Indeed, they are one normal happy family. Hence, to allow
Stephanie to use her mothers surname as her middle name
will not only sustain her continued loving relationship with her
mother but will also eliminate the stigma of her illegitimacy.
Liberal Construction of
Adoption Statutes In Favor Of
Adoption
It is a settled rule that adoption statutes, being humane and
salutary, should be liberally construed to carry out the
beneficent purposes of adoption.25 The interests and welfare
of the adopted child are of primary and paramount
consideration,26 hence, every reasonable intendment should
be sustained to promote and fulfill these noble and
compassionate objectives of the law.
Hence, since there is no law prohibiting an illegitimate
child adopted by her natural father, like Stephanie, to use, as
middle name her mothers surname, we find no reason why
she should not be allowed to do so.
 G.R. No. 164948, June 27, 2006
LANDINGIN vs. REPUBLIC
FACTS: Diwata Ramos Landingin, a citizen of USA, of Filipino
parentage and a resident of Guam, USA, filed a petition for
the adoption of minors Elaine Dizon Ramos, Elma Dizon
Ramos and Eugene Dizon Ramos, the natural children of
Manuel Ramos, petitioners brother, and Amelia Ramos.
Petitioner alleged in her petition that when Manuel died, the
children were left to their paternal grandmother, Maria Taruc
Ramos; their biological mother, Amelia, went to Italy, re-
married there and now has two children by her second
marriage and no longer communicated with her children by
Manuel Ramos nor with her in-laws from the time she left up
to the institution of the adoption; the minors are being
financially supported by the petitioner and her children, and
relatives abroad; as Maria passed away on November 23,
2000, petitioner desires to adopt the children; the minors
have given their written consent to the adoption; she is
qualified to adopt as shown by the fact that she is a 57-year-
old widow, has children of her own who are already married,
gainfully employed and have their respective families; she
lives alone in her own home in Guam, USA, where she
acquired citizenship, and works as a restaurant server. She
came back to the Philippines to spend time with the minors;
her children gave their written consent to the adoption of the
minors. Petitioners brother, Mariano Ramos, who earns
substantial income, signified his willingness and commitment
to support the minors while in petitioners custody.
Court ordered the DSWD to conduct a case study as
mandated by Article 34 of Presidential Decree No. 603, as
amended, and to submit a report thereon. The OSG entered
its appearance but deputized the City Prosecutor of Tarlac to
appear in its behalf. Since her petition was unopposed,
petitioner was allowed to present her evidence ex parte.
Court - ordered that minors Elaine Dizon Ramos, Elma Dizon
Ramos, Eugene Dizon Ramos be freed from all legal
obligations obedience and maintenance from their natural
parents and that they be declared for all legal intents and
purposes the children of Diwata Ramos Landingin. Trial
custody is dispensed with considering that parent-children
relationship has long been established between the children
and the adoptive parents. Let the surnames of the children be
changed from Dizon-Ramos to Ramos-Landingin.
OSG appealed the decision to the CA reversed RTC
ISSUES: (a) whether the petitioner is entitled to adopt the
minors without the written consent of their biological mother,
Amelia Ramos; NO
(b) whether or not the affidavit of consent
purportedly executed by the petitioner-adopters children
sufficiently complies with the law; NO
(c) whether or not petitioner is financially capable of
supporting the adoptees. NO
HELD: (a.)The general requirement of consent and notice to
the natural parents is intended to protect the natural parental
relationship from unwarranted interference by interlopers,
and to insure the opportunity to safeguard the best interests
of the child in the manner of the proposed adoption.
Clearly, the written consent of the biological parents is
indispensable for the validity of a decree of adoption. Indeed,
the natural right of a parent to his child requires that his
consent must be obtained before his parental rights and
duties may be terminated and re-established in adoptive
parents. In this case, petitioner failed to submit the written
consent of Amelia Ramos to the adoption.
Ordinarily, abandonment by a parent to justify the adoption
of his child without his consent, is a conduct which evinces a
settled purpose to forego all parental duties. The term means
neglect and refusal to perform the filial and legal obligations
of love and support. If a parent withholds presence, love,
care, the opportunity to display filial affection, and neglects to
lend support and maintenance, the parent, in effect,
abandons the child.
Merely permitting the child to remain for a time undisturbed
in the care of others is not such an abandonment. To
dispense with the requirement of consent, the abandonment
must be shown to have existed at the time of adoption.
(b.) Section 34, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court provides that
the Court shall consider no evidence which has not been
formally offered. The purpose for which the evidence is
offered must be specified. The offer of evidence is necessary
because it is the duty of the Court to rest its findings of fact
and its judgment only and strictly upon the evidence offered
by the parties. Unless and until admitted by the court in
evidence for the purpose or purposes for which such
document is offered, the same is merely a scrap of paper
barren of probative weight. Mere identification of documents
and the markings thereof as exhibits do not confer any
evidentiary weight on documents unless formally offered.
Petitioner failed to offer in evidence Pagbilaos Report and of
the Joint Affidavit of Consent purportedly executed by her
children; the authenticity of which she, likewise, failed to
prove. The joint written consent of petitioners children was
notarized on January 16, 2002 in Guam, USA; for it to be
treated by the Rules of Court in the same way as a document
notarized in this country it needs to comply with Section 2 of
Act No. 2103.
As the alleged written consent of petitioners legitimate
children did not comply with the afore-cited law, the same
can at best be treated by the Rules as a private document
whose authenticity must be proved either by anyone who saw
the document executed or written; or by evidence of the
genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the makers.
Since, in the instant case, no further proof was introduced by
petitioner to authenticate the written consent of her
legitimate children, the same is inadmissible in evidence.
(c.) The law states that it is the adopter who should be in a
position to provide support in keeping with the means of the
family.
Since the primary consideration in adoption is the best
interest of the child, it follows that the financial capacity of
prospective parents should also be carefully evaluated and
considered. Certainly, the adopter should be in a position to
support the would-be adopted child or children, in keeping
with the means of the family.
It is indeed doubtful whether petitioner will be able to
sufficiently handle the financial aspect of rearing the three
children in the US. She only has a part-time job, and she is
rather of age. While petitioner claims that she has the
financial support and backing of her children and siblings, the
OSG is correct in stating that the ability to support the
adoptees is personal to the adopter, as adoption only creates
a legal relation between the former and the latter. Moreover,
the records do not prove nor support petitioners allegation
that her siblings and her children are financially able and that
they are willing to support the minors herein.