ARTICLE 854

Reyes v. Barretto-Datu

19 SCRA 85 | Ventura

FACTS:

Bibiano Barretto was married to Maria Gerardo. When Bibiano Barretto died he left his share in a will to
Salud Barretto and Lucia Milagros Barretto and a small portion as legacies to his two sisters Rosa Barretto and
Felisa Barretto and his nephew and nieces. The usufruct of a fishpond was reserved for his widow, Maria Gerardo.
Maria Gerardo, as administratrix prepared a project of partition. It was approved and the estate was distributed
and the shares delivered.

Later on, Maria Gerardo died. Upon her death, it was discovered that she executed two wills, in the first,
she instituted Salud and Milagros, both surnamed Barretto, as her heirs; and, in the second, she revoked the same
and left all her properties in favor of Milagros Barretto alone. The later will was allowed and the first rejected. In
rejecting the first will presented by Tirso Reyes, as guardian of the children of Salud Barretto, the LC held that
Salud was not the daughter of the decedent Maria Gerardo by her husband Bibiano Barretto. This ruling was
appealed to the SC, which affirmed the same.

Having thus lost this fight for a share in the estate of Maria Gerardo, as a legitimate heir of Maria Gerardo,
plaintiff now falls back upon the remnant of the estate of the deceased Bibiano Barretto, which was given in
usufruct to his widow Maria Gerardo. Hence, this action for the recovery of one-half portion, thereof.

This action afforded the defendant an opportunity to set up her right of ownership, not only of the fishpond under
litigation, but of all the other properties willed and delivered to Salud Barretto, for being a spurious heir, and not
entitled to any share in the estate of Bibiano Barretto, thereby directly attacking the validity, not only of the
project of partition, but of the decision of the court based thereon as well.

ISSUE:

W/N the partition from which Salud acquired the fishpond is void ab initio and Salud did not acquire valid title to it.

HELD:

NO. Salud Barretto admittedly had been instituted heir in the late Bibiano Barretto's last will and
testament together with defendant Milagros; hence, the partition had between them could not be one such had
with a party who was believed to be an heir without really being one, and was not null and void. The legal precept
(Article 1081) does not speak of children, or descendants, but of heirs (without distinction between forced,
voluntary or intestate ones), and the fact that Salud happened not to be a daughter of the testator does not
preclude her being one of the heirs expressly named in his testament; for Bibiano Barretto was at liberty to assign
the free portion of his estate to whomsoever he chose. While the share () assigned to Salud impinged on the
legitime of Milagros, Salud did not for that reason cease to be a testamentary heir of Bibiano Barretto.
 Nor does the fact that Milagros was allotted in her father's will a share smaller than her legitime
invalidate the institution of Salud as heir, since there was here no preterition, or total ommission of a forced heir.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-10701 January 16, 1959

MARIA CANO, applicant-appellee,

vs.
DIRECTOR OF LANDS, EUSTAQUIA GUERRERO, ET AL., oppositors-appellants.
JOSE FERNANDEZ, ET AL., oppositors-appellants.

Ramon C. Fernandez for appellants.

Jose B. Dealca for appellee.

REYES, J.B.L., J.:

In an amended decision dated October 9, 1951, issued in Land Registration Case No. 12, G.L.R.O.
Rec. No. 2835, the Court of First Instance of Sorsogon decreed the registration of Lots Nos. 1798
and 1799 of the Juban (Sorsogon) Cadastre, under the following terms and conditions:

In view of the foregoing, and it appearing that the notices have been duly published and
posted as required by law, and that the title of the applicant to the above-mentioned two
parcels of land is registrable in law, it is hereby adjudged and decreed, and with reaffirmation
 of the order of general default, that the two parcels of land described in plan SWO-24152,
known as Lots Nos. 1798 and 1799 of the Cadastral Survey of Juban, with their
improvements, be registered in the name of Maria Cano, Filipina, 71 years of age, widow
and resident of Juban, province of Sorsogon, with the understanding that Lot No. 1799 shall
be subject to the right of reservation in favor of Eustaquia Guerrero pursuant to Article 891 of
the Civil code. After this decision shall have become final for lack of appeal therefrom within
the 30-day period from its promulgation, let the corresponding decree issue.

So ordered. (Rec. App. pp. 18-19)

The decision having become final, the decree and the Certificate of Title (No. 0-20) were issued in
the name of Maria Cano, subject to reserva troncal in favor of Eustaquia Guerrero. In October 1955,
counsel for the reserve (reservatorio) Guerrero filed a motion with the Cadastral Court, alleging the
death of the original registered owner and reservista, Maria Cano, on September 8, 1955, and
praying that the original Certificate of Title be ordered cancelled and a new one issued in favor of
movant Eustaquia Guerrero; and that the Sheriff be ordered to place her in possession of the
property. The motion was opposed by Jose and Teotimo Fernandez, sons of thereservista Maria
Cano, who contended that the application and operation of the reserva troncal should be ventilated
in an ordinary contentious proceeding, and that the Registration Court did not have jurisdiction to
grant the motion.

In view of the recorded reserva in favor of the appellee, as expressly noted in the final decree of
registration, the lower court granted the petition for the issuance of a new certificate, for the reason
that the death of the reservistavested the ownership of the property in the petitioner as the
sole reservatorio troncal.

The oppositors, heirs of the reservista Maria Cano, duly appealed from the order, insisting that the
ownership of the reservatorio can not be decreed in a mere proceeding under sec. 112 of Act 496,
but requires a judicial administration proceedings, wherein the rights of appellee, as
the reservatorio entitled to the reservable property, are to be declared. In this connection, appellants
argue that the reversion in favor of the reservatorio requires the declaration of the existence of the
following facts:

(1) The property was received by a descendant by gratuitous title from an ascendant or from
a brother or sister;

(2) Said descendant dies without issue;

(3) The property is inherited by another ascendant by operation of law; and

(4) The existence of relatives within the third degree belonging the line from which said
property came. (Appellants' Brief, p. 8)

We find the appeal untenable. The requisites enumerated by appellants have already been declared
to exist by the decree of registration wherein the rights of the appellee as reservatario troncal were
expressly recognized:

From the above-quoted agreed stipulation of facts, it is evident that Lot No. 1799 was
acquired by the Appellant Maria Cano by inheritance from her deceased daughter, Lourdes
Guerrero who, in turn, inherited the same from her father Evaristo Guerrero and, hence, falls
squarely under the provisions of Article 891 of the Civil Code; and that each and everyone of
 the private oppositors are within the third degree of consaguinity of the decedent Evaristo
Guerrero, and who belonging to the same line from which the property came.

It appears however, from the agreed stipulation of facts that with the exception of Eustaquia
Guerrero, who is the only living daughter of the decedent Evaristo Guerrero, by his former
marriage, all the other oppositors are grandchildren of the said Evaristo Guerrero by his
former marriages. Eustaquia Guerrero, being the nearest of kin, excludes all the other private
oppositors, whose decree of relationship to the decedent is remoter (Article 962, Civil Code;
Director of Lands vs. Aguas, 62 Phil., 279). (Rec. App. pp. 16-17)

This decree having become final, all persons (appellees included) are bared thereby from contesting
the existence of the constituent elements of the reserva. The only requisites for the passing of the
title from thereservista to the appellee are: (1) the death of the reservista; and (2) the fact that
the reservatario has survived the reservista. Both facts are admitted, and their existence is nowhere
questioned.

The contention that an intestacy proceeding is still necessary rests upon the assumption that
the reservatario will succeed in, or inherit, the reservable property from the reservista. This is not
true. The reservatario is not thereservista's successor mortis causa nor is the reservable property
part of the reservista's estate; the reservatarioreceives the property as a conditional heir of the
descendant ( prepositus), said property merely reverting to the line of origin from which it had
temporarily and accidentally strayed during the reservista's lifetime. The authorities are all agreed
that there being reservatarios that survive the reservista, the latter must be deemed to have enjoined
no more than a life interest in the reservable property.

It is a consequence of these principles that upon the death of the reservista, the reservatario nearest
to theprepositus (the appellee in this case) becomes, automatically and by operation of law, the
owner of the reservable property. As already stated, that property is no part of the estate of
the reservista, and does not even answer for the debts of the latter. Hence, its acquisition by
the reservatario may be entered in the property records without necessity of estate proceedings,
since the basic requisites therefor appear of record. It is equally well settled that the reservable
property can not be transmitted by a reservista to her or his own successors mortis causa,(like
appellants herein) so long as a reservatario within the third degree from the prepositus and
belonging to the line whence the property came, is in existence when the reservista dies.

Of course, where the registration decree merely specifies the reservable character of the property,
without determining the identity of the reservatario (as in the case of Director of Lands vs. Aguas, 63
Phil., 279) or where several reservatarios dispute the property among themselves, further
proceedings would be unavoidable. But this is not the case. The rights of the reservataria Eustaquia
Guerrero have been expressly recognized, and it is nowhere claimed that there are
other reservatarios of equal or nearer degree. It is thus apparent that the heirs of the reservista are
merely endeavoring to prolong their enjoyment of the reservable property to the detriment of the
party lawfully entitled thereto.

We find no error in the order appealed from and therefore, the same is affirmed with costs against
appellants in both instances. So ordered.

Paras, C. J., Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion and Endencia
JJ., concur.

Mendoza v Delos Santos (Succession)

Mendoza v Delos Santos
GR No 176422, March 20, 2013

MARIA MENDOZA, in her own capacity and as Attorney-in-fact of DEOGRACIAS, MARCELA, DIONISIA, ADORA
CION, all surnamed MENDOZA, REMEDIOS MONTILLA, FELY BAUTISTA, JULIANA GUILALAS and ELVIRA
MENDOZA, Petitioners,
vs.
JULIA POLl CARPIO DELOS SANTOS, substituted by her heirs, CARMEN P. DELOS SANTOS, ROSA BUENA
VENTURA, ZENAIDA P. DELOS SANTOS VDA. DE MATEO, LEONILA P. DELOS SANTOS, ELVIRA P. DELOS
SANTOS VDA. DE JOSE, TERESITA P. DELOS SANTOS-CABUHAT, MERCEDITA P. DELOS SANTOS, LYDIA P.
DELOS SANTOS VDA. DE HILARIO, PERFECTO P. DELOS SANTOS, JR., and CECILIA M. MENDOZA,
Respondents.

FACTS:
The properties subject in the instant case are three parcels of land located in Sta. Maria, Bulacan are presently
in the name of respondent Julia Delos Santos (respondent). Lot No. 1646-B, on the other hand, is also in the
name of respondent but co- owned by Victoria Pantaleon, who bought one-half of the property from
petitioner Maria Mendoza and her siblings.
Petitioners are grandchildren of Placido Mendoza (Placido) and Dominga Mendoza (Dominga). Petitioners
alleged that the properties were part of Placido and Domingas properties that were subject of an oral
partition and subsequently adjudicated to Exequiel. After Exequiels death, it passed on to his spouse Leonor
and only daughter, Gregoria. After Leonors death, her share went to Gregoria. In 1992, Gregoria died
intestate and without issue. They claimed that after Gregorias death, respondent, who is Leonors sister,
adjudicated unto herself all these properties as the sole surviving heir of Leonor and Gregoria. Hence,
petitioners claim that the properties should have been reserved by respondent in their behalf and must now
revert back to them, applying Article 891 of the Civil Code on reserva troncal.

DECISION OF LOWER COURTS:

(1) RTC: granted their action for Recovery of Possession by Reserva Troncal, Cancellation of TCT and
Reconveyance.
(2) CA: reversed and set aside the RTC decision and dismissed the complaint filed by petitioners. CA also
denied their motion for reconsideration.

ISSUES:
A. THE HONORABLE [CA] GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE SUBJECT PROPERTIES ARE NOT
RESERVABLE PROPERTIES, COMING AS THEY DO FROM THE FAMILY LINE OF THE PETITIONERS
MENDOZAS.
B. THE HONORABLE [CA] GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE PETITIONERS MENDOZAS DO NOT
HAVE A RIGHT TO THE SUBJECT PROPERTIES BY VIRTUE OF THE LAW ON RESERVA TRONCAL.

APPLICABLE LAW:

The principle of reserva troncal is provided in Article 891 of the Civil Code:
Art. 891. The ascendant who inherits from his descendant any property which the latter may have acquired
by gratuitous title from another ascendant, or a brother or sister, is obliged to reserve such property as he
may have acquired by operation of law for the benefit of relatives who are within the third degree and belong
to the line from which said property came. (Emphasis ours)

RULING:
No, CA is correct.
I. Reserva troncal is not applicable.
Julia, who now holds the properties in dispute, is not the other ascendant within the purview of Article 891 of
the Civil Code
Reserva troncal is a special rule designed primarily to assure the return of a reservable property to the third
degree relatives belonging to the line from which the property originally came, and avoid its being dissipated
into and by the relatives of the inheriting ascendant.

It should be pointed out that the ownership of the properties should be reckoned only from Exequiels as he is
the ascendant from where the first transmission occurred, or from whom Gregoria inherited the properties in
dispute. The law does not go farther than such ascendant/brother/sister in determining the lineal character
of the property. It was also immaterial for the CA to determine whether Exequiel predeceased Placido and
Dominga or whether Gregoria predeceased Exequiel. What is pertinent is that Exequiel owned the properties
and he is the ascendant from whom the properties in dispute originally came. Gregoria, on the other hand, is
the descendant who received the properties from Exequiel by gratuitous title.
Article 891 simply requires that the property should have been acquired by the descendant or prepositus
from an ascendant by gratuitous or lucrative title. A transmission is gratuitous or by gratuitous title when the
recipient does not give anything in return.18 At risk of being repetitious, what was clearly established in this
case is that the properties in dispute were owned by Exequiel (ascendant). After his death, Gregoria
(descendant/prepositus) acquired the properties as inheritance.
Article 891 provides that the person obliged to reserve the property should be an ascendant (also known as
the reservor/reservista) of the descendant/prepositus. Julia, however, is not Gregorias ascendant; rather, she
is Gregorias collateral relative.

II. Petitioners cannot be considered reservees/reservatarios as they are not relatives within the third degree
of Gregoria from whom the properties came. The person from whom the degree should be reckoned is the
descendant/prepositusthe one at the end of the line from which the property came and upon whom the
property last revolved by descent. It is Gregoria in this case. Petitioners are Gregorias fourth degree relatives,
being her first cousins. First cousins of the prepositus are fourth degree relatives and are not reservees or
reservatarios.
They cannot even claim representation of their predecessors Antonio and Valentin as Article 891 grants a
personal right of reservation only to the relatives up to the third degree from whom the reservable properties
came. The only recognized exemption is in the case of nephews and nieces of the prepositus, who have the
right to represent their ascendants (fathers and mothers) who are the brothers/sisters of the prepositus and
relatives within the third degree.

OTHER NOTES:
1. three (3) lines of transmission in reserva troncal. The first transmission is by gratuitous title, whether by
inheritance or donation, from an ascendant/brother/sister to a descendant called the prepositus. The second
transmission is by operation of law from the prepositus to the other ascendant or reservor, also called the
reservista. The third and last transmission is from the reservista to the reservees or reservatarios who must
be relatives within the third degree from which the property came.
2. The persons involved in reserva troncal are:
(1) The ascendant or brother or sister from whom the property was received by the descendant by lucrative
or gratuitous title;
(2) The descendant or prepositus (propositus) who received the property;
(3) The reservor (reservista), the other ascendant who obtained the property from the prepositus by
operation of law; and (4) The reservee (reservatario) who is within the third degree from the prepositus and
who belongs to the (linea o tronco) from which the property came and for whom the property should be
reserved by the reservor.
3. Art. 964. A series of degrees forms a line, which may be either direct or collateral. A direct line is that
constituted by the series of degrees among ascendants and descendants.
A collateral line is that constituted by the series of degrees among persons who are not ascendants and
descendants, but who come from a common ancestor.
4. Art. 1003. If there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or a surviving spouse, the collateral
relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased in accordance with the following articles.
Art. 1009. Should there be neither brothers nor sisters, nor children of brothers or sisters, the other collateral
relatives shall succeed to the estate.
The latter shall succeed without distinction of lines or preference among them by reason of relationship by
the whole blood.
5. Reservista, has the duty to reserve and to annotate the reservable character of the property on the title. In
reserva troncal, the reservista who inherits from a prepositus, whether by the latters wish or by operation of
law, acquires the inheritance by virtue of a title perfectly transferring absolute ownership. All the attributes
of ownership belong to him exclusively.

I. Reserva/Reversion Adoptiva Art. 39, PD 603

Article 39. Effects of Adoption. - The adoption shall:

1. Give to the adopted person the same rights and duties as if he were a legitimate child of
the adopter: Provided, That an adopted child cannot acquire Philippine citizenship by virtue
of such adoption; lawphi1.net

2. Dissolve the authority vested in the natural parent or parents, except where the adopter is
the spouse of the surviving natural parent;

3. Entitle the adopted person to use the adopter's surname; and

4. Make the adopted person a legal heir of the adopter: Provided, That if the adopter is
survived by legitimate parents or ascendants and by an adopted person, the latter shall not
have more successional rights than an acknowledged natural child: Provided, further, That
any property received gratuitously by the adopted from the adopter shall revert to the adopter
should the former predecease the latter without legitimate issue unless the adopted has,
during his lifetime, alienated such property: Provided, finally, That in the last case, should the
adopted leave no property other than that received from the adopter, and he is survived by
illegitimate issue or a spouse, such illegitimate issue collectively or the spouse shall receive
one-fourth of such property; if the adopted is survived by illegitimate issue and a spouse,
then the former collectively shall receive one-fourth and the latter also one-fourth, the rest in
any case reverting to the adopter, observing in the case of the illegitimate issue the
proportion provided for in Article 895 of the Civil Code.

The adopter shall not be a legal heir of the adopted person, whose parents by nature shall inherit
from him, except that if the latter are both dead, the adopting parent or parents take the place of the
natural parents in the line of succession, whether testate or interstate.
Case Digest - Banawa vs. Mirano, No. L-24750, 97 SCRA 517,
May 16, 1980
Case Digest for Statutory Construction

FACTS: Defendants-appellants spouses Doroteo Banawa and Juliana Mendoza took care of Maria Mirano,
Julianas niece, since Maria is 9 years old and treated her the same way as they treated the co-appellant
Gliceria Abrenica, their legally adopted child. On May 5, 1921, the spouses bought a parcel of land situated
at Brgy. Iba, Taal, Batangas from Placido Punzalan and registered the said parcel of land in the name of
Maria, because the said spouses wanted something for Maria after their death.

On July 31, 1949, after a lingering illness, Maria Mirano died. At the time of her death she left only as her
nearest relatives the herein plaintiffs-appellees, namely Primitiva, who is a surviving sister, and Gregoria,
Juana and Marciano, all surnamed Mirano, who are children of the deceaseds brother.

The Miranos filed a case in court against the Banawas with regards to the possession of the Iba
property as legal heirs of Maria. The court ruled in favor of the Miranos. The Banawas appealed to the Court
of Appeals stating that they are entitled to the land in question by virtue of Section 5, Rule 100 of the
Old Rules of Court, the pertinent portion of which reads:

In case of the death of the child, his parents and relatives by nature, and not by adoption, shall be
his legal heirs, except as to property received or inherited by the adopted child from either of his parents
by adoption, which shall become the property of the latter or their legitimate relatives who shall
participate in the order established by the Civil Code for intestate estates.

The defendant spouses died during the pendency of the case at the Court of Appeals and
were substituted by their legally adopted child Gliceria Abrenica and her husband Casiano Amponin.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the lower court. The Appellants filed at the Supreme Court a
petition for review by certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals regarding its ruling that Sec. 5, Rule
100 of the Old Rules of Court does not apply in the instant case because Maria Mirano was
not legally adopted.

ISSUE: Whether or not, Sec. 5, Rule 100 of the Old Rules of Court applicable to the instant case?

HELD: NO. It is very clear in the rule involved that specifically provides for the case of the judicially adopted
child and does not include extrajudicial adoption. It is an elementary rule in statutory construction that
when the language of the law is clear and unequivocal, the law must be taken to mean exactly what it says.

THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 148311. March 31, 2005]

IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF STEPHANIE NATHY

ASTORGA GARCIA
HONORATO B. CATINDIG, petitioner.
 DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

May an illegitimate child, upon adoption by her natural father, use the surname of
her natural mother as her middle name? This is the issue raised in the instant case.
The facts are undisputed.
On August 31, 2000, Honorato B. Catindig, herein petitioner, filed a petition[1] to
adopt his minor illegitimate child Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia. He alleged therein,
among others, that Stephanie was born on June 26, 1994;[2] that her mother is Gemma
Astorga Garcia; that Stephanie has been using her mothers middle name and
surname; and that he is now a widower and qualified to be her adopting parent. He
prayed that Stephanies middle name Astorga be changed to Garcia, her mothers
surname, and that her surname Garcia be changed to Catindig, his surname.
On March 23, 2001,[3] the trial court rendered the assailed Decision granting the
adoption, thus:

After a careful consideration of the evidence presented by the petitioner, and

in the absence of any opposition to the petition, this Court finds that the
petitioner possesses all the qualifications and none of the disqualification
provided for by law as an adoptive parent, and that as such he is qualified to
maintain, care for and educate the child to be adopted; that the grant of this
petition would redound to the best interest and welfare of the minor
Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia. The Court further holds that the petitioners
care and custody of the child since her birth up to the present constitute more
than enough compliance with the requirement of Article 35 of Presidential
Decree No. 603.

WHEREFORE, finding the petition to be meritorious, the same is GRANTED.

Henceforth, Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia is hereby freed from all
obligations of obedience and maintenance with respect to her natural mother,
and for civil purposes, shall henceforth be the petitioners legitimate child and
legal heir. Pursuant to Article 189 of the Family Code of the Philippines, the
minor shall be known as STEPHANIE NATHY CATINDIG.

Upon finality of this Decision, let the same be entered in the Local Civil
Registrar concerned pursuant to Rule 99 of the Rules of Court.

Let copy of this Decision be furnished the National Statistics Office for record
purposes.
SO ORDERED.[4]

On April 20, 2001, petitioner filed a motion for clarification and/or

reconsideration[5] praying that Stephanie should be allowed to use the surname of her
natural mother (GARCIA) as her middle name.
On May 28, 2001,[6] the trial court denied petitioners motion for reconsideration
holding that there is no law or jurisprudence allowing an adopted child to use the
surname of his biological mother as his middle name.
Hence, the present petition raising the issue of whether an illegitimate child may use
the surname of her mother as her middle name when she is subsequently adopted by
her natural father.
Petitioner submits that the trial court erred in depriving Stephanie of a middle name
as a consequence of adoption because: (1) there is no law prohibiting an adopted child
from having a middle name in case there is only one adopting parent; (2) it is customary
for every Filipino to have as middle name the surname of the mother; (3) the middle
name or initial is a part of the name of a person; (4) adoption is for the benefit and best
interest of the adopted child, hence, her right to bear a proper name should not be
violated; (5) permitting Stephanie to use the middle name Garcia (her mothers
surname) avoids the stigma of her illegitimacy; and; (6) her continued use of Garcia as
her middle name is not opposed by either the Catindig or Garcia families.
The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), agrees with
petitioner that Stephanie should be permitted to use, as her middle name, the surname
of her natural mother for the following reasons:
First, it is necessary to preserve and maintain Stephanies filiation with her natural
mother because under Article 189 of the Family Code, she remains to be an intestate
heir of the latter. Thus, to prevent any confusion and needless hardship in the future,
her relationship or proof of that relationship with her natural mother should be
maintained.
Second, there is no law expressly prohibiting Stephanie to use the surname of her
natural mother as her middle name. What the law does not prohibit, it allows.
Last, it is customary for every Filipino to have a middle name, which is ordinarily the
surname of the mother. This custom has been recognized by the Civil Code and Family
Code. In fact, the Family Law Committees agreed that the initial or surname of the
mother should immediately precede the surname of the father so that the second name,
if any, will be before the surname of the mother.[7]
We find merit in the petition.

Use Of Surname Is Fixed By Law

 For all practical and legal purposes, a man's name is the designation by which he is
known and called in the community in which he lives and is best known. It is defined as
the word or combination of words by which a person is distinguished from other
individuals and, also, as the label or appellation which he bears for the convenience of
the world at large addressing him, or in speaking of or dealing with him. [8] It is both of
personal as well as public interest that every person must have a name.
The name of an individual has two parts: (1) the given or proper name and (2)
the surname or family name. The given or proper name is that which is given to the
individual at birth or at baptism, to distinguish him from other individuals. The surname
or family name is that which identifies the family to which he belongs and is continued
from parent to child. The given name may be freely selected by the parents for the child,
but the surname to which the child is entitled is fixed by law.[9]
Thus, Articles 364 to 380 of the Civil Code provides the substantive rules which
regulate the use of surname[10] of an individual whatever may be his status in life, i.e.,
whether he may be legitimate or illegitimate, an adopted child, a married woman or a
previously married woman, or a widow, thus:

Art. 364. Legitimate and legitimated children shall principally use

the surname of the father.

Art. 365. An adopted child shall bear the surname of the adopter.

xxx

Art. 369. Children conceived before the decree annulling a voidable marriage
shall principally use the surname of the father.

Art. 370. A married woman may use:

(1) Her maiden first name and surname and add her husband's surname, or

(2) Her maiden first name and her husband's surname or

(3) Her husband's full name, but prefixing a word indicating that she is his
wife, such as Mrs.

Art. 371. In case of annulment of marriage, and the wife is the guilty party,
she shall resume her maiden name and surname. If she is the innocent spouse,
she may resume her maiden name and surname. However, she may choose to
continue employing her former husband's surname, unless:

(1) The court decrees otherwise, or

(2) She or the former husband is married again to another person.

Art. 372. When legal separation has been granted, the wife shall continue
using her name and surname employed before the legal separation.

Art. 373. A widow may use the deceased husband's surname as though he
were still living, in accordance with Article 370.

Art. 374. In case of identity of names and surnames, the younger person shall
be obliged to use such additional name or surname as will avoid confusion.

Art. 375. In case of identity of names and surnames between ascendants and
descendants, the word Junior can be used only by a son. Grandsons and other
direct male descendants shall either:

(1) Add a middle name or the mother's surname,

(2) Add the Roman numerals II, III, and so on.

xxx

Law Is Silent As To The Use Of

Middle Name
As correctly submitted by both parties, there is no law regulating the use of a middle
name. Even Article 176[11] of the Family Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 9255,
otherwise known as An Act Allowing Illegitimate Children To Use The Surname Of Their
Father, is silent as to what middle name a child may use.
The middle name or the mothers surname is only considered in Article 375(1),
quoted above, in case there is identity of names and surnames between ascendants
and descendants, in which case, the middle name or the mothers surname shall be
added.
Notably, the law is likewise silent as to what middle name an adoptee may
use. Article 365 of the Civil Code merely provides that an adopted child shall bear the
surname of the adopter. Also, Article 189 of the Family Code, enumerating the legal
effects of adoption, is likewise silent on the matter, thus:

"(1) For civil purposes, the adopted shall be deemed to be a legitimate child
of the adopters and both shall acquire the reciprocal rights and obligations
arising from the relationship of parent and child, including the right of the
adopted to use the surname of the adopters;
xxx

However, as correctly pointed out by the OSG, the members of the Civil Code and
Family Law Committees that drafted the Family Code recognized the Filipino custom
of adding the surname of the childs mother as his middle name. In the Minutes of
the Joint Meeting of the Civil Code and Family Law Committees, the members approved
the suggestion that the initial or surname of the mother should immediately
precede the surname of the father, thus

Justice Caguioa commented that there is a difference between the use by the
wife of the surname and that of the child because the fathers surname
indicates the family to which he belongs, for which reason he would insist
on the use of the fathers surname by the child but that, if he wants to, the
child may also use the surname of the mother.

Justice Puno posed the question: If the child chooses to use the surname of the
mother, how will his name be written? Justice Caguioa replied that it is up to
him but that his point is that it should be mandatory that the child uses the
surname of the father and permissive in the case of the surname of the
mother.

Prof. Baviera remarked that Justice Caguioas point is covered by the present
Article 364, which reads:

Legitimate and legitimated children shall principally use the surname of the
father.

Justice Puno pointed out that many names change through no choice of the
person himself precisely because of this misunderstanding. He then cited the
following example: Alfonso Ponce Enriles correct surname is Ponce since the
mothers surname is Enrile but everybody calls him Atty. Enrile. Justice Jose
Gutierrez Davids family name is Gutierrez and his mothers surname is David
but they all call him Justice David.

Justice Caguioa suggested that the proposed Article (12) be modified to the
effect that it shall be mandatory on the child to use the surname of the
father but he may use the surname of the mother by way of an initial or a
middle name. Prof. Balane stated that they take note of this for inclusion in
the Chapter on Use of Surnames since in the proposed Article (10) they are
just enumerating the rights of legitimate children so that the details can be
covered in the appropriate chapter.
 xxx

Justice Puno remarked that there is logic in the simplification suggested by

Justice Caguioa that the surname of the father should always be last because
there are so many traditions like the American tradition where they like to use
their second given name and the Latin tradition, which is also followed by the
Chinese wherein they even include the Clan name.

xxx

Justice Puno suggested that they agree in principle that in the Chapter on
the Use of Surnames, they should say that initial or surname of the mother
should immediately precede the surname of the father so that the second
name, if any, will be before the surname of the mother. Prof. Balane added
that this is really the Filipino way. The Committee approved the
suggestion.[12] (Emphasis supplied)

In the case of an adopted child, the law provides that the adopted shall bear the
surname of the adopters.[13] Again, it is silent whether he can use a middle name. What
it only expressly allows, as a matter of right and obligation, is for the adoptee to bear the
surname of the adopter, upon issuance of the decree of adoption.[14]
The Underlying Intent of
Adoption Is In Favor of the
Adopted Child
Adoption is defined as the process of making a child, whether related or not to the
adopter, possess in general, the rights accorded to a legitimate child. [15] It is a juridical
act, a proceeding in rem which creates between two persons a relationship similar to
that which results from legitimate paternity and filiation.[16] The modern trend is to
consider adoption not merely as an act to establish a relationship of paternity and
filiation, but also as an act which endows the child with a legitimate status.[17] This was,
indeed, confirmed in 1989, when thePhilippines, as a State Party to the Convention
of the Rights of the Child initiated by the United Nations, accepted the principle
that adoption is impressed with social and moral responsibility, and that its
underlying intent is geared to favor the adopted child.[18] Republic Act No. 8552,
otherwise known as the Domestic Adoption Act of 1998,[19]secures these rights and
privileges for the adopted.[20]
One of the effects of adoption is that the adopted is deemed to be a legitimate child
of the adopter for all intents and purposes pursuant to Article 189[21] of the Family Code
and Section 17[22] Article V of RA 8552.[23]
Being a legitimate child by virtue of her adoption, it follows that Stephanie is
entitled to all the rights provided by law to a legitimate child without
discrimination of any kind, including the right to bear the surname of her father
and her mother, as discussed above. This is consistent with the intention of the
members of the Civil Code and Family Law Committees as earlier discussed. In fact, it
is a Filipino custom that the initial or surname of the mother should immediately precede
the surname of the father.
Additionally, as aptly stated by both parties, Stephanies continued use of her
mothers surname (Garcia) as her middle name will maintain her maternal lineage. It is
to be noted that Article 189(3) of the Family Code and Section 18 [24], Article V of RA
8552 (law on adoption) provide that the adoptee remains an intestate heir of his/her
biological parent. Hence, Stephanie can well assert or claim her hereditary rights from
her natural mother in the future.
Moreover, records show that Stephanie and her mother are living together in the
house built by petitioner for them at 390 Tumana, San Jose, Baliuag, Bulacan.
Petitioner provides for all their needs. Stephanie is closely attached to both her mother
and father. She calls them Mama and Papa. Indeed, they are one normal happy family.
Hence, to allow Stephanie to use her mothers surname as her middle name will not only
sustain her continued loving relationship with her mother but will also eliminate the
stigma of her illegitimacy.
Liberal Construction of
Adoption Statutes In Favor Of
Adoption
It is a settled rule that adoption statutes, being humane and salutary, should be
liberally construed to carry out the beneficent purposes of adoption. [25] The interests and
welfare of the adopted child are of primary and paramount consideration, [26] hence,
every reasonable intendment should be sustained to promote and fulfill these noble and
compassionate objectives of the law.[27]
Lastly, Art. 10 of the New Civil Code provides that:

In case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed

that the lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail.

This provision, according to the Code Commission, is necessary so that it may tip
the scales in favor of right and justice when the law is doubtful or obscure. It will
strengthen the determination of the courts to avoid an injustice which may apparently be
authorized by some way of interpreting the law.[28]
Hence, since there is no law prohibiting an illegitimate child adopted by her natural
father, like Stephanie, to use, as middle name her mothers surname, we find no reason
why she should not be allowed to do so.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision is partly
MODIFIED in the sense that Stephanie should be allowed to use her mothers surname
GARCIA as her middle name.
Let the corresponding entry of her correct and complete name be entered in the
decree of adoption.
 SO ORDERED.
Panganiban, (Chairman), Corona, Carpio-Morales, and Garcia, JJ., concur.

[1] Rollo at 34-36.

[2] Annex C, id. at 33.
[3] Annex F, id. at 41-43.
[4] Rollo at 42-43.
[5] Annex G, id. at 44-48.
[6] Annex H, id. at 49.
[7] Minutes of the Joint Meeting of the Civil Code and Family Law Committees, August 10, 1985, p. 8.
[8] Republic vs. Court of Appeals and Maximo Wong, G.R. No. 97906, May 21, 1992, 209 SCRA 189,
citing 38 Am Jur, Name 594-595.
[9] Republic vs. Hon. Hernandez, et al., G.R. No. 117209, February 9, 1996, 253 SCRA 509, citing
Tolentino, A.M., Civil Code of the Philippines, Commentaries and Jurisprudence, Vol. I, 1993 ed.,
672.
[10] Republic vs. Court of Appeals and Maximo Wong, supra.
[11] Art. 176. Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental authority of their
mother, and shall be entitled to support in conformity with this Code. However, illegitimate
children may use the surname of their father if their filiation has been expressly recognized by the
father through the record of birth appearing in the civil register, or when an admission in a public
document or private handwritten instrument is made by the father. Provided, the father has the
right to institute an action before the regular courts to prove non-filiation during his lifetime. The
legitime of each illegitimate child shall consist of one-half of the legitime of a legitimate child.
[12] Minutes of the Joint Meeting of the Civil Code and Family law Committees, August 10, 1985, pp. 16-
18.
[13] Article 365 of the New Civil Code.
[14] Republic vs. Hon. Hernandez, et al., supra; Republic vs. Court of Appeals and Maximo Wong, supra.
[15] Paras, Civil Code of the Philippines Annotated, Vol. I, Fifteenth Edition, 2002, p. 685.
[16] Pineda, The Family Code of the Philippines Annotated, 1989 Edition, p. 272-273, citing 4 Valverde,
473.
[17] Paras, supra, citing Prasnick vs. Republic, 98 Phil. 665.
[18] Lahom vs. Sibulo, G.R. No. 143989, July 14, 2003, 406 SCRA 135, citing United Nation General
Assembly/44/49 (1989).
[19] Sec. 17. Legitimacy. The adoptee shall be considered the legitimate son/daughter of the adopter(s) for
all intents and purposes and as such is entitled to all the rights and obligations provided by law to
legitimate sons/daughters born to them without discrimination of any kind. To this end, the
adoptee is entitled to love, guidance and support in keeping with the means of the family.
[20] Id.
[21] Art. 189. (1) For civil purposes, the adopted shall be deemed to be a legitimate child of the
adopters and both shall acquire the reciprocal rights and obligations arising from the relationship
of parent and child, including theright of the adopted to use the surname of the adopters;
[22] Supra.
[23] Domestic Adoption Act of 1998.
[24] Sec. 18. Succession. In legal and intestate succession, the adopter(s) and the adoptee shall have
reciprocal rights of succession without distinction from legitimate filiation. However, if the adoptee
and his/her biological parent(s) had left a will, the law on testamentary succession shall govern.
[25] Republic of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 92326, January 24, 1992, 205 SCRA
356, citing 2 Am Jur 2d, Adoption, 865.
[26] Republic of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, et al., id., citing 2 Am Jur 2d, Adoption, 910.
[27] Republic of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, et al., id., citing Bobanovic, et al. vs. Montes, etc., et
al., 142 SCRA 485 (1986).
[28] Paras, supra, p. 91.

Teotico vs Del Val

Teotico vs Del Val

GR No. L18753, March 26, 1965

FACTS:

Maria Mortera died on July 1955 leaving properties worth P600,000. She executed a will written in
Spanish, affixed her signature and acknowledged before Notary Public by her and the
witnesses. Among the legacies made in the will was the P20,000 for Rene Teotico who was married
to the testatrixs niece, Josefina Mortera. The usufruct of Marias interest in the Calvo Building were
left to the said spouses and the ownership thereof was left in equal parts to her grandchildren, the
legitimate children of said spouses. Josefina was likewise instituted, as sole and universal heir to all
the remainder of her properties not otherwise disposed by will. Vicente Teotico filed a petition for
the probate of the will but was opposed by Ana del Val Chan, claiming that she was an adopted child
of Francisca (deceased sister of Maria) and an acknowledged natural child of Jose (deceased brother
of Maria), that said will was not executed as required by law and that Maria as physically and
mentally incapable to execute the will at the time of its execution and was executed under duress,
threat, or influence of fear.

ISSUE: WON defendant has right to intervene in this proceeding.

HELD:

It is a well-settled rule that in order that a person may be allowed to intervene in a probate proceeding
is that he must have an interest in the estate, will or in the property to be affected by either as
executor or as a claimant of the estate and be benefited by such as an heir or one who has a claim
against it as creditor. Under the terms of the will, defendant has no right to intervene because she has
no such interest in the estate either as heir, executor or administrator because it did not appear therein
any provision designating her as heir/ legatee in any portion of the estate. She could have acquired
such right if she was a legal heir of the deceased but she is not under the CIVIL CODE. Even if her
allegations were true, the law does not give her any right to succeed the estate of the deceased sister
of both Jose and Francisca because being an illegitimate child she is prohibited by law from
succeeding to the legitimate relatives of her natural father and that relationship established by
adoption is limited solely to the adopter and adopted and does not extend to the relatives of the
adopting parents except only as expressly provided by law. As a consequence, she is an heir of the
adopter but not of the relatives of the adopter.

Hence, defendant has no right to intervene either as testamentary or as legal heir in the probate
proceeding.