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A. Admissibility
1. Stonehill v. Diokno, 20 SCRA 353
Upon application of the officers of the government named on the margin 1 - hereinafter
referred to as Respondent-Prosecutors - several judges 2 - hereinafter referred to as
Respondent-Judges - issued, on different dates, 3 a total of 42 search warrants against
petitioners herein 4 and/or the corporations of which they were officers, 5 directed to any
peace officer, to search the persons above-named and/or the premises of their offices,
warehouses and/or residences, and to seize and take possession of the following personal
property to wit:
"Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, correspondence, receipts, ledgers,
journals, portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers
showing all business transactions including disbursements receipts, balance sheets and
profit and loss statements and Bobbins (cigarette wrappers)."
as "the subject of the offense; stolen or embezzled and proceeds or fruits of the offense,"
or "used or intended to be used as the means of committing the offense," which is
described in the applications adverted to above as "violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff
and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and the Revised Penal Code."
Alleging that the aforementioned search warrants are null and void, as contravening the
Constitution and the Rules of Court - because, inter alia: (1) they do not describe with
particularity the documents, books and things to be seized; (2) cash money, not
mentioned in the warrants, were actually seized; (3) the warrants were issued to fish
evidence against the aforementioned petitioners in deportation cases filed against them;
(4) the searches and seizures were made in an illegal manner; and (5) the documents,
papers and cash money seized were not delivered to the courts that issued the warrants,
to be disposed of in accordance with law - on March 20, 1962, said petitioners filed with
the Supreme Court this original action for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus and
injunction, and prayed that, pending final disposition of the present case, a writ of
preliminary injunction be issued restraining Respondent-Prosecutors, their agents and or
representatives from using the effects seized as aforementioned, or any copies thereof, in
the deportation cases already adverted to, and that, in due course, thereafter, decision be
rendered quashing the contested search warrants and declaring the same null and void,
and commanding the respondents, their agents or representatives to return to petitioners
herein, in accordance with Section 3, Rule 67, of the Rules of Court, the documents,
papers, things and cash moneys seized or confiscated under the search warrants in
question.
In their answer, respondents-prosecutors alleged 6 (1) that the contested search warrants
are valid and have been issued in accordance with law; (2) that the defects of said
warrants, if any, were cured by petitioners' consent; and (3) that, in any event, the effects
seized are admissible in evidence against herein petitioners, regardless of the alleged
illegality of the aforementioned searches and seizures.
On March 22, 1962, this Court issued the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for in the
petition. However, by resolution dated June 29, 1962, the writ was partially lifted or
dissolved, insofar as the papers, documents and things seized from the offices of the
corporations above mentioned are concerned; but, the injunction was maintained as
regards the papers, documents and things found and seized in the residences of
petitioners herein. 7
Thus, the documents, papers, and things seized under the alleged authority of the
warrants in question may be split into (2) major groups, namely: (a) those found and
seized in the offices of the aforementioned corporations and (b) those found seized in the
residences of petitioners herein.
As regards the first group, we hold that petitioners herein have no cause of action to assail
the legality of the contested warrants and of the seizures made in pursuance thereof, for
the simple reason that said corporations have their respective personalities, separate and
distinct from the personality of herein petitioners, regardless of the amount of shares of
stock or of the interest of each of them in said corporations, and whatever the offices they
hold therein may be. 8 Indeed, it is well settled that the legality of a seizure can be
contested only by the party whose rights have been impaired thereby, 9 and that the
objection to an unlawful search and seizure is purely personal and cannot be availed of by
third parties. 10 Consequently, petitioners herein may not validly object to the use in
evidence against them of the documents, papers and things seized from the offices and
premises of the corporations adverted to above, since the right to object to the admission
of said papers in evidence belongs exclusively to the corporations, to whom the seized
effects belong, and may not be invoked by the corporate officers in proceedings against
them in their individual capacity. 11 Indeed, it has been held:
". . . that the Government's action in gaining possession of papers belonging to the
corporation did not relate to nor did it affect the personal defendants. If these papers were
unlawfully seized and thereby the constitutional rights of or any one were invaded, they
were the rights of the corporation and not the rights of the other defendants. Next, it is
clear that a question of the lawfulness of a seizure can be raised only by one whose rights
have been invaded. Certainly, such a seizure, if unlawful, could not affect the
constitutional rights of defendants whose property had not been seized or the privacy of
whose homes had not been disturbed; nor could they claim for themselves the benefits of
the Fourth Amendment, when its violation, if any, was with reference to the rights of
another. Remus vs. United States (C.C.A.) 291 F. 501, 511. It follows, therefore, that the
question of the admissibility of the evidence based on an alleged unlawful search and
seizure does not extend to the personal defendants but embraces only the corporation
whose property was taken . . ." (A. Guckenheimer & Bros. Co. vs. United States, [1925] 3
F. 2d, 786, 789, Emphasis supplied.)
With respect to the documents, papers and things seized in the residences of petitioners
herein, the aforementioned resolution of June 29, 1962, denied the lifting of the writ of
preliminary injunction previously issued by this Court, 12 thereby, in effect, restraining
herein Respondent-Prosecutors from using them in evidence against petitioners herein.

In connection with said documents, papers and things, two (2) important questions need
be settled, namely: (1) whether the search warrants in question, and the searches and
seizures made under the authority thereof, are valid or not; and (2) if the answer to the
preceding question is in the negative, whether said documents, papers and things may be
used in evidence against petitioners herein.
Petitioners maintain that the aforementioned search warrants are in the nature of general
warrants and that, accordingly, the seizures effected upon the authority thereof are null
and void. In this connection, the Constitution 13 provides:
"The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue but
upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized."
Two points must be stressed in connection with this constitutional mandate, namely: (1)
that no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge in the
manner set forth in said provision; and (2) that the warrant shall particularly describe the
things to be seized.
None of these requirements has been complied with in the contested warrants. Indeed,
the same were issued upon applications stating that the natural and juridical persons
therein named had committed a "violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws,
Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code." In other words, no specific offense had
been alleged in said applications. The averments thereof with respect to the offense
committed were abstract. As a consequence, it was impossible for the judges who issued
the warrants to have found the existence of probable cause, for the same presupposes the
introduction of competent proof that the party against whom it is sought has performed
particular acts, or committed specific omissions, violating a given provision of our criminal
laws. As a matter of fact, the applications involved in this case do not allege any specific
acts performed by herein petitioners. It would be a legal heresy, of the highest order, to
convict anybody of a "violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal
Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code," - as alleged in the aforementioned applications
- without reference to any determinate provision of said laws or codes.
To uphold the validity of the warrants in question would be to wipe out completely one of
the most fundamental rights guaranteed in our Constitution, for it would place the sanctity
of the domicile and the privacy of communication and correspondence at the mercy of the
whims, caprice or passion of peace officers. This is precisely the evil sought to be
remedied by the constitutional provision above quoted - to outlaw the so-called general
warrants. It is not difficult to imagine what would happen, in times of keen political strife,
when the party in power feels that the minority is likely to wrest it, even though by legal
means.
Such is the seriousness of the irregularities committed in connection with the disputed
search warrants, that this Court deemed it fit to amend Section 3 of Rule 122 of the
former Rules of Court 14 by providing in its counterpart, under the Revised Rules of
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Court 15 that "a search warrant shall not issue upon probable cause in connection with one
specific offense." Not satisfied with this qualification, the Court added thereto a paragraph,
directing that "no search warrant shall issue for more than one specific offense."
The grave violation of the Constitution made in the application for the contested search
warrants was compounded by the description therein made of the effects to be searched
for and seized, to wit:
"Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, journals, correspondence, receipts,
ledgers, portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers
showing all business transactions including disbursement receipts, balance sheets and
related profit and loss statements."
Thus, the warrants authorized the search for and seizure of records pertaining to all
business transactions of petitioners herein, regardless of whether the transactions were
legal or illegal. The warrants sanctioned the seizure of all records of the petitioners and
the aforementioned corporations, whatever their nature, thus openly contravening the
explicit command of our Bill of Rights - that the things to be seized be particularly
described - as well as tending to defeat its major objective: the elimination of general
warrants.
Relying upon Moncado vs. People's Court (80 Phil. 1), Respondent- Prosecutors maintain
that, even if the searches and seizures under consideration were unconstitutional, the
documents, papers and things thus seized are admissible in evidence against petitioners
herein. Upon mature deliberation, however, we are unanimously of the opinion that the
position taken in the Moncado case must be abandoned. Said position was in line with the
American common law rule, that the criminal should not be allowed to go free merely
"because the constable has blundered," 16 upon the theory that the constitutional
prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures is protected by means other than
the exclusion of evidence unlawfully obtained, 17 such as the common-law action for
damages against the searching officer, against the party who procured the issuance of the
search warrant and against those assisting in the execution of an illegal search, their
criminal punishment, resistance, without liability to an unlawful seizure, and such other
legal remedies as may be provided by other laws.
However, most common law jurisdictions have already given up this approach and
eventually adopted the exclusionary rule, realizing that this is the only practical means of
enforcing the constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures. In the
language of Judge Learned Hand:
"As we understand it, the reason for the exclusion of evidence competent as such, which
has been unlawfully acquired, is that exclusion is the only practical way of enforcing the
constitutional privilege. In earlier times the action of trespass against the offending official
may have been protection enough; but that is true no longer. Only in case the prosecution
which itself controls the seizing officials, knows that it cannot profit by their wrong, will
that wrong be repressed". 18
In fact, over thirty (30) years before, the Federal Supreme Court had already declared:

"If letters and private documents can thus be seized and held and used in evidence
against a citizen accused of an offense, the protection of the 4th Amendment, declaring
his rights to be secure against such searches and seizures, is of no value, and, so far as
those thus placed are concerned, might as well be stricken from the Constitution. The
efforts of the courts and their officials to bring the guilty to punishment, praiseworthy as
they are, are not to be aided by the sacrifice of those great principles established by years
of endeavor and suffering which have resulted in their embodiment in the fundamental law
of the land." 19
This view was, not only reiterated, but, also, broadened in subsequent decisions of the
same Federal Court. 20 After reviewing previous decisions thereon, said Court held, in
Mapp vs. Ohio (supra.):
". . . Today we once again examine the Wolf's constitutional documentation of the right of
privacy free from unreasonable state intrusion, and, after its dozen years on our books,
are led by it to close the only courtroom door remaining open to evidence secured by
official lawlessness in flagrant abuse of that basic right, reserved to all persons as a
specific guarantee against that very same unlawful conduct. We held that all evidence
obtained by searches and seizures in violation of the Constitution is, by that same
authority, inadmissible in a State court.
"Since the Fourth Amendment's right of privacy has been declared enforceable against the
States through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth, it is enforceable against them by
the same sanction of exclusion as it used against the Federal Government. Were it
otherwise, then just as without the Weeks rule the assurance against unreasonable federal
searches and seizures would be 'a form of words', valueless and undeserving of mention in
a perpetual charter of inestimable human liberties, so too, 'without that rule the freedom
from state invasions of privacy would be so ephemeral and so neatly severed from its
conceptual nexus with the freedom from all brutish means of coercing evidence as not to
permit this Court's high regard as a freedom implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.' At
the time that the Court held in Wolf that the Amendment was applicable to the States
through the Due Process Clause, the cases of this Court as we have seen, had steadfastly
held that as to federal officers the Fourth Amendment included the exclusion of the
evidence seized in violation of its provisions. Even Wolf 'stoutly adhered' to that
proposition. The right to privacy, when conceded operatively enforceable against the
States, was not susceptible of destruction by avulsion of the sanction upon which its
protection and enjoyment had always been deemed dependent under the Boyd, Weeks
and Silverthorne Cases. Therefore, in extending the substantive protections of due process
to all constitutionally unreasonable searches - state or federal - it was logically and
constitutionally necessary that the exclusion doctrine - an essential part of the right to
privacy - be also insisted upon as an essential ingredient of the right newly recognized by
the Wolf Case. In short, the admission of the new constitutional right by Wolf could not
consistently tolerate denial of its most important constitutional privilege, namely, the
exclusion of the evidence which an accused had been forced to give by reason of the
unlawful seizure. To hold otherwise is to grant the right but in reality to withhold its
privilege and enjoinment. Only last year the Court itself recognized that the purpose of the
exclusionary rule 'is to deter - to compel respect for the constitutional guaranty in the only
effectively available way - by removing the incentive to disregard it.' . . .
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"The ignoble shortcut to conviction left open to the State tends to destroy the entire
system of constitutional restraints on which the liberties of the people rest. Having once
recognized that the right to privacy embodied in the Fourth Amendment is enforceable
against the States, and that the right to be secure against rude invasions of privacy by
state officers is, therefore constitutional in origin, we can no longer permit that right to
remain an empty promise. Because it is enforceable in the same manner and to like effect
as other basic rights secured by the Due Process Clause, we can no longer permit it to be
revocable at the whim of any police officer who, in the name of law enforceable itself,
chooses to suspend its enjoinment. Our decision, founded on reason and truth, gives to
the individual no more than that which the Constitution guarantees him, to the police
officer no less than that to which honest law enforcement is entitled, and, to the courts,
that judicial integrity so necessary in the true administration of justice." (Emphasis ours.)
Indeed, the non-exclusionary rule is contrary, not only to the letter, but, also, to spirit of
the constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures. To be sure, if the
applicant for a search warrant has competent evidence to establish probable cause of the
commission of a given crime by the party against whom the warrant is intended, then
there is no reason why the applicant should not comply with the requirements of the
fundamental law. Upon the other hand, if he has no such competent evidence, then it is
not possible for the judge to find that there is probable cause, and, hence, no justification
for the issuance of the warrant. The only possible explanation (not justification) for its
issuance is the necessity of fishing evidence of the commission of a crime. But, then, this
fishing expedition is indicative of the absence of evidence to establish a probable cause.
Moreover, the theory that the criminal prosecution of those who secure an illegal search
warrant and/or make unreasonable searches or seizures would suffice to protect the
constitutional guarantee under consideration, overlooks the fact that violations thereof
are, in general, committed by agents of the party in power, for, certainly, those belonging
to the minority could not possibly abuse a power they do not have. Regardless of the
handicap under which the minority usually - but, understandably - finds itself in
prosecuting agents of the majority, one must not lose sight of the fact that the
psychological and moral effect of the possibility 21 of securing their conviction, is watered
down by the pardoning, power of the party for whose benefit the illegality had been
committed.
In their Motion for Reconsideration and Amendment of the Resolution of this Court dated
June 29, 1962, petitioners allege that Room Nos. 81 and 91 of Carmen Apartments, House
No. 2008, Dewey Boulevard, House No. 1436, Colorado Street, and Room No. 304 of the
Army-Navy Club, should be included among the premises considered in said Resolution as
residences of herein petitioners, Harry S. Stonehill, Robert P. Brook, John J. Brooks and
Karl Beck, respectively, and that, furthermore, the records, papers and other effects
seized in the offices of the corporations above referred to include personal belongings of
said petitioners and other effects under their exclusive possession and control, for the
exclusion of which they have a standing under the latest rulings of the federal courts of
the United States. 22

We note, however, that petitioners' theory, regarding their alleged possession of and
control over the aforementioned records, papers and effects, and the alleged "personal"
nature thereof, has been advanced, not in their petition or amended petition herein, but in
the Motion for Reconsideration and Amendment of the Resolution of June 29, 1962. In
other words, said theory would appear to be a readjustment of that followed in said
petitions, to suit the approach intimated in the Resolution sought to be reconsidered and
amended. Then, too, some of the affidavits or copies of alleged affidavits attached to said
motion for reconsideration, or submitted in support thereof, contain either inconsistent
allegations, or allegations inconsistent with the theory now advanced by petitioners
herein.
Upon the other hand, we are not satisfied that the allegations of said petitions and motion
for reconsideration, and the contents of the aforementioned affidavits and other papers
submitted in support of said motion, have sufficiently established the facts or conditions
contemplated in the cases relied upon by the petitioners, to warrant application of the
views therein expressed, should we agree thereto. At any rate, we do not deem it
necessary to express our opinion thereon, it being best to leave the matter open for
determination in appropriate cases in the future.
We hold, therefore, that the doctrine adopted in the Moncado case must be, as it is
hereby, abandoned; that the warrants for the search of three (3) residences of herein
petitioners, as specified in the Resolution of June 29, 1962 are null and void; that the
searches and seizures therein made are illegal; that the writ of preliminary injunction
heretofore issued, in connection with the documents, papers and other effects thus seized
in said residences of herein petitioners is hereby made permanent, that the writs prayed
for are granted, insofar as the documents, papers and other effects so seized in the
aforementioned residences are concerned; that the aforementioned motion for
Reconsideration and Amendment should be, as it is hereby, denied; and that the petition
herein is dismissed and the writs prayed for denied, as regards the documents, papers and
other effects seized in the twenty-nine (29) places, offices and other premises enumerated
in the same Resolution, without special pronouncement as to costs.
It is so ordered.
SUMMARY:
Subject:
Search Warrants; General Warrants; Right Against Unlawful Search is a Personal Right;
Exclusionary Rule
Facts:
Several judges issued 42 search warrants against Stonehill and other petitioners to seize
books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, correspondence, receipts, ledgers,
journals, portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers
showing all business transactions including disbursements receipts, balance sheets and
profit and loss statements and Bobbins (cigarette wrappers), claiming violations of
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Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal
Code.
The documents were seized from two locations: (1) their corporate offices and (2) the
personal residences of the petitioners.
The respondent-judges claim that the warrants were valid, and any possible defects are
cured by Stonehills consent.
Held:
Right Against Unlawful Search is Personal
1. As regards the warrants issued to the corporations, we hold that petitioners herein
have no cause of action to assail the legality of the contested warrants and of the seizures
made in pursuance thereof, for the simple reason that said corporations have their
respective personalities, separate and distinct from the personality of herein petitioners,
regardless of the amount of shares of stock or of the interest of each of them in said
corporations, and whatever the offices they hold therein may be.
2. Indeed, it is well settled that the legality of a seizure can be contested only by the
party whose rights have been impairedthereby, and that the objection to an
unlawful search and seizure is purely personal and cannot be availed of by third
parties.
Right Against Unreasonable Search
3. The Constitution [Art III, Sec 2] provides that the right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures
shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, to be
determined by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant
and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched,
and the persons or things to be seized.
4. Two points must be stressed in connection with this constitutional mandate, namely:
(1) that no warrant shall issue but uponprobable cause, to be determined by the judge in
the manner set forth in said provision; and (2) that the warrant shall particularly
describe the things to be seized.
General Warrants
5. The subject warrants were issued upon applications stating that the natural and juridical
persons therein named had committed a "violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and
Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code." In other words, no
specific offense had been alleged in said applications. The averments thereof with respect
to the offense committed were abstract. As a consequence, it was impossible for the
judges who issued the warrants to have found the existence of probable cause, for the
same presupposes the introduction of competent proof that the party against whom it is
 Page |5

sought has performed particular acts, or committed specific omissions, violating a given
provision of our criminal laws.
6. General search warrants are outlawed because they place the sanctity of the domicile
and the privacy of communication and correspondence at the mercy of the whims, caprice
or passion of peace officers.
Exclusionary Rule: Inadmissibility of illegally seized items
7. The prosecutors, relying on Moncado vs. People's Court, maintain that, even if the
searches and seizures under consideration were unconstitutional, the documents, papers
and things thus seized are admissible in evidence against petitioners. Said position was in
line with the American common law rule, that the criminal should not be allowed to go free
merely "because the constable has blundered," 1 upon the theory that the constitutional
prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures is protected by means other than
the exclusion of evidence unlawfully obtained, such as the common-law action for
damages against the searching officer, against the party who procured the issuance of the
search warrant and against those assisting in the execution of an illegal search.
"In the morning of October 22, 1975, complainant Atty. Tito Pintor and his client Manuel
Montebon were in the living room of complainant's residence discussing the terms for the
withdrawal of the complaint for direct assault which they filed with the Office of the City
Fiscal of Cebu against Leonardo Laconico. After they had decided on the proposed
conditions, complainant made a telephone call to Laconico (tsn, August 26, 1981, pp. 3-
5).
"That same morning, Laconico telephoned appellant, who is a lawyer to come to his office
and advise him on the settlement of the direct assault case because his regular lawyer,
Atty. Leon Gonzaga, went on a business trip. According to the request, appellant went to
the office of Laconico where he was briefed about the problem. (Exhibit 'D', tsn, April 22,
1982, pp. 4-5).
"When complainant called up, Laconico requested appellant to secretly listen to the
telephone conversation through a telephone extension so as to hear personally the
proposed conditions for the settlement. Appellant heard complainant enumerate the
following conditions for withdrawal of the complaint for direct assault"

8. The court declared that the doctrine adopted in the Moncado case is abandoned. Most "(a) the P5,000.00 was no longer acceptable, and that the figure had been increased to
common law jurisdictions have already given up this approach and have adopted P8,000.00. A breakdown of the P8,000.00 had been made together with other demands,
the exclusionary rule, realizing that this is the only practical means of enforcing the to wit: (a) P5,000.00 no longer for the teacher Manuel Montebon, but for Atty. Pintor
constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures. In the language of himself in persuading his client to withdraw the case for Direct Assault against Atty.
Justice Hand: As we understand it, the reason for the exclusion of evidence competent as Laconico before the Cebu City Fiscal's Office;
such, which has been unlawfully acquired, is that exclusion is the only practical way of
enforcing the constitutional privilege. "(b) Public apology to be made by Atty. Laconico before the students of Don Bosco
Technical High School;
9. The non-exclusionary rule is contrary, not only to the letter, but, also, to spirit of the
constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures. To be sure, if the "(c ) P1,000.00 to be given to the Don Bosco Faculty club;
applicant for a search warrant has competent evidence to establish probable cause of the
commission of a given crime by the party against whom the warrant is intended, then "(d) transfer of son of Atty. Laconico to another school or another section of Don Bosco
there is no reason why the applicant should not comply with the requirements of the Technical High School;
fundamental law. Upon the other hand, if he has no such competent evidence, then it is
not possible for the judge to find that there is probable cause, and, hence, no justification "(e) Affidavit of desistance by Atty. Laconico on the Maltreatment case earlier filed against
for the issuance of the warrant. The only possible explanation (not justification) for its Manuel Montebon at the Cebu City Fiscal's Office, whereas Montebon's affidavit of
issuance is the necessity of fishing evidence of the commission of a crime. But, then, this desistance on the Direct Assault Case against Atty. Laconico to be filed later;
fishing expedition is indicative of the absence of evidence to establish a probable cause.
"(f) Allow Manuel Montebon to continue teaching at the Don Bosco Technical School;
2. Gaanan v. IAC, 145 SCRA 112
"(g) Not to divulge the truth about the settlement of the Direct Assault Case to the mass
This petition for certiorari asks for an interpretation of Republic Act (RA) No. 4200, media;
otherwise known as the Anti-Wiretapping Act, on the issue of whether or not an extension
telephone is among the prohibited devices in Section 1 of the Act, such that its use to "(h) P2,000.00 attorney's fees for Atty. Pintor. (tsn, August 26, 1981, pp. 47-48).
overhear a private conversation would constitute unlawful interception of communications
between the two parties using a telephone line. "Twenty minutes later, complainant called up again to ask Laconico if he was agreeable to
the conditions. Laconico answered `Yes'. Complainant then told Laconico to wait for
The facts presented by the People and narrated in the respondent court's decision are not instructions on where to deliver the money. (tsn, March 10, 1983, pp. 2-12).
disputed by the petitioner.

"Complainant called up again and instructed Laconico to give the money to his wife at the
office of the then Department of Public Highways. Laconico who earlier alerted his friend
Colonel Zulueta of the Criminal Investigation Service of the Philippine Constabulary,
insisted that complainant himself should receive the money. (tsn, March 10, 1982, pp. 26-
33). When he received the money at the Igloo Restaurant, complainant was arrested by
agents of the Philippine Constabulary.
"Appellant executed on the following day an affidavit stating that he heard complainant
demand P8,000.00 for the withdrawal of the case for direct assault. Laconico attached the
affidavit of appellant to the complainant for robbery/extortion which he filed against
complainant. Since appellant listened to the telephone conversation without complainant's
consent, complainant charged appellant and Laconico with violation of the Anti-
Wiretapping Act."
After trial on the merits, the lower court, in a decision dated November 22, 1982, found
both Gaanan and Laconico guilty of violating Section 1 of Republic Act No. 4200. The two
were each sentenced to one (1) year imprisonment with costs. Not satisfied with the
decision, the petitioner appealed to the appellate court.
On August 16, 1984, the Intermediate Appellate Court affirmed the decision of the trial
court, holding that the communication between the complainant and accused Laconico was
private in nature and, therefore, covered by Rep. Act No. 4200; that the petitioner
overheard such communication without the knowledge and consent of the complainant;
and that the extension telephone which was used by the petitioner to overhear the
telephone conversation between complainant and Laconico is covered in the term "device"
as provided in Rep. Act No. 4200.
In this petition for certiorari, the petitioner assails the decision of the appellate court and
raises the following issues; (a) whether or not the telephone conversation between the
complainant and accused Laconico was private in nature; (b) whether or not an extension
telephone is covered by the term "device or arrangement" under Rep. Act No. 4200; (c)
whether or not the petitioner had authority to listen or overhear said telephone
conversation and (d) whether or not Rep. Act No. 4200 is ambiguous and, therefore,
should be construed in favor of the petitioner.
Section 1 of Rep. Act No. 4200 provides:
"Section 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to
any private communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable or by using any other
device or arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such communication or
spoken word by using a device commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or
detectaphone or walkie-talkie or taperecorder, or however otherwise described;
It shall be unlawful for any person, be he a participant or not in the act or acts penalized
in the next preceeding sentence, to knowingly possess any tape record, wire record, disc
record, or any other such record, or copies thereof, of any communication or spoken word
secured either before or after the effective date of this Act in the manner prohibited by
this law; or to replay the same for any other person or persons; or to communicate the
Page |6
contents thereof, either verbally or in writing, or to furnish transcriptions thereof, whether
complete or partial, to any other person: Provided, that the use of such record or any
copies thereof as evidence in any civil, criminal investigation or trial of offenses mentioned
in Section 3 hereof, shall not be covered by this prohibition."
We rule for the petitioner.
We are confronted in this case with the interpretation of a penal statute and not a rule of
evidence. The issue is not the admissibility of evidence secured over an extension line of a
telephone by a third party. The issue is whether or not the person called over the
telephone and his lawyer listening to the conversation on an extension line should both
face prison sentences simply because the extension was used to enable them to both
listen to an alleged attempt at extortion.
There is no question that the telephone conversation between complainant Atty. Pintor
and accused Atty. Laconico was "private" in the sense that the words uttered were made
between one person and another as distinguished from words between a speaker and a
public. It is also undisputed that only one of the parties gave the petitioner the authority
to listen to and overhear the caller's message with the use of an extension telephone line.
Obviously, complainant Pintor, a member of the Philippine bar, would not have discussed
the alleged demand for an P8,000.00 consideration in order to have his client withdraw a
direct assault charge against Atty. Laconico filed with the Cebu City Fiscal's Office if he
knew that another lawyer was also listening. We have to consider, however, that
affirmance of the criminal conviction would, in effect, mean that a caller by merely using a
telephone line can force the listener to secrecy no matter how obscene, criminal, or
annoying the call may be. It would be the word of the caller against the listener's.
Because of technical problems caused by the sensitive nature of electronic equipment and
the extra heavy loads which telephone cables are made to carry in certain areas,
telephone users often encounter what are called "crossed lines". An unwary citizen who
happens to pick up his telephone and who overhears the details of a crime might hesitate
to inform police authorities if he knows that he could be accused under Rep. Act 4200 of
using his own telephone to secretly overhear the private communications of the would be
criminals. Surely the law was never intended for such mischievous results.
The main issue in the resolution of this petition, however, revolves around the meaning of
the phrase "any other device or arrangement." Is an extension of a telephone unit such a
device or arrangement as would subject the user to imprisonment ranging from six
months to six years with the accessory penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification for a
public officer or deportation for an alien? Private secretaries with extension lines to their
bosses' telephones are sometimes asked to use answering or recording devices to record
business conversations between a boss and another businessman. Would transcribing a
recorded message for the use of the boss be a proscribed offense? Or for that matter,
would a "party line" be a device or arrangement under the law?
The petitioner contends that telephones or extension telephones are not included in the
enumeration of "commonly known" listening or recording devices, nor do they belong to
the same class of enumerated electronic devices contemplated by law. He maintains that
 Page |7

in 1964, when Senate Bill No. 9 (later Rep. Act No. 4200) was being considered in the `particularization followed by a general expression will ordinarily be restricted to the
Senate, telephones and extension telephones were already widely used instruments, former' is based on the fact in human experience that usually the minds of parties are
probably the most popularly known communication device. addressed specially to the particularization, and that the generalities, though broad
enough to comprehend other fields if they stood alone, are used in contemplation of that
Whether or not listening over a telephone party line would be punishable was discussed on upon which the minds of the parties are centered. (Hoffman v. Eastern Wisconsin R., etc.,
the floor of the Senate. Yet, when the bill was finalized into a statute, no mention was Co., 134 Wis. 603, 607; 115 NW 383, cited in Francisco, Revised Rules of Court
made of telephones in the enumeration of devices "commonly known as a dictaphone or (Evidence), 1973 ed., pp. 180-181."
dictagraph, detectaphone or walkie talkie or tape recorder or however otherwise
described." The omission was not a mere oversight. Telephone party lines were Hence, the phrase "device or arrangement" in Section 1 of RA No. 4200, although not
intentionally deleted from the provisions of the Act. exclusive to that enumerated therein, should be construed to comprehend instruments of
the same or similar nature, that is, instruments the use of which would be tantamount to
The respondent People argue that an extension telephone is embraced and covered by the tapping the main line of a telephone. It refers to instruments whose installation or
term "device" within the context of the aforementioned law because it is not a part or presence cannot be presumed by the party or parties being overheard because, by their
portion of a complete set of a telephone apparatus. It is a separate device and distinct set very nature, they are not of common usage and their purpose is precisely for tapping,
of a movable apparatus consisting of a wire and a set of telephone receiver not forming intercepting or recording a telephone conversation.
part of a main telephone set which can be detached or removed and can be transferred
away from one place to another and to be plugged or attached to a main telephone line to An extension telephone is an instrument which is very common especially now when the
get the desired communication coming from the other party or end. extended unit does not have to be connected by wire to the main telephone but can be
moved from place to place within a radius of a kilometer or more. A person should safely
The law refers to a "tap" of a wire or cable or the use of a "device or arrangement" for the presume that the party he is calling at the other end of the line probably has an extension
purpose of secretly overhearing, intercepting, or recording the communication. There must telephone and he runs the risk of a third party listening as in the case of a party line or a
be either a physical interruption through a wiretap or the deliberate installation of a device telephone unit which shares its line with another. As was held in the case of Rathbun v.
or arrangement in order to overhear, intercept, or record the spoken words. United States (355, U.S. 107, 2 L Ed 2d 137-138):

An extension telephone cannot be placed in the same category as a dictaphone, "Common experience tells us that a call to a particular telephone number may cause the
dictagraph or the other devices enumerated in Section 1 of RA No. 4200 as the use thereof bell to ring in more than one ordinarily used instrument. Each party to a telephone
cannot be considered as "tapping" the wire or cable of a telephone line. The telephone conversation takes the risk that the other party may have an extension telephone and
extension in this case was not installed for that purpose. It just happened to be there for may allow another to overhear the conversation. When such takes place there has been no
ordinary office use. It is a rule in statutory construction that in order to determine the true violation of any privacy of which the parties may complain. Consequently, one element of
intent of the legislature, the particular clauses and phrases of the statute should not be 605, interception, has not occurred."
taken as detached and isolated expressions, but the whole and every part thereof must be
considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts. (see Commissioner of Customs v. Esso In the same case, the Court further ruled that the conduct of the party would differ in no
Estandard Eastern, Inc., 66 SCRA 113, 120). way if instead of repeating the message he held out his hand-set so that another could
hear out of it and that there is no distinction between that sort of action and permitting an
In the case of Empire Insurance Company v. Rufino (90 SCRA 437, 443-444), we ruled: outsider to use an extension telephone for the same purpose.

"Likewise, Article 1372 of the Civil Code stipulates that `however general the terms of a
contract may be, they shall not be understood to comprehend things that are distinct and
cases that are different from those upon which the parties intended to agree.' Similarly,
Article 1374 of the same Code provides that 'the various stipulations of a contract shall be
interpreted together, attributing to the doubtful ones that sense which may result from all
of them taken jointly.'
xxx xxx xxx
"Consequently, the phrase `all liabilities or obligations of the decedent' used in paragraph
5(c) and 7(d) should be then restricted only to those listed in the Inventory and should not
be construed as to comprehend all other obligations of the decedent. The rule that
Furthermore, it is a general rule that penal statutes must be construed strictly in favor of
the accused. Thus, in case of doubt as in the case at bar, on whether or not an extension
telephone is included in the phrase "device or arrangement", the penal statute must be
construed as not including an extension telephone. In the case of People v. Purisima, 86
SCRA 542, 562, we explained the rationale behind the rule:
"American jurisprudence sets down the reason for this rule to be `the tenderness of the
law of the rights of individuals; the object is to establish a certain rule by conformity to
which mankind would be safe, and the discretion of the court limited. (United States v.
Harris, 177 US 305, 44 L Ed 780, 20 S Ct 609; Braffith v. Virgin Islands (CA3) 26 F2d 646;
Caudill v. State, 224 Ind 531, 69 NE2d 549; Jennings v. Commonwealth, 109 VA 821, 63
SE 1080, all cited in 73 Am Jur 2d 452.) The purpose is not to enable a guilty person to
 Page |8

escape punishment through a technicality but to provide a precise definition of forbidden installing devices in order to gather evidence for use in court or to intimidate, blackmail or
acts." (State v. Zazzaro, 20 A 2d 737, quoted in Martin's Handbook on Statutory gain some unwarranted advantage over the telephone users. Consequently, the mere act
Construction, Rev. Ed. pp. 183-184)." of listening, in order to be punishable must strictly be with the use of the enumerated
devices in RA No. 4200 or others of similar nature. We are of the view that an extension
In the same case of Purisima, we also ruled that in the construction or interpretation of a telephone is not among such devices or arrangements.
legislative measure, the primary rule is to search for and determine the intent and spirit of
the law. A perusal of the Senate Congressional Records will show that not only did our WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the then Intermediate Appellate
lawmakers not contemplate the inclusion of an extension telephone as a prohibited "device Court dated August 16, 1984 is ANNULLEDand SET ASIDE. The petitioner is
or arrangement" but of greater importance, they were more concerned with penalizing the hereby ACQUITTED of the crime of violation of Rep. Act No. 4200, otherwise known as
act of recording than the act of merely listening to a telephone conversation. the Anti-Wiretapping Act. SO ORDERED.

xxx xxx xxx 3. Garcillano v. House of Representatives GR No. 170338 December 23,2008

Senator Taada. Another possible objection to that is entrapment which is certainly More than three years ago, tapes ostensibly containing a wiretapped conversation
objectionable. It is made possible by special amendment which Your Honor may introduce. purportedly between the President of the Philippines and a high-ranking official of the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) surfaced. They captured unprecedented public
Senator Diokno. Your Honor, I would feel that entrapment would be less possible with the attention and thrust the country into a controversy that placed the legitimacy of the
amendment than without it, because with the amendment the evidence of entrapment present administration on the line, and resulted in the near-collapse of the Arroyo
would only consist of government testimony as against the testimony of the defendant. government. The tapes, notoriously referred to as the "Hello Garci" tapes, allegedly
With this amendment, they would have the right, and the government officials and the contained the President's instructions to COMELEC Commissioner Virgilio Garcillano to
person in fact would have the right to tape record their conversation. manipulate in her favor results of the 2004 presidential elections. These recordings were
to become the subject of heated legislative hearings conducted separately by committees
Senator Taada. In case of entrapment, it would be the government. of both Houses of Congress.[1]

Senator Diokno. In the same way, under this provision, neither party could record and, In the House of Representatives (House), on June 8, 2005, then Minority Floor Leader
therefore, the court would be limited to saying: "Okay, who is more credible, the police Francis G. Escudero delivered a privilege speech, "Tale of Two Tapes," and set in motion a
officers or the defendant?" In these cases, as experienced lawyers, we know that the congressional investigation jointly conducted by the Committees on Public Information,
Court go with the peace offices. Public Order and Safety, National Defense and Security, Information and Communications
Technology, and Suffrage and Electoral Reforms (respondent House Committees). During
(Congressional Record, Vol. III, No. 33, p. 628, March 12, 1964). the inquiry, several versions of the wiretapped conversation emerged. But on July 5, 2005,
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) Director Reynaldo Wycoco, Atty. Alan Paguia and
xxx xxx xxx the lawyer of former NBI Deputy Director Samuel Ong submitted to the respondent House
Committees seven alleged "original" tape recordings of the supposed three-hour taped
Senator Diokno. The point I have in mind is that under these conditions, with an agent conversation. After prolonged and impassioned debate by the committee members on the
outside listening in, he could falsify the testimony and there is no way of checking it. But if admissibility and authenticity of the recordings, the tapes were eventually played in the
you allow him to record or make a recording in any form of what is happening, then the chambers of the House.[2]
chances of falsifying the evidence is not very much.
On August 3, 2005, the respondent House Committees decided to suspend the hearings
Senator Taada. Your Honor, this bill is not intended to prevent the presentation of false indefinitely. Nevertheless, they decided to prepare committee reports based on the said
testimony. If we could devise a way by which we could prevent the presentation of false recordings and the testimonies of the resource persons.[3]
testimony, it would be wonderful. But what this bill intends to prohibit is the use of tape
record and other electronic devices to intercept private conversations which later on will Alarmed by these developments, petitioner Virgilio O. Garcillano (Garcillano) filed with this
be used in court. Court a Petition for Prohibition and Injunction, with Prayer for Temporary Restraining
Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction[4] docketed as G.R. No. 170338. He prayed
(Congressional Record, Vol. III, No. 33, March 12, 1964, p. 629). that the respondent House Committees be restrained from using these tape recordings of
the "illegally obtained" wiretapped conversations in their committee reports and for any
It can be readily seen that our lawmakers intended to discourage, through punishment, other purpose. He further implored that the said recordings and any reference thereto be
persons such as government authorities or representatives of organized groups from ordered stricken off the records of the inquiry, and the respondent House Committees
 Page |9

directed to desist from further using the recordings in any of the House proceedings.[5] On November 20, 2007, the Court resolved to consolidate G.R. Nos. 170338 and 179275.
[19]
Without reaching its denouement, the House discussion and debates on the "Garci tapes"
abruptly stopped. It may be noted that while both petitions involve the "Hello Garci" recordings, they have
different objectives-the first is poised at preventing the playing of the tapes in the House
After more than two years of quiescence, Senator Panfilo Lacson roused the slumbering and their subsequent inclusion in the committee reports, and the second seeks to prohibit
issue with a privilege speech, "The Lighthouse That Brought Darkness." In his discourse, and stop the conduct of the Senate inquiry on the wiretapped conversation.
Senator Lacson promised to provide the public "the whole unvarnished truth - the what's,
when's, where's, who's and why's" of the alleged wiretap, and sought an inquiry into the The Court dismisses the first petition, G.R. No. 170338, and grants the second, G.R. No.
perceived willingness of telecommunications providers to participate in nefarious 179275.
wiretapping activities.
-I-
On motion of Senator Francis Pangilinan, Senator Lacson's speech was referred to the
Senate Committee on National Defense and Security, chaired by Senator Rodolfo Biazon, Before delving into the merits of the case, the Court shall first resolve the issue on the
who had previously filed two bills[6] seeking to regulate the sale, purchase and use of parties' standing, argued at length in their pleadings.
wiretapping equipment and to prohibit the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) from
performing electoral duties.[7] In Tolentino v. COMELEC,[20] we explained that "'[l]egal standing' or locus standi refers to
a personal and substantial interest in a case such that the party has sustained or will
In the Senate's plenary session the following day, a lengthy debate ensued when Senator sustain direct injury because of the challenged governmental act x x x," thus, generally, a
Richard Gordon aired his concern on the possible transgression of Republic Act (R.A.) No. party will be allowed to litigate only when (1) he can show that he has personally suffered
4200[8] if the body were to conduct a legislative inquiry on the matter. On August 28, some actual or threatened injury because of the allegedly illegal conduct of the
2007, Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago delivered a privilege speech, articulating her government; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and (3) the injury
considered view that the Constitution absolutely bans the use, possession, replay or is likely to be redressed by a favorable action.[21]
communication of the contents of the "Hello Garci" tapes. However, she recommended a
legislative investigation into the role of the Intelligence Service of the AFP (ISAFP), the The gist of the question of standing is whether a party has "alleged such a personal stake
Philippine National Police or other government entities in the alleged illegal wiretapping of in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens
public officials.[9] the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of
difficult constitutional questions."[22]
On September 6, 2007, petitioners Santiago Ranada and Oswaldo Agcaoili, retired justices
of the Court of Appeals, filed before this Court a Petition for Prohibition with Prayer for the However, considering that locus standi is a mere procedural technicality, the Court, in
Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction,[10] recent cases, has relaxed the stringent direct injury test. David v. Macapagal-Arroyo[23]
docketed as G.R. No. 179275, seeking to bar the Senate from conducting its scheduled articulates that a "liberal policy has been observed, allowing ordinary citizens, members of
legislative inquiry. They argued in the main that the intended legislative inquiry violates Congress, and civic organizations to prosecute actions involving the constitutionality or
R.A. No. 4200 and Section 3, Article III of the Constitution.[11] validity of laws, regulations and rulings."[24] The fairly recent Chavez v. Gonzales[25]
even permitted a non-member of the broadcast media, who failed to allege a personal
As the Court did not issue an injunctive writ, the Senate proceeded with its public hearings stake in the outcome of the controversy, to challenge the acts of the Secretary of Justice
on the "Hello Garci" tapes on September 7,[12] 17[13] and October 1,[14] 2007. and the National Telecommunications Commission. The majority, in the said case, echoed
the current policy that "this Court has repeatedly and consistently refused to wield
Intervening as respondents,[15] Senators Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., Benigno Noynoy C. procedural barriers as impediments to its addressing and resolving serious legal questions
Aquino, Rodolfo G. Biazon, Panfilo M. Lacson, Loren B. Legarda, M.A. Jamby A.S. Madrigal that greatly impact on public interest, in keeping with the Court's duty under the 1987
and Antonio F. Trillanes filed their Comment[16] on the petition on September 25, 2007. Constitution to determine whether or not other branches of government have kept
themselves within the limits of the Constitution and the laws, and that they have not
The Court subsequently heard the case on oral argument.[17] abused the discretion given to them."[26]

On October 26, 2007, Maj. Lindsay Rex Sagge, a member of the ISAFP and one of the In G.R. No. 170338, petitioner Garcillano justifies his standing to initiate the petition by
resource persons summoned by the Senate to appear and testify at its hearings, moved to alleging that he is the person alluded to in the "Hello Garci" tapes. Further, his was
intervene as petitioner in G.R. No. 179275.[18] publicly identified by the members of the respondent committees as one of the voices in
the recordings.[27] Obviously, therefore, petitioner Garcillano stands to be directly injured
 P a g e | 10

by the House committees' actions and charges of electoral fraud. The Court recognizes his
standing to institute the petition for prohibition.
In G.R. No. 179275, petitioners Ranada and Agcaoili justify their standing by alleging that
they are concerned citizens, taxpayers, and members of the IBP. They are of the firm
conviction that any attempt to use the "Hello Garci" tapes will further divide the country.
They wish to see the legal and proper use of public funds that will necessarily be defrayed
in the ensuing public hearings. They are worried by the continuous violation of the laws
and individual rights, and the blatant attempt to abuse constitutional processes through
the conduct of legislative inquiries purportedly in aid of legislation.[28]
power is limited to the determination and resolution of actual cases and controversies.[35]
By actual cases, we mean existing conflicts appropriate or ripe for judicial determination,
not conjectural or anticipatory, for otherwise the decision of the Court will amount to an
advisory opinion. The power of judicial inquiry does not extend to hypothetical questions
because any attempt at abstraction could only lead to dialectics and barren legal questions
and to sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities.[36] Neither will the Court determine a
moot question in a case in which no practical relief can be granted. A case becomes moot
when its purpose has become stale.[37] It is unnecessary to indulge in academic
discussion of a case presenting a moot question as a judgment thereon cannot have any
practical legal effect or, in the nature of things, cannot be enforced.[38]

Intervenor Sagge alleges violation of his right to due process considering that he is In G.R. No. 170338, petitioner Garcillano implores from the Court, as aforementioned, the
summoned to attend the Senate hearings without being apprised not only of his rights issuance of an injunctive writ to prohibit the respondent House Committees from playing
therein through the publication of the Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid the tape recordings and from including the same in their committee report. He likewise
of Legislation, but also of the intended legislation which underpins the investigation. He prays that the said tapes be stricken off the records of the House proceedings. But the
further intervenes as a taxpayer bewailing the useless and wasteful expenditure of public Court notes that the recordings were already played in the House and heard by its
funds involved in the conduct of the questioned hearings.[29] members.[39] There is also the widely publicized fact that the committee reports on the
"Hello Garci" inquiry were completed and submitted to the House in plenary by the
Given that petitioners Ranada and Agcaoili allege an interest in the execution of the laws respondent committees.[40] Having been overtaken by these events, the Garcillano
and that intervenor Sagge asserts his constitutional right to due process,[30] they satisfy petition has to be dismissed for being moot and academic. After all, prohibition is a
the requisite personal stake in the outcome of the controversy by merely being citizens of preventive remedy to restrain the doing of an act about to be done, and not intended to
the Republic. provide a remedy for an act already accomplished.[41]

Following the Court's ruling in Francisco, Jr. v. The House of Representatives,[31] we find - III -
sufficient petitioners Ranada's and Agcaoili's and intervenor Sagge's allegation that the
continuous conduct by the Senate of the questioned legislative inquiry will necessarily As to the petition in G.R. No. 179275, the Court grants the same. The Senate cannot be
involve the expenditure of public funds.[32] It should be noted that in Francisco, rights allowed to continue with the conduct of the questioned legislative inquiry without duly
personal to then Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. had been injured by the alleged published rules of procedure, in clear derogation of the constitutional requirement.
unconstitutional acts of the House of Representatives, yet the Court granted standing to
the petitioners therein for, as in this case, they invariably invoked the vindication of their Section 21, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides that "[t]he Senate or the
own rights-as taxpayers, members of Congress, citizens, individually or in a class suit, and House of Representatives, or any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid
members of the bar and of the legal profession-which were also supposedly violated by of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure." The requisite of
the therein assailed unconstitutional acts.[33] publication of the rules is intended to satisfy the basic requirements of due process.[42]
Publication is indeed imperative, for it will be the height of injustice to punish or otherwise
Likewise, a reading of the petition in G.R. No. 179275 shows that the petitioners and burden a citizen for the transgression of a law or rule of which he had no notice
intervenor Sagge advance constitutional issues which deserve the attention of this Court in whatsoever, not even a constructive one.[43] What constitutes publication is set forth in
view of their seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents. The issues are of Article 2 of the Civil Code, which provides that "[l]aws shall take effect after 15 days
transcendental and paramount importance not only to the public but also to the Bench and following the completion of their publication either in the Official Gazette, or in a
the Bar, and should be resolved for the guidance of all.[34] newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines."[44]

Thus, in the exercise of its sound discretion and given the liberal attitude it has shown in The respondents in G.R. No. 179275 admit in their pleadings and even on oral argument
prior cases climaxing in the more recent case of Chavez, the Court recognizes the legal that the Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation had been
standing of petitioners Ranada and Agcaoili and intervenor Sagge. published in newspapers of general circulation only in 1995 and in 2006.[45] With respect
to the present Senate of the 14th Congress, however, of which the term of half of its
- II - members commenced on June 30, 2007, no effort was undertaken for the publication of
these rules when they first opened their session.
The Court, however, dismisses G.R. No. 170338 for being moot and academic. Repeatedly
stressed in our prior decisions is the principle that the exercise by this Court of judicial

Recently, the Court had occasion to rule on this very same question. In Neri v. Senate
Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations,[46] we said:
Fourth, we find merit in the argument of the OSG that respondent Committees likewise
violated Section 21 of Article VI of the Constitution, requiring that the inquiry be in
accordance with the "duly published rules of procedure." We quote the OSG's explanation:
The phrase "duly published rules of procedure" requires the Senate of every Congress to
publish its rules of procedure governing inquiries in aid of legislation because every Senate
is distinct from the one before it or after it. Since Senatorial elections are held every three
(3) years for one-half of the Senate's membership, the composition of the Senate also
changes by the end of each term. Each Senate may thus enact a different set of rules as it
may deem fit. Not having published its Rules of Procedure, the subject hearings in aid of
legislation conducted by the 14th Senate, are therefore, procedurally infirm.
Justice Antonio T. Carpio, in his Dissenting and Concurring Opinion, reinforces this ruling
with the following rationalization:
The present Senate under the 1987 Constitution is no longer a continuing legislative body.
The present Senate has twenty-four members, twelve of whom are elected every three
years for a term of six years each. Thus, the term of twelve Senators expires every three
years, leaving less than a majority of Senators to continue into the next Congress. The
1987 Constitution, like the 1935 Constitution, requires a majority of Senators to
"constitute a quorum to do business." Applying the same reasoning in Arnault v.
Nazareno, the Senate under the 1987 Constitution is not a continuing body because less
than majority of the Senators continue into the next Congress. The consequence is that
the Rules of Procedure must be republished by the Senate after every expiry of the term
of twelve Senators.[47]
The subject was explained with greater lucidity in our Resolution[48] (On the Motion for
Reconsideration) in the same case, viz.:
On the nature of the Senate as a "continuing body," this Court sees fit to issue a
clarification. Certainly, there is no debate that the Senate as an institution is "continuing,"
as it is not dissolved as an entity with each national election or change in the composition
of its members. However, in the conduct of its day-to-day business the Senate of each
Congress acts separately and independently of the Senate of the Congress before it. The
Rules of the Senate itself confirms this when it states:
RULE XLIV UNFINISHED BUSINESS
SEC. 123. Unfinished business at the end of the session shall be taken up at the next
session in the same status.
All pending matters and proceedings shall terminate upon the expiration of one (1)
Congress, but may be taken by the succeeding Congress as if present for the first time.
Undeniably from the foregoing, all pending matters and proceedings, i.e., unpassed bills
and even legislative investigations, of the Senate of a particular Congress are considered
P a g e | 11
terminated upon the expiration of that Congress and it is merely optional on the Senate of
the succeeding Congress to take up such unfinished matters, not in the same status, but
as if presented for the first time. The logic and practicality of such a rule is readily
apparent considering that the Senate of the succeeding Congress (which will typically have
a different composition as that of the previous Congress) should not be bound by the acts
and deliberations of the Senate of which they had no part. If the Senate is a continuing
body even with respect to the conduct of its business, then pending matters will not be
deemed terminated with the expiration of one Congress but will, as a matter of course,
continue into the next Congress with the same status.
This dichotomy of the continuity of the Senate as an institution and of the opposite nature
of the conduct of its business is reflected in its Rules. The Rules of the Senate (i.e. the
Senate's main rules of procedure) states:
RULE LI
AMENDMENTS TO, OR REVISIONS OF, THE RULES
SEC. 136. At the start of each session in which the Senators elected in the preceding
elections shall begin their term of office, the President may endorse the Rules to the
appropriate committee for amendment or revision.
The Rules may also be amended by means of a motion which should be presented at least
one day before its consideration, and the vote of the majority of the Senators present in
the session shall be required for its approval.
RULE LII
DATE OF TAKING EFFECT
SEC. 137. These Rules shall take effect on the date of their adoption and shall remain in
force until they are amended or repealed.
Section 136 of the Senate Rules quoted above takes into account the new composition of
the Senate after an election and the possibility of the amendment or revision of the Rules
at the start of each session in which the newly elected Senators shall begin their term.
However, it is evident that the Senate has determined that its main rules are intended to
be valid from the date of their adoption until they are amended or repealed. Such
language is conspicuously absent from the Rules. The Rules simply state "(t)hese Rules
shall take effect seven (7) days after publication in two (2) newspapers of general
circulation." The latter does not explicitly provide for the continued effectivity of such rules
until they are amended or repealed. In view of the difference in the language of the two
sets of Senate rules, it cannot be presumed that the Rules (on legislative inquiries) would
continue into the next Congress. The Senate of the next Congress may easily adopt
different rules for its legislative inquiries which come within the rule on unfinished
business.
The language of Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution requiring that the inquiry be
conducted in accordance with the duly published rules of procedure is categorical. It is
 P a g e | 12

incumbent upon the Senate to publish the rules for its legislative inquiries in each
Congress or otherwise make the published rules clearly state that the same shall be Very recently, the Senate caused the publication of the Senate Rules of Procedure
effective in subsequent Congresses or until they are amended or repealed to sufficiently Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation in the October 31, 2008 issues of Manila Bulletin
put public on notice. and Malaya. While we take judicial notice of this fact, the recent publication does not cure
the infirmity of the inquiry sought to be prohibited by the instant petitions. Insofar as the
If it was the intention of the Senate for its present rules on legislative inquiries to be consolidated cases are concerned, the legislative investigation subject thereof still could
effective even in the next Congress, it could have easily adopted the same language it had not be undertaken by the respondent Senate Committees, because no published rules
used in its main rules regarding effectivity. governed it, in clear contravention of the Constitution.

Respondents justify their non-observance of the constitutionally mandated publication by With the foregoing disquisition, the Court finds it unnecessary to discuss the other issues
arguing that the rules have never been amended since 1995 and, despite that, they are raised in the consolidated petitions.
published in booklet form available to anyone for free, and accessible to the public at the
Senate's internet web page.[49] WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 170338 is DISMISSED, and the petition in G.R. No.
179275 is GRANTED. Let a writ of prohibition be issued enjoining the Senate of the
The Court does not agree. The absence of any amendment to the rules cannot justify the Republic of the Philippines and/or any of its committees from conducting any inquiry in aid
Senate's defiance of the clear and unambiguous language of Section 21, Article VI of the of legislation centered on the "Hello Garci" tapes. SO ORDERED.
Constitution. The organic law instructs, without more, that the Senate or its committees
may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation only in accordance with duly published rules of 4. People v. Lauga G.R. No. 186228 March 15, 2010
procedure, and does not make any distinction whether or not these rules have undergone
amendments or revision. The constitutional mandate to publish the said rules prevails over Before Us for final review is the trial court's conviction of the appellant for the rape of his
any custom, practice or tradition followed by the Senate. thirteen-year old daughter.

Justice Carpio's response to the same argument raised by the respondents is illuminating:
The publication of the Rules of Procedure in the website of the Senate, or in pamphlet
form available at the Senate, is not sufficient under the Taada v. Tuvera ruling which
requires publication either in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation.
The Rules of Procedure even provide that the rules "shall take effect seven (7) days after
publication in two (2) newspapers of general circulation," precluding any other form of
publication. Publication in accordance with Taada is mandatory to comply with the due
process requirement because the Rules of Procedure put a person's liberty at risk. A
person who violates the Rules of Procedure could be arrested and detained by the Senate.
The invocation by the respondents of the provisions of R.A. No. 8792,[50] otherwise
known as the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, to support their claim of valid publication
through the internet is all the more incorrect. R.A. 8792 considers an electronic data
message or an electronic document as the functional equivalent of a written document
only for evidentiary purposes.[51] In other words, the law merely recognizes the
admissibility in evidence (for their being the original) of electronic data messages and/or
electronic documents.[52] It does not make the internet a medium for publishing laws,
rules and regulations.
Given this discussion, the respondent Senate Committees, therefore, could not, in
violation of the Constitution, use its unpublished rules in the legislative inquiry subject of
these consolidated cases. The conduct of inquiries in aid of legislation by the Senate has to
be deferred until it shall have caused the publication of the rules, because it can do so only
"in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure."
Consistent with the ruling of this Court in People v. Cabalquinto,[1] the real name and the
personal circumstances of the victim, and any other information tending to establish or
compromise her identity, including those of her immediate family or household members,
are not disclosed in this decision.
The Facts
In an Information dated 21 September 2000,[2] the appellant was accused of the crime of
QUALIFIED RAPE allegedly committed as follows:
That on or about the 15th day of March 2000, in the evening, at Barangay xxx,
municipality of xxx, province of Bukidnon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being the father of AAA with lewd design,
with the use of force and intimidation, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
criminally have carnal knowledge with his own daughter AAA, a 13 year[s]old minor
against her will.[3]
On 12 October 2000, appellant entered a plea of not guilty.[4] During the pre-trial
conference, the prosecution and the defense stipulated and admitted: (a) the correctness
of the findings indicated in the medical certificate of the physician who examined AAA; (b)
that AAA was only thirteen (13) years old when the alleged offense was committed; and (c)
that AAA is the daughter of the appellant.[5] On trial, three (3) witnesses testified for the
prosecution, namely: victim AAA;[6] her brother BBB;[7] and one Moises Boy Banting,[8] a
"bantay bayan" in the barangay. Their testimonies revealed the following:
In the afternoon of 15 March 2000, AAA was left alone at home.[9] AAA's father, the
appellant, was having a drinking spree at the neighbor's place.[10] Her mother decided to
leave because when appellant gets drunk, he has the habit of mauling AAA's mother.[11]
 P a g e | 13

Her only brother BBB also went out in the company of some neighbors.[12] MODIFICATIONS[44] by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 00456-MIN.[45] The
appellate court found that appellant is not eligible for parole and it increased both the civil
At around 10:00 o'clock in the evening, appellant woke AAA up;[13] removed his pants, slid indemnity and moral damages from P50,000.00 to P75,000.00.[46]
inside the blanket covering AAA and removed her pants and underwear;[14] warned her
not to shout for help while threatening her with his fist;[15] and told her that he had a knife On 24 November 2008, the Court of Appeals gave due course to the appellant's notice of
placed above her head.[16] He proceeded to mash her breast, kiss her repeatedly, and appeal.[47] This Court required the parties to simultaneously file their respective
"inserted his penis inside her vagina."[17] supplemental briefs,[48] but both manifested that they will no longer file supplemental
pleadings.[49]
Soon after, BBB arrived and found AAA crying.[18] Appellant claimed he scolded her for
staying out late.[19] BBB decided to take AAA with him.[20] While on their way to their The lone assignment of error in the appellant's brief is that, the trial court gravely erred in
maternal grandmother's house, AAA recounted her harrowing experience with their father. finding him guilty as charged despite the failure of the prosecution to establish his guilt
[21] Upon reaching their grandmother's house, they told their grandmother and uncle of beyond reasonable doubt,[50] because: (1) there were inconsistencies in the testimonies
the incident,[22] after which, they sought the assistance of Moises Boy Banting.[23] of AAA and her brother BBB;[51] (2) his extrajudicial confession before Moises Boy Banting
was without the assistance of a counsel, in violation of his constitutional right;[52] and (3)
Moises Boy Banting found appellant in his house wearing only his underwear.[24] He AAA's accusation was ill-motivated.[53]
invited appellant to the police station,[25] to which appellant obliged. At the police
outpost, he admitted to him that he raped AAA because he was unable to control himself. Our Ruling
[26]
Appellant contests the admissibility in evidence of his alleged confession with a "bantay
The following day, AAA submitted herself to physical examination.[27] Dra. Josefa Arlita L. bayan" and the credibility of the witnesses for the prosecution.
Alsula, Municipal Health Officer of x x x, Bukidnon, issued the Medical Certificate, which
reads: Admissibility in Evidence of an Extrajudicial Confession before a "Bantay Bayan"

hyperemic vulvae with 4 o'clock & 6 o'clock freshly lacerated hymen; (+) minimal to Appellant argues that even if he, indeed, confessed to Moises Boy Banting, a "bantay
moderate bloody discharges 2 to an alleged raping incident[28] bayan," the confession was inadmissible in evidence because he was not assisted by a
lawyer and there was no valid waiver of such requirement.[54]
On the other hand, only appellant testified for the defense. He believed that the charge
against him was ill-motivated because he sometimes physically abuses his wife in front of The case of People v. Malngan[55] is the authority on the scope of the Miranda doctrine
their children after engaging in a heated argument,[29] and beats the children as a provided for under Article III, Section 12(1)[56] and (3)[57] of the Constitution. In Malngan,
disciplinary measure.[30] He went further to narrate how his day was on the date of the appellant questioned the admissibility of her extrajudicial confessions given to the
alleged rape. barangay chairman and a neighbor of the private complainant. This Court distinguished.
Thus:
He alleged that on 15 March 2000, there was no food prepared for him at lunchtime.[31]
Shortly after, AAA arrived.[32] She answered back when confronted.[33] This infuriated Arguably, the barangay tanods, including the Barangay Chairman, in this particular
him that he kicked her hard on her buttocks.[34] instance, may be deemed as law enforcement officer for purposes of applying Article III,
Section 12(1) and (3), of the Constitution. When accused-appellant was brought to the
Appellant went back to work and went home again around 3 o'clock in the afternoon.[35] barangay hall in the morning of 2 January 2001, she was already a suspect, actually the
Finding nobody at home,[36] he prepared his dinner and went to sleep.[37] only one, in the fire that destroyed several houses x x x. She was, therefore, already under
custodial investigation and the rights guaranteed by x x x [the] Constitution should have
Later in the evening, he was awakened by the members of the "Bantay Bayan" headed by already been observed or applied to her. Accused-appellant's confession to Barangay
Moises Boy Banting.[38] They asked him to go with them to discuss some matters.[39] He Chairman x x x was made in response to the 'interrogation' made by the latter - admittedly
later learned that he was under detention because AAA charged him of rape.[40] conducted without first informing accused-appellant of her rights under the Constitution or
done in the presence of counsel. For this reason, the confession of accused-appellant,
On 8 July 2006, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 9, Malaybalay City, Bukidnon, rendered its given to Barangay Chairman x x x, as well as the lighter found x x x in her bag are
decision[41] in Criminal Case No. 10372-0, finding appellant guilty of rape qualified by inadmissible in evidence against her x x x.
relationship and minority, and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
[42] It also ordered him to indemnify AAA P50,000.00 as moral damages, and P50,000.00 [But such does] not automatically lead to her acquittal. x x x [T]he constitutional
as civil indemnity with exemplary damages of P25,000.00.[43] safeguards during custodial investigations do not apply to those not elicited through
questioning by the police or their agents but given in an ordinary manner whereby the
On 30 September 2008, the decision of the trial court was AFFIRMED with accused verbally admits x x x as x x x in the case at bar when accused-appellant admitted
 P a g e | 14

to Mercedita Mendoza, one of the neighbors x x x [of the private complainant].[58]

(Emphasis supplied) The principle, however, is not applicable in the case at bar. In Bartocillo, the two
testimonies could not simply stand together because:
Following the rationale behind the ruling in Malngan, this Court needs to ascertain whether
or not a "bantay bayan" may be deemed a law enforcement officer within the On one hand, if we are to believe Susan, Orlando could not have possibly seen the hacking
contemplation of Article III, Section 12 of the Constitution. incident since he had accompanied Vicente home. On the other hand, if we are to accept
the testimony of Orlando, then Susan could not have possibly witnessed the hacking
In People of the Philippines v. Buendia,[59] this Court had the occasion to mention the incident since she was with Vicente at that time.
nature of a "bantay bayan," that is, "a group of male residents living in [the] area
organized for the purpose of keeping peace in their community[,which is] an accredited Here, the testimony of AAA does not run contrary to that of BBB. Both testified that they
auxiliary of the x x x PNP."[60] sought the help of a "bantay bayan." Their respective testimonies differ only as to when
the help was sought for, which this Court could well attribute to the nature of the
Also, it may be worthy to consider that pursuant to Section 1(g) of Executive Order No. 309 testimony of BBB, a shortcut version of AAA's testimony that dispensed with a detailed
issued on 11 November 1987, as amended, a Peace and Order Committee in each account of the incident.
barangay shall be organized "to serve as implementing arm of the City/Municipal Peace
and Order Council at the Barangay level."[61] The composition of the Committee includes, At any rate, the Court of Appeals is correct in holding that the assailed inconsistency is too
among others: (1) the Punong Barangay as Chairman; (2) the Chairman of the trivial to affect the veracity of the testimonies.[66] In fact, inconsistencies which refer to
Sangguniang Kabataan; (3) a Member of the Lupon Tagapamayapa; (4) a Barangay Tanod; minor, trivial or inconsequential circumstances even strengthen the credibility of the
and (5) at least three (3) Members of existing Barangay-Based Anti-Crime or neighborhood witnesses, as they erase doubts that such testimonies have been coached or rehearsed.
Watch Groups or a Non Government Organization Representative well-known in his [67]
community.[62]
Appellant's contention that AAA charged him of rape only because she bore grudges
This Court is, therefore, convinced that barangay-based volunteer organizations in the against him is likewise unmeritorious. This Court is not dissuaded from giving full credence
nature of watch groups, as in the case of the "bantay bayan," are recognized by the local to the testimony of a minor complainant by motives of feuds, resentment or revenge.[68]
government unit to perform functions relating to the preservation of peace and order at As correctly pointed out by the Court of Appeals:
the barangay level. Thus, without ruling on the legality of the actions taken by Moises Boy
Banting, and the specific scope of duties and responsibilities delegated to a "bantay Indeed, mere disciplinary chastisement is not strong enough to make daughters in a
bayan," particularly on the authority to conduct a custodial investigation, any inquiry he Filipino family invent a charge that would not only bring shame and humiliation upon them
makes has the color of a state-related function and objective insofar as the entitlement of and their families but also bring their fathers into the gallows of death.[69] The Supreme
a suspect to his constitutional rights provided for under Article III, Section 12 of the Court has repeatedly held that it is unbelievable for a daughter to charge her own father
Constitution, otherwise known as the Miranda Rights, is concerned. with rape, exposing herself to the ordeal and embarrassment of a public trial and
subjecting her private parts to examination if such heinous crime was not in fact
We, therefore, find the extrajudicial confession of appellant, which was taken without a committed.[70] No person, much less a woman, could attain such height of cruelty to one
counsel, inadmissible in evidence. who has sired her, and from whom she owes her very existence, and for which she
naturally feels loving and lasting gratefulness.[71] Even when consumed with revenge, it
Be that as it may, We agree with the Court of Appeals that the conviction of the appellant takes a certain amount of psychological depravity for a young woman to concoct a story
was not deduced solely from the assailed extrajudicial confession but "from the confluence which would put her own father to jail for the most of his remaining life and drag the rest of
of evidence showing his guilt beyond reasonable doubt."[63] the family including herself to a lifetime of shame.[72] It is highly improbable for [AAA]
against whom no proof of sexual perversity or loose morality has been shown to fake
Credibility of the Witnesses for the Prosecution charges much more against her own father. In fact her testimony is entitled to greater
weight since her accusing words were directed against a close relative.[73]
Appellant assails the inconsistencies in the testimonies of AAA and her brother BBB. AAA
testified that BBB accompanied her to the house of their grandmother. Thereafter, they, Elements of Rape
together with her relatives, proceeded to look for a "bantay bayan." On the other hand,
BBB testified that he brought her sister to the house of their "bantay bayan" after he
learned of the incident. Having established the credibility of the witnesses for the prosecution, We now examine
the applicability of the Anti-Rape Law of 1997[74] to the case at bar.
Citing Bartocillo v. Court of Appeals,[64] appellant argues that "where the testimonies of
two key witnesses cannot stand together, the inevitable conclusion is that one or both
must be telling a lie, and their story a mere concoction."[65] The law provides, in part, that rape is committed, among others, "[b]y a man who shall

have carnal knowledge of a woman" "through force, threat or intimidation."[75] The death
penalty shall be imposed if it is committed with aggravating/qualifying circumstances,
which include, "[w]hen the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a
parent."[76]
The consistent and forthright testimony of AAA detailing how she was raped, culminating
with the penetration of appellant's penis into her vagina, suffices to prove that appellant
had carnal knowledge of her. When a woman states that she has been raped, she says in
effect all that is necessary to show that rape was committed.[77] Further, when such
testimony corresponds with medical findings, there is sufficient basis to conclude that the
essential requisites of carnal knowledge have been established.[78]
The Court of Appeals pointed out that the element of force or intimidation is not essential
when the accused is the father of the victim, inasmuch as his superior moral ascendancy
or influence substitutes for violence and intimidation.[79] At any rate, AAA was actually
threatened by appellant with his fist and a knife allegedly placed above AAA's head.[80]
It may be added that the self-serving defense of appellant cannot prevail over the positive
and straightforward testimony of AAA. Settled is the rule that, "alibi is an inherently weak
defense that is viewed with suspicion because it is easy to fabricate."[81] "Alibi and denial
must be supported by strong corroborative evidence in order to merit credibility."[82]
Moreover, for the defense of alibi to prosper, the accused must establish two elements - (1)
he was not at the locus delicti at the time the offense was committed; and (2) it was
physically impossible for him to be at the scene at the time of its commission.[83]
Appellant failed in this wise.
Aggravating/Qualifying Circumstances
The presence of the qualifying circumstances of minority and relationship with the offender
in the instant case has likewise been adequately established. Both qualifying
circumstances were specifically alleged in the Information, stipulated on and admitted
during the pre-trial conference, and testified to by both parties in their respective
testimonies. Also, such stipulation and admission, as correctly pointed out by the Court of
Appeals, are binding upon this Court because they are judicial admissions within the
contemplation of Section 4, Rule 129 of the Revised Rules of Court. It provides:
Sec. 4. Judicial admissions. - An admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the course
of the proceedings in the same case, does not require proof. The admission may be
contradicted only by showing that it was made through palpable mistake or that no such
admission was made.
Penalty
Finally, in increasing the amount of civil indemnity and damages each from P50,000.00 to
P75,000.00, the Court of Appeals correctly considered controlling jurisprudence to the
effect that where, as here, the rape is committed with any of the qualifying/aggravating
circumstances warranting the imposition of the death penalty, the victim is entitled to
P75,000.00 as civil indemnity ex delicto[84] and P75,000.00 as moral damages.[85]
However, the award of exemplary damages should have been increased from P25,000.00
to P30,000.00.[86] Also, the penalty of reclusion perpetua in lieu of death was correctly
P a g e | 15
imposed considering that the imposition of the death penalty upon appellant would have
been appropriate were it not for the enactment of Republic Act No. 9346, or An Act
Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines.[87] We further affirm the
ruling of the Court of Appeals on appellant's non-eligibility for parole. Sec. 3 of Republic Act
No. 9346 clearly provides that "persons convicted of offenses punished with reclusion
perpetua, or whose sentences will be reduced to reclusion perpetua by reason of the law,
shall not be eligible for parole."
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 30 September 2008 in CA-G.R. CR
HC No. 00456-MIN is hereby AFFIRMED. Appellant Antonio Lauga is GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of qualified rape, and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole and to pay AAA P75,000.00 as civil
indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages, and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages.
SO ORDERED.
5. Herrera v. Alba G.R. No. 148220 June 15,2005
The Case
This is a petition for review[1] to set aside the Decision[2] dated 29 November 2000 of the
Court of Appeals ("appellate court") in CA-G.R. SP No. 59766. The appellate court affirmed
two Orders[3] issued by Branch 48 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila ("trial court") in
SP No. 98-88759. The Order dated 3 February 2000 directed Rosendo Herrera
("petitioner") to submit to deoxyribonucleic acid ("DNA") paternity testing, while the Order
dated 8 June 2000 denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
The Facts
On 14 May 1998, then thirteen-year-old Rosendo Alba ("respondent"), represented by his
mother Armi Alba, filed before the trial court a petition for compulsory recognition, support
and damages against petitioner. On 7 August 1998, petitioner filed his answer with
counterclaim where he denied that he is the biological father of respondent. Petitioner also
denied physical contact with respondent's mother.
Respondent filed a motion to direct the taking of DNA paternity testing to abbreviate the
proceedings. To support the motion, respondent presented the testimony of Saturnina C.
Halos, Ph.D. When she testified, Dr. Halos was an Associate Professor at De La Salle
University where she taught Cell Biology. She was also head of the University of the
Philippines Natural Sciences Research Institute ("UP-NSRI"), a DNA analysis laboratory.
She was a former professor at the University of the Philippines in Diliman, Quezon City,
where she developed the Molecular Biology Program and taught Molecular Biology. In her
testimony, Dr. Halos described the process for DNA paternity testing and asserted that the
test had an accuracy rate of 99.9999% in establishing paternity.[4]
Petitioner opposed DNA paternity testing and contended that it has not gained
acceptability. Petitioner further argued that DNA paternity testing violates his right against
self-incrimination.
The Ruling of the Trial Court

In an Order dated 3 February 2000, the trial court granted respondent's motion to conduct
DNA paternity testing on petitioner, respondent and Armi Alba. Thus:
In view of the foregoing, the motion of the petitioner is GRANTED and the
relevant individuals, namely: the petitioner, the minor child, and respondent are
directed to undergo DNA paternity testing in a laboratory of their common choice
within a period of thirty (30) days from receipt of the Order, and to submit the
results thereof within a period of ninety (90) days from completion. The parties
are further reminded of the hearing set on 24 February 2000 for the reception of
other evidence in support of the petition.
IT IS SO ORDERED.[5] (Emphasis in the original)
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the 3 February 2000 Order. He asserted
that "under the present circumstances, the DNA test [he] is compelled to take would be
inconclusive, irrelevant and the coercive process to obtain the requisite specimen...,
unconstitutional."
In an Order dated 8 June 2000, the trial court denied petitioner's motion for
reconsideration.[6]
On 18 July 2000, petitioner filed before the appellate court a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. He asserted that the trial court rendered the
Orders dated 3 February 2000 and 8 June 2000 "in excess of, or without jurisdiction
and/or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction."
Petitioner further contended that there is "no appeal nor any [other] plain, adequate and
speedy remedy in the ordinary course of law." Petitioner maintained his previous
objections to the taking of DNA paternity testing. He submitted the following grounds to
support his objection:
1. Public respondent misread and misapplied the ruling in Lim vs. Court of
Appeals (270 SCRA 2).
2. Public respondent ruled to accept DNA test without considering the limitations
on, and conditions precedent for the admissibility of DNA testing and ignoring
the serious constraints affecting the reliability of the test as admitted by private
respondent's "expert" witness.
3. Subject Orders lack legal and factual support, with public respondent relying
on scientific findings and conclusions unfit for judicial notice and unsupported by
experts in the field and scientific treatises.
4. Under the present circumstances the DNA testing petitioner [is] compelled to
take will be inconclusive, irrelevant and the coercive process to obtain the
requisite specimen from the petitioner, unconstitutional.[7]
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
P a g e | 16
On 29 November 2000, the appellate court issued a decision denying the petition and
affirming the questioned Orders of the trial court. The appellate court stated that
petitioner merely desires to correct the trial court's evaluation of evidence. Thus, appeal is
an available remedy for an error of judgment that the court may commit in the exercise of
its jurisdiction. The appellate court also stated that the proposed DNA paternity testing
does not violate his right against self-incrimination because the right applies only to
testimonial compulsion. Finally, the appellate court pointed out that petitioner can still
refute a possible adverse result of the DNA paternity testing. The dispositive portion of the
appellate court's decision reads:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the Petition is hereby DENIED DUE COURSE,
and ordered dismissed, and the challenged orders of the Trial Court AFFIRMED, with costs
to Petitioner.
SO ORDERED.[8]
Petitioner moved for reconsideration, which the appellate court denied in its Resolution
dated 23 May 2001.[9]
Issues
Petitioner raises the issue of whether a DNA test is a valid probative tool in this jurisdiction
to determine filiation. Petitioner asks for the conditions under which DNA technology may
be integrated into our judicial system and the prerequisites for the admissibility of DNA
test results in a paternity suit.[10]
Petitioner further submits that the appellate court gravely abused its discretion when it
authorized the trial court "to embark in [sic] a new procedure xxx to determine filiation
despite the absence of legislation to ensure its reliability and integrity, want of official
recognition as made clear in Lim vs. Court of Appeals and the presence of technical and
legal constraints in respect of [sic] its implementation."[11] Petitioner maintains that the
proposed DNA paternity testing violates his right against self-incrimination.[12]
The Ruling of the Court
The petition has no merit.
Before discussing the issues on DNA paternity testing, we deem it appropriate to give an
overview of a paternity suit and apply it to the facts of this case. We shall consider the
requirements of the Family Code and of the Rules of Evidence to establish paternity and
filiation.
An Overview of the Paternity and Filiation Suit
Filiation proceedings are usually filed not just to adjudicate paternity but also to secure a
legal right associated with paternity, such as citizenship,[13] support (as in the present
case), or inheritance. The burden of proving paternity is on the person who alleges that
the putative father is the biological father of the child. There are four significant procedural
aspects of a traditional paternity action which parties have to face: a prima facie case,

affirmative defenses, presumption of legitimacy, and physical resemblance between the
putative father and child.[14]
A prima facie case exists if a woman declares that she had sexual relations with the
putative father. In our jurisdiction, corroborative proof is required to carry the burden
forward and shift it to the putative father.[15]
There are two affirmative defenses available to the putative father. The putative father
may show incapability of sexual relations with the mother, because of either physical
absence or impotency.[16] The putative father may also show that the mother had sexual
relations with other men at the time of conception.
A child born to a husband and wife during a valid marriage is presumed legitimate.[17]
The child's legitimacy may be impugned only under the strict standards provided by law.
[18]
Finally, physical resemblance between the putative father and child may be offered as part
of evidence of paternity. Resemblance is a trial technique unique to a paternity
proceeding. However, although likeness is a function of heredity, there is no mathematical
formula that could quantify how much a child must or must not look like his biological
father.[19] This kind of evidence appeals to the emotions of the trier of fact.
In the present case, the trial court encountered three of the four aspects. Armi Alba,
respondent's mother, put forward a prima faciecase when she asserted that petitioner is
respondent's biological father. Aware that her assertion is not enough to convince the trial
court, she offered corroborative proof in the form of letters and pictures. Petitioner, on the
other hand, denied Armi Alba's assertion. He denied ever having sexual relations with Armi
Alba and stated that respondent is Armi Alba's child with another man. Armi Alba
countered petitioner's denial by submitting pictures of respondent and petitioner side by
side, to show how much they resemble each other.
Paternity and filiation disputes can easily become credibility contests. We now look to the
law, rules, and governing jurisprudence to help us determine what evidence of
incriminating acts on paternity and filiation are allowed in this jurisdiction.
Laws, Rules, and Jurisprudence
Establishing Filiation
The relevant provisions of the Family Code provide as follows:
ART. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the
same way and on the same evidence as legitimate children.
xxx
ART. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the
following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
P a g e | 17
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private
handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved
by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
The Rules on Evidence include provisions on pedigree. The relevant sections of Rule 130
provide:
SEC. 39. Act or declaration about pedigree.-The act or declaration of a person
deceased, or unable to testify, in respect to the pedigree of another person
related to him by birth or marriage, may be received in evidence where it
occurred before the controversy, and the relationship between the two persons is
shown by evidence other than such act or declaration. The word "pedigree"
includes relationship, family genealogy, birth, marriage, death, the dates when
and the places where these facts occurred, and the names of the relatives. It
embraces also facts of family history intimately connected with pedigree.
SEC. 40. Family reputation or tradition regarding pedigree.-The reputation or
tradition existing in a family previous to the controversy, in respect to the
pedigree of any one of its members, may be received in evidence if the witness
testifying thereon be also a member of the family, either by consanguinity or
affinity. Entries in family bibles or other family books or charts, engraving on
rings, family portraits and the like, may be received as evidence of pedigree.
This Court's rulings further specify what incriminating acts are acceptable as evidence to
establish filiation. In Pe Lim v. CA,[20] a case petitioner often cites, we stated that the
issue of paternity still has to be resolved by such conventional evidence as the
relevantincriminating verbal and written acts by the putative father. Under Article 278 of
the New Civil Code, voluntary recognition by a parent shall be made in the record of birth,
a will, a statement before a court of record, or in any authentic writing. To be effective,
the claim of filiation must be made by the putative father himself and the writing must be
the writing of the putative father.[21] A notarial agreement to support a child whose
filiation is admitted by the putative father was considered acceptable evidence.[22] Letters
to the mother vowing to be a good father to the child and pictures of the putative father
cuddling the child on various occasions, together with the certificate of live birth, proved
filiation.[23] However, a student permanent record, a written consent to a father's
operation, or a marriage contract where the putative father gave consent, cannot be taken
as authentic writing.[24] Standing alone, neither a certificate of baptism[25] nor family
pictures[26] are sufficient to establish filiation.
So far, the laws, rules, and jurisprudence seemingly limit evidence of paternity and
filiation to incriminating acts alone. However, advances in science show that sources of
evidence of paternity and filiation need not be limited to incriminating acts. There is now

almost universal scientific agreement that blood grouping tests are conclusive on non-
paternity, although inconclusive on paternity.[27]
In Co Tao v. Court of Appeals,[28] the result of the blood grouping test showed that the
putative father was a "possible father" of the child. Paternity was imputed to the putative
father after the possibility of paternity was proven on presentation during trial of facts and
circumstances other than the results of the blood grouping test.
In Jao v. Court of Appeals,[29] the child, the mother, and the putative father agreed to
submit themselves to a blood grouping test. The National Bureau of Investigation ("NBI")
conducted the test, which indicated that the child could not have been the possible
offspring of the mother and the putative father. We held that the result of the blood
grouping test was conclusive on the non-paternity of the putative father.
The present case asks us to go one step further. We are now asked whether DNA analysis
may be admitted as evidence to prove paternity.
DNA Analysis as Evidence
DNA is the fundamental building block of a person's entire genetic make-up. DNA is found
in all human cells and is the same in every cell of the same person. Genetic identity is
unique. Hence, a person's DNA profile can determine his identity.[30]
DNA analysis is a procedure in which DNA extracted from a biological sample obtained
from an individual is examined. The DNA is processed to generate a pattern, or a DNA
profile, for the individual from whom the sample is taken. This DNA profile is unique for
each person, except for identical twins.[31] We quote relevant portions of the trial court's
3 February 2000 Order with approval:
Everyone is born with a distinct genetic blueprint called DNA (deoxyribonucleic
acid). It is exclusive to an individual (except in the rare occurrence of identical
twins that share a single, fertilized egg), and DNA is unchanging throughout life.
Being a component of every cell in the human body, the DNA of an individual's
blood is the very DNA in his or her skin cells, hair follicles, muscles, semen,
samples from buccal swabs, saliva, or other body parts.
The chemical structure of DNA has four bases. They are known as A (adenine), G
(guanine), C (cystosine) and T (thymine). The order in which the four bases
appear in an individual's DNA determines his or her physical makeup. And since
DNA is a double-stranded molecule, it is composed of two specific paired bases,
A-T or T-A and G-C or C-G. These are called "genes."
Every gene has a certain number of the above base pairs distributed in a
particular sequence. This gives a person his or her genetic code. Somewhere in
the DNA framework, nonetheless, are sections that differ. They are known
as"polymorphic loci," which are the areas analyzed in DNA typing (profiling,
tests, fingerprinting, or analysis/DNA fingerprinting/genetic tests or
fingerprinting). In other words, DNA typing simply means determining
the "polymorphic loci."
P a g e | 18
How is DNA typing performed? From a DNA sample obtained or extracted, a
molecular biologist may proceed to analyze it in several ways. There are five (5)
techniques to conduct DNA typing. They are: the RFLP (restriction fragment
length polymorphism); "reverse dot blot" or HLA DQ a/Pm loci which was used in
287 cases that were admitted as evidence by 37 courts in the U.S. as of
November 1994; mtDNA process; VNTR (variable number tandem repeats); and
the most recent which is known as the PCR-([polymerase] chain reaction) based
STR (short tandem repeats) method which, as of 1996, was availed of by most
forensic laboratories in the world. PCR is the process of replicating or copying
DNA in an evidence sample a million times through repeated cycling of a reaction
involving the so-called DNA polymerize enzyme.STR, on the other hand, takes
measurements in 13 separate places and can match two (2) samples with a
reported theoretical error rate of less than one (1) in a trillion.
Just like in fingerprint analysis, in DNA typing, "matches" are determined. To
illustrate, when DNA or fingerprint tests are done to identify a suspect in a
criminal case, the evidence collected from the crime scene is compared with
the"known" print. If a substantial amount of the identifying features are the
same, the DNA or fingerprint is deemed to be a match. But then, even if only one
feature of the DNA or fingerprint is different, it is deemed not to have come from
the suspect.
As earlier stated, certain regions of human DNA show variations between people.
In each of these regions, a person possesses two genetic types called "allele",
one inherited from each parent. In [a] paternity test, the forensic scientist looks
at a number of these variable regions in an individual to produce a DNA profile.
Comparing next the DNA profiles of the mother and child, it is possible to
determine which half of the child's DNA was inherited from the mother. The
other half must have been inherited from the biological father. The alleged
father's profile is then examined to ascertain whether he has the DNA types in
his profile, which match the paternal types in the child. If the man's DNA types
do not match that of the child, the man is excluded as the father. If the DNA
types match, then he is not excluded as the father.[32] (Emphasis in the
original)
Although the term "DNA testing" was mentioned in the 1995 case of People v.
Teehankee, Jr.,[33] it was only in the 2001 case ofTijing v. Court of Appeals[34] that
more than a passing mention was given to DNA analysis. In Tijing, we issued a writ of
habeas corpus against respondent who abducted petitioners' youngest son. Testimonial
and documentary evidence and physical resemblance were used to establish parentage.
However, we observed that:
Parentage will still be resolved using conventional methods unless we adopt the
modern and scientific ways available. Fortunately, we have now the facility and
expertise in using DNA test for identification and parentage testing. The
University of the Philippines Natural Science Research Institute (UP-NSRI) DNA
Analysis Laboratory has now the capability to conduct DNA typing using short

tandem repeat (STR) analysis. xxx For it was said, that courts should apply the
results of science when completely obtained in aid of situations presented, since
to reject said result is to deny progress. Though it is not necessary in this case to
resort to DNA testing, in [the] future it would be useful to all concerned in the
prompt resolution of parentage and identity issues.
Admissibility of
DNA Analysis as Evidence
The 2002 case of People v. Vallejo[35] discussed DNA analysis as evidence. This may be
considered a 180 degree turn from the Court's wary attitude towards DNA testing in the
1997 Pe Lim case,[36] where we stated that "DNA, being a relatively new science, xxx
has not yet been accorded official recognition by our courts." In Vallejo, the DNA profile
from the vaginal swabs taken from the rape victim matched the accused's DNA profile. We
affirmed the accused's conviction of rape with homicide and sentenced him to death. We
declared:
In assessing the probative value of DNA evidence, therefore, courts should
consider, among other things, the following data: how the samples were
collected, how they were handled, the possibility of contamination of the
samples, the procedure followed in analyzing the samples, whether the proper
standards and procedures were followed in conducting the tests, and the
qualification of the analyst who conducted the tests.[37]
Vallejo discussed the probative value, not admissibility, of DNA evidence. By 2002, there
was no longer any question on the validity of the use of DNA analysis as evidence. The
Court moved from the issue of according "official recognition" to DNA analysis as evidence
to the issue of observance of procedures in conducting DNA analysis.
In 2004, there were two other cases that had a significant impact on jurisprudence on
DNA testing: People v. Yatar[38] and In re: The Writ of Habeas Corpus for
Reynaldo de Villa.[39] In Yatar, a match existed between the DNA profile of the semen
found in the victim and the DNA profile of the blood sample given by appellant in open
court. The Court, following Vallejo's footsteps, affirmed the conviction of appellant
because the physical evidence, corroborated by circumstantial evidence, showed appellant
guilty of rape with homicide. In De Villa, the convict-petitioner presented DNA test results
to prove that he is not the father of the child conceived at the time of commission of the
rape. The Court ruled that a difference between the DNA profile of the convict-petitioner
and the DNA profile of the victim's child does not preclude the convict-petitioner's
commission of rape.
In the present case, the various pleadings filed by petitioner and respondent refer to two
United States cases to support their respective positions on the admissibility of DNA
analysis as evidence: Frye v. U.S.[40] and Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals.
[41] In Frye v. U.S., the trial court convicted Frye of murder. Frye appealed his conviction
to the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia. During trial, Frye's counsel offered an
expert witness to testify on the result of a systolic blood pressure deception test[42] made
on defendant. The state Supreme Court affirmed Frye's conviction and ruled that "the
P a g e | 19
systolic blood pressure deception test has not yet gained such standing and scientific
recognition among physiological and psychological authorities as would justify the courts
in admitting expert testimony deduced from the discovery, development, and experiments
thus far made." The Fryestandard of general acceptance states as follows:
Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line between the
experimental and demonstrable stages is difficult to define. Somewhere in this
twilight zone the evidential force of the principle must be recognized, and while
courts will go a long way in admitting expert testimony deduced from a well
recognized scientific principle or discovery, the thing from which the deduction is
made must be sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the
particular field in which it belongs.
In 1989, State v. Schwartz[43] modified the Frye standard. Schwartz was charged with
stabbing and murder. Bloodstained articles and blood samples of the accused and the
victim were submitted for DNA testing to a government facility and a private facility. The
prosecution introduced the private testing facility's results over Schwartz's objection. One
of the issues brought before the state Supreme Court included the admissibility of DNA
test results in a criminal proceeding. The state Supreme Court concluded that:
While we agree with the trial court that forensic DNA typing has gained general
acceptance in the scientific community, we hold that admissibility of specific test
results in a particular case hinges on the laboratory's compliance with
appropriate standards and controls, and the availability of their testing data and
results.[44]
In 1993, Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.[45] further modified
the Frye-Schwartz standard. Daubert was a product liability case where both the trial
and appellate courts denied the admissibility of an expert's testimony because it failed to
meet the Frye standard of "general acceptance." The United States Supreme Court ruled
that in federal trials, the Federal Rules of Evidence have superseded the Frye standard.
Rule 401 defines relevant evidence, while Rule 402 provides the foundation for
admissibility of evidence. Thus:
Rule 401. "Relevant evidence" is defined as that which has any "tendency to
make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the
action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.
Rule 402. All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by
the Constitution of the United States, by Act of Congress, by these rules, or by
other rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority.
Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible.
Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence governing expert testimony provides:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact
to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as
an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify
thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.

Daubert cautions that departure from the Frye standard of general acceptance does not
mean that the Federal Rules do not place limits on the admissibility of scientific evidence.
Rather, the judge must ensure that the testimony's reasoning or method is scientifically
valid and is relevant to the issue. Admissibility would depend on factors such as (1)
whether the theory or technique can be or has been tested; (2) whether the theory or
technique has been subjected to peer review and publication; (3) the known or potential
rate of error; (4) the existence and maintenance of standards controlling the technique's
operation; and (5) whether the theory or technique is generally accepted in the scientific
community.
Another product liability case, Kumho Tires Co. v. Carmichael,[46] further modified
the Daubert standard. This led to the amendment of Rule 702 in 2000 and which now
reads as follows:
If scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact
to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as
an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify
thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise, if (1) the testimony is based upon
sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and
methods, and (3) the witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to
the facts of the case.
We now determine the applicability in this jurisdiction of these American cases. Obviously,
neither the Frye-Schwartz standard nor the Daubert-Kumho standard is controlling in
the Philippines.[47] At best, American jurisprudence merely has a persuasive effect on our
decisions. Here, evidence is admissible when it is relevant to the fact in issue and is not
otherwise excluded by statute or the Rules of Court.[48] Evidence is relevant when it has
such a relation to the fact in issue as to induce belief in its existence or non-existence.[49]
Section 49 of Rule 130, which governs the admissibility of expert testimony, provides as
follows:
The opinion of a witness on a matter requiring special knowledge, skill,
experience or training which he is shown to possess may be received in
evidence.
This Rule does not pose any legal obstacle to the admissibility of DNA analysis as
evidence. Indeed, even evidence on collateral matters is allowed "when it tends in any
reasonable degree to establish the probability or improbability of the fact in issue."[50]
Indeed, it would have been convenient to merely refer petitioner to our decisions
in Tijing, Vallejo and Yatar to illustrate that DNA analysis is admissible as evidence. In
our jurisdiction, the restrictive tests for admissibility established by Frye-
Schwartz andDaubert-Kumho go into the weight of the evidence.
Probative Value of
DNA Analysis as Evidence
P a g e | 20
Despite our relatively liberal rules on admissibility, trial courts should be cautious in giving
credence to DNA analysis as evidence. We reiterate our statement in Vallejo:
In assessing the probative value of DNA evidence, therefore, courts should
consider, among other things, the following data: how the samples were
collected, how they were handled, the possibility of contamination of the
samples, the procedure followed in analyzing the samples, whether the proper
standards and procedures were followed in conducting the tests, and the
qualification of the analyst who conducted the tests.[51]
We also repeat the trial court's explanation of DNA analysis used in paternity cases:
In [a] paternity test, the forensic scientist looks at a number of these variable regions in
an individual to produce a DNA profile. Comparing next the DNA profiles of the mother and
child, it is possible to determine which half of the child's DNA was inherited from the
mother. The other half must have been inherited from the biological father. The alleged
father's profile is then examined to ascertain whether he has the DNA types in his profile,
which match the paternal types in the child. If the man's DNA types do not match that of
the child, the man is excluded as the father. If the DNA types match, then he is not
excluded as the father.[52]
It is not enough to state that the child's DNA profile matches that of the putative father. A
complete match between the DNA profile of the child and the DNA profile of the putative
father does not necessarily establish paternity. For this reason, following the highest
standard adopted in an American jurisdiction,[53] trial courts should require at least
99.9% as a minimum value of the Probability of Paternity ("W") prior to a paternity
inclusion. W is a numerical estimate for the likelihood of paternity of a putative father
compared to the probability of a random match of two unrelated individuals. An
appropriate reference population database, such as the Philippine population database, is
required to compute for W. Due to the probabilistic nature of paternity inclusions, W will
never equal to 100%. However, the accuracy of W estimates is higher when the putative
father, mother and child are subjected to DNA analysis compared to those conducted
between the putative father and child alone.[54]
DNA analysis that excludes the putative father from paternity should be conclusive proof
of non-paternity. If the value of W is less than 99.9%, the results of the DNA analysis
should be considered as corroborative evidence. If the value of W is 99.9% or higher, then
there is refutable presumption of paternity.[55] This refutable presumption of paternity
should be subjected to the Vallejostandards.
Right Against
Self-Incrimination
Section 17, Article 3 of the 1987 Constitution provides that "no person shall be compelled
to be a witness against himself." Petitioner asserts that obtaining samples from him for
DNA testing violates his right against self-incrimination. Petitioner ignores our earlier
pronouncements that the privilege is applicable only to testimonial evidence. Again, we
quote relevant portions of the trial court's 3 February 2000 Order with approval:
 P a g e | 21

Obtaining DNA samples from an accused in a criminal case or from the against her will.
respondent in a paternity case, contrary to the belief of respondent in this action,
will not violate the right against self-incrimination. This privilege applies only to CONTRARY TO LAW.
evidence that is "communicative" in essence taken under duress (People vs.
Olvis, 154 SCRA 513, 1987). The Supreme Court has ruled that the right against (p. 6, Rello)
self-incrimination is just a prohibition on the use of physical or moral compulsion
to extort communication (testimonial evidence) from a defendant, not an At his arraignment on November 8, 1995, accused-appellant entered a plea of not guilty,
exclusion of evidence taken from his body when it may be material. As such, a after which trial ensued.
defendant can be required to submit to a test to extract virus from his body (as
The prosecution's version of the generative facts, as gathered from the testimony of its
cited in People vs. Olvis, Supra); the substance emitting from the body of the
witnesses-Alejandra Tabada, mother of the victim; PO3 Celso Y. Tan Sanchez, the police
accused was received as evidence for acts of lasciviousness (US vs. Tan Teng, 23
officer who investigated the case; Orlando Pioquinto, brother-in-law of the victim; Escelea
Phil. 145); morphine forced out of the mouth was received as proof (US vs. Ong
Tabada, the 13-year-old victim; and Felicitas delos Santos Timorata, the medical record
Siu Hong, 36 Phil. 735); an order by the judge for the witness to put on pair of clerk who used to be the medical officer under Dr. Rimberto Sangglang, the physically
pants for size was allowed (People vs. Otadora, 86 Phil. 244); and the court can examined the victim after the incident-is abstracted in the Appellee's Brief in this wise.:
compel a woman accused of adultery to submit for pregnancy test (Villaflor vs.
Summers, 41 Phil. 62), since the gist of the privilege is the restriction Escelea Tabada and appellant Rodegelio Turco were neighbors in lower Begang, Isabela,
on "testimonial compulsion."[56] Basilan, their houses being only about sixty (60) meters apart (p. 6 and p. 8, t.s.n., August
19, 1996). Escelea was then staying with her father, Alejandro and her deaf grandmother,
The policy of the Family Code to liberalize the rule on the investigation of the paternity Perseveranda (p. 9, id.) She was twelve (12) years and six (6) months old at the time of
and filiation of children, especially of illegitimate children, is without prejudice to the right incident, having been born on December 3, 1982 (p. 3, id.).
of the putative parent to claim his or her own defenses.[57] Where the evidence to aid this
investigation is obtainable through the facilities of modern science and technology, such The nightmare of Escelea began in the evening of July 1995. At around seven o'clock (7:00
evidence should be considered subject to the limits established by the law, rules, and p.m.) in the evening, Escelea, after (pp. 11-12, daughter of her neighbor, Leonora Cabase
jurisprudence. (p. 13, id).

WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition. We AFFIRM the Decision of the Court of Appeals Cory left upon reaching Escelea's home. Escelea went upstairs to join her grandmother
dated 29 November 2000 in CA-G.R. SP No. 59766. We also AFFIRM the Orders dated 3 who was already sleeping in the room. About to enter the said room, Escelea heard a call
February 2000 and 8 June 2000 issued by Branch 48 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila from outside. She recognized the voice and when she asked who was it, the party
in Civil Case No. SP-98-88759. introduced himself as the appellant, viz.:

SO ORDERED. Q. After you heard your named was mentioned, what did you if any?
A. I answered: "Who is that?"

Q. Did the person calling your answer you?

B. Admissibility versus Probative Value A. I heard, sir, "me Totong/"

Q. When you say the person who called your name "Lea" was "Totong" you are referring to
6. People v. Turco G.R. No. 167757 August 14, 2000
whom?
A. Rodegelio, sir.
Accused-appellant Rodegelio Turco, Jr. (aka "Totong") was charged with the crime of rape in
Criminal Case No. 2379-272, Branch I of the Regional Trial Court of Basilan of the 9th
(p. 15, id.; Italics supplied)
Judicial Region, stationed in Isabela, Basilan, under the following Information:
She recognized appellant Turco immediately as she had known him for four (4) years and
That on or about the 8th day of July 1995, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
appellant is her second cousin (p. 34, id.). Unaware of the danger that was about to befall
Court, viz, at Km. 6, Begang Barangay, Municipality of Isabela, Province of Basilan,
her, Escelea forthwith opened the door. Appellant Turco, with the use of towel, covered
Philippines, the above-named accused, by the use of force, threat and intimidation, did
Escelea's face. Appellant, aside from covering the victim's mouth, even placed his right
then and there willfully, unlawfully and forcibly make her lie down, after which the said
hand on the latter's neck.
accused mounted on top of her and removed her short pant and panty. Thereafter, the said
accused, by the use of force, threat and intimidation, inserted his penis into the vagina of
Appellant bid Escelea to walk. When they reached a grassy part, near the pig which was
the undersigned complainant and finally succeeded to have carnal knowledge of her,
 P a g e | 22

about twelve (12) meters away from the victim's house, appellant lost no time in laying the October 2-31, 1997, pp. 157-160, and they are: (1) an accusation for rape can be made
victim on the grass, laid on top of the victim and took off her shortpants and panty (pp. 17- with facility, it is difficult to prove but more difficult for the person accused, though
19, id.). Escelea tried to resist by moving her body but to no avail. Appellant succeeded in innocent, to innocent, to disprove it: (2) in view of the intrinsic nature of the crime of rape
pursuing his evil-design-by forcibly inserting his penis inside Escelea's private part. The where two persons are usually involved, the testimony of the complainant must be
victim felt terrible pain (p. 20, id.). Still dissatisfied, after consummating the act, appellant scrutinized with extreme caution; and (3) the evidence for the prosecution must stand or
kissed and held the victim's breast. Thereafter, appellant threatened her that he will kill fall on its own merit; and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the
her if she reports the incident to anybody, thus: evidence for the defense. Thus, the credibility of the complainant is a paramount
importance, and if her testimony proves credible, the accused may be convicted on the
"He threatened me, that if you will reveal the incident to anybody I will kill you. basis thereof.
(p. 21, id.; Italics supplied)
It should be noted that the complainant and the accused are second degree cousin or they
Finally, after having satisfied his lust, appellant hurriedly went home. Escelea, on the other are sixth civil degree relatives. The mother of the accused is a first degree cousin of the
hand, upon reaching home, discovered that her shortpants and panty were filled with blood father of the complainant. In the culture of the Filipino family on extended family, the
(p. 23, id.). For almost ten (10) days, she just kept to herself the harrowing experience until relationship between the complainant and the accused being only second degree cousin, it
July 18, 1995 when she was able to muster enough courage to tell her brother-in-law, becomes the duty of an older relative (the accused) to protect and care for a younger
Orlando Pioquinto, about the said incident. Orlando in turn informed Alejandro, the victim's relative (the complainant). It is very hard to understand or comprehend why a cousin files
father, about the rape of his daughter. Alejandro did not waste time and immediately asked a case of rape against her cousin, unless it is true. There is no showing that there was
Escelea to see a doctor for medical examination (p. 27, id.). compelling motive why the case be filed against the accused, except that the rape really
happened.
Escelea was accompanied by her sister Clairlyn Pioquinto to the Provincial Hospital. She
was examined by Dr. Rimberto Sanggalang. After the issuance of the medical certificate, x x x
they went to Isabela Municipal Station and filed Escelea's complaint against appellant (pp. x x x
30-33, id.). x x x

(pp. 97-100, Rollo) It is noted that there was no underlying reason why the complainant and/or her father
would bring an action against the accused, except that the accused had raped Escelea
The defense presented Leonora Cabase, neighbor of accused-appellant; her granddaughter Tabada on July 8, 1995, at about 7:00 o'clock in the evening. If it were not true that she
Corazon Macapili, and accused-appellant himself. Accused-appellant denied the charge. was raped by the accused, why would she expose herself to an embarrassment and
The defense that the victim and him were sweethearts was also advanced. Leonora Cabase traumatic experience connected with the litigation of this rape case. We are aware of the
mentioned this in her direct testimony. Filipino culture especially on virginity. We likened it as a mirror, once dropped and broken,
it can no longer be pieced together. . . not ever. This is true among the Filipino folks that
In reaching a moral certainty of guilt, the trial court held: the complainant belonged, poor and helpless and everything is entrusted to God. The
complainant is a young girl, a little over twelve (12) years old and almost illiterate, having
While the accused denies the charge of rape, his witness, Mrs. Leonora Cabase was trying attended school up to Grade III only. So poor that her family cannot even buy the cheapest
to project that the complainant Escelea Tabada and the accused Rodegelio Turco, Jr. are television set and she has to go to a house of a neighbor for the meager joy of seeing a
sweethearts. In the case of People vs. Casil, 241 SCRA 285, the Supreme Court agrees with television show . . . and expose herself to the danger of the dark night. All said, it is very
the trial court that the "sweetheart story" was a mere concoction of appellant in order to difficult to be poor. Going to the court is a shout for help . . . let us try to hear it.
exculpate himself from criminal liability. The claim of voluntary love affair is an affirmative
defense, the allegation of a love affair needed proof. Nowhere in the record of the case that x x x
the same was substantiated, though mentioned by Mrs. Leonora Cabase. The accused x x x
and/or his witnesses must present any token of the alleged relationship like love notes, x x x
mementos or pictures and the like. Such bare allegation of the defense, not to mention its
utter lack of proof, is incredulous. It is hard to understand how such a relationship could WHEREFORE, under the above circumstances and evaluation, this court finds the accused
exculpate a person from the rape of a terrified young child barely a little over the age of "GUILTY" of rape and sentences him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to
twelve (12) years old. Indeed, a love relationship, even if true, will not necessarily rule out indemnify the complainant the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) for moral
force (People vs. Sergio Betonio, G.R. No. 119165, September 26, 1997, Case Digest of damages without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
Supreme Court Decisions, Vol., 36, No. 3, September 1-29, 1997, pp. 695-697).
x x x
There are guiding in rape cases as cited in People vs. Victor Abrecinoz, G.R. No. 122474, x x x
281 SCRA 59, October 17, 1997, Case Digest of Supreme Court Decisions, Vol. 37, No. 1, x x x
 P a g e | 23

(pp. 33-37, Rollo.) Accordingly, the primordial consideration in a determination concerning the crime of rape
is the credibility of complainant's testimony.
in accused-appellant's brief, he assigns the following alleged errors:
The trial court described complainant as "a young girl, a little over twelve (12) years old
and almost illiterate, having attended school up to Grade III only. So poor that her family
I cannot even buy the cheapest television set and she has to go to a house of neighbor
herself to the danger of the dark night." But verily, age, youth, and poverty are not
THAT THE HONORABLE COURT A QUO SEROUSLY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED GUILTY guarantees of credibility. Hence, thorough scrutiny must be made by the Court.
OF RAPE BASED ON THE TESTIMONIES OF THE COMPLAINANT ESCELEA TABADA AND HER
WITNESS. Complainant narrated the incident in this wise:

II Q: While you went upstairs and about to enter the room of your grandmother, did you hear
anything?
THAT THE HONORABLE COURT A QUO SEROUSLY ERRED IN RULING THAT THE A: Yes, sir.
PROSECUTION, BASED ON THE AFFIDAVITS AND ORAL TESTIMONIES OFHTE COMPLAINANT
AND ITS WITNESSES WAS ABLE TO PROVED [sic] BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT THAT THE Q: What was that?
ACCUSED COMMITTED THE CRIME OF RAPE AGAINST THE COMPLAINANT. A: I heard a call, sir.

III Q: How was the call made?

A: It is just by saying: "Lea."
THAT THE HONORABLE COURT A QUO SERIOUSLY ERRED IN SENTENCING THE ACCUSED TO
SUFFER THE PENALTY OF RECLUSION PERPETUA ANDTO INDEMNIFY THE COMPLAINANT Q: After you heard you name was mentioned, what did you say if any?
THE AMOUNT OF P50,000.00 REPRESWENTING MORAL DAMAGES BASED ON THE A: I answered: "Who is that?"
EVIDENCES PRESENTED BY THE PROSECUTION.
Q: Did the person calling your name answer you?
(p. 101, Rollo.) A: I heard, sir, "me Totong."

He particularly argues that his conviction is not supported by proof beyond reasonable Q: When you say the person who called your name "Lea" was "Totong," you are referring to
doubt considering that other than the written statement of the complainant before the whom?
Police Station of Isabela and before the Clerk of Court of the Municipal Trial Court, and her A: Rodegelio, sir.
testimony during direct examination, no other evidence was presented to conclusively
prove that there was ever rape at all; that she only presumed that it was accused- Q: When you say "Rodegelio," you are referring to Rodegelio Turco, Jr., the accused in this
appellant who attacked her since she admitted that immediately upon opening the door, case?
the perpetrator hastily covered her face with a towel; that nothing in her testimony clearly A: I opened the door, sir.
and convincingly shows that she was able to identify accused-appellant only because her
father forced her to do so; and lastly, that no actual proof was presented that the rape of Q: After the person calling your name "Lea" identified himself as "Totong, Jr., the accused in
the complainant actually happened considering that although a medical certificate was this case?
presented, the medico-legal officer the same. A: Yes, sir.

We agree with the trial court. Q: And when you opened the door, what happened next?
A: Totong with the use of towel covered my face, sir.
As aptly recalled by the trial court, there are three guiding principles in the review of rape
cases, to wit: (1) an accusation of rape can be made with facility; it is difficult to prove but Q: Aside from covering your face with a towel, what else did he do?
more difficult for the person accused, although innocent, to disprove; (2) in view of the A: He covered my mouth, sir.
usually involved, the testimony of the complainant is scrutinized with extreme caution; and
(3) the evidence for the prosecution stands or falls on its own merits and cannot be Q: Aside from covering your mouth, what else did he do?
allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the defense (People vs. Gallo, 284 SCRA A: He placed his right hand on my neck, sir.
590 [1998]; People vs. Balmoria, 287 SCRA 687 [1998]; People vs. Auxtero, 289 SCRA 75
[1998]; People vs. Sta. Ana, 291 SCRA 188 [1998]). Q: And aside from placing his right hand . . . and when he placed his right hand on your
neck, where was he? Was he infront of behind?
 P a g e | 24

A: He was at my back, sir. Leading, Your Honor.

Q: After placing his right hand on your neck behind you, what did "Totong" do next with PROSECUTOR M.L. GENERALAO:
that position? I will withdraw.
A: He covered my mouth, sir.
Q: Will you please explain to the Court what particular place of the pig pen that your were
Q: After covering your mouth and face what did he do next? brought by the accused?
A: He told me to walk, sir. A: Inside the grasses, sir.

Q: Where did he bring you? Q: When you were already inside the grasses near this pig pen, what did the accused do to
A: I don't know exactly where he brought me, sir. you?
A: He put me down, sir.
Q: But you know very well that he brought you to a certain place?
A: I don't know exactly the place where he brought me, sir. Q: When you were already down on the ground, what did the accused do next?
A: He molested me, sir.
Q: Is it far from your house where you were forcibly taken?
A: Yes, sir. Q: Before he molested you, did he remove anything from your body?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Do you have a copra kiln?
Q: What?
ATTY. G.V. DELA PE'A III: A: My shortpants and panty, sir.

The witness already answered that she does not know where she was brought, leading, Q: You stated that the accused while on top of you removed your pants and panty, did he
Your Honor. totally remove it from your body?
A: Yes, sir.
COURT: (Questioning the witness)
Q: After removing your shortpants and panty, what else did the accused do?
Q: According to you, from your hose you were bought by the accused to a place which you A: He abused me, sir.
do not know?
A: Yes, Your Honor. Q: You said that he abused you, how did he abuse you?
A: He put his private part inside my private part, sir.
Q: What place?
A: Peg pen, Your Honor. Q: When the accused was on top of you and he forcibly abused you, what did you do?
A: I tried to move my body, sir.
Q: Who owned that pig pen?
A: My father, Your Honor. Q: While you were trying to move your body and while the accused was on top of you,
what did the accused do?
Q: How far is that pig pen to your house? A: He tried to insert his private part to my private part, sir.
A: (From this witness stand to that road outside of this building).
Q: And was he able to insert his private part?
COURT: A: Yes, sir.
It is about 12 meters. Alright, continue.
Q: What did you feel when his private part was already inside your private part?
PROSECUTOR M.L. GENERALAO: (Continuing) A: I felt pain, sir.

Q: You stated in answer to the question of the Honorable Court that you were brought to Q: Will you please explain why you felt when the private part of the accused was already
the pig pen of the place where you were sexually abused, were you placed inside or inside your private part?
outside? A: I felt pain when he already finished, sir.

ATTY. G.V. DELA PE'A III: Q: By the way, before July 8, 1995, were you had been raped?
 P a g e | 25

Will you please tell us whether you have already experienced or you have already your together . . . not ever," this being "true among the Filipino folks [to which] complainant
menstruation at that time? belonged, poor and helpless everything is entrusted to God" (p. 35, Rollo).
A: No, sir.
The victim's relatively low level of intelligence explains the lapses in her testimony, having
Q: Now you stated to the Honorable Court . . . after the accused had sexually abused you intermingled two incidents. Nonetheless, it can easily be gathered from the record that the
and you said you felt pains after he consummated the sexual act, after that what did he do defense counsel may have contributed to this confusion when he asked the victim what
next after consumating the act? transpired "before" the incident (tsn, August 19, 1996, p. 37). Minor lapses in a witness'
A: After consumating his desire, he raised my panty and shortpants then he kissed me and testimony should be expected when a person recounts details of an experience so
hold my nipples, sir. humiliating and so painful to recall as rape (People vs. Gementiza, 285 SCRA 478 [1998]).
Rape, as a harrowing experience, is usually not remembered in detail. For, such an offense
Q: After the accused had raised your shortpants and panty, embraced you, kissed you and is not something which enhances one's life experience as to be worth recalling or reliving
hold your breast, did he tell you anything? but, rather, something which causes deep psychological wounds and casts a stigma upon
A: He threatened me, "that if you will reveal the incident to anybody I will kill you." the victim for the rest of her life, which her conscious mind would prefer to forget (People
vs. Garcia, 281 SCRA 463 [1997]). These lapses do not detract from the overwhelming
Q: In what dialect? testimony of a prosecution witness positively identifying the malefactor (People vs. Baccay,
A: In Chavacano, sir. 284 SCRA 296 [1998). Further, the testimony of a witness must be considered and
calibrated in its entirely and not by truncated portions thereof or isolated passages therein
Q: After the accused embraced you, kissed you and hold your nipple and threatened you in (People vs. Natan, 193 SCRA 355 [1991]).
Chavacano dialect, what happened nest after that?
A: No more, sir. The Court finds that the victim had no motive to falsely testify against accused-appellant.
Her testimony deserves the credence accorded thereto by the trial court (People vs.
(tsn, Aug. 19, 1996, pp. 14-22.) Luzorata, 286 SCRA 487 [1998]). Pertinently, no woman, especially one of tender age,
would concoct a story of defloration, allow an examination of her private parts, and
On cross-examination, the victim did display some apparent confusion when the defense thereafter pervert herself by being subjected to a public trial if she was not motivated
counsel asked her about the events that transpired before the ill-fated July 8, 1995. The solely by the desire to have the culprit apprehended and punished (People vs. Taneo, 284
query prompted her to narrate the incident prior to said date when she also watched SCRA 251 [1998]).
television at the home of Leonora Cabase, and that when she arrived home, accused-
appellant came and called her Lea" and when she asked who was it, he answered "si Another point to consider is the blood relationship between accused-appellant and the
Totong." When she asked what he wanted, he said he wanted to borrow a guitar. She said victim. at this juncture, we reiterate the trial court's observation thereon-the mother of
that she could not lend him the guitar since her father was not home. She went to sleep accused-appellant being a first degree cousin of the victim's father, that makes the victim
afterwards. On re-direct examination, she clarified that when accused-appellant came to and accused-appellant second degree cousins or sixth civil degree relatives. Filipino
borrow the guitar on July 8, 1995, it was about 5:30 o'clock in the afternoon. Lastly, she culture, particularly in the provinces, looks at the extended family as closely-knit and
said that the incident of the borrowing of the guitar and the incident that transpired at 7 recognizes the obligation of an older relative to protect and take care of a younger one. On
o'clock in the evening on July 8, 1995 were separate incidents. the contrary, in the instant case, the victim initiated the prosecution of her cousin. If the
charge were not true, it is indeed difficult to understand why the victim would charge her
Significantly, three things could be perceived: complainant's youth, her apparent confusion own cousin case against accused-appellant, the conclusion that the rape really happened
concerning the events that transpired, and her fear of both accused-appellant and her is logically reinforced.
father.
As regards the initial delay of the victim in reporting the rape incident, suffice it to state
At the outset, it should be remember that the declarations on the witness stand of rape that the delay and initial reluctance of a rape victim to make public the assault on her
victims who are young and immature deserve full credence (People vs. Bernaldez, 294 virtue is not uncommon (People vs. Gallo, supra,). In the case at bar, the victim's fear of
SCRA 317 [1998]). Succinctly, when the offended parties are young and immature girls her father who had moral ascendancy over her, was explicit. She testified that she did not
from the ages of twelve to sixteen, courts are inclined to lend credence to their version of disclose the incident to her father because of fear both of her father as well as of accused-
what transpired, considering not only their relative vulnerability but also the shame and appellant (tsn, August 19, 1996, pp. 23-24). Such reaction is typical of a twelve-year-old
embarrassment to which they would be exposed by court trial if the matter about which girl and only strengthens her credibility.
they testified were not true (People vs. Clopino, 290 SCRA 432 [1998]). In addition, we take
cognizance of the trial court's observation on the segment of the Filipino society to which The issue of credibility of the victim having been settled, there are a few points presented
the victim belongs-almost illiterate, having attended school up to the third grade only, and by the defense that must be passed upon:
so poor that she had to go to a neighbor's house to watch television, yet one who values
her virginity which like a "mirror, once dropped and broken . . . can no longer be pieced 1. Other than blood relationship, was there an intimate relationship between accused-
 P a g e | 26

appellant and the victim? The theory initially advanced by the defense in the proceedings Antonio Begang, Isabela, Basilan, is that right?
before the court a quo is the "sweetheart theory." In this regard, we agree with the trial A: Yes, sir, we are only close.
court that the "sweetheart story" was a mere concoction of accused-appellant in order to
exculpate himself from criminal liability. In People vs. Benerable (290 SCRA 15 [1998]), we Q: Is it not a fact Mr. Witness that your mother is the first cousin of the father of Escelea
held that the sweetheart theory of the accused was unavailing and self-serving where he Tabada?
failed to introduce love letters, gifts, and the like to attest to his alleged amorous affair A: They are cousins, sir.
with the victim. hence, the defense cannot just present testimonial evidence in support of
the theory that he and the victim were sweethearts. Independent proof is necessary, such Q: So, indeed you are related to the Tabadas?
as tokens, mementos, and photographs. It is likewise remarkable, a confession possibly of A: Yes, sir.
the bankruptcy of this theory, that accused-appellant has not insisted on this defense in
his brief, seemingly abandoning this line. Q: So, when you said that you are not related to the Tabadas, you were not telling the
truth?
We, therefore, conclude that whatever familiarity and supposed closeness there was A: Yes, sir.
between accused-appellant and the victim, is explained not by an intimate relationship but
by their blood relationship. Hence, it is noticeable that on the day of the incident, when (ibid., p. 51.)
accused-appellant called upon the victim and the latter asked who he was, the victim knew
right away that her caller was accused-appellant when the latter replied "Si Totong." 2. Accused-appellant argues that no actual proof was presented that the rape actually
happened since the medico-legal officer who prepared the medical certificate was not
Accused-appellant, in his direct testimony, tried to deny any blood relation with the victim presented in court to explain the same.
Escelea Tabada and touched on the apparent friendship between them, as follows:
In People vs. Bernaldez (supra), the court a quo erred in giving weight to the medical
Q: You mentioned earlier that you know the complainant, why do you know the certificate issued by the examining physician despite the failure of the latter to testify.
complainant Escelea Tabada? While the certificate could be admitted as an exception to the hearsay rule since entries in
A: I only know her when I was already in jail, sir. official records (under Section 44, Rule 130, Rules of Court) constitute exceptions to the
hearsay evidence rule, since it involved an opinion of one who must first be established as
Q: You mean to say that you never knew the complainant before you were arrested? an expert witness, it could not be given weight or credit unless the doctor who issued, it
A: I do not know her, sir. could not be given weight or credit unless the doctor who issued it is presented in court to
show his qualifications. We place emphasis on the distinction between admissibility by
COURT: (Questioning the witness) evidence and the probative value thereof. Evidence is admissible when it is relevant to the
issue and is not excluded by the law or the law or the rules (Section 3, Rule 128, Rules of
Q: Why, are you not related to the Tabadas? Court) or is competent. Since admissibility of evidence us determined by its by its
A: No, Your Honor. relevance and competence, admissibility is, an affair of logic and law. On the other hand,
the weight to be given to such evidence, once admitted, depends on judicial evaluation
ATTY. G.V. DELA PE'A III: (Continuing) within the guidelines provided in Rule 133 and the jurisprudence laid down with the Court.
thus, while evidence may be admissible, it may be entitled to or no weight at all.
Q: Have you ever seen the complainant in Begang? Conversely, evidence which may have evidentiary weight may be inadmissible because a
A: The complainant is at Begang, sir. special rule forbids its reception (Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium, Vol. II, 1998 ed.,
p. 550).
Q: And you mentioned that you were not related with the complainant, Mr. Witness?>
A: Yes, sir, were are only close. Withal, although the medical certificate is an exception to the hearsay rule, hence
admissible as evidence, it has very little probative value due to the absence of the
Q: So, in other words, Mr. Witness, you and the complainant Escelea Tabada were already examining physician. Nevertheless, it cannot be said that the prosecution relied solely on
friends? the medical certificate (stating that there was "[h]ymen rupture, secondary to penile
A: Yes, sir. insertion" as well as "foul-smelling discharges." The diagnosis was "[r]uptured hymen
secondary to rape" [p. 68, Record]). In fact, reliance was made on the testimony of the
(tsn, June 16, 1998, pp. 42-43) victim herself which, standing alone even without medical examination, is sufficient to
convict (people vs. Topaguen, 369 SCRA 601 [1997]). It is well-settled that a medical
However, on cross-examination, he notably crumbled: examination is not indispensable in the prosecution of rape (People vs. Lacaba, G.R. No.
130591, November 17, 1999; People vs. Salazar, 258 SCRA 55 [1996]; People vs.
Q: Now, you stated in your direct examinaiton that you are not related to the Tabada in San Venerable, supra). It is enough that the evidence on hand convinces the court that

conviction is proper (People vs. Auxtero, supra). In the instant case, the victim's testimony
alone is credible and sufficient to convict.
As a final observation, it must be said that the amount awarded by the trial court in favor
of Escelea Tabada as indemnification P50,000.00 to the victim as indemnity for rape not
committed or qualified by any of the circumstances under the Death Penalty Law, needs no
proof other than the conviction of the accused for the raped proved. This is different from
the P50,000.00 awarded as moral damages which also needs no pleading or proof as basis
thereof (People vs. Prades, 293 SCRA 411 [1998]).
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED, with the MODIFICATION that
accused-appellant Rodegelio Turco, Jr. aka "Totong" is ordered to indemnify the offended
party, Escelea Tabada, in the amount of Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos in addition to
the sum of P50,000.00 already awarded by the trial court as moral damages.
SO ORDERED.
7. Atienza v. Board of Medicine G.R. No. 177407 February 9, 2011
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
assailing the Decision1 dated September 22, 2006 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
SP No. 87755. The CA dismissed the petition for certiorari filed by petitioner Rico Rommel
Atienza (Atienza), which, in turn, assailed the Orders 2 issued by public respondent Board
of Medicine (BOM) in Administrative Case No. 1882.
The facts, fairly summarized by the appellate court, follow.
Due to her lumbar pains, private respondent Editha Sioson went to Rizal Medical Center
(RMC) for check-up on February 4, 1995. Sometime in 1999, due to the same problem,
she was referred to Dr. Pedro Lantin III of RMC who, accordingly, ordered several
diagnostic laboratory tests. The tests revealed that her right kidney is normal. It was
ascertained, however, that her left kidney is non-functioning and non-visualizing. Thus,
she underwent kidney operation in September, 1999.
On February 18, 2000, private respondents husband, Romeo Sioson (as complainant),
filed a complaint for gross negligence and/or incompetence before the [BOM] against the
doctors who allegedly participated in the fateful kidney operation, namely: Dr. Judd dela
Vega, Dr. Pedro Lantin, III, Dr. Gerardo Antonio Florendo and petitioner Rico Rommel
Atienza.
It was alleged in the complaint that the gross negligence and/or incompetence committed
by the said doctors, including petitioner, consists of the removal of private respondents
fully functional right kidney, instead of the left non-functioning and non-visualizing kidney.
The complaint was heard by the [BOM]. After complainant Romeo Sioson presented his
evidence, private respondent Editha Sioson, also named as complainant there, filed her
P a g e | 27
formal offer of documentary evidence. Attached to the formal offer of documentary
evidence are her Exhibits "A" to "D," which she offered for the purpose of proving that her
kidneys were both in their proper anatomical locations at the time she was operated. She
described her exhibits, as follows:
"EXHIBIT A the certified photocopy of the X-ray Request form dated December
12, 1996, which is also marked as Annex 2 as it was actually originally the Annex
to x x x Dr. Pedro Lantin, IIIs counter affidavit filed with the City Prosecutor of
Pasig City in connection with the criminal complaint filed by [Romeo Sioson] with
the said office, on which are handwritten entries which are the interpretation of
the results of the ultrasound examination. Incidentally, this exhibit happens to be
the same as or identical to the certified photocopy of the document marked as
Annex 2 to the Counter-Affidavit dated March 15, 2000, filed by x x x Dr. Pedro
Lantin, III, on May 4, 2000, with this Honorable Board in answer to this complaint;
"EXHIBIT B the certified photo copy of the X-ray request form dated January
30, 1997, which is also marked as Annex 3 as it was actually likewise originally
an Annex to x x x Dr. Pedro Lantin, IIIs counter-affidavit filed with the Office of
the City Prosecutor of Pasig City in connection with the criminal complaint filed by
the herein complainant with the said office, on which are handwritten entries
which are the interpretation of the results of the examination. Incidentally, this
exhibit happens to be also the same as or identical to the certified photo copy of
the document marked as Annex 3 which is likewise dated January 30, 1997,
which is appended as such Annex 3 to the counter-affidavit dated March 15,
2000, filed by x x x Dr. Pedro Lantin, III on May 4, 2000, with this Honorable
Board in answer to this complaint.
"EXHIBIT C the certified photocopy of the X-ray request form dated March 16,
1996, which is also marked as Annex 4, on which are handwritten entries which
are the interpretation of the results of the examination.
"EXHIBIT D the certified photocopy of the X-ray request form dated May 20,
1999, which is also marked as Annex 16, on which are handwritten entries which
are the interpretation of the results of the examination. Incidentally, this exhibit
appears to be the draft of the typewritten final report of the same examination
which is the document appended as Annexes 4 and 1 respectively to the
counter-affidavits filed by x x x Dr. Judd dela Vega and Dr. Pedro Lantin, III in
answer to the complaint. In the case of Dr. dela Vega however, the document
which is marked as Annex 4 is not a certified photocopy, while in the case of Dr.
Lantin, the document marked as Annex 1 is a certified photocopy. Both
documents are of the same date and typewritten contents are the same as that
which are written on Exhibit D.
Petitioner filed his comments/objections to private respondents [Editha Siosons] formal
offer of exhibits. He alleged that said exhibits are inadmissible because the same are mere
photocopies, not properly identified and authenticated, and intended to establish matters
which are hearsay. He added that the exhibits are incompetent to prove the purpose for
which they are offered.
Dispositions of the Board of Medicine
The formal offer of documentary exhibits of private respondent [Editha Sioson] was
admitted by the [BOM] per its Order dated May 26, 2004. It reads:

"The Formal Offer of Documentary Evidence of [Romeo Sioson], the Comments/Objections
of [herein petitioner] Atienza, [therein respondents] De la Vega and Lantin, and the
Manifestation of [therein] respondent Florendo are hereby ADMITTED by the [BOM] for
whatever purpose they may serve in the resolution of this case.
"Let the hearing be set on July 19, 2004 all at 1:30 p.m. for the reception of the evidence
of the respondents.
"SO ORDERED."
Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the abovementioned Order basically on the same
reasons stated in his comment/objections to the formal offer of exhibits.
The [BOM] denied the motion for reconsideration of petitioner in its Order dated October
8, 2004. It concluded that it should first admit the evidence being offered so that it can
determine its probative value when it decides the case. According to the Board, it can
determine whether the evidence is relevant or not if it will take a look at it through the
process of admission. x x x.3
Disagreeing with the BOM, and as previously adverted to, Atienza filed a petition for
certiorari with the CA, assailing the BOMs Orders which admitted Editha Siosons
(Edithas) Formal Offer of Documentary Evidence. The CA dismissed the petition for
certiorari for lack of merit.
Hence, this recourse positing the following issues:
I. PROCEDURAL ISSUE:
WHETHER PETITIONER ATIENZA AVAILED OF THE PROPER REMEDY WHEN HE
FILED THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI DATED 06 DECEMBER 2004 WITH THE
COURT OF APPEALS UNDER RULE 65 OF THE RULES OF COURT TO ASSAIL THE
ORDERS DATED 26 MAY 2004 AND 08 OCTOBER 2004 OF RESPONDENT BOARD.
II. SUBSTANTIVE ISSUE:
WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE REVERSIBLE ERROR AND
DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE IN A WAY NOT IN ACCORDANCE WITH
LAW AND THE APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THE HONORABLE COURT WHEN IT
UPHELD THE ADMISSION OF INCOMPETENT AND INADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE BY
RESPONDENT BOARD, WHICH CAN RESULT IN THE DEPRIVATION OF
PROFESSIONAL LICENSE A PROPERTY RIGHT OR ONES LIVELIHOOD. 4
We find no reason to depart from the ruling of the CA.
Petitioner is correct when he asserts that a petition for certiorari is the proper remedy to
assail the Orders of the BOM, admitting in evidence the exhibits of Editha. As the assailed
P a g e | 28
Orders were interlocutory, these cannot be the subject of an appeal separate from the
judgment that completely or finally disposes of the case. 5 At that stage, where there is no
appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the only
and remaining remedy left to petitioner is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court on the ground of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.
However, the writ of certiorari will not issue absent a showing that the BOM has acted
without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. Embedded in the CAs
finding that the BOM did not exceed its jurisdiction or act in grave abuse of discretion is
the issue of whether the exhibits of Editha contained in her Formal Offer of Documentary
Evidence are inadmissible.
Petitioner argues that the exhibits formally offered in evidence by Editha: (1) violate the
best evidence rule; (2) have not been properly identified and authenticated; (3) are
completely hearsay; and (4) are incompetent to prove their purpose. Thus, petitioner
contends that the exhibits are inadmissible evidence.
We disagree.
To begin with, it is well-settled that the rules of evidence are not strictly applied in
proceedings before administrative bodies such as the BOM. 6 Although trial courts are
enjoined to observe strict enforcement of the rules of evidence, 7 in connection with
evidence which may appear to be of doubtful relevancy, incompetency, or admissibility,
we have held that:
[I]t is the safest policy to be liberal, not rejecting them on doubtful or technical grounds,
but admitting them unless plainly irrelevant, immaterial or incompetent, for the reason
that their rejection places them beyond the consideration of the court, if they are
thereafter found relevant or competent; on the other hand, their admission, if they turn
out later to be irrelevant or incompetent, can easily be remedied by completely discarding
them or ignoring them.8
From the foregoing, we emphasize the distinction between the admissibility of evidence
and the probative weight to be accorded the same pieces of evidence. PNOC Shipping and
Transport Corporation v. Court of Appeals9teaches:
Admissibility of evidence refers to the question of whether or not the circumstance (or
evidence) is to be considered at all. On the other hand, the probative value of evidence
refers to the question of whether or not it proves an issue.
Second, petitioners insistence that the admission of Edithas exhibits violated his
substantive rights leading to the loss of his medical license is misplaced. Petitioner

mistakenly relies on Section 20, Article I of the Professional Regulation Commission Rules
of Procedure, which reads:
Section 20. Administrative investigation shall be conducted in accordance with these
Rules. The Rules of Court shall only apply in these proceedings by analogy or on a
suppletory character and whenever practicable and convenient. Technical errors in the
admission of evidence which do not prejudice the substantive rights of either party shall
not vitiate the proceedings.10
As pointed out by the appellate court, the admission of the exhibits did not prejudice the
substantive rights of petitioner because, at any rate, the fact sought to be proved thereby,
that the two kidneys of Editha were in their proper anatomical locations at the time she
was operated on, is presumed under Section 3, Rule 131 of the Rules of Court:
Sec. 3. Disputable presumptions. The following presumptions are satisfactory if
uncontradicted, but may be contradicted and overcome by other evidence:
xxxx
(y) That things have happened according to the ordinary course of nature and the ordinary
habits of life.
The exhibits are certified photocopies of X-ray Request Forms dated December 12, 1996,
January 30, 1997, March 16, 1996, and May 20, 1999, filed in connection with Edithas
medical case. The documents contain handwritten entries interpreting the results of the
examination. These exhibits were actually attached as annexes to Dr. Pedro Lantin IIIs
counter affidavit filed with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Pasig City, which was
investigating the criminal complaint for negligence filed by Editha against the doctors of
Rizal Medical Center (RMC) who handled her surgical procedure. To lay the predicate for
her case, Editha offered the exhibits in evidence to prove that her "kidneys were both in
their proper anatomical locations at the time" of her operation.
The fact sought to be established by the admission of Edithas exhibits, that her "kidneys
were both in their proper anatomical locations at the time" of her operation, need not be
proved as it is covered by mandatory judicial notice.11
Unquestionably, the rules of evidence are merely the means for ascertaining the truth
respecting a matter of fact.12 Thus, they likewise provide for some facts which are
established and need not be proved, such as those covered by judicial notice, both
mandatory and discretionary.13 Laws of nature involving the physical sciences, specifically
biology,14 include the structural make-up and composition of living things such as human
beings. In this case, we may take judicial notice that Edithas kidneys before, and at the
time of, her operation, as with most human beings, were in their proper anatomical
locations.
P a g e | 29
Third, contrary to the assertion of petitioner, the best evidence rule is inapplicable. Section
3 of Rule 130 provides:
1. Best Evidence Rule
Sec. 3. Original document must be produced; exceptions. When the subject of inquiry is
the contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original
document itself, except in the following cases:
(a) When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court,
without bad faith on the part of the offeror;
(b) When the original is in the custody or under the control of the party against
whom the evidence is offered, and the latter fails to produce it after reasonable
notice;
(c) When the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents which
cannot be examined in court without great loss of time and the fact sought to be
established from them is only the general result of the whole; and
(d) When the original is a public record in the custody of a public officer or is
recorded in a public office.
The subject of inquiry in this case is whether respondent doctors before the BOM are liable
for gross negligence in removing the right functioning kidney of Editha instead of the left
non-functioning kidney, not the proper anatomical locations of Edithas kidneys. As
previously discussed, the proper anatomical locations of Edithas kidneys at the time of her
operation at the RMC may be established not only through the exhibits offered in
evidence.
Finally, these exhibits do not constitute hearsay evidence of the anatomical locations of
Edithas kidneys. To further drive home the point, the anatomical positions, whether left or
right, of Edithas kidneys, and the removal of one or both, may still be established through
a belated ultrasound or x-ray of her abdominal area.
In fact, the introduction of secondary evidence, such as copies of the exhibits, is
allowed.15 Witness Dr. Nancy Aquino testified that the Records Office of RMC no longer had
the originals of the exhibits "because [it] transferred from the previous building, x x x to
the new building."16 Ultimately, since the originals cannot be produced, the BOM properly
admitted Edithas formal offer of evidence and, thereafter, the BOM shall determine the
probative value thereof when it decides the case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 87755 is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

C. Relevance
8. People v. Galleno G.R. No. 123546 July 2, 1998
PER CURIAM:
What could be more compelling than deciding a case which involves the sexual abuse of a
five-year old child? Equally important is the fact that the case before us involves the
highest penalty imposable by law. Being the guardian of the most fundamental liberties of
every citizen, the Court must pass upon every intricate detail of the case at bar to
determine whether or not accused-appellant committed the gruesome act imputed against
him.
Accused-appellant Joeral Galleno seeks reversal of the judgment of Branch 14 of the
Regional Trial Court of the 6th Judicial Region stationed in Roxas City, relying on the
defense of denial. Since the case involves the death penalty, the matter has been elevated
to this Court for automatic review.
Accused-appellant was charged in an Information docketed as Criminal Case No. C-4629 for
the crime of Statutory Rape, reading as follows:
The undersigned Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, upon prior authority and approval of the
Provincial Prosecutor, and the original complaint filed by the guardian of the offended
party, accuses JOERAL GALLENO of the crime of STATUTORY RAPE, committed as follows:
That on or about 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon of August 16, 1994, at Brgy. Balighot,
Maayon, Capiz, and within the jurisdiction of this Court, the said accused did, then and
there, wilfully and feloniously, and without the permission of anyone, enter the house of
EVELYN OBLIGAR, a five-year old child, and succeeded in having carnal knowledge of her
thereby inflicting upon the latter a vaginal laceration which caused continuous bleeding
and her admission of five (5) days at the Roxas Memorial Hospital.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
(p. 9, Rollo.)
Accused-appellant entered a plea of not guilty. Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued,
resulting in a judgment of conviction, the dispositive portion of which reads:
IN THE LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING ESTABLISHED FACTS, the Court finds accused JOERAL
GALLENO GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt under Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7659
amending Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code.
Accordingly, accused JOERAL GALLENO is sentenced to suffer the supreme penalty of
DEATH and to indemnify the victim Evelyn Obligar Garganera the sum of FIFTY THOUSAND
(P50,000.00) PESOS.
P a g e | 30
Let this DECISION serve as clear signal, warning the perverts, the misguided elements of
our society, especially their lackadaisical parents in their innate moral obligation and
responsibility in educating their children that in this corner of the world the wheels of
justice is not asleep and its unforgiving hands and watchful eyes are as vigilant as ever.
(pp. 44-45, Rollo.)
In flashback, let us visualize the events.
Evelyn Obligar Garganera is the 5-year old daughter of Rosita Obligar Garganera who had
to leave the province to find work in Manila after separating from her husband. Evelyn,
together with her younger brother, 3-year old Eleazar, was thus left under the care and
custody of their uncle, Emeterio Obligar, and aunt Penicola Obligar.
Less than a kilometer away from their place of residence lived accused-appellant, 19-year
old Joeral Galleno, known well to Evelyn's family due to his frequent visits at the Obligars'
abode as he was paying court to Emeterio's eldest child, Gina.
On August 16, 1994, Emeterio and Penicola left their residence to work at the sugarcane
plantation owned by Magdalena Dasibar. Their three children had all earlier left for school.
The only persons left in the house were niece Evelyn and nephew Eleazar.
At around 4 o'clock in the afternoon, accused-appellant was on his way to his Lola Esing to
have his pants tailored. Since it was drizzling, he passed by the Obligars' residence and
found the two children left to themselves. The prosecution and the defense presented
conflicting versions on what occurred at said residence. However, the result is undisputed.
Evelyn sustained a laceration in her vagina which resulted in profuse, and to our mind, life-
threatening bleeding due to her tender age.
The prosecution's version of what took place at the Obligars' residence is based on the
testimony of Evelyn herself, her uncle Emeterio, and the doctors who examined and
treated her. The Solicitor General summarized the same in this wise:
2. Appellant took advantage of the situation by sexually molesting Evelyn. After lowering
her shorts, he made Evelyn sit on his lap, facing him. Then he forcibly inserted his penis
into her vagina. As Evelyn was only five-years old while appellant was a fully-grown man,
the penetration caused the child's vagina to bleed, making her cry in pain. (pp. 10-11 and
18-25, tsn, Garganera, January 10, 1995).
3. Appellant tried to stop the bleeding by applying, with his finger, the sap of "madre de
cacao" leaves on her vagina. Unsuccessful in his attempt, he left Evelyn grimacing and
crying in pain. (pp. 14-15, tsn, Garganera, January 10, 1995; pp. 6-7, tsn, Obligar, February
7, 1995).
4. Shortly, Emeterio and Penicola came home from work. The Spouses were laborers in a
sugarcane plantation about two kilometers away from their house. They arrived to find
Evelyn crying. Emeterio noticed that there was blood in Evelyn's dress and she was
pressing a rug against her genital organ. (pp. 11-12, tsn, Obligar, January 10, 1995; pp. 8-
9, tsn, Obligar, February 7, 1995).

5. Emeterio asked Evelyn what happened but she did not answer. Emeterio spread the
child's legs and saw that her vagina had been lacerated and blood was oozing therefrom.
He summoned a "quack" doctor who applied herbal medicine on Evelyn's vagina but this
did not stop the bleeding. (pp. 12-14, tsn, Obligar, January 12, 1995).
6. The following day, August 17, 1994, Emeterio brought Evelyn to the clinic of Dr. Alfonso
D. Orosco, the Rural Health Physician of Maayon, Capiz. Dr. Orosco reported, upon
examining Evelyn, that he found (1) clotted blood, about 1 centimeter in diameter, in her
vaginal opening, and (2) a vaginal laceration, measuring 1.0 centimeter x 0.5 centimeter,
between the 3:00 o'clock and 6:00 o'clock position. He also affirmed that Evelyn's vaginal
laceration could have been caused by a blunt instrument inserted into the vagina, that it
was possible that a human penis in full erection had been forcibly inserted into her vagina,
and that a human penis in full erection is considered a blunt instrument. (pp. 4-7, tsn,
Orosco, November 28, 1994; p. 14, tsn, Obligar, January 12, 1995).
7. While he was examining Evelyn, Dr. Orosco asked Evelyn what caused her injuries. The
child told him that a penis was inserted into her vagina and that its insertion caused her
pain. (pp. 9-10, 14 and 18-19, tsn, Orosco, November 28, 1994).
8. Since his clinic lacked the proper medical facilities needed to treat Evelyn, Dr. Orosco,
after dressing the victim's wound which continued to bleed, advised Emeterio and Penicola
to bring the child to the hospital for further medical treatment. (p. 8, tsn, Orosco,
November 28, 1994; pp. 14-16, tsn, Obligar, January 12, 1995).
9. On August 18, 1994, Emeterio brought Evelyn to the Roxas Memorial General Hospital
where she was examined by resident physician Dr. Ma. Lourdes Laada. Dr. Laada, upon
examining Evelyn, found that "there was a 3 cm. lacerated wound at the left anterior one-
third of the vagina" and "the presence of about 10-15 cc of blood" at the vaginal vault. Dr.
Laada recommended that Evelyn be admitted for confinement in the hospital because the
wound in her vagina, which was still bleeding, had to be repaired. Due to financial
constraints, Evelyn was not admitted into the hospital that day and went home with
Emeterio to Barangay Balighot. (pp. 6-8. tsn, Laada, January 4, 1995; pp. 15-16, tsn,
Obligar, January 12, 1995).
10. Upon her examination of the victim on August 18, 1994, Dr. Laada opined that "a lot
of things will cause the lacerated wound in the vagina." (p. 9, tsn, Laada, January 4,
1995). According to Dr. Laada, the vaginal laceration may be caused (1) by trauma to the
area, when a girl falls and hits her genital area on a blunt instrument; (2) by medical
instrumentation, like the insertion of a speculum into the vagina; or (3) by the insertion of
a blunt foreign object into the vagina, like a finger or a penis of a man in full erection. (pp.
8-10, tsn, Laada, January 4, 1995).
11. On August 19, 1994, Emeterio brought Evelyn back to the Roxas Memorial General
Hospital where she was attended to by Dr. Machel Toledo, the resident physician on duty,
who found blood clots and minimal bleeding in the genital area. Dr. Toledo ". . . pack(ed)
the area to prevent further bleeding and (he) . . . admitted the patient for possible repair of
that laceration and blood transfusion because she has anaemia 2ndary to bleeding." Two
hundred fifty five (255) cc of blood was transfused to Evelyn and she was given antibiotics
to prevent infection. However, she was no longer operated on because the laceration had
healed. Five days later, Evelyn was discharged and sent home with medication. (pp. 11-13,
P a g e | 31
17 and 26, tsn, Toledo, December 2, 1994).
12. Upon his examination of Evelyn on August 19, 1994, Dr. Toledo disclosed that the child
suffered severe compound laceration which could have been caused by a normal and fully
developed penis of a man in a state of erection that was forcibly inserted into her vagina
and that the insertion caused her vagina to hemorrhage which thus required the
transfusion of 255 cc of blood. (pp. 14-16 and 26, tsn, Toledo, December 2, 1994).
13. Prior to her confinement in the Roxas Memorial General Hospital on August 19,
Emeterio and Penicola Obligar brought Evelyn to the Maayon Police Station on August 18,
1994, where they reported the crime to SPO1 Paulino Durana. That same day, appellant
was apprehended in a house near the Balighot Elementary School and brought to the
police station. (pp. 17-19, tsn, Obligar, January 12, 1995; pp. 5-9, 16-17 and 21, tsn,
Durana, January 16, 1995).
(pp. 164-171, Rollo.)
Denial is presented as the defense. Accused-appellant testified that when he arrived at the
Obligar residence that afternoon of August 16, 1994, he found the two children, Evelyn and
Eleazar (also referred to in the record as Pilfo). While seated at the balcony, accused-
appellant was approached by Evelyn, who knew him (tsn, April 5, 1995, pp. 5 and 8). He
cajoled her by throwing her up and down, his right hand holding the child and his left hand
covering her vagina (Ibid., p. 21). Upon lifting up the child the first time, his left ring finger
was accidentally inserted into the vagina of the child since his fingernail was long and the
child was not wearing any underwear. Consequently, Evelyn began to cry because her
vagina started to bleed. Upon seeing this, he immediately went down the house and got
some bark or leaves of a madre de cacao tree and applied the sap on the child's wound.
The bleeding ceased and Evelyn stopped crying. Thereafter, accused-appellant went home.
(Ibid., pp. 9-10).
Accused-appellant further testified that on August 18, 1994, at around 9 o'clock in the
morning, he was arrested. On the same day, Emeterio Obligar asked him to admit the
offense so that he could be released the next day, but accused-appellant did not do so
(Ibid., pp. 26-27).
Accused-appellant's father Raul Galleno was also called to the witness stand and he
testified that he learned about the arrest of his son on August 18, 1994 (tsn, May 12, 1995,
p. 6). The following day, he went to the house of the Obligars to ask Evelyn what happened
to her. The child allegedly answered that a finger was accidentally inserted into her genital
organ, but that Penicola who was then present, butted into the conversation and told Raul
Galleno that the penis of accused-appellant was likewise inserted (Ibid., p. 8).
The trial court did not accord credence to the version of the defense, pointing out in its
decision that accused-appellant's defense of denial hinged on the argument that the
statement of Evelyn as to how she sustained her vaginal laceration was a mere concoction
and a plain distortion of facts by her guardian. The trial court called this a "desperate
attempt of the defense to becloud the charge of rape."
The trial court believed and accepted the testimony of Police Officer Paulino Durana that
during the interrogation of Evelyn which he conducted at the PNP Station of Maayon,

Emeterio and Penicola Obligar did not interfere with the responses of Evelyn, although,
true enough, it was difficult to obtain answers from her because of her tender age.
The trial court deemed the following circumstances significant in finding accused-appellant
culpable:
1. Accused-appellant failed to explain how his left ring finger accidentally came in contact
with Evelyn's vagina, while in the process of throwing her up and down. Besides, the
prosecution was able to establish that Evelyn was wearing shorts. And assuming for the
sake of argument that Evelyn was not wearing any pants or underwear at that time,
accused-appellant failed to explain how his finger could possibly penetrate the victim's
vagina by about one-fourth of an inch (p. 23, tsn, April 5, 1995).
2. After satisfying his lust, accused-appellant left the victim with her 3-year old brother, in
pain and bleeding.
3. Evelyn's statement given to Dr. Ma. Lourdes Laada, the physician who examined her at
the Roxas Memorial General Hospital, that it was accused-appellant's finger which injured
her, was a consequence of the victim's confusion.
4. The formal offer of settlement made by accused-appellant's father Raul Galleno militates
against the cause of the defense.
Hence, the instant appeal and review, with accused-appellant assigning the following
errors:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING FULL WEIGHT AND CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONIES
OF THE MEDICAL DOCTORS WHEN THE SAME FAILED TO CONCLUSIVELY AND SUFFICIENTLY
ESTABLISH THE CAUSE OF THE LACERATION IN THE OFFENDED PARTY'S VAGINA
THE TRIAL COURT SHOWED MANIFEST BIAS THEREBY DEPRIVING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT
TO A FAIR AND IMPARTIAL TRIAL AND DISREGARDED THE RIGHT OF THE ACCUSED TO BE
PRESUMED INNOCENT, WHEN HE ACTIVELY PARTICIPATED IN THE CROSS EXAMINATION OF
THE ACCUSED
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THE WARRANTLESS ARREST OF THE
ACCUSED AS UNJUSTIFIED
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN INTERPRETING THE FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE EXTENDED BY THE
PARENTS OF THE ACCUSED TO THE OFFENDED PARTY AS AN IMPLIED ADMISSION OF
GUILT.
(pp. 81-82, Rollo.)
One can not escape the feeling of utmost compassion for any rape victim, and more
especially so for a 5-year old statutory rape victim. However, in our consideration of the
matter before us, we set aside emotion and observe impartiality and coldness in drawing
conclusions.
Under the first assigned error, accused-appellant contends that the testimony of the three
P a g e | 32
expert witnesses presented by the prosecution, namely, Dr. Alfonso Orosco, Dr. Ma.
Lourdes Laada, and Dr. Machael Toledo, which convinced the trial court that rape was
committed against the offended party, is not impeccable considering that they found that
there was no presence of spermatozoa, and that they were not sure as to what caused the
laceration in the victim's vagina; that Dr. Laada herself testified that Evelyn told her that
it was the finger of accused-appellant which caused the laceration. In addition, accused-
appellant banks on the victim's testimony on cross-examination, that it was the finger of
accused-appellant which caused the laceration; and that she even disclosed this to
accused-appellant's father, Raul Galleno.
We are not persuaded.
As a general rule, witnesses must state facts and not draw conclusions or give opinions. It
is the court's duty to draw conclusions from the evidence and form opinions upon the facts
proved (Francisco, Pleadings and Trial Practice, Vol. I, 1989 ed., pp. 889-890). However,
conclusions and opinions of witnesses are received in many cases, and are not confined to
expert testimony, based on the principle that either because of the special skill or expert
knowledge of the witness, or because of the nature of the subject matter under
observation, or for other reasons, the testimony will aid the court in reaching a judgment
(Ibid., p. 886).
In the case at bar, the trial court arrived at its conclusions not only with the aid of the
expert testimony of doctors who gave their opinions as to the possible cause of the
victim's laceration, but also the testimony of the other prosecution witnesses, especially
the victim herself. In other words, the trial court did not rely solely on the testimony of the
expert witnesses. Such expert testimony merely aided the trial court in the exercise of its
judgment on the facts. Hence, the fact that the experts enumerated various possible
causes of the victim's laceration does not mean that the trial court's inference is wrong.
The absence of spermatozoa in the victim's vagina does not negate the conclusion that it
was his penis which was inserted in the victim's vagina (People vs. Caada, 253 SCRA 277
[1996]). In rape, the important consideration is not the emission of semen but the
penetration of the female genitalia by the male organ (People vs. Dones, 254 SCRA 696
[1996]). Verily, it is entirely probable that climax on the part of accused-appellant was not
reached due to the cries of pain of the victim and the profuse bleeding of her vagina.
As regards the inconsistencies in Evelyn's declarations, particularly as to what really
caused the laceration, we are convinced that the child, due to her tender age, was just
confused. This is best exemplified by the testimony of Dr. Lourdes Laada on cross-
examination, as follows:
Q. Now, Doctor, at the time that you conducted your examination, you were aware that
this child was only five years old?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And at that tender age, Doctor, is it possible that the child may not know the difference
or distinction between fingers of the hands and a finger protruding between the legs of a
person?
A. Yes, sir, it is possible.

Q. So that it is possible, Doctor, that the child may have referred to a finger that is
between the legs?
WITNESS
You mean the penis?
PROSECUTOR OBIENDA
Yes.
WITNESS
It is possible.
(tsn, p. 27, March 30, 1995.)
Of vital consideration and importance too is the unreliability, if not the outright incredulity
of the version of accused-appellant which is not in accord with ordinary human experience.
We thus can not help expressing sentiments similar to those of the trial court when it said:
The contention of accused Joeral Galleno raises serious doubts to his credibility. He failed
to explain how his ring finger accidentally came in contact with the genitalia of Evelyn,
while in the process of throwing her up and down, when it was established by the
prosecution that at that time Evelyn was wearing shorts. Even assuming "ex gratia
argumente" that Evelyn was pantyless, how could it be possible for his finger to penetrate
the vagina for about one-fourth of an inch . . . when she was in shorts. The Supreme Court,
in People vs. Fulgencio Baquiran, 20 SCRA 451, (held that) evidence, to be believed must
not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness, but it must be credible in itself.
Human perception can be warped by the impact of events and testimony colored by the
unconscious workings of the mind. No better test has yet been found to measure the value
of a witness' testimony than its conformity to the knowledge and common experience of
mankind.
(pp. 42-43, Rollo.)
Section 4, Rule 128 of the Rules of Court provides that "(e)vidence must have such a
relation to the fact in issue as to induce belief in its existence or non-existence." This
simply means that relevancy is determinable by the rules of logic and human experience
(Regalado, Remedial law Compendiun, Vol. II, 1988 ed., p. 434). There is no precise and
universal test of relevancy provided by law. However, the determination of whether
particular evidence is relevant rests largely at the discretion of the court, which must be
exercised according to the teachings of logic and everyday experience (Sibal and Salazar,
Compendiun on Evidence, 1995 ed., p. 6, citing Alfred Asmore Pope Foundation vs. New
York, 138 A. 444,106 Conn. 432).
There is no explanation how the left ring finger (allegedly with a long fingernail) of
accused-appellant penetrated the victim's vagina by a depth of one fourth of an inch.
Admittedly, accused-appellant's right hand held the child while his left hand supposedly
held her in the vagina area. Why would he hold the child's vagina if his only intention was
to frolic and kid around with her?
Accused-appellant likewise failed to explain why after injuring Evelyn (and after applying to
P a g e | 33
the wound the sap of madre de cacao), he left her in the company of an even younger
child, the victim's 3-year old brother. He did not even make an effort to immediately inform
Emeterio and Penicola of what had happened. Instead, he went home and kept mum about
the incident.
Accused-appellant also said that after the alleged accident, before going home, he
removed Eleazar's shorts and put them on Evelyn. Assuming this to be true, this only
shows that the child was still bleeding. Why then would he leave the child considering that
there was no adult, to attend to her? Significantly, his act of immediately leaving the place,
when considered in the light of the other evidence, reflects his fear because of what he
had done. The proverb "the wicked fleeth even when no man pursueth, but the innocent
are as bold as a lion" was correctly adopted by the trial court in drawing its conclusions.
All of these loopholes are palpable and manifest, and clearly work against the credibility of
accused-appellant's story on which his defense is based.
Besides, the trial court's conclusions find support in the testimony of accused-appellant's
own witness, Dr. Lourdes Laada (who was earlier presented during the trial as a
prosecution witness), who testified that a laceration is caused by a blunt instrument and
that a fingernail is not a blunt but a sharp instrument (tsn, pp. 32-33, March 30, 1995).
As regards accused-appellant's argument that the victim's testimony is just a concocted
story of what really happened, we apply the rule that the revelation of an innocent child
whose chastity was abused deserves full credence (People vs. Cagto, 253 SCRA 455
[1996]). We likewise consider the fact that her uncle and aunt, virtually her foster parents,
themselves support her story of rape. It is unnatural for a parent to use her offspring as an
engine of malice, especially if it will subject a daughter to embarrassment and even stigma
(People vs. Dones, supra.).
Accused-appellant's father, Raul Galleno, tried to destroy the credibility of Evelyn when he
took the stand and testified that the child disclosed to him that it was accused-appellant's
finger which was inserted into her vagina. Nevertheless, this testimony cannot prevail over
the testimony of the victim, to wit:
FISCAL OBIENDA
Q. You said that Joeral Galleno the accused in this case hurt you while you were in the
farm, can you tell the Honorable Court which part of your body was hurt by Joeral Galleno?
A. (Witness pointing to her vagina) Here.
Q. When you said you were hurt did you bleed?
WITNESS
A. Yes, Sir.
FISCAL OBIENDA
Q. What was used by Joeral Galleno in hurting your sexual organ?
A. His (Pitoy). Penis.

COURT
Make the translation of "Pitoy" into Penis.
Do you agree that the translation of Pitoy is Penis in English?
ATTY. DISTURA
Agreeable, Your Honor.
FISCAL OBIENDA
Q. What did Joeral Galleno do with his Pitoy (Penis) to your vagina (Putay)?
A. It was inserted (ginsulod) to my vagina (Putay).
Q. When Joeral Galleno inserted his penis (Pitoy) to your vagina (Putay), that was the
reason why it bleed?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And it was very painful?
A. Yes, Sir.
Q. And you cried because of the pain?
A. Yes, Sir.
FISCAL OBIENDA
Q. And you were brought to the Doctor and admitted to the hospital because of that?
A. Yes, Sir.
(tsn, pp. 10-12, January 10, 1995.)
Under the second assigned error, accused-appellant alleges that he was deprived of a fair
and impartial trial since the trial court showed bias by discounting his testimony, and by
actually participating in the cross-examination of accused-appellant.
We recently pronounced in People vs. Malabago (265 SCRA 198 [1996]) that a judge may
properly intervene in the presentation of evidence to expedite and prevent unnecessary
waste of time and clarify obscure and incomplete details after the witness has given direct
testimony. And such discretion to question witnesses in order to clear obscurities in their
testimony cannot be assailed as a specie of bias.
Of course, we are aware of Rule 3.06 of the Code of Judicial Conduct provides:
While a judge may, to promote justice, prevent waste of time or clear up some obscurity,
properly intervene in the presentation of evidence during the trial, it should always be
borne in mind that undue interference may prevent the proper presentation of the cause or
the ascertainment of truth.
And there is undoubtedly undue interference if the judge extensively propounds questions
to the witnesses which will have the effect of or will tend to build or bolster the case for
one of the parties. We have, however, carefully examined the record and transcript of
stenographic notes of the instant case. The trial court judge, the Honorable Salvador S.
Gubaton, did propound questions but this was done only for clarification purposes and not
to build the case for one of the parties. For instance, accused-appellant, in his brief, refers
to the questions propounded by the trial court on his act of cajoling the child. A perusal of
P a g e | 34
the line of questioning referred to hardly shows bias on the part of the trial court, but pure
clarification.
In the third assigned error, accused-appellant questions the validity of his arrest.
It is settled jurisprudence that any objection involving a warrant of arrest or procedure in
the acquisition by the court of jurisdiction over the person of the accused must be made
before he enters his plea, otherwise the objection is deemed waived (People vs. Lopez, Jr.,
245 SCRA 95 [1995]). An accused should question the validity of his arrest before he enters
his plea in the trial court (Filoteo, Jr. vs. Sandiganbayan, 263 SCRA 222 [1996]). He is
estopped from questioning any defect in the manner of his arrest if he fails to move for the
quashing of the information before the trial court (People vs. Compil, 244 SCRA 135 [1995])
or if he voluntarily submits himself to the jurisdiction of the court by entering a plea and by
participating in the trial (People vs. De Guzman, 224 SCRA 93 [1993]; People vs. Lopez, Jr.,
supra).
It does not appear in the record that accused-appellants raised this matter before entering
his plea of "not guilty" to the charge (pp. 63 & 67, Record). Further, this issue was not even
touched during the trial.
Lastly, accused-appellant, in his fourth assigned error, argues that the trial court
misinterpreted the financial assistance extended by his parents as an attempt to settle the
case. Accused-appellant even banks on the alleged close relationship between Emeterio
Obligar and Raul Galleno as compadres, and the fact that Emeterio borrowed forty pesos
from Raul Galleno, despite the fact that Emeterio already knew that accused-appellant
caused the laceration in Evelyn's vagina.
Accused-appellant also draws attention to two incidents involving alleged financial
assistance extended by Raul Gallono to the spouses Emeterio and Penicola Obligar. First,
Emeterio Obligar, whom Raul Galleno said is his compadre, borrowed P40.00 for fare going
to Roxas City where Evelyn was confined. Second, on August 20, 1994, Raul Galleno and
his wife and one of the brothers of Penicola Obligar went to Roxas Memorial General
Hospital. There he gave P400.00 financial assistance to Penicola Obligar. Raul Galleno later
admitted that the sum of P440.00 was returned to him by the spouses. Accused-appellant
insists that these offers of financial assistance were not attempts at an amicable
settlement but were prompted out of a sincere desire on the part of Raul Galleno to help
the offended party.
We find no merit in the above-stated argument. It may be inferred that Raul Galleno
wanted to settle the case by offering an amount to the spouses Obligar, to wit:
Q. Now, according to you, you were paid in the amount of Four Hundred Pesos (P400.00)
then you expected your Comareng Pening as financial assistance to Evelyn Garganera,
isn't it?
A. Yes, Your Honor.
Q. How long after August 19, 1994, that your Comareng Pening returned to you the amount
of Four Hundred Pesos (P400.00)?
A. A week after when Evelyn had already checked up from the hospital.

Q. It was given by you or as voluntary financial assistance, why did you receive the amount
or the payment returned to that amount of Four Hundred Pesos (P400.00)?
A. That was telling me that they refused already for the settlement of the case.
Q. And that is why they returned the amount of Four Hundred Pesos (P400.00).
(tsn, pp. 29-30, May 12, 1995.)
From the above-stated clarificatory questions by the trial court, it may be gleaned that
Raul Galleno no longer had any interest in aiding the victim when he found that the Obligar
spouses would still pursue the case against his son, accused-appellant, and hence he
found that his offer for settlement was unavailing. Hence, on this point we likewise agree
with the trial court when it took the financial assistance to mean an act of settling the
case. This act does manifest a father's attempt to rescue his guilty son from sure
incarceration.
The nightmare that was forced into the tender mind of 5-year old Evelyn Obligar Garganera
may unfortunately haunt her all her life. Justice may not be able to save her from this
nightmare but it can calm and assure her that her tormentor and abuser shall undoubtedly
face retribution.
Four members of the Court - although maintaining their adherence to the separate
opinions expressed in People vs. Echegaray (G.R. No. 117472, February 7, 1997) that
Republic Act No. 7659, insofar as it prescribes the death penalty is unconstitutional -
nevertheless submit to the ruling of the Court , by a majority vote, that the law is
constitutional and that the death penalty should accordingly be imposed.
WHEREFORE, finding the conviction of accused-appellant justified by the evidence on
record, the assailed decision is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
In accordance with Section 25 of Republic Act No. 7659, amending Article 83 of the Revised
Penal Code, upon finality of this decision, let the record of the case be forthwith forwarded
to the Office of the President for the possible exercise of the pardoning power.
SO ORDERED.
9. Yu v. CA G.R. No. 154115 November 29, 2005
This treats of the petition for review on certiorari of the Court of Appeals' Decision and
Resolution in CA G.R. SP No. 66252 dated 30 April 2002[1] and 27 June 2002,[2]
respectively, which set aside the Order of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City[3]
dated 10 May 2001, declaring an application for insurance and an insurance policy as
inadmissible evidence.
The facts of the case are undisputed.
On 15 March 1994, Viveca Lim Yu (private respondent) brought against her husband,
Philip Sy Yu (petitioner), an action for legal separation and dissolution of conjugal
partnership on the grounds of marital infidelity and physical abuse. The case was filed
before the RTC of Pasig and raffled to Branch 158, presided by Judge Jose R. Hernandez.
P a g e | 35
During trial, private respondent moved for the issuance of a subpoena duces
tecum and ad testificandum[4] to certain officers of Insular Life Assurance Co. Ltd. to
compel production of the insurance policy and application of a person suspected to be
petitioner's illegitimate child.[5] The trial court denied the motion.[6] It ruled that the
insurance contract is inadmissible evidence in view of Circular Letter No. 11-2000, issued
by the Insurance Commission which presumably prevents insurance companies/agents
from divulging confidential and privileged information pertaining to insurance policies.[7]
It added that the production of the application and insurance contract would violate Article
280[8] of the Civil Code and Section 5 of the Civil Registry Law,[9] both of which prohibit
the unauthorized identification of the parents of an illegitimate child.[10] Private
respondent sought reconsideration of the Order, but the motion was denied by the trial
court.[11]
Aggrieved, private respondent filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals,
imputing grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part
of Judge Hernandez in issuing the 10 May 2001 Order.[12] The Court of Appeals
summarized the issues as follows: (i) whether or not an insurance policy and its
corresponding application form can be admitted as evidence to prove a party's extra-
marital affairs in an action for legal separation; and (ii) whether or not a trial court has the
discretion to deny a party's motion to attach excluded evidence to the record under
Section 40, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court.[13]
According to the Court of Appeals, private respondent was merely seeking the production
of the insurance application and contract, and was not yet offering the same as part of her
evidence. Thus, it declared that petitioner's objection to the admission of the documents
was premature, and the trial court's pronouncement that the documents are inadmissible,
precipitate.[14] The contents of the insurance application and insurance documents cannot
be considered as privileged information, the Court of Appeals added, in view of the opinion
of the Insurance Commissioner dated 4 April 2001 to the effect that Circular Letter No.11-
2000 "was never intended to be a legal impediment in complying with lawful orders".[15]
Lastly, the Court of Appeals ruled that a trial court does not have the discretion to deny a
party's privilege to tender excluded evidence, as this privilege allows said party to raise on
appeal the exclusion of such evidence.[16] Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but
to no avail.
In the present petition, petitioner argues that the Court of Appeals blundered in delving
into errors of judgment supposedly committed by the trial court as if the petition filed
therein was an ordinary appeal and not a special civil action. Further, he claims that the
Court of Appeals failed to show any specific instance of grave abuse of discretion on the
part of the trial court in issuing the assailed Order. Additionally, he posits that private
respondent had already mooted her petition before the Court of Appeals when she filed
her formal offer of rebuttal exhibits, with tender of excluded evidence before the trial
court.[17]
For her part, private respondent maintains that the details surrounding the insurance
policy are crucial to the issue of petitioner's infidelity and his financial capacity to provide
support to her and their children. Further, she argues that she had no choice but to make

a tender of excluded evidence considering that she was left to speculate on what the
insurance application and policy ruled out by the trial court would contain.[18]
A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is the proper remedy to correct errors of jurisdiction
and grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction committed by a
lower court.[19] Where a respondent does not have the legal power to determine the case
and yet he does so, he acts without jurisdiction; where, "being clothed with power to
determine the case, oversteps his authority as determined by law, he is performing a
function in excess of jurisdiction."[20]
Petitioner claims that the Court of Appeals passed upon errors of judgment, not errors of
jurisdiction, since it delved into the propriety of the denial of the subpoena duces
tecum and subpoena ad testificandum. The argument must fail.
While trial courts have the discretion to admit or exclude evidence, such power is
exercised only when the evidence has been formally offered.[21] For a long time, the
Court has recognized that during the early stages of the development of proof, it is
impossible for a trial court judge to know with certainty whether evidence is relevant or
not, and thus the practice of excluding evidence on doubtful objections to its materiality
should be avoided.[22] As well elucidated in the case of Prats & Co. v. Phoenix Insurance
Co.:[23]
Moreover, it must be remembered that in the heat of the battle over which he presides a
judge of first instance may possibly fall into error in judging of the relevancy of proof
where a fair and logical connection is in fact shown. When such a mistake is made and the
proof is erroneously ruled out, the Supreme Court, upon appeal, often finds itself
embarrassed and possibly unable to correct the effects of the error without returning the
case for a new trial, - a step which this court is always very loath to take. On the other
hand, the admission of proof in a court of first instance, even if the question as to its form,
materiality, or relevancy is doubtful, can never result in much harm to either litigant,
because the trial judge is supposed to know the law; and it is its duty, upon final
consideration of the case, to distinguish the relevant and material from the irrelevant and
immaterial. If this course is followed and the cause is prosecuted to the Supreme Court
upon appeal, this court then has all the material before it necessary to make a correct
judgment.
In the instant case, the insurance application and the insurance policy were yet to be
presented in court, much less formally offered before it. In fact, private respondent was
merely asking for the issuance of subpoena duces tecum and subpoena ad
testificandum when the trial court issued the assailed Order. Even assuming that the
documents would eventually be declared inadmissible, the trial court was not then in a
position to make a declaration to that effect at that point. Thus, it barred the production of
the subject documents prior to the assessment of its probable worth. As observed by
petitioners, the assailed Order was not a mere ruling on the admissibility of evidence; it
was, more importantly, a ruling affecting the proper conduct of trial.[24]
Excess of jurisdiction refers to any act which although falling within the general powers of
the judge is not authorized and is consequently void with respect to the particular case
P a g e | 36
because the conditions under which he was only authorized to exercise his general power
in that case did not exist and therefore, the judicial power was not legally exercised.[25]
Thus, in declaring that the documents are irrelevant and inadmissible even before they
were formally offered, much less presented before it, the trial court acted in excess of its
discretion.
Anent the issue of whether the information contained in the documents is privileged in
nature, the same was clarified and settled by the Insurance Commissioner's opinion that
the circular on which the trial court based its ruling was not designed to obstruct lawful
court orders.[26] Hence, there is no more impediment to presenting the insurance
application and policy.
Petitioner additionally claims that by virtue of private respondent's tender of excluded
evidence, she has rendered moot her petition before the Court of Appeals since the move
evinced that she had another speedy and adequate remedy under the law. The Court
holds otherwise.
Section 40, Rule 132 provides:
Sec.40. Tender of excluded evidence.-If documents or things offered in evidence are
excluded by the court, the offeror may have the same attached to or made part of the
record. If the evidence excluded is oral, the offeror may state for the record the name and
other personal circumstances of the witness and the substance of the proposed
testimony.
It is thus apparent that before tender of excluded evidence is made, the evidence must
have been formally offered before the court. And before formal offer of evidence is made,
the evidence must have been identified and presented before the court. While private
respondent made a "Tender of Excluded Evidence," such is not the tender contemplated by
the above-quoted rule, for obviously, the insurance policy and application were not
formally offered much less presented before the trial court. At most, said "Tender of
Excluded Evidence" was a
manifestation of an undisputed fact that the subject documents were declared inadmissible
by the trial court even before these were presented during trial. It was not the kind of
plain, speedy and adequate remedy which private respondent could have resorted to
instead of the petition forcertiorari she filed before the Court of Appeals. It did not in any
way render the said petition moot.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated 30 April
2002 and Resolution dated 27 June 2002 areAFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
10. Yapyuco v. Sandiganbayan G.R. 120744-46 June 25, 2012

Law enforcers thrust their lives in unimaginable zones of peril. Yet resort to wanton
violence is never justified when their duty could be performed otherwise. A shoot first,
think later disposition occupies no decent place in a civilized society. Never has homicide
or murder been a function of law enforcement. The public peace is never predicated on
the cost of human life.
These are petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing
the June 30, 1995 Decision[1] of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case Nos. 16612, 16613
and 16614 cases for murder, frustrated murder and multiple counts of attempted
murder, respectively. The cases are predicated on a shooting incident on April 5, 1988 in
Barangay Quebiawan, San Fernando, Pampanga which caused the death of Leodevince
Licup (Licup) and injured Noel Villanueva (Villanueva). Accused were petitioners Salvador
Yapyuco, Jr. (Yapyuco) and Generoso Cunanan, Jr. (Cunanan) and Ernesto Puno
(Puno) who were members of the Integrated National Police (INP)[2] stationed at the
Sindalan Substation in San Fernando, Pampanga; Jose Pamintuan (Pamintuan) and Mario
Reyes, who were barangay captains of Quebiawan and Del Carmen, respectively; Ernesto
Puno, Andres Reyes and Virgilio Manguerra (Manguerra), Carlos David, Ruben Lugtu,
Moises Lacson (Lacson), Renato Yu, Jaime Pabalan (Pabalan) and Carlos David (David),
who were either members of the Civil Home Defense Force (CHDF) or civilian volunteer
officers in Barangays Quebiawan, Del Carmen and Telebastagan. They were all charged
with murder, multiple attempted murder and frustrated murder in three Informations, the
inculpatory portions of which read:
Criminal Case No. 16612:
That on or about the 5 th day of April 1988, in Barangay Quebiawan, San Fernando,
Pampanga, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, all public officers, being then policemen, Brgy. Captains, Brgy. Tanod and
members of the Civil Home Defense Force (CHDF), respectively, confederating and
mutually helping one another, and while responding to information about the presence of
armed men in said barangay and conducting surveillance thereof, thus committing the
offense in relation to their office, did then and there, with treachery and evident
premeditation, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, and with deliberate intent to take the
life of Leodevince S. Licup, attack the latter with automatic weapons by firing directly at
the green Toyota Tamaraw jitney ridden by Leodevince S. Licup and inflicting multiple
gunshot wounds which are necessarily mortal on the different parts of the body, thereby
causing the direct and immediate death of the latter.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[3]
Criminal Case No. 16613:
That on or about the 5 th day of April 1988, in Barangay Quebiawan, San Fernando,
Pampanga, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, all public officers, being then policemen, Brgy. Captains, Brgy. Tanod and
members of the Civil Home Defense Force (CHDF), respectively, confederating and
mutually helping one another, and while responding to information about the presence of
P a g e | 37
armed men in said barangay and conducting surveillance thereof, thus committing the
offense in relation to their office, did then and there, with treachery and evident
premeditation, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, and with intent to kill, attack Eduardo
S. Flores, Alejandro R. de Vera, Restituto G. Calma and Raul V. Panlican with automatic
weapons by firing directly at the green Toyota Tamaraw jitney ridden by said Eduardo S.
Flores, Alejandro R. de Vera, Restituto G. Calma and Raul V. Panlican, having commenced
the commission of murder directly by overt acts of execution which should produce the
murder by reason of some cause or accident other than their own spontaneous desistance.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[4]
Criminal Case No. 16614:
That on or about the 5 th day of April 1988, in Barangay Quebiawan, San Fernando,
Pampanga, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, all public officers, being then policemen, Brgy. Captains, Brgy. Tanod and
members of the Civil Home Defense Force (CHDF), respectively, confederating and
mutually helping one another, and while responding to information about the presence of
armed men in said barangay and conducting surveillance thereof, thus committing the
offense in relation to their office, did then and there, with treachery and evident
premeditation, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, and with intent of taking the life of
Noel C. Villanueva, attack the latter with automatic weapons by firing directly at the green
Toyota Tamaraw jitney driven by said Noel C. Villanueva and inflicting multiple gunshot
wounds which are necessarily mortal and having performed all the acts which would have
produced the crime of murder, but which did not, by reason of causes independent of the
defendants will, namely, the able and timely medical assistance given to said Noel C.
Villanueva, which prevented his death.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[5]
Hailed to court on April 30, 1991 after having voluntarily surrendered to the authorities,
[6] the accused except Pabalan who died earlier on June 12, 1990,[7] and Yapyuco who
was then allegedly indisposed[8] entered individual pleas of not guilty.[9] A month later,
Yapyuco voluntarily surrendered to the authorities, and at his arraignment likewise
entered a negative plea.[10] In the meantime, Mario Reyes, Andres Reyes, David, Lugtu,
Lacson, Yu and Manguerra jointly filed a Motion for Bail relative to Criminal Case No.
16612.[11] Said motion was heard on the premise, as previously agreed upon by both the
prosecution and the defense, that these cases would be jointly tried and that the evidence
adduced at said hearing would automatically constitute evidence at the trial on the merits.
[12] On May 10, 1991, the Sandiganbayan granted bail in Criminal Case No. 16612.
[13] Yapyuco likewise applied for bail on May 15, 1991 and the same was also granted
on May 21, 1991.[14] Pamintuan died on November 21, 1992,[15] and accordingly, the
charges against him were dismissed.
At the July 4, 1991 pre-trial conference, the remaining accused waived the pre-trial
inquest. [16] Hence, joint trial on the merits ensued and picked up from where the
presentation of evidence left off at the hearing on the bail applications.

The prosecution established that in the evening of April 5, 1988, Villanueva, Flores, Calma,
De Vera, Panlican and Licup were at the residence of Salangsang as guests at the barrio
fiesta celebrations between 5:00 and 7:30 p.m.. The company decided to leave at around
7:30 p.m., shortly after the religious procession had passed. As they were all inebriated,
Salangsang reminded Villanueva, who was on the wheel, to drive carefully and watch out
for potholes and open canals on the road. With Licup in the passenger seat and the rest of
his companions at the back of his Tamaraw jeepney, Villanueva allegedly proceeded at 5-
10 kph with headlights dimmed. Suddenly, as they were approaching a curve on the road,
they met a burst of gunfire and instantly, Villanueva and Licup were both wounded and
bleeding profusely.[17]
Both Flores and Villanueva, contrary to what the defense would claim, allegedly did not
see any one on the road flag them down.[18] In open court, Flores executed a
sketch[19] depicting the relative location of the Tamaraw jeepney on the road, the
residence of Salangsang where they had come from and the house situated on the right
side of the road right after the curve where the jeepney had taken a left turn; he identified
said house to be that of a certain Lenlen Naron where the gunmen allegedly took post and
opened fire at him and his companions. He could not tell how many firearms were
used. He recounted that after the shooting, he, unaware that Licup and Villanueva were
wounded, jumped out of the jeepney when he saw from behind them Pamintuan emerging
from the yard of Narons house. Frantic and shaken, he instantaneously introduced himself
and his companions to be employees of San Miguel Corporation but instead, Pamintuan
reproved them for not stopping when flagged. At this point, he was distracted when
Villanueva cried out and told him to summon Salangsang for help as he (Villanueva) and
Licup were wounded. He dashed back to Salangsangs house as instructed and, returning
to the scene, he observed that petitioner Yu was also there, and Villanueva and Licup were
being loaded into a Sarao jeepney to be taken to the hospital.[20] This was corroborated
by Villanueva who stated that as soon as the firing had ceased, two armed men, together
with Pamintuan, approached them and transferred him and Licup to another jeepney and
taken to the nearby St. Francis Hospital.[21]
Flores remembered that there were two sudden bursts of gunfire which very rapidly
succeeded each other, and that they were given no warning shot at all contrary to what
the defense would say.[22] He professed that he, together with his co-passengers, were
also aboard the Sarao jeepney on its way to the hospital and inside it he observed two
men, each holding long firearms, seated beside the driver. He continued that as soon as
he and his companions had been dropped off at the hospital, the driver of the Sarao
jeepney immediately drove off together with his two armed companions.[23] He further
narrated that the day after the shooting, he brought Licup to the Makati Medical Center
where the latter expired on April 7, 1988.[24] He claimed that all the accused in the case
had not been known to him prior to the incident, except for Pamintuan whom he identified
to be his wifes uncle and with whom he denied having had any rift nor with the other
accused for that matter, which would have otherwise inspired ill motives. [25] He claimed
the bullet holes on the Tamaraw jeepney were on the passenger side and that there were
no other bullet holes at the back or in any other portion of the vehicle.[26]
Salangsang, also an electrician at the San Miguel Corporation plant, affirmed the presence
of his companions at his residence on the subject date and time, and corroborated
P a g e | 38
Villanuevas and Flores narration of the events immediately preceding the shooting. He
recounted that after seeing off his guests shortly after the procession had passed his
house and reminding them to proceed carefully on the pothole-studded roads, he was
alarmed when moments later, he heard a volley of gunfire from a distance which was
shortly followed by Flores frantic call for help. He immediately proceeded to the scene on
his bicycle and saw Pamintuan by the lamppost just outside the gate of Narons house
where, inside, he noticed a congregation of more or less six people whom he could not
recognize. [27] At this point, he witnessed Licup and Villanueva being loaded into another
jeepney occupied by three men who appeared to be in uniform. He then retrieved the keys
of the Tamaraw jeepney from Villanueva and decided to deliver it to his mothers house,
but before driving off, he allegedly caught a glance of Mario Reyes on the wheel of an
owner-type jeepney idling in front of the ill-fated Tamaraw; it was the same jeepney which
he remembered to be that frequently used by Yapyuco in patrolling the barangay. He
claimed he spent the night at his mothers house and in the morning, a policeman came
looking for him with whom, however, he was not able to talk.[28]
Salangsang observed that the scene of the incident was dark because the electric post in
front of Narons house was strangely not lit when he arrived, and that none of the
neighboring houses was illuminated. He admitted his uncertainty as to whether it was
Yapyucos group or the group of Pamintuan that brought his injured companions to the
hospital, but he could tell with certainty that it was the Sarao jeepney previously identified
by Villanueva and Flores that brought his injured companions to the hospital.[29]
Daisy Dabor, forensic chemist at the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory
in Camp Olivas, affirmed that she had previously examined the firearms suspected to have
been used by petitioners in the shooting and found them positive for gunpowder
residue. She could not, however, determine exactly when the firearms were discharged;
neither could she tell how many firearms were discharged that night nor the relative
positions of the gunmen. She admitted having declined to administer paraffin test on
petitioners and on the other accused because the opportunity therefor came only 72 hours
after the incident. She affirmed having also examined the Tamaraw jeepney and found
eleven (11) bullet holes on it, most of which had punctured the door at the passenger side
of the vehicle at oblique and perpendicular directions. She explained, rather
inconclusively, that the bullets that hit at an angle might have been fired while the
jeepney was either at a standstill or moving forward in a straight line, or gradually making
a turn at the curve on the road.[30] Additionally, Silvestre Lapitan, administrative and
supply officer of the INP-Pampanga Provincial Command tasked with the issuance of
firearms and ammunitions to members of the local police force and CHDF and CVO
members, identified in court the memorandum receipts for the firearms he had issued to
Mario Reyes, Andres Reyes, Manguerra, Pabalan and Yapyuco.[31]
Dr. Pedro Solis, Jr., medico-legal consultant at the Makati Medical Center, examined the
injuries of Villanueva and Licup on April 6, 1988. He recovered multiple metal shrapnel
from the occipital region of Villanuevas head as well as from the posterior aspect of his
chest; he noted nothing serious in these wounds in that the incapacity would last between
10 and 30 days only. He also located a bullet wound on the front lateral portion of the
right thigh, and he theorized that this wound would be caused by a firearm discharged in
front of the victim, assuming the assailant and the victim were both standing upright on

the ground and the firearm was fired from the level of the assailants waist; but if the
victim was seated, the position of his thigh must be horizontal so that with the shot
coming from his front, the trajectory of the bullet would be upward. He hypothesized that
if the shot would come behind Villanueva, the bullet would enter the thigh of the seated
victim and exit at a lower level.[32]
With respect to Licup, Dr. Solis declared he was still alive when examined. On the patient,
he noted a lacerated wound at the right temporal region of the head one consistent with
being hit by a hard and blunt object and not a bullet. He noted three (3) gunshot wounds
the locations of which suggested that Licup was upright when fired upon from the front:
one is a through-and-through wound in the middle lateral aspect of the middle portion of
the right leg; another, through-and-through wound at the middle portion of the right
forearm; and third one, a wound in the abdomen which critically and fatally involved the
stomach and the intestines. He hypothesized that if Licup was seated in the passenger
seat as claimed, his right leg must have been exposed and the assailant must have been
in front of him holding the gun slightly higher than the level of the bullet entry in the
leg. He found that the wound in the abdomen had entered from the left side and crossed
over to and exited at the right, which suggested that the gunman must have been
positioned at Licups left side. He explained that if this wound had been inflicted ahead of
that in the forearm, then the former must have been fired after Licup had changed his
position as a reaction to the first bullet that hit him. He said that the wound on the leg
must have been caused by a bullet fired at the victims back and hit the jeepney at a
downward angle without hitting any hard surface prior.[33]
Dr. Solis believed that the wound on Licups right forearm must have been caused by a
bullet fired from the front but slightly obliquely to the right of the victim. Hypothesizing,
he held the improbability of Licup being hit on the abdomen, considering that he might
have changed position following the infliction of the other wounds, unless there was more
than one assailant who fired multiple shots from either side of the Tamaraw jeepney;
however, he proceeded to rule out the possibility of Licup having changed position
especially if the gunfire was delivered very rapidly. He could not tell which of Licups three
wounds was first inflicted, yet it could be that the bullet to the abdomen was delivered
ahead of the others because it would have caused Licup to lean forward and stoop down
with his head lying low and steady.[34]
Finally, Atty. Victor Bartolome, hearing officer at the National Police Commission
(NAPOLCOM) affirmed that the accused police officers Yapyuco, Cunanan and Puno had
been administratively charged with and tried for gross misconduct as a consequence of the
subject shooting incident and that he had in fact conducted investigations thereon
sometime in 1989 and 1990 which culminated in their dismissal from service.[35] Dolly
Porquerio, stenographer at the NAPOLCOM, testified that at the hearing of the
administrative case, Yapyuco authenticated the report on the shooting incident dated April
5, 1988 which he had previously prepared at his office. This, according to her, together
with the sketch showing the relative position of the responding law enforcers and the
Tamaraw jeepney at the scene of the incident, had been forwarded to the NAPOLCOM
Central Office for consideration.[36] The Sandiganbayan, in fact, subpoenaed these
documents together with the joint counter-affidavits which had been submitted in that
case by Yapyuco, Cunanan and Puno.
P a g e | 39
Of all the accused, only Yapyuco took the stand for the defense. He identified himself
as the commander of the Sindalan Police Substation in San Fernando, Pampanga and the
superior officer of petitioners Cunanan and Puno and of the accused Yu whose jurisdiction
included Barangays Quebiawan and Telebastagan. He narrated that in the afternoon
of April 5, 1988, he and his men were investigating a physical injuries case when Yu
suddenly received a summon for police assistance from David, who supposedly was
instructed by Pamintuan, concerning a reported presence of armed NPA members in
Quebiawan. Yapyuco allegedly called on their main station in San Fernando for
reinforcement but at the time no additional men could be dispatched. Hence, he decided
to respond and instructed his men to put on their uniforms and bring their M-16 rifles with
them.[37]
Yapyuco continued that at the place appointed, he and his group met with Pamintuan who
told him that he had earlier spotted four (4) men carrying long firearms. As if sizing up
their collective strength, Pamintuan allegedly intimated that he and barangay
captain Mario Reyes of nearby Del Carmen had also brought in a number of armed men
and that there were likewise Cafgu members convened at the residence of Naron.
Moments later, Pamintuan announced the approach of his suspects, hence Yapyuco,
Cunanan and Puno took post in the middle of the road at the curve where the Tamaraw
jeepney conveying the victims would make an inevitable turn. As the jeepney came much
closer, Pamintuan announced that it was the target vehicle, so he, with Cunanan and Puno
behind him, allegedly flagged it down and signaled for it to stop. He claimed that instead
of stopping, the jeepney accelerated and swerved to its left. This allegedly inspired him,
and his fellow police officers Cunanan and Puno,[38] to fire warning shots but the jeepney
continued pacing forward, hence they were impelled to fire at the tires thereof and
instantaneously, gunshots allegedly came bursting from the direction of Narons house
directly at the subject jeepney.[39]
Yapyuco recalled that one of the occupants of the jeepney then alighted and exclaimed at
Pamintuan that they were San Miguel Corporation employees. Holding their fire, Yapyuco
and his men then immediately searched the vehicle but found no firearms but instead, two
injured passengers whom they loaded into his jeepney and delivered to nearby
St. Francis Hospital. From there he and his men returned to the scene supposedly to
investigate and look for the people who fired directly at the jeepney. They found no one;
the Tamaraw jeepney was likewise gone.[40]
Yapyuco explained that the peace and order situation in Barangay Quebiawan at the time
was in bad shape, as in fact there were several law enforcement officers in the area who
had been ambushed supposedly by rebel elements,[41] and that he frequently patrolled
the barangay on account of reported sightings of unidentified armed men therein.
[42] That night, he said, his group which responded to the scene were twelve (12) in all,
comprised of Cunanan and Puno from the Sindalan Police Substation, [43] the team
composed of Pamintuan and his men, as well as the team headed by Captain Mario
Reyes. He admitted that all of them, including himself, were armed.[44] He denied that
they had committed an ambuscade because otherwise, all the occupants of the Tamaraw
jeepney would have been killed. [45] He said that the shots which directly hit the
passenger door of the jeepney did not come from him or from his fellow police officers but

rather from Cafgu members assembled in the residence of Naron, inasmuch as said shots
were fired only when the jeepney had gone past the spot on the road where they were
assembled.[46]
Furthermore, Yapyuco professed that he had not communicated with any one of the
accused after the incident because he was at the time very confused; yet he did know that
his co-accused had already been investigated by the main police station in San Fernando,
but the inquiries did not include himself, Cunanan and Puno.[47] He admitted an
administrative case against him, Cunanan and Puno at the close of which they had been
ordered dismissed from service; yet on appeal, the decision was reversed and they were
exonerated. He likewise alluded to an investigation independently conducted by their
station commander, S/Supt. Rolando Cinco. [48]
S/Supt Rolando Cinco, then Station Commander of the INP in San Fernando, Pampanga
acknowledged the volatility of the peace and order situation in his jurisdiction, where
members of the police force had fallen victims of ambuscade by lawless elements. He said
that he himself has actually conducted investigations on the Pamintuan report that rebel
elements had been trying to infiltrate the employment force of San Miguel Corporation
plant, and that he has accordingly conducted clearing operations in sugarcane
plantations in the barangay. He intimated that days prior to the incident, Yapyucos team
had already been alerted of the presence of NPA members in the area. Corroborating
Yapyucos declaration, he confessed having investigated the shooting incident and making
a report on it in which, curiously, was supposedly attached Pamintuans statement
referring to Flores as being married to a resident of Barangay Quebiawan and found
after surveillance to be frequently visited by NPA members. He affirmed having found
that guns were indeed fired that night and that the chief investigator was able to gather
bullet shells from the scene. [49]
Cunanan and Puno did not take the witness stand but adopted the testimony of Yapyuco
as well as the latters documentary evidence.[50] Mario Reyes, Andres Reyes, Lugtu,
Lacson, Yu and Manguera, waived their right to present evidence and submitted their
memorandum as told.[51]
The Sandiganbayan reduced the basic issue to whether the accused had acted in the
regular and lawful performance of their duties in the maintenance of peace and order
either as barangay officials and as members of the police and the CHDF, and hence, could
take shelter in the justifying circumstance provided in Article 11 (5) of the Revised Penal
Code; or whether they had deliberately ambushed the victims with the intent of killing
them.[52] With the evidence in hand, it found Yapyuco, Cunanan, Puno, Manguera and
Mario and Andres Reyes guilty as co-principals in the separate offense of homicide for the
eventual death of Licup (instead of murder as charged in Criminal Case No. 16612) and of
attempted homicide for the injury sustained by Villanueva (instead of frustrated murder as
charged in Criminal Case No. 16614), and acquitted the rest in those cases. It acquitted
all of them of attempted murder charged in Criminal Case No. 16613 in respect of Flores,
Panlican, De Vera and Calma. The dispositive portion of the June 30, 1995 Joint Decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
P a g e | 40
I. In Crim. Case No. 16612, accused Salvador Yapyuco y Enriquez, Generoso Cunanan,
Jr. y Basco, Ernesto Puno y Tungol, Mario Reyes y David, Andres Reyes y Salangsang and
Virgilio Manguerra y Adona are hereby found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as co-
principals in the offense of Homicide, as defined and penalized under Article 249 of the
Revised Penal Code, and crediting all of them with the mitigating circumstance of
voluntary surrender, without any aggravating circumstance present or proven, each of
said accused is hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty ranging from SIX (6)
YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of prision correccional, as the minimum, to TWELVE (12) YEARS
and ONE (1) DAY of reclusion temporal, as the maximum; to indemnify, jointly and
severally, the heirs of the deceased victim Leodevince Licup in the amounts of P77,000.00
as actual damages and P600,000.00 as moral/exemplary damages, and to pay their
proportionate shares of the costs of said action.
II. In Crim. Case No. 16613, for insufficiency of evidence, all the accused charged in the
information, namely, Salvador Yapyuco y Enriquez, Generoso Cunanan, Jr. y Basco,
Ernesto Puno yTungol, Mario Reyes y David, Carlos David y Baez, Ruben Lugtu y Lacson,
Moises Lacson y Adona, Renato Yu y Barrera, Andres Reyes y Salangsang and Virgilio
Manguerra y Adona are hereby acquitted of the offense of Multiple Attempted Murder
charged therein, with costs de oficio.
III. In Crim. Case No. 16614, accused Salvador Yapyuco y Enriquez, Generoso Cunanan,
Jr. y Basco, Ernesto Puno y Tungol, Mario Reyes y David, Andres Reyes y Salangsang and
Virgilio Manguerra y Adona are hereby found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as co-
principals in the offense Attempted Homicide, as defined and penalized under Article 249,
in relation to Article 6, paragraph 3, both of the Revised Penal Code, and crediting them
with the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, without any aggravating
circumstance present or proven, each of said accused is hereby sentenced to suffer an
indeterminate penalty ranging from SIX (6) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of prision
correccional as the minimum, to SIX (6) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of prision mayor as the
maximum; to indemnify, jointly and severally, the offended party Noel Villanueva in the
amount of P51,700.00 as actual and compensatory damages, plus P120,000.00 as
moral/exemplary damages, and to pay their proportionate share of the costs of said
action.
SO ORDERED.[53]
The Sandiganbayan declared that the shootout which caused injuries to Villanueva and
which brought the eventual death of Licup has been committed by petitioners herein
willfully under the guise of maintaining peace and order;[54] that the acts performed by
them preparatory to the shooting, which ensured the execution of their evil plan without
risk to themselves, demonstrate a clear intent to kill the occupants of the subject vehicle;
that the fact they had by collective action deliberately and consciously intended to inflict
harm and injury and had voluntarily performed those acts negates their defense of lawful
performance of official duty;[55] that the theory of mistaken belief could not likewise
benefit petitioners because there was supposedly no showing that they had sufficient basis
or probable cause to rely fully on Pamintuans report that the victims were armed NPA
members, and they have not been able by evidence to preclude ulterior motives or gross

inexcusable negligence when they acted as they did;[56] that there was insufficient or
total absence of factual basis to assume that the occupants of the jeepney were members
of the NPA or criminals for that matter; and that the shooting incident could not have been
the product of a well-planned and well-coordinated police operation but was the result of
either a hidden agenda concocted by Barangay Captains Mario Reyes and Pamintuan, or a
hasty and amateurish attempt to gain commendation.[57]
These findings obtain context principally from the open court statements of prosecution
witnesses Villanueva, Flores and Salangsang, particularly on the circumstances prior to the
subject incident. The Sandiganbayan pointed out that the Tamaraw jeepney would have
indeed stopped if it had truly been flagged down as claimed by Yapyuco especially since
as it turned out after the search of the vehicle they had no firearms with them, and
hence, they had nothing to be scared of.[58] It observed that while Salangsang and
Flores had been bona fide residents of Barangay Quebiawan, then it would be impossible
for Pamintuan, barangay captain no less, not to have known them and the location of their
houses which were not far from the scene of the incident; so much so that the presence of
the victims and of the Tamaraw jeepney in Salangsangs house that evening could not
have possibly escaped his notice. In this regard, it noted that Pamintuans Sworn
Statement dated April 11, 1988 did not sufficiently explain his suspicions as to the
identities of the victims as well as his apparent certainty on the identity and whereabouts
of the subject Tamaraw jeepney. [59] It surmised how the defense, especially Yapyuco in
his testimony, could have failed to explain why a large group of armed men which
allegedly included Cafgu members from neighboring barangays were assembled at the
house of Naron that night, and how petitioners were able to identify the Tamaraw jeepney
to be the target vehicle. From this, it inferred that petitioners had already known that
their suspect vehicle would be coming from the direction of Salangsangs house such
knowledge is supposedly evident first, in the manner by which they advantageously
positioned themselves at the scene to afford a direct line of fire at the target vehicle, and
second, in the fact that the house of Naron, the neighboring houses and the electric post
referred to by prosecution witnesses were deliberately not lit that night.[60]
The Sandiganbayan also drew information from Flores sketch depicting the position of the
Tamaraw jeepney and the assailants on the road, and concluded that judging by the bullet
holes on the right side of the jeepney and by the declarations of Dr. Solis respecting the
trajectory of the bullets that hit Villanueva and Licup, the assailants were inside the yard
of Narons residence and the shots were fired at the jeepney while it was slowly moving
past them. It also gave weight to the testimony and the report of Dabor telling that the
service firearms of petitioners had been tested and found to be positive of gunpowder
residue, therefore indicating that they had indeed been discharged.[61]
The Sandiganbayan summed up what it found to be overwhelming circumstantial evidence
pointing to the culpability of petitioners: the nature and location of the bullet holes on the
jeepney and the gunshot wounds on the victims, as well as the trajectory of the bullets
that caused such damage and injuries; particularly, the number, location and trajectory of
the bullets that hit the front passenger side of the jeepney; the strategic placement of the
accused on the right side of the street and inside the front yard of Narons house; the
deliberate shutting off of the lights in the nearby houses and the lamp post; and the
positive ballistic findings on the firearms of petitioners. [62]
P a g e | 41
This evidentiary resum, according to the Sandiganbayan, not only fortified petitioners
admission that they did discharge their firearms, but also provided a predicate to its
conclusion that petitioners conspired with one another to achieve a common purpose,
design and objective to harm the unarmed and innocent victims. Thus, since there was no
conclusive proof of who among the several accused had actually fired the gunshots that
injured Villanueva and fatally wounded Licup, the Sandiganbayan imposed collective
responsibility on all those who were shown to have discharged their firearms that night
petitioners herein.[63] Interestingly, it was speculated that the manner by which the
accused collectively and individually acted prior or subsequent to or contemporaneously
with the shooting indicated that they were either drunk or that some, if not all of them,
had a grudge against the employees of San Miguel Corporation;[64] and that on the basis
of the self-serving evidence adduced by the defense, there could possibly have been a
massive cover-up of the incident by Philippine Constabulary and INP authorities in
Pampanga as well as by the NAPOLCOM.[65] It likewise found very consequential the fact
that the other accused had chosen not to take the witness stand; this, supposedly because
it was incumbent upon them to individually explain their participation in the shooting in
view of the weight of the prosecution evidence, their invocation of the justifying
circumstance of lawful performance of official duty and the declaration of some of them in
their affidavits to the effect that they had been deployed that evening in the front yard of
Narons residence from which the volley of gunfire was discharged as admitted by Yapyuco
himself.[66]
As to the nature of the offenses committed, the Sandiganbayan found that the qualifying
circumstance of treachery has not been proved because first, it was supposedly not shown
how the aggression commenced and how the acts causing injury to Villanueva and fatally
injuring Licup began and developed, and second, this circumstance must be supported by
proof of a deliberate and conscious adoption of the mode of attack and cannot be drawn
from mere suppositions or from circumstances immediately preceding the aggression. The
same finding holds true for evident premeditation because between the time Yapyuco
received the summons for assistance from Pamintuan through David and the time he and
his men responded at the scene, there was found to be no sufficient time to allow for the
materialization of all the elements of that circumstance.[67]
Finally as to damages, Villanueva had testified that his injury required leave from work for
60 days which were all charged against his accumulated leave credits;[68] that he was
earning P8,350.00 monthly;[69] and that he had spent P35,000.00 for the repair of his
Tamaraw jeepney.[70] Also, Teodoro Licup had stated that his family had
spentP18,000.00 for the funeral of his son, P28,000.00 during the wake, P11,000.00 for
the funeral plot and P20,000.00 in attorneys fees for the prosecution of these cases.
[71] He also submitted a certification from San Miguel Corporation reflecting the income
of his deceased son.[72] On these bases, the Sandiganbayan ordered petitioners, jointly
and severally, to indemnify (a) Villanueva P51,700.00 as actual and compensatory
damages and P120,000.00 as moral/exemplary damages, plus the proportionate costs of
the action, and (b) the heirs of deceased Licup in the amount of P77,000.00 as actual
damages and P600,000.00 as moral/exemplary damages, plus the proportionate costs of
the action.

Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied; hence, the present recourse.
In G.R. Nos. 120744-46, Yapyuco disputes the Sandiganbayans finding of conspiracy and
labels the same to be conjectural. He points out that the court a quo has not clearly
established that he had by positive acts intended to participate in any criminal object in
common with the other accused, and that his participation in a supposed common criminal
object has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt. He believes the finding is belied by
Flores and Villanueva, who saw him at the scene only after the shooting incident when the
wounded passengers were taken to the hospital on his jeepney.[73] He also points out
the uncertainty in the Sandiganbayans declaration that the incident could not have been
the product of a well-planned police operation, but rather was the result of either a hidden
agenda concocted against the victims by the barangay officials involved or an amateurish
attempt on their part to earn commendation. He theorizes that, if it were the latter
alternative, then he could hardly be found guilty of homicide or frustrated homicide but
rather of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide and frustrated homicide. [74] He
laments that, assuming arguendo that the injuries sustained by the victims were caused
by his warning shots, he must nevertheless be exonerated because he responded to the
scene of the incident as a bona fide member of the police force and, hence, his presence
at the scene of the incident was in line with the fulfillment of his duty as he was in fact in
the lawful performance thereof a fact which has been affirmed by the NAPOLCOM en
bancwhen it dismissed on appeal the complaint for gross misconduct against him,
Cunanan and Puno.[75] He also invokes the concept of mistake of fact and attributes to
Pamintuan the responsibility why he, as well as the other accused in these cases, had
entertained the belief that the suspects were armed rebel elements.[76]
In G.R. No. 122677, petitioners Manguerra, Mario Reyes and Andres Reyes claim that the
Sandiganbayan has not proved their guilt beyond reasonable doubt, and the assailed
decision was based on acts the evidence for which has been adduced at a separate trial
but erroneously attributed to them. They explain that there were two sets of accused, in
the case: one, the police officers comprised of Yapyuco, Cunanan and Puno and, two, the
barangay officials and CHDFs comprised of David, Lugtu, Lacson, Yu and themselves who
had waived the presentation of evidence. They question their conviction of the
charges vis-a-vis the acquittal of David, Lugtu, Lacson and Yu who, like them, were
barangay officials and had waived their right to present evidence in their behalf. They
emphasize in this regard that all accused barangay officials and CHDFs did not participate
in the presentation of the evidence by the accused police officers and, hence, the finding
that they too had fired upon the Tamaraw jeepney is hardly based on an established fact.
[77] Also, they believe that the findings of fact by the Sandiganbayan were based on
inadmissible evidence, specifically on evidence rejected by the court itself and those
presented in a separate trial. They label the assailed decision to be speculative,
conjectural and suspicious and, hence, antithetical to the quantum of evidence required in
a criminal prosecution.[78] Finally, they lament that the finding of conspiracy has no
basis in evidence and that the prosecution has not even shown that they were with the
other accused at the scene of the incident or that they were among those who fired at the
victims, and neither were they identified as among the perpetrators of the crime.[79]
In G.R. No. 122776, Cunanan and Puno likewise dispute the finding of conspiracy. They
claim that judging by the uncertainty in the conclusion of the Sandiganbayan as to
P a g e | 42
whether the incident was the result of a legitimate police operation or a careless plot
designed by the accused to obtain commendation, conspiracy has not been proved beyond
reasonable doubt. This, because they believe the prosecution has not, as far as both of
them are concerned, shown that they had ever been part of such malicious design to
commit an ambuscade as that alluded to in the assailed decision. They advance that as
police officers, they merely followed orders from their commander, Yapyuco, but were not
privy to the conversation among the latter, David and Pamintuan, moments before the
shooting. They posit they could hardly be assumed to have had community of criminal
design with the rest of the accused.[80] They affirm Yapyucos statement that they fired
warning shots at the subject jeepney,[81] but only after it had passed the place where
they were posted and only after it failed to stop when flagged down as it then became
apparent that it was going to speed away as supposedly shown by bullet holes on the
chassis and not on the rear portion of the jeepney. They also harp on the absence of
proof of ill motives that would have otherwise urged them to commit the crimes charged,
especially since none of the victims had been personally or even remotely known to either
of them. That they were not intending to commit a crime is, they believe, shown by the
fact that they did not directly aim their rifles at the passengers of the jeepney and that in
fact, they immediately held their fire when Flores identified themselves as employees of
San Miguel Corporation. They conceded that if killing was their intent, then they could
have easily fired at the victims directly.[82]
Commenting on these petitions, the Office of the Special Prosecutor stands by the finding
of conspiracy as established by the fact that all accused, some of them armed, had
assembled themselves and awaited the suspect vehicle as though having previously known
that it would be coming from Salangsangs residence. It posits that the manner by which
the jeepney was fired upon demonstrates a community of purpose and design to commit
the crimes charged.[83] It believes that criminal intent is discernible from the posts the
accused had chosen to take on the road that would give them a direct line of fire at the
target as shown by the trajectories of the bullets that hit the Tamaraw jeepney.[84] This
intent was supposedly realized when after the volley of gunfire, both Flores and Licup were
wounded and the latter died as a supervening consequence.[85] It refutes the invocation
of lawful performance of duty, mainly because there was no factual basis to support the
belief of the accused that the occupants were members of the NPA, as indeed they have
not shown that they had previously verified the whereabouts of the suspect vehicle. But
while it recognizes that the accused had merely responded to the call of duty when
summoned by Pamintuan through David, it is convinced that they had exceeded the
performance thereof when they fired upon the Tamaraw jeepney occupied, as it turned
out, by innocent individuals instead.[86]
As to the contention of Mario Reyes, Andres Reyes and Manguerra that the evidence
adduced before the Sandiganbayan as well the findings based thereon should not be
binding on them, the OSP explains that said petitioners, together with Pamintuan, David,
Lugtu, Lacson and Yu, had previously withdrawn their motion for separate trial and as
directed later on submitted the case for decision as to them with the filing of their
memorandum. It asserts there was no denial of due process to said petitioners in view of
their agreement for the reproduction of the evidence on the motion for bail at the trial
proper as well as by their manifestation to forego with the presentation of their own
evidence. The right to present witnesses is waivable. Also, where an accused is jointly

tried and testifies in court, the testimony binds the other accused, especially where the
latter has failed to register his objection thereto.[87]
The decision on review apparently is laden with conclusions and inferences that seem to
rest on loose predicates. Yet we have pored over the records of the case and found that
evidence nonetheless exists to support the penultimate finding of guilt beyond reasonable
doubt.
I.
It is as much undisputed as it is borne by the records that petitioners were at the situs of
the incident on the date and time alleged in the Informations. Yapyuco, in his testimony
which was adopted by Cunanan and Puno as well as Manguerra, Mario Reyes and Andres
Reyes in their affidavits which had been offered in evidence by the prosecution,
[88] explained that their presence at the scene was in response to the information relayed
by Pamintuan through David that armed rebel elements on board a vehicle described to be
that occupied by the victims were reportedly spotted in Barangay Quebiawan. It is on the
basis of this suspicion that petitioners now appeal to justification under Article 11 (5) of
the Revised Penal Code and under the concept of mistake of fact. Petitioners admit that it
was not by accident or mistake but by deliberation that the shooting transpired when it
became apparent that the suspect vehicle was attempting to flee, yet contention arises as
to whether or not there was intention to harm or even kill the passengers aboard, and who
among them had discharged the bullets that caused the eventual death of Licup and
injured Villanueva.
The first duty of the prosecution is not to present the crime but to identify the criminal.
[89] To this end, the prosecution in these cases offered in evidence the joint counter-
affidavit[90] of Andres Reyes and Manguerra; the counter-affidavit[91] of Mario Reyes;
the joint counter-affidavit[92] of Cunanan and Puno; the counter-affidavit[93]of Yapyuco;
and the joint counter-affidavit[94] of Yapyuco, Cunanan and Puno executed immediately
after the incident in question. In brief, Cunanan and Puno stated therein that [their] team
was forced to fire at the said vehicle when it accelerated after warning shots were fired in
air and when it ignored Yapyucos signal for it to stop;[95] in their earlier affidavit they,
together with Yapyuco, declared that they were constrained x x x to fire directly to (sic)
the said fleeing vehicle.[96] Yapyucos open court declaration, which was adopted by
Cunanan and Puno, is that he twice discharged his firearm: first, to give warning to the
subject jeepney after it allegedly failed to stop when flagged down and second, at the tires
thereof when it came clear that it was trying to escape.[97] He suggested substantiating
the implication in his affidavit that it was the whole team [which fired] at the fleeing
vehicle [98] that the bullets which hit the passenger side of the ill-fated jeepney could
have come only from the CHDFs posted inside the yard of Naron where Manguerra, Mario
Reyes and Andres Reyes admitted having taken post while awaiting the arrival of the
suspect vehicle.[99]
Mario Reyes and Andres Reyes, relying on their affidavits, declared that it was only
Manguerra from their group who discharged a firearm but only into the air to give warning
shots,[100] and that it was the policemen [who] directly fired upon the jeepney.
[101] Manguerra himself shared this statement.[102] Yet these accounts do not sit well
P a g e | 43
with the physical evidence found in the bullet holes on the passenger door of the jeepney
which Dabor, in both her report and testimony, described to have come from bullets
sprayed from perpendicular and oblique directions. This evidence in fact supports
Yapyucos claim that he, Cunanan and Puno did fire directly at the jeepney after it had
made a right turn and had already moved past them such that the line of fire to the
passengers thereof would be at an oblique angle from behind. It also bolsters his claim
that, almost simultaneously, gunshots came bursting after the jeepney has passed the
spot where he, Cunanan and Puno had taken post, and when the vehicle was already right
in front of the yard of Narons house sitting on the right side of the road after the curve
and where Manguerra, Mario Reyes and Andres Reyes were positioned, such that the line
of fire would be direct and perpendicular to it.[103]
While Dabors ballistics findings are open to challenge for being inconclusive as to who
among the accused actually discharged their firearms that night, her report pertaining to
the examination of the ill-fated Tamaraw jeepney affirms the irreducible fact that the
CHDFs posted within the yard of Narons house had indeed sprayed bullets at the said
vehicle. Manguerra, Mario Reyes and Andres Reyes seek to insulate themselves by arguing
that such finding cannot be applied to them as it is evidence adduced in a separate trial.
But as the OSP noted, they may not evade the effect of their having withdrawn their
motion for separate trial, their agreement to a joint trial of the cases, and the binding
effect on them of the testimony of their co-accused, Yapyuco.[104]
Indeed, the extrajudicial confession or admission of one accused is admissible only against
said accused, but is inadmissible against the other accused. But if the declarant or
admitter repeats in court his extrajudicial admission, as Yapyuco did in this case, during
the trial and the other accused is accorded the opportunity to cross-examine the admitter,
the admission is admissible against both accused because then, it is transposed into a
judicial admission.[105] It is thus perplexing why, despite the extrajudicial statements of
Cunanan, Puno and Yapyuco, as well as the latters testimony implicating them in the
incident, they still had chosen to waive their right to present evidence when, in fact, they
could have shown detailed proof of their participation or non-participation in the offenses
charged. We, therefore, reject their claim that they had been denied due process in this
regard, as they opted not to testify and be cross-examined by the prosecution as to the
truthfulness in their affidavits and, accordingly, disprove the inculpatory admissions of
their co-accused.
II.
The availability of the justifying circumstance of fulfillment of duty or lawful exercise of a
right or office under Article 11 (5) of the Revised Penal Code rests on proof that (a) the
accused acted in the performance of his duty or in the lawful exercise of his right or office,
and (b) the injury caused or the offense committed is the necessary consequence of the
due performance of such duty or the lawful exercise of such right or office.[106] The
justification is based on the complete absence of intent and negligence on the part of the
accused, inasmuch as guilt of a felony connotes that it was committed with criminal intent
or with fault or negligence.[107] Where invoked, this ground for non-liability amounts to
an acknowledgment that the accused has caused the injury or has committed the offense
charged for which, however, he may not be penalized because the resulting injury or

offense is a necessary consequence of the due performance of his duty or the lawful
exercise of his right or office. Thus, it must be shown that the acts of the accused relative
to the crime charged were indeed lawfully or duly performed; the burden necessarily shifts
on him to prove such hypothesis.
We find that the requisites for justification under Article 11 (5) of the Revised Penal Code
do not obtain in this case.
The undisputed presence of all the accused at the situs of the incident is a legitimate law
enforcement operation. No objection is strong enough to defeat the claim that all of them
who were either police and barangay officers or CHDF members tasked with the
maintenance of peace and order were bound to, as they did, respond to information of a
suspected rebel infiltration in the locality. Theirs, therefore, is the specific duty to identify
the occupants of their suspect vehicle and search for firearms inside it to validate the
information they had received; they may even effect a bloodless arrest should they find
cause to believe that their suspects had just committed, were committing or were bound
to commit a crime. While, it may certainly be argued that rebellion is a continuing
offense, it is interesting that nothing in the evidence suggests that the accused were
acting under an official order to open fire at or kill the suspects under any and all
circumstances. Even more telling is the absence of reference to the victims having
launched such aggression as would threaten the safety of any one of the accused, or
having exhibited such defiance of authority that would have instigated the accused,
particularly those armed, to embark on a violent attack with their firearms in self-
defense. In fact, no material evidence was presented at the trial to show that the accused
were placed in real mortal danger in the presence of the victims, except maybe their bare
suspicion that the suspects were armed and were probably prepared to conduct hostilities.
But whether or not the passengers of the subject jeepney were NPA members and
whether or not they were at the time armed, are immaterial in the present inquiry
inasmuch as they do not stand as accused in the prosecution at hand. Besides, even
assuming that they were as the accused believed them to be, the actuations of these
responding law enforcers must inevitably be ranged against reasonable expectations that
arise in the legitimate course of performance of policing duties. The rules of engagement,
of which every law enforcer must be thoroughly knowledgeable and for which he must
always exercise the highest caution, do not require that he should immediately draw or
fire his weapon if the person to be accosted does not heed his call. Pursuit without danger
should be his next move, and not vengeance for personal feelings or a damaged pride.
Police work requires nothing more than the lawful apprehension of suspects, since the
completion of the process pertains to other government officers or agencies.[108]
A law enforcer in the performance of duty is justified in using such force as is reasonably
necessary to secure and detain the offender, overcome his resistance, prevent his escape,
recapture him if he escapes, and protect himself from bodily harm.[109] United States v.
Campo[110] has laid down the rule that in the performance of his duty, an agent of the
authorities is not authorized to use force, except in an extreme case when he is attacked
or is the subject of resistance, and finds no other means to comply with his duty or cause
himself to be respected and obeyed by the offender. In case injury or death results from
the exercise of such force, the same could be justified in inflicting the injury or causing the
P a g e | 44
death of the offender if the officer had used necessary force.[111] He is, however, never
justified in using unnecessary force or in treating the offender with wanton violence, or in
resorting to dangerous means when the arrest could be effected otherwise.[112] People
v. Ulep[113] teaches that
The right to kill an offender is not absolute, and may be used only as a last resort, and
under circumstances indicating that the offender cannot otherwise be taken without
bloodshed. The law does not clothe police officers with authority to arbitrarily judge the
necessity to kill. It may be true that police officers sometimes find themselves in a
dilemma when pressured by a situation where an immediate and decisive, but legal, action
is needed. However, it must be stressed that the judgment and discretion of police officers
in the performance of their duties must be exercised neither capriciously nor oppressively,
but within reasonable limits. In the absence of a clear and legal provision to the contrary,
they must act in conformity with the dictates of a sound discretion, and within the spirit
and purpose of the law. We cannot countenance trigger-happy law enforcement officers
who indiscriminately employ force and violence upon the persons they are apprehending.
They must always bear in mind that although they are dealing with criminal elements
against whom society must be protected, these criminals are also human beings with
human rights.[114]
Thus, in People v. Tabag,[115] where members of the Davao CHDF had killed four
members of a family in their home because of suspicions that they were NPA members,
and the accused sought exoneration by invoking among others the justifying circumstance
in Article 11 (5) of the Revised Penal Code, the Court in dismissing the claim and holding
them liable for murder said, thus:
In no way can Sarenas claim the privileges under paragraphs 5 and 6, Article 11 of the
Revised Penal Code, for the massacre of the Magdasals can by no means be considered as
done in the fulfillment of a duty or in the lawful exercise of an office or in obedience to an
order issued by a superior for some lawful purpose. Other than suspicion, there is
no evidence that Welbino Magdasal, Sr., his wife Wendelyn, and their children
were members of the NPA. And even if they were members of the NPA, they
were entitled to due process of law. On that fateful night, they were peacefully
resting in their humble home expecting for the dawn of another uncertain day. Clearly,
therefore, nothing justified the sudden and unprovoked attack, at nighttime, on the
Magdasals. The massacre was nothing but a merciless vigilante-style execution.[116]
Petitioners rationalize their election to aim their fire directly at the jeepney by claiming
that it failed to heed the first round of warning shots as well as the signal for it to stop and
instead tried to flee. While it is possible that the jeepney had been flagged down but
because it was pacing the dark road with its headlights dimmed missed petitioners signal
to stop, and compound to it the admitted fact that the passengers thereof were drunk
from the party they had just been to,[117] still, we find incomprehensible petitioners
quick resolve to use their firearms when in fact there was at least one other vehicle at the
scene the Sarao jeepney owned by Yapyuco which they could actually have used to
pursue their suspects whom they supposedly perceived to be in flight.

Lawlessness is to be dealt with according to the law. Only absolute necessity justifies the
use of force, and it is incumbent on herein petitioners to prove such necessity. We find,
however, that petitioners failed in that respect. Although the employment of powerful
firearms does not necessarily connote unnecessary force, petitioners in this case do not
seem to have been confronted with the rational necessity to open fire at the moving
jeepney occupied by the victims. No explanation is offered why they, in that instant, were
inclined for a violent attack at their suspects except perhaps their over-anxiety or
impatience or simply their careless disposition to take no chances. Clearly, they exceeded
the fulfillment of police duties the moment they actualized such resolve, thereby inflicting
Licup with a mortal bullet wound, causing injury to Villanueva and exposing the rest of the
passengers of the jeepney to grave danger to life and limb all of which could not have
been the necessary consequence of the fulfillment of their duties.
III.
At this juncture, we find that the invocation of the concept of mistake of fact faces certain
failure. In the context of criminal law, a mistake of fact is a misapprehension of a fact
which, if true, would have justified the act or omission which is the subject of the
prosecution.[118] Generally, a reasonable mistake of fact is a defense to a charge of
crime where it negates the intent component of the crime.[119] It may be a defense even
if the offense charged requires proof of only general intent.[120] The inquiry is into the
mistaken belief of the defendant,[121] and it does not look at all to the belief or state of
mind of any other person.[122] A proper invocation of this defense requires (a) that the
mistake be honest and reasonable;[123] (b) that it be a matter of fact;[124] and (c) that
it negate the culpability required to commit the crime[125] or the existence of the mental
state which the statute prescribes with respect to an element of the offense.[126]
The leading authority in mistake of fact as ground for non-liability is found in United
States v. Ah Chong,[127] but in that setting, the principle was treated as a function of
self-defense where the physical circumstances of the case had mentally manifested to the
accused an aggression which it was his instinct to repel. There, the accused, fearful of
bad elements, was woken by the sound of his bedroom door being broken open and,
receiving no response from the intruder after having demanded identification, believed
that a robber had broken in. He threatened to kill the intruder but at that moment he was
struck by a chair which he had placed against the door and, perceiving that he was under
attack, seized a knife and fatally stabbed the intruder who turned out to be his
roommate. Charged with homicide, he was acquitted because of his honest mistake of
fact. Finding that the accused had no evil intent to commit the charge, the Court
explained:
x x x The maxim here is Ignorantia facti excusat ("Ignorance or mistake in point of fact is,
in all cases of supposed offense, a sufficient excuse").
Since evil intent is in general an inseparable element in every crime, any such mistake of
fact as shows the act committed to have proceeded from no sort of evil in the mind
necessarily relieves the actor from criminal liability, provided always there is no fault or
negligence on his part and as laid down by Baron Parke, "The guilt of the accused must
depend on the circumstances as they appear to him." x x x
P a g e | 45
If, in language not uncommon in the cases, one has reasonable cause to believe the
existence of facts which will justify a killing or, in terms more nicely in accord with the
principles on which the rule is founded, if without fault or carelessness he does not believe
them he is legally guiltless of homicide; though he mistook the facts, and so the life of
an innocent person is unfortunately extinguished. In other words, and with reference to
the right of self-defense and the not quite harmonious authorities, it is the doctrine of
reason, and sufficiently sustained in adjudication, that notwithstanding some
decisions apparently adverse, whenever a man undertakes self-defense, he is
justified in acting on the facts as they appear to him. If, without fault or
carelessness, he is misled concerning them, and defends himself correctly
according to what he thus supposes the facts to be, the law will not punish him
though they are in truth otherwise, and he has really no occasion for the extreme
measure. x x x [128]
Besides, as held in People v. Oanis[129] and Baxinela v. People,[130] the justification of
an act, which is otherwise criminal on the basis of a mistake of fact, must preclude
negligence or bad faith on the part of the accused.[131] Thus, Ah Chong further explained
that
The question then squarely presents itself, whether in this jurisdiction one can be held
criminally responsible who, by reason of a mistake as to the facts, does an act for which
he would be exempt from criminal liability if the facts were as he supposed them to be,
but which would constitute the crime of homicide or assassination if the actor had known
the true state of the facts at the time when he committed the act. To this question we
think there can be but one answer, and we hold that under such circumstances there is no
criminal liability, provided always that the alleged ignorance or mistake of fact was not due
to negligence or bad faith.[132]
IV.
This brings us to whether the guilt of petitioners for homicide and frustrated homicide has
been established beyond cavil of doubt. The precept in all criminal cases is that the
prosecution is bound by the invariable requisite of establishing the guilt of the accused
beyond reasonable doubt. The prosecution must rely on the strength of its own evidence
and not on the evidence of the accused. The weakness of the defense of the accused does
not relieve the prosecution of its responsibility of proving guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
[133] By reasonable doubt is meant that doubt engendered by an investigation of the
whole proof and an inability, after such investigation, to let the mind rest easy upon the
certainty of guilt.[134] The overriding consideration is not whether the court doubts the
innocence of the accused, but whether it entertains reasonable doubt as to his guilt.[135]
The prosecution is burdened to prove corpus delicti beyond reasonable doubt either by
direct evidence or by circumstantial or presumptive evidence.[136] Corpus delicticonsists
of two things: first, the criminal act and second, defendant's agency in the commission of
the act.[137] In homicide (by dolo) as well as in murder cases, the prosecution must
prove: (a) the death of the party alleged to be dead; (b) that the death was produced by

the criminal act of some other than the deceased and was not the result of accident,
natural cause or suicide; and (c) that defendant committed the criminal act or was in
some way criminally responsible for the act which produced the death. In other words,
proof of homicide or murder requires incontrovertible evidence, direct or circumstantial,
that the victim was deliberately killed (with malice), that is, with intent to kill. Such
evidence may consist in the use of weapons by the malefactors, the nature, location and
number of wounds sustained by the victim and the words uttered by the malefactors
before, at the time or immediately after the killing of the victim. If the victim dies because
of a deliberate act of the malefactors, intent to kill is conclusively presumed.[138] In such
case, even if there is no intent to kill, the crime is homicide because with respect to crimes
of personal violence, the penal law looks particularly to the material results following the
unlawful act and holds the aggressor responsible for all the consequences
thereof. [139] Evidence of intent to kill is crucial only to a finding of frustrated and
attempted homicide, as the same is an essential element of these offenses, and thus must
be proved with the same degree of certainty as that required of the other elements of said
offenses.[140]
The records disclose no ill motives attributed to petitioners by the prosecution. It is
interesting that, in negating the allegation that they had by their acts intended to kill the
occupants of the jeepney, petitioners turn to their co-accused Pamintuan, whose picture
depicted in the defense evidence is certainly an ugly one: petitioners affidavits as well as
Yapyucos testimony are replete with suggestions that it was Pamintuan alone who
harbored the motive to ambush the suspects as it was he who their (petitioners) minds
that which they later on conceded to be a mistaken belief as to the identity of the
suspects. Cinco, for one, stated in court that Pamintuan had once reported to him that
Flores, a relative of his (Pamintuan), was frequently meeting with NPA members and that
the San Miguel Corporation plant where the victims were employed was being penetrated
by NPA members. He also affirmed Yapyucos claim that there had been a number of
ambuscades launched against members of law enforcement in Quebiawan and in the
neighboring areas supposedly by NPA members at around the time of the incident. But as
the Sandiganbayan pointed out, it is unfortunate that Pamintuan had died during the
pendency of these cases even before his opportunity to testify in court emerged.[141]
Yet whether such claims suffice to demonstrate ill motives evades relevance and
materiality. Motive is generally held to be immaterial inasmuch as it is not an element of
a crime. It gains significance when the commission of a crime is established by evidence
purely circumstantial or otherwise inconclusive.[142] The question of motive is important
in cases where there is doubt as to whether the defendant is or is not the person who
committed the act, but when there is no doubt that the defendant was the one who
caused the death of the deceased, it is not so important to know the reason for the deed.
[143]
In the instant case, petitioners, without abandoning their claim that they did not intend to
kill anyone of the victims, admit having willfully discharged their service firearms; and the
manner by which the bullets concentrated on the passenger side of the jeepney permits no
other conclusion than that the shots were intended for the persons lying along the line of
fire. We do not doubt that instances abound where the discharge of a firearm at another is
not in itself sufficient to sustain a finding of intention to kill, and that there are instances
P a g e | 46
where the attendant circumstances conclusively establish that the discharge was not in
fact animated by intent to kill. Yet the rule is that in ascertaining the intention with which
a specific act is committed, it is always proper and necessary to look not merely to the act
itself but to all the attendant circumstances so far as they develop in the evidence.[144]
The firearms used by petitioners were either M16 rifle, .30 caliber garand rifle and .30
caliber carbine.[145] While the use of these weapons does not always amount to
unnecessary force, they are nevertheless inherently lethal in nature. At the level the
bullets were fired and hit the jeepney, it is not difficult to imagine the possibility of the
passengers thereof being hit and even killed. It must be stressed that the subject jeepney
was fired upon while it was pacing the road and at that moment, it is not as much too
difficult to aim and target the tires thereof as it is to imagine the peril to which its
passengers would be exposed even assuming that the gunfire was aimed at the tires
especially considering that petitioners do not appear to be mere rookie law enforcers or
unskilled neophytes in encounters with lawless elements in the streets.
Thus, judging by the location of the bullet holes on the subject jeepney and the firearms
employed, the likelihood of the passenger next to the driver and in fact even the driver
himself of being hit and injured or even killed is great to say the least, certain to be
precise. This, we find to be consistent with the uniform claim of petitioners that the
impulse to fire directly at the jeepney came when it occurred to them that it was
proceeding to evade their authority. And in instances like this, their natural and logical
impulse was to debilitate the vehicle by firing upon the tires thereof, or to debilitate the
driver and hence put the vehicle to a halt. The evidence we found on the jeepney
suggests that petitioners actuations leaned towards the latter.
This demonstrates the clear intent of petitioners to bring forth death on Licup who was
seated on the passenger side and to Villanueva who was occupying the wheel, together
with all the consequences arising from their deed. The circumstances of the shooting
breed no other inference than that the firing was deliberate and not attributable to sheer
accident or mere lack of skill. Thus, Cupps v. State[146] tells that:
This rule that every person is presumed to contemplate the ordinary and natural
consequences of his own acts, is applied even in capital cases. Because men generally
act deliberately and by the determination of their own will, and not from the
impulse of blind passion, the law presumes that every man always thus acts,
until the contrary appears. Therefore, when one man is found to have killed
another, if the circumstances of the homicide do not of themselves show that it
was not intended, but was accidental, it is presumed that the death of the
deceased was designed by the slayer; and the burden of proof is on him to show
that it was otherwise.
V.
Verily, the shooting incident subject of these petitions was actualized with the deliberate
intent of killing Licup and Villanueva, hence we dismiss Yapyucos alternative claim in G.R.
No. 120744 that he and his co-petitioners must be found guilty merely of reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide and frustrated homicide. Here is why:

First, the crimes committed in these cases are not merely criminal negligence, the killing
being intentional and not accidental. In criminal negligence, the injury caused to another
should be unintentional, it being the incident of another act performed without malice.
[147] People v. Guillen[148] and People v. Nanquil [149] declare that a deliberate intent
to do an unlawful act is essentially inconsistent with the idea of reckless imprudence. And
in People v. Castillo,[150] we held that that there can be no frustrated homicide through
reckless negligence inasmuch as reckless negligence implies lack of intent to kill, and
without intent to kill the crime of frustrated homicide cannot exist.
Second, that petitioners by their acts exhibited conspiracy, as correctly found by the
Sandiganbayan, likewise militates against their claim of reckless imprudence.
Article 8 of the Revised Penal Code provides that there is conspiracy when two or more
persons agree to commit a felony and decide to commit it. Conspiracy need not be proven
by direct evidence. It may be inferred from the conduct of the accused before, during and
after the commission of the crime, showing that they had acted with a common purpose
and design. Conspiracy may be implied if it is proved that two or more persons aimed by
their acts towards the accomplishment of the same unlawful object, each doing a part so
that their combined acts, though apparently independent of each other were, in fact,
connected and cooperative, indicating a closeness of personal association and a
concurrence of sentiment. Conspiracy once found, continues until the object of it has been
accomplished and unless abandoned or broken up. To hold an accused guilty as a co-
principal by reason of conspiracy, he must be shown to have performed an overt act in
pursuance or furtherance of the complicity. There must be intentional participation in the
transaction with a view to the furtherance of the common design and purpose.[151]
Conspiracy to exist does not require an agreement for an appreciable period prior to the
occurrence. From the legal viewpoint, conspiracy exists if, at the time of the commission
of the offense, the accused had the same purpose and were united in its execution.
[152] The instant case requires no proof of any previous agreement among petitioners
that they were really bent on a violent attack upon their suspects. While it is far-fetched to
conclude that conspiracy arose from the moment petitioners, or all of the accused for that
matter, had converged and strategically posted themselves at the place appointed by
Pamintuan, we nevertheless find that petitioners had been ignited by the common impulse
not to let their suspect jeepney flee and evade their authority when it suddenly occurred
to them that the vehicle was attempting to escape as it supposedly accelerated despite the
signal for it to stop and submit to them. As aforesaid, at that point, petitioners were
confronted with the convenient yet irrational option to take no chances by preventing the
jeepneys supposed escape even if it meant killing the driver thereof. It appears that
such was their common purpose. And by their concerted action of almost simultaneously
opening fire at the jeepney from the posts they had deliberately taken around the
immediate environment of the suspects, conveniently affording an opportunity to target
the driver, they did achieve their object as shown by the concentration of bullet entries on
the passenger side of the jeepney at angular and perpendicular trajectories. Indeed, there
is no definitive proof that tells which of all the accused had discharged their weapons that
night and which directly caused the injuries sustained by Villanueva and fatally wounded
Licup, yet we adopt the Sandiganbayans conclusion that since only herein petitioners were
P a g e | 47
shown to have been in possession of their service firearms that night and had fired the
same, they should be held collectively responsible for the consequences of the subject law
enforcement operation which had gone terribly wrong.[153]
VI.
The Sandiganbayan correctly found that petitioners are guilty as co-principals in the
crimes of homicide and attempted homicide only, respectively for the death of Licup and
for the non-fatal injuries sustained by Villanueva, and that they deserve an acquittal
together with the other accused, of the charge of attempted murder with respect to the
unharmed victims.[154] The allegation of evident premeditation has not been proved
beyond reasonable doubt because the evidence is consistent with the fact that the urge to
kill had materialized in the minds of petitioners as instantaneously as they perceived their
suspects to be attempting flight and evading arrest. The same is true with treachery,
inasmuch as there is no clear and indubitable proof that the mode of attack was
consciously and deliberately adopted by petitioners.
Homicide, under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, is punished by reclusion
temporal whereas an attempt thereof, under Article 250 in relation to Article 51, warrants
a penalty lower by two degrees than that prescribed for principals in a consummated
homicide. Petitioners in these cases are entitled to the ordinary mitigating circumstance
of voluntary surrender, and there being no aggravating circumstance proved and applying
the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the Sandiganbayan has properly fixed in Criminal Case
No. 16612 the range of the penalty from six (6) years and one (1) day, but should have
denominated the same as prision mayor, not prision correccional, to twelve (12) years
and one (1) day of reclusion temporal.
However, upon the finding that petitioners in Criminal Case No. 16614 had committed
attempted homicide, a modification of the penalty is in order. The penalty of attempted
homicide is two (2) degrees lower to that of a consummated homicide, which is prision
correccional. Taking into account the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, the
maximum of the indeterminate sentence to be meted out on petitioners is within the
minimum period of prision correccional, which is six (6) months and one (1) day to two
(2) years and four (4) months of prision correccional, whereas the minimum of the
sentence, which under the Indeterminate Sentence Law must be within the range of the
penalty next lower to that prescribed for the offense, which is one (1) month and one (1)
day to six (6) months of arresto mayor.
We likewise modify the award of damages in these cases, in accordance with prevailing
jurisprudence, and order herein petitioners, jointly and severally, to indemnify the heirs of
Leodevince Licup in the amount of P77,000.00 as actual damages and P50,000.00 in moral
damages. With respect to Noel Villanueva, petitioners are likewise bound to pay, jointly
and severally, the amount of P51,700.00 as actual and compensatory damages
and P20,000.00 as moral damages. The award of exemplary damages should be deleted,
there being no aggravating circumstance that attended the commission of the crimes.
 P a g e | 48

WHEREFORE, the instant petitions are DENIED. The joint decision of the Sandiganbayan
in Criminal Case Nos. 16612, 16613 and 16614, dated June 27, 1995, are
hereby AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS:

(a) In Criminal Case No. 16612, petitioners are sentenced to suffer the indeterminate
penalty of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as the minimum, to twelve (12)
years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as the maximum; in Criminal Case No.
16614, the indeterminate sentence is hereby modified to Two (2) years and four (4)
months of prision correccional, as the maximum, and Six (6) months of arresto mayor, as
the minimum.

(b) Petitioners are DIRECTED to indemnify, jointly and severally, the heirs of Leodevince
Licup in the amount of P77,000.00 as actual damages, P50,000.00 in moral damages, as
well as Noel Villanueva, in the amount of P51,700.00 as actual and compensatory
damages, and P20,000.00 as moral damages.