1. A.C. No.

5305 March 17, 2003

MARCIANO P. BRION, JR., petitioner,

vs.
FRANCISCO F. BRILLANTES, JR., respondent.

QUISUMBING, J .:

In this petition for disbarment, complainant Marciano Brion, Jr., charges the respondent, Atty. Francisco Brillantes, Jr., of having willfully
violated a lawful order of this Court in A.M. No. MTJ-92-706, entitled Lupo Almodiel Atienza v. Judge Francisco F. Brillantes, Jr.1 The
decretal portion of our resolution in Atienza reads:

WHEREFORE, respondent is DISMISSED from the service with forfeiture of all leave and retirement benefits and with
prejudice to reappointment in any branch, instrumentality or agency of the government, including government-owned and
controlled corporations. This decision is immediately executory.

SO ORDERED.2

Respondents dismissal in the aforesaid case was ordered after he was found guilty of Gross Immorality and Appearance of Impropriety
during his incumbency as presiding judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 20, Manila.

Petitioner now avers that respondent violated our decree of perpetual disqualification imposed upon him from assuming any post in
government service, including any posts in government-owned and controlled corporations, when he accepted a legal consultancy post
at the Local Water Utilities Administration (LWUA), from 1998 to 2000. Said consultancy included an appointment by LWUA as 6th
member of the Board of Directors of the Urdaneta (Pangasinan) Water District. Upon expiration of the legal consultancy agreement,
this was subsequently renewed as a Special Consultancy Agreement.

Petitioner contends that while both consultancy agreements contained a proviso to the effect that nothing therein should be construed
as establishing an employer-employee relationship between LWUA and respondent, the inclusion of this proviso was only a ploy to
circumvent our order barring respondent from appointment to a government agency. Petitioner points out in reality, respondent enjoys
the same rights and privileges as a regular employee, to wit:3

1. Issuance of LWUA properties such as a cellular phone with accessories, as evidenced by the covering Property Issue Slips with
respondent signing as "Accountable Employee";4

2. Official travel to various places in the country as shown by Reports of Authorized Travel kept by LWUAs General Services
Division5 and Report of Travel accomplished by respondent himself;6

3. Designation as supervising officer over other LWUA employees as brought to light by written instructions personally signed by
respondent;7

4. Attendance in water district conventions and meetings held in various provinces;8

5. Membership in several sensitive LWUA committees such as the Prequalification, Bids, and Awards Committee (PBAC), Build-
Operate-Transfer (BOT) Committee, among others, with receipt of corresponding honoraria as borne out by various Disbursement
Vouchers;9

6. Sitting at meetings of the LWUA Board of Trustees as evidenced by the minutes of such meetings;10 and

7. Receipt of Productivity Incentive Bonus in 1999.

Petitioner submits that all of the foregoing constitute deceitful conduct, gross misconduct, and willful disobedience to a decree of this
Court, and show that respondent is unfit to be a member of the Bar.

In his comment,11 respondent admits the existence of the Legal Consultancy Contract as well as the Special Consultancy Contract.
However, he raises the affirmative defense that under Civil Service Commission (CSC) Memorandum Circular No. 27, Series of 1993,
services rendered pursuant to a consultancy contract shall not be considered government services, and therefore, are not covered by
Civil Service Law, rules and regulations.

Further, says respondent, according to the same Memorandum Circular issued by the Commission, consultancy contracts do not have
to be submitted to the Commission for approval. With respect to his designation as the 6th Member of the Board of Directors of the
Urdaneta Water District, respondent reasons out that the same is not a "reappointment", which is prohibited by our ruling in Atienza, as
said designation is not an organic appointment to a LWUA plantilla position. Hence, according to respondent, the CSC need not pass
approval upon his temporary designation.
Respondent also argues that all the members of the Urdaneta Water District Board, especially the 6th Member, who comes from the
LWUA, assumed such functions merely by virtue of a designation and only in addition to their regular duties. In any event, says
respondent, his designation as 6th Member was revoked in April 2000 and the Special Consultancy Contract was pre-terminated on
April 30, 2000. It has never been renewed since then. With respect to his use of LWUA properties, respondent admits receiving the
cellular phone unit but insists that he merely borrowed it from one Solomon Badoy, a former LWUA Board of Trustees Member.

In our Resolution of February 19, 2001, we referred this case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation. The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline found that respondent willfully violated a lawful order of this Court and
recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for one (1) year and fined ten thousand (P10,000) pesos.

There is no question that the LWUA is a government-owned and controlled corporation, created by virtue of Presidential Decree No.
198.12 As such, our ruling in the Atienza case, A.M. No. MTJ-92-706, which categorically prohibits respondents appointment to any
position in any government-owned and controlled corporation, clearly encompasses and extends to LWUA positions.

In the instant case the respondent does not deny the petitioners allegations.13 Instead, he offers the existence of Memorandum Circular
No. 27, Series of 1993 (MC No. 27, s. 1993) to exculpate himself from the charge against him. However, it does not escape our
attention that the very Memorandum Circular that respondent cites before this Court provides that the duties enumerated in the
consultancy contract are mainly advisory in nature.14

Without belaboring the definition of "advisory,"15 it appears obvious to us that the tasks and duties that respondent performed pursuant
to the consultancy contract cannot, by any stretch of imagination, be deemed merely advisory in nature.

An adviser does not exercise supervisory powers over LWUA employees nor does he issue written instructions to them. An adviser is
not entitled to a seat in such vital LWUA committees like PBAC and the BOT Committee. Also, respondents continuous receipt of
honoraria for sitting as a member of certain LWUA Committees, particularly the BOT Committee, belies his claim that he is a mere
consultant for the LWUA. The evidence on record clearly shows that the LWUA Office Order implementing National Compensation
Circular No. 75-9516 refers to payments of honoraria to officials/employees in consideration of services rendered.

Most telling, in our view, is respondents acceptance of his 1998 Productivity Incentive Bonus (PIB). The Board of Trustees Resolution
No. 26, Series of 1999, of the LWUA,17 which governed the release of the PIB, limited the entitlement to said bonus only to "officials"
and "employees" (permanent, temporary, casual, or contractual) of LWUA.

In sum, we find that for all intents and purposes, respondent performed duties and functions of a non-advisory nature, which pertain to
a contractual employee of LWUA. As stated by petitioner in his reply,18 there is a difference between a consultant hired on a contractual
basis (which is governed by CSC M.C. No. 27, s. 1993) and a contractual employee (whose appointment is governed, among others,
by the CSC Omnibus Rules on Appointment and other Personnel Actions). By performing duties and functions, which clearly pertain to
a contractual employee, albeit in the guise of an advisor or consultant, respondent has transgressed both letter and spirit of this Courts
decree in Atienza.

The lawyers primary duty as enunciated in the Attorneys Oath is to uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land, and promote
respect for law and legal processes.19 That duty in its irreducible minimum entails obedience to the legal orders of the courts.
Respondents disobedience to this Courts order prohibiting his reappointment to any branch, instrumentality, or agency of government,
including government owned and controlled corporations, cannot be camouflaged by a legal consultancy or a special consultancy
contract. By performing duties and functions of a contractual employee of LWUA, by way of a consultancy, and receiving compensation
and perquisites as such, he displayed acts of open defiance of the Courts authority, and a deliberate rejection of his oath as an officer
of the court. It is also destructive of the harmonious relations that should prevail between Bench and Bar, a harmony necessary for the
proper administration of justice. Such defiance not only erodes respect for the Court but also corrodes public confidence in the rule of
law.

What aggravates respondents offense is the fact that respondent is no ordinary lawyer. Having served in the judiciary for eight (8)
years, he is very well aware of the standards of moral fitness for membership in the legal profession. His propensity to try to "get away"
with an indiscretion becomes apparent and inexcusable when he entered into a legal "consultancy" contract with the LWUA. Perhaps
realizing its own mistake, LWUA terminated said contract with respondent, but then proceeded to give him a "special consultancy." This
travesty could not be long hidden from public awareness, hence the instant complaint for disbarment filed by petitioner. Given the
factual circumstances found by Commission on Bar Discipline, we have no hesitance in accepting the recommendation of the Board of
Governors, Integrated Bar of the Philippines, that respondent be fined and suspended from the practice of law. The Code of
Professional Responsibility, Rule 1.01, provides that a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. For
violating the Code as well as transgressing his oath as an officer of the court, his suspension for one (1) year and a fine of ten thousand
(P10,000) pesos are in order.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Francisco Brillantes, Jr., is found liable for having willfully violated a lawful order of this Court in our
decision of March 29, 1995 rendered in A.M. No. MTJ-92-706, entitled Lupo Almodiel Atienza vs. Judge Francisco F. Brillantes, Jr. He is
hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) year and ordered to pay a FINE of Ten Thousand (P10,000.00) Pesos, with a
STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar conduct shall be dealt with more severely. Let a copy of this Decision be
furnished to the Bar Confidant and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and spread on the personal records of respondent as well as
circulated to all courts in the Philippines. This decision is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.

2. A.C. No. 4921 March 6, 2003

CARMELITA I. ZAGUIRRE, complainant,

vs.
ATTY. ALFREDO CASTILLO, respondent.

PER CURIAM:

Before this Court is a Petition for Disbarment filed by Carmelita I. Zaguirre against Atty. Alfredo Castillo on the ground of Gross Immoral
Conduct.

The facts as borne by the records are as follows:

Complainant and respondent met sometime in 1996 when the two became officemates at the National Bureau of Investigation
(NBI).1 Respondent courted complainant and promised to marry her while representing himself to be single.2 Soon they had an intimate
relationship that started sometime in 1996 and lasted until 1997.3 During their affair, respondent was preparing for the bar examinations
which he passed. On May 10, 1997, he was admitted as a member of the Philippine Bar.4 It was only around the first week of May 1997
that complainant first learned that respondent was already married when his wife went to her office and confronted her about her
relationship with respondent.5 On September 10, 1997, respondent, who by now is a lawyer, executed an affidavit, admitting his
relationship with the complainant and recognizing the unborn child she was carrying as his.6 On December 9, 1997, complainant gave
birth to a baby girl, Aletha Jessa.7 By this time however, respondent had started to refuse recognizing the child and giving her any form
of support.8

Respondent claims that: he never courted the complainant; what transpired between them was nothing but mutual lust and desire; he
never represented himself as single since it was known in the NBI that he was already married and with children;9 complainant is
almost 10 years older than him and knew beforehand that he is already married;10 the child borne by complainant it not his, because
the complainant was seeing other men at the time they were having an affair.11 He admits that he signed the affidavit dated September
10, 1997 but explains that he only did so to save complainant from embarrassment. Also, he did not know at the time that complainant
was seeing other men.12

After due haring, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline found Atty. Alfredo Castillo guilty of gross immoral conduct and recommends
that he be meted the penalty of indefinite suspension from the practice of law.

The Court agrees with the findings and recommendation of the IBP.

The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:

"Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct."

xxx xxx xxx

"CANON 7 A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession, and support the activities of the
Integrated Bar."

xxx xxx xxx

"Rule 7.03 A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor should he, whether
in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession."

Immoral conduct has been defined as:

"x x x that conduct which is so willful, flagrant, or shameless as to show indifference to the opinion of good and respectable
members of the community. Furthermore, such conduct must not only be immoral, but grossly immoral. That is, it must be so
corrupt as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree or committed under such
scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock the common sense of decency."13

In his affidavit dated September 10, 1997, duly acknowledged before a notary public, he declared explicitly:

"1. That I had a relationship with one Carmelita Zaguirre, my officemate;

"2. That as a result of that relationship, she is presently pregnant with my child;

"3. That I hereby voluntarily recognize the child now under (sic) her womb to be my own;
 "4. That I am willing to support the said child henceforth, including his/her personal and medical needs, education, housing,
food, clothing and other necessities for living, which I will give through his/her mother, Carmelita Zaguirre, until he/she
becomes of legal age and capable to live on his/her own;

"5. That I undertake to sign the birth certificate as an additional proof that he/she is my child; however, my failure to sign does
not negate the recognition and acknowledgement already done herein;

"6. That I am executing this affidavit without compulsion on my part and being a lawyer, I have full knowledge of the
consequence of such acknowledgment and recognition."14

More incriminating is his handwritten letter dated March 12, 1998 which states in part:

"Ayoko ng umabot tayo sa kung saan-saan pa. All your officemates, e.g., Ate Ging, Glo, Guy and others (say) that I am the
look like(sic) of your daughter.

"Here's my bargain. I will help you in supporting your daughter, but I cannot promise fix amount for monthly support of your
daughter. However it shall not be less than P500 but not more than P1,000."15

In the recent case of Luguid vs. Judge Camano, Jr., the Court in castigating a judge stated that:

". . . even as an ordinary lawyer, respondent has to conform to the strict standard of conduct demanded of members of the
profession. Certainly, fathering children by a woman other than his lawful wife fails to meet these standards."16

Siring a child with a woman other than his wife is a conduct way below the standards of morality required of every lawyer.17

Moreover, the attempt of respondent to renege on his notarized statement recognizing and undertaking to support his child by
Carmelita demonstrates a certain unscrupulousness on his part which is highly censurable, unbecoming a member of a noble
profession, tantamount to self-stultification.18

This Court has repeatedly held:

"as officers of the court, lawyers must not only in fact be of good moral character but must also be seen to be of good moral
character and leading lives in accordance with the highest moral standards of the community. More specifically, a member of
the Bar and officer of the court is not only required to refrain from adulterous relationships or the keeping of mistresses but
must also so behave himself as to avoid scandalizing the public by creating the belief that he is flouting those moral
standards."19

While respondent does not deny having an extra-marital affair with complainant he seeks understanding from the Court, pointing out
that "men by nature are polygamous,"20 and that what happened between them was "nothing but mutual lust and desire."21 The Court is
not convinced. In fact, it is appalled at the reprehensible, amoral attitude of the respondent.

Respondent claims that he did not use any deception to win her affection. Granting arguendo that complainant entered into a
relationship with him knowing full well his marital status, still it does not absolve him of gross immorality for what is in question in a case
like this is respondent's fitness to be a member of the legal profession. It is not dependent whether or not the other party knowingly
engaged in an immoral relationship with him.

We agree with the IBP that the defense of in pari delicto is not feasible. The Court held in Mortel vs. Aspiras:

"In a disbarment proceeding, it is immaterial that the complainant is in pari delicto because this is not a proceeding to grant
relief to the complainant, but one to purge the law profession of unworthy members, to protect the public and the courts."22

The illicit relationship with Carmelita took place while respondent was preparing to take the bar examinations. Thus, it cannot be said
that it is unknown to him that an applicant for admission to membership in the bar must show that he is possessed of good moral
character, a requirement which is not dispensed with upon admission to membership of the bar.23 This qualification is not only a
condition precedent to admission to the legal profession, but its continued possession is essential to maintain one's good standing in
the profession;24 it is a continuing requirement to the practice of law25 and therefore admission to the bar does not preclude a
subsequent judicial inquiry, upon proper complaint, into any question concerning his mental or moral fitness before he became a
lawyer. This is because his admission to practice merely creates a rebuttable presumption that he has all the qualifications to become a
lawyer.

The Court held:

"The practice of law is not a right but a privilege bestowed by the State on those who show that they possess, and continue to
possess, the qualifications required by law for the conferment of such privilege. We must stress that membership in the bar is
a privilege burdened with conditions. A lawyer has the privilege to practice law only during good behavior. He can be deprived
of his license for misconduct ascertained and declared by judgment of the court after giving him the opportunity to be heard."26
and in Dumadag vs. Lumaya:

"The practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions. Adherence to the rigid standards of mental fitness, maintenance of
the highest degree of morality and faithful compliance with the rules of the legal profession are the conditions required for
remaining a member of good standing of the bar and for enjoying the privilege to practice law."27

Respondent repeatedly engaged in sexual congress with a woman not his wife and now refuses to recognize and support a child whom
he previously recognized and promised to support. Clearly therefore, respondent violated the standards of morality required of the legal
profession and should be disciplined accordingly.

As consistently held by this Court, disbarment shall not be meted out if a lesser punishment could be given.28Records show that from
the time he took his oath in 1997, he has severed his ties with complainant and now lives with his wife and children in Mindoro. As of
now, the Court does not perceive this fact as an indication of respondent's effort to mend his ways or that he recognizes the impact of
his offense on the noble profession of law. Nevertheless, the Court deems it more appropriate under the circumstances that indefinite
suspension should be meted out than disbarment. The suspension shall last until such time that respondent is able to show, to the full
satisfaction of the Court, that he has instilled in himself a firm conviction of maintaining moral integrity and uprightness required of every
member of the profession.

The rule is settled that a lawyer may be suspended or disbarred for any misconduct, even if it pertains to his private activities, as long
as it shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity or good demeanor.29

ACCORDINGLY, in view of the foregoing, the Court finds respondent GUILTY of Gross Immoral Conduct and ordered to suffer
INDEFINITE SUSPENSION from the practice of law.

Let a copy of this Decision be attached to Atty. Castillo's personal record in the Office of the Bar Confidant and a copy thereof be
furnished the IBP and all courts throughout the country.

SO ORDERED.

3. A.M. No. 3249 November 29, 1989

SALVACION DELIZO CORDOVA, complainant,

vs.
ATTY. LAURENCE D. CORDOVA, respondent.

RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM:

In an unsworn letter-complaint dated 14 April 1988 addressed to then Mr. Chief Justice Claudio Teehankee, complainant Salvacion
Delizo charged her husband, Atty. Laurence D. Cordova, with immorality and acts unbecoming a member of the Bar. The letter-
complaint was forwarded by the Court to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Commission on Bar Discipline ("Commission"), for
investigation, report and recommendation.

The Commission, before acting on the complaint, required complainant to submit a verified complaint within ten (10) days from notice.
Complainant complied and submitted to the Commission on 27 September 1988 a revised and verified version of her long and detailed
complaint against her husband charging him with immorality and acts unbecoming a member of the Bar.

In an Order of the Commission dated 1 December 1988, respondent was declared in default for failure to file an answer to the
complaint within fifteen (15) days from notice. The same Order required complainant to submit before the Commission her evidence ex
parte, on 16 December 1988. Upon the telegraphic request of complainant for the resetting of the 16 December 1988 hearing, the
Commission scheduled another hearing on 25 January 1989. The hearing scheduled for 25 January 1989 was rescheduled two (2)
more times-first, for 25 February 1989 and second, for 10 and 11 April 1989. The hearings never took place as complainant failed to
appear. Respondent Cordova never moved to set aside the order of default, even though notices of the hearings scheduled were sent
to him.

In a telegraphic message dated 6 April 1989, complainant informed the Commission that she and her husband had already
"reconciled". In an order dated 17 April 1989, the Commission required the parties (respondent and complainant) to appear before it for
confirmation and explanation of the telegraphic message and required them to file a formal motion to dismiss the complaint within
fifteen (15) days from notice. Neither party responded and nothing was heard from either party since then.

Complainant having failed to submit her evidence ex parte before the Commission, the IBP Board of Governors submitted to this Court
its report reprimanding respondent for his acts, admonishing him that any further acts of immorality in the future will be dealt with more
severely, and ordering him to support his legitimate family as a responsible parent should.
The findings of the IBP Board of Governors may be summed up as follows:

Complainant and respondent Cordova were married on 6 June 1976 and out of this marriage, two (2) children were born. In 1985, the
couple lived somewhere in Quirino Province. In that year, respondent Cordova left his family as well as his job as Branch Clerk of Court
of the Regional Trial Court, Cabarroguis, Quirino Province, and went to Mangagoy, Bislig, Surigao del Sur with one Fely G. Holgado.
Fely G. Holgado was herself married and left her own husband and children to stay with respondent. Respondent Cordova and Fely G.
Holgado lived together in Bislig as husband and wife, with respondent Cordova introducing Fely to the public as his wife, and Fely
Holgado using the name Fely Cordova. Respondent Cordova gave Fely Holgado funds with which to establish a sari-sari store in the
public market at Bislig, while at the same time failing to support his legitimate family.

On 6 April 1986, respondent Cordova and his complainant wife had an apparent reconciliation. Respondent promised that he would
separate from Fely Holgado and brought his legitimate family to Bislig, Surigao del Sur. Respondent would, however, frequently come
home from beerhouses or cabarets, drunk, and continued to neglect the support of his legitimate family. In February 1987, complainant
found, upon returning from a trip to Manila necessitated by hospitalization of her daughter Loraine, that respondent Cordova was no
longer living with her (complainant's) children in their conjugal home; that respondent Cordova was living with another mistress, one
Luisita Magallanes, and had taken his younger daughter Melanie along with him. Respondent and his new mistress hid Melanie from
the complinant, compelling complainant to go to court and to take back her daughter by habeas corpus. The Regional Trial Court,
Bislig, gave her custody of their children.

Notwithstanding respondent's promises to reform, he continued to live with Luisita Magallanes as her husband and continued to fail to
give support to his legitimate family.

Finally the Commission received a telegram message apparently from complainant, stating that complainant and respondent had been
reconciled with each other.

After a review of the record, we agree with the findings of fact of the IBP Board. We also agree that the most recent reconciliation
between complainant and respondent, assuming the same to be real, does not excuse and wipe away the misconduct and immoral
behavior of the respondent carried out in public, and necessarily adversely reflecting upon him as a member of the Bar and upon the
Philippine Bar itself. An applicant for admission to membership in the bar is required to show that he is possessed of good moral
character. That requirement is not exhausted and dispensed with upon admission to membership of the bar. On the contrary, that
requirement persists as a continuing condition for membership in the Bar in good standing.

In Mortel v. Aspiras,1 this Court, following the rule in the United States, held that "the continued possession ... of a good moral character
is a requisite condition for the rightful continuance in the practice of the law ... and its loss requires suspension or disbarment, even
though the statutes do not specify that as a ground for disbarment. " 2 It is important to note that the lack of moral character that we
here refer to as essential is not limited to good moral character relating to the discharge of the duties and responsibilities of an attorney
at law. The moral delinquency that affects the fitness of a member of the bar to continue as such includes conduct that outrages the
generally accepted moral standards of the community, conduct for instance, which makes "a mockery of the inviolable social institution
or marriage." 3 In Mortel, the respondent being already married, wooed and won the heart of a single, 21-year old teacher who
subsequently cohabited with him and bore him a son. Because respondent's conduct in Mortel was particularly morally repulsive,
involving the marrying of his mistress to his own son and thereafter cohabiting with the wife of his own son after the marriage he had
himself arranged, respondent was disbarred.

In Royong v. Oblena, 4 the respondent was declared unfit to continue as a member of the bar by reason of his immoral conduct and
accordingly disbarred. He was found to have engaged in sexual relations with the complainant who consequently bore him a son; and
to have maintained for a number of years an adulterous relationship with another woman.

In the instant case, respondent Cordova maintained for about two (2) years an adulterous relationship with a married woman not his
wife, in full view of the general public, to the humiliation and detriment of his legitimate family which he, rubbing salt on the wound,
failed or refused to support. After a brief period of "reform" respondent took up again with another woman not his wife, cohabiting with
her and bringing along his young daughter to live with them. Clearly, respondent flaunted his disregard of the fundamental institution of
marriage and its elementary obligations before his own daughter and the community at large.

WHEREFORE, the Court Resolved to SUSPEND respondent from the practice of law indefinitely and until farther orders from this
Court. The Court will consider lifting his suspension when respondent Cordova submits proof satisfactory to the Commission and this
Court that he has and continues to provide for the support of his legitimate family and that he has given up the immoral course of
conduct that he has clung to.
4. A.M. No. 2019 June 3, 1991

SHIRLEY CUYUGAN LIZASO, complainant,

vs.
ATTY. SERGIO AMANTE, respondent

RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM:

On 27 March 1979, Shirley Cuyugan-Lizaso filed a sworn Complaint for disbarment against respondent Atty. Sergio G. Amante
charging the latter with deceitful and grossly immoral conduct. The Court required respondent Amante to file an Answer to the
complaint, and respondent did so on 25 May 1979. A Reply dated 23 September 1980 was filed by complainant.

By a Resolution dated 10 November 1980, the Court referred this case to the Office of the Solicitor General for investigation, report and
recommendation.

On 18 June 1981, complainant wrote a letter to this Court requesting an order restraining respondent from leaving the country and an
order restraining respondent's employer, the University of the East, from disbursing monies that may be due to respondent on account
of his retirement from the University's service. The Court referred this request to the Office of the Solicitor General in a Resolution
dated 15 July 1981.

The Office of the Solicitor General accordingly held hearings at which the complainant appeared and testified on her own behalf and
submitted documentary evidence to support her allegations of misconduct on the part of the respondent Amante. Respondent Amante
appeared at these hearings, testified on his own behalf and was cross-examined. Respondent also presented documentary evidence
on his behalf, but failed to complete his presentation of evidence despite repeated notices to do so. Moreover, respondent Amante
failed to offer formally his documentary evidence.

The complainant's case was summarized by the Solicitor General in his Report and Recommendation dated 7 February 1990 in the
following manner:

On August 7, 1978, complainant handed to respondent Prudential Bank Check No. 655615 dated August 4, 1978 in the
amount of P5,000.00 (Exh. "A") payable to the latter and which, per agreement between the two of them, was to be invested in
respondent's business venture in the casino. Complainant was enticed into investing in the business by respondent's
proposition that the business will guarantee her an interest of 10% profit a day. Complainant was further convinced because
she knows of her sister's friend who deals in the same business in the casino and who even accepts jewelries from gamblers
who have lost heavily. The check was encashed by respondent as shown by his signature appearing at the back of the check.

A written receipt (Exh. "B") for the amount of P5,000.00 was signed by respondent on August 7, 1978 and which states:

Mrs. Shirley Cuyugan Lizaso entrusted the amount of P5,000.00 to Atty. Sergio Amante to be invested in business
with a guarantee of 10% net profit a day starting Aug. 7, 1978, capital to be returned after two months.

Received by:

S.M Amante
(signed)

The complainant originally prepared the check and the receipt on August 4, 1978. She tried to seek respondent's signature on
the receipt but it was only on August 7, 1978 when she was able to see respondent and gave to him the P5,000.00 check for
which respondent signed the receipt/promissory note.

Three days after August 7, 1978, complainant tried to see respondent in order to collect the interest on her investment but
respondent failed to give her any. For the many weeks that followed, complainant even begged respondent to return her
money if he could not give the interests but respondent merely made promises.

Afraid that her investment will not be returned, complainant sought the help of the U.E Legal Department Head, Atty. Pedro
Siojo and presented her written complaint dated August 27, 1978 against respondent (Exh. "C"). Atty. Siojo scheduled a
confrontation but the respondent failed to come. The second scheduled confrontation likewise resulted in respondent's failure
to appear. In view of these, Atty. Siojo informed her that he cannot do anything if respondent refuses to appear.

Because of this, complainant sought the help of Mr. Antonio Ravelo, U.E Faculty President, but the latter was not able to help
her because respondent denied that he ever owed complainant anything.

Again, complainant sought the help of the University President, Conrado Aquino, by her letter of December 11, 1978 (Exh.
"D"). Mr. Aquino, however, was of the opinion that this was a personal agreement best left between the two of them to settle.1
Respondent Amante presented a different version of the facts, which was substantially as follows. Sometime in June 1978, complainant
allegedly approached respondent for a loan of P20,000.00 needed to forestall foreclosure of a mortgage on complainant's house.
Respondent Amante allegedly lent P5,000.00 to complainant, which loan fell due a month later. Complainant was allegedly very slow in
repaying the loan. To provide complainant with an incentive for repaying her loan from the respondent, the latter dangled the possibility
of a second loan for P20,000.00 to complainant, upon complainant's repayment of her first loan. Thus, on 7 August 1978, complainant
tendered to respondent Amante the P5,000.00 check referred to in the complaint. Amante admitted he encashed the check, but' argued
that he did so to realize the payment of complainant's prior obligation to him. Respondent said he had no real intention of extending a
second loan to complainant. This outraged the complainant and she allegedly then tried to extort money from respondent Amante by
harassing him with her false and fabricated complaint.

The respondent also denied having signed the receipt for P5,000.00 with the wording appearing in Exhibit "B" of the Complaint. At the
same time, to substantiate his own version of the evidence, respondent offered in evidence Exhibits "1" and "2" being a copy of a
receipt for P5,000.00 allegedly given in payment of complainant's loan from respondent, and purportedly signed by complainant.

After careful examination of the records of this case, we agree with the Solicitor General that complainant has discharged the burden of
showing, by clear and convincing evidence, that she had delivered P5,000.00 to respondent Amante for investment purposes and that
respondent not only failed to deliver the promised return on the investment but also the principal thereof, despite repeated demands
therefor. The reasoning and conclusions of fact of the Solicitor General follow:

First. Most persuasive in lending credence to this is the fact that the check, at the time of encashment by respondent, already
contained the words "capital investment" at the back thereof. The bank's microfilm copy of the reverse side of the check
confirms it. This amply and clearly substantiate the material fact that at the time the check was received by respondent and
presented by him to the bank, the agreement between him and complainant was to invest the amount in respondent's
business venture. It totally negates respondent's claim that the check was in payment of a previous loan given by him to
complainant.

Second. The receipt/promissory note (Exh. "B") dated August 7, 1978 clearly expresses the terms of their oral agreement that
the amount of P5,000.00 was entrusted to respondent to be invested by him in his business venture, that said amount has a
guarantee of 10% profit per day starting August 7, 1978, and that the capital of P5,000.00 shall be returned to complainant
after two months from date thereof. Said receipt unquestionably bears the signature of respondent. To all these terms,
respondent affixed his signature.

Third. After complainant had repeatedly demanded the return of her P5,000.00 capital investment which respondent failed to
do, the latter wrote a note dated November 7, 1978 addressed to a certain Mr. Resty Noriega (Exh. "H") authorizing
complainant to collect in his (respondent's) behalf his fee from Mr. Noriega. Complainant presented this note to Mr. Noriega
who informed her that the note is not clear enough to entrust complainant with payment of respondent's fee. Mr. Noriega then
returned the note to her with the advice that she should secure a letter from respondent to specify the amount to be collected
by complainant. Respondent's note does not show an admission of his obligation to return or reimburse complainant's money.

Fourth. The tenacity and resourcefulness with which complainant repeatedly sought help from various school officials, such as
the U.E Head of Legal Department, the U.E Faculty President and the University President himself, in separate written
complaints, prior to finally securing legal assistance from a private lawyer, all directed to seeking the return or reimbursement
of her P5,000.00 investment, are evincive of the credibility and faithfulness to the truth of complainant's cause of action
against respondent.2

Upon the other hand, the Solicitor General found respondent's version of the facts to be unreal and implausible. Moreover, the exhibits
submitted by respondent Amante appeared to have been fabricated by respondent. The analysis of respondent's evidence by the
Solicitor General follows:

xxx xxx xxx

1. Annex "1" photocopy of a stub in an actual size as short and as small as one inch by three inches, dated August 7, 1987,
addressed to "Gigi" which is the nickname of respondent and embodying ten words: "Attached is check No. 655615 as
payment of my "utang'" and bearing the signature Shirley C. Lizaso. This evidence can only elicit disbelief as being incredible
if not manufactured for the following reasons:

xxx xxx xxx

Furthermore, the situation raises the question why complainant would give and sign such a note of receipt when, in the
ordinary course of things as in the case at bar, it should be the respondent who should sign and give a receipt for the check of
P5,000.00, if indeed complainant paid her loan to respondent.

d) Finally, the stub receipt had never been presented by respondent in any of the investigations/confrontations set by the U.E.
Legal Department Head or the U.E Faculty President. If there was any truth to the genuineness of the stub receipt claimed by
respondent, he should have immediately presented this in the scheduled confrontations if only to dismiss the complaint
outright or the malicious rumor he claimed complainant was spreading within the university. Instead, the stub receipt suddenly
surfaced only during the investigation of this disbarment case.
 2. Annex "2", subsequently marked as Exh. "1", is the alleged receipt dated August 4, 1978 embodying the following words:

Received from Shirley C. Lizaso Check No. 655615C (P5,000.00) in payment of her loan.

[Unusually long vacant space between the above words and signature below]

Sergio G. Amante
(signed)

Exh. "1" is fully handwritten. According to respondent, Exh. "1" and Exh. "B" are one and the same and that in view of the long
and big vacant space between the handwritten words and his signature, he claimed that complainant inserted the words in
Exh. "B" embodying the agreement that the P5,000.00 was received by respondent as her capital to be invested in
respondent's business venture with a guarantee of 10% net profit a day starting August 7, 1978 and the same to be returned
two months thereafter; and that complainant allegedly cut off all the wordings of Exh. "1" that what remained is the receipt
promissory note or Exh. "B" of the complainant and the same signature of respondent.

xxx xxx xxx

Moreover, it taxes credulity on why respondent in Exh. "1" would affix his signature so far away below from the handwritten
words, leaving a big void or vacant space in between which any ordinary layman knows may be used to another's advantage
and manipulated to the prejudice of the signatory, even more so that respondent is a lawyer.

Furthermore, a comparison of the edge of the cut top portion of Exh. "B" with the last handwritten line in Exh. "1" which
consisted of only one word "loan" would readily show that the handwritten loops appearing on the edge of the cut portion of
the top of Exh. "B" do not, at all, correspond to the last line of Exh. "1", which does not contain any tail loops at all. In other
words, the last line of respondent's Exh. "1" containing the handwritten word "loan" does not have any tail loops that would
correspond with those appearing on the edge of the top cut portion of complainant's Exh. "B", if it were true that the paper
showing Exh. "B" is a physical continuation of Exh. "1" as respondent would want the undersigned Hearing Officer to believe.
Immediately clear, therefore, is the conclusion that Exh. "1" and "B" are not the same and are far different from each other.

Lastly, Exh. "1", just like Annex "1" (stub receipt), had never been presented by respondent in any of the confrontations set by
the university officials between complainant and respondent, but was only presented during the investigation at bar.

3. Respondent's claim that he enticed complainant to pay him the alleged P5,000.00 loan he earlier gave to her, by promising
to give her P20,000.00 if she pays the P5,000.00 loan, is quite hollow and very unlikely. Any person, the complainant no less,
who knows that she will be given a P20,000.00 loan would very unlikely pay a previous loan of P5,000.00 but would merely
partially offset said amount and received instead the balance of P15,000.00.

Moreover, it must be remembered that complainant secured from the Prudential Bank a loan of P5,000.00 on August 4, 1978
in order to invest it on respondent's business venture. To follow respondent's twisted reasoning, it evokes wonder why
complainant would secure a P5,000.00 loan from the bank just to pay a P5,000.00 loan to respondent who promised to give
her, anyway, a P20,000.00 loan. If complainant really needed the balance of P15,000.00, she could have very well secured
the same from the bank and not from the respondent. In other words, there was no necessity for complainant to obtain a
subsequent loan from respondent because she could, just as well, get the same loan from the bank as she was able to.

xxx xxx xxx

5. For a lawyer, as the respondent is, it appears strange that he has not required complainant to sign any receipt for the
P5,000.00 loan he allegedly gave her "sometime in June, 1978." If complainant, who is not a lawyer, was able to make him
sign a receipt for P5,000.00 she gave him, respondent, with all his legal expertise, would be doubly expected to protect his
loan by a similar receipt. And yet, respondent was not able to, as there was actually none to secure.3

Thus, it appears to the Court that respondent failed to return and account for complainant's money notwithstanding repeated demands
of complainant for such return and accounting. It also appears that when finally brought before the Office of the Solicitor General in the
disbarment proceedings, respondent tried to controvert complainant's charges by using in evidence documents that appear to be
falsified and which try to make it appear that complainant had delivered the P5,000.00 to respondent in payment of a prior loan from
the latter.

It is true, of course, that there was no attorney-client relationship between respondent Amante and complainant Cuyugan-Lizaso. The
transaction that complainant entered into with respondent did not require respondent to perform professional legal services for
complainant nor did that transaction relate to the rendition of professional services by respondent to any other person.

As early as 1923, however, the Court laid down in In Re Vicente Pelaez4 the principle that it can exercise its power to discipline lawyers
for causes which do not involve the relationship of an attorney and client. In that case, the respondent Vicente Pelaez, a member of the
Bar, was appointed guardian of a minor child. As such guardian, he came into possession of certain property, including some shares of
stock in certain corporations. Pelaez, while still guardian of the minor, borrowed money from the Philippine National Bank and to
guarantee that personal loan, Pelaez, without the knowledge or consent of the guardianship court, pledged the shares of stock
belonging to the minor. In disciplining the respondent, Mr. Justice Malcolm said:

. . . [A]s a general rule, a court will not assume jurisdiction to discipline one of its officers for misconduct alleged to have been
committed in his private capacity. But this is a general rule with many exceptions. The courts sometimes stress the point
that the attorney has shown, through misconduct outside of his professional dealings, a want of such professional honesty as
render him unworthy of public confidence, and an unfit and unsafe person to manage the legal business of others. The reason
why such a distinction can be drawn is because it is the court which admits an attorney to the bar, and the court requires for
such admission the possession of a good moral character.5

xxx xxx xxx

The nature of the office, the trust relation which exists between attorney and client,, as well as between court and attorney,
and the statutory rule prescribing the qualifications of attorneys, uniformly require that an attorney shall be a person of a good
moral character. If that qualification is a condition precedent to a license or privilege to enter upon the practice of the law, it
would seem to be equally essential during the continuance of the practice and the exercise of the privilege. So it is held
that an attorney will be removed not only for malpractice and dishonesty in his profession, but also for gross misconduct not
connected with his professional duties, which shows him to be unfit for the office and unworthy of the privileges which his
license and the law confer upon him.6 (Emphasis supplied)

The rationale of the rule that misconduct, indicative of moral unfitness, whether relating to professional or non-professional matters,
justifies suspension or disbarment, was expressed by Mr. Chief Justice Prentice in In Re Disbarment of Peck,7 with eloquence and
restraint:

As important as it is that an attorney be competent to deal with the oftentimes intricate matters which may be entrusted to
him, it is infinitely more so that he be upright and trustworthy. Unfortunately, it is not easy to limit membership in the profession
to those who satisfy the standard test of fitness. But scant progress in that direction can be hoped for if, in the determination of
the qualification of professional fitness, non-professional dishonor and dishonesty in whatsoever path of life is to be
ignored. Professional honesty and honor are not to be expected as the accompaniment of dishonesty and dishonor in other
relations. So it is that we, in common with other courts, hold, as did Lord Mansfield more than a century ago, that misconduct,
indicative of moral unfitness for the profession, whether it be professional or non-professional, justifies dismission as well as
exclusion from the bar.8 (Emphasis supplied)

The rule in this jurisdiction was stated by Mr. Justice Malcolm in Piatt v. Abordo9 in the following terms: that an attorney may be
removed or otherwise disciplined "not only for malpractice and dishonesty in his profession, but also for gross misconduct not
connected with his professional duties, which showed him to be unfit for the office and unworthy of the privileges which his license and
the law confer to him." Mr. Justice Malcolm went on to say:

The courts are not curators of the morals of the bar. At the same time the profession is not compelled to harbor all persons
whatever their character, who are fortunate enough to keep out of prison. As good character is an essential qualification for
admission of an attorney to practice, when the attoney's character is bad in such respects as to show that he is unsafe and
unfit to be entrusted with the powers of an attorney, the courts retain the power to discipline him.10

Finally, we should refer to Rule 191 set out in Chapter I entitled "The Lawyer and Society" of the "Code of Professional Responsibility"
which requires that "a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct." We emphasize here that "conduct,"
as used in this rule, is not limited to conduct exhibited in connection with the performance of professional duties.

In the case at bar, it is clear to the Court that the conduct of respondent Amante in failing to account for and return the P5,000.00
delivered to him for investment purposes by complainant, constituted dishonest and immoral conduct. We are compelled to conclude
that respondent attorney converted complainant's monies to his personal uses. This dishonest conduct was compounded by the efforts
of respondent attorney to deny and dissimulate the transaction that he had entered into with complainant. As far as the records of this
case show, respondent has not to date returned complainant's monies.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Sergio G. Amante is hereby SUSPENDED INDEFINITELY from the practice of law.1wphi1Copies of
this Resolution shall be furnished to all courts of the land. Copies shall also be finished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and to
the Office of the Bar Confidant and spread on the personal record of respondent attorney.
5. A.C. No. 5118. September 9, 1999

MARILOU SEBASTIAN, complainant, vs . ATTY. DOROTHEO CALIS, respondent.

DECISION
PER CURIAM :

For unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct as well as violation of his oath as lawyer, respondent Atty. Dorotheo Calis
faces disbarment.
The facts of this administrative case, as found by the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP),
[1]
in its Report, are as follows:

Complainant (Marilou Sebastian) alleged that sometime in November, 1992, she was referred to the respondent who promised to
process all necessary documents required for complainants trip to the USA for a fee of One Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos
(P150,000.00).

On December 1, 1992 the complainant made a partial payment of the required fee in the amount of Twenty Thousand Pesos
(P20,000.00), which was received by Ester Calis, wife of the respondent for which a receipt was issued.

From the period of January 1993 to May 1994 complainant had several conferences with the respondent regarding the processing of
her travel documents. To facilitate the processing, respondent demanded an additional amount of Sixty Five Thousand Pesos
(P65,000.00) and prevailed upon complainant to resign from her job as stenographer with the Commission on Human Rights.

On June 20, 1994, to expedite the processing of her travel documents complainant issued Planters Development Bank Check No.
12026524 in the amount of Sixty Five Thousand Pesos (P65,000.00) in favor of Atty. D. Calis who issued a receipt. After receipt of said
amount, respondent furnished the complainant copies of Supplemental to U.S. Nonimmigrant Visa Application (Of. 156) and a list of
questions which would be asked during interviews.

When complainant inquired about her passport, Atty. Calis informed the former that she will be assuming the name Lizette P. Ferrer
married to Roberto Ferrer, employed as sales manager of Matiao Marketing, Inc. the complainant was furnished documents to support
her assumed identity.

Realizing that she will be travelling with spurious documents, the complainant demanded the return of her money, however she was
assured by respondent that there was nothing to worry about for he has been engaged in the business for quite sometime; with the
promise that her money will be refunded if something goes wrong.

Weeks before her departure respondent demanded for the payment of the required fee which was paid by complainant, but the
corresponding receipt was not given to her.

When complainant demanded for her passport, respondent assured the complainant that it will be given to her on her departure which
was scheduled on September 6, 1994. On said date complainant was given her passport and visa issued in the name of Lizette P.
Ferrer. Complainant left together with Jennyfer Belo and a certain Maribel who were also recruits of the respondent.

Upon arrival at the Singapore International Airport, complainant together with Jennyfer Belo and Maribel were apprehended by the
Singapore Airport Officials for carrying spurious travel documents; Complainant contacted the respondent through overseas telephone
call and informed him of by her predicament. From September 6 to 9, 1994, complainant was detained at Changi Prisons in Singapore.

On September 9, 1994 the complainant was deported back to the Philippines and respondent fetched her from the airport and brought
her to his residence at 872-A Tres Marias Street, Sampaloc, Manila. Respondent took complainants passport with a promise that he will
secure new travel documents for complainant. Since complainant opted not to pursue with her travel, she demanded for the return of
her money in the amount of One Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos (P150,000.00).

On June 4, 1996, June 18 and July 5, 1996 respondent made partial refunds of P15,000.00; P6,000.00; and P5,000.00.

On December 19, 1996 the complainant through counsel, sent a demand letter to respondent for the refund of a remaining balance of
One Hundred Fourteen Thousand Pesos (P114,000.00) which was ignored by the respondent.

Sometime in March 1997 the complainant went to see the respondent, however his wife informed her that the respondent was in Cebu
attending to business matters.

In May 1997 the complainant again tried to see the respondent however she found out that the respondent had transferred to an
unknown residence apparently with intentions to evade responsibility.
Attached to the complaint are the photocopies of receipts for the amount paid by complainant, applications for U.S.A. Visa, questions
and answers asked during interviews; receipts acknowledging partial refunds of fees paid by the complainant together with demand
letter for the remaining balance of One Hundred Fourteen Thousand Pesos (P114,000.00); which was received by the respondent.[2]

Despite several notices sent to the respondent requiring an answer to or comment on the complaint, there was no
response. Respondent likewise failed to attend the scheduled hearings of the case. No appearance whatsoever was made by the
respondent.[3] As a result of the inexplicable failure, if not obdurate refusal of the respondent to comply with the orders of the
Commission, the investigation against him proceeded ex parte.
On September 24, 1998, the Commission on Bar Discipline issued its Report on the case, finding that:

It appears that the services of the respondent was engaged for the purpose of securing a visa for a U.S.A. travel of complainant. There
was no mention of job placement or employment abroad, hence it is not correct to say that the respondent engaged in illegal
recruitment.

The alleged proposal of the respondent to secure the U.S.A. visa for the complainant under an assumed name was accepted by the
complainant which negates deceit on the part of the respondent. Noted likewise is the partial refunds made by the respondent of the
fees paid by the complainant. However, the transfer of residence without a forwarding address indicates his attempt to escape
responsibility.

In the light of the foregoing, we find that the respondent is guilty of gross misconduct for violating Canon 1 Rule 1.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which provides that a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

WHEREFORE, it is respectfully recommended that ATTY. DOROTHEO CALIS be SUSPENDED as a member of the bar until he
fully refunds the fees paid to him by complainant and comply with the order of the Commission on Bar Discipline pursuant to Rule 139-
B, Sec. 6 of the Rules of Court.[4]

Pursuant to Section 12, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, this administrative case was elevated to the IBP Board of Governors for
review. The Board in a Resolution[5] dated December 4, 1998 resolved to adopt and approve with amendment the recommendation of
the Commission. The Resolution of the Board states:

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution/Decisions as Annex A; and, finding the
recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, with an amendment that Respondent
Atty. Dorotheo Calis be DISBARRED for having been found guilty of Gross Misconduct for engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct.

We are now called upon to evaluate, for final action, the IBP recommendation contained in its Resolution dated December 4,
1998, with its supporting report.
After examination and careful consideration of the records in this case, we find the resolution passed by the Board of Governors
of the IBP in order. We agree with the finding of the Commission that the charge of illegal recruitment was not established because
complainant failed to substantiate her allegation on the matter. In fact she did not mention any particular job or employment promised to
her by the respondent. The only service of the respondent mentioned by the complainant was that of securing a visa for the United
States.
We likewise concur with the IBP Board of Governors in its Resolution, that herein respondent is guilty of gross misconduct by
engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct contrary to Canon 1, Rule 101 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Respondent deceived the complainant by assuring her that he could give her visa and travel documents; that despite
spurious documents nothing untoward would happen; that he guarantees her arrival in the USA and even promised to refund her the
fees and expenses already paid, in case something went wrong. All for material gain.
Deception and other fraudulent acts by a lawyer are disgraceful and dishonorable. They reveal moral flaws in a lawyer. They are
unacceptable practices. A lawyers relationship with others should be characterized by the highest degree of good faith, fairness and
candor. This is the essence of the lawyers oath. The lawyers oath is not mere facile words, drift and hollow, but a sacred trust that must
be upheld and keep inviolable.[6] The nature of the office of an attorney requires that he should be a person of good moral character.
[7]
This requisite is not only a condition precedent to admission to the practice of law, its continued possession is also essential for
remaining in the practice of law.[8] We have sternly warned that any gross misconduct of a lawyer, whether in his professional or private
capacity, puts his moral character in serious doubt as a member of the Bar, and renders him unfit to continue in the practice of law.[9]
It is dismaying to note how respondent so cavalierly jeopardized the life and liberty of complainant when he made her travel with
spurious documents. How often have victims of unscrupulous travel agents and illegal recruiters been imprisoned in foreign lands
because they were provided fake travel documents? Respondent totally disregarded the personal safety of the complainant when he
sent her abroad on false assurances. Not only are respondents acts illegal, they are also detestable from the moral point of view. His
utter lack of moral qualms and scruples is a real threat to the Bar and the administration of justice.
The practice of law is not a right but a privilege bestowed by the State on those who show that they possess, and continue to
possess, the qualifications required by law for the conferment of such privilege. [10] We must stress that membership in the bar is a
privilege burdened with conditions. A lawyer has the privilege to practice law only during good behavior. He can be deprived of his
license for misconduct ascertained and declared by judgment of the court after giving him the opportunity to be heard.[11]
 Here, it is worth noting that the adamant refusal of respondent to comply with the orders of the IBP and his total disregard of the
summons issued by the IBP are contemptuous acts reflective of unprofessional conduct. Thus, we find no hesitation in removing
respondent Dorotheo Calis from the Roll of Attorneys for his unethical, unscrupulous and unconscionable conduct toward complainant.
Lastly, the grant in favor of the complainant for the recovery of the P114,000.00 she paid the respondent is in order.[12] Respondent
not only unjustifiably refused to return the complainants money upon demand, but he stubbornly persisted in holding on to it, unmindful
of the hardship and humiliation suffered by the complainant.
WHEREFORE, respondent Dorotheo Calis is hereby DISBARRED and his name is ordered stricken from the Roll of
Attorneys. Let a copy of this Decision be FURNISHED to the IBP and the Bar Confidant to be spread on the personal records of
respondent. Respondent is likewise ordered to pay to the complainant immediately the amount of One Hundred Fourteen Thousand
(P114,000.00) Pesos representing the amount he collected from her.
SO ORDERED.

6. Adm. Case No. 1048. July 14, 1995

WELLINGTON REYES, Complainant , v. ATTY. SALVADOR M. GAA, Respondent .

DECISION

PER CURIAM :

This administrative complaint for disbarment charges respondent, a former Assistant City Fiscal of Manila, with malpractice and willful
violation of his oath as an attorney.chanrobles lawlibrary : rednad

On March 30, 1971, at around 9:00 A.M., complainant reported to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) that he had been the
victim of extortion by respondent, an Assistant City Fiscal of Manila, who was investigating a complaint for estafa filed by complainants
business rival. According to complainant, he had given respondent P500.00 on March 1, 1971 and a total of P500.00 on three other
occasions. He said that another "payoff" was scheduled at 11:00 A.M. that day in respondents office at the City Hall.

An entrapment was set up by the NBI.

Complainant furnished the NBI agents several peso bills totalling P150.00 for marking. The paper bills were sent to the Forensic and
Chemistry Division of the NBI and subsequently returned to complainant for use in the entrapment.

When complainant went to respondents office, he was told that the latter would not return until around 2:30. P.M. So complainant and
the NBI agents went back at around 2:30 P.M. As there were other persons doing business with respondent, complainant had to wait
for thirty minutes. When finally complainant was able to see respondent, the latter greeted him in Tagalog "Ano ba ang sa iyo?"
Complainant answered "Hindi tayo nagkita kaninang umaga." To which respondent replied "Oo, kanina pa kita hinihintay." Complainant
then handed to respondent the marked money which he placed inside his right pocket. The NBI agents then apprehended respondent
and brought him to the NBI Forensic and Chemistry Division for examination. Respondents hands were found positive of the yellow
florescent powder applied earlier to the marked money. Respondent was thereafter taken to the Office of the Anti-Organized Crime
Division of the NBI where he was photographed, fingerprinted and record checked. Respondent declined to give a sworn statement to
explain his side of the case, invoking his right against self-incrimination.

On the same date, the NBI recommended the prosecution of respondent for violation of Section 3(b) of R.A. No. 3019.

On April 13, 1971, the NBI recommended to the Secretary of Justice the filing of administrative charges and the institution of
disbarment proceedings against him.

On April 21, 1971, President Marcos suspended respondent from office pending investigation and disposition of his administrative case
(Case No. 74).

Aside from the criminal complaint and Administrative Case No. 74, two other cases were earlier filed against respondent: namely,
Administrative Case No. 10 for Grave Misconduct filed by one Angel Alora on October 13, 1969, wherein respondent was found guilty
as charged and was recommended for suspension; and Administrative Case No. 10-A for partiality filed by Fabiola Fajardo on April 26,
1970, which was pending resolution.

In his answer to the complaint for disbarment, respondent asserted that complainant surreptitiously planted the marked money in his
pocket without his knowledge and consent.
He further said that the criminal case (IS No. 71-6558) filed against him by the NBI at the instance of complainant was still pending
preliminary investigation by the City Fiscal of Manila. In connection with the incident of March 30, 1971, he said that he had filed a
criminal complaint for incriminatory machination, perjury and attempted corruption of a public official against complainant with the City
Fiscal of Manila.

In reply to the answer, complainant denied that the several cases against respondent were motivated by revenge, malice or personal ill
will. He said that the investigating fiscal had recommended the dismissal of the charges filed by respondent against him.

In a resolution dated December 23, 1971, this Court resolved to refer the disbarment case to the Solicitor General for investigation,
report and recommendation. However, upon the adoption of Rule 139-B of the Revised Rules of Court, the case was transferred to the
IBP Board of Governors for investigation and disposition.

On March 15, 1993, Commissioner Vicente Q. Roxas of the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
recommended that respondent be disbarred. Said recommendation was approved by the IBP Board of Governors in its resolution dated
March 26, 1994.

II

We agree with the recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors.

In the case at bench, respondent was caught in flagrante delicto in the act of receiving the marked money from complainant during the
entrapment conducted by the NBI agents, which resulted in his arrest and the subsequent filing of administrative and criminal cases
against him. In his defense, respondent merely denied the charge of extortion and retorted that the marked money was planted by
complainant.

It is settled that affirmative testimony is given greater weight than negative testimony (Delos Reyes v. Aznar, 179 SCRA 653 [1989]).
When the integrity of a member of the bar is challenged, it is not enough that he denies the charges against him; he must meet the
issue and overcome the evidence against him (Malcolm, Legal and Judicial Ethics 93 [1949]). He must show proof that he still
maintains that degree of morality and integrity which at all times is expected of him (Bayasen v. Court of Appeals, 103 SCRA 197
[1981]; Vda. de Ramos v. Court of Appeals, 81 SCRA. 393 [1978]).chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

Where the misconduct of a lawyer as a government official is of such a character as to affect his qualification as a lawyer or to show
moral delinquency, then he may be disciplined as a member of the bar on such grounds (Gonzales-Austria v. Abaya, 176 SCRA 634
[1989]).

The extortion committed by respondent constitutes misconduct as a public official, which also constitutes a violation of his oath as a
lawyer. The lawyers oath (Revised Rules of Court, Rule 138, Section 18; People v. De Luna, 102 Phil. 968 (1958]), imposes upon
every lawyer the duty to delay no man for money or malice. The lawyers oath is a source of his obligations and its violation is a ground
for his suspension, disbarment or other disciplinary action (Agpalo, Legal Ethics 66-67 [1983]).

WHEREFORE, respondent is DISBARRED and his name is ordered STRICKEN OFF from the Roll of Attorneys. Let a copy of this
resolution be furnished the Bar Confidant and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and spread on the personal records of Respondent.

SO ORDERED.

7. A.C. No. 3324 February 9, 2000

PASTOR EDWIN VILLARIN, PACIANO DE VEYRA, SR., and BARTOLOME EVAROLO, SR., complainants,
vs.
ATTY. RESTITUTO SABATE, JR., respondent.

RESOLUTION

BUENA, J.:

Complainants Pastor Edwin Villarin, Paciano de Veyra, Sr. and Bartolome Evarolo, Sr. prays that administrative sanctions be imposed
on respondent Atty. Restituto Sabate, Jr. for not having observed honesty and utmost care in the performance of his duties as notary
public.

In their Affidavit-Complaint,1 complainants alleged that through their counsel Atty. Eduardo D. Estores, they filed a complaint against
Paterno Diaz, et al. under SEC Case No. DV091, Region XI Davao Extension Office, Davao City.

Respondents in the SEC Case filed their "Motion to Dismiss With Answer To Villarin's Et. Al., Complaint To The Securities and
Exchange Commission"2 prepared and notarized by Atty. Restituto Sabate, Jr. The verification of the said pleading reads:
 V E R I F I C AT I O N

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES)

CAGAYAN DE ORO CITY) S.S.

WE, REV. PASTORS PATERNO M. DIAZ, MANUEL DONATO, ULYSSES CAMAGAY, LEVI PAGUNSAN, ALEJANDRO
BOFETIADO, All of legal ages after having been sworn in accordance with law depose and say:

1. That we were the one who caused the above writings to be written;

2. That we have read and understood all statements therein and believed that all are true and correct to the best of our
knowledge and belief.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF hereunto affixed our signatures on the 6th day of February, 1989 at the City of Cagayan de Oro,
Philippines.

By: (Sgd.) Lilian C. Diaz (Sgd.) Camagay (Sgd.) M Donato

By: (Sgd.) Atty. Restituto B. Sabate

(Sgd.) Dr. Levi Pagunsan (Sgd.) Pastor A. Bofetiado

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before the above-named affiants on the 6th day of February, 1989 at the City of Cagayan de
Oro, Philippines.

(Sgd.) RESTITUTO B. SABATE, JR.

Notary Public3

Complainants alleged that the signature of Paterno Diaz was not his, but that of a certain Lilian Diaz; that with regard to the signatures
of Levi Pagunsan and Alejandro Bofetiado, it was Atty. Sabate, Jr. who signed for them; and that herein respondent Sabate, Jr. made it
appear that said persons participated in the said act when in fact they did not do so. Complainants averred that respondent's act
undermined the public's confidence for which reason administrative sanctions should be imposed against him.

In his Answer,4 respondent alleged that Paterno Diaz, Levi Pagunsan and Alejandro Bofetiado swore to the correctness of the
allegations in the motion to dismiss/pleading for the SEC through their authorized representatives known by their names as Lilian C.
Diaz, wife of Paterno Diaz, and Atty. Restituto B. Sabate, Jr. manifested by the word "By" which preceded every signature of said
representatives. Respondent allegedly signed for and in the interest of his client backed-up by their authorization5; and Lilian Diaz was
authorized to sign for and in behalf of her husband as evidenced by a written authority.6 Respondent alleged that on the strength of the
said authorizations he notarized the said document.

Respondent also alleged that in signing for and in behalf of his client Pagunsan and Bofetiado, his signature was preceded by the word
"By" which suggests that he did not in any manner make it appear that those persons signed in his presence; aside from the fact that
his clients authorized him to sign for and in their behalf, considering the distance of their place of residence to that of the respondent
and the reglementary period in filing said pleadings he had to reckon with. Respondent further alleged that the complaint is malicious
and anchored only on evil motives and not a sensible way to vindicate complainants' court losses, for respondent is only a lawyer
defending a client and prayed that the case be dismissed with further award for damages to vindicate his honor and mental anguish as
a consequence thereof.

The designated Investigating Commissioner of Integrated Bar of the Philippines recommended that respondent Atty. Restituto Sabate,
Jr. be suspended from his Commission as Notary Public for a period of six (6) months. The Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines adopted the said recommendation and resolved to suspend the respondent's Commission for six (6) months for failure
to exercise due diligence in upholding his duty as a notary public.

From the facts obtaining, it is apparent that respondent Atty. Restituto Sabate, Jr. notarized the Motion to Dismiss With Answer
prepared by him which pleading he signed for and in behalf of Levi Pagunsan and Alejandro Bofetiado (while Lilian Diaz signed for her
husband Pastor Diaz), three of the respondents in the SEC case, with the word "By" before their signatures, because he was their
counsel in said case and also because he was an officer of the religious sect and corporation represented by the respondents-Pastors.

But while it would appear that in doing so, he acted in good faith, the fact remains that the same cannot be condoned. He failed to state
in the preliminary statements of said motion/answer that the three respondents were represented by their designated attorneys-in-fact.
Besides, having signed the Verification of the pleading, he cannot swear that he appeared before himself as Notary Public.1wphi1.nt

The function of a notary public is, among others, to guard against any illegal or immoral arrangements.7 That function would be
defeated if the notary public were one of the signatories to the instrument. For then, he would be interested in sustaining the validity
thereof as it directly involves himself and the validity of his own act. It would place him in an inconsistent position, and the very purpose
of the acknowledgment, which is to minimize fraud, would be thwarted.8
Sec. 1 of Public Act No. 2103 provides:

(a) The acknowledgment shall be made before a notary public or an officer duly authorized by law of the country to take
acknowledgment of instruments or documents in the place where the act is done. The notary public or the officer taking the
acknowledgment shall certify that the person acknowledging the instrument or document is known to him and that he is the
same person who executed it, and acknowledged that the same is his free act and deed. The certificate shall be made under
his official seal, if he is by law required to keep a seal, and if not, his certificate shall so state.9

A member of the bar who performs an act as a notary public should not notarize a document unless the persons who signed the same
are the very same persons who executed and personally appeared before said notary public to attest to the contents and truth of what
are stated therein. The acts of affiants cannot be delegated to anyone for what are stated therein are facts they have personal
knowledge of and swore to the same personally and not through any representative. Otherwise, their representative's names should
appear in the said documents as the ones who executed the same and that is only the time they can affix their signatures and
personally appear before the notary public for notarization of said document.

As a lawyer commissioned as notary public, respondent is mandated to subscribe to the sacred duties pertaining to his office, such
duties being dictated by public policy impressed with public interest. Faithful observance and utmost respect of the legal solemnity of
the oath in an acknowledgment or jurat is sacrosanct. Simply put, such responsibility is incumbent upon and failing therein, he must
now accept the commensurate consequences of his professional indiscretion.10

That respondent acted the way he did because he was confronted with an alleged urgent situation is no excuse at all. As an individual,
and even more so as a member of the legal profession, he is required to obey the laws of the land at all times.11 For notarizing the
Verification of the Motion to Dismiss With Answer when three of the affiants thereof were not before him and for notarizing the same
instrument of which he was one of the signatories, he failed to exercise due diligence in upholding his duty as a notary public.

WHEREFORE, for lack of diligence in the observance of the Notarial Law, respondent Atty. Restituto Sabate, Jr. is SUSPENDED from
his Commission as Notary Public for a period of one (1) year.

SO ORDERED

8. Adm. Case No. 4500. April 30, 1999

BAN HUA U. FLORES, Complainant , v. ATTY. ENRIQUE S. CHUA, Respondent .

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

In its Resolution No. XIII-98-288 in this Administrative Case, the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
RESOLVED as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

. . . to ADOPT and APPROVE . . . the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case,
herein made part of this Resolution/Decision as "Annex "A", and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record
and the applicable laws and rules, respondent Atty. Enrique S. Chua is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three (3)
years.cralawnad

We quote the 21-page Report of the Investigating Commissioner, Atty. Jaime M. Vibar:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

THE FACTS AND THE CASE

Complainant Ban HUA U. Flores seeks the disbarment of respondent Atty. Enrique S. Chua, a practicing lawyer in the City of Bacolod
(Complaint dated October 11, 1995) for various offenses amounting to "malpractice, gross misconduct, violation of his lawyers oath,
the Code of Professional Conduct and Responsibility, as well as the provisions of the laws of the Republic of the Philippines, to
wit:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

I. FRAUD AGAINST A DEFENSELESS WIDOW BY THE DEATHBED OF HER DECEASED SPOUSE THROUGH FALSIFICATION
AND FORGERY OF PUBLIC DOCUMENT.

II. FOISTING FALSEHOOD AND FABRICATED PUBLIC DOCUMENT TO MOLEST AND HARASS PARTIES CONCERNED AND
DEPRIVED THEM OF THEIR PROPERTY RIGHTS TO THEIR PREJUDICE AND DETRIMENT.

III. LIBEL, MISPRESENTATION AND UNLAWFUL ADVERTISEMENT THROUGH THE PREMATURE PUBLICATION OF PORTION
OF A QUESTIONABLE DECISION WHICH IS PENDING APPEAL.

IV. BRIBERY AND CORRUPTION AND BLACKMAIL OF THE JUDICIARY AMOUNTING TO MALPRACTICE.
V. ILLEGAL TAPPING OF CONVERSATIONS IN VIOLATION OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 4200.

VI. COMMISSION OF PERJURY FORUM SHOPPING, MISPRESENTATION, FILING A FALSE SUIT AND MISLEADING THE CLERK
OF COURT TO EVADE PAYMENT OF DOCKET FEES.

Respondent filed his Comment on the complaint with a countercharge against complainant and counsel, dated January 24, 1996.
Respondent denies the charges and alleges that:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

1. Grounds I and II, referring to the forgery of the signature on a Deed of Sale notarized by respondent Chua, "are presently the subject
of an on-going litigation (Crim. Case No. 12036 or Annex "A" Complaint and SEC Case No. 3328 or Annex "F" or Sec Case No. 520 or
Annex "P", Complaint) whose termination or conclusion is far from over, thus it would be premature to impose now any sanction upon
the Respondent. . . ."cralaw virtua1aw library

2. Grounds III, III-A and III-B "are presently litigated in the Libel Complaint docketed as BC-I.S. No. 93-2801 filed by complainant
against the respondent and her (Complainants) brother . . . and is still awaiting resolution." Said grounds are also intertwined with other
pending cases.

3. Grounds IV, IV-A, IV-B and IV-C "are absolutely baseless and false" .

4. Other grounds mentioned are not valid and sufficient basis for respondents disbarment for the issues raised therein are still the
subject of pending cases. Such grounds are flimsy and frivolous.

Respondent claims that the cases he is handling and subject of the complaint involve disputes between family members. As he
represents the brother of complainant, the present administrative complaint has apparently been filed by complainant to vent her ire for
failing to attain what she sought in the pending litigations against respondents client.

In the trial of the case, complainant presented testimonial and documentary evidence, including decisions of courts and pleadings filed
therein while respondent opted to submit the case for decision only on the basis of documents. He submitted resolutions, pleadings
and orders issued in other pending cases adverted to in the complaint, to prove that the issues raised in the disbarment case are still
the subject of pending actions, or that the complaint has no legal and factual basis.

Let us examine the facts as established by the evidence adduced by the parties.

GROUND I. On the charge that respondent Chua was guilty of falsification and criminal activities in connection with his office as lawyer
and notary public.

Complainant presented evidence on the notarization by respondent Chua of a Deed of Sale allegedly executed on December 5, 1989
(Exhibit "E"), or one (1) day before the death of Chua Beng, one of the owners of the property. In the transcript of stenographic notes
taken in Criminal Case Nos. 12037 and 12036, a proceeding against respondent Chua for falsification and notarization of a falsified
document, RTC-Bacolod City, Branch 53, it is revealed that during the wake of Chua Beng, Silvina Chua, the wife of the deceased,
asked to sign a document by Yu Seng, her husbands helper or assistant, who represented to her that said document she signed was a
deed of sale which conveyed a property of her husband located in Nandalagan, Bacolod City, containing 344 square meters and
evidenced by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 151706. She also found out that her husbands signature was forged. The deed of sale
purportedly transferred their property to Yu Seng and Benjamin Laudio.

Silvina Chua gave testimony that her husband Chua Beng could not have signed the deed of sale as they were together all the time
prior to his death and she did not see him sign any document (Exhibit "G" at pages 39, et seq.) The forgery of the signature of her
husband was reported to authorities (Exhibit "G" at page 55) and a fingerprint expert in the person of Police Superintendent Rodolfo
Castillo attested to such forgery (Exhibit "F" at page 48 et. seq.) The forgery and notarization of the document containing the said
forged signature of Chua Beng became the basis of a criminal prosecution for falsification of notarial document against Atty. Chua, the
above-mentioned Criminal Case Nos. 12037 and 12036.

Respondent Chua has not rebutted evidence presented on his role in notarizing a deed of sale where the signatory did not appear
before him as, in fact, the signature was a forgery. The "Acknowledgment" in the deed of sale states that Chua Beng appeared and
signed the deed personally before Respondent. In his defense, respondent claims that there is a criminal case still pending against him
for his participation in the notarization and alleged falsification of the document so the administrative case cannot proceed until the
decision is rendered in the criminal case.

GROUND II. On the charge that respondent foisted falsehood and falsification to molest and harass parties concerned to their prejudice
and detriment.

The charge relates to the filing of a notice of lis pendens in connection with a case filed before the Securitie [sic] and Exchange
Commission (SEC). It appears that a petition, dated April 6, 1988, was filed by the lawyers Ramon Encarnacion and Alberto de Joya in
behalf of UBS Marketing Corporation and Johnny K.H. Uy. Complainant herein and other family members were the respondents. The
action was for the "turn over of Books of Accounts, Sums of Money and Damages with Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction."
Subsequently, or on April 26, 1995, a notice of lis pendens was sent to the Register of Deed of Bacolod City, informing of the filing of a
SEC petition, docketed as Case No. 3328. The first page of the petition was altered by obliterating the entry pertaining to the nature of
the suit appearing at the upper right hand portion of the caption of the case just below the case number. The complainant testified that
the erasure was made to conceal the true nature of the suit and lack of basis of the notice so as to mislead the Register of Deeds into
annotating the notice of lis pendens. The notice sent to the Register of Deeds, Exhibit "J", Annex "F", Disbarment Complaint, was
signed for "Ramon Encarnacion and Associates" .

It is further charged that the notice was unlawful and baseless as the owner (SK Realty, Inc.) of the properties subject thereof was not
even a party to the SEC petition.

The application for the annotation of the notice of lis pendens was denied by the Register of Deeds in a letter dated May 5, 1995,
addressed, to UBS Marketing Corp. and Johnny KH Uy c/o Atty. Enrique Chua on the ground that the ownership of the titles was never
an issue in the case and the registered owner was not a party thereto. Respondent Chua, this time acting for the applicants, appealed
the denial to the Land Registration Commission (LRC) en consulta. However, the LRC Administrator in a Resolution dated September
21, 1995, denied the appeal, sustaining the ground stated by the Register of Deeds that the notice was not registrable as the registered
owner of the affected properties was not a party to the SEC case.

No contrary evidence was presented by Respondent.

GROUND III. On the third charge that respondent was guilty of libel, misrepresentation and unlawful conduct by causing the publication
and advertisement of a portion of the SEC decision in a newspaper of general and wide circulation in the province, evidence is not
disputed that indeed an advertisement/notice and news report came out in the Visayan Daily Star, in its issues of June 6, 1995 and
June 9, 1995 (Exhibits "Q" and "R", Annexes "L" and "M") respectively, relating to the decision of the hearing officer in the SEC Case
No. 3328 holding complainant and other liable for P68 million. The decision as published included, among others, the cancellation of
titles of SK Realty, Inc. and New Challenge Resources, Inc.chanrobles virtuallawlibrary

In these publications, respondent was always in the forefront, claiming to be the lawyer of the winning parties and paying for the
advertisement/notice of the SEC decision. (Annexes "N" and "O").

Complainant testified (TSN February 19, 1997 at page 54 et. seq.) before this Commission and affirmed that the decision of the hearing
officer in SEC Case No. 3328 declared her and others in default and held liable for P68 million. Thereafter, Atty. Chua, who was not the
counsel or petitioners in the proceedings, caused damage and embarrassment to the [sic] them when said respondent instigated and
initiated the publication in a newspaper of general and wide circulation in the Visayas, the Visayan Daily Star issue of June 6, 1995, the
issuance of the decision with the caption "BUSINESSMEN ORDERED TO PAY P68 MILLION PESOS BY THE SECURITIES AND
EXCHANGE COMMISSION." The publication reported that Atty. Chua was the counsel of the petitioners. Not content with the news
report, respondent Chua himself caused and paid for the publication of a two (2) page notice/advertisement in the Visayan Daily Star in
its issue of June 9, 1995, informing the public about the decision of the SEC finding the complainant and others liable for P68 million.

Even non-parties, SK Realty, Inc. and New Challenge Resources were mentioned in the publication (Exhibit "Q", Annex L",
Complaint).

The SEC decision adverted to in the publications had been appealed to the Commission en banc. A copy of the notice of appeal was
sent by mail to the counsel of record on June 9, 1995. (Exhibit "V", Annex "P").

While the SEC case was pending appeal, respondent Chua filed a case against SK Realty, complainant herein and others with the
Regional Trial Court of Bacolod City, Case No. 95-9051 for "Reconveyance of Property and Cancellation of Titles and/or Recovery of
Ownership and Possession of Real Estate with Damages and Accounting." (Annex "Q")

In defense, respondent Chua submitted evidence to show that a complaint for libel filed by Ban Hua Flores against respondent, arising
from the publication/advertisement of the decision in SEC No. 3328, was dismissed by the prosecutors office of Bacolod (Annex "1",
Respondents Manifestation and Submission of Evidence dated February 15, 1997.). He further alleged that while complainant filed an
administrative complaint against the prosecutors, the said complaint was likewise dismissed for the acts complained of amounted
merely to errors of judgment correctable by appeal or a petition for review and not by an administrative proceedings (Annex "3", Ibid).
Respondent maintains that the complaint on the publication is, therefore, baseless.

GROUND IV. On the charge that respondent was guilty of bribery, corruption and blackmail of the judiciary, as well as harassment of
the prosecution arm through the filing of administrative and criminal cases against them, complainant presented evidence that
respondent testified in Administrative Matter No. RTJ-92-863 and Administrative Matter No. RTJ No. 92-880, involving Judge Renato
Abastillas and Judge Bethel Moscardon, respectively, whereat respondent Chua allegedly admitted having bribed and/or conspired to
bribed then RTC judge Abastillas in order to obtain a favorable ruling for his clients in Crim. Case Nos. 10009 and 10010. Failing to get
a favorable action, respondent Chua "squealed/fabricated Administrative Matter No. RTJ-92-863 against ex-Judge Abastillas" .

Complainant further charges respondent of having conspired to bribe Judge Moscardon, which illegal act he admitted in A.M. RTJ-92-
880. Complainant also makes the sweeping accusation that respondent Chua has the propensity to either bribe or sue the judges and
prosecutors. He is charged of having harassed Provincial Prosecutor Bartolome Facual.

Respondent denies the accusation but admits that he has already been proceeded against and, in fact, sternly warned for his
misconduct in giving Judge Abastillas P20,000.00 for a case he was handling and for which acts he has already expressed rancor
(A.M. No. RTJ-92-863). He emphasizes that the charges he acted irresponsibly by indiscriminately suing or harassing judges and
others, white serious, are false and untrue. His actions, in fact, resulted in the dismissal of judges.
Evidence adduced indeed prove that respondent Chua was previously found guilty for misconduct as a lawyer in Administrative Matter
No. RTJ-92-863/Administrative Case No. 3815, and where Judge Renato Abastillas was ordered dismissed (Annex "C", Complaint for
Disbarment). Respondent was found to have bribed Judge Abastillas and "sternly warned that a repetition of similar act or acts or
violation committed by him in the future will be dealt with more severely." In Administrative Matter RTJ-99-880 (In re: Judge Bethel
Moscardon), the Honorable Supreme Court directed the Bar Confidant to investigate Atty. Chuas conduct in negotiating with a judge for
an increase in rent for his client and further noted that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Thus is not the first time that Atty. Chua was involved in a similar incident. In A.C. No. 3815 Atty. Chua admitted giving P20,000.00
bribe to another judge who was ordered dismissed. Atty. Chua was spared from prosecution but he was sternly warned that a repetition
of a similar acts or acts or violation committed by him in the future would be dealt with more severely."cralaw virtua1aw library

The Honorable Supreme Court furnished the Department of Justice with a copy of the decision in A.M. RTJ 99-880 for investigation and
possible criminal prosecution of persons concerned including respondent herein. A copy of said decision was also endorsed to the Bar
Confidant for possible investigation and disciplinary action against Respondent.

Complainant further alleges that there is a pattern of conduct on the part of respondent that tends towards the frustration of justice.
While not specifically alleged in the complaint, evidence was adduced that respondent resorted to dilatory tactics in the handling of his
cases. The attempts to delay and impeded the natural course of justice has not remained unnoticed. In a Comment of the Office of the
Solicitor General (Exhibit "Z") filed in CA-G.R. No. 41329, a petition to question an order of the trial court which denied the accused
petitioners Motion to Suspend Further Proceedings in a criminal case for Estafa filed in 1988, the Solicitor General revealed that the
petitioner therein, who was assisted by Atty. Chua, filed six (6) Motions to Disqualify Private Prosecutor/law firm, three (3) Motion for
Reinvestigation, five (5) Motions to Quash/Dismiss/Suspend Proceedings, four (4) Motions to Recall Warrant of Arrest and several
motions to inhibit the judges. These motions were all denied or dismissed. Aside from the motions, the accused succeeded in seeking
the postponement of the arraignment twenty three (23) times. The filing of the petition in the Court of Appeals was part of the ploy to
further delay the proceedings.

The dilatory tactics of respondent Chua has not escaped the attention of the Court of Appeals in a petition for certiorari docketed as
CA-G.R. No. 38798 (Exhibit "AA"). This petition was filed by respondent Chua to seek the annulment of an Order of the trial court dated
August 21, 1995 setting the case for further proceedings on various dates and the annulment of the April 27, 1998 Order which directs
Atty. Reynaldo Depasucat, counsel for the plaintiff, to put in writing his oral manifestation that respondent Chuas client has not honored
a subpoena ad testificandum and subpoena duces tecum previously issued by the court. Petitioner likewise seeks to compel the trial
court to dismiss and/or suspend the proceedings in Civil Case No. 7675. The Court of Appeals dismissed petition but noted
that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"The petition is utterly without merit and is obviously intended to delay proceedings in the aforesaid civil case.

"The court looks with disfavor at the clear dilatory tactics employed by herein petitioner in delaying the proceedings in Civil Case No.
7635 by bringing the instant petition before this court when private respondent is merely being required to put in writing his oral
manifestation that Sy Seng Cho refused to honor the subpoena duces tecum requiring him to produce the original of the minutes of the
reconciliation meeting of the feuding Uy family of which he is the custodian. Quite obvious is the fact that herein petitioner is merely
employing this petition to delay the case and thus delay likewise the motion to cite him for contempt.

"We will not be a part to the unreasonable and unnecessary delay of the proceedings in Civil Case No. 7635 which has dragged on
since 1993 to the detriment of the proper administration of justice and has prolonged the long standing feud of the Uy family.

"We see that there is no valid issues that could arise from the order of the public respondent since the order merely directs counsel for
the plaintiff (private respondent) to put in writing his oral manifestation as to the reason for the dishonor by the petitioner of the
subpoena . . . ."cralaw virtua1aw library

Respondent claims that he has not caused a delay in the proceedings much less in Case No. 95-9597 or in Criminal Case Nos. 12037
and 12036.

V. On the charge that respondent admitted in the administrative cases as aforesaid that he and his clients tapped private conversations
and that said acts allegedly violated the Anti-Wiretapping Act, RA No. 4200, no evidence was adduced, independent of what has been
stated in the administrative cases, had been adduced by the complainant.chanrobles.com : virtual law library

VI. Respondent is further charged of forum shopping for this role as counsel for certain parties in instituting various actions in different
judicial and quasi-judicial fora. These cases have the same or similar causes of action and were allegedly instituted to defeat the ends
of justice.

The decision of the Regional Trial Court on a motion to dismiss the case entitled "Johnny K.H. Uy & UBS v. SK Realty, Et. Al. Civil Case
No. 95-9051, RTC-Bacolod City, Branch 43" gives a summary of the cases instituted by respondent Chua in behalf of his clients and
finds that there was forum shopping committed, thus:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

". . . defendants alleged that there are three pending case involving practically the same parties, subject matter and issues. The first is
SEC AC Case No. 520 entitled "UBS Marketing Corporation and Johnny K.H. Uy v. Ban Hua U. Flores, Et. Al." which is an appeal from
the decision of the Hearing Officer of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC Case No. 3528) to the SEC En Banc. The
dispositive portion of the appealed decision ordered, among others, the cancellation and annulment of all the Certificates of Title in the
name of herein defendant S.K. Realty Inc. The present case, likewise, asks for the annulment and cancellation of transfer certificates of
title in the name of defendant S.K. Realty, Inc. which properties are the very same properties covered by SEC AC No. 520.

"The second case, entitled "S.K. Realty, Inc. et al v. Securities and Exchange Commission, UBS Marketing Corporation and Johnny
K.H. Uy" is CA-G.R. No. 37451 pending in the Court of Appeals. The issue raised thereto refers to the nullity of the decision rendered in
SEC Case No. 3328 which awarded the real properties of S.K. Realty, Inc., to the herein plaintiffs. These properties are the very same
subject matter of the present action between the same parties.

"The third case, Civil case No. 95-8978 entitled "SK Realty, Inc. v. Johnny K.H. Uy and UBS Marketing Corporation" pending in Branch
41 of this Court, is an action for damages due to the Notices of Lis Pendens effected by the herein plaintiffs on the real properties of the
defendant SK Realty, Inc.

x x x

"Finally it is the contention of plaintiffs that there is no forum shopping in the present case as the defendants even vehemently declared
that defendants SK Realty is not and has never been a party to SEC Case Nos. 3318, 520 and 3328, therefore, is a total stranger to
the said case. Neither can there be a similarity of causes in the petition with the Court of Appeals and Civil Case No. 95-8975, for the
causes of action in these cases are distinct and the reliefs prayed for are different from the present case.

"The denial of defendants motion to dismiss is what plaintiffs seek for.

"A judicious scrutiny of the evidence on record led this Court to hold that defendants position, as a whole, is impressed with merit.

"A perusal of the plaintiffs complaint in the instant case and SEC Case No. 5328 . . . which is now the subject of appeal docketed as
SEC Case No. 520, disclosed that the plaintiffs in both instances assert rights founded on substantially the same set of facts giving rise
to the same basic issues breach, on the defendants part, of the "Family Agreement" reached during the "Family Reconciliation
Meeting" held on February 10, 11 and 12, 1987; and the validity or nullity of the "Deed of Sale" involving several parcels of land,
executed by and between the defendants, to the prejudice of the rights and interest of the plaintiffs.

"While the case at bar is for the recovery of ownership and possession of real properties and on the other hand SEC Case No. 3328
(now pending appeal) involves, inter alia, an action for accounting and damages, ostensibly the cause of action in one is different from
the other but in the final analysis the same aforementioned basic issues confront these cases.

"One must bear in mind that "a party cannot, by varying the form of action or adopting a different method of presenting this case,
escape the operation of the principle that one and the same cause of action shall not be twice litigated." (Aldez Realty, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals, 212 SCRA 623)

"It is evident that the aforementioned cases hinges on the same essential facts and circumstances. Though the parties impleaded in
one are not entirely the same to that (sic) in the other, nevertheless, the same parties represent the same interest in both actions.

"What we have before us is a clear case of forum shopping."cralaw virtua1aw library

Respondent is thus accused of perjury in falsely certifying in his Complaint, Civil Case No. 95-9051 (Annex "Q"), that there are no
pending cases with the same subject matter and cause of action. Likewise, it is charged that respondent, in not specifying the value of
the real properties involved in the suit, misled the clerk of court in accepting the complaint without the correct filing fee being paid.

FINDING AND RECOMMENDATION

I. On the first charge (GROUND I) that responding was guilty of fraud against a person in his deathbed by falsification and forgery of a
deed of sale, there is no evidence that he actively conspired with any party, or actively participated, in the forgery of the signature of
one Chua Beng, a purported party to the contract. However, complainants evidence supports the conclusion that the signature of Chua
Beng on a Deed of Sale (Exhibit "E") was forged. While the wife, Silvina Chua, admits that she signed a document during the wake of
her husband, she denies that her husband signed a "Deed of Sale" (ANNEX "E") on 5 December 1989, or one (1) day before her
husbands death, concerning a property covered by TCT No. T-151706.

We find the testimony of the wife on the forgery, which is supported by a handwriting expert, as truthful and credible. We cannot ignore
the circumstances of the execution of the said deed of sale which purports to have been signed by Chua Beng before a Notary Public
one day before his death. We find the statement in the "Acknowledgment" appearing on the second page of the deed stating that Chua
Beng personally appeared before the Notary Public is untruthful statement that amounts to falsification. While we note that there is a
criminal case of falsification pending against respondent (Criminal Case No. 12036), the lack of a decision from the trial court on the
matter should not dissuade us from making a finding of liability in this administrative proceedings against respondent, as, in fact, we
find respondent Chua failed to exercise the required diligence and fealty to his office by attending to the fact that the alleged party,
Chua Beng, appeared before him and signed the deed when in truth and in fact said person did not so participate in the execution
thereof. Emphatically, this finding does not in any way preempt the trial court on whatever decision it will issue on the criminal cases
against respondent Chua.
II. We shall jointly discuss the second ground (Ground II) together with Ground VI, VI-A, VI-B, and VI-C, as said charges emanate from,
or is related to, the filing of a case with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC Case No. 3328), involving the Uy family
members and another case with the civil court (Case No. 95-9051) involving their properties.

Complainant charges respondent Chua, under the second ground of her complaint, of foisting falsehood and falsified a document to
obtain a notice of lis pendens. We find documentary evidence to sustain the conclusion that indeed a Notice of Lis Pendens was filed in
relation to SEC Case No. 3328 (Exhibit "J", Annex "F", Complaint), to which was attached a copy of the Petition with page one thereof
containing an apparent erasure to omit the statement that it is "For: Turn over of Books of Account, Sums of Money and Damages with
Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction." However, the Petition and the Notice of Lis Pendens have been prepared and executed by
Ramon Encarnacion or his law firm. It does not appear from the documents, neither is there credible testimonial evidence, that
respondent Chua directly participated in the unlawful acts complained of. The fact that respondent Chua was not the lawyer for the
petitioners in the said SEC case is even admitted by complainant in her complaint (Complaint, paragraph 15, page 11).

However, there is evidence that respondent Chua subsequently took action to appeal the denial by the registry of Deeds of the
application for the registration of the Notice of Lis Pendens to the Land Registration Commission, which eventually sustained the
decision of the former, in a Resolution dated September 21, 1995, which denied the application on the ground that the real party in
interest in the SEC case, the registered property owner SK Realty, Inc., was not impleaded in the suit.

It also appears that respondent Chua filed a similar action in the civil court while the SEC case was pending adjudications, an action
claimed to amount to forum shopping, intended to enable respondents clients to annotate a notice of lis pendens on the titles of the
properties which were the same subject of an earlier SEC petition and application for a notice of lis pendens. Respondent Chua cannot
deny the institution of the civil complaint (Annex "Q", Complaint for Disbarment). The civil complaint, Civil Case No. 95-9051, shows
that SK Realty, Inc., which was not a party in the SEC case, was impleaded this time as party plaintiff. The causes of action and the
reliefs sought therein seem to differ from those stated in the SEC case. In the civil case, the plaintiffs seek judgment specifically as
follows:chanrobles law library : red

"1. Declaring null and void the Deed of Absolute Sale (Annex "A") and annulling and cancelling Transfer Certificates of Titles Nos. T-
141057; 141058; 141059; 141060; 141061; 141062; 141063; 141064, standing in the name of defendant SK and reverting their
ownership and possession to either of the plaintiffs; 2) Directing the defendants to render full and accurate account of income and
revenues on the eight (8) parcels of land; 3) finding defendants, jointly and severally, liable for a) attorneys fees . . . b) Moral
Damages . . . c) Exemplary Damages . . . d) Nominal Damages . . . and e) Moderate Damages . . ."cralaw virtua1aw library

The controversy over the sale of, or the titles to, the real properties of the Uy family was, to respondent Chuas thinking, cognizable by
the civil court and on the face of the SEC petition filed by another lawyer, it is not indicated that a relief for the annulment of titles was
being sought. As admitted by complainant herself, SK Realty, Inc. was not a party litigant in the SEC case, while she is now a party in
the civil case and perhaps rightly so considering that an owner of property is an indispensable party.

We cannot, however, ignore the resolution of the trial court in Civil Case No. 95-9051, dated November 9, 1995, which found that while
ostensibly the causes of action in the civil action is different from the SEC Case, it held that "in the final analysis the same . . . issues
confront these cases." (Exhibit "P" at page 5) and it, therefore, concluded that respondents clients were guilty of forum shopping.

Indeed, while it would appear that respondent Chua was not the counsel of the petitioners in SEC CASE No. 3328, his action to have a
notice of lis pendens annotated at the Register of Deeds and his appeal to the LRC indicate his clear knowledge of the pending action.
Clearly, while there is no sufficient basis to hold respondent liable for the charge of committing fraud in the filing of notice of lis pendens
in relation to the SEC case, or for falsification of page one of the SEC petition as attached to the notice, respondent not being privy
thereto, we are not prepared, however, to say that he is "off the hook" on the forum shopping charge. As we have earlier pointed out,
the pleadings in the SEC case and in Civil Case No. 95-9051 may appear to have different causes of action and parties. But here is the
catch. The SEC rendered a decision, dated May 3, 1995, which directed, among others, the cancellation and annulment of "the transfer
certificate of titles in the name of Soon Kee Commercial, Inc. if any, the certificate of titles in the name of SK Realty, Inc., if any, and the
certificate of titles in the name of New Challenge Resources, if still there is, and all the properties formerly belonging to and in the name
of UBS, presently totalling eight (8) lots TCT No. 141057, TCT No. 141058, TCT No. 141059, TCT No. I41060, TCT No. 141061, TCT
No. 141062, TCT No. 141063, TCT No. 14106 and reverting them back to UBS Marketing Corporation." The decision was published
and even quoted in the Visayan Daily Star, the issue of June 6, 1995, at respondent Chuas behest and expense. The decision was
later appealed to the SEC Commission en banc. Respondent Chua was undoubtedly aware that while the SEC petition did not make
any references to the real properties, the decision of the SEC gave reliefs in relation thereto. Therefore, when respondent filed a
complaint, Civil Case No. 95-9051 (Annex "Q", Disbarment complaint), on September 18, 1995, he was aware that the forum shopping
prohibition could be violated and yet he submitted a "Verification" in his Civil complaint, which was for reconveyance and cancellation of
titles, that there is no "prior action or proceedings involving the same issues, as herein raised, has been filed with the Court of Appeals
or Supreme Court or any other tribunal or agency." He knew that the controversy on the properties was pending with the SEC, or was
pending appeal, initiated by SK Realty and New Challenge Resources, Inc., with the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. No. 37541) and SEC
Case No. 520). The fact that the relief granted by the SEC hearing officer has not yet been set aside when respondent instituted the
civil case and that he was aware of this fact should be enough reason for him to be made answerable for making false representation
and forum shopping. It is also worth noting the fact that when the civil complaint was filed on September 18, 1995, the appeal in
Consulta No. 2334, with respect to the notice of Lis Pendens, was still unresolved. The decision of the LRC Administrator came only on
September 21, 1995 (Annex "K", Disbarment Case). Ignorance of a pending action on the properties subject of the SEC case cannot,
therefore, be invoked by Respondent. Respondent is answerable for misconduct under Canon 12.02.

III. On the third ground (Ground III, III-A and III-B) that respondent Chua caused the publication of new reports and paid
advertisement/notice about the issuance of a decision by the Securities and Exchange Commission, there is sufficient evidence to
sustain complainants charges.

Undeniably, respondent Chua did not act as counsel for any of the parties in the SEC case, although it is safe to say that he
represented some of the protagonist in other matters or cases. It is likewise undenied that the decision of the SEC hearing officer in
Case No. 3328 was favorable to respondent Chuas clients. Respondent Chua, being a lawyer, should have known that the said
decision was appealable. When he published the decision, he courted a possible sanction for contempt. Here, we cannot excuse him
from such misconduct for it behooves him to even exert earnest efforts towards the settlement of family disputes and certainly he
should be the last to exacerbate and complicate the controversial situation in which family members are embroiled. By his publication,
respondents has violated the canons of professional ethics and professional responsibility, particularly Canon 19, 27, 3.01, 13.02, 1.03
and 1.04.

IV. The charges alleged in Ground IV, IV-A IV-B and IV-C, which imputes to respondent acts of blackmail, harassment of the judiciary,
arbitrary filing of administrative and criminal cases, and the charges alleged in Ground V, which attributes to respondent the crime of
wire tapping private conversations in violation of RA No. 4200 should be dismissed for lack of evidence and for being without basis.
Besides, the acts complained of were the subject of Administrative Case No. 92-863 and A..M. No. RTJ 92-880. The decision in said
administrative matters will have a bearing on the imposition of the penalty on respondent who has been warned of a stiffer penalty in
case another misconduct is committed.

V. The charge alleged in Ground VI-D which assails the allegation of respondent in the civil complaint, paragraph 4 of Annex "Q",
Complaint for Disbarment, as a brazen lie should be dismissed for lack of merit. A reading of paragraph 4 of the Complaint shows that
when respondent made a statement that these facts are within the judicial notice of the Court being a settled litigation passed upon with
finality by the Supreme Court", he made a reference to a case docketed as Securities and Exchange Commission v. Court of Appeals
and JBS v. Court of Appeals reported in 201 SCRA 124. The term "these facts" should not, therefore, be interpreted by complainant as
referring to the facts alleged in the complaint or that there was an intention to mislead the trial court by invoking judicial notice of a court
decision.

VI. The charge against respondent, stated under Ground VI-E of the complaint, of allegedly misleading the Clerk of Court into accepting
the filing of a civil complaint without the proper filing fee being paid should be dismissed for lack of merit. The insufficiency in the
payment of filing should better be threshed in the civil case rather than before the Commission. The intent to mislead the Clerk of Court
cannot be deduced from the mere fact of filing, although real properties are involved in the case. We think that the charge lacks factual
and legal basis.

Finally, the Commission does not wish to see lawyers deeply involving themselves in a fractious and divisive family feud, nay
aggravating a controversy by reckless resort to unnecessary legal actions that only tend to frustrate the ends of justice. Instead of
working for the amicable settlement or a friendly end to the dispute, lawyers file pleadings, perhaps with the clients cheers and
approval, that only cause delay and impede the normal course of justice until the solution to the family imbroglio has become
unreachable. Under Rule 1.04, it is mandated that lawyers "shall encourage (their) clients to avoid, end or settle a controversy if it will
admit of a fair settlement." It appears that in the family conflicts in which the lawyers involved herein are also active participants, no
earnest efforts have been exerted by said lawyers towards that end. It is pathetic that years have been wasted without any end in sight.

While a lawyer has the solemn duty to defend his clients rights and is expected to display the utmost zeal in defense of a clients
cause, the conduct must never be at the expense of truth. (People v. Susano Blancas, 45 SCRA 405; Caballero v. Deiparine, 60 SCRA
136; Muoz v. People, 53 SCRA 190) A lawyer may be disbarred at suspended for any misconduct when he is wanting in moral
character, in honesty, probity and good demeanor or unworthy to continue as an officer of the court (Nadayag v. Grageda, 237 SCRA
202).

In view of our observation and finding that the charges against respondent for forum shopping, committing falsehood, injurious, willful
and unprofessional conduct of publishing, or causing the publication, in a newspaper of general circulation, of a pending case, causing
undue delay in the court proceedings and for notarizing a document without the party being present, to be supported by evidence and
meritorious, it is hereby recommended that respondent be suspended for a total of three (3) years for all his acts of misconduct.
Respondent Chua has, by his unprofessional conducts violated Rules 10.01, 12.02, 12.04 (foisting or commission of falsehood, forum
shopping and causing delay in court proceedings), Canon 19 (failing to resort to lawful means in representing client), 27, 3.01, 13.02
(causing undue publication of pending action). Having been previously found guilty of misconduct by the Hon. Supreme Court and
warned of a more stern penalty should he commit another breach of the Canons of Professional Responsibility respondents penalty
would even seem light.chanrobles.com.ph : virtual law library

While the counsel for the complainant is not recommended for any disciplinary action, he is, however, advised to take note of the Rules
of Professional Conduct (Rule 1.01) which requires him to take the necessary steps aimed at encouraging a fair amicable settlement of
the long-running family disputes, brought to light in this administrative proceedings, where he is actively and deeply involved.

We fully agree with the Investigating Commissioner in his findings of facts and conclusion of culpability, and even in his own lament that
the recommended penalty "would even seem light." Indeed, the misconduct of respondent, which this case has unfolded, is grave and
serious that brings dishonor to the legal profession. Committed in succession and within a short time, the misconduct exposes a habit,
attitude, and mindset not only to abuse ones legal knowledge or training, but also to deliberately defy or ignore known virtues and
values which the legal profession demands from its members.

In respondents notarization of a forged deed of sale, we see not just an act of generosity lavishly extended. We see his active role to
perpetuate a fraud, a deceitful act to prejudice a party. He did not deny knowing the supposed vendor. As a matter of fact, he certified in
the acknowledgment that he knew the vendor and knew him to be the same person who executed the document. When he then
solemnly declared that such "vendor" appeared before him and acknowledged to him that the document was the vendors free act and
deed despite the fact that the "vendor" did not do so as his "signature" was forged, respondent deliberately made false representations.

It must be stressed that under Section 1 of Public Act No. 2103, 1 a notary public, like herein respondent, "shall certify that the person
acknowledging the instrument or document is known to him and that he is the same person who executed it, and acknowledged that
the same is his free act and deed." The purpose of the requirement of personal appearance by the acknowledging party before the
notary public is to enable the latter to verify the genuineness of the signature of the former. 2 It may be added, too, that only by such
personal appearance may the notary public be able to ascertain from the acknowledging party himself that the instrument or document
is his own free act and deed. Needless to state, the personal appearances and acknowledgment by the party to the document are the
core of the ritual that effectively convert a private document into a public document, making it admissible in court without further proof of
its authenticity. 3

The role then of the notary public in this ritual cannot be taken lightly. Where the notary public is a lawyer, a graver responsibility is
placed upon his shoulder by reason of his solemn oath to obey the laws and to do no falsehood or consent to the doing of any. The
Code of Professional Responsibility also commands him not to engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct and to
uphold at all times the integrity and dignity of the legal profession. In Maligsa v. Cabanting, we emphatically pronounced:chanrob1es
virtual 1aw library

As a lawyer commissioned as notary public, respondent is mandated to subscribe to the sacred duties appertaining to his office, such
duties being dictated by public policy impressed with public interest. Faithful observance and utmost respect of the legal solemnity of
the oath in acknowledgment or jurat is sacrosanct. Simply put, such responsibility is incumbent upon and failing therein, he must now
accept the commensurate consequences of his professional indiscretion. By his effrontery of notarizing a fictitious or spurious
document, he has made a mockery of the legal solemnity of the oath in an Acknowledgment. 4

In said case, respondent Cabanting notarized a forged deed of quitclaim. Considering also his previous misconduct for which he was
suspended from the practice of law for six months, we ordered him disbarred from the practice of law.

In the instant case, respondent Enrique S. Chua also notarized a forged deed of sale. It must be recalled that in Lee v. Abastillas and
Abastillas v. Chua, 5 we held respondent Enrique Chua "administratively liable . . . for violation of Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility for allegedly bribing Judge Abastillas" ; and, accordingly, we "STERNLY WARNED [him] that a repetition of similar act or
acts or violation committed by him in the future [would] be dealt with more severely." Respondent Chua should, on this score alone,
deserve a similar deal with Cabanting. But, considering the other items of his misconduct enumerated in the Report of the Investigating
Commissioner, which in their totality brought dishonor to the legal professions, for more reasons must we visit upon respondent the
most severe permissible penalty. What we said in Maligsa v. Cabanting bears repeating:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession. The bar should maintain a high standard of legal
proficiency as well as honesty and fair dealing. A lawyer brings honor to the legal profession by faithfully performing his duties to
society, to the bar, to the courts and to his clients. To this end a member of the legal fraternity should refrain from doing any act which
might lessen in any degree the confidence and trust reposed by the public in the fidelity, honesty and integrity of the legal profession.

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, we find respondent ENRIQUE S. CHUA guilty of grave misconduct rendering him unworthy of
continuing membership in the legal profession. He is thus ordered DISBARRED from the practice of law and his name stricken off the
Roll of Attorneys, effective immediately.

Let copies of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, which shall forthwith record it in the personal files of
respondent; all the Courts of the Philippines; the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, which shall disseminate copies thereof to all its
Chapters; and all administrative and quasi-judicial agencies of the Republic of the Philippines.

SO ORDERED.

9. A.C. No. 6057 June 27, 2006

PETER T. DONTON, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. EMMANUEL O. TANSINGCO, Respondent.
 DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

This is a disbarment complaint against respondent Atty. Emmanuel O. Tansingco ("respondent") for serious misconduct and deliberate
violation of Canon 1,1 Rules 1.012 and 1.023 of the Code of Professional Responsibility ("Code").

The Facts

In his Complaint dated 20 May 2003, Peter T. Donton ("complainant") stated that he filed a criminal complaint for estafa thru falsification
of a public document4 against Duane O. Stier ("Stier"), Emelyn A. Maggay ("Maggay") and respondent, as the notary public who
notarized the Occupancy Agreement.

The disbarment complaint arose when respondent filed a counter-charge for perjury5 against complainant. Respondent, in his affidavit-
complaint, stated that:

5. The OCCUPANCY AGREEMENT dated September 11, 1995 was prepared and notarized by me under the following
circumstances:

A. Mr. Duane O. Stier is the owner and long-time resident of a real property located at No. 33 Don Jose Street, Bgy. San
Roque, Murphy, Cubao, Quezon City.

B. Sometime in September 1995, Mr. Stier a U.S. citizen and thereby disqualified to own real property in his
name agreed that the property be transferred in the name of Mr. Donton, a Filipino.

C. Mr. Stier, in the presence of Mr. Donton, requested me to prepare several documents that would guarantee recognition of
him being the actual owner of the property despite the transfer of title in the name of Mr. Donton.

D. For this purpose, I prepared, among others, the OCCUPANCY AGREEMENT, recognizing Mr. Stiers free and undisturbed
use of the property for his residence and business operations. The OCCUPANCY AGREEMENT was tied up with a loan which
Mr. Stier had extended to Mr. Donton.6

Complainant averred that respondents act of preparing the Occupancy Agreement, despite knowledge that Stier, being a foreign
national, is disqualified to own real property in his name, constitutes serious misconduct and is a deliberate violation of the Code.
Complainant prayed that respondent be disbarred for advising Stier to do something in violation of law and assisting Stier in carrying
out a dishonest scheme.

In his Comment dated 19 August 2003, respondent claimed that complainant filed the disbarment case against him upon the instigation
of complainants counsel, Atty. Bonifacio A. Alentajan,7 because respondent refused to act as complainants witness in the criminal case
against Stier and Maggay. Respondent admitted that he "prepared and notarized" the Occupancy Agreement and asserted its
genuineness and due execution.

In a Resolution dated 1 October 2003, the Court referred the matter to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation,
report and recommendation.

The IBPs Report and Recommendation

In her Report dated 26 February 2004 ("Report"), Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan ("Commissioner San Juan") of the IBP
Commission on Bar Discipline found respondent liable for taking part in a "scheme to circumvent the constitutional prohibition against
foreign ownership of land in the Philippines." Commissioner San Juan recommended respondents suspension from the practice of law
for two years and the cancellation of his commission as Notary Public.

In Resolution No. XVI-2004-222 dated 16 April 2004, the IBP Board of Governors adopted, with modification, the Report and
recommended respondents suspension from the practice of law for six months.

On 28 June 2004, the IBP Board of Governors forwarded the Report to the Court as provided under Section 12(b), Rule 139-B8 of the
Rules of Court.

On 28 July 2004, respondent filed a motion for reconsideration before the IBP. Respondent stated that he was already 76 years old and
would already retire by 2005 after the termination of his pending cases. He also said that his practice of law is his only means of
support for his family and his six minor children.

In a Resolution dated 7 October 2004, the IBP denied the motion for reconsideration because the IBP had no more jurisdiction on the
case as the matter had already been referred to the Court.
 The Ruling of the Court

The Court finds respondent liable for violation of Canon 1 and Rule 1.02 of the Code.

A lawyer should not render any service or give advice to any client which will involve defiance of the laws which he is bound to uphold
and obey.9 A lawyer who assists a client in a dishonest scheme or who connives in violating the law commits an act which justifies
disciplinary action against the lawyer.10

By his own admission, respondent admitted that Stier, a U.S. citizen, was disqualified from owning real property.11Yet, in his motion for
reconsideration,12 respondent admitted that he caused the transfer of ownership to the parcel of land to Stier. Respondent, however,
aware of the prohibition, quickly rectified his act and transferred the title in complainants name. But respondent provided "some
safeguards" by preparing several documents,13 including the Occupancy Agreement, that would guarantee Stiers recognition as the
actual owner of the property despite its transfer in complainants name. In effect, respondent advised and aided Stier in circumventing
the constitutional prohibition against foreign ownership of lands14 by preparing said documents.

Respondent had sworn to uphold the Constitution. Thus, he violated his oath and the Code when he prepared and notarized the
Occupancy Agreement to evade the law against foreign ownership of lands. Respondent used his knowledge of the law to achieve an
unlawful end. Such an act amounts to malpractice in his office, for which he may be suspended.15

In Balinon v. De Leon ,16 respondent Atty. De Leon was suspended from the practice of law for three years for preparing an affidavit
that virtually permitted him to commit concubinage. In In re: Santiago ,17 respondent Atty. Santiago was suspended from the practice of
law for one year for preparing a contract which declared the spouses to be single again after nine years of separation and allowed them
to contract separately subsequent marriages.

WHEREFORE, we find respondent Atty. Emmanuel O. Tansingco GUILTY of violation of Canon 1 and Rule 1.02 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, we SUSPEND respondent Atty. Emmanuel O. Tansingco from the practice of law for SIX
MONTHS effective upon finality of this Decision.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant to be appended to respondents personal record as an attorney,
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Department of Justice, and all courts in the country for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.

10. Adm. Case No. 2131 May 10, 1985

ADRIANO E. DACANAY, complainant

vs.
BAKER & MCKENZIE and JUAN G. COLLAS JR., LUIS MA. GUERRERO, VICENTE A. TORRES, RAFAEL E.
EVANGELISTA, JR., ROMEO L. SALONGA, JOSE R. SANDEJAS, LUCAS M. NUNAG, J. CLARO TESORO, NATIVIDAD
B. KWAN and JOSE A. CURAMMENG, JR., respondents.

Adriano E. Dacanay for and his own behalf.

Madrid, Cacho, Angeles, Dominguez & Pecson Law Office for respondents.

AQUINO, J.:

Lawyer Adriano E. Dacanay, admitted to the bar in 1954, in his 1980 verified complaint, sought to enjoin Juan G. Collas, Jr. and nine
other lawyers from practising law under the name of Baker & McKenzie, a law firm organized in Illinois.

In a letter dated November 16, 1979 respondent Vicente A. Torres, using the letterhead of Baker & McKenzie, which contains the
names of the ten lawyers, asked Rosie Clurman for the release of 87 shares of Cathay Products International, Inc. to H.E. Gabriel, a
client.

Attorney Dacanay, in his reply dated December 7, 1979, denied any liability of Clurman to Gabriel. He requested that he be informed
whether the lawyer of Gabriel is Baker & McKenzie "and if not, what is your purpose in using the letterhead of another law office." Not
having received any reply, he filed the instant complaint.

We hold that Baker & McKenzie, being an alien law firm, cannot practice law in the Philippines (Sec. 1, Rule 138, Rules of Court). As
admitted by the respondents in their memorandum, Baker & McKenzie is a professional partnership organized in 1949 in Chicago,
Illinois with members and associates in 30 cities around the world. Respondents, aside from being members of the Philippine bar,
practising under the firm name of Guerrero & Torres, are members or associates of Baker & Mckenzie.
As pointed out by the Solicitor General, respondents' use of the firm name Baker & McKenzie constitutes a representation that being
associated with the firm they could "render legal services of the highest quality to multinational business enterprises and others
engaged in foreign trade and investment" (p. 3, respondents' memo). This is unethical because Baker & McKenzie is not authorized to
practise law here. (See Ruben E. Agpalo, Legal Ethics, 1983 Ed., p. 115.)

WHEREFORE, the respondents are enjoined from practising law under the firm name Baker & McKenzie.

SO ORDERED.

11. A.C. No. 3056 August 16, 1991

FERNANDO T. COLLANTES, complainant,

vs.
ATTY. VICENTE C. RENOMERON respondent.

PER CURIAM: p

This complaint for disbarment is related to the administrative case which complainant Attorney Fernando T. Collantes, house counsel
for V & G Better Homes Subdivision, Inc. (V & G for short), filed against Attorney Vicente C. Renomeron, Register of Deeds of Tacloban
City, for the latter's irregular actuations with regard to the application of V & G for registration of 163 pro forma Deeds of Absolute Sale
with Assignment of lots in its subdivision. The present complaint charges the respondent with the following offenses:

1. Neglecting or refusing inspite (sic) repeated requests and without sufficient justification, to act within reasonable time (sic)
the registration of 163 Deeds of Absolute Sale with Assignment and the eventual issuance and transfer of the corresponding
163 transfer certificates of titles to the GSIS, for the purpose of obtaining some pecuniary or material benefit from the person
or persons interested therein.

2. Conduct unbecoming of public official.

3. Dishonesty.

4. Extortion.

5. Directly receiving pecuniary or material benefit for himself in connection with pending official transaction before him.

6. Causing undue injury to a party, the GSIS [or] Government through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross
inexcusable negligence.

7. Gross ignorance of the law and procedure. (p. 10, Rollo.)

As early as January 15, 1987, V & G had requested the respondent Register of Deeds to register some 163 deeds of sale with
assignment (in favor of the GSIS) of lots of the V & G mortgaged to GSIS by the lot buyers. There was no action from the respondent.

Another request was made on February 16, 1987 for him to approve or deny registration of the uniform deeds of absolute sale with
assignment. Still no action except to require V & G to submit proof of real estate tax payment and to clarify certain details about the
transactions.

Although V & G complied with the desired requirements, respondent Renomeron suspended the registration of the documents pending
compliance by V & G with a certain "special arrangement" between them, which was that V & G should provide him with a weekly
round trip ticket from Tacloban to Manila plus P2,000.00 as pocket money per trip, or, in lieu thereof, the sale of respondent's Quezon
City house and lot by V & G or GSIS representatives.

On May 19, 1987, respondent confided to the complainant that he would act favorably on the 163 registrable documents of V & G if the
latter would execute clarificatory affidavits and send money for a round trip plane ticket for him.

The plane fare amounting to P800 (without the pocket money of P2,000) was sent to respondent through his niece.

Because of V & G's failure to give him pocket money in addition to plane fare, respondent imposed additional registration requirements.
Fed up with the respondent's extortionate tactics, the complainant wrote him a letter on May 20, 1987 challenging him to act on all
pending applications for registration of V & G within twenty-four (24) hours.
On May 22, 1987, respondent formally denied registration of the transfer of 163 certificates of title to the GSIS on the uniform ground
that the deeds of absolute sale with assignment were ambiguous as to parties and subject matter. On May 26, 1987, Attorney Collantes
moved for a reconsideration of said denial, stressing that:

... since the year 1973 continuously up to December 1986 for a period of nearly fifteen (15) years or for a sum total of more
than 2,000 same set of documents which have been repeatedly and uniformly registered in the Office of the Register of Deeds
of Tacloban City under Attys. Modesto Garcia and Pablo Amascual Jr., it is only during the incumbency of Atty. Vicente C.
Renomeron, that the very same documents of the same tenor have been refused or denied registration ... (p. 15, Rollo.)

On May 27, 1987, respondent elevated the matter en consulta to the Administrator, National Land Titles and Deeds Registration
Administration (NLTDRA) (now the Land Registration Authority [LRA]). In a Resolution dated July 27,1987 (Consulta No. 1579), the
NLTDRA ruled that the questioned documents were registrable. Heedless of the NLTDRA's opinion, respondent continued to sit on V &
Gs 163 deeds of sale with assignment.

Exasperated by respondent's conduct, the complainant filed with the NLTDRA on June 4, 1987 administrative charges (docketed as
Adm. Case No. 87-15), against respondent Register of Deeds.

Upon receipt of the charges, NLTDRA Administrator Teodoro G. Bonifacio directed respondent to explain in writing why no
administrative disciplinary action should be taken against him. Respondent was further asked whether he would submit his case on the
basis of his answer, or be heard in a formal investigation.

In his answer dated July 9, 1987, respondent denied the charges of extortion and of directly receiving pecuniary or material benefit for
himself in connection with the official transactions awaiting his action.

Although an investigator was appointed by NLTDRA Administrator Bonifacio to hear Attorney Collantes' charges against him, Attorney
Renomeron waived his right to a formal investigation. Both parties submitted the case for resolution based on the pleadings.

The investigator, Attorney Leonardo Da Jose, recommended dropping the charges of: (1) dishonesty; (2) causing undue injury to a
party through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence; and (3) gross ignorance of the law and procedure.
He opined that the charge of neglecting or refusing, in spite repeated requests and without sufficient justification, to act within a
reasonable time on the registration of the documents involved, in order to extort some pecuniary or material benefit from the interested
party, absorbed the charges of conduct unbecoming of a public official, extortion, and directly receiving some pecuniary or material
benefit for himself in connection with pending official transactions before him.

Brushing aside the investigator's recommendation, NLTDRA Administrator Teodoro G. Bonifacio on February 22, 1988, recommended
to Secretary of Justice Sedfrey A. Ordoez that the respondent: (1) be found guilty of simple neglect of duty: (2) be reprimanded to act
with dispatch on documents presented to him for registration; and (3) be warned that a repetition of similar infraction will be dealt with
more severely.

After due investigation of the charges, Secretary Ordoez found respondent guilty of grave misconduct.

Our study and consideration of the records of the case indicate that ample evidence supports the Investigating Officer's
findings that the respondent committed grave misconduct.

The respondent unreasonably delayed action on the documents presented to him for registration and, notwithstanding
representations by the parties interested for expeditious action on the said documents, he continued with his inaction.

The records indicate that the respondent eventually formally denied the registration of the documents involved; that he himself
elevated the question on the registrability of the said documents to Administrator Bonifacio after he formally denied the
registration thereof, that the Administrator then resolved in favor of the registrability of the said documents in question; and
that, such resolution of the Administrator notwithstanding, the respondent still refused the registration thereof but demanded
from the parties interested the submission of additional requirements not adverted to in his previous denial.

xxx xxx xxx

In relation to the alleged 'special arrangement,' although the respondent claims that he neither touched nor received the
money sent to him, on record remains uncontroverted the circumstance that his niece, Ms. de la Cruz, retrieved from him the
amount of P800.00 earlier sent to him as plane fare, not in the original denomination of P100.00 bills but in P50.00 bills. The
respondent had ample opportunity to clarify or to countervail this related incident in his letter dated 5 September 1987 to
Administrator Bonifacio but he never did so.

... We believe that, in this case, the respondent's being new in office cannot serve to mitigate his liability. His being so should
have motivated him to be more aware of applicable laws, rules and regulations and should have prompted him to do his best
in the discharge of his duties. (pp. 17-18, Rollo.)
Secretary Ordoez recommended to President Corazon C. Aquino that Renomeron be dismissed from the service, with forfeiture of
leave credits and retirement benefits, and with prejudice to re-employment in the government service, effective immediately.

As recommended by the Secretary of Justice, the President of the Philippines, by Adm. Order No. 165 dated May 3, 1990, dismissed
the respondent from the government service (pp. 1419, Rollo).

Less than two weeks after filing his complaint against Renomeron in the NLTDRA, Attorney Collantes also filed in this Court on June
16, 1987, a disbarment complaint against said respondent.

The issue in this disbarment proceeding is whether the respondent register of deeds, as a lawyer, may also be disciplined by this Court
for his malfeasances as a public official. The answer is yes, for his misconduct as a public official also constituted a violation of his oath
as a lawyer.

The lawyer's oath (Rule 138, Section 17, Rules of Court; People vs. De Luna, 102 Phil. 968), imposes upon every lawyer the duty to
delay no man for money or malice. The lawyer's oath is a source of his obligations and its violation is a ground for his suspension,
disbarment or other disciplinary action (Legal Ethics, Ruben E. Agpalo, 1983 Edition, pp. 66-67).

As the late Chief Justice Fred Ruiz Castro said:

A person takes an oath when he is admitted to the Bar which is designed to impress upon him his responsibilities. He thereby
becomes an "officer of the court" on whose shoulders rests the grave responsibility of assisting the courts in the proper. fair,
speedy, and efficient administration of justice. As an officer of the court he is subject to a rigid discipline that demands that in
his every exertion the only criterion he that truth and justice triumph. This discipline is what as given the law profession its
nobility, its prestige, its exalted place. From a lawyer, to paraphrase Justice Felix Frankfurter, are expected those qualities of
truth-speaking, a high sense of honor, full candor, intellectual honesty, and the strictest observance of fiduciary responsibility
all of which, throughout the centuries, have been compendiously described as moral character.

Membership in the Bar is in the category of a mandate to public service of the highest order.1wphi1 A lawyer is an oath-
bound servant of society whose conduct is clearly circumscribed by inflexible norms of law and ethics, and whose primary duty
is the advancement of the quest of truth and justice, for which he has sworn to be a fearless crusader. (Apostacy in the Legal
Profession, 64 SCRA 784, 789- 790; emphasis supplied.)

The Code of Professional Responsibility applies to lawyers in government service in the discharge of their official tasks (Canon 6). Just
as the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials requires public officials and employees to process documents and
papers expeditiously (Sec. 5, subpars. [c] and [d] and prohibits them from directly or indirectly having a financial or material interest in
any transaction requiring the approval of their office, and likewise bars them from soliciting gifts or anything of monetary value in the
course of any transaction which may be affected by the functions of their office (See. 7, subpars. [a] and [d]), the Code of Professional
Responsibility forbids a lawyer to engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct (Rule 1.01, Code of Professional
Responsibility), or delay any man's cause "for any corrupt motive or interest" (Rule 103).

A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or
private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession. (Rule 7.03, Code of Professional
Responsibility.)

This Court has ordered that only those who are "competent, honorable, and reliable" may practice the profession of law (Noriega vs.
Sison, 125 SCRA 293) for every lawyer must pursue "only the highest standards in the practice of his calling" (Court Administrator vs.
Hermoso, 150 SCRA 269, 278).

The acts of dishonesty and oppression which Attorney Renomeron committed as a public official have demonstrated his unfitness to
practice the high and noble calling of the law (Bautista vs. Judge Guevarra, 142 SCRA 632; Court Administrator vs. Rodolfo G.
Hermoso, 150 SCRA 269). He should therefore be disbarred.

WHEREFORE, it is hereby ordered that Attorney Vicente C. Renomeron be disbarred from the practice of law in the Philippines, and
that his name be stricken off the Roll of Attorneys

SO ORDERED.

12. A.C. No. 7430 February 15, 2012

MARTIN LAHM III and JAMES P. CONCEPCION, Complainants,
vs.
LABOR ARBITER JOVENCIO Ll. MAYOR, JR., Respondent.

RESOLUTION

REYES, J.:

Before us is a verified complaint1 filed by Martin Lahm III and James P. Concepcion (complainants) praying for the disbarment of Labor
Arbiter Jovencio Ll. Mayor, Jr. (respondent) for alleged gross misconduct and violation of lawyers oath.

On June 27, 2007, the respondent filed his Comment2 to the complaint.

In a Resolution3 dated July 18, 2007, the Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report
and recommendation.

The antecedent facts, as summarized in the Report and Recommendation4 dated September 19, 2008 of Commissioner Romualdo A.
Din, Jr. of the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, are as follows:

On September 5, 2006 a certain David Edward Toze filed a complaint for illegal dismissal before the Labor Arbitration Branch of the
National Labor Relations Commission against the members of the Board of Trustees of the International School, Manila. The same was
docketed as NLRC-NCR Case No. 00-07381-06 and raffled to the sala of the respondent. Impleaded as among the party-respondents
are the complainants in the instant case.

On September 7, 2006, David Edward Toze filed a Verified Motion for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or
Preliminary Injunction Against the Respondents. The said Motion was set for hearing on September 12, 2006 at 10:00 in the morning. A
day after, on September 8, 2006, the counsel for the complainants herein entered its appearance and asked for additional time to
oppose and make a comment to the Verified Motion for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction
Against the Respondents of David Edward Toze.

Thereafter, the respondent issued an Order dated September 14, 2006 that directs the parties in the said case to maintain the status
quo ante. The complainants herein sought the reconsideration of the Order dated September 14, 200[6] x x x.

xxxx

On account of the Order dated September 14, 2006, David Edward Toze was immediately reinstated and assumed his former position
as superintendent of the International School Manila.

The pending incidents with the above-mentioned illegal dismissal case were not resolved, however, the scheduled hearing for the
issuance of a preliminary injunction on September 20, 2006 and September 27, 2006 was postponed.

On January 19, 2007, the co-respondents of the complainants herein in the said illegal dismissal case filed a motion for an early
resolution of their motion to dismiss the said case, but the respondent instead issued an Order dated February 6, 2007 requiring the
parties to appear in his Office on February 27, 2007 at 10:00 in the morning in order to thresh out David Edward Toze claim of moral
and exemplary damages.

xxxx

The respondent on the other maintains that the Order dated September 14, 2006 was issued by him on account of [the] Verified Motion
for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction Against the Respondents that was filed by David
Edward Toze, and of the Entry of Appearance with Motion for Additional Time to File Comment that was thereafter filed by the counsel
for the herein complainants in the illegal dismissal case pending before the respondent.

The respondent maintains that in order to prevent irreparable damage on the person of David Edward Toze, and on account of the
urgency of [the] Verified Motion for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction Against the
Respondents of David Edward Toze, and that the counsel for respondents in the illegal dismissal case have asked for a relatively long
period of fifteen days for a resetting, he (respondent) found merit in issuing the Order dated September 14, 2006 that requires the
parties to maintain the status quo ante.

xxx

The respondent argues that [the] instant case should be dismissed for being premature since the aforementioned illegal dismissal case
is still pending before the Labor Arbitration Branch of the National Labor Relations Commission, that the instant case is a subterfuge in
order to compel the respondent to inhibit himself in resolving the said illegal dismissal case because the complainants did not assail the
Order dated September 14, 2006 before the Court of Appeals under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.5
Based on the foregoing, the Investigating Commissioner concluded that: (1) the grounds cited by the respondent to justify his issuance
of the status quo ante order lacks factual basis and is speculative; (2) the respondent does not have the authority to issue a temporary
restraining order and/or a preliminary injunction; and (3) the inordinate delay in the resolution of the motion for reconsideration directed
against the September 14, 2006 Order showed an orchestrated effort to keep the status quo ante until the expiration of David Edward
Tozes employment contract.

Accordingly, the Investigating Commissioner recommended that:

WHEREFORE, it is respectfully recommended that the respondent be SUSPENDED for a period of six (6) months with a warning that a
repetition of the same or similar incident will be dealt with more severe penalty.6

On December 11, 2008, the IBP Board of Governors issued Resolution No. XVIII-2008-6447 which adopted and approved the
recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner. The said resolution further pointed out that the Board of Governors had previously
recommended the respondents suspension from the practice of law for three years in Administrative Case (A.C.) No. 7314 entitled
"Mary Ann T. Flores v. Atty. Jovencio Ll. Mayor, Jr.".

The respondent sought to reconsider the foregoing disposition,8 but it was denied by the IBP Board of Governors in its Resolution No.
XIX-2011-476 dated June 26, 2011.

The case is now before us for confirmation. We agree with the IBP Board of Governors that the respondent should be sanctioned.

Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides that a lawyer may be removed or suspended from the practice of law, inter alia, for
gross misconduct and violation of the lawyers oath. Thus:

Section 27. Attorneys removed or suspended by Supreme Court on what grounds. A member of the bar may be removed or
suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office,
grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is
required to take before the admission to practice, or for a wilful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or
wilful appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of
gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice. (emphasis supplied)

A lawyer may be suspended or disbarred for any misconduct showing any fault or deficiency in his moral character, honesty, probity or
good demeanor.9 Gross misconduct is any inexcusable, shameful or flagrant unlawful conduct on the part of a person concerned with
the administration of justice; i.e., conduct prejudicial to the rights of the parties or to the right determination of the cause. The motive
behind this conduct is generally a premeditated, obstinate or intentional purpose.10

Intrinsically, the instant petition wants this Court to impose disciplinary sanction against the respondent as a member of the bar.
However, the grounds asserted by the complainants in support of the administrative charges against the respondent are intrinsically
connected with the discharge of the respondents quasi-judicial functions.

Nonetheless, it cannot be discounted that the respondent, as a labor arbiter, is a public officer entrusted to resolve labor controversies.
It is well settled that the Court may suspend or disbar a lawyer for any conduct on his part showing his unfitness for the confidence and
trust which characterize the attorney and client relations, and the practice of law before the courts, or showing such a lack of personal
honesty or of good moral character as to render him unworthy of public confidence.11

Thus, the fact that the charges against the respondent were based on his acts committed in the discharge of his functions as a labor
arbiter would not hinder this Court from imposing disciplinary sanctions against him.

The Code of Professional Responsibility does not cease to apply to a lawyer simply because he has joined the government service. In
fact, by the express provision of Canon 6 thereof, the rules governing the conduct of lawyers "shall apply to lawyers in government
service in the discharge of their official tasks." Thus, where a lawyers misconduct as a government official is of such nature as to affect
his qualification as a lawyer or to show moral delinquency, then he may be disciplined as a member of the bar on such grounds.12

In Atty. Vitriolo v. Atty. Dasig,13 we stressed that:

Generally speaking, a lawyer who holds a government office may not be disciplined as a member of the Bar for misconduct in the
discharge of his duties as a government official. However, if said misconduct as a government official also constitutes a violation of his
oath as a lawyer, then he may be disciplined by this Court as a member of the Bar.

In this case, the record shows that the respondent, on various occasions, during her tenure as OIC, Legal Services, CHED, attempted
to extort from Betty C. Mangohon, Rosalie B. Dela Torre, Rocella G. Eje, and Jacqueline N. Ng sums of money as consideration for her
favorable action on their pending applications or requests before her office. The evidence remains unrefuted, given the respondents
failure, despite the opportunities afforded her by this Court and the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline to comment on the charges. We
find that respondents misconduct as a lawyer of the CHED is of such a character as to affect her qualification as a member of the Bar,
for as a lawyer, she ought to have known that it was patently unethical and illegal for her to demand sums of money as consideration
for the approval of applications and requests awaiting action by her office.
 xxx

A member of the Bar who assumes public office does not shed his professional obligations. Hence, the Code of Professional
Responsibility, promulgated on June 21, 1988, was not meant to govern the conduct of private practitioners alone, but of all lawyers
including those in government service. This is clear from Canon 6 of said Code. Lawyers in government are public servants who owe
the utmost fidelity to the public service. Thus, they should be more sensitive in the performance of their professional obligations, as
their conduct is subject to the ever-constant scrutiny of the public.

For a lawyer in public office is expected not only to refrain from any act or omission which might tend to lessen the trust and confidence
of the citizenry in government, she must also uphold the dignity of the legal profession at all times and observe a high standard of
honesty and fair dealing. Otherwise said, a lawyer in government service is a keeper of the public faith and is burdened with high
degree of social responsibility, perhaps higher than her brethren in private practice.14 (emphasis supplied and citations omitted)

In Tadlip v. Atty. Borres, Jr.,15 we ruled that an administrative case against a lawyer for acts committed in his capacity as provincial
adjudicator of the Department of Agrarian Reform Regional Arbitration Board may be likened to administrative cases against judges
considering that he is part of the quasi-judicial system of our government.

This Court made a similar pronouncement in Buehs v. Bacatan16 where the respondent-lawyer was suspended from the practice of law
for acts he committed in his capacity as an accredited Voluntary Arbitrator of the National Conciliation and Mediation Board.

Here, the respondent, being part of the quasi-judicial system of our government, performs official functions that are akin to those of
judges. Accordingly, the present controversy may be approximated to administrative cases of judges whose decisions, including the
manner of rendering the same, were made subject of administrative cases.

As a matter of public policy, not every error or mistake of a judge in the performance of his official duties renders him liable. In the
absence of fraud, dishonesty or corruption, the acts of a judge in his official capacity do not always constitute misconduct although the
same acts may be erroneous. True, a judge may not be disciplined for error of judgment absent proof that such error was made with a
conscious and deliberate intent to cause an injustice.17

While a judge may not always be held liable for ignorance of the law for every erroneous order that he renders, it is also axiomatic that
when the legal principle involved is sufficiently basic, lack of conversance with it constitutes gross ignorance of the law. Indeed, even
though a judge may not always be subjected to disciplinary action for every erroneous order or decision he renders, that relative
immunity is not a license to be negligent or abusive and arbitrary in performing his adjudicatory prerogatives.18

When the law is sufficiently basic, a judge owes it to his office to know and to simply apply it. Anything less would be constitutive of
gross ignorance of the law.19

In the case at bench, we find the respondent guilty of gross ignorance of the law.

Acting on the motion for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction, the respondent issued the
September 14, 2006 Order requiring the parties to maintain the status quo ante until the said motion had been resolved. It should be
stressed, however, that at the time the said motion was filed, the 2005 Rules of Procedure of the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC) is already in effect.

Admittedly, under the 1990 Rules of Procedure of the NLRC, the labor arbiter has, in proper cases, the authority to issue writs of
preliminary injunction and/or restraining orders. Section 1, Rule XI of the 1990 Rules of Procedure of the NLRC provides that:

Section 1. Injunction in Ordinary Labor Disputes. A preliminary injunction or restraining order may be granted by the Commission
through its Divisions pursuant to the provisions of paragraph (e) of Article 218 of the Labor Code, as amended, when it is established
on the basis of the sworn allegations in the petition that the acts complained of involving or arising from any labor dispute before the
Commission, which, if not restrained or performed forthwith, may cause grave or irreparable damage to any party or render ineffectual
any decision in favor of such party.

If necessary, the Commission may require the petitioner to post a bond and writ of preliminary injunction or restraining order shall
become effective only upon the approval of the bond which shall answer for any damage that may be suffered by the party enjoined, if
it is finally determined that the petitioner is not entitled thereto.

The foregoing ancillary power may be exercised by the Labor Arbiters only as an incident to the cases pending before them in order to
preserve the rights of the parties during the pendency of the case, but excluding labor disputes involving strike or lockout. (emphasis
supplied)

Nevertheless, under the 2005 Rules of Procedure of the NLRC, the labor arbiters no longer has the authority to issue writs of
preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining orders. Under Section 1, Rule X of the 2005 Rules of Procedure of the NLRC, only
the NLRC, through its Divisions, may issue writs of preliminary injunction and temporary restraining orders. Thus:
Section 1. Injunction in Ordinary Labor Disputes. - A preliminary injunction or restraining order may be granted by the Commission
through its Divisions pursuant to the provisions of paragraph (e) of Article 218 of the Labor Code, as amended, when it is established
on the basis of the sworn allegations in the petition that the acts complained of involving or arising from any labor dispute before the
Commission, which, if not restrained or performed forthwith, may cause grave or irreparable damage to any party or render ineffectual
any decision in favor of such party. (emphasis supplied)

The role of the labor arbiters, with regard to the issuance of writs of preliminary injunctions and/or writ of preliminary injunction, at
present, is limited to reception of evidence as may be delegated by the NLRC. Thus, Section 4, Rule X of the 2005 Rules of Procedure
of the NLRC provides that:

Section 4. Reception of Evidence; Delegation. - The reception of evidence for the application of a writ of injunction may be delegated by
the Commission to any of its Labor Arbiters who shall conduct such hearings in such places as he may determine to be accessible to
the parties and their witnesses, and shall thereafter submit his report and recommendation to the Commission within fifteen (15) days
from such delegation. (emphasis supplied)

The foregoing rule is clear and leaves no room for interpretation. However, the respondent, in violation of the said rule, vehemently
insist that he has the authority to issue writs of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order. On this point, the Investigating
Commissioner aptly ruled that:

The respondent should, in the first place, not entertained Edward Tozes Verified Motion for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining
Order and/or Preliminary Injunction Against the Respondents. He should have denied it outright on the basis of Section 1, Rule X of the
2005 Revised Rules of Procedure of the National Labor Relations Commission.

xxxx

The respondent, being a Labor Arbiter of the Arbitration Branch of the National Labor Relations Commission, should have been familiar
with Sections 1 and 4 of the 2005 Revised Rules of procedure of the National Labor Relations Commission. The first, states that it is
the Commission of the [NLRC] that may grant a preliminary injunction or restraining order. While the second, states [that] Labor Arbiters
[may] conduct hearings on the application of preliminary injunction or restraining order only in a delegated capacity.20

What made matters worse is the unnecessary delay on the part of the respondent in resolving the motion for reconsideration of the
September 14, 2006 Order. The unfounded insistence of the respondent on his supposed authority to issue writs of preliminary
injunction and/or temporary restraining order, taken together with the delay in the resolution of the said motion for reconsideration,
would clearly show that the respondent deliberately intended to cause prejudice to the complainants.

On this score, the Investigating Commissioner keenly observed that:

The Commission is very much disturbed with the effect of the Order dated September 14, 2006 and the delay in the resolution of the
pending incidents in the illegal dismissal case before the respondent.

Conspicuously, Section 3 (Term of Contract) of the Employment Contract between David Edward Toze and International School Manila
provides that David Edward Toze will render work as a superintendent for the school years August 2005-July 2006 and August 2006-
July 2007.

The Order dated September 14, 2006 in effect reinstates David Edward Toze as superintendent of International School of Manila until
the resolution of the formers Verified Motion for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction Against
the Respondents.

Since the Employment Contract between David Edward Toze and International School Manila is about to expire or end on August 2007,
prudence dictates that the respondent expediently resolved [sic] the merits of David Edward Tozes Verified Motion for the Issuance of a
Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction Against the Respondents because any delay in the resolution thereof would
result to undue benefit in favor of David Edward Toze and unwarranted prejudice to International School Manila.

xxxx

At the time the respondent inhibited himself from resolving the illegal dismissal case before him, there are barely four (4) months left
with the Employment Contract between David Edward Toze and International School Manila.

From the foregoing, there is an inordinate delay in the resolution of the reconsideration of the Order dated September 14, 2006 that
does not escape the attention of this Commission. There appears an orchestrated effort to delay the resolution of the reconsideration of
the Order dated September 14, 2006 and keep status quo ante until expiration of David Edward Tozes Employment Contract with
International School Manila come August 2007, thereby rendering the illegal dismissal case moot and academic.

xxxx
Furthermore, the procrastination exhibited by the respondent in the resolution of [the] assailed Order x x x should not be countenanced,
specially, under the circumstance that is attendant with the term of the Employment Contract between David Edward Toze and
International School Manila. The respondents lackadaisical attitude in sitting over the pending incident before him for more than five (5)
months only to thereafter inhibit himself therefrom, shows the respondents disregard to settled rules and jurisprudence.1wphi1 Failure
to decide a case or resolve a motion within the reglementary period constitutes gross inefficiency and warrants the imposition of
administrative sanction against the erring magistrate x x x. The respondent, being a Labor Arbiter, is akin to judges, and enjoined to
decide a case with dispatch. Any delay, no matter how short, in the disposition of cases undermine the peoples faith and confidence in
the judiciary x x x. 21

Indubitably, the respondent failed to live up to his duties as a lawyer in consonance with the strictures of the lawyers oath and the Code
of Professional Responsibility, thereby occasioning sanction from this Court.

In stubbornly insisting that he has the authority to issue writs of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order contrary to the
clear import of the 2005 Rules of Procedure of the NLRC, the respondent violated Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
which mandates lawyers to "obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal processes".

All told, we find the respondent to have committed gross ignorance of the law, his acts as a labor arbiter in the case below being
inexcusable thus unquestionably resulting into prejudice to the rights of the parties therein.

Having established the foregoing, we now proceed to determine the appropriate penalty to be imposed.

Under Rule 14022 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC, gross ignorance of the law is a serious
charge,23 punishable by a fine of more than 20,000.00, but not exceeding 40,000.00, suspension from office without salary and
other benefits for more than three but not exceeding six months, or dismissal from the service.24

In Tadlip v. Atty. Borres, Jr., the respondent-lawyer and provincial adjudicator, found guilty of gross ignorance of the law, was suspended
from the practice of law for six months. Additionally, in parallel cases,25 a judge found guilty of gross ignorance of the law was meted the
penalty of suspension for six months.

Here, the IBP Board of Governors recommended that the respondent be suspended from the practice of law for six months with a
warning that a repetition of the same or similar incident would be dealt with more severe penalty. We adopt the foregoing
recommendation.

This Court notes that the IBP Board of Governors had previously recommended the respondents suspension from the practice of law
for three years in A.C. No. 7314, entitled "Mary Ann T. Flores v. Atty. Jovencio Ll. Mayor, Jr.". This case, however, is still pending.

It cannot be gainsaid that since public office is a public trust, the ethical conduct demanded upon lawyers in the government service is
more exacting than the standards for those in private practice. Lawyers in the government service are subject to constant public
scrutiny under norms of public accountability. They also bear the heavy burden of having to put aside their private interest in favor of
the interest of the public; their private activities should not interfere with the discharge of their official functions.26

At this point, the respondent should be reminded of our exhortation in Republic of the Philippines v. Judge Caguioa,27 thus:

Ignorance of the law is the mainspring of injustice. Judges are called upon to exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance with
statutes and procedural rules. Basic rules should be at the palm of their hands. Their inexcusable failure to observe basic laws and
rules will render them administratively liable.1wphi1 Where the law involved is simple and elementary, lack of conversance with it
constitutes gross ignorance of the law. "Verily, for transgressing the elementary jurisdictional limits of his court, respondent should be
administratively liable for gross ignorance of the law."

"When the inefficiency springs from a failure to consider so basic and elemental a rule, a law or a principle in the discharge of his
functions, a judge is either too incompetent and undeserving of the position and title he holds or he is too vicious that the oversight or
omission was deliberately done in bad faith and in grave abuse of judicial authority."28 (citations omitted)

WHEREFORE, finding respondent Atty. Jovencio Ll. Mayor, Jr. guilty of gross ignorance of the law in violation of his lawyers oath and
of the Code of Professional Responsibility, the Court resolved to SUSPEND respondent from the practice of law for a period of six (6)
months, with a WARNING that commission of the same or similar offense in the future will result in the imposition of a more severe
penalty.

Let copies of this Resolution be furnished the IBP, as well as the Office of the Bar Confidant and the Court Administrator who shall
circulate it to all courts for their information and guidance and likewise be entered in the record of the respondent as attorney.

SO ORDERED.

13. B.M. No. 44 February 24, 1992

EUFROSINA Y. TAN, complainant,
vs.
NICOLAS EL. SABANDAL, respondent.

SBC No. 609 February 24, 1992

MOISES B. BOQUIA, complainant,

vs.
NICOLAS EL. SABANDAL, respondent.

SBC No. 616 February 24, 1992

HERVE DAGPIN, complainant,

vs.
NICOLAS EL. SABANDAL, respondent.

Nelbert T. Paculan for respondent.

Moises B. Boquia for himself and Herve Dagpin.

RESOLUTION

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:

On 29 November 1983, * this Court sustained the charge of unauthorized practice of law filed against respondent Sabandal and
accordingly denied the latter's petition to be allowed to take the oath as member of the Philippine Bar and to sign the Roll of Attorneys.

From 1984-1988, Sabandal filed Motions for Reconsideration of the aforesaid Resolution, all of which were either denied or "Noted
without action." The Court, however, on 10 February 1989, after considering his plea for mercy and forgiveness, his willingness to
reform and the several testimonials attesting to his good moral character and civic consciousness, reconsidered its earlier Resolution
and finally allowed him to take the lawyer's oath "with the Court binding him to his assurance that he shall strictly abide by and adhere
to the language, meaning and spirit of the Lawyer's Oath and the highest standards of the legal profession" (Yap Tan v. Sabandal, 10
February 1989, 170 SCRA 211).

However, before a date could be set for Sabandal's oath-taking, complainants Tan, Dagpin and Boquia each filed separate motions for
reconsideration of the Resolution of 10 February 1989. These were acted upon in the Resolution of 4 July 1989 hereunder quoted, in
part, for ready reference:

On 7 April 1989, Complainant Herve Dagpin in SBC No. 616, and Complainant Moises Boquia in SBC No. 609 also
filed a Motion for Reconsideration of our Resolution allowing respondent to take his oath. They alleged that
respondent had deliberately and maliciously excluded them in his Petition of 28 June 1988. That, of course, is without
merit considering that in his Petition of 28 June 1988, respondent had discussed said cases quite lengthily.

On 27 April 1989, Complainant Tan also manifested that Complainant Benjamin Cabigon in BM No. 59 and
Complainant Cornelio Agnis in SBC No. 624, had passed away so that they are in no position to submit their
respective Comments.

One of the considerations we had taken into account in allowing respondent to take his oath, was a testimonial from
the IBP Zamboanga del Norte Chapter, dated 29 December 1986, certifying that respondent was "acting with morality
and has been careful in his actuations in the community."

Complainant Tan maintains that said IBP testimonial was signed only by the then President of the IBP, Zamboanga
del Norte Chapter, Atty. Senen O. Angeles, without authorization from the Board of Officers of said Chapter; and that
Atty. Angeles was respondent's own counsel as well as the lawyer of respondent's parents-in-law in CAR Case No.
347, Ozamiz City. Attached to Complainant's Motion for Reconsideration was a Certification, dated 24 February 1989,
signed by the IBP Zamboanga del Norte Chapter President, Atty. Norberto L. Nuevas, stating that "the present Board
of Officers with the undersigned as President had not issued any testimonial attesting to the good moral character
and civic consciousness of Mr. Nicolas Sabandal."

In his Comment, received by the Court on 27 March 1989, respondent states that the IBP testimonial referred to by
Complainant Tan must have been that signed by the former IBP Zamboanga del Norte Chapter President, Atty.
Senen O. Angeles, addressed to the Chief Justice, dated 29 December 1986, and that he himself had not submitted
to the Court any certification from the IBP Zamboanga del Norte Chapter Board of Officers of 1988-1989.
 Under the circumstances, the Court has deemed it best to require the present Board of Officers of the IBP,
Zamboanga del Norte Chapter, to MANIFEST whether or not it is willing to give a testimonial certifying to
respondent's good moral character as to entitle him to take the lawyer's oath, and if not, the reason therefor. The
Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga del Norte is likewise required to submit a COMMENT on
respondent's moral fitness to be a member of the Bar.

Compliance herewith is required within ten (10) days from notice.

Pursuant to the aforesaid Resolution, Judge Pelagio R. Lachica, Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga del Norte,
filed his Comment, dated 4 August 1989, and received on 25 August 1989, pertinently reading:

The undersigned, who is not well acquainted personally with the respondent, is not aware of any acts committed by
him as would disqualify him from admission to the Bar. It might be relevant to mention, however, that there is Civil
Case No. 3747 entitled Republic of the Philippines, Represented by the Director of Lands, Plaintiff, versus Nicolas
Sabandal, Register of Deeds of Zamboanga del Norte and Rural Bank of Pinan, (Zamboanga del Norte), Inc., for
Cancellation of Title and/or Reversion pending in this Court in which said respondent, per complaint filed by the
Office of the Solicitor General, is alleged to have secured a free patent and later a certificate of title to a parcel of
land which, upon investigation, turned out to be a swampland and not susceptible of acquisition under a free patent,
and which he later mortgaged to the Rural Bank of Pinan (ZN) Inc. The mortgage was later foreclosed and the land
sold at public auction and respondent has not redeemed the land until the present. (Emphasis Supplied)

The IBP Zamboanga del Norte Chapter also submitted a Certification, dated 2 February 1990, signed by its Secretary Peter Y. Co and
attested to by its President Gil L. Batula, to wit:

This is to certify that based on the certifications issued by the Office of the Clerk of CourtMunicipal Trial Court in
the City of Dipolog; Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga del Norte and the Office of the Provincial and City
Prosecutors, Mr. Nicolas E. Sabandal has not been convicted of any crime, nor is there any pending derogatory
criminal case against him. Based on the above findings, the Board does not find any acts committed by the petitioner
to disqualify him from admission to the Philippine Bar.

We required the complainants to comment on the aforesaid IBP Certification and to reply to Executive Judge Pelagio Lachica's
comment in our Resolution of 15 February 1990.

On 17 April 1990, after taking note of the unrelenting vehement objections of complainants Tan (in BM 44) and Boquia (in SBC 616)
and the Certification by Executive Judge Lachica, dated 4 August 1989, that there is a pending case before his Court involving
respondent Sabandal, this Court resolved to DEFER the setting of a date for the oath-taking of respondent Sabandal and required
Judge Lachica to inform this Court of the outcome of the case entitled Republic v. Sabandal, (Civil Case 3747), pending before his
"Sala" as soon as resolved.

In the meantime, on 18 April 1990, the Court received another Comment, dated 13 March 1990, by complainant Herve Dagpin in SBC
609, vehemently objecting to the oath-taking of respondent Sabandal and describing his actuations in Civil Case 3747 as manipulative
and surreptitious. This comment was Noted in the Resolution of 22 May 1990.

In a letter, addressed to the Chief Justice, dated 15 August 1990, complainant Tan in Bar Matter 44, informed the Court that her
relationship with Sabandal has "already been restored," as he had asked forgiveness for what has been done to her and that she finds
no necessity in pursuing her case against him. Complainant Tan further stated that she sees no further reason to oppose his admission
to the Bar as he had shown sincere repentance and reformation which she believes make him morally fit to become a member of the
Philippine Bar. "In view of this development," the letter stated, "we highly recommend him for admission to the legal profession and
request this Honorable Court to schedule his oath-taking at a time most convenient." This letter was Noted in the Resolution of 2
October 1990, which also required a comment on Tan's letter from complainants Boquia and Dagpin.

Moises Boquia, for himself, and complainant Dagpin, in their comment, dated 5 November 1990, stated thus:

Eufrosina Yap Tan's letter dated 15 August 1990 is a private personal disposition which raises the question whether
personal forgiveness is enough basis to exculpate and obliterate these cases. On our part, we believe and maintain
the importance and finality of the Honorable Supreme Court's resolutions in these cases. . . .

It is not within the personal competence, jurisdiction and discretion of any party to change or amend said final
resolutions which are already res judicata. Viewed in the light of the foregoing final and executory resolutions, these
cases therefore should not in the least be considered as anything which is subject and subservient to the changing
moods and dispositions of the parties, devoid of any permanency or finality. Respondent's scheming change in
tactics and strategy could not improve his case.

The above was "Noted" in the Resolution of 29 November 1990.

In compliance with the Resolution of 2 October 1990, Judge Pacifico M. Garcia, Regional Trial Court Judge of Branch 8, Dipolog City
(who apparently succeeded Judge Pelagio Lachica, the latter having availed of optional retirement on 30 June 1990) submitted to this
Court, on 17 December 1990, a copy of the "Judgment," dated 12 December 1990, in Civil Case 3747, entitled "Republic of the
Philippines v. Nicolas Sabandal et al" for Cancellation of Title and/or Reversion, which, according to him, was already considered
closed and terminated.

Said judgment reveals that an amicable settlement, dated 24 October 1990, had been reached between the principal parties, approved
by the Trial Court, and conformed to by the counsel for defendant Rural Bank of Pinan.

Briefly, the said amicable settlement cancelled the Original Certificate of Title under Free Patent in Sabandal's name and the latter's
mortgage thereof in favor of the Rural Bank of Pinan; provided for the surrender of the certificate of title to the Register of Deeds for
proper annotation; reverted to the mass of public domain the land covered by the aforesaid Certificate of' Title with defendant Sabandal
refraining from exercising acts of possession or ownership over said land; caused the defendant Sabandal to pay defendant Rural Bank
of Pinan the sum of P35,000 for the loan and interest; and the Rural Bank of Pinan to waive its cross-claims against defendant Nicolas
Sabandal.

Judge Pacifico Garcia's letter and the afore-mentioned Judgment were NOTED in our Resolution of 29 January 1991. In the same
Resolution, complainants Tan, Boquia and Dagpin were required to comment on the same.

Upon request of Sabandal, a certification, dated 20 December 1990, was sent by Executive judge Jesus Angeles of the RTC of
Zamboanga del Norte, certifying that Sabandal has no pending case with his Court and that he has no cause to object to his admission
to the Philippine Bar. This was "Noted" in the Resolution of 26 February 1991.

Meanwhile, Sabandal reiterated his prayer to be allowed to take the lawyer's oath in a Motion dated 8 June 1991. In our Resolution of 1
August 1991, we deferred action on the aforesaid Motion pending compliance by the complainants with the Resolution of 29 January
1991 requiring them to comment on the letter of Judge Pacifico M. Garcia.

To date, only complainant Tan has complied with the said Resolution by submitting a Comment, dated 29 August 1991, stating that the
termination of Civil Case No. 3747 is "proof of Sabandal's sincere reformation, of his repentance with restitution of the rights of
complainants he violated," and that "there is no more reason to oppose his admission to the Bar." This was "Noted" in the Resolution of
24 September 1991.

In a Manifestation, dated 6 December 1991, Sabandal reiterates his plea to be allowed to take the Lawyer's Oath.

His plea must be DENIED.

In our Resolution of 10 February 1989, Sabandal was allowed to take the oath, ten (10) years having elapsed from the time he took
and passed the 1976 Bar examinations, after careful consideration of his show of contrition and willingness to reform. Also taken
cognizance of were the several testimonials attesting to his good moral character and civic consciousness. At that time, we had not
received the objections from complainant Tan to Sabandal's taking the oath nor were we aware of the gravity of the civil case against
him.

It turns out that Civil Case No. 3747 entitled "Republic of the Philippines v. Nicolas Sabandal" was instituted by the Government in 1985
and was brought about because of respondent's procurement of a certificate of free patent over a parcel of land belonging to the public
domain and its use as security for a mortgage in order to obtain a loan. At that time, Sabandal was an employee of the Bureau of
Lands. He did not submit any defense and was declared it default by order of the RTC dated 26 November 1986. The controversy was
eventually settled by mere compromise with respondent surrendering the bogus certificate of title to the government and paying-off the
mortgagor, "to buy peace and forestall further expenses of litigation incurred by defendants" (Rollo, Judgment in Civil Case No. 3747).
The Office of the Solicitor General interposed no objection to the approval of the said amicable settlement and prayed that judgment be
rendered in accordance therewith, "as the amicable settlement may amount to a confession by the defendant" (Rollo, supra). It must
also be stressed that in 1985, at the time said case was instituted, Sabandal's petition to take the lawyer's oath had already been
denied on 29 November 1983 and he was then submitting to this Court motions for reconsideration alleging his good moral character
without, however, mentioning the pendency of that civil case against him.

In view of the nature of that case and the circumstances attending its termination, the Court now entertains second thoughts about
respondent's fitness to become a member of the Bar.

It should be recalled that Sabandal worked as Land Investigator at the Bureau of Lands. Said employment facilitated his procurement
of the free patent title over property which he could not but have known was public land. This was manipulative on his part and does
not speak well of his moral character. It is a manifestation of gross dishonesty while in the public service, which can not be erased by
the termination of the case filed by the Republic against him where no determination of his guilt or innocence was made because the
suit had been compromised. Although as the Solicitor General had pointed out, the amicable settlement was tantamount to a
confession on his part. What is more, he could not but have known of the intrinsic invalidity of his title and yet he took advantage of it by
securing a bank loan, mortgaging it as collateral, and notwithstanding the foreclosure of the mortgage and the sale of the land at public
auction, he did not lift a finger to redeem the same until the civil case filed against him was eventually compromised. This is a sad
reflection on his sense of honor and fair dealing. His failure to reveal to this Court the pendency of the civil case for Reversion filed
against him during the period that he was submitting several Motions for Reconsideration before us also reveal his lack of candor and
truthfulness.

There are testimonials attesting to his good moral character, yes. But these were confined to lack of knowledge of the pendency of any
criminal case against him and were obviously made without awareness of the facts and circumstances surrounding the case instituted
by the Government against him. Those testimonials can not, therefore, outweigh nor smother his acts of dishonesty and lack of good
moral character.

That the other complainants, namely, Moises Boquia (in SBC 606) and Herve Dagpin (in SBC 619) have not submitted any opposition
to his motion to take the oath, is of no moment. They have already expressed their objections in their earlier comments. That
complainant Tan has withdrawn her objection to his taking the oath can neither tilt the balance in his favor, the basis of her complaint
treating as it does of another subject matter.

Time and again, it has been held that the practice of law is not a matter of right. It is a privilege bestowed upon individuals who are not
only learned in the law but who are also known to possess good moral character:

The Supreme Court and the Philippine Bar have always tried to maintain a high standard for the legal profession,
both in academic preparation and legal training as well as in honesty and fair dealing. The Court and the licensed
lawyers themselves are vitally interested in keeping this high standard; and one of the ways of achieving this end is
to admit to the practice of this noble profession only those persons who are known to be honest and to possess good
moral character. . . . (In re Parazo, 82 Phil. 230).

Although the term "good moral character" admits of broad dimensions, it has been defined as "including at least common honesty"
(Royong v. Oblena, Adm. Case No. 376, April 30, 1963, 7 SCRA 859; In re Del Rosario, 52 Phil. 399 [1928]). It has also been held that
no moral qualification for bar membership is more important than truthfulness or candor (Fellner v. Bar Association of Baltimore City,
131 A. 2d 729).

WHEREFORE, finding respondent Sabandal to be unfit to become a member of the BAR, this Court's Resolution, dated 10 February
1989 is RECALLED and his prayer to be allowed to take the lawyer's oath is hereby denied.

SO ORDERED.

14. A.C. No. 4807. March 22, 2000

MANUEL N. CAMACHO, Complainant , v. ATTYS. LUIS MEINRADO C. PANGULAYAN, REGINA D. BALMORES,

CATHERINE V. LAUREL and HUBERT JOAQUIN P. BUSTOS of PANGULAYAN AND ASSOCIATES LAW
OFFICES, Respondents .

DECISION

VITUG, J. :

Respondent lawyers stand indicted for a violation of the Code of Professional Ethics, specifically Canon 9 thereof,
viz:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"A lawyer should not in any way communicate upon the subject of controversy with a party represented by counsel, much less should
he undertake to negotiate or compromise the matter with him, but should only deal with his counsel. It is incumbent upon the lawyer
most particularly to avoid everything that may tend to mislead a party not represented by counsel and he should not undertake to
advise him as to law." chanrobles virtuallawlibrary:red

Atty. Manuel N. Camacho filed a complaint against the lawyers comprising the Pangulayan and Associates Law Offices, namely,
Attorneys Luis Meinrado C. Pangulayan, Regina D. Balmores, Catherine V. Laurel, and Herbert Joaquin P. Bustos. Complainant, the
hired counsel of some expelled students from the AMA Computer College ("AMACC"), in an action for the Issuance of a Writ of
Preliminary Mandatory Injunction and for Damages, docketed Civil Case No. Q-97-30549 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 78, of
Quezon City, charged that respondents, then counsel for the defendants, procured and effected on separate occasions, without his
knowledge, compromise agreements ("Re-Admission Agreements") with four of his clients in the aforementioned civil case which in
effect required them to waive all kinds of claims they might have had against AMACC, the principal defendant, and to terminate all civil,
criminal and administrative proceedings filed against it. Complainant averred that such an act of respondents was unbecoming of any
member of the legal profession warranting either disbarment or suspension from the practice of law.

In his comment, Attorney Pangulayan acknowledged that not one of his co-respondents had taken part in the negotiation, discussion,
formulation, or execution of the various Re-Admission Agreements complained of and were, in fact, no longer connected at the time
with the Pangulayan and Associates Law Offices. The Re-Admission Agreements, he claimed, had nothing to do with the dismissal of
Civil Case Q-97-30549 and were executed for the sole purpose of effecting the settlement of an administrative case involving nine
students of AMACC who were expelled therefrom upon the recommendation of the Student Disciplinary Tribunal. The students, namely,
Ian Dexter Marquez, Almira O. Basalo, Neil Jason R. Salcedo, Melissa F. Domondon, Melyda B. De Leon, Leila D. Joven, Signorelli A.
Santiago, Michael Ejercito, and Cleo B. Villareiz, were all members of the Editorial Board of DATALINE, who apparently had caused to
be published some objectionable features or articles in the paper. The 3-member Student Disciplinary Tribunal was immediately
convened, and after a series of hearings, it found the students guilty of the use of indecent language and unauthorized use of the
student publication funds. The body recommended the penalty of expulsion against the erring students.

The denial of the appeal made by the students to Dr. Amable R. Aguiluz V, AMACC President gave rise to the commencement of Civil
Case No. Q-97-30549 on 14th March 1997 before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 78, of Quezon City. While the civil case was still
pending, letters of apology and Re-Admission Agreements were separately executed by and/or in behalf of some of the expelled
students, to wit: Letter of Apology, dated 27 May 1997, of Neil Jason Salcedo, assisted by his mother, and Re-Admission Agreement of
22 June 1997 with the AMACC President; letter of apology, dated 31 March 1997, of Mrs. Veronica B. De Leon for her daughter Melyda
B. De Leon and Re-Admission Agreement of 09 May 1997 with the AMACC President; letter of apology, dated 22 May 1997, of Leila
Joven, assisted by her mother, and Re-Admission Agreement of 22 May 1997 with the AMACC President; letter of apology, dated 22
September 1997, of Cleo Villareiz and Re-Admission Agreement of 10 October 1997 with the AMACC President; and letter of apology,
dated 20 January 1997, of Michael Ejercito, assisted by his parents, and Re-Admission Agreement of 23 January 1997 with the
AMACC President.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Following the execution of the letters of apology and Re-Admission Agreements, a Manifestation, dated 06 June 1997, was filed with
the trial court where the civil case was pending by Attorney Regina D. Balmores of the Pangulayan and Associates Law Offices for
defendant AMACC. A copy of the manifestation was furnished complainant. In his Resolution, dated 14 June 1997, Judge Lopez of the
Quezon City Regional Trial Court thereupon dismissed Civil Case No. Q-97-30549.

On 19 June 1999, the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines ("IBP") passed Resolution No. XIII-99-163,
thus:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution/Decision as Annex A and, finding the
recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, with an amendment Atty. Meinrado
Pangulayan is suspended from the practice of law for SIX (6) MONTHS for being remiss in his duty and DISMISSAL of the case
against the other Respondents for they did not take part in the negotiation of the case."cralaw virtua1aw library

It would appear that when the individual letters of apology and Re-Admission Agreements were formalized, complainant was by then
already the retained counsel for plaintiff students in the civil case. Respondent Pangulayan had full knowledge of this fact. Although
aware that the students were represented by counsel, respondent attorney proceeded, nonetheless, to negotiate with them and their
parents without at the very least communicating the matter to their lawyer, herein complainant, who was counsel of record in Civil Case
No. Q-97-30549. This failure of respondent whether by design or because of oversight is an inexcusable violation of the canons of
professional ethics and in utter disregard of a duty owing to a colleague. Respondent fell short of the demands required of him as a
lawyer and as a member of the Bar.

The allegation that the context of the Re-Admission Agreements centers only on the administrative aspect of the controversy is belied
by the Manifestation 1 which, among other things, explicitly contained the following stipulation; viz:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"1. Among the nine (9) signatories to the complaint, four (4) of whom assisted by their parents/guardian already executed a Re-
Admission Agreement with AMACC President, AMABLE R. AGUILUZ V acknowledging guilt for violating the AMA COMPUTER
COLLEGE MANUAL FOR DISCIPLINARY ACTIONS and agreed among others to terminate all civil, criminal and administrative
proceedings which they may have against the AMACC arising from their previous dismissal.chanrobles.com : virtual law library

"x x x

"3. Consequently, as soon as possible, an Urgent Motion to Withdraw from Civil Case No. Q-97-30549 will be filed by them."cralaw
virtua1aw library

The Court can only thus concur with the IBP Investigating Commission and the IBP Board of Governors in their findings, nevertheless,
the recommended six-month suspension would appear to be somewhat too harsh a penalty given the circumstances and the
explanation of Respondent.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Luis Meinrado C. Pangulayan is ordered SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of THREE
(3) MONTHS effective immediately upon his receipt of this decision. The case against the other respondents is DISMISSED for
insufficiency of evidence.

Let a copy of this decision be entered in the personal record of respondent as an attorney and as a member of the Bar, and furnished
the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country.chanrobles
virtual lawlibrary

SO ORDERED.
15. A.C. No. 9604 March 20, 2013

RODRIGO E. TAPAY and ANTHONY J. RUSTIA, Complainants,

vs.
ATTY. CHARLIE L. BANCOLO and ATTY. JANUS T. JARDER, Respondents.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

This administrative case arose from a Complaint tiled by Rodrigo E. Tapay (Tapay) and Anthony J. Rustia (Rustia), both employees of
the Sugar Regulatory Administration, against Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo (Atty. Bancolo) and Atty. Janus T. larder (Atty. Jarder) for violation
of the Canons of Ethics and Professionalism, Falsification of Public Document, Gross Dishonesty, and Harassment.

The Facts

Sometime in October 2004, Tapay and Rustia received an Order dated 14 October 2004 from the Office of the Ombudsman-Visayas
requiring them to file a counter-affidavit to a complaint for usurpation of authority, falsification of public document, and graft and corrupt
practices filed against them by Nehimias Divinagracia, Jr. (Divinagracia), a co-employee in the Sugar Regulatory Administration. The
Complaint1 dated 31 August 2004 was allegedly signed on behalf of Divinagracia by one Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo of the Jarder Bancolo
Law Office based in Bacolod City, Negros Occidental.

When Atty. Bancolo and Rustia accidentally chanced upon each other, the latter informed Atty. Bancolo of the case filed against them
before the Office of the Ombudsman. Atty. Bancolo denied that he represented Divinagracia since he had yet to meet Divinagracia in
person. When Rustia showed him the Complaint, Atty. Bancolo declared that the signature appearing above his name as counsel for
Divinagracia was not his. Thus, Rustia convinced Atty. Bancolo to sign an affidavit to attest to such fact. On 9 December 2004, Atty.
Bancolo signed an affidavit denying his supposed signature appearing on the Complaint filed with the Office of the Ombudsman and
submitted six specimen signatures for comparison. Using Atty. Bancolos affidavit and other documentary evidence, Tapay and Rustia
filed a counter-affidavit accusing Divinagracia of falsifying the signature of his alleged counsel, Atty. Bancolo.

In a Resolution dated 28 March 2005, the Office of the Ombudsman provisionally dismissed the Complaint since the falsification of the
counsels signature posed a prejudicial question to the Complaints validity. Also, the Office of the Ombudsman ordered that separate
cases for Falsification of Public Document2 and Dishonesty3 be filed against Divinagracia, with Rustia and Atty. Bancolo as
complainants.

Thereafter, Divinagracia filed his Counter-Affidavit dated 1 August 2005 denying that he falsified the signature of his former lawyer, Atty.
Bancolo. Divinagracia presented as evidence an affidavit dated 1 August 2005 by Richard A. Cordero, the legal assistant of Atty.
Bancolo, that the Jarder Bancolo Law Office accepted Divinagracias case and that the Complaint filed with the Office of the
Ombudsman was signed by the office secretary per Atty. Bancolos instructions. Divinagracia asked that the Office of the Ombudsman
dismiss the cases for falsification of public document and dishonesty filed against him by Rustia and Atty. Bancolo and to revive the
original Complaint for various offenses that he filed against Tapay and Rustia.

In a Resolution dated 19 September 2005, the Office of the Ombudsman dismissed the criminal case for falsification of public
document (OMB-V-C-05-0207-E) for insufficiency of evidence. The dispositive portion states:

WHEREFORE, the instant case is hereby DISMISSED for insufficiency of evidence, without prejudice to the re-filing by Divinagracia, Jr.
of a proper complaint for violation of RA 3019 and other offenses against Rustia and Tapay.

SO ORDERED.4

The administrative case for dishonesty (OMB-V-A-05-0219-E) was also dismissed for lack of substantial evidence in a Decision dated
19 September 2005.

On 29 November 2005, Tapay and Rustia filed with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) a complaint5 to disbar Atty. Bancolo and
Atty. Jarder, Atty. Bancolos law partner. The complainants alleged that they were subjected to a harassment Complaint filed before the
Office of the Ombudsman with the forged signature of Atty. Bancolo. Complainants stated further that the signature of Atty. Bancolo in
the Complaint was not the only one that was forged. Complainants attached a Report6 dated 1 July 2005 by the Philippine National
Police Crime Laboratory 6 which examined three other letter-complaints signed by Atty. Bancolo for other clients, allegedly close friends
of Atty. Jarder. The report concluded that the questioned signatures in the letter-complaints and the submitted standard signatures of
Atty. Bancolo were not written by one and the same person. Thus, complainants maintained that not only were respondents engaging
in unprofessional and unethical practices, they were also involved in falsification of documents used to harass and persecute innocent
people.
On 9 January 2006, complainants filed a Supplement to the Disbarment Complaint Due to Additional Information. They alleged that a
certain Mary Jane Gentugao, the secretary of the Jarder Bancolo Law Office, forged the signature of Atty. Bancolo.

In their Answer dated 26 January 2006 to the disbarment complaint, respondents admitted that the criminal and administrative cases
filed by Divinagracia against complainants before the Office of the Ombudsman were accepted by the Jarder Bancolo Law Office. The
cases were assigned to Atty. Bancolo. Atty. Bancolo alleged that after being informed of the assignment of the cases, he ordered his
staff to prepare and draft all the necessary pleadings and documents. However, due to some minor lapses, Atty. Bancolo permitted that
the pleadings and communications be signed in his name by the secretary of the law office. Respondents added that complainants filed
the disbarment complaint to retaliate against them since the cases filed before the Office of the Ombudsman were meritorious and
strongly supported by testimonial and documentary evidence. Respondents also denied that Mary Jane Gentugao was employed as
secretary of their law office.

Tapay and Rustia filed a Reply to the Answer dated 2 March 2006. Thereafter, the parties were directed by the Commission on Bar
Discipline to attend a mandatory conference scheduled on 5 May 2006. The conference was reset to 10 August 2006. On the said date,
complainants were present but respondents failed to appear. The conference was reset to 25 September 2006 for the last time. Again,
respondents failed to appear despite receiving notice of the conference. Complainants manifested that they were submitting their
disbarment complaint based on the documents submitted to the IBP. Respondents were also deemed to have waived their right to
participate in the mandatory conference. Further, both parties were directed to submit their respective position papers. On 27 October
2006, the IBP received complainants position paper dated 18 October 2006 and respondents position paper dated 23 October 2006.

The IBPs Report and Recommendation

On 11 April 2007, Atty. Lolita A. Quisumbing, the Investigating Commissioner of the Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP, submitted
her Report. Atty. Quisumbing found that Atty. Bancolo violated Rule 9.01 of Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility while
Atty. Jarder violated Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the same Code. The Investigating

Commissioner recommended that Atty. Bancolo be suspended for two years from the practice of law and Atty. Jarder be admonished
for his failure to exercise certain responsibilities in their law firm.

In her Report and Recommendation, the Investigating Commissioner opined:

x x x. In his answer, respondent Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo admitted that his signature appearing in the complaint filed against
complainants Rodrigo E. Tapay and Anthony J. Rustia with the Ombudsman were signed by the secretary. He did not refute the
findings that his signatures appearing in the various documents released from his office were found not to be his. Such pattern of
malpratice by respondent clearly breached his obligation under Rule 9.01 of Canon 9, for a lawyer who allows a non-member to
represent him is guilty of violating the aforementioned Canon. The fact that respondent was busy cannot serve as an excuse for him
from signing personally. After all respondent is a member of a law firm composed of not just one (1) lawyer. The Supreme Court has
ruled that this practice constitute negligence and undersigned finds the act a sign of indolence and ineptitude. Moreover, respondents
ignored the notices sent by undersigned. That showed patent lack of respect to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Commission on
Bar Discipline and its proceedings. It betrays lack of courtesy and irresponsibility as lawyers.

On the other hand, Atty. Janus T. Jarder, a senior partner of the law firm Jarder Bancolo and Associates Law Office, failed to exercise
certain responsibilities over matters under the charge of his law firm. As a senior partner[,] he failed to abide to the principle of
"command responsibility". x x x.

xxxx

Respondent Atty. Janus Jarder after all is a seasoned practitioner, having passed the bar in 1995 and practicing law up to the present.
He holds himself out to the public as a law firm designated as Jarder Bancolo and Associates Law Office. It behooves Atty. Janus T.
Jarder to exert ordinary diligence to find out what is going on in his law firm, to ensure that all lawyers in his firm act in conformity to the
Code of Professional Responsibility. As a partner, it is his responsibility to provide efficacious control of court pleadings and other
documents that carry the name of the law firm. Had he done that, he could have known the unethical practice of his law partner Atty.
Charlie L. Bancolo. Respondent Atty. Janus T. Jarder failed to perform this task and is administratively liable under Canon 1, Rule 1.01
of the Code of Professional Responsibility.7

On 19 September 2007, in Resolution No. XVIII-2007-97, the Board of Governors of the IBP approved with modification the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner. The Resolution states:

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, with modification, the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A"; and,
finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and considering Respondent
Atty. Bancolos violation of Rule 9.01, Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo is hereby
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) year.
However, with regard to the charge against Atty. Janus T. Jarder, the Board of Governors RESOLVED as it is hereby RESOLVED to
AMEND, as it is hereby AMENDED the Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner, and APPROVE the DISMISSAL of the
case for lack of merit.8

Tapay and Rustia filed a Motion for Reconsideration. Likewise, Atty. Bancolo filed his Motion for Reconsideration dated 22 December
2007. Thereafter, Atty. Jarder filed his separate Consolidated Comment/Reply to Complainants Motion for Reconsideration and
Comment Filed by Complainants dated 29 January 2008.

In Resolution No. XX-2012-175 dated 9 June 2012, the IBP Board of Governors denied both complainants and Atty. Bancolos motions
for reconsideration. The IBP Board found no cogent reason to reverse the findings of the Investigating Commissioner and affirmed
Resolution No. XVIII-2007-97 dated 19 September 2007.

The Courts Ruling

After a careful review of the records of the case, we agree with the findings and recommendation of the IBP Board and find reasonable
grounds to hold respondent Atty. Bancolo administratively liable.

Atty. Bancolo admitted that the Complaint he filed for a former client before the Office of the Ombudsman was signed in his name by a
secretary of his law office. Clearly, this is a violation of Rule 9.01 of Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides:

CANON 9
A LAWYER SHALL NOT, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, ASSIST IN THE UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW.

Rule 9.01 - A lawyer shall not delegate to any unqualified person the performance of any task which by law may only be performed by a
member of the Bar in good standing.

This rule was clearly explained in the case of Cambaliza v. Cristal-Tenorio,9 where we held:

The lawyers duty to prevent, or at the very least not to assist in, the unauthorized practice of law is founded on public interest and
policy. Public policy requires that the practice of law be limited to those individuals found duly qualified in education and character. The
permissive right conferred on the lawyer is an individual and limited privilege subject to withdrawal if he fails to maintain proper
standards of moral and professional conduct. The purpose is to protect the public, the court, the client, and the bar from the
incompetence or dishonesty of those unlicensed to practice law and not subject to the disciplinary control of the Court. It devolves upon
a lawyer to see that this purpose is attained. Thus, the canons and ethics of the profession enjoin him not to permit his professional
services or his name to be used in aid of, or to make possible the unauthorized practice of law by, any agency, personal or corporate.
And, the law makes it a misbehavior on his part, subject to disciplinary action, to aid a layman in the unauthorized practice of law.

In Republic v. Kenrick Development Corporation,10 we held that the preparation and signing of a pleading constitute legal work involving
the practice of law which is reserved exclusively for members of the legal profession. Atty. Bancolos authority and duty to sign a
pleading are personal to him. Although he may delegate the signing of a pleading to another lawyer, he may not delegate it to a non-
lawyer. Further, under the Rules of Court, counsels signature serves as a certification that (1) he has read the pleading; (2) to the best
of his knowledge, information and belief there is good ground to support it; and (3) it is not interposed for delay.11 Thus, by affixing ones
signature to a pleading, it is counsel alone who has the responsibility to certify to these matters and give legal effect to the
document.1wphi1

In his Motion for Reconsideration dated 22 December 2007, Atty. Bancolo wants us to believe that he was a victim of circumstances or
of manipulated events because of his unconditional trust and confidence in his former law partner, Atty. Jarder. However, Atty. Bancolo
did not take any steps to rectify the situation, save for the affidavit he gave to Rustia denying his signature to the Complaint filed before
the Office of the Ombudsman. Atty. Bancolo had an opportunity to maintain his innocence when he filed with the IBP his Joint Answer
(with Atty. Jarder) dated 26 January 2006. Atty. Bancolo, however, admitted that prior to the preparation of the Joint Answer, Atty. Jarder
threatened to file a disbarment case against him if he did not cooperate. Thus, he was constrained to allow Atty. Jarder to prepare the
Joint Answer. Atty. Bancolo simply signed the verification without seeing the contents of the Joint Answer.

In the Answer, Atty. Bancolo categorically stated that because of some minor lapses, the communications and pleadings filed against
Tapay and Rustia were signed by his secretary, albeit with his tolerance. Undoubtedly, Atty. Bancolo violated the Code of Professional
Responsibility by allowing a non-lawyer to affix his signature to a pleading. This violation Is an act of falsehood which IS a ground for
disciplinary action.

The complainants did not present any evidence that Atty. Jarder was directly involved, had knowledge of, or even participated in the
wrongful practice of Atty. Bancolo in allowing or tolerating his secretary to sign pleadings for him. Thus, we agree with the finding of the
IBP Board that Atty. Jarder is not administratively liable.

In sum, we find that the suspension of Atty. Bancolo from the practice of law for one year is warranted. We also find proper the
dismissal of the case against Atty. larder.

WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the complaint against Atty. Janus T. larder for lack of merit.
We find respondent Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo administratively liable for violating Rule 9.01 of Canon 9 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. He is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one year effective upon finality of this Decision. He is warned
that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely.

Let a copy of this Decision be attached to respondent Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo's record in this Court as attorney. Further, let copies of
this Decision be furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator, which is directed to circulate
them to all the courts in the country for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.

.1wphi1.nt