Case 4:17-cv-00615-ALM Document 7 Filed 09/04/17 Page 1 of 14 PageID #: 2827

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
SHERMAN DIVISION

NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE

PLAYERS ASSOCIATION, on its own
Behalf and on behalf of EZEKIEL
ELLIOTT,

Petitioner,

v. No. 4:17-CV-00615-ALM

NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE and
NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE
MANAGEMENT COUNCIL,

Respondents.

RESPONDENTS MOTION TO DISMISS AND BRIEF IN SUPPORT

In an improper race to the courthouse, Petitioner National Football League Players

Association (the NFLPA) has defied binding precedent squarely foreclosing its premature suit.

This Court lacks jurisdiction and the NFLPA lacks standing to raise the claims or seek the relief

set forth in the Petition.

Rather than awaiting the completion of the pending arbitration proceeding and filing a

Federal Arbitration Act challenge in the United States court in and for the district wherein the

award was made, 9 U.S.C. 10here, the Southern District of New Yorkthe NFLPA asks

this Court to restrain a forthcoming award. But abundant and consistent Fifth Circuit

precedent confirms that federal courts lack power to vacate an award that has not yet been

made.

The NFLPA also lacks standing to seek a contingent order preemptively challenging an

award that clearly has not yet (and may never) cause it or Ezekiel Elliott any harm. And the

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NFLPAs claim is unripe to boot, as even the NFLPA acknowledges that the Arbitrators

forthcoming award could still afford the NFLPA all the relief it seeks.

The NFLPAs flagrant evasion of these fundamental jurisdictional limits is apparently

founded on the belief that, in a strategic attempt to obtain first-filed status, it is free to file a

placeholder complaintostensibly to be pursued if it is dissatisfied with the arbitration award,

and simply abandoned if it wins. The NFLPA makes this clear in its application for a TRO:

Although the Court need not act until the Award is issued, the NFLPA will satisfy the

requirements for preliminary injunctive relief should Elliotts appeal be denied. (ECF #5,

NFLPA Emergency Motion for Temporary Restraining Order or Preliminary Injunction (herein,

TRO Motion) at 1 (emphases added).) In other words, the NFLPA has moved for a TRO

while acknowledging that there is not yet any basis to award one. Needless to say, federal court

jurisdictionincluding the limits set forth in Article III of the U.S. Constitutionis not so easily

manipulated. There is no such thing as a placeholder complaint: Because the district court

must have jurisdiction at the commencement of the suit, the amendment process [for

pleadings] cannot be used to create jurisdiction retroactively where it did not previously exist.

United States ex rel. Jamison v. McKesson Corp., 649 F.3d 322, 328 (5th Cir. 2011) (formatting

modified; quoting Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Hillman, 796 F.2d 770, 775 (5th Cir. 1986)). Nor

can a party rely on events that unfolded after the filing of the complaint to establish its

standing. Kitty Hawk Aircargo, Inc. v. Chao, 418 F.3d 453, 458 (5th Cir. 2005).

Not only does the NFLPA concede it knows better, it has made precisely this argument in

almost identical litigation brought against the NFLPA. Late last year, the NFLPA criticized a

player for filing a federal lawsuit over his pending arbitration concerning his potential

discipline, arguing that he should have file[d] a petition to vacate the arbitration decision after

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it is issued rather than asking a Court to intrude upon an ongoing labor arbitration proceeding.

(Defendant National Football League Players Associations Position Statement [Corrected]

(herein, NFLPA Position Statement) at 6, Michael Pennel, Jr. v. NFLPA, No. 5:16-CV-02889-

JRA (N.D. Ohio Nov. 30, 2016, ECF #8) (emphasis in original).) The players lawsuit, the

NFLPA emphasized, asked the federal district court to prematurely and improperly invade the

labor and arbitral processes for which the NFL and NFLPA bargained. (Id.) (Of course, filing a

premature lawsuit lacking in subject matter jurisdiction is also a significant waste of the

Courtsand all partiestime and resources.)

The NFLPA was right the first time. After the award issuesand if it sustains Elliotts

suspension in whole or in parta federal district court with jurisdiction over an action by a party

with standing may consider whether the arbitration award should be vacated, modified, or

confirmed in a new suit filed at that time. But this Court plainly lacks jurisdiction to adjudicate

this petition to vacate the forthcoming award in this suitregardless of when the award comes

down. Because Plaintiffs cannot resuscitate jurisdiction based on events that unfolded after the

filing of the complaint, this Court lacks jurisdiction, the NFLPA lacks standing, and this Court

should immediately dismiss the Petition.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES FOR DECISION

The issue for decision is whether this Court has subject matter jurisdiction to decide

Petitioner NFLPAs Petition to Vacate. The NFLPA seeks vacatur of a forthcoming arbitration

award that has not yet issued. This Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the hypothetical

award (which is determined as of the commencement of the lawsuit), the NFLPA lacks standing

to seek vacatur of a hypothetical award, and any dispute over the hypothetical award is not ripe.

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BACKGROUND

On August 11, 2017, the NFL Commissioner suspended Elliott for six games for conduct

detrimental to the NFL in violation of Article 46 of the parties collective bargaining agreement

(CBA). (ECF #1, Petition to Vacate Arbitration Award (Pet.) 28.) Elliotts suspension

followed a year-long investigation into domestic violence allegations, which compiled

information from twenty-two NFL interviews, reviews of photographic and other documentary

evidence from law enforcement authorities, and opinions from two medical examiners, and

resulted in the issuance of a 164-page investigative report. (Pet. 33, 36.) The

Commissioners disciplinary decision found substantial and persuasive evidence that [Elliott]

engaged in physical violence against the victim, Tiffany Thompson, on at least three separate

occasions. (Id. 28.)

Elliott appealed pursuant to the CBAs collectively bargained internal grievance process.

(Id. 8.) By operation of the CBA, the suspension cannot go into effect until that process is

complete. (Id. 28.) Pursuant to those collectively bargained procedures, the NFL

Commissioner appointed a designee, Harold Henderson, to serve as Arbitrator. (Id. 27-28.)

The Arbitrator has authority under the CBA to affirm, reduce, or vacate Elliotts suspension.

(ECF #1-62, (Kessler Decl., Ex. A-NFLPA-58), Art. 46.) The Arbitrators appeal decision

known as an awardmust be rendered [a]s soon as practicable. (Id. Art. 46 2(d)). Once

issued, that award constitutes full, final and complete disposition of the dispute that is

binding on all parties, as well as the NFL Management Council (NFLMC) and the NFLPA.

(Id.) No further appeal or process is contemplated or permitted.

The NFLPAs appeal hearing lasted three days, from August 29 through 31. (Pet. 68.)

The NFLPA asked the Arbitrator to overturn [the suspension] because theres no credible

evidence. (ECF #2-13, Kessler Decl, Ex. C, Hearing Tr. (Day 1) at 77.). In the alternative, the

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NFLPA asked the Arbitrator to reduce Elliotts suspension on the grounds that the victims

conduct and behavior provoked Elliott and should be a mitigating factor. (Id. at 77-80.) Counsel

for the NFLMC argued that the six-game suspension should be affirmed.

On the same day the appeal hearing concludedbut before the Arbitrator issued his

awardthe NFLPA filed the instant suit seeking to vacate the forthcoming Arbitration

Award. (Pet. at 1.) The following day, the NFLPA filed an application for a Temporary

Restraining Order, which clarified that it actually seeks to vacate the forthcoming award only to

the extent it loses in arbitration: the NFLPA respectfully requests that the Court preliminarily

enjoin any suspension of Elliott affirmed by the Award[.] (TRO Motion at 15 (emphasis

added).) As of the time of this filing, no award has been issued.

ARGUMENT

I. THIS COURT SHOULD DISMISS THE PETITION FOR LACK OF SUBJECT

MATTER JURISDICTION

This Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this Petition: no statute provides

jurisdiction to review a hypothetical award, the NFLPA lacks standing to seek vacatur of a

hypothetical award, and a dispute over the hypothetical award is not ripe. Accordingly, this

Court should dismiss for lack of jurisdiction and failure to state a claim on which relief can be

granted. See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1), (6).

A. No Statute Grants Federal Jurisdiction To Review Forthcoming Awards.

Neither The Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), nor the Labor Management Relations Act

(LMRA), provides this Court with jurisdiction to review forthcoming arbitration awards.

1. The FAA permits parties to vacate arbitration awards that have been made. 9

U.S.C. 10. It does not permit parties to file placeholder petitions to vacate forthcoming,

hypothetical awards that do not yet exist.

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That commonsense conclusion follows from the FAAs text, which permits district courts

to vacat[e] the award in the district wherein the award was made. 9 U.S.C. 10 (emphasis

added). Thus, [b]y its own terms, 10 authorizes court action only after a final award is made

by the arbitrator. Folse v. Richard Wolf Med. Instruments Corp., 56 F.3d 603, 605 (5th Cir.

1995); see, e.g., Howard v. Volunteers of Am., 34 F. App'x 150, 2002 WL 493896, at *1 (5th Cir.

Mar. 11, 2002) ([W]e do not have jurisdiction to reach merits of 10 claim [b]ecause no final

award has been issued.); Michaels v. Mariforum Shipping, S.A., 624 F.2d 411, 414 (2d Cir.

1980) (district court is without authority to review the validity of arbitrators rulings prior to the

making of an award); Northland Truss Sys., Inc. v. Henning Const. Co., LLC, 808 F. Supp. 2d

1119, 1123-24 (S.D. Iowa 2011) (same; granting motion to dismiss).

The NFLPA concedes that there is no final award here, but rather merely a

forthcoming one. (See Pet. at 1 (defined term Award actually refers to forthcoming

arbitration award); id. (noting that award will be issued by Arbitrator Harold Henderson

imminently); TRO Motion at 1 (The NFLPA expects that on or before September 5, Arbitrator

Harold Henderson will issue an arbitral decision (the Award) . . . .); id. at 8 (The Award will

rest . . . .) (emphases added).) Where, as here, a petitioner concedes that there is no final

award, the FAA provides no relief. See Folse, 56 F.3d at 606 ([O]ur directive in this case is

clear: these facts do not permit us to intervene until the parties see this arbitration through to a

final award.). And because the amendment process [for pleadings] cannot be used to create

jurisdiction retroactively where it did not previously exist, Jamison, 649 F.3d at 328 (quotation

marks omitted), the NFLPA cannot cure this fatal jurisdictional defect by attempting to amend

after the award issues.

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The NFLPA seems to suggest that its petition should survive because it is challenging the

forthcoming award on fairness grounds. That argument, too, is squarely foreclosed by binding

precedent: Because objections to the nature of arbitral proceedings are for the arbitrator to

decide in the first instance, any [f]airness objections should generally be made to the arbitrator

subject only to limited post-arbitration judicial review as set forth in section 10 of the FAA.

Gulf Guar. Life Ins. Co. v. Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co., 304 F.3d 476, 487 (5th Cir. 2002) (quoting

Hooters of Am., Inc. v. Phillips, 173 F.3d 933, 94041 (4th Cir. 1999)). Simply put, there is no

authority under the FAA for a court to entertain such [fairness] challenges prior to issuance of

the arbitral award. Id. at 488.

2. Nor can the NFLPA sidestep the FAAs plain terms by seeking vacatur under Section

301 of the LMRA, 29 U.S.C. 185 (LMRA). The law is clear that [f]ederal courts lack

jurisdiction to decide cases alleging violations of a collective bargaining agreement under the

Labor Management Relations Act by an employee against his employer unless the employee has

exhausted contractual procedures for redress. Meredith v. Louisiana Fedn of Teachers, 209

F.3d 398, 402 (5th Cir. 2000) (emphasis added; citation omitted). Where, as here, an arbitration

procedure is the exclusive and final remedy for breach of the collective bargaining agreement,

the employee may not sue his employer under 301 until he has exhausted the procedure.

Daigle v. Gulf State Utilities Co., Local Union No. 2286, 794 F.2d 974, 977 (5th Cir. 1986).

Such a procedure is not exhausted until the arbitration award has become final and complete.

See Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 424 U.S. 554, 56263 (1976) ( Congress has specified

. . . that (f)inal adjustment by a method agreed upon by the parties is declared to be the desirable

method for settlement of grievance disputes, and that policy can only be effectuated if the

grievance procedure is given full play. (quotations omitted)); see, e.g., Johnson v. Ceres Gulf,

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Inc., No. 4:13-CV-1851, 2015 WL 1518955, at *2 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 31, 2015) (It is undisputed

that Johnson did not complete the arbitration procedure pursuant to the CBA and that she has not

exhausted her administrative remedies.). Yet the NFLPA filed this lawsuit despite admitting

that it has failed to fully exhaust Article 46s exclusive grievance procedures.

The NFLPA can hardly claim to be unaware of this finality requirement. Barely nine

months ago, the NFLPA criticized a plaintiff who filed an action challenging the pending

arbitration concerning his potential discipline on the ground that he was seek[ing] to stop the

arbitration appeal process in its tracks. (NFLPA Position Statement at 6.) The NFLPA

continued:

The normal course would be for Plaintiff to file a petition to vacate the arbitration
decision after it is issued rather than asking a Court to intrude upon an ongoing
labor arbitration proceeding. *** Plaintiff asks this Court to prematurely and
improperly invade the labor and arbitral processes for which the NFL and
NFLPA bargained.

Id. (first emphasis in original). Those words are just as true today as when the NFLPA wrote

them last year. By asking this Court to intrude upon an ongoing labor arbitration proceeding,

the NFLPA is now the one improperly invading the parties collective bargaining agreement

and flouting Fifth Circuit precedent in the process. This action should be dismissed immediately.

B. The NFLPA Lacks Standing To Vacate A Hypothetical Award.

The NFLPA lacks standing to challenge the forthcoming award regardless. The

Constitutions cases and controversies restriction requires any party invoking federal

jurisdiction to demonstrate standingi.e., the personal interest that must exist at the

commencement of the litigation. Davis v. FEC, 554 U.S. 724, 732 (2008) (emphasis added;

quotation omitted); see Mollan v. Torrance, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 537, 539 (1824) (jurisdiction

depends upon the state of things at the time of the action brought). In Lujan v. Defenders of

Wildlife, the Supreme Court explained that demonstrating the irreducible constitutional

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minimum of standing requires a plaintiff to show an injury in fact that is fairly traceable to

the defendants actions, and that will likely . . . be redressed by a favorable decision. 504 U.S.

555, 560-61 (1992) (citations and quotation marks omitted). Moreover, each plaintiff must

demonstrate standing for each claim he seeks to press and for each form of relief that is sought.

Davis, 554 U.S. at 734 (quotation marks omitted).

Here, the NFLPA brings only one claim and seeks only one form of relief: vacatur of the

forthcoming award under 9 U.S.C. 10. (See Pet. 85-87 (Prayer for Relief).) But the NFLPA

lacks standing to seek that form of relief. Under the parties CBA, Elliotts suspension is

enjoined until after an award is issued. Until then, the NFLPA and Elliott have suffered no injury

whatsoevernever mind one traceable to a phantom award that has yet to be issued. Nor could

any decision of this court redress that supposed injury, considering there is no award to vacate.

Because the NFLPA lacks standing, its lone claim, and lone request for relief, must be dismissed.

See Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2661 (2013) (Article III demands that an actual

controversy persist throughout all stages of litigation.).

Perhaps recognizing this deficiency, the NFLPA emphasizes that it expects the award

to issue imminently and therefore the Court need not act until the award is issued. (TRO

Motion at 1.) The NFLPA, in other words, has demanded a TRO before there is anything for the

Court to enjoin. But the issuance of the award in the future is irrelevant to whether the NFLPA

has standing now. Because standing is determined as of the commencement of the suit, the

party invoking the jurisdiction of the court cannot rely on events that unfolded after the filing of

the complaint to establish its standing. Kitty Hawk, 418 F.3d at 458 (emphasis added). As the

Fifth Circuit and others have squarely held, alleged injuries that occur for the first time after a

complaint was filed simply have no bearing on the standing inquiry. See id. at 459-60 (because

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the contract had not yet been terminated when Kitty Hawk filed this suit and Kitty Hawk had

not assumed liability for any back pay, Kitty Hawks assumption of the Postal Services

liability for back pay is not relevant to the standing analysis (emphasis added)); see, e.g.,

Yamada v. Snipes, 786 F.3d 1182, 1203, 1203 (9th Cir. 2015) (rejecting plaintiffs argument

that it now has standing after a change in law because [s]tanding is determined as of the

commencement of litigation (alteration in original)); Utah Assn of Counties v. Bush, 455 F.3d

1094, 1101 (10th Cir. 2006) (noting glaring problem that alleged injury could not have

occurred until after the time th[is] action [wa]s brought (alterations in original)); Park v.

Forest Serv. of U.S., 205 F.3d 1034, 1037 (8th Cir. 2000) (events occurring after plaintiff filed

her original complaint not relevant on the issue of standing to seek injunction); Perry v.

Village of Arlington Heights, 186 F.3d 826, 830 (7th Cir. 1999) (It is not enough for Perry to

attempt to satisfy the requirements of standing as the case progresses. The requirements of

standing must be satisfied from the outset and in this case, they were not.).

Once a final award issues, and if it actually affirms Elliotts suspension as the NFLPA

expects, the NFLPA could try again to petition to vacate the awardjust as Respondents may

petition to confirm it. See Yamada, 786 F.3d at 1204 & n.15 (Nothing we say today . . .

precludes [plaintiff] from bringing a future challenge given plaintiffs argument that it now has

standing.). As a matter of law, however, the NFLPA cannot cure the fatal standing defect that

currently exists based on events that post-date its Petition. See Camsoft Data Sys v. S. Elecs.

Supply, Inc., 756 F.3d 327, 337 (5th Cir. 2014) (Although 28 U.S.C. 1653 and [Rule] 15(a)

allow amendments to cure defective jurisdictional allegations, these rules do not permit the

creation of jurisdiction when none existed at the time the original complaint was filed[.])

(quoting Arena v. Graybar Elec. Co., Inc., 669 F.3d 214, 218 (5th Cir. 2012)).

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C. The Petition To Vacate A Hypothetical Award Is Not Ripe.

Even if the NFLPA could surmount the foregoing hurdles, its claims are not ripe. Like

standing, [r]ipeness is a component of subject matter jurisdiction, because a court has no power

to decide disputes that are not yet justiciable. Lopez v. City of Houston, 617 F.3d 336, 341 (5th

Cir. 2010); see Miss. State Democratic Party v. Barbour, 529 F.3d 538, 545 (5th Cir. 2008)

(ripeness overlaps with standing); LeClerc v. Webb, 419 F.3d 405, 413 (5th Cir. 2005)

(Standing and ripeness are two doctrines of justiciability that assure federal courts will only

decide Article III cases or controversies.). Ripeness prevents premature adjudication by

distinguishing matters that are hypothetical or speculative from those that are poised for

judicial review. LeClerc, 419 F.3d at 41314.

To determine whether claims are ripe, [courts] evaluate (1) the fitness of the issues for

judicial resolution, and (2) the potential hardship to the parties caused by declining court

consideration. Lopez, 617 F.3d at 341. The NFLPA cannot satisfy either prong.

First, the issues before the Court are obviously not yet fit for judicial resolution. It is

well-settled that [a] court should dismiss a case for lack of ripeness when the case is abstract

or hypothetical. Monk v. Huston, 340 F.3d 279, 282 (5th Cir. 2003) (quoting New Orleans Pub.

Serv., Inc. v. Council of New Orleans, 833 F.2d 583, 586 (5th Cir. 1987)). The NFLPA freely

admits that its suit is based on hypothetical eventsits position is that the Court will have some

role at some unknown time in the future if certain contingent events occur. The NFLPA

expects that a decision will come down soon, and further expects that it will prevent

Ezekiel Elliott from participating in League games or practices. (TRO Motion at 1.) It

emphasizes that there is a threat of a suspension if the Arbitrator does not rule in its favor. (Id.

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at 7-8.) And it points out that if Elliotts suspension is sustained by the award, it will have

devastating effects on the NFLPA and Elliott. (Pet. 69.)

Yet during the underlying arbitration proceeding, the NFLPA urged the Arbitrator to

overturn [the suspension] because theres no credible evidence. (ECF #2-13 (Kessler Decl,

Ex. C, Hearing Tr. (Day 1) at 77).) The NFLPA participated in the arbitration and urged the

Arbitrator to rule on the evidence before him. Indeed, the NFLPA argued that the Arbitrator

should reduce or vacate Elliotts discipline based on the very same procedural and fairness

claims made here. (See, e g., ECF #2-13 (Kessler Decl, Ex. C, Hearing Tr. (Day 2) at 364-76).)

The Arbitrator has taken the NFLPAs request for relief under advisement. Accordingly, it is

plainly hypothetical and speculativenot to mention an utter waste of judicial resources

for this Court to adjudicate whether to vacate a hypothetical award that might still grant the

NFLPA the very relief it sought in arbitration. If the purported injury is contingent [on] future

events that may not occur as anticipated, or indeed may not occur at all, the claim is not ripe for

adjudication. Lopez, 617 F.3d at 34142 (quoting Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co.,

473 U.S. 568, 58081 (1985)). That the NFLPA still does not (and cannot) know whether its

claims in arbitration will prevailor whether Elliotts suspension will occur at allconfirms

that its claims are unripe. See Dealer Comp. Servs., Inc. v. Dub Herring Ford, 547 F.3d 558, 562

(6th Cir. 2008) (holding petition to vacate interlocutory ruling unripe given uncertainty as to

anticipated final ruling by arbitration panel, as relief sought was anchored in future events that

may not occur as anticipated, or at all (quotation omitted)); Camsoft Data Sys, 756 F.3d at 336

(no jurisdiction over inventorship dispute before patent issues because we are unable to

establish jurisdiction based on the theory that a disputed pending patent might eventually ripen

into a patent controversy that Congress has authorized the federal courts to adjudicate).

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Second, given that the suspension cannot go into effect until the award issues, the NFLPA

and Elliott will suffer no hardship if this Court merely awaits the final award. Indeed, the

NFLPA concedes this point. (See TRO Motion at 1 (because the award will not inflict harm

unless it affirms suspension, the Court need not act until the Award is issued).) After all, the

NFLPA does not truly seek to vacate the award; it seeks to vacate the award if it loses in

arbitration. Thus, the NFLPA asks the Court to enjoin any suspension of Elliott [that is]

affirmed by the Award. (TRO Motion at 15; see also Pet. 9 (the NFLPA will file a motion

for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction to be decided before any suspension

of Elliott can go into effect).)

Once the award issuesand if it harms the NFLPA and Elliottthey may attempt to seek

relief by filing a new action at that time. Until then, the NFLPA cannot graft a provision for

interlocutory judicial review onto the otherwise straight-forward regime contemplated by the

FAA[.] Savers Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburg, PA, 748 F.3d

708, 722 (6th Cir. 2014). Saving all judicial review until a final award issues is consistent with

the structure of the [FAA] and with the strong federal policy favoring arbitration as an alternative

means of dispute resolution. Benihana, Inc. v. Benihana of Tokyo, LLC, 784 F.3d 887, 900 (2d

Cir. 2015) (quotations omitted). By contrast, the NFLPAs concededly premature filing, which

seeks interlocutory relief contingent on the possibility that the Arbitrator does not grant the

NFLPA all the relief it seeks, is foreign both to the FAA and LMRA and to the strong federal

policies those laws embody.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Petition to Vacate should be dismissed.

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Respectfully submitted,

AKIN GUMP STRAUSS HAUER & FELD

LLP

/s/ Eric Gambrell

Eric Gambrell
egambrell@akingump.com
Texas Bar No. 00790735
Lead Attorney
Patrick G. OBrien
pobrien@akingump.com
Texas Bar No. 24046541
1700 Pacific Avenue, Suite 4100
Dallas, TX 75201
Telephone: (214) 969-2800
Facsimile: (214) 969-4343

Daniel L. Nash
Pro hac vice application pending
dnash@akingump.com
Nathan J. Oleson
Pro hac vice application pending
noleson@akingump.com
1333 New Hampshire Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20036
Telephone: (202) 887-4000
Facsimile: (202) 887-4288

ATTORNEYS FOR RESPONDENTS

NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE and
NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE
MANAGEMENT COUNCIL

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on this 4th day of September, 2017, I electronically filed the
foregoing document with the clerk of the court for the U.S. District Court, Eastern District of
Texas, using the electronic case filing system of the court. The electronic case filing system sent
a Notice of Electronic Filing to the attorneys of record in this case who have consented in
writing to accept this Notice as service of this document by electronic means.

/s/ Eric Gambrell

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