G.R. No. 200773, July 08, 2015 - REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. ANGELINE L.

DAYAOEN,
AGUST1NA TAUEL, AND LAWANA T. BATCAGAN, Respondents.

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 200773, July 08, 2015

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. ANGELINE L. DAYAOEN, AGUST1NA TAUEL,****AND

LAWANA T. BATCAGAN, Respondents.

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

This Petition for Review on Certiorari1 seeks to set aside the February 23, 2012 Decision2 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 92584 affirming the September 11, 2008 Amended Decision3 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of La Trinidad, Benguet, Branch 63 in LRC Case No. 03-LRC-0024.

Factual Antecedents

As (determined by the appellate court, the facts are as follows:c hanRoblesv irtual Lawlib rary

Appellees Angeline Dayaoen (Angeline), Agustina Taule (Agustina) and Lawana Batcagan4 (Lawana) filed
an Application for Registration5 of three parcels of land located in Barangay Tabangaoen, La Trinidad,
Benguet, described as Lots 1, 6 and 7, each with an area of 994 square meters, 390 sq. m., and 250 sq. m.
respectively, or, a total of 1,634 sq. m. under Survey Plan Psu-1-002413.6 chanrob leslaw

The subject parcels of land were originally owned and possessed since pre-war time by Antonio Pablo
(Antonio), the grandfather of Dado Pablo (Dado), husband of appellee Angeline. In 1963, Antonio gave the
parcels of land in question to appellee Angeline and Dado as a wedding gift. From that time on, they
continuously occupied and possessed the properties. In 1976 and 1977, appellee Angeline sold Lots 6 and 7
to co-appellees Agustina and Lawana, pursuant to an Affidavit of Quitclaim and a Deed of Absolute Sale of a
Portion of Unregistered Land, respectively. Since 12 June 1945, appellees and their predecessor-in-interest
have been in public, open, exclusive, uninterrupted and continuous possession thereof in the concept of an
owner. Appellees declared the questioned properties for taxation purposes. There was no mortgage or
encumbrance of any kind whatsoever affecting the said parcels of land. Neither did any other person have
an interest therein, legal or equitable, or was in possession thereof.

On the scheduled initial hearing, appellees adduced pieces of documentary evidence to comply with the
jurisdictional requirements of notices, posting and publication. Appellee Angeline testified on the continuous,
open, public and exclusive possession of the lands in dispute.

Trial on the merits ensued. In a Decision7 dated 6 November 2007, the court a quo granted appellees'
application for registration. Unflinching, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) moved for reconsideration
but failed to attain favorable relief as its Motion was denied by the court a quo in its Order dated 11
September 2008. On even date, the court a quo rendered the assailed Amended Decision finding appellees
to have the registrable title over the subject properties.8
LRC Case No. N-453

Previously, or in 1979, herein respondents Angeline, Agustina and Lawana filed a similar application for
registration of the herein subject property which was docketed as LRC Case No. N-453 before the RTC La
Trinidad, Branch 8. The Republic opposed the application. After trial on the merits, a Decision9dated
December 26, 1994 was rendered dismissing the application on the ground that respondents failed to prove
that they or their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession of the subject property under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier.
Respondents did not appeal the said Decision; thus, it became final and executory.

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court in LRC Case No. 03-LRC-0024

The September 11, 2008 Amended Decision in LRC Case No. 03-LRC-0024 held as follows: c hanRoblesv irtual Lawlib rary

Well settled is the rule that the burden of proof in land registration cases is incumbent on the applicant who
must show that he is the real and absolute owner in fee simple of the land being applied for. x x x The
applicant must present specific acts of ownership to substantiate the claim and cannot just offer general
statements which are more conclusion of law than factual evidence of possession. Simply put, facts
constituting possession must be duly established by competent evidence, x x x

However, given the foregoing facts, as borne out by competent, reliable, concrete, and undisputed evidence,
the Court cannot conceive of any better proof of applicants' adverse, continuous, open, public, peaceful,
uninterrupted and exclusive possession and occupation in concept of owners. The Court finds and concludes
that the applicants have abundantly shown the specific acts that would show such nature of their
possession. In view of the totality of facts obtaining in evidence on record, the applicants had ably complied
with the burden of proof required of them by law. The Court holds that the established facts are sufficient
proof to overcome the presumption that the lots sought to be registered form part of the; public domain.
Hence, they have fully discharged to the satisfaction of the Court their burden in this proceeding.

Moreover, the Court is mindful of what the Supreme Court said in Director of Lands v. Funtillar x x x that
"The attempts of humble people to have disposable lands they have been tilling for generations titled in their
names should not only be viewed with an understanding attitude but should, as a matter of policy, be
encouraged." For this reason, the Supreme Court limited the strict application of the rule stated in Heirs
ofAmunategui v. Director of Forestry, x x x, that "In confirmation of imperfect title cases, the applicant
shoulders the burden of proving that he meets the requirements of Section 48, Commonwealth Act No. 141,
as amended by Republic Act 1942. He must overcome the presumption that the land he is applying for is
part of the public domain but that he has an interest therein sufficient to warrant registration in his name
because of an imperfect title such as those derived from old Spanish grants or that he has had continuous,
open and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain under a bonafide
claim of acquisition of ownership for at least thirty (30) years preceding the filing of his application." Thus, in
Director of Lands v. Funtillar, the Supreme Court liberalized the aforecited rule and stated: chanRoblesv irt ual Lawlib rary

The Regalian doctrine which forms the basis of our land laws and, in fact all laws governing natural
resources is a revered and long standing principle. It must, however, be applied together with the
constitutional provisions on social justice and land reform and must be interpreted in a way as to avoid
manifest unfairness and injustice.

Every application for a concession of public land has to be viewed in the light of its peculiar circumstances. A
strict application of the Heirs of Amunategui vs. Director of Forestry (126 SCRA 69) ruling is warranted
whenever a portion of the public domain is in danger of ruthless exploitation, fraudulent titling, or other
questionable practices. But when an application appears to enhance the very reasons behind the enactment
of Act 496, as amended, or the Land Registration Act, and Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, or the
Public Land Act, then their provisions should not be made to stand in the way of their own
implementation. chan roble svi rtual lawlib rary

In the present case, there is no showing that any "portion of the public domain is in danger of ruthless
exploitation, fraudulent titling, or other questionable practices." Instead, it is very evident from applicants'
mass of undisputed evidence that the present application will enhance social justice considerations behind
the Public Land Law and the Land Registration Act, in the light of the incontrovertible fact that applicant
Angeline Dayaoen and her three (3) children have long established their residential houses on the land
subject of the application, which is "the policy of the State to encourage and promote the distribution of
alienable public lands as a spur to economic growth and in line with the social justice ideal enshrined in the
Constitution" (Republic vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-62680, November 9, 1988).

In the case at bar, the tracing cloth (Diazo Polyester film) of the approved survey plan of the land embracing
the lots subject of the application was adduced in evidence as Exhibit "H" for the applicants. At its lower left
hand corner is a certification. It states in part: "x x x. This Survey is inside the alienable and disposable
areas per Proc. No. 209, Lot-A. The land herein described is outside any military or civil reservations. x x x"
Aside from this certification, it is further certified by Geronimo B. Fernandez, in his capacity as Supervising
Geodetic Engineer I, "that this survey is outside the Mountain State Agricultural College and it is within the
Proclamation No. 209, Lot-A." Further scrutiny of the tracing cloth plan also reveals that the survey plan was
approved by Regional Director Sulpicio A. Taeza "For the Director of Lands."

The Court takes judicial notice of Proclamation No. 20910 Issued by then President Ramon Magsaysay on
October 20, 1955. It provides: chanRob lesvi rtual Lawli bra ry

"Upon recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and pursuant to the provisions
of Sections 83 and 89 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, I, RAMON MAGSAYSAY, President of the
Philippines do hereby exclude from the operation of Proclamation Nos. 99, 64, 39, 102 and 698, series of
1914, 1919, 1920, 1927 and 1934, respectively, and declare the parcel or parcels of land embraced therein
or portions thereof situated in the Municipality of La Trinidad, Sub-province of Benguet, Mountain Province,
open to disposition under the provisions of the Public Land Act, to wit: x x x"
Lot A, mentioned in the aforestated certifications in the tracing cloth of the approved survey plan (Exh. "H"),
is one of the three (3) lots described in the aforecited Presidential Proclamation No. 209 opened to
"disposition under the provisions of the Public Land Act."

The categorical statement of facts in the tracing cloth of the approved survey plan (Exh. "H"), in conjunction
with the aforecited Proclamation No. 209, support the certification that the land subject of the survey is
alienable and disposable. The certifications therein attesting that the land, which embraced Lots 1, 6 and 7
subject of the present application, is outside the Mountain State Agricultural College reservation, that it is
within the Proclamation No. 209, Lot-A; that the land is alienable and disposable - pursuant to the
Proclamation No. 209, Lot-A, and that it is outside any military or civil reservations. [This] statement of
facts in the certifications in the tracing cloth of the approved survey plan sufficiently contain all the essential
factual and legal bases for any certification that may be issued by the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources that the lots subject of the present application are indeed alienable and disposable. More
importantly, the tracing cloth of the approved survey plan was approved by Regional Director Sulpicio A.
Taeza "For the Director of Lands." As such, the aforecited certifications in the tracing cloth of the approved
survey plan carry not only his imprimatur but also that of the Director of Lands for whom he was acting.
Thus, the approval of the survey plan was in effect the act of the Director of Lands. Necessarily, the
certifications in the approved survey plan were [those] of the Director of Lands, not only of the Supervising
Geodetic Engineer I and Regional Director Sulpicio A. Taeza. Under Commonwealth Act No. 141, the Director
of Lands is empowered to issue the approved survey plan and to certify that the land subject thereof is
alienable and disposable (Exh. "H") xxx. The law states the powers of the Director of Lands, as follows: chanRoblesvi rtua lLaw lib rary

Sec. 3. The Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce shall be the executive officer charged with carrying out
the provisions of this Act through the Director of Lands, who shall act under his immediate control.

Sec. 4. Subject to said control, the Director of Lands shall have direct executive control of the survey,
classifications, lease, sale or any other form of concession or disposition and management of the lands of
the public domain, and his decisions as to questions of fact shall be conclusive when approved by the
Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce.

Sec. 5. The Director of Lands, with the approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce shall prepare
and issue such forms, instructions, rules, and regulations consistent with this Act, as may be necessary and
proper to carry into effect the provisions thereof and for the conduct of proceedings arising under such
provisions.chan rob lesvi rtual lawlib rary

Therefore, to require another certification to be issued by the Director of Lands attesting to same facts
already certified in the tracing cloth of the approved survey plan that the lots subject of the present
application for registration of titles are alienable and disposable is a needless ceremony, a pure act of
supererogation.

It is clear, therefore, that the applicants have satisfactorily complied with their burden of proving "that the
land subject of an application for registration is alienable" considering that they have established "the
existence of a positive act of the government such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order, an
administrative action, investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators, and a legislative act or
statute." The certifications categorically cited Proclamation No. 209, Lot-A, as the basis in attesting that the
land, which is the subject of the survey and present application, is alienable and disposable because it is
inside Lot A opened by the presidential proclamation "to disposition under the provisions of the Public Land
Act."

The Court finds it significant that the State has not adduced any evidence, in spite of the fact that it has all
the records, resources, and power in its command, to show that the lots subject of the present application
are not alienable and disposable part of the public domain. Having failed to refute the evidence on the very
face of the tracing cloth of the approved survey plan (Exh. "H"), which is a public document and part of a
public record, the presumption that the certifications therein contained, attesting that the lots subject of the
present application for registration are alienable and disposable, are true and correct have attained the
status of concrete facts.

Hence, the Court now turns to resolve the sole issue of whether or not [sic] the herein applicants are
entitled to the confirmation of their titles to the lots subject of their present application.

It has been well established that since pre-war Antonio Pablo had been in possession and occupation of the
land (TSN, Oct. 19, 2005), which is corroborated by evidence that when the land was verbally given to
applicant Angeline Dayaoen and Dado Dayaoen as a wedding gift, the old man Antonio Pablo had already an
old hut thereon (TSN. May 29, 1984, p. 14) where the spouses stayed after their marriage (TSN, Oct. 19,
2005, p. 9), and there were already on the land some fruit trees, and some other plants, consisting of
guavas and avocados already bearing fruits, which he had planted thereon (TSN, May 29, 1984, pp. 12-14).
The anterior possession and occupation of Ajitonio Pablo of the land since pre-war should be tacked to the
possession and occupation of applicant Angeline Dayaoen, and the latter's possession and occupation, in
turn, is tacked to the present possession and occupation of her co-applicants, who acquired titles from her.
Consequently, the applicants are entitled to the benefits of Sec. 48(b) of C.A. 141, as amended by R.A.
1942, which provides as follows: chanRoble svirtual Lawlib ra ry

"Sec. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or
claiming to own such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed,
may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their
claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor under the Land Registration Act, to wit: ChanRobles Virtualawl ibra ry

xxxx

(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona
fide claim of acquisition of ownership, for at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the
application for confirmation of title, except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be
conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a government grant and shall be
entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter."
This section was amended by Presidential Decree No. 1073, which took effect on January 25, 1977 (Republic
vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 48327, August 21,1991). Section 4 thereof provides: cha nRobles virtua lLawl ibra ry

Sec. 4. The provisions of Section 48(b) and Section 48(c), Chapter VIII of the Public Land Act are hereby
amended in the sense that these provisions shall apply only to alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain which have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation by the
applicant himself or thru his predecessor-in-interest, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership,
since June 12, 1945
In the present case, it will be recalled that Antonio Pablo commenced possession and occupation of the land
subject of the application for confirmation of title since before the Second World War. Thus, applicant
Angeline Dayaoen was already in possession and occupation of the land under bona fide claim of acquisition
of ownership for more than thirty (30) years, including the anterior possession and occupation of Antonio
Pablo, when P.D. 1073 amended Sec. 48(b) if C.A. 141, as amended by R.A. 1942. Applicant Angeline
Dayaoen already acquired vested right of ownership over the land and, therefore, already excluded from the
public domain, as it was already a private property over which applicant Angeline Dayaoen has a
confirmable title. Republic vs. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 48327, August 21,1991) held: c hanRoblesv irtual Lawlib rary

It is important to note that private respondents' application for judicial confirmation of their imperfect title
was filed in 1970 and that the land registration court rendered its decision confirming their long-continued
possession of the lands here involved in 1974, that is, during the time when Section 48(c) was in legal
effect. Private respondents' imperfect title was, in other words, perfected or vested by the completion of the
required period of possession prior to the issuance of P.D. No. 1073. Private respondents' right in respect of
the land they had possessed for thirty (30) years could not be divested by P.D. No. 1073. chanro blesvi rt uallawli bra ry

Even if Sec. 48(b) of C.A. 141 is applied in the present case in its textual form as amended by P.D. 1073,
still the present applicants are qualified thereunder to have their titles confirmed. They have already been in
possession and occupation of the lots subject of their application for confirmation of titles under bona fide
claim of acquisition of ownership for more than thirty (30) years since before the Second World War (or
before June 12, 1945) considering that the possession and occupation of x x x Antonio Pablo, the
predecessor-in-interest of the present applicants, should be tacked to their possession and occupation.
Consequently, applicant Angeline Dayaoen had a vested right over the lots subject of the present application
when she conveyed, transferred and delivered Lots 6 and 7, respectively, to her co-applicants.
Under Article 541 of the New Civil Code, which squarely applies to applicants' present application, "A
possessor in the concept of owner has in his favor the legal presumption that he possesses with a just title
and he cannot be obliged to show or prove it." Clearly, therefore, since the applicant Angeline Dayaoen and
her predecessor, Antonio Pablo, have been in continuous and uninterrupted possession of the land since
before the Second World War and have been exercising acts of ownership thereon, it is incumbent upon the
State, and not the applicants, to show that the land still forms part of the public domain. The State has
utterly failed to overcome the presumption with the sole testimony of Irene Leano Caayas, which the Court
does not even accord any weight and credence.

The tax declaration of applicant Angeline Dayaoen and religious payment of real property taxes lend strong
corroboration to the evidence of the applicants. It is the established jurisprudence that "While it is true that
by themselves tax receipts and declarations of ownership for taxation purposes are not incontrovertible
evidence of ownership they become strong evidence of ownership acquired by prescription when
accompanied by proof of actual possession of the property" (Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 131 SCRA 533).
In the present application, it has been concretely and [indisputably] established that applicant Angeline
Dayaoen and her predecessor Antonio Pablo have been in actual and continuous possession of the parcel of
land embracing the lots subject of the present application.

In fine, therefore, the present applicants are entitled to have their titles confirmed under Section 14(1) of
Presidential Decree No. 1529. The Court concludes that the applicants have indeed confirmable and
registrable titles over the lots subject of the instant application for confirmation of titles pursuant to either
Sec. 48(b) of C.A. 141, as amended by R.A. 1942, or Sec. 48(c) of C.A. 141, as amended by R.A. 1942 and
P.D. 1073.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered GRANTING the herein Application for
Registration of the parcels of land described as follows: c hanRoble s virtua lLawl ibra ry

Lot 1, Psu-1-002413, in the name of ANGELINE L. DAYAOEN, particularly described as a parcel of land (Lot
1, Psu-1-002413) situated at Brgy. of Tabangaoen, Mun. of La Trinidad, Prov. of Benguet, Island of Luzon.
Bounded on the NW., along line 1-2 by an alley (2.00m. wide); on the NE., along line 2-3 by Morris Leano;
on the SE., along line 3-4 by lot 2 of the plan; on the SW., along line 4-1 by Mt. State Agricultural College,
T.C.T. #7179; Beginning at a point marked "1" on plan being S. 63 deg. 59'E., 1391.52 m. from Tri. Sta,
"TRINIDAD", La Trinidad, Benguet, thence: chanRoblesvi rtua lLaw lib rary

N. 45 deg. 18'E., 27.25m. to point 2;

S. 40 deg. 37'E., 33.18m. to point 3;
S. 54 deg. 05'W., 37.44m. to point 4;
N. 20 deg. 50'W., 29.94m. to point of beginning. cha nrob lesvi rtua llawlib ra ry

Containing an area of NINE HUNDRED NINETY FOUR (994) SQ. METERS, more or less.

Lot 6, Psu-1-002413, in the name of AGUSTFNA TAULE, particularly described as a parcel of land (Lot 6,
Psu-1-002413) situated at Brgy. of Tabangaoen, Mun. of La Trinidad, Prov. of Benguet, Island of Luzon.
Bounded on the SW., along line 1-2 by Mt. State Agricultural College, T.C.T. # 7179; on the NE., along line
2-3 by Morris Leano; on the NE., along line 3-4 by Psu-1-000485; on the SE., along line 4-1 by lot 7 of the
plan,. Beginning at a point marked "1" on plan being S. 64 deg. 20'E. 1382.57m. from Tri. "TRINIDAD", La
Trinidad, Benguet, thence: chanRoblesvi rtu alLawli bra ry

N. 20 deg. 50'W., 47.27m. to point 2;

S. 45 deg. 15'E., 16.02m. to point 3;
S. 43 deg. 38'E., 24.91m. to point 4;
S. 38 deg. 20'W., 18.96m. to point of beginning. cha nrob lesvi rtua llawlib ra ry

Containing an area of THREE HUNDRED NINETY (390) SQ. METERS, more or less.

Lot 7, Psu-1-002413, in the name of LAWANA T. BATCAGAN, particularly described as a parcel of land (Lot
7, Psu-1-002413) situated at Brgy. of Tabangaoen, Mun. of La Trinidad, Prov. of Benguet, Island of Luzon.
Bounded on the NW, along line 1-2 by Psu-1-000485; on the NE., along line 2-3 by Morris Leano; on the
SE., along line 3-4 by an alley (2.00 m. wide); on the SW., along line 4-5 by Mt. State Agricultural College,
T.C.T. #7179; on the NW., along line 5-1 by lot 6 of the plan. Beginning at a point marked "1" on plan being
S. 65 deg. 02'E., 1385.03 m. from Tri. "TRINIDAD", La Trinidad, Benguet, thence: chanRoblesv irt ual Lawlib ra ry

N. 62 deg. 02'E., 3.1 lm. to point 2;

S. 47 deg. 13'E., 10.58m. to point 3;
S. 44 deg. 47'W., 26.43m. to point 4;
N. 20 deg. 50'W., 10.29m. to point 5;
N. 38 deg. 20'E., 18.96m. to point of beginning. cha nrob lesvi rtua llawlib ra ry

Containing an area of TWO HUNDRED FIFTY (250) SQ. METERS, more or less. chanro blesvi rt uallawli bra ry

The decree of registration shall be issued upon attainment by this judgment of its finality.

This Amended Decision supersedes the Decision earlier rendered by the court.

SO ORDERED.11
Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Petitioner filed an appeal with the CA, which was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 92584. Petitioner essentially
argued that the La Trinidad RTC erred in granting respondents' application for registration since they failed
to prove that the subject property constitutes alienable and disposable land; that the annotation on the
survey plan that the subject property is alienable and disposable is not sufficient; and that respondents
failed to prove open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the subject property.

On February 23,2012, the CA rendered the assailed Decision affirming the September 11, 2008 Amended
Decision of the La Trinidad RTC, pronouncing thus: chanRoblesvirt ual Lawlib rary

The Appeal bears no merit.

Appellant Republic asseverates that appellees12 failed to comply with the legal requirement of open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the lands applied for since 12 June 1945
or earlier as required under Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1529.13 cralawred

Appellant's asseveration does not hold sway.

Section 14(1) of PD No. 1529 provides: ChanRob les Vi rtualaw lib rary

"Sec. 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance x x x an
application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized
representatives:

(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have

been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under
a bona fide claim of ownership since <B>June 12, 1945, or
earlier</B>."
By the same token, Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act (CA) No. 14114 which took effect [in] November
1936, amended by Section 4 PD No. 1073, provides: chanRoblesv irt ual Lawlib rary

"Sec. 4. The provisions of Section 48(b) and Section 48(c), Chapter VIII of the Public Land Act are hereby
amended in the sense that these provisions shall apply only to alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain which have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation by the
applicant himself or thru his predecessor-in-interest, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of
ownership, since June 12, 1945."
The proceedings under the Property Registration Decree (P.D. No. 1529), and Section 48 of the Public Land
Act (C.A. No. 141 as amended by P.D. No. 1073), are the same in that both are against the whole world,
both take the nature of judicial proceedings, and both the decree of registration issued is conclusive and
final. Both proceedings are likewise governed by the same court procedure and law of evidence.

There are three obvious requisites for the filing of an application for registration of title under Section 14 (1)
- that the property in question is alienable and disposable land of the public domain; that the applicants by
themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in continuous, open, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation, and; that such possession is under a bona fide claim of ownership since June
12,1945 or earlier.

Withal, appellees must present specific acts of ownership to substantiate their claim and they cannot just
offer general statements which are mere conclusions of law than factual evidence of possession.
Jurisprudence dictates that a person who seeks confirmation of imperfect or incomplete title to a piece of
land on the basis of possession by himself and his predecessors-in-interest shoulders the burden of proving
by clear and convincing evidence compliance with the requirements of Section 48(b) of C.A. No. 141, as
amended.

Parenthetically, case law teaches us that the determination of whether claimants were in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession under a bona fide claim of ownership since 1945 as required by law, is a
question of fact. Here, We find no cogent reason to deviate from the conclusion of the court a quo that
appellees have the registrable right owing to their and their predecessor-in-interest continuous possession of
the subject parcels of land. The foundation of such conclusion is primarily factual. Findings of fact of the trial
court are conclusive when supported by substantial evidence on record.

Contrary to appellant's thesis, appellees were able to prove by convincing evidence that they and their
predecessor-in-interest have been in continuous, open, exclusive and notorious possession over the subject
properties since 12 June 1945 or earlier. Appellee Angeline had personal knowledge that her predecessor-in-
interest, Antonio, owned and possessed them from pre-war time. She and her husband Dado, tilled and
cultivated the lands in question since 19621 when it was given to them by Antonio as a wedding gift. This
was corroborated by co-appellee Lawana who was a co-employee of Antonio in 1961 at the Mountain State
Agricultural College (MSAC), and witness Albert Dimas (Albert), a resident of the adjoining lot (MSAC
cottage), and witness Victor Alejandro, a neighbor of Antonio in Camp Dangwa.

In the same vein, appellees declared the subject properties for taxation purposes. Although tax declarations
and realty tax payment of property are not conclusive evidence of ownership, nevertheless, they are
good indicia of the possession in the concept of owner for no one in his right mind would be paying taxes for
a property that is not in his actual or at least constructive possession. They constitute at least proof that the
holder has a claim of title over the property. The voluntary declaration of a piece of property for taxation
purposes manifests not only one's sincere and honest desire to obtain title to the property and announces
his adverse claim against the State and all other interested parties, but also the intention to contribute
needed revenues to the Government. Such an act strengthens one's bona fide claim of acquisition of
ownership.

Next, appellant's postulations that the disputed lands were not yet alienable and disposable and that
appellees failed to overcome trie presumption that all lands form part of the public domain, carry no weight.

xxxx

In the case at bench, appellees were able to discharge such bounden duty. The subject properties are no
longer part of public domain. Their private character is declared in the annotation of the survey plan
approved by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources through the Bureau of Lands, Regional
Office No. 1, San Fernando, La Union, viz: "The survey is inside alienable and disposable areas per Proa No.
209, Lot-A "; xxx The land herein described is outside any military and civil reservations, xxx" The
Supervising Geodetic Engineer of the same Office likewise certified "x x x this survey is outside the Mountain
State Agricultural College and it is within the Proclamation No. 209, Lot-A."

We echo with approval the disquisition of the court a quo which thoroughly threshed out the issue on the
alienable and disposable character of the challenged parcels of land -
"In the case at bar, the tracing cloth (Diazo Polyester film) of the approved survey plan of the land
embracing the lots subject of the application xxx.

The Court takes judicial notice of Proclamation No. 209 issued by then President Ramon Magsaysay on
October 20, 1955. xxx

Lot A, mentioned in the aforestated certifications in the tracing cloth of the approved survey plan (Exh. "H"),
is one of the three (3) lots described in the aforecited Presidential Proclamation No. 209 opened to
"disposition under the provisions of the Public Land Act."

The categorical statement of facts in the tracing cloth of the approved survey plan (Exh. "H"), in
conjunction with the aforecited Proclamation No. 209, support the certification that the land
subject of the survey is alienable and disposable.

The certifications therein attesting that the land, which embraced Lots 1, 6 and 7 subject of the present
application, is outside the Mountain State Agricultural College reservation, that it is within the
Proclamation No. 209, Lot-A; that the land is alienable and disposable - pursuant to the
Proclamation No. 209, Lot-A, and that it is outside any military or civil reservations. [This]
statement of facts in the certifications in the tracing cloth of the approved survey plan sufficiently contain[s]
all the essential factual and legal bases for any certification that may be issued by the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources that the lots subject of the present application are indeed
alienable and disposable. More importantly, the tracing cloth of the approved survey plan was
approved by Regional Director Sulpicio A. Taeza "For the Director of Lands." As such, the aforecited
certifications in the tracing cloth of the approved survey plan carry not only his imprimatur but also that of
the Director of Lands for whom he was acting. Thus, the approval of the survey plan was in effect the act of
the Director of Lands. Necessarily, the certifications in the approved survey plan were [those] of the Director
of Lands, not only of the Supervising Geodetic Engineer I and Regional Director Sulpicio A. Taeza. chanroblesvi rtua llawli bra ry

The foregoing discourse is in congruity with the principle enunciated in Republic v. Serrano wherein the 15

Supreme Court explicitly pronounced, viz: chanRoble svirtual Lawlib ra ry

"While Cayetano failed to submit any certification which would formally attest to the alienable and
disposable character of the land applied for, the Certification by DENR Regional Technical Director
Celso V. Loriega, Jr., as annotated on the subdivision plan submitted in evidence by
Paulita, constitutes substantial compliance with the legal requirement. It clearly indicates that Lot
249 had been verified as belonging to the alienable and disposable area as early as July 18,1925.

The DENR certification enjoys the presumption of regularity absent any evidence to the
contrary. It bears noting that no opposition was filed or registered by the Land Registration Authority or the
DENR to contest respondents' applications on the ground that their respective shares of the lot are
inalienable. There being no substantive rights which stand to be prejudiced, the benefit of the
Certification may be equitably extended in favor of respondents.
In precis, We discern no reversible error committed by the court a quo.

WHEREFORE, the Appeal is hereby DENIED. The Amended Decision dated 11 September 2008 of the
Regional Trial Court, First Judicial Region, La Trinidad, Benguet, Branch 63, in LRC No. 03-LRC-0024,
is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.16
Hence, the present Petition

Issues

In a November 25, 2013 Resolution,17 this Court resolved to give due course to the Petition, which contains
the following assignment of errors: c hanRoblesv irtual Lawlib rary

THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY MISAPPRECIATED THE FACTS AS WELL AS MADE FINDINGS WHICH
ARE INCONSISTENT WITH, OR NOT SUPPORTED BY, THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD. LIKEWISE, IT GRAVELY
MISAPPLIED THE LAWS AND JURISPRUDENCE, AS FOLLOWS: chanRoblesvi rtua lLawl ibra ry

(a) The land registration court gravely erred in granting the application for registration of the three (3)
subject lots despite respondents' utter failure to prove that the said lots are alienable and disposable, a
mere annotation on the survey plan that the said lots are alienable and disposable being insufficient to prove
alienability;

(b) Respondents' evidence is utterly insufficient to prove open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
occupation and possession by themselves and their predecessors-in-interest since June 12, 1945, or
earlier.18
Petitioner's Arguments

In its Petition and Reply19 seeking reversal of the assailed CA decision and the dismissal of respondents'
application for registration in LRC Case No. 03-LRC-0024, petitioner argues that respondents failed to satisfy
the legal requirements relative to proof of the alienability of the subject land and continuous, open,
exclusive and notorious possession thereof. Particularly, petitioner claims that it was erroneous for the trial
and appellate courts to consider as substantial compliance the certification or annotation in the survey plan
that the subject land is alienable and disposable; that respondents did not present in court the public
officials who issued the said certification/annotation in order that they may authenticate the same; that
respondents failed to establish the existence of a positive act of government declaring that the subject land
is alienable and disposable; that respondents failed to secure a government certification that the subject
land constitutes alienable and disposable land of the public domain; that the trial court erred in taking
judicial notice of Proclamation 209, as the exact boundaries of the lots covered by said law, as well as that
of the subject land, are not a matter of judicial knowledge; that respondents have not shown that their
predecessors-in-interest were in continuous, open, exclusive and notorious possession of the land for 30
years or since June 12, 1945 or earlier; that respondents' possession is not genuine; that the trial court
erred in relying on the testimonial evidence taken in LRC Case No. N-453 since the transcripts of
stenographic notes in said case were not submitted to the court; and that respondents' tax declarations and
receipts do not constitute proof of adverse possession or ownership of the subject land.

Respondents' Arguments

In their Comment,20 respondents contend that, as correctly found by the trial and appellate courts, the
annotations and certifications in the approved survey plan substantially comply with the legal requirement
for a certification as to the alienability of the subject land. They cite as follows: chanRoblesv irt ual Lawlib rary

Third. The approved survey plan (Exh. "H") of the respondents contain certifications attesting to the fact
that the three (3) lots, among others, which are the subject of their application for title, are within the
parcel of land described as Lot A in Presidential Proclamation 209 of the late President Ramon Magsaysay
excluded from the Mountain State Agricultural College (now Benguet State University) and released for
disposition; x x x The certifications are found at the foot of the approved survey plan (Exh. "H"), which, for
ready reference, are here quoted: chanRoble svi rtual Lawli bra ry

Note:ChanRobles Vi rtua lawlib rary

All corners not otherwise described are P.S. cyl. Cone. Mons. 15x60 cm. This survey is for registration
purposes and should not be subject of a public land application unless declared public land by a competent
court. This survey is claimed by Irene L. Ca-aya - representing the Hrs. of M. Leano. This survey is inside
the alienable & disposable area as per Proc. No. 209, Lot A. The land herein described is outside any military
or civil registrations. Tax declaration no. 4317 of real property has been submitted as part of the survey-
returns.

- CERTIFICATION -

I hereby certify that this survey is outside the Mountain State Agricultural College and it is within the
Proclamation No. 209, Lot A.

(Signed)
GERONTMO B. FERNANDEZ
Superv. Geodetic Engineer - I
In recommending approval of the survey plan, Laurentino P. Baltazar, Regional Chief, Surveys Division, of
the Regional Lands Office No. 1, Bureau of Lands, then Department of Natural Resources (now Department
of Environment and Natural Resources), at San Fernando, La Union, certified: cha nRoblesvi rt ualLawlib rary

I certify that the complete survey returns of the herein described survey, which are on file in this Office,
were verified and found to conform with pertinent laws of the Philippines and with applicable regulations of
the Bureau of Lands. In view thereof, approval of the plan is hereby recommended.

(Signed)
LAURENTINO P. BALTAZAR
Regional Chief, Survey Division
Sulpicio A. Taeza, Regional Director, Regional Lands Office No. 1, Bureau of Lands, then Department of
Natural Resources (now Department of Environment and Natural Resources), at San Fernando, La Union,
approved the survey and plan (Exh. "H") "For the Director of Lands."

The survey plan (Exh. "H") was approved on April 10, 1976. Subsequent thereto, or on August 18, 1977, the
sketch plan of Mr. Edilberto Quiaoit (Exh. "P" and Exh. "Z" and series) was prepared. It contains this
certification of District Land Officer Amador Roxas of the Bureau of Lands at the foot thereof, to wit: chanRoble svirtual Lawli bra ry

CERTIFICATION

I hereby certify that this sketch plan is true and correct as plotted from the technical descriptions of Lot 954,
GSS-157, & Lots 1-7, PSU-1-002413 which are on file in this Office.

Issued upon request of Mr. Lawana Batcagan in connection with Administrative Case No. (N) Angeline
Dayaoen et al. vs. Morris Leano et al.

... Bu. Of Lands, Baguio City August 18, 1977

 (Signed)
AMADOR P. ROXAS
District Land Officer21
Respondents add that, as correctly held by the trial and appellate courts, they have satisfactorily proved
their continuous, open, exclusive and notorious possession of the subject land; that their predecessors-in-
interest occupied the land as early as during the Japanese occupation, or clearly prior to June 12, 1945; and
that petitioner's evidence should not be believed for being biased.

Our Ruling

The Court grants the Petition.

The trial and appellate courts seriously erred in declaring that the annotation in the tracing cloth of the
approved survey plan (Exh. "H") and the certifications therein constitute substantial compliance with the
legal requirement on presentation of a certificate of land classification status or any other proof that the
subject land is alienable and disposable. We cannot subscribe to such notion.

Under the Regalian doctrine, all lands of the public domain belong to the State. The classification and
reclassification of such lands are the prerogative of the Executive Department. The President may at any
time transfer these public lands from one class to another.22 chan roble slaw

While in 1955 the President - through Presidential Proclamation No. 209 declared particular lands in Baguio
City as alienable and disposable, they may have been re-classified by the President thereafter. This is
precisely the reason why an applicant for registration of title based on an executive proclamation is required
to present evidence on the alienable and disposable character of the land applied for. such as a certificate of
land classification status from the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), which only
the Community Environment and Natural Resources Officer23(CENRO) and the Provincial Environment and
Natural Resources Officer24 (PENRO) are authorized to issue under DENR Administrative Order No.
38,25 series of 1990 (DAO 38).

In Republic v. Cortez,26 the Court made the following pronouncement: chanRoblesvi rtua lLawl ib rary

It must be stressed that incontrovertible evidence must be presented to establish that the land subject of
the application is alienable or disposable.

In the present case, the only evidence to prove the character of the subject lands as required by law is the
notation appearing in the Advance Plan stating in effect that the said properties are alienable and
disposable. However, this is hardly the kind of proof required by law. To prove that the land subject of an
application for registration is alienable, an applicant must establish the existence of a positive act of the
government such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order, an administrative action,
investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators, and a legislative act or statute. The applicant also
secure a certification from the Government that the lands applied for are alienable and disposable. In the
case at bar, while the Advance Plan bearing the notation was certified by the Lands Management Services of
the DENR, the certification refers only to the technical correctness of the survey plotted in the
said plan and has nothing to do whatsoever with the nature and character of the property
surveyed. Respondents failed to submit a certification from the proper government agency to prove that
the lands subject for registration are indeed alienable and disposable. (Emphasis in the original)
Similarly, in Republic v. Roche, the Court declared that:chanRoblesvirtual Lawlib ra ry

Respecting the third requirement, the applicant bears the burden of proving the status of the land. In this
connection, the Court has held that he must present a certificate of land classification status issued
by the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) or the Provincial
Environment and Natural Resources Office (PENRO) of the DENR. He must also prove that the
DENR Secretary had approved the land classification and released the land as alienable and
disposable, and that it is within the approved area per verification through survey by the CENRO
or PENRO. Further, the applicant must present a copy of the original classification approved by
the DENR Secretary and certified as true copy by the legal custodian of the official records. These
facts must be established by the applicant to prove that the land is alienable and disposable.
(Emphasis in the original)

Here, Roche did not present evidence that the land she applied for has been classified as alienable or
disposable land of the public domain. She submitted only the survey map and technical description of the
land which bears no information regarding the land's classification. She did not bother to establish the status
of the land by any certification from the appropriate government agency. Thus, it cannot be said that she
complied with all requisites for registration of title under Section 14(1) of P.D. 1529. chanrobl esvirt uallawl ibra ry

The annotation in the survey plan presented by Cortez is not the kind of evidence required by law
as proof that the subject property forms part of the alienable and disposable land of the public
domain. Cortez failed to present a certification from the proper government agency as to the classification
of the subject property. Cortez likewise failed to present any evidence showing that the DENR Secretary had
indeed classified the subject property as alienable and disposable. Having failed to present any
incontrovertible evidence, Cortez' claim that the subject property forms part of the alienable and disposable
lands of the public domain must fail. (Emphasis supplied)
Later, another pronouncement was made in Fortuna v. Republic,27 stating thus: chanRoble svi rtual Lawli bra ry

Under Section 6 of the PLA,28 the classification and the reclassification of public lands are the prerogative of
the Executive Department. The President, through a presidential proclamation or executive order, can
classify or reclassify a land to be included or excluded from the public domain. The Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) Secretary is likewise empowered by law to approve a land
classification and declare such land as alienable and disposable. Accordingly, jurisprudence has required that
an applicant for registration of title acquired through a public land grant must present incontrovertible
evidence that the land subject of the application is alienable or disposable by establishing the existence of a
positive act of the government, such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order; an administrative
action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; and a legislative act or a statute.

In this case, the C A declared that the alienable nature of the land was established by the notation in the
survey plan, which states: chanRoblesvirtual Lawlibra ry

This survey is inside alienable and disposable area as per Project No. 13 L.C. Map No. 1395 certified August
7, 1940. It is outside any civil or military reservation.
It also relied on the Certification dated July 19, 1999 from the DENR Community Environment and Natural
Resources Office (CENRO) that "there is, per record, neither any public land application filed nor title
previously issued for the subject parcel[.]" However, we find that neither of the above documents is
evidence of a positive act from the government reclassifying the lot as alienable and disposable agricultural
land of the public domain.

Mere notations appearing in survey plans are inadequate proof of the covered properties'
alienable and disposable character. These notations, at the very least, only establish that the
land subject of the application for registration falls within the approved alienable and disposable
area per verification through survey by the proper government office. The applicant, however, must
also present a copy of the original classification of the land into alienable and disposable land, as declared by
the DENR Secretary or as proclaimed by the President. In Republic v. Heirs of Juan Fabio, the Court ruled
that
[t]he applicant for land registration must prove that the DENR Secretary had approved the land classification
and released the land of the public domain as alienable and disposable, and that the land subject of the
application for registration falls within the approved area per verification through survey by the PENRO or
CENRO. In addition, the applicant must present a copy of the original classification of the land into alienable
and disposable, as declaredJpy the D,ENR Secretary, or as proclaimed by the President. chanrob lesvi rtua llawli bra ry

The survey plan and the DENR-CENRO certification are not proof that the President or the DENR Secretary
has reclassified and released the public land as alienable and disposable. The offices that prepared these
documents are not the official repositories or legal custodian of the issuances of the President or the DENR
Secretary declaring the public land as alienable and disposable.

For failure to present incontrovertible evidence that Lot No. 4457 has been reclassified as alienable and
disposable land of the public domain though a positive act of the Executive Department, the spouses
Fortuna's claim of title through a public land grant under the PLA should be denied. (Emphasis supplied
and/or in the original)
Yet again, in another subsequent decision of this Court in Remman Enterprises, Inc. v. Republic,29 it was
held that
The burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of Sate ownership of the lands of the public domain is
on the person applying for registration, who must prove that the properties subject of the application are
alienable and disposable. Even the notations on the survey plans submitted by the petitioner cannot be
admitted as evidence of the subject properties' alienability and disposability. Such notations do not
constitute incontrovertible evidence to overcome the presumption that the subject properties
remain part of the inalienable public domain. (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, while judicial notice of Presidential Proclamation No. 209 may be taken, the DENR certificate of land
classification status or any other proof of the alienable and disposable character of the land may not be
dispensed with, because it provides a more recent appraisal of the classification of the land as alienable and
disposable, or that the land has not been re-classified in the meantime. The applicable law - Section 14(1) of
Presidential Decree No. 1529 - requires that the property sought to be registered is alienable and
disposable at the time the application for registration of title is filed;30 one way of establishing this
material fact is through the DENR certificate of land classification status which is presumed to be the most
recent appraisal of the status and character of the property.

The ruling in Republic v. Serrano31 cannot be controlling. Instead, We must apply the pronouncements
in Republic v. Cortez, Fortuna v. Republic, and Remman Enterprises, Inc. v. Republic, as they are more
recent and in point. Besides, these cases accurately ratiocinate that such notations or certifications in
approved survey plans refer only to the technical correctness of the surveys plotted in these plans and have
nothing to do whatsoever with the nature and character of the properties surveyed, and that they only
establish that the land subject of the application for registration falls within the approved alienable and
disposable per verification through survey by the proper government office; they do not indicate at all that
the property sought to be registered is alienable and disposable at the time the application for registration of
title is filed.

On the issue of continuous, open, exclusive and notorious possession, however, there appears to be no
reason to deviate from the identical findings of fact of the trial court and the CA, which are rooted in the
testimonies of the respondents and their witnesses - categorical declarations which petitioner has failed to
refute. We adopt the findings of the trial court, to wit: chanRoblesv irt ual Lawli brary

It has been well established that since pre-war Antonio Pablo had been in possession and occupation of the
land (TSN, Oct. 19, 2005), which is corroborated by evidence that when the land was verbally given to
applicant Angeline Dayaoen and Dado Dayaoen as a wedding gift, the old man Antonio Pablo had already an
old hut thereon (TSN, May 29, 1984, p. 14) where the spouses stayed after their marriage (TSN, Oct. 19,
2005, p. 9), and there were already on the land some fruit trees, and some other plants, consisting of
guavas and avocados already bearing fruits, which he had planted thereon (TSN, May 29, 1984, pp. 12-14).
The anterior possession and occupation of Antonio Pablo of the land since pre-war should be tacked to the
possession and occupation of applicant Angeline Dayaoen, and the latter's possession and occupation, in
turn, is tacked to the present possession and occupation of her co-applicants, who acquired titles from her.32
Thus, while respondents have complied with most of the requirements in connection with their application
for registration, they have not sufficiently shown that the property applied for is alienable and disposable at
the time their application for registration was filed. The Court is left with no alternative but to deny their
application for registration. To be sure, the nation's interests will be best served by a strict adherence to the
provisions of the land registration laws.33
chanrob leslaw

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The February 23, 2012 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV No. 92584 and the September 11, 2008 Amended Decision of the Regional Trial Court of La Trinidad,
Benguet, Branch 63 in LRC Case No. 03-LRC-0024 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Respondents'
application for registration in LRC Case No. 03-LRC-0024 is ordered DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED. cralawlawlibra ry

Peralta,*Bersamin,**Mendoza, and Leonen, JJ., concur.

Endnotes:

*
Per Special Order No. 2088 dated July 1, 2015.

**
Per Special Order No. 2079 dated June 29, 2015.

***
Per Special Order No. 2087 (Revised) dated July 1, 2015.

****
Or Taule.

Rollo, pp. 21-86.

1

2
Id. at 88-99; penned by Associate Justice Japar B. Dimaampao and concurred in by Associate Justices
Michael P. Elbinias and Agnes Reyes Carpio.

3
Id. at 100-116; penned by Presiding Judge Benigno M. Galacgac.

4
Herein respondents.

5
Rollo, pp. 134-138. Docketed as LRC Case No. 03-LRC-0024 before the Regional Trial Court, First Judicial
Region, of La Trinidad, Benguet (RTC La Trinidad), Branch 63. The Application was superseded by an
Amended Application dated January 30,2003 (Id. at 190-194).

6
The subject property.

Rollo, pp. 238-247; penned by Presiding Judge Benigno M. Galacgac.

7

8
Id. at 90-91. Italics in the original.

9
Id. at 228-237; penned by Presiding Judge Angel V. Colet.

10
EXCLUDING FROM THE OPERATION OF PROCLAMATIONS NOS. 99, 64, 39, 102, AND 698, SERIES OF
1914, 1919, 1920, 1927, AND 1934, RESPECTIVELY, AND DECLARING THE PARCEL OR PARCELS OF LAND
EMBRACED THEREIN OR PORTIONS THEREOF SITUATED IN THE MUNICIPALITY OF LA TRINIDAD, SUB-
PROVINCE OF BENGUET, MOUNTAIN PROVINCE, OPEN TO DISPOSITION UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF THE
PUBLIC LAND ACT.

11
Rollo, pp. 109-116. Italics in the original.

12
Herein respondents.

13
THE PROPERTY REGISTRATION DECREE.

14
THE PUBLIC LAND ACT.

15
G.R. No. 183063, February 24, 2010, 613 SCRA 537, 546-547.

16
Rollo, pp. 92-98. Emphases and italics in the original.

17
Id. at 385-386.

18
Id. at 37-38.

19
Id. at 378-383.

20
Id. at 337-366.

21
Id. at 346-347.

22
C.A. No. 141, or the Public Land Act, Section 6.

Sec. 6. The President, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources,
shall from time to time classify the lands of the public domain into:(a) Alienable or disposable, (b) Timber,
and (c) Mineral lands, and may at any time and in a like manner transfer such lands from one class to
another, for the purposes of their administration and disposition.

23
For areas below 50 hectares.

24
For areas exceeding 50 hectares.

25
REVISED REGULATIONS ON THE DELINEATION OF FUNCTIONS AND DELEGATION OF AUTHORITIES, April
19, 1990.

26
G.R. No. 186639, February 5, 2014, 715 SCRA 416,427-429.
27
G.R. No. 173423, March 5, 2014.

28
PUBLIC LAND ACT, or C.A. No. 141.

29
G.R. No. 188494, November 26, 2014.

30
Republic v. Zurbaran Realty and Development Corporation, G.R. No. 164408, March 24, 2014.

31
Supra note 14.

Rollo, pp. 112-113.

32

33
See De Melgar v. Pagayon, 129 Phil. 91, 96 (1967). chanrob lesvi rtua llawli bra ry

G.R. No. 177168, August 03, 2015 - NAVY OFFICERS' VILLAGE ASSOCIATION, INC. (NOVAI), Petitioner, v.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 177168, August 03, 2015

NAVY OFFICERS' VILLAGE ASSOCIATION, INC. (NOVAI), Petitioner, v. REPUBLIC OF THE

PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

BRION, J.:

We resolve the present petition for review on certiorari1 assailing the December 28, 2006 decision2and March 28,
2007 resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 85179.

The CA reversed and set aside the August 20, 2004 decision4 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) Branch 67, Pasig
City, that dismissed the complaint filed by the Republic of the Philippines (respondent or the Republic) for the
cancellation of Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-15387 issued in the name of Navy Officers' Village
Association, Inc. or NOVAI (petitioner).

The Factual Antecedents

TCT No. T-15387,5 issued in NOVAI's name, covers a 475,009 square-meter parcel of land (the
property)6 situated inside the former Fort Andres Bonifacio Military Reservation (FBMR) in Taguig, Metro Manila.

The property previously formed part of a larger 15,812,684 square-meter parcel of land situated at the former
Fort William McKinley, Rizal, which was covered by TCT No. 61524 issued in the name of the Republic of the
Philippines.

On July 12, 1957, then President Carlos P. Garcia issued Proclamation No. 4237 "reserving for military
purposes certain parcels of the public domain situated in the municipalities of Pasig, Taguig, Paraaque, province
of Rizal, and Pasay City," which included the 15,812,684 square-meter parcel of land covered by TCT No. 61524.

On September 29, 1965, then Pres. Diosdado Macapagal issued Proclamation No. 4618 which excluded from
Fort McKinley "a certain portion of land embraced therein, situated in the municipalities of Taguig and
Paraaque, Province of Rizal, and Pasay City," with an area of 2,455,310 square meters, and declared the
excluded area as "AFP Officers' Village" to be disposed of under the provisions of Republic Act Nos. 2749 and
730.10cralaw rednad

Barely a month after, or on October 25, 1965, Pres. Macapagal issued Proclamation No. 47811"reserving for
the veterans rehabilitation, medicare and training center site purposes" an area of 537,520 square meters of the
land previously declared as AFP Officers' Village under Proclamation No. 461, and placed the reserved area under
the administration of the Veterans Federation of the Philippines (VFP).

The property is within the 537,520 square-meter parcel of land reserved in VFP's favor.

On November 15, 1991, the property was the subject of a Deed of Sale12between the Republic of the
Philippines, through former Land Management Bureau (LMB) Director Abelardo G. Palad, Jr., (Dir. Palad) and
petitioner NOVAI. The deed of sale was subsequently registered and from which TCT No. T-15387
was issued in NOVAI's name.

The Republic's Complaint for Cancellation of Title

In its complaint13 filed with the RTC on December 23, 1993, the Republic sought to cancel NOVAFs title based on
the following grounds: (a) the land covered by NOVAFs title is part of a military reservation; (b) the deed of sale
conveying the property to NOVAI, which became the basis for the issuance of TCT No. 15387, is fictitious; (c)
the LMB has no records of any application made by NOVAI for the purchase of the property, and of the NOVAFs
alleged payment of P14,250,270.00 for the property; and (d) the presidential proclamation, i.e., Proclamation
No. 2487, claimed to have been issued by then President Corazon C. Aquino in 1991 that authorized the transfer
and titling of the property to NOVAI, is fictitious.

NOVAI's Answer to the Complaint

In its answer (which was later amended) to the Republic's complaint, NOVAI counter-argued that the property
was no longer part of the public dominion, as the land had long been segregated from the military reservation
pursuant to Proclamation No. 461.

NOVAI claimed that, contrary to the Republic's contention that there were no records of the sale, it had actually
filed a letter-application for a sales patent over the property with the LMB which prepared, verified and approved
the property's plan and technical description; and that the LMB delivered to it a copy of the deed of sale, signed
and executed by Dir. Palad, after it had paid a portion of the P14,250,270.00 purchase price, corresponding
taxes, and other charges, with the balance to be paid in installments.

Also, NOVAI contended that, since any alleged irregularities that may have attended the sale pertained only to
formalities, the proper remedy for the Republic was to file an action for reformation of instrument, not for
cancellation of title. In any event, it added that the Republic's cause of action had prescribed because its title to
the property had already become indefeasible.

The RTC's decision

The RTC narrowed down the issues to: (a) the character of the property in question, i.e., whether the property in
question was part of the FBMR, and hence, inalienable; and (b) the validity of the deed of sale conveying the
property to NOVAI, i.e., whether the title over the property was acquired by NOVAI through fraud. The RTC
resolved both issues in NOVAI's favor.

In its decision, the RTC ruled that: (a) the property is alienable and disposable in character, as the land falls
within the area segregated from the FBMR pursuant to Proclamation No. 461; (b) the subject deed of sale should
be presumed valid on its face, as it was executed with all the formalities of a notarial certification; (c)
notwithstanding the claims of forgery, the signature of Dir. Palad on the deed of sale appeared genuine and
authentic; and (d) NOVAI's title to the property had attained indefeasibility since the Republic's action for
cancellation of title was filed close to two (2) years from the issuance of the title.

The CA's decision

The CA reversed and set aside the RTC's decision. It ruled that the property is inalienable land of the public
domain; thus, it cannot be disposed of or be the subject of a sale. It pointed out that, since NOVAI failed to
discharge its burden of proving the existence of Proclamation No. 2487 - the positive governmental act that
would have removed the property from the public domain the property remained reserved for veterans
rehabilitation purposes under Proclamation No. 478, the latest executive issuance affecting the property.

Since the property is inalienable, the CA held that the incontestability and indefeasibility generally accorded to a
Torrens title cannot apply because the property, as in this case, is unregistrable land; that a title issued by
reason or on account of any sale, alienation, or transfer of an inalienable property is void and a patent nullity;
and that, consequently, the Republic's action for the cancellation of NOVAI's title cannot be barred by
prescription.

Also, the CA held that there can be no presumption of regularity in the execution of the subject deed of sale
given the questionable circumstances that surrounded the alleged sale of the property to NOVAI,14e.g., NOVAI's
failure to go through the regular process in the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) or
the LMB Offices in the filing of an application for sales patent and in the conduct of survey and investigation; the
execution of the deed of sale without payment of the full purchase price as required by policy; and the
appearances of forgery and falsification of Dir. Palad's signature on the deed of sale and on the receipts issued to
NOVAI for its installment payments on the property, among others.

Lastly, the CA held that the Court's observations and ruling in Republic of the Philippines v. Southside
Homeowners Association, Inc (Southside)15 is applicable to the present case. In Southside, the Republic similarly
sought the cancellation of title - TCT No. 15084 - issued in favor of Southside Homeowners Association, Inc.
(SHAI) over a 39.99 hectare area of land situated in what was known as the Joint U.S. Military Assistance Group
(JUSMAG) housing area in Fort Bonifacio. The Court cancelled the certificate of title issued to SHAI, as the latter
failed to prove that the JUSMAG area had been withdrawn from the military reservation and had been declared
open for disposition. The Court therein ruled that, since the JUSMAG area was still part of the FBMR, its alleged
sale to SHAI is necessarily void and of no effect.

NOVAI sought reconsideration of the CA's decision, which the CA denied in its March 28, 2007
resolution;16 hence, this petition.

The Petition

NOVAI alleges that the CA erred in declaring that: (a) the property is inalienable land of the public domain, (b)
the deed of sale and Proclamation No. 2487 were void and nonexistent, respectively, (c) the Republic's action for
cancellation of title was not barred by prescription, and (d) the ruling in Southside was applicable to the present
case.

In support of its petition, NOVAI raises the following arguments: ChanRoblesvi rtua lLawl ibra ry

(a)The property is no longer part of the public domain because, by virtue of

Proclamation No. 461, s. of 1965, the property was excluded from the FBMR
and made available for disposition to qualified persons, subject to the
provisions of R.A. Nos. 274 and 720 in relation to the Public Land Act;

(b)The deed of sale was, in all respects, valid and enforceable, as it was shown
to have been officially executed by an authorized public officer under the
provisions of the Public Land Act, and celebrated with all the formalities of a
notarial certification;

(c) Proclamation No. 2487 is to be presumed valid until proven otherwise; that
the Republic carried the burden of proving that Proclamation No. 2487 was a
forgery, and that it failed to discharge this burden;

(d)The CA should not have considered as evidence the testimony of Senator

Franklin Drilon on the nonexistence of Proclamation No. 2487 because such
 testimony was given by Senator Drilon in another case17 and was not
formally offered in evidence by the Republic during the trial of the present
case before the RTC;

(e)The action for cancellation of title filed by the Republic is already barred by
prescription because it was filed only on December 23, 1993, or close to two
(2) years from the issuance of NOVAI's title on January 9, 1992; and

(f) The case of Southside is not a cognate or companion case to the present
case because the two cases involve completely dissimilar factual and
doctrinal bases; thus, the Court's observations and ruling
in Southside should not be applied to the present case.
The Republic's Comment to the Petition

Procedurally, the Republic assails the propriety of the issues raised by NOVAI, such as "whether Proclamation
No. 2487 and the signature of LMB Director Palad on the assailed deed of sale are forged or fictitious," and
"whether the Republic had presented adequate evidence to establish the spuriousness of the subject
proclamation," which are factual in nature and not allowed in a Rule 45 petition.

On the petition's substance, the Republic counters that: ChanRobles virtua lLawl ibra ry

(a)The property is inalienable public land incapable of private appropriation

because, while the property formed part of the area segregated from the
FBMR under Proclamation No. 461, it was subsequently reserved for a
specific public use or purpose under Proclamation No. 478;

(b)Proclamation No. 2487, which purportedly revoked Proclamation No. 478,

does not legally exist and thus cannot be presumed valid and constitutional
unless proven otherwise; the presumption of validity and constitutionality of
a law applies only where there is no dispute as to the authenticity and due
execution of the law in issue;

(c) The deed of sale executed by NOVAI and by Dir. Palad was undeniably
forged, as Dir. Palad categorically denied having signed the deed of sale, and
a handwriting expert from the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI)
confirmed that Dir. Palad's signature was indeed a forgery;18

(d)NOVAI, a private corporation, is disqualified from purchasing the property

because R.A. Nos. 274 and 730, and the Public Land Act only allow the sale
of alienable and disposable public lands to natural persons, not juridical
persons; and

(e)The Court's decision in Southside applies to the present case because of the
strong factual and evidentiary relationship between the two cases.
BCDA's Comment-in-Intervention
On December 28, 2007, and while the case was pending before this Court, the Bases Conversion Development
Authority (BCDA) filed a motion for leave to file comment-in-intervention and to admit the attached comment-in-
intervention.19 c ralawre dnad

In a resolution dated February 18, 2008,20 the Court allowed the BCDA's intervention.

As the Republic has done, the BCDA contends that NOVAI is disqualified from acquiring the property given the
constitutional and statutory provisions that prohibit the acquisition of lands of the public domain by a corporation
or association; that any sale of land in violation of the Constitution or of the provisions of R.A. Nos. 274 and 730,
and the Public Land Act are null and void; and that any title which may have been issued by mistake or error on
the part of a public official can be cancelled at any time by the State.

The BCDA further contends that NOVAI miserably failed to comply with the legal requirements for the release of
the property from the military reservation. More specifically, (1) the Director of Lands did not cause the
property's subdivision, including the determination of the number of prospective applicants and the area of each
subdivision lot which should not exceed one thousand (1,000) square meters for residential purposes; (2) the
purchase price for the property was not fixed by the Director of Lands as approved by the DENR Secretary; (3)
NOVAI did not pay the purchase price or a portion of it to the LMB; and (4) the Deed of Sale was not signed by
the President of the Republic of the Philippines or by the Executive Secretary, but was signed only by the LMB
Director.

Also, the BCDA observed that NOVAI was incorporated only on December 11, 1991, while the deed of sale was
purportedly executed on November 15, 1991, which shows that NOVAI did not yet legally exist at the time of the
property's purported sale.

OUR RULING

We resolve to DENY NOVAI's petition for review on certiorari as we find no reversible error committed by the
CA in issuing its December 28, 2006 decision and March 28, 2007 resolution.

I. Procedural Objections

A. In the filing of the present petition before this Court

Under Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, a party desiring to appeal from a judgment or final order of the
CA shall raise only questions of law which must be distinctly set forth.

A question of law exists when the doubt or controversy concerns the correct application of law or jurisprudence
on a certain state of facts.21 The issue does not call for an examination of the probative value of the evidence
presented, the truth or falsehood of the facts being admitted.22 In contrast, a question of fact exists when a
doubt or difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of facts or when the query invites the calibration of the
whole evidence considering mainly the credibility of the witnesses; the existence and relevancy of specific
surrounding circumstances, as well as their relation to each other and to the whole; and the probability of the
situation.23
cralawre dnad

The rule that only questions of law may be the subject of a Rule 45 Petition before this Court, however, has
exceptions.24 Among these exceptions is when there is conflict between the factual findings of the RTC and
that of the CA.

In this case, the CA totally reversed the RTC on the nature and character of the land, in question, and on
the,validity of the deed of sale between the parties. Due to the conflicting findings of the RTC and the CA on
these issues, we are allowed to reexamine the facts and the parties' evidence in order to finally resolve the
present controversy.

B. On BCD A's Intervention

In its reply25 to the BCDA's comment-in-intervention, NOVAI primarily objects to the BCDA's intervention
cralawre d

because it was made too late.

Intervention is a proceeding in a suit or action by which a third person is permitted by the court to make himself
a party, either joining the plaintiff or defendant, or demanding something adverse to both of them.26 Its purpose
is to enable such third party to protect or preserve a right or interest which may be affected by the
proceeding,27 such interest being actual, material, direct and immediate, not simply contingent and
expectant.28cralawred nad

As a general rule, intervention cannot be made at the appeal stage. Section 2, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court,
governing interventions, provides that "the motion to intervene may be filed at any time before rendition of
judgment by the trial court." This rule notwithstanding, intervention may be allowed after judgment where it is
necessary to protect some interest which cannot otherwise be protected, and may be allowed for the purpose of
preserving the intervenor's right to appeal.29 "The rule on intervention, like all other rules of procedure, is
intended to make the powers of the Court fully and completely available for justice x x x and aimed to facilitate a
comprehensive adjudication of rival claims overriding technicalities on the timeliness of the filing thereof."30
cra lawred nad

Thus, in exceptional cases, the Court may allow intervention although the trial court has already rendered
judgment. In fact, the Court had allowed intervention in one case even when the petition for review was already
submitted for decision before it.31
cra lawred nad

In the present case, the BCDA is indisputably the agency specifically created under R.A. No. 722732 to own, hold
and/or administer military reservations including, among others, those located inside the FBMR. If we are to
affirm the CA's decision, the BCDA stands to benefit as a favorable ruling will enable it to pursue its mandate
under R.A. No. 7227. On the other hand, if we reverse the CA's decision, it stands to suffer as the contrary ruling
will greatly affect the BCDA's performance of its legal mandate as it will lose the property without the
opportunity to defend its right in court.

Indeed, the BCDA has such substantial and material interest both in the outcome of the case and in the disputed
property that a final adjudication cannot be made in its absence without affecting such interest. Clearly, the
BCDA's intervention is necessary; hence, we allow the BCDA's intervention although made beyond the period
prescribed under Section 2, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court.

II. Substantive Issues

A. The property is non-disposable land of the public domain reserved for public or quasi-public use or
purpose

We agree with the CA that the property remains a part of the public domain that could not have been validly
disposed of in NOVAI's favor. NOVAI failed to discharge its burden of proving that the property was withdrawn
from the intended public or quasi-public use or purpose.

While the parties disagree on the character and nature of the property at the time of the questioned sale, they
agree, however, that the property formed part of the FBMR - a military reservation belonging to the public
domain. We note that the FBMR has been the subject of several presidential proclamations and statues issued
subsequent to Proclamation No. 423, which either removed or reserved for specific public or quasi-public use or
purpose certain of its portions.

On the one hand, NOVAI argues that Proclamation No. 461 had already transferred the property from the State's
"public domain" to its "private domain." On the other hand, the respondents argue that Proclamation No. 478, in
relation with RA 7227 and EO No. 40, had reverted the property to the inalienable property of the "public
domain."

The classification and disposition of lands of the public domain are governed by Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No.
141 or the Public Land Act, the country's primary law on the matter.

Under Section 6 of C.A. No. 141, the President of the Republic of the Philippines, upon the recommendation of
the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, may, from time to time, classify lands of the public domain
into alienable or disposable, timber and mineral lands, and transfer these lands from one class to another for
purposes of their administration and disposition.

Under Section 7 of C.A. No. 141, the President may, from time to time, upon recommendation of the Secretary
of Agriculture and Natural Resources and for purposes of the administration and disposition of alienable and
disposable public lands, declare what lands are open to disposition or concession under the Acts' provisions.33 cralaw rednad

Section 8 of C.A. No. 141 sets out the public lands open to disposition or concession and the requirement that
they have been officially delimited and classified, and when practicable, surveyed. Section 8 excludes (by
implication) from disposition or concession, public lands which have been reserved for public or quasi-public
uses; appropriated by the Government; or in any manner have become private property, or those on which a
private right authorized and recognized by the Act or any other valid law may be claimed. Further, Section 8
authorizes the President to suspend the concession or disposition of lands previously declared open to
disposition, until again declared open to disposition by his proclamation or by act of Congress.

Lands of the public domain classified as alienable and disposable are further classified, under Section 9 of C.A.
No. 141, according to their use or purpose into: (1) agricultural; (2) residential, commercial, industrial, or for
similar productive purposes; (3) educational, charitable, or other similar purposes; and (4) reservations for
townsites and for public and quasi-public uses. Section 9 also authorizes the President to make the classifications
and, at any time, transfer lands from one class to another.

Section 83 of C.A. No. 141 defines public domain lands classified as reservations for public and quasi-
public uses as "any tract or tracts of land of the public domain" which the President, by proclamation and
upon recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, may designate "as reservations for
the use of the Republic of the Philippines or any of its branches, or of the inhabitants thereof or "for quasi-public
uses or purposes when the public interest requires it."34Under Section 88 of the same Act, these "reserved
tract or tracts of lands shall be non-alienable and shall not be subject to occupation, entry, sale,
lease or other disposition until again declared alienable under the provisions of [CA No. 141] or by
proclamation of the President."35 cralawrednad

As these provisions operate, the President may classify lands of the public domain as alienable and disposable,
mineral or timber land, and transfer such lands from one class to another at any time.

Within the class of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, the President may further classify public
domain lands, according to the use or purpose to which they are destined, as agricultural: residential,
commercial, industrial, etc.; educational, charitable, etc.; and reservations for townsites and for public and
quasi-public uses; and, he may transfer such lands from one class to the other at any time.

Thus, the President may, for example, transfer a certain parcel of land from its classification as agricultural
(under Section 9 [a]), to residential, commercial, industrial, or for similar purposes (under Section 9 [b]) and
declare it available for disposition under any of the modes of disposition of alienable and disposable public lands
available under C.A. No. 141, as amended.

The modes of disposition of alienable and disposable lands available under C.A. No. 141 include: (1) by
homestead settlement (Chapter IV), by sale (Chapter V), by lease (Chapter VI) and by confirmation of imperfect
or incomplete titles (Chapters VII and VIII) for agricultural lands under Title II of C.A. No. 141 as amended; (2)
by sale or by lease for residential, commercial, or industrial lands under Title III of C.A. No. 141, as amended;
(3) by donation, sale, lease, exchange or any other form for educational and charitable lands under Title IV of
C.A. No. 141, as amended; and (4) by sale by public auction for townsite reservations under Chapter XI, Title V
of C.A. No. 141, as amended.

Once these parcels of lands are actually acquired by private persons, either by sale, grant, or other modes of
disposition, they are removed from the mass of land of the public domain and become, by operation of law, their
private property.

With particular regard, however, to parcels of land classified as reservations for public and quasi-public uses
(under Section 9 [d]), when the President transfers them to the class of .alienable and disposable public domain
lands destined for residential, commercial, industrial, or for similar purposes (under Section 9 [b]), or some
other class under Section 9, these reserved public domain lands become available for disposition under any of
the available modes of disposition under C.A. No. 141, as provided above. Once these re-classified lands (to
residential purposes from reservation for public and quasi-public uses) are actually acquired by private persons,
they become private property.

In the meantime, however, and until the parcels of land are actually granted to, acquired, or purchased by
private persons, they remain lands of the public domain which the President, under Section 9 of C.A. No. 141,
may classify again as reservations for public and quasi-public uses. The President may also, under Section 8 of
C.A. No. 141, suspend their concession or disposition.

If these parcels of land are re-classified as reservations before they are actually acquired by private persons, or
if the President suspends their concession or disposition, they shall not be subject to occupation, entry, sale,
lease, or other disposition until again declared open for disposition by proclamation of the President pursuant to
Section 88 in relation with Section 8 of C.A. No. 141.

Thus, in a limited sense, parcels of land classified as reservations for public or quasi-public uses under Section 9
(d) of C.A. No. 141 are still non-alienable and non-disposable, even though they are, by the general
classification under Section 6, alienable and disposable lands of the public domain. By specific declaration under
Section 88, in relation with Section 8, these lands classified as reservations are non-alienable and non-
disposable.

In short, parcels of land classified as reservations for public or quasi-public uses: (1) are non-alienable and non-
disposable in view of Section 88 (in relation with Section 8) of CA No. 141 specifically declaring them as non-
alienable and not subject to disposition; and (2) they remain public domain lands until they are actually disposed
of in favor of private persons.

Complementing and reinforcing this interpretation - that lands designated as reservations for public and quasi-
public uses are non-alienable and non-disposable and retain their character as land of the public domain is the
Civil Code with its provisions on Property that deal with lands in general. We find these provisions significant to
our discussion and interpretation as lands are property, whether they are public lands or private lands.36 cralaw rednad

In this regard, Article 419 of the Civil Code classifies property as either of public dominion or of private
ownership. Article 42037 defines property of the public dominion as those which are intended for public use or,
while not intended for public use, belong to the State and are intended for some public service. Article 421, on
the other hand, defines patrimonial property as all other property of the State which is not of the character
stated in Article 420. While Article 422 states that public dominion property which is no longer intended for
public use or service shall form part of the State's patrimonial property.

Thus, from the perspective of the general Civil Code provisions on Property, lands which are intended for public
use or public service such as reservations for public or quasi-public uses are property of the public dominion and
remain to be so as long as they remain reserved.

As property of the public dominion, public lands reserved for public or quasi-public uses are outside the
commerce of man.38 They cannot be subject to sale, disposition or encumbrance; any sale, disposition or
encumbrance of such property of the public dominion is void for being contrary to law and public policy.39 c ralaw rednad

To be subject to sale, occupation or other disposition, lands of the public domain designated as reservations
must first be withdrawn, by act of Congress or by proclamation of the President, from the public or quasi-public
use for which it has been reserved or otherwise positively declared to have been converted to patrimonial
property, pursuant to Sections 8 and 88 of C.A. No. 141 and Article 422 of the Civil Code.40 Without such
express declaration or positive governmental act, the reserved public domain lands remain to be public dominion
property of the State.41cralawredna d

To summarize our discussion: ChanRoblesvi rtua lLawl ibra ry

(1) Lands of the public domain classified as reservations for public or quasi-public uses are non-alienable and
shall not be subject to disposition, although they are, by the general classification under Section 6 of C.A. No.
141, alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, until declared open for disposition by proclamation of
the President; and

(2) Lands of the public domain classified as reservations are property of the public dominion; they remain to be
property of the public dominion until withdrawn from the public or quasi-public use for which they have been
reserved, by act of Congress or by proclamation of the President, or otherwise positively declared to have been
converted to patrimonial property.

Based on these principles, we now examine the various issuances affecting the property in order to determine
the property's character and nature, i.e., whether the property remains public domain property of the State or
has become its private property.

For easier reference, we reiterate the various presidential proclamations and statutes affecting the property: cralaw lawlib rary

(1)Proclamation No. 423, series of 1957 - established the FBMR, a military

reservation; the property falls within the FBMR;
(2)Proclamation No. 461, series of (September) 1965 - segregated, from the
FBMR, a portion of Parcel 3, plan Psd-2031, which includes the property, for
disposition in favor of the AFPOVAI;

(3)Proclamation No. 478, series of (October) 1965 reserved the property in

favor of the Veterans Rehabilitation and Medical Training Center (VRMTC);
and

(4)RA No. 7227 (1992), as implemented by EO No. 40, series of 1992 - subject
to certain specified exemptions, transferred the military camps within Metro
Manila, among others, to the BCDA.
1. Proclamation No. 461 was not the legal basis for the property's sale in favor of NOVAI

We agree with the respondents that while Proclamation No. 461, issued in September 1965, removed from the
FBMR a certain parcel of land that includes the property, Proclamation No. 478, issued in October 1965, in turn
segregated the property from the area made available for disposition under Proclamation No. 461, and reserved
it for the use of the VRMTC.

We find it clear that Proclamation No. 478 was issued after, not before, Proclamation No. 461. Hence, while
Proclamation No. 461 withdrew a certain area or parcel of land from the FBMR and made the covered area
available for disposition in favor of the AFPOVAI, Proclamation No. 478 subsequently withdrew the property from
the total disposable portion and reserved it for the use of the VRMTC. With the issuance of Proclamation No. 478,
the property was transferred back to that class of public domain land reserved for public or quasi-public use or
purpose which, consistent with Article 420 of the Civil Code, is property of the public dominion, not patrimonial
property of the State.

Even under the parties' deed of sale, Proclamation No. 2487, not Proclamation No. 461, was used as the
authority for the transfer and sale of the property to NOVAI. The subject deed of sale pertinently reads:
cralaw lawlib rary

"This DEED OF SALE, made and executed in Manila, Philippines, by the Director of Lands, Pursuant to Batas
Pambansa Blg. 878 and in representation of the Republic of the Philippines, hereinafter referred to as the
Vendor, in favor of THE NAVY OFFICERS VILLAGE ASSOCIATION (NOVA) and residing in Fort Bonifacio, Metro
Manila, referred to as the Vendee, WITNESSETH: ChanRoblesvirtua lLawl ibra ry

xxxx

WHEREAS, pursuant to Presidential proclamation No. 478 as amended by proclamation No. 2487 in
relation to the provision of Act No. 3038 and similar Acts supplemented thereto, the Vendee applied for the
purchase of a portion of the above-described Property which portion is identical to Lot 3, Swo-000183 and more
particularly described on page two hereof;

xxxx

WHEREAS, the Vendee has complied with all other conditions required by Act No. 3038 in relation to
Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, and the rules and regulation promulgated thereunder.

x x x x. (Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, the legal basis of the property's sale could not have been Proclamation No. 461.

2. Proclamation No. 2487 which purportedly revoked Proclamation No. 478 does not legally exist; hence, it did
not withdraw the property from the reservation or from the public dominion

Neither can Proclamation No. 2487 serve as legal basis for the property's sale in NOVAI's favor. Proclamation No.
2487 purportedly revoked Proclamation No. 478 and declared the property open for disposition in favor of
NOVAI.

The Republic and the BCD A (now respondents) argue that Proclamation No. 2487 does not legally exist; it could
not have served to release the property from the mass of the non-alienable property of the State.
Hence, even if NOVAI relies on Proclamation No. 2487 - on which it did not as it relied on Proclamation No. 4.61
- the sale and NOVAI's title are still void. NOVAI, on the other hand, claims in defense that Proclamation No.
2487 is presumed valid and constitutional, and the burden of proving otherwise rests on the respondents.

In insisting on the presumptive validity of law, NOVAI obviously failed to grasp and appreciate the thrust of the
respondents' arguments, including the impact of the evidence which they presented to support the question they
raised regarding the authenticity of Proclamation No. 2487.

Rather than the validity or constitutionality of Proclamation No. 2487, what the respondents assailed was its
legal existence, not whether it was constitutional or not. Put differently, they claimed that Proclamation No. 2487
was never issued by former Pres. Aquino; hence, the presumptive validity and constitutionality of laws cannot
apply.

Accordingly, after the respondents presented their evidence, it was NOVAI's turn to present its own evidence
sufficient to rebut that of the respondents. On this point, we find the Republic's evidence sufficiently convincing
to show that Proclamation No. 2487 does not legally exist. These pieces of evidence include: ChanRob lesvi rtual Lawl ibra ry

First, the October 26, 1993 letter of the Solicitor General to the Office of the President inquiring about the
existence of Proclamation No. 2487.42 cralawre dnad

Second, the November 12, 1993 letter-reply of the Office of the President informing the Solicitor General that
Proclamation No. 2487 "is not among the alleged documents on file with [its] Office."43 cralawre dnad

Third, the testimony of the Assistant Director of the Records Office in Malacaang confirming that indeed, after
verifying their records or of the different implementing agencies, "[t]here is no existing document(s) in [their]
possession regarding that alleged Proclamation No. 2487;"44 and

Fourth and last, the October 11, 1993 Memorandum of then Department of Justice Secretary Frahklin M. Drilon
(DOJ Secretary Drilon) to the NBI to investigate, among others, the circumstances surrounding the issuance of
Proclamation No. 2487.45 Notably, this October 11, 1993 Memorandum of DOJ Secretary Drilon stated that:
"Proclamation No. 2487 is null and void x x x. [It] does not exist in the official records of the Office of the
President x x x [and] could riot have been issued by the former President since the last Proclamation issued
during her term was proclamation No. 932 dated 19 June 1992."46 cralawred nad

In this regard, we quote with approval the CA's observations in its December 28, 2006 decision: c ralawlawl ibra ry

Cast against this backdrop, it stands to reason enough that the defendant-appellee NOVAI was inevitably duty
bound to prove and establish the very existence, as well as the genuineness or authenticity, of this Presidential
Proclamation No. 2487. For certain inexplicable reasons, however, the defendant-appellee did not do so, but
opted to build up and erect its case upon Presidential Proclamation No. 461.

To be sure, the existence of Presidential Proclamation No. 2487 could be easily proved, and established,
by its publication in the Official Gazette. But the defendant-appellee could not, as it did not, submit
or present any copy or issue of the Official Gazette mentioning or referring to this Presidential
Proclamation No. 2487, this even in the face of the Government's determined and unrelenting claim that it
does not exist at all.47 (Emphasis supplied)
A final point, we did not fail to notice the all too obvious and significant difference between the proclamation
number of Proclamation No. 2487 and the numbers of the proclamations actually issued by then President
Corazon C. Aquino on or about that time.

We take judicial notice that on September 25, 1991 - the very day when Proclamation No. 2487 was supposedly
issued - former Pres. Aquino issued Proclamation No. 80048 and Proclamation No. 801.49Previously, on
September 20, 1991, Pres. Aquino issued Proclamation No. 799;50 and thereafter, on September 27, 1991, she
issued Proclamation No. 802.51 cralaw rednad

Other proclamations issued around or close to September 25, 1991, included the following: c ralawlawl ibra ry

1. Proclamation No. 750 issued on July 1, 1991;52 cra lawredna d

2. Proclamation No. 760 issued on July 18, 1991;53 cra lawredna d

3. Proclamation No. 770 issued on August 12, 1991;54 cralaw rednad

4. Proclamation No. 780 issued on August 26, 1991;55 cralawrednad

5. Proclamation No. 790 issued on September 3, 1991;56 cralaw rednad

6. Proclamation No. 792 issued on September 5, 1991;57 cralaw rednad

7. Proclamation No. 797 issued on September 11, 1991;58 cra lawredna d

8. Proclamation No. 798 issued on September 12, 1991;59 cra lawredna d

9. Proclamation No. 804 issued on September 30, 1991;60 cra lawredna d

10. Proclamation No. 805 issued on September 30, 1991;61 cra lawredna d

11. Proclamation No. 806 issued on October 2, 1991;62 cralaw redn ad

12. Proclamation No. 810 issued on October 7, 1991;63 cralaw redn ad

13. Proclamation No. 820 issued on October 25, 1991;64 cralaw rednad

14. Proclamation No. 834 issued on November 13, 1991;65 and

15. Proclamation No. 840 issued on November 26, 1991.66

This list shows that the proclamations issued by former Pres. Aquino followed a series or sequential pattern with
each succeeding issuance bearing a proclamation number one count higher than the proclamation number of the
preceding Presidential Proclamation. It also shows that on or about the time Proclamation No. 2487 was
purportedly issued, the proclamation numbers of the proclamations issued by President Aquino did not go
beyond the hundreds series.

It is highly implausible that Proclamation No. 2487 was issued on September 25, 1991, or on any day close to
September 25, 1991, when the proclamations issued for the same period were sequentially numbered and bore
three-digit proclamation numbers.

As Proclamation No. 2487 does not legally exist and therefore could not have validly revoked Proclamation No.
478, we find, as the CA also correctly did, that Proclamation No. 478 stands as the most recent manifestation of
the State's intention to reserve the property anew for some public or quasi-public use or purpose. Thus,
consistent with Sections 88, in relation with Section 8, of C.A. No. 141 and Article 420 of the Civil Code, as
discussed above, the property which was classified again as reservation for public or quasi-public use or purpose
is non-alienable and not subject to disposition; it also remains property of the public dominion; hence, non-
alienable and non-disposable land of the public domain.

As a consequence, when R.A. No. 7227 took effect in 1992, the property subject of this case, which does not fall
among the areas specifically designated as exempt from the law's operation67 was, by legal fiat, transferred to
the BCDA's authority.

B. As the property remains a reserved public domain land, its sale and the title issued pursuant to the
sale are void

As the property remains a reserved public domain land, it is outside the commerce of man. Property which are
intended for public or quasi- public use or for some public purpose are public dominion property of the
State68 and are outside the commerce of man. NOVAI, therefore, could not have validly purchased the property
in 1991.

We reiterate and emphasize that property which has been reserved for public or quasi-public use or purpose are
non-alienable and shall not be subject to sale or other disposition until again declared alienable by law or by
proclamation of the President.69 Any sale or disposition of property of the public dominion is void for being
contrary to law and public policy.70c ralawred nad

Since the sale of the property, in this case, is void, the title issued to NOVAI is similarly void ab initio. It is a
well-settled doctrine that registration under the Torrens System does not, by itself, vest title as it is not a mode
of acquiring ownership;71 that registration under the Torrens System merely confirms the registrant's already
existing title.72
c ralawred nad
Accordingly, the indefeasibility of a Torrens title does not apply in this case and does not attach to NOVAI's title.
The principle of indefeasibility does not apply when the sale of the property and the title based thereon are null
and void. Hence, the Republic's action to declare the nullity of NOVAI's void title has not prescribed.

NOVAI insists that the deed of sale carries the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties as it
bears all the earmarks of a valid deed of sale and is duly notarized.

While we agree that duly notarized deeds of sale carry the legal presumption of regularity in the performance of
official duties,73 the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties, like all other disputable legal
presumptions, applies only in the absence of clear and convincing evidence establishing the contrary.74 cralawre dnad

When, as in this case, the evidence on record shows not only that the property was reserved for public use or
purpose, and thus, non-disposable - a fact that on its own defeats all the evidence which the petitioner may
have had to support the validity of the sale - but also shows that the sale and the circumstances leading to it are
void in form and in substance, the disputable presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties
certainly cannot apply.

C. Even assuming that Proclamation No. 2487 legally exists, the sale of the property to NOVAI is
illegal.

1. Dir. Palad did not have the authority to sell and convey the property.

The subject deed of sale points to Proclamation No. 2487, purportedly amending Proclamation No. 478, in
relation with Act No. 3038,75 as legal basis for authorizing the sale.

Section 176 of Act No. 3038 authorizes the sale or lease only: (i) of land of the private domain, not land of the
public domain; and (ii) by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, not by the LMB Director. Section
277 of the said Act, in fact, specifically exempts from its coverage "land necessary for the public service." As the
sale was executed by the LMB Director covering the property that was reserved for the use of the VRMTC, it,
therefore, clearly violated the provisions of Act No. 3038.

2. The area subject of the sale far exceeded the area that the Director of Lands is authorized to convey.

Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 87878 which, per the Deed of Sale, purportedly authorized the Director of Lands,
representing the Republic, to sell the property in favor of NOVAI, limits the authority of the Director of Lands to
sign patents or certificates covering lands to ten (10) hectares.

In this case, the subject deed of sale covers a total area of 475,009 square meters or 47.5009 hectares.
Obviously, the area covered by the deed of sale and which NOVAI purportedly purchased, far exceeds the area
that the Director of Lands is authorized to convey under B.P. Blg. 878.

3. The evidence on record and the highly suspect circumstances surrounding the sale fully supports the
conclusion that the property's sale to NOVAI is fictitious, thus, void.

We note the following irregularities that attended the sale of the property to NOVAI:

a. The absence, on file with the LMB, of any request for approval of any survey plan or of an approved
survey plan in NOVAI's name covering the property.79 The approved survey plan relating to Lot 3, SWO-
13-000183 subject of NOVAI's TCT No. 15387 pertains to the AFPOVAI under Proclamation No. 461;80 cralawred nad

b. The technical description, which the DENR prepared for the property as covered by TCT No. T-15387,
was issued upon NOVAI's request only for purposes of reference, not for registration of title, and was
based on the approved survey plan of the AFPOVAI;81 cralawrednad

c. There is no record of any public land application filed by NOVAI with the LMB or with the DENR Office for
the purchase of the property or of any parcel of land in Metro Manila;82 cralawre dnad

d. LMB Dir. Palad categorically denied signing and executing the deed of sale;83 c ralawre dnad
 e. The findings of the NBI handwriting; expert, detailed in the Questioned Documents Report No. 815-1093
dated October 29, 1993,84 revealed that the, signature of LMB Director Palad as it appeared on the Deed
of Sale and his standard/sample signature as they appeared on the submitted comparison documents
"were not written by one and the same person,"85 and concluded that "[t]he questioned signature of
'ABELARDG G. PALAD, JR.' xxx is a TRACED FORGERY by carbon process;"86 and

f. Lastly, the LMB Cashier's Office did not receive the amount of P14,250,270.00 allegedly paid by NOVAI
as consideration for the property. The receipts87 - O.R. No. 8282851 dated November 28, 1991, for
P160,000.00 and O.R. No. 317024 dated December 23, 1992, for P200,000.00 - which NOVAI presented
as evidence of its alleged payment bore official receipt numbers which were not among the series of
official receipts issued by the National Printing Office to the LMB, and in fact, were not among the series
used by the LMB on the pertinent dates.88

In sum, we find - based on the facts, the law, and jurisprudence - that the property, at the time of the sale, was
a reserved public domain land. Its sale, therefore, and the corresponding title issued in favor of petitioner
NOVAI, is void.

WHEREFORE, we hereby DENY the present petition for review on certiorari. No reversible error attended the
decision dated December 28, 2006, and the resolution dated March 28, 2007, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV No. 85179.

SO ORDERED. chanrobles virtuallawlibrary

Carpio, (Chairperson), Del Castillo, Mendoza, and Leonen, JJ., concur. ChanRoblesVirtualawl ibra ry

Endnotes:

Rollo, pp. 8-45.

1

2
Penned by Associate Justice Renato C. Dacudao and concurred in by Associate Justices Rosmari D. Carandang
and Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe (now a Member of this Court), id. at 47-88.

3
Id. at 90.

4
Civil Case No. 63983, penned by Judge Mariano M. Singzon, Jr., id. at 182-190.

5
Annex "B" of the Records, Vol. I, pp. 9-11.

6
Designated as Lot 3, SWO-13-000183; rollo, pp. 96-97.

7
Entitled "RESERVING FOR MILITARY PURPOSES CERTAIN PARCELS OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN SITUATED IN THE
MUNICIPALITIES OF PASIG, TAGUIG, PARAAQUE, PROVINCE OF RIZAL AND PASAY CITY."

8
Entitled "EXCLUDING FROM THE OPERATION OF PROCLAMATION NO. 423 DATED JULY 12, 1957, WHICH
ESTABLISHED THE MILITARY RESERVATION KNOWN AS FORT WILLIAM MCKINLEY (NOW FORT ANDRES
BONIFACIO) SITUATED IN THE MUNICIPALITIES OF PASIG TAGUIG AND PARAAQUE, PROVINCE OF RIZAL, AND
PASAY CITY, A CERTAIN PORTION OF LAND EMBRACED THEREIN, SITUATED IN THE MUNICIPALITIES OF
TAGUIG AND PARAAQUE, PROVINCE OF RIZAL, AND PASAY CITY, ISLAND OF LUZON, AND DECLARING THE
SAME AS AFP OFFICERS' VILLAGE TO BE DISPOSED OF UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF REPUBLIC ACTS NOS. 274
AND 730."

9
Entitled "AN ACT AUTHORIZING THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS TO SUBDIVIDE THE LANDS WITHIN MILITARY
RESERVATIONS BELONGING TO THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES WHICH ARE NO LONGER NEEDED FOR
MILITARY PURPOSES, AND TO DISPOSE OF THE SAME BY SALE SUBJECT TO CERTAIN CONDITIONS, AND FOR
OTHER PURPOSES," Approved June 15, 1948.

10
Entitled "AN ACT TO PERMIT THE SALE WITHOUT PUBLIC AUCTION OF PUBLIC LANDS OF THE REPUBLIC OF
THE PHILIPPINES FOR RESIDENTIAL PURPOSES TO QUALIFIED APPLICANTS UNDER CERTAIN CONDITIONS,"
Approved June 18, 1952.
11
Entitled "RESERVING FOR THE VETERANS REHABILITATION, MEDICARE AND TRAINING CENTER SITE
PURPOSES A CERTAIN PARCEL OF LAND OF THE PRIVATE DOMAIN SITUATED IN THE PROVINCE OF RIZAL,
ISLAND OF LUZON."

12
Records, Vol. IV, pp. 682-684.

13
Records, Vol. I, pp. 1-5.

14
See rollo, pp. 79-80, where the CA enumerated the following circumstances that cast strong doubt on the
validity of the property's sale in favour of NOVAI: (1) the lack of record with the LMB of NOVAI's application for
sales patent; (2) the survey return shows that the subdivision survey was requested by NOVAI itself; and (3) the
technical description presented by NOVAI was prepared by the LMB for reference purposes only, and not for
registration of title.

15
G.R. No. 156951, September 22, 2006, cited in rollo, pp. 80-86. The CA's December 28, 2006 decision stated
the name of the respondent in G.R. No. 156951 as "Southcom Homeowners Association, Inc." We believe the
name "Southcom" was a clear typographical error and what the CA was obviously referring to was "Southside"
for other than the word "Southcom," the quoted portion of the ruling, the GR No. and the date all pertains to the
case entitled "Republic of the Philippines v. Southside Homeowners Association, Inc. and the Register of Deeds,
et al."

Supra note 3.
16

People v. Eduardo Domingo, et al., Criminal Case No 98-164382; TSN. November 17, 2003; CA rollo, pp. 172-
17

201.

18
Records, Vol. II, pp. 433-436.

Rollo, pp. 660-671. Comment-in-intervention, id. at 672-725.

19

20
Id., insert between pp. 746 and 747.

21
See Altres, et al. v. Empleo, et al., 594 Phil. 246, 263 (2008).

22
Id.

23
See Altres, et al. v. Empleo, et al., supra note 21, at 263; Republic v. Medida, GR No. 195097, August 13,
2012, 678 SCRA317, 323-324.

24
In Development Bank of the Philippines v. Traders Royal Bank, G.R. No. 171982, August 18, 2010, 628 SCRA
404, the Court held: cralawlawli bra ry

"The jurisdiction of the Court in cases brought before it from the appellate court is limited to reviewing errors of
law, and findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are conclusive upon the Court since it is not the Court's function
to analyze and weigh the evidence all over again. Nevertheless, in several cases, the Court enumerated the
exceptions to the rule that factual findings of the Court of Appeals are binding on the Court: (1) when the
findings are grounded entirely on speculations, surmises or conjectures; (2) when the inference made is
manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment
is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) when in making its
findings the Court of Appeals wsiit beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of
bofy the appellant and the appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary to that of the trial court; (8) when
the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the facts set
forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent; (10)
when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence
on record; or (11) when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the
parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion." (Emphasis supplied)
25
cralaw red Rollo, pp. 783-807.

26
See GSIS v. Court of Appeals, 251 Phil. 222, 234 (1989).

27
See First Philippine Holdings Corporation v. Sandiganbayan, et al., 323 Phil. 36, 47 (1996).

28
See Garcia, et al. v. David, et al., 67 Phil. 279, 282 (1939); and Tahanan Development Corp. v. CA, et al., 203
Phil. 652, 688-691 (1982).

29
See Pinlac v. Court of Appeals, 457 Phil. 527, 534 (2003).

30
Id.

31
See Pinlac v. Court of Appeals, supra note 29, at 534-535 (2003), citing Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals,
181 Phil. 432 (1979).

32
Entitled "AN ACT ACCELERATING THE CONVERSION OF MILITARY RESERVATIONS INTO OTHER PRODUCTIVE
USES, CREATING THE BASES CONVERSION AND DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY FOR THIS PURPOSE, PROVIDING
FUNDS THEREFOR AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES" or otherwise known as the "BASES CONVERSION AND
DEVELOPMENT ACT OF 1992;" approved on March 13, 1992.

33
See Section 7 of Commonwealth Act No. 141.

34
Section 83, C.A. No. 141 reads in full: ChanRoble svirtual Lawli bra ry

SECTION 83. Upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, the President
may designate by proclamation any tract or tracts of land of the public domain as reservations for
the use of the Republic of the Philippines or of any of its branches, or of the inhabitants thereof, in
accordance with regulations prescribed for this purposes, or for quasi-public uses or purposes when
the public interest requires it, including reservations for highways, rights of way for railroads, hydraulic
power sites, irrigation systems, communal pastures or lequas comnnunales, public parks, public quarries, public
fishponds, working men's village and other improvements for the public benefit, (Emphasis supplied)

35
Section 88, C.A. No. 141 provides in full: ChanRob lesvi rtual Lawli bra ry

SECTION 88. The tract or tracts of land reserved under the provisions of Section eighty-three shall be non-
alienable and shall not be subject to occupation, entry, sale, lease, or other disposition until again declared
alienable under the provisions of this Act or by proclamation of the President, (Emphasis supplied)

36
See J. Brion Dissent in Heirs of Mario Malabanan v. Rep. of the Philippines, 605 Phil. 244 (2009).

37
Article 420 of the Civil Code reads in full: c ralawlaw lib rary

Art. 420. The following things are the property of public dominion: ChanRoble svi rtual Lawli bra ry

(1) Those intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges constructed by the
State, banks, shores, roadsteads, and others of similar character;

(2) Those which belong to the State, without being for public use, and are intended for some public
service or for the development of the national wealth, (Emphasis supplied)
38
See Manila International Airport Authority v. Court of Appeals, 528 Phil. 181, 218-221 (2006).

39
Id. at at 219.

40
Id. at 219-220.

41
Id. at 220-221.

42
The October 26, 1999 letter of then Solicitor General Raul I. Goco to Director Aurora T. Aquino of the Office of
the President inquiring about the existence of Proclamation No. 2487, records, Vol. II, pp. 205-206. It
pertinently reads: c ralawlaw lib rary

"Dear Director Aquino,

The President, in Memorandum Order No. 173, directed the Solicitor General, in coordination with the
Administrator of the Land Authority, to file an action for the cancellation of x x x (ii) TCT No. 15387 in the name
of Navy Officers Village Association, covering Lot 3, SWO-13-0Q0183 with an area of 47.5009 hectares,
otherwise known as the NOVA area.

Also, please furnish us with a copy of Proclamation No. 2487 which purportedly excluded from Proclamation No.
478 {reservation for the Veterans Rehabilitation, Medicare and Training Center} that portion known as NOVA
area for disposition."
43
The November 12, 1993 reply-letter of Director Aurora T. Aquino to Solicitor General Drilon, records, Vol. II,
pp. 208-206. It reads in part: cralawlawl ib rary

"This has reference to your letter dated October 20, 1993 x x x

It is further informed that the alleged Proclamation No. 2487 excluding from the Proclamation No. 478 dated
October 25, 1965, {reservation for the Veterans Rehabilitation, Medicare and Training Center site purposes} the
NOVA AREA for disposition, is not among the signed documents on file with this Office x x x."
44
Testimony of Marianito Dimaandal, Assistant Director of the Records Office of Malacaang, records, Vol. II, pp.
208-211.

45
Records, Vol. II, pp. 361-364.

46
Id. at 364.

Rollo, unnumbered page between pp. 74 and 75.

47

48
"DECLARING FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 27, 1991, AS A SPECIAL DAY IN THE PROVENCE OF BATANGAS AND THE
CITIES OF BATANGAS AND LIPA;" www.gov.ph/1991/09/25/proclamation-no-800-S-1991/ (last accessed May
22, 2015).

49
"RESERVING FOR SCHOOL SITE PURPOSES A CERTAIN PARCEL OF LAND OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN SITUATED
IN RAKANOAY MADAUM, MUNICIPALITY OF TAGUM, PROVINCE OF DAVAO DEL NORTH ISLAND OF
MINDANAO www.gov.ph/1991/09/25/proclamation-no-801-s-1991/ (last accessed May 23, 2015).

"DECLARING THE PERIOD FROM NOVEMBER 3 TO 9, 1991 AS 'CIVIL ENGINEERING

50

WEEK;" www.gov.ph/1991/09/20/proclamation-no-799-s-1991/ (last accessed May 23, 2015).

51
"REVOKING PROCLAMATION NO. 207, SERIES OF 1950, WHICH RESERVED FOR RESIDENCIA SITE PURPOSES
A CERTAIN PARCEL OF LAND SITUATED IN THE MUNICIPALITY OF SANTIAGO, ISABELA, ISLAND OF LUZON, AND
RESERVING THE LOT EMBRACED THEREIN FOR MARKET EXPANSION AND OTHER COMMERCIAL SITE PURPOSES
OF THE MUNICIPALITY OF SANTIAGO, ISABELA;" www.gov.ph/1991 /09/27/proclamation-no-802-s-1991/ (last
accessed May 23, 2015).

"DECLARING THE MONTH OF JULY, 1991 AND EVERY YEAR THEREAFTER, AS 'KABISIG HOUSING
52

MONTH;" www.gov.ph/1991/07/01/proclamation-no-750-s-1991/ (last accessed May 22, 2015).

53
"DECLARING MONDAY, JULY 22, 1991 A DAY OF ECUMENICAL PRAYER FOR NATIONAL UNITY AND A NON-
WORKING DAY IN METRO MANILA;" www.gov.ph/1991/07/18/proclamation-no-760-s-1991/ (last accessed May
22, 2015).

54
"DECLARING SEPTEMBER 1991 AS 'WORLD QUIZ BEE MONTH;" www.gov.ph/1991/08/26/proclamation-no-
780-s-1991/ (last accessed May 22, 2015).

55
"DECLARING FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 6, 1991, AS A 'SPECIAL DAY' IN THE PROVINCE OF
BUKIDNON;" www.gov.ph/1991/07/01/proclamation-no-750-s-1991/ (last accessed May 22, 2015).

56
"AMENDING PROCLAMATION NO. 770 DATED AUGUST 12, 1991 TO DECLARE NOVEMBER 1991 AS 'WORLD
QUIZ BEE MONTH', INSTEAD OF SEPTEMBER 1991;" www.gov.ph/1991 /09/03/proclamation-no-790-s-
1991/ (last accessed May 22, 2015).

57
"CONVERTING A PORTION OF THE PRISON SITE OF THE NEW BILIBID PRISON TO PATRIMONIAL PROPERTY
OF THE GOVERNMENT AND DECLARING THE SAME OPEN TO DISPOSITION AS THE SITE OF THE DEPARTMENT
OF JUSTICE HOUSING PROJECT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF ACT NUMBERED THREE
THOUSAND AND THIRTY-EIGHT;" http://www.gov.ph/1991/09/05/proclamation-no-792-s-1991/ (last accessed
May 23, 2015).

58
"DECLARING SATURDAY, OCTOBER 12, 1991, AS A SPECIAL DAY IN ZAMBOANGA
CITY;" www.gov.ph/1991/09/11/proclamation-no-797-s-1991/ (last accessed May 23, 2015)
59
"DECLARING THE MONTH OF OCTOBER OF EVERY YEAR AS MUSEUMS AND GALLERIES
MONTH;" www.gov.ph/1991/09/12/proclamation-no-798-s-1991/ (last accessed May 23, 2015).

60
"RESERVING FOR SCHOOL SITE PURPOSES OF THE KORONADAL CENTRAL ELEMENTARY SCHOOL A CERTAIN
PARCEL OF LAND OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN SITUATED IN THE POBLACION, MUNICIPALITY OF KORONADAL,
PROVINCE OF SOUTH COTABATO, ISLAND OF MINDANAO;" www.gov.ph/1991/09/30/proclamation-no-804-s-
1991/ (last accessed May 23, 2015).

61
"FURTHER EXTENDING THE NATIONAL MEMBERSHIP, EDUCATIONAL AND FUND CAMPAIGN PERIOD OF THE
PHILIPPINE MENTAL HEALTH ASSOCIATION UP TO SEPTEMBER 30,
1992;" www.gov.ph/1991/09/30/proclamation-no-805-s-1991/ (last accessed May 23, 2015).

62
"AUTHORIZING THE FEDERATION OF SENIOR CITIZENS ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC. TO
CONDUCT A NATIONAL FUND CAMPAIGN FOR A PERIOD OF ONE YEAR;" www.gov.ph/1991/10/02/proclamation-
no-806-s-1991/ (last accessed May 23, 2015).

63
"RESERVING FOR ZAMBOANGA CITY GOVERNMENT CENTER SITE PURPOSES A CERTAIN PARCEL OF LAND OF
THE PUBLIC DOMAIN SITUATED IN THE POBLACION, CITY OF ZAMBOANGA, ISLAND OF
MINDANAO" www.gov.ph/1991/10/07/proclamation-no-810-s-1991/ (last accessed May 22, 2015).

64
"ESTABLISHING AS KABANKALAN WATERSHED FOREST RESERVE FOR PURPOSES OF PROTECTING,
MAINTAINING OR IMPROVING ITS WATER YIELD AND PROVIDING RESTRAINED MECHANISM FOR
INAPPROPRIATE FOREST EXPLOITATION AND DISRUPTIVE LAND-USE A PARCEL OF LAND OF THE PUBLIC
DOMAIN LOCATED IN THE MUNICIPALITY OF KABANKALAN, PROVINCE OF NEGROS OCCIDENTAL, ISLAND OF
NEGROS, PHILIPPINES" www.gov.ph/1991 /10/25/proclamation-no-820-s-1991/ (last accessed May 22, 2015)

65
"ESTABLISHING AS CABADBARAN RIVER WATERSHED FOREST RESERVE FOR PURPOSES OF PROTECTING,
MAINTAINING AND IMPROVING ITS WATER YIELD AND TO PROVIDE RESTRAINING MECHANISM FOR
INAPPROPRIATE FOREST EXPLOITATION AND DISRUPTIVE LAND-USE, A CERTAIN PARCEL OF LAND OF THE
PUBLIC DOMAIN SITUATED IN THE MUNICIPALITIES OF CABADBARAN AND SANTIAGO, PROVINCE OF AGUSAN
DEL NORTE, ISLAND OF MINDANAO, PHILIPPINES" www.gov.ph/1991/11/13/proclamation-no-834-s-1991/ (last
accessed May 22, 2015).

66
"RESERVING FOR PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT CENTER SITE PURPOSES A CERTAIN PARCEL OF LAND OF THE
PUBLIC DOMAIN SITUATED IN THE BARANGAY OF BULANAO, MUNICIPALITY OF TABUK, PROVINCE OF KALINGA-
APAYAO, ISLAND OF LUZON" www.gov.ph/1991/11 /26/proclamation-no-840-s-1991/ (last accessed May 22,
2015).

67
The areas specifically exempted from sale, as enumerated under Section 8 of RA 7227, are: cralawlawl ibra ry

(a) Approximately 148.80 hectares in Fort Bonifacio for the National Capital Region (NCR) Security Brigade,
Philippine Army (PA) officers' housing area, and Philippine National Police (PNP) jails and support services
(presently Camp Bagong Diwa);

(b) Approximately 99.91 hectares in Villamore Air Base for the Presidential Airlift Wing, one squadron of
helicopters for the NCR and respective security units;

(c) The following areas segregated by Proclamation Nos.: cralawlawl ibra ry

(1) 461, series of 1965; (AFP Officers Village)

(2) 462, series of 1965; (AFP Enlisted Men's Village)

(3) 192, series of 1967; (Veterans Center)

(4) 208, series of 1967; (National Shrines)

(5) 469, series of 1969; (Philippine College of Commerce)

(6) 653, series of 1970; (National Manpower and Youth Council)

(7) 684, series of 1970; (University Center)

(8) 1041, series of 1972; (Open Lease Concession)

(9) 1160, series of 1973; (Manila Technical Institute)

(10) 1217, series of 1970; (Maharlika Village)

(11) 682, series of 1970; (Civil Aviation Purposes)

(12) 1048, series of 1975; (Civil Aviation Purposes)

(13) 1453, series of 1975; (National Police Commission)

(14) 1633, series of 1977; (Housing and Urban Development)

(15) 2219, series of 1982; (Ministry of Human Settlements, BLISS)

(16) 172, series of 1987; (Upper, Lower and Western Bicutan and Signal Housing)

(17) 389, series of 1989; (National Mapping and Resource Information Authority)

(18) 518, series of 1990; (CEMBO, SO CEMBO, W REMBO, E REMBO, COMEMBO, PEMBO, PITOGO)

(19) 467, series of 1968; (General Manila Terminal Food Market Site)

(20) 347, series of 1968; (Greater Manila Food Market Site)

(21) 376, series of 1968; (National Development Board and Science Community)
(d) A proposal of 15 hectares as relocation site for families to be affected by circumferential road 5 and radial
road 4 construction; Provided, further, That the boundaries and technical description of these crumpet areas
shall be determined by an actual group survey.
68
See Article 420 of the Civil Code.

69
See Section 88, C.A. No. 141.

Supra note 38, at 218-219.

70

71
See Lorzano v. Tabayag, Jr., G.R. No. 189647, February 6, 2012, 665 SCRA 38, 51, citing Republic v. Heirs of
Felipe Alejaga, Sr., 441 Phil. 656 (2002).

72
Id. at 51. See also Torbela v. Rosario, G.R. No. 140553, December 7, 2011, 661 SCRA 633, 659.

73
See Section 3 (k), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court.

74
See Section 3, Rule 131 of the Rules of Court. See also Delfin v. Billones, 519 Phil. 720, 732 (2006).

75
Approved on March 9, 1922, entitled "An Act Authorizing the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources to
Sell or Lease Land of the Private Domain of the Government of the Philippine Islands."

76
"Section 1. The Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources is hereby authorized to sell or lease land of the
private domain of the Government of the Philippines Islands, or any part thereof, to such persons, corporations
or associations as are, under the provisions of Act Numbered Twenty-eight hundred and seventy-four, known as
the Public Land Act, entitled to apply for the purchase or lease of agricultural public land."

77
"Sec. 2. The sale or lease of the land referred to in the preceding section shall, if such land is agricultural, be
made in the manner and subject to the limitations prescribed in chapters five and six, respectively, of said Public
Land Act, and if it be classified differently in conformity with the provisions of chapter nine of said Act: Provided,
however, That the land necessary for the public service shall be exempt from the provision of this Act."

78
Entitled "AN ACT FURTHER AMENDING SECTION ONE HUNDRED SEVEN OF COMMONWEALTH ACT NUMBER
ONE HUNDRED FORTY-ONE, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE PUBLIC LAND ACT, AS AMENDED." It was enacted on
July 9, 1985.
79
See testimony of Ernesto Erive, then Chief of Surveys Division of the National Capital Region, Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR-NCR), TSN, September 16, 1996, pp. 18-25.

80
See testimony of Ernesto Erive, then Chief of Surveys Division, DENR-NCR, TSN, pp. April 22, 1996, pp. 2-24.

81
See testimony of Ernesto Erive, then Chief of Surveys Division, DENR-NCR, TSN, August 26, 1996, pp. 2-3.

82
Certification of Jose Mariano, Chief of the LMB Records Management Division, dated September 24, 1993,
records, Vol. II, p. 347.

See also TSN of the testimonies of Armando B. Bangayan, then Chief of the LMB Records Management Division,
January 10, 1996; Jose Parayno, Records Officer I of the DENR-NCR South CENRO, September 16, 1996, pp. 3-
7; and of Ernesto Erive, Chief of Surveys Division, DENR-NCR, July 13, 1996, pp. 3-10.

83
See October 4, 1993 letter of LMB Director Palad to Captain Nilo Rosario Villarta, Office of the Naval Judge
Advocate, records, Vol. II, pp. 343-344; and TSN, February 12, 1997.

84
Submitted by Eliodoro M. Constantino NBI Document Examiner III, Records, Vol. II, pp. 433- 436. See also
TSNs dated July 25, 1997 and December 2, 1997 where NBI Document Examiner Constantino confirmed his
findings in the October 29, 1993 Questioned Documents Report.

85
Records, Vol. II, p. 436.

86
Id.

87
Records, Vol. I, p. 163.

88
See November 22, 1994 Certification issued by the LMB Cash Section, signed by Cash Section OIC Lilibeth
Sloan, records, Vo. II, p. 348.

LMB Cashier Lilibeth Sloan testified that the official receipts which the LMB used on November 28, 1991, started
from No. 4195501 S up to 4195550 S; while those which it used on December 23, 1992, started with 4195699 S
up to 4195709 S, TSN, September 3, 2002, pp. 7-9.

G.R. No. 195990, August 05, 2015 - HEIRS OF RAFAEL GOZO REPRESENTED BY CASTILLO GOZO AND
RAFAEL GOZO, JR., Petitioners, v. PHILIPPINE UNION MISSION CORPORATION OF THE SEVENTH DAY
ADVENTIST CHURCH (PUMCO), SOUTH PHILIPPINE UNION MISSION OF SDA (SPUMCO) AND SEVENTH DAY
ADVENTIST CHURCH AT SIMPAK, LALA, LANAO DEL NORTE REPRESENTED BY BETTY PEREZ , Respondents.

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 195990, August 05, 2015

 HEIRS OF RAFAEL GOZO REPRESENTED BY CASTILLO GOZO AND RAFAEL GOZO,
JR., Petitioners, v. PHILIPPINE UNION MISSION CORPORATION OF THE SEVENTH DAY ADVENTIST
CHURCH (PUMCO), SOUTH PHILIPPINE UNION MISSION OF SDA (SPUMCO) AND SEVENTH DAY
ADVENTIST CHURCH AT SIMPAK, LALA, LANAO DEL NORTE REPRESENTED BY BETTY
PEREZ , Respondents.

DECISION

PEREZ, J.:

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 filed by petitioners Heirs of Rafael Gozo seeking to reverse and set
aside the 10 November 2010 Decision2 of the Court of Appeals and its 14 February 2011 Resolution3 in CA-
G.R. CV No. 00188. The assailed decision and resolution reversed the 30 June 2004 Decision of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Kapatagan, Lanao del Norte and held that the action for nullification and recovery of
possession filed by the petitioners is already, barred by laches. The dispositive portion of the Court of
Appeals Decision reads: chanRoble svirtual Lawlib ra ry

ACCORDINGLY, the Decision dated 30 June 2004 of the court a quo is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
South Philippine Union Mission of the Seventh Day Adventist Church remains the absolute owner of the
donated property.4 ChanRobles Vi rtua lawlib rary

ChanRobles Vi rtualaw lib rary

The Facts

Petitioners claim that they are the heirs of the Spouses Rafael and Concepcion Gozo (Spouses Gozo) who,
before their death, were the original owners of a parcel of land with an area 236,638 square meters located
in Sitio Simpak, Brgy. Lala, Municipality of Kolambugan, Lanao del Norte. The respondents claim that they
own a 5,000 square-meter portion of the property. The assertion is based on the 28 February 1937 Deed of
Donation5 in favor of respondent Philippine Union Mission Corporation of the Seventh Day Adventist
(PUMCO-SDA). Respondents took possession of the subject property by introducing improvements thereon
through the construction of a church building, and later on, an elementary school. On the date the Deed of
Donation is executed in 1937, the Spouses Gozo were not the registered owners of the property yet
although they were the lawful possessors thereof. It was only on 5 October 1953 that the Original Certificate
of Title (OCT) No. P-642 covering the entire property was issued in the name of Rafael Gozo (Rafael)
married to Concepcion Gozo (Concepcion) pursuant to the Homestead Patent granted by the President of the
Philippines on 22 August 1953.6

In view of Rafael's prior death, however, his heirs, Concepcion, and their six children, namely, Abnera,
Benia, Castillo, Dilbert, Filipinas and Grace caused the extrajudicial partition of the property. Accordingly,
the Register of Deeds of Lanao del Norte issued a new certificate of title under Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) No. (T-347)-2927 under the names of the heirs on 13 January 1954.

On 30 July 1992, Concepcion caused the survey and the subdivision of the entire property including the
portion occupied by PUMCO-SDA.8 It was at this point that respondents brought to the attention of
Concepcion that the 5,000 square-meter portion of the property is already owned by respondent PUMCO-
SDA in view of the Deed of Donation she executed together with her husband in their favor in 1937. When
Concepcion, however, verified the matter with the Register Deeds, it appeared that the donation was not
annotated in the title. The absence of annotation of the so-called encumbrance in the title prompted
petitioners not to recognize the donation claimed by the respondents. The matter was left unresolved until
Concepcion died and the rest of the owners continued to pursue their claims to recover the subject property
from the respondents.

A compromise was initially reached by the parties wherein the petitioners were allowed by respondents to
harvest from the coconut trees planted on the subject property but a misunderstanding ensued causing
respondents to file a case for qualified theft against the petitioners.

On 19 June 2000 or around six decades after the Deed of Donation was executed, petitioners filed an action
for Declaration of Nullity of Document, Recovery of Possession and Ownership with Damages against
PUMCO-SDA before the RTC of Kapatagan, Lanao del Norte.9 In their-Complaint docketed as Civil Case No.
21-201, petitioners claimed that the possession of PUMCO-SDA on the subject property was merely
tolerated by petitioners and therefore could not ripen into ownership.10 In addition, petitioners argued that
the signatures of the Spouses Gozo were forged underscoring the stark contrast between the genuine
signatures of their parents from the ones appearing in the deed.11Finally, petitioners averred that granting
for the sake of argument that the said signatures were genuine, the deed of donation will remain invalid for
lack of acceptance which is an essential requisite for a valid contract of donation.12

For their part, respondents insisted on the validity of the donation and on the genuineness of the signatures
of the donors who had voluntarily parted with their property as faithful devotees of the church for the
pursuit of social and religious ends.13 They further contended that from the moment the Spouses Gozo
delivered the subject property to respondents in 1937, they were already in open, public, continuous and
adverse possession thereof in the concept of an owner.14 A considerable improvement was claimed to have
been introduced into the property in the form of church and school buildings.15 The argument of the
petitioners, therefore, that the donation was invalid for lack of acceptance, a question which came 63 years
after it was executed, is already barred by laches.

After the pre-trial conference, trial on the merits ensued. Both parties adduced documentary and testimonial
evidence to support their respective positions.

On 30 June 2004, the RTC rendered a Decision16 in favor of the petitioners thereby declaring that they are
the rightful owners of the subject property since the contract of donation which purportedly transferred the.
ownership of the subject property to PUMCO-SDA is void for lack of acceptance. In upholding the right of the
petitioners to the land, the court a quo held that an action or defense for the declaration of nullity of a
contract does not prescribe. Anent the claim that petitioners slept on their rights, the RTC adjudged that the
equitable doctrine of laches is inapplicable in the case at bar because the action of the registered owners to
recover possession is based on Torrens title which cannot be barred by laches. The RTC disposed in this
wise: cha nRoblesvi rt ualLaw lib rary

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing consideration, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the
[petitioners], to wit:

(1) Declaring the 5,000 square meter portion of the land covered by TCT
[No.] (T-347)-292 part of the common property of the [petitioners]; and

(2) Declaring the Deed of Donation as void.

The [petitioners], however, are not entitled to damages, attorney's fees and cost of litigation prayed
for.17 ChanRobles Vi rtua lawlib rary

On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the RTC Decision18 and ordered the dismissal of petitioners'
complaint on the ground of laches. The appellate court opined that petitioners failed to assert their rights
over the land for more than 60 years, thus, laches had set in. Even if petitioners were the registered owners
of the land in dispute, laches would still bar them from recovering possession of the same.

The Motion for Reconsideration filed by the petitioners was likewise denied by the appellate court in a
Resolution19 dated 14 February 2011.

Petitioners are now before this Court via this instant Petition for Review on Certiorari seeking the reversal of
the Court of Appeals Decision and Resolution on the sole ground that: chanRoblesvi rtual Lawl ibra ry

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN REVERSING AND SETTING ASIDE THE DECISION OF THE
COURT A QUO ON THE GROUND OF LACHES.20 ChanRoblesVirt ualawli bra ry

ChanRobles Vi rtualaw lib rary

The Court's Ruling

While the opposing parties center their arguments and counterarguments on the timeliness of raising the
question of the validity of' donation, a careful scrutiny of the records, however, reveals a significant fact that
at the time the Deed of Donation was executed by the Spouses Gozo on 28 February 1937, the subject
property was part of the inalienable public domain. It was only almost after two decades later or on 5
October 1953 that the State ceded its right over the land in favor of the Spouses Gozo by granting their
patent application and issuing an original certificate of title in their favor. Prior to such conferment of title,
the Spouses Gozo possessed no right to dispose of the land which, by all intents and purposes, belongs to
the State.

Under the Regalian doctrine, which is embodied in Article XII, Section 2 of our Constitution, all lands of the
public domain belong to the State, which is the source of any asserted right to any ownership of land. All
lands not appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State. Accordingly,
public lands not shown to have been reclassified or released as alienable agricultural land or alienated to a
private person by the State remain part of the inalienable public domain.21

The classification of public lands is an exclusive prerogative of the executive department of the government
and not the Courts. In the absence of such classification, the land remains as an unclassified land until it is
released therefrom and rendered open to disposition. This is in consonance with the Regalian doctrine that
all lands of the public domain belong to the State and that the State is the source of any asserted right to
ownership in land and charged with the conservation of such patrimony.22

All lands not appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State.
Accordingly, all public lands not shown to have been reclassified or released as alienable agricultural land or
alienated to a private person by the State remain part of the alienable public domain. As already well-settled
in jurisprudence, no public land can be acquired by private persons without any grant, express or implied,
from the government; and it is indispensable that the person claiming title to public land should show that
his title was acquired from the State or any other mode of acquisition recognized by law. To prove that the
land subject of an application for registration is alienable, the applicant must establish the existence of a
positive act of the government such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order, an administrative
action, investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators, and a legislative act or a statute. The
applicant may also secure a certification from the Government that the land applied for is alienable and
disposable.23

Commonwealth Act No. 141, also known as the Public Land Act, as amended by Presidential Decree No.
1073, remains to this day the existing general law governing the classification and disposition of lands of the
public domain, other than timber and mineral lands. The following provisions under Title I, Chapter II of the
Public Land Act, as amended, is very specific on how lands of the public domain become alienable or
disposable:24
SEC. 6. The President, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources,
shall from time to time classify the lands of the public domain into: chanRoblesv irtual Lawlib rary

(a) Alienable or disposable,

(b) Timber, and
(c) Mineral lands, ChanRobles Vi rtualaw lib rary

and may at any time and in a like manner transfer such lands from one class to another, for the purposes of
their administration and disposition.

SEC. 7. For the purposes of the administration and disposition of alienable or disposable public lands, the
Batasang Pambansa or the President, upon recommendation by the Secretary of Natural Resources, may
from time to time declare what public lands are open to disposition or concession under this Act.

xxxx

SEC. 8. Only those lands shall be declared open to disposition or concession which have been officially
delimited and classified and, when practicable, surveyed, and which have not been reserved for public or
quasi-public uses, nor appropriated by the Government, nor in any manner become private property, nor
those on which a private right authorized and recognized by this Act or any other valid law may be claimed,
or which, having been reserved or appropriated, have ceased to be so. However, the President may, for
reasons of public interest, declare lands of the public domain open to disposition before the same have had
their boundaries established or been surveyed, or may, for the same reason, suspend their concession or
disposition until they are again declared open to concession or disposition by proclamation duly published or
by Act of the Congress.

SEC. 9. For the purpose of their administration and disposition, the lands of the public domain alienable or
open to disposition shall be classified, according to the use or purposes to which such lands are destined, as
follows:
cha nRoblesv irt ual Lawlib rary

(a) Agricultural; cra lawlawlib rary

(b) Residential, commercial, industrial, or for similar productive purposes; c ralawlaw lib rary

(c) Educational, charitable, or other similar purposes; and

(d) Reservations for townsites and for public and quasi-public uses.
The President, upon recommendation by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, shall from time
to time make the classifications provided for in this section, and may, at any time and in a similar manner,
transfer lands from one class to another.25 cralawredChanRob les Virtualawl ibra ry
By virtue of Presidential Decree No. 705, otherwise known as the Revised Forestry Code, the President
delegated to the DENR Secretary the power to determine which of the unclassified lands of the public
domain are (1) needed for forest purposes and declare them as permanent forest to form part of the forest
reserves; and (2) not needed for forest purposes and declare them as alienable and disposable lands.26

Per the Public Land Act, alienable and disposable public lands suitable for agricultural purposes can be
disposed of only as follows: cha nRobl esvirt ual Lawlib rary

1. For homestead settlement; cralawlawl ib rary

2. By sale;cralawlawlib rary

3. By lease; and
4. By confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles:

(a) By judicial legalization; cralawlawl ibra ry

(b) By administrative legalization (free patent).27

Homestead over alienable and disposable public agricultural land is granted after compliance by
an applicant with the conditions and requirements laid down under Title II, Chapter IV of the Public
Land Act, the most basic of which are quoted below: cha nRoblesv irt ual Lawlib rary

SEC. 12. Any citizen of the Philippines over the age of eighteen years, or the head of a family, who does not
own more than twenty-four hectares of land in the Philippines or has not had the benefit of any gratuitous
allotment of more than twenty-four hectares of land since the occupation of the Philippines by the United
States, may enter a homestead of not exceeding twenty-four hectares of agricultural land of the public
domain.

SEC. 13. Upon the filing of an application for a homestead, the Director of Lands, if he finds that the
application should be approved, shall do so and authorize the applicant to take possession of the land upon
the payment of five pesos, Philippine currency, as entry fee. Within six months from and after the date of
the approval of the application, the applicant shall begin to work the homestead, otherwise he shall lose his
prior right to the land.

SEC. 14. No certificate shall be given or patent issued for the land applied for until at least one-fifth of the
land has been improved and cultivated. The period within which the land shall be cultivated shall not be less
than one nor more than five years, from and after the date of the approval of the application. The applicant
shall, within the said period, notify the Director of Lands as soon as he is ready to acquire the title. If at the
date of such notice, the applicant shall prove to the satisfaction of the Director of Lands, that he has resided
continuously for at least one year in the municipality in which the land is located, or in a municipality
adjacent to the same and has cultivated at least one-fifth of the land continuously since the approval of the
application, and shall make affidavit that no part of said land has been alienated or encumbered, and that he
has complied with all the requirements of this Act, then, upon the payment of five pesos, as final fee, he
shall be entitled to a patent.28 ChanRobles Vi rtua lawlib rary

It is clear under the law that before compliance with the foregoing conditions and requirements the applicant
has no right over the land subject of the patent and therefore cannot dispose the same even if such disposal
was made gratuitously. It is an established principle that no one can give what one does not have, nemo dat
quod non habet.29 It is true that gratuitous disposal in donation may consist of a thing or a right but the
term right must be understood in a "proprietary" sense over which the possessor has jus disponendi.30 This
is because in true donations there results a consequent impoverishment of the donor or diminution of his
assets.31 In Republic v. Court of Appeals,32 the Court declared the contract of donation, executed by the
donor who has no proprietary right over the object of the contract, null and void, viz: chanRoble svirtual Lawli bra ry

Even on the gratuitous assumption that a donation of the military "camp site" was executed between
Eugenio de Jesus and Serafin Marabut, such donation would anyway be void because Eugenio de
Jesus held no dominical rights over the site when it was allegedly donated by him in 1936. In that
year, Proclamation No. 85. of President Quezon already withdrew the area from sale or settlement and
reserved it for military purposes, x x x Eugenio de Jesus cannot be said to be possessed of that "proprietary"
right over the whole 33 hectares in 1936 including the disputed 12.8081 hectares for at the time this
12.8081-hectare lot had already been severed from the mass disposable public lands by Proclamation No.
85 and excluded from the Sales Award. Impoverishment of Eugenio's asset as a result of such donation is
therefore farfetched. (Emphasis supplied) ChanRo bles Vi rtualaw lib rary

It is beyond question that at the time the gratuitous transfer was effected by the Spouses Gozo on 28
February 1937, the subject property was part of the public domain and is outside the commerce of man. It
was only on 5 October 1953 that the ownership of the property was vested by the State to the Spouses
Gozo by virtue of its issuance of the OCT pursuant to the Homestead Patent granted by the President of the
Philippines on 22 August 1953. Hence, the donation of the subject property which took place before 5
October 1953 is null and void from the very start.33

As a void contract, the Deed of Donation produces no legal effect whatsoever. Quod nullum est, nullum
producit effectum34 That which is a nullity produces no effect.35 Logically, it could not have transferred title
to the subject property from the Spouses Gozo to PUMCO-SDA and there can be no basis for the church's
demand for the issuance of title under its name. Neither does the church have the right to subsequently
dispose the property nor invoke acquisitive prescription to justify its occupation. A void contract is not
susceptible to ratification, and the action for the declaration of absolute nullity of such contract is
imprescriptible.36

The lack of respondents' right over the property was confirmed when the Spouses Gozo had the entire
property, including the portion occupied by the church, surveyed and patented, and covered by their
homestead patent. Further, after a certificate of title was issued under their names, the Spouses Gozo did
not effect the annotation thereon of the supposed donation. Registration is the operative act that gives
validity to the transfer or creates a lien upon the land.37 Indeed it has been ruled that where there was
nothing in the certificate of title to indicate any cloud or vice in the ownership of the property, or any
encumbrance thereon, the purchaser is not required to explore farther than what the Torrens title upon its
face indicates in quest for any hidden defect or inchoate right that may subsequently defeat his right
thereto.38 If the rule were otherwise, the efficacy and conclusiveness of the certificate of title which the
Torrens system seeks to insure would entirely be futile and nugatory.39The public shall then be denied of its
foremost motivation for respecting and observing the Land Registration Act.40

Just as significantly, the homestead application of the Spouses Gozo over the entire area of the property
including that occupied by respondents and the issuance in their favor of the corresponding title without any
complaint or objection from the respondents, remove the case of the petitioners from the operation of the
doctrine of laches.

And, further than the issuance of an original title, the entire property was made subject of an extrajudicial
partition of the property by the Gozo heirs resulting in the issuance of TCTs in their names in 1954. Again, in
no instance during the partition did the respondents make known their claim over the property.

Clearly from the facts, the petitioners asserted their rights repeatedly; it was the respondents who kept
silent all throughout about the supposed donee's rights.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated
10 November 2010 and Resolution dated 14 February 2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 00188
are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

SO ORDERED. chanroblesvi rtua llawli bra ry

Sereno, C.J., (Chairperson), Leonardo-De Castro, Bersamin, and Perlas-Bernabe, JJ., concur.

Endnotes:

Rollo, pp. 10-24.

1

2
Id. at 50-64; Penned by Associate Justice Edgardo T. Lloren with Associate Justices Romulo V. Borja and
Ramon Paul L. Hernando, concurring.

3
Id. at 71-72.

4
Id. at 63.

5
Records, p. 101.

6
Id. at 8.

7
Id. at 143-145.

8
Id. at 146.
9
Id. at 1-7.

10
Id.

11
Id.

12
Id.

13
Id. at 19-24.

14
Id.

15
Id.

16
Rollo, pp. 28-49.

17
Id. at 48-49.

18
Id. at 50-64.

19
Id. at 71-72.

20
Id. at 15.

Republic-Bureau of Forest Development v. Roxas, G.R. No. 157988, 11 December 2013, 712 SCRA 177,
21

201.

22
Republic of the Phils., v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 239 Phil. 393, 401 (1987).

23
Rep. of the Phils., v. Muoz, 562 Phil. 103, 115-116 (2007).

24
Republic-Bureau of Forest Development v. Roxas, supra note 21.

25
Id. at 201-202.

26
Id. at 203.

27
Id. at 204.

28
Id. at 204-205.

29
Naval v. Court of Appeals, 518 Phil. 271, 282 (2006).

30
That is why future property cannot be donated because ownership does not reside yet in the donor. (Art.
751, New Civil Code) as cited in Republic v. Court of Appeals, 165 Phil. 142, 159 (1976).

31
Republic v. Court of Appeals, 165 Phil. 142, 159 (1976).

32
Id.

33
Art. 1409, New Civil Code. The following contracts are inexistent and void from the beginning:

(1) Those whose cause, object or purpose is contrary to law, morals, good
customs, public order or public policy;
(2) Those which are absolutely simulated or fictitious;
(3) Those whose cause or object did not exist at the time of the transaction;
(4) Those whose object is outside the commerce of men;
(5) Those which contemplate an impossible service;
(6) Those where the intention of the parties relative to the principal object of
the contract cannot be ascertained;
(7) Those expressly prohibited or declared void by law. (Emphasis supplied)
Spouses Tan v. Bantegui, 510 Phil. 434, 447 (2005).
34

35
Id.

Binayug v. Ugaddan, G.R. No. 181623, 5 December 2012, 687 SCRA 260, 273.
36

Spouses Peralta v. Heirs of Abalon, G.R. No. 183448, 30 June 2014, 727 SCRA 477, 494 citing Fule v. De
37

Legare, 117 Phil. 367 (1963).

38
Id. at 494-495.

39
Id. at 495.

40
Id.

G.R. No. 172961, September 07, 2015 - PEDRO MENDOZA [DECEASED], SUBSTITUTED BY HIS HEIRS
FEDERICO MENDOZA AND DELFIN MENDOZA, AND JOSE GONZALES, Petitioners, v. REYNOSA VALTE,
Respondent.

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 172961, September 07, 2015

PEDRO MENDOZA [DECEASED], SUBSTITUTED BY HIS HEIRS FEDERICO MENDOZA AND DELFIN
MENDOZA, AND JOSE GONZALES, Petitioners, v. REYNOSA VALTE, Respondent.

DECISION

LEONEN, J.:

The existence or non-existence of fraud is a legal conclusion based on a finding that the evidence presented
is sufficient to establish facts constituting its elements.1 Questions of fact are generally not entertained in a
petition for review before this court.2 In any event, petitions for a review or reopening of a decree of
registration based on actual fraud must be filed before the proper court within the one-year period provided
under the relevant laws.3 The party alleging fraud must overcome the burden of proving the fraud with clear
and convincing evidence.4 Section 101 of Commonwealth No. 141 allows actions for the reversion of land
fraudulently granted to private individuals filed even after the lapse of the one-year period,5 but this must
be initiated by the state.

This Petition for Review on Certiorari assails the Court of Appeals' December 28, 2005 Decision6 and prays
that the Office of the President Decision be reinstated.7

Sometime in 1978,8 Reynosa Valte (Valte) filed a free patent application9 dated July 6, 1978 for a 7.2253-
hectare parcel of land10 in San Isidro, Lupao, Nueva Ecija.11 The application listed Procopio Vallega and
Pedro Mendoza (Mendoza) as witnesses who would testify to the truth of the allegations in Valte's
application.12

The Director of Lands then issued the Notice of Application for Free Patent stating that "[a]ll adverse claims
to the tract of land above-described must [be] filed in the Bureau of Lands on or before the 7th day of
August 1978. Any claim not so filed will be forever barred."13

On September 14, 1978, the Land Investigator certified that the land formed part of the old cadastral lot
subdivided in December 1975 and approved as Csd-03-000514-D on March 25, 1976. Thus, Lot 1035-B was
equivalent to Lot 2391, Cad. 144 of Lupao, Nueva Ecija.14 The land was first occupied and cultivated by
Francis Maglaya, Nemesio Jacala, and Laureano Parias, who sold all their rights to the portions adjudicated
to them to Spouses Policarpio Valte and Miguela dela Fuente in May 1941.15 The spouses immediately took
possession. Miguela dela Fuente assumed the responsibilities over the land after her husband died. When
she aged, she transferred all her rights to their only daughter, Reynosa Valte, who was found in actual
possession of the land.16 The Land Investigator recommended the grant of Valte's application considering
these findings.17

On December 28, 1978, the Bureau of Lands approved Valte's application and issued Free Patent No.
586435.18 On January 31, 1979, the Cabanatuan City Register of Deeds issued OCT No. P-10119.19

On December 6, 1982,20 Mendoza and Jose Gonzales (Gonzales) filed a protest against Valte's application,
claiming to be "the lawful owner[s] and possessors] since 1930 thru predecessor-in-interest [and who] had
been in actual uninterrupted, open, peaceful, exclusive[,] and adverse possession in the concept of an
owner of the above-described property."21

Mendoza and Gonzales alleged that Valte procured Free Patent No. 586435 by means of fraud,
misrepresentation, and connivance.22 Specifically: cha nRoblesvi rt ualLaw lib rary

In her application for Free Patent, applicant-respondent REYNOSA VALTE, willfully and fraudulently
suppressed and omitted to state the material fact that the said land was in actual possession of the land
claimants-protestants[,] and the improvements consisting of rice paddies and pilapiles were existing long
before the time Reynosa Valte filed her free patent.23 ChanRobles Vi rtua lawlib rary

In view of the protest, the Department of Environment and Natural Resources notified the parties on March
10, 1993 regarding an ocular investigation. Only Mendoza and Gonzales were present despite notice on
Valte.24

On March 15, 1993, the Barangay Captain and other officials of San Isidro Lupao, Nueva Ecija executed
a Sinumpaang Salaysay stating that they have been residents of the barangay since birth, that they know all
the residents but do not know Valte, and that they are definite that there is no barangay resident with that
name.25 cralawred

Mendoza and Gonzales were mandated to present two (2) witnesses during the investigation.26 They
presented Eimirando Sabado, who testified that: chanRoblesvi rt ualLaw lib rary

(1) he has been residing on the lot adjacent to the area in question since 1929; (2) he personally knows
Mendoza and Gonzales who are his neighbors; (3) both Mendoza and Gonzales filed FPAs for the
controverted land before 1982; (4) both Mendoza and Gonzales resided on the subject land on or before
1929; (5) no one has claimed nor interrupted their said occupation since 1929; (6) he does not know Valte
who is claiming the lot and that no one had claimed the same; (7) Mendoza's father, Juan Mendoza, was the
one who planted the acacia trees on the land sometime in 1949 and that, until now, there are still acacia
and mango trees on the disputed lot aged twenty (20) years or more.27 ChanRobles Vi rtua lawlib rary

The second witness, Agapito Pagibitan, executed an Affidavit attesting to the following: chanRoble svirtual Lawli bra ry

(1) he personally knows Mendoza and Gonzales; (2) he likewise knows that both Mendoza and Gonzales
have been working in said area; (3) they are the real occupants of the lot which they have [been] tilling; (4)
since 1929 no one came to the disputed area nor had claimed the same; (5) since 1929, Mendoza and
Gonzales have been the ones who introduced improvements on the land such as mango, tamarind, acacia
and star apple trees; (6) Mendoza and Gonzales have built their respective houses thereon which were
made of cement-concrete materials with a pump to boot; (7) no one has been residing on the controverted
lot except Mendoza and Gonzales.28 ChanRobles Vi rtua lawlib rary

On March 30, 1993, Mendoza and Gonzales filed an amended protest alleging that Mendoza was in actual
possession and cultivation of four (4) hectares, more or less; that Gonzales was in actual possession and
cultivation of two (2) hectares, more or less; and that Procopio Vallega was in actual possession and
cultivation of the rest of the land.29 Also, the rice paddies and "pilapiles" had already been existing in the
land even before Valte filed her free patent application,30 and the District Land Officer failed to exercise due
diligence in its evaluation and mistakenly recommended the grant of Valte's application that was based on
fraud and misrepresentation.31

The Department of Environment and Natural Resources Secretary, in the Decision32 dated January 20, 1994,
ruled in favor of Mendoza and Gonzales: chanRoble svi rtual Lawli bra ry

WHEREFORE, foregoing premises duly considered, the Regional Executive Director (RED) of DENR Region
III is hereby directed to cause the REVERSION of the area covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No.
P-10119 of Reynosa Valte, through the Office of the Solicitor General in accordance with the pertinent
provisions of Commonwealth Act (CA) No. 141, as amended. Claimants-Protestants Pedro Mendoza and Jose
Gonzales and Procopio Vallega are hereby ADJUDGED to have the preferential right over the land in
question pro rata to their area of actual occupation. Hence, they are GIVEN SIXTY (60) DAYS from the
termination of the reversion proceedings to FILE their respective appropriate public land applications.

SO ORDERED.33 ChanRoblesVi rtualaw lib rary

On March 20, 1994, Valte appealed before the Office of the President, raising violation of due process since
the Department of Environment and Natural Resources' investigation was conducted ex parte without giving
her the opportunity to be heard.34

The Office of the President, in its Decision dated February 10, 1997, set aside the January 20, 1994 Decision
and ordered "the conduct of another formal hearing and thorough investigation of the case."35

Mendoza and Gonzales reiterated their claim of ownership and possession of the land since 1930 and the
nullity of Valte's title for having been acquired through fraudulent means.36 Their evidence was grounded
mostly on the Department of Environment and Natural Resources' investigation results consisting of
the Sinumpaang Salaysay of the Barangay Captain and officials and the statements of their two (2)
witnesses.37

Valte countered that her father bought the land in 1941, and her mother ceded the land to her in
1978.38 She then processed titling in her name.39 She, through her administrator, Pacifico M. Vizmonte,
maintained that Mendoza and Gonzales were tenants with no preferential right over the land.40 She
presented her free patent application and the Joint Affidavit of Procopio Vallega and Mendoza where
Mendoza recognized Valte's exclusive claim and possession over the land.41

The Department of Environment and Natural Resources Secretary,42 in the Decision dated March 11, 1999,
found Mendoza and Gonzales to be mere tenants of the land43 and dismissed the protest: chanRoble svirtual Lawlib ra ry

In view on the foregoing, the Protest of Jose Gonzales and Pedro Mendoza against Free Patent Application
No. (III-2) 124061 and Original Certificate of Title No. P-10119 in the name of Reynosa Valte is hereby
dismissed for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.44 ChanRoblesVi rtualaw lib rary

The Office of the President, in its Decision45 dated April 26, 2000, reversed the March 11, 1999 Decision and
reinstated the January 20, 1994. It denied reconsideration.46 The Decision's fallo reads: chanRoble svi rtual Lawli bra ry

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the questioned decision dated March 11, 1999 is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The decision dated January 20, 1994 is hereby REINSTATED directing
the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, through the Solicitor General, to cause the reversion
of the area covered by Original Certificate of Title No. P-10119 of Reynosa Valte. Appellants Mendoza and
Gonzales are hereby adjudged to have the preferential right over the subject land, pro-rata to their area of
actual occupation, entitling them to file their respective public land applications within sixty (60) days after
the termination of the reversion proceedings.

SO ORDERED.47 ChanRoblesVi rtualaw lib rary

The Court of Appeals, in its September 8, 2000 Resolution, dismissed Valte's Petition for Review due to
several defects, such as incomplete certification of non-forum shopping, failure to attach registry receipts in
the affidavit of service, and lack of certified true copies of the material portions of the record referred to in
the Petition.48 It also denied reconsideration, which prompted Valte to file a Petition for Certiorari before this
court.49

This court denied Valte's Petition due to late filing, lack of certification against forum shopping, and failure to
sufficiently show that the Court of Appeals committed any reversible error. However, on reconsideration,
this court reinstated Valte's Petition.50 Respondents filed their Comment, and the parties filed their
respective Memoranda. This court, in its Decision51 dated June 29, 2004, remanded the case to the Court of
Appeals for decision on the merits: cha nRoblesv irt ual Lawlib rary

Considering that the resolution of the controversy between the parties revolves admittedly on factual issues
and that these issues involve the regularity and legality of the disposition under the Public Land Law of
7.2293 hectares of public land to petitioner, this Court relaxes the rule on certification on forum shopping
and directs the remand of the case to the Court of Appeals for decision on the merits.

WHEREFORE, the assailed Court of Appeals Resolutions of September 8, 2000 and January 12, 2001 are
hereby SET ASIDE.

Let the case be REMANDED to the Court of Appeals for decision on the merits.

SO ORDERED.52 ChanRoblesVi rtualaw lib rary

The Court of Appeals, in its Decision53 dated December 28, 2005, reversed the Office of the President
Decision and reinstated the March 11, 1999 Decision. It also denied reconsideration.54 The Decision's fallo
reads:chanRoble svirtual Lawli bra ry

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated April 26, 2000 and Resolution dated July 14, 2000
of the Office of the President in OP Case No. 5942 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The decision dated March
11, 1999 of the Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources in DENR Case No. 7480
is hereby REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.55 ChanRoblesVi rtualaw lib rary

Hence, Mendoza and Gonzales filed this Petition.

Mendoza and Gonzales submit that Valte employed fraud, misrepresentation, and connivance in her free
patent application.56 Lot 1035-B only has two (2) hectares, yet her application stated an area of 7.2255
hectares.57 The Technical Description of Lot 1035-B in OCTNo. P-10119 shows that Lot 103 5-A covering
three (3) hectares is under free patent application by Gonzales.58 The Department of Agrarian Reform
[Municipal Agrarian Reform Office] Certification states that Mendoza and Gonzales are tenants of a combined
area of 2.6367 hectares, yet this does not explain Valte's claim over the rest of the 7.2255 hectares.59 Valte
does not possess nor cultivate the land,60 and her employment of tenants over 2.6367 hectares violates
Presidential Decree No. 152.61

In her Comment, Valte counters that Mendoza and Gonzales cannot raise for the first time on appeal the
issue arising from Gonzales' claim over Lot 1035-A with three (3) hectares.62 Valte submits that "[i]f only
petitioners raised this issue below, then respondent could have proven that petitioner Jose Gonzales' [three-
hectare] land known as Lot 1035-A is distinct and separate from respondents' 7.2255 hectares land known
as Lot 1035-B."63 If Gonzales indeed owns two (2) hectares of Valte's land, then he should have included
this in his free patent application for Lot 1035-A filed even before Valte's application.64 Mendoza and
Gonzales' tardiness in raising this issue and their inconsistent claims regarding land area show bad
faith.65 Valte claims that the argument that Lot 1035-B should be limited to two (2) hectares should be
disallowed for being a change of theory on appeal66 and for being belied by the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources' factual findings.67 Mendoza and Gonzales also amended their protest on March 30,
1993, which showed that they reduced their claim from 7.335 hectares to six hectares, with Mendoza in
possession of four (4) hectares, Gonzales with possession of two (2) hectares, and Procopio Vallega with
possession of the remaining area.68Valte adds the inapplicability of Presidential Decree No. 152 as this law
applies only to lands of public domain, while the land in question has already been privately owned as early
as 1929.69 Valte's free patent application in 1978 was for the recognition of her vested title to the land.70

In their Reply, Mendoza and Gonzales submit that Valte failed to present evidence of ownership of the land
now covered under OCT No. P-10119.71 Petitioners contend that they "have consistently asserted that
respondent has only an area of [one] hectare or two, and her FPANo. 12409 (E-590098) is tainted with
misrepresentation by claiming that she owns all of [L]ots 1035-A, 1035-B, 1035-C, and 1035-D."72 They
submit that Valte's free patent application was for Lot No. 1035-B that has two (2) hectares, not 7.2255
hectares as Valte claimed, and she only presented a Deed of Sale covering Lot No. 1035-C that has 1.2829
hectares.73 They reiterate that Gonzales owns the adjacent Lot 1035-A covered by OCT No. P-8211.74

The issues for resolution are:

First, whether this case falls within the exceptions that allow the examination of questions of fact before this
court; and

Second, whether the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the Office of the President Decision that found
fraud and misrepresentations by respondent Reynosa Valte in her free patent application.

We deny the Petition.

A petition for review filed under Rule 45 may raise only questions of law. The factual findings by the Court of
Appeals, when supported by substantial evidence, are generally conclusive and binding on the parties and
are no longer reviewable unless the case falls under the recognized exceptions.75 This court is not a trier of
facts and we are not duty bound to re-examine evidence.76 The existence or non-existence of fraud in an
application for free patent depends on a finding of fact insofar as the presence of its requirements. As
observed by the Court of Appeals, petitioner Mendoza admitted against his interest when he stated in his
Joint Affidavit that respondent "has continuously occupied and cultivated the land."77 Petitioners cannot also
now raise the factual issue on land identity since a change of theory on appeal offends due process and fair
play.78 Unless it can be shown that irregularity tainted the free patent proceedings conducted before the
Director of Lands, the presumption that official duty has been regularly performed79 stands.

In any event, petitions for a review or reopening of a decree of registration based on actual fraud must be
filed before the proper court within the one-year period provided under the relevant laws.80Section 101 of
Commonwealth Act No. 141 allows actions for the reversion of land fraudulently granted to private
individuals filed even after the lapse of the one-year period,81 but this must be initiated by the state. As
regards Presidential Decree No. 152 that prohibits the employment of share tenants for purposes of
complying with the requirements under the Public Land Act on entry, occupation, improvement, and
cultivation of the land, the Municipal Agrarian Reform Office Certification dated March 27, 1995 on
petitioners' tillage for a combined area of 2.6367 hectares does not disprove a finding of occupation and
cultivation by respondent's parents over the land applied for since 1941.

Respondent filed the free patent application pursuant to "Chapter VII of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as
amended, or Republic Act No. 782 further as amended Republic Act No. 6236."82 Section 44 of
Commonwealth Act No. 141 reads: chanRoble svirtual Lawli bra ry

CHAPTER VII. Free Patents

Sec. 44. Any natural-born citizen of the Philippines who is not the owner of more than twenty-four hectares,
and who since July fourth, nineteen hundred and forty-five or prior thereto, has continuously occupied and
cultivated, either by himself or through his predecessors-in-interest, a tract or tracts of agricultural public
lands subject to disposition, or who shall have paid the real estate tax thereon while the same has not been
occupied by any other person shall be entitled, under the provisions of this chapter, to have a free patent
issued to him for such tract or tracts of such land not to exceed twenty-four hectares.83 ChanRobles Vi rtualaw lib rary

Thus, the requisites for the issuance of a free patent are as follows: first, the applicant is a natural-born
citizen of the Philippines; second, the applicant is not the owner of more than 12 hectares of land; third, the
applicant has continuously occupied and cultivated, either himself or through his predecessors-in-interest, a
tract or tracts of agricultural public land subject to disposition, for at least 30 years before the effectivity of
Republic Act No. 6940; and fourth, the applicant has paid the real taxes thereon while the land has not been
occupied by any other person.84

Section 91 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 provides for the consequences of false statements or omissions of
facts made in an application: chanRoble svirtual Lawli bra ry

Sec. 91. The statements made in the application shall be considered as essential condition and parts of any
concession, title, or permit issued on the basis of such application, and any false statement therein or
omission of facts altering, changing, or modifying the consideration of the facts set forth in such statements,
and any subsequent modification, alteration, or change of the material facts set forth in the application shall
ipso facto produce the cancellation of the concession, title, or permit granted. It shall be the duty of the
Director of Lands, from time to time and whenever he may deem it advisable, to make the necessary
investigations for the purpose of ascertaining whether the material facts set out in the application are true,
or whether they continue to exist and are maintained and preserved in good faith, and for the purposes of
such investigation, the Director of Lands is hereby empowered to issue subpoenas and subpoenas duces
tecum and, if necessary, to obtain compulsory process from the courts. In every investigation made in
accordance with this section, the existence of bad faith, fraud, concealment, or fraudulent and illegal
modification of essential facts shall be presumed if the grantee or possessor of the land shall refuse or fail to
obey a subpoena or subpoena duces tecum lawfully issued by the Director of Lands or his authorized
delegates or agents, or shall refuse or fail to give direct and specific answers to pertinent questions, and on
the basis of such presumption, an order of cancellation may issue without further proceedings.85 ChanRoble s Virtualawl ibra ry

Article 1456 of the Civil Code also provides that "[i]f property is acquired through mistake or fraud, the
person obtaining it is, by force of law, considered a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the person
from whom the property comes."86

The identity of the land in controversy involves a factual question. This requires a delineation of actual
boundaries and a review of the admissibility and credibility of documents such as deeds of sale and survey
plans.87 The presence or absence of fraud also involves a factual question.88

Only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review before this court.89 This rule admits of
exceptions,90 and petitioners invoke these exceptions, in that the factual findings of the Court of Appeals and
of the Office of the President are at variance with each other, the factual findings of the Court of Appeals are
contrary to the parties' evidence, and the factual findings of the Court of Appeals were made with grave
abuse of discretion.91

Questions of fact challenge the lower court's appreciation of evidence and factual conclusions, as opposed to
questions of law that no longer deal with the probative value of evidence:92
A question of law exists when the doubt or controversy concerns the correct application of law or
jurisprudence to a certain set of facts; or when the issue does not call for an examination of the probative
value of the evidence presented, the truth or falsehood of facts being admitted. A question of fact exists
when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of facts or when the query invites calibration
of the whole evidence considering mainly the credibility of the witnesses, the existence and relevancy of
specific surrounding circumstances, as well as their relation to each other and to the whole, and the
probability of the situation.93
ChanRobles Vi rtua lawlib rary

The Department of Environment and Natural Resources Secretary, the Office of the President, and the Court
of Appeals rendered their Decisions based on their own appreciation of the evidence in determining whether
respondent obtained the patent through fraudulent means.

The Department of Environment and Natural Resources Secretary's Decision dated January 20, 1994 gave
credence to petitioners' witnesses' positive testimony regarding petitioners' actual possession of the land: chanRoblesv irt ual Lawlib rary

After a thorough scrutiny of the entire records as well as an objective appraisal of the complete facts of the
present case, We find the protest of Mendoza and Gonzales to be highly meritorious and the claim of
Procopio Vallega, who is occupying one (1) hectare of the disputed premises, justifiable as the same has
even been respected and acknowledged by the claimants-protestants herein. The witnesses of the
claimants-protestants are both credible and hence, their positive testimony to the effect that the claimants-
protestants have been in actual possession of the land in question cannot be simply disregarded and should
be accorded great weight. WE hold that applicant-respondent Valte has never been in open, continuous,
exclusive, peaceful and notorious possession of the land in dispute[.]94 ChanRo bles Vi rtua lawlib rary

After reinvestigation, the Department of Environment and Natural Resources Secretary's Decision dated
March 11, 1999 dismissed the protest for lack of merit,95 this time giving weight to the Joint Affidavit
executed by petitioner Mendoza and Procopio Vallega on respondent's occupation of the land: chanRoblesv irtual Lawlib rary

The evidence on record preponderates to the fact that Reynosa Valte has preferential rights over the
controverted lot. In fact, as early as 1978, in the report of Land Investigator Celedonio P. Bacena, it was
found that the controverted land has been occupied and cultivated by Reynosa Valte, and previously by her
predecessor-in-interest since 1945. Herein protestants, Pedro Mendoza and Procopio Vallega, thru an
affidavit dated July 6, 1978 supported Reynosa Valte's application for free patent over the controverted
land, under oath, confirmed that the latter has continuously occupied and cultivated the land since 1945 by
herself and by her predecessors-in-interest. The aforestated joint affidavit is a very convincing documents
[sic] to strengthen Reynosa Valte's assertions that, indeed, the protestants are tenants and that their rights
on the controverted lot cannot rise higher than its source, that of Reynosa Valte.96 ChanRobles Virtual awlibra ry

The Office of the President Decision dated April 26, 2000, in reinstating the January 20, 1994
Decision,97 again accorded greater weight to petitioners' witnesses' positive testimony: chanRoble svirtual Lawlib ra ry
After going through the evidence presented by the parties, we find the protest of appellants to be credible.
The positive testimony of their witnesses, namely the barangay captain, the barangay officials as well as
neighbors, to the effect that appellee was hardly or never seen cultivating nor possessing the subject
premises cannot simply be disregarded. Rather, these testimonies should be accorded great weight and
respect, as they come from individuals who could very well attest to the truth or falsity of appellee's claim
that she was in "open, continuous, exclusive and peaceful" possession of the property in dispute.
cralawlawl ibra ry

The declaration of appellee that she actually possessed the subject property and had cultivated the same,
despite her full knowledge that Mendoza and Gonzales were the actual possessors and occupants, simply
constitutes fraud as she failed to state this material fact in her application for free patent. Hence, the
cancellation of OCT No. P-10119 issued in her favor is in order[.]98 Cha nRobles Vi rtua lawlib rary

The Court of Appeals' December 28, 2005 Decision reversed and set aside the Office of the President
Decision and reinstated the Department of Environment and Natural Resources Secretary's Decision dated
March 11, 1999.99

The Court of Appeals gave more weight to the Joint Affidavit of petitioner Mendoza and Procopio Vallega and
discussed the reasons why the statements by petitioners' witnesses were not credible.

First, the statements of Elmirando Sabado and Agapito Pagibitan were taken during the ex parte
investigation where respondent had no opportunity to present contrary evidence.100 During the formal
hearing and reinvestigation ordered by the Office of the President, respondent presented the Joint Affidavit
where petitioner Mendoza admitted against his interest in the land by stating that "[t]he said applicant has
continuously occupied and cultivated the land [herself] and/or thru h[er] predecessor-in-interest since July
4, 1945, or prior thereto and it is free from claims and conflicts."101

As regards the land area, the Court of Appeals discussed that "a perusal of the records and again the Joint
Affidavit would reveal that they affirm that the property subject of the free patent application has an area of
'7 hectares, 22 ares and 55 centares.'"102

Second, Elmirando Sabado and Agapito Pagibitan's statements that petitioners occupied the property as
early as 1929 or 1930 appeared doubtful and unreliable. The Certification dated September 24, 1976 by
Nueva Ecija Deputy Clerk of Court Prudencio P. Ciriaco states that other persons had possession of the land
during this time, and these persons sold the land to respondent's father in 1941.103 Also, Elmirando Sabado
was only four years old in 1929, and he could not have had the comprehension to adequately inform himself
on the concept of petitioners' alleged possession of the land.104

Third, even if petitioners' evidence were taken at face value, these would not sufficiently establish their
possession since 1929 or 1930 and the nature of this possession.105 On the other hand, the Municipal
Agrarian Reform Office Certification dated March 27, 1995106 reveals that petitioners' possession was merely
that of tenants.107

Also, respondent's mother, Miguela dela Fuente, executed a Sinumpaang Salaysay dated September 12,
1978 stating that she and her husband bought the land in 1941, and they cultivated it and paid the taxes
until they transferred its care to their daughter, Reynosa Valte, in 1964.108

The Sinumpaalang Salaysay reads: chanRoble svirtual Lawlib ra ry

AKO si MIGUELA DELA FUENTE, 86 na taong gulang, Pilipino, biyuda ni Polcarpio Valte, at kasalukuyang
nakatira sa 1826 Kalimbas, Sta. Cruz, Manila, matapos na ako ay sumumpa nang ayon sa umiiral na batas,
ay malaya at kusang loob akong nagsaysay ng gaya ng mga sumusunod; cralawlawlibra ry

Na, nang taong 1941, buwan ng Mayo, ako at ang namatay kong asawa na si Policarpio Valte, ay nakabili ng
3 lagay na bahagi ng palayang lupa na kung pagsama-samahin ay may parisukat na mahigit na 7 hectaryas
at nasa sa baryo ng San Isidro, Lupao, Nueba Esiha; cralawlawlibra ry

Na, ang isang lagay na may parisukat na 2 hectaryas humigit-kumulang ay nabili namin sa mag-asawang
Francisco Maglaya at Maxima Benitez, ang ikalawang lagay na may parisukat na kulang na 2 hectarya ay
nabili namin sa mag-asawang Nemesio Jacalan at Trinidad, Marta at ang ikatlong lagay ay parisukat na
mahigit na 3 at kalahating hectaryas at ito ay nabili naman namin kay Laureano Parias at bawat lagay ay
pawang bahagi ng Lote bilang 1035 ng sukat-cadastro bilang 144 ng Lupao, Nueba Esiha; cralawlawlib ra ry

Na, ang mga kasulatan ng bilihan namin nina Francisco Maglaya at Maxima Benitez at Laureano Parias ay
kapua nawala nuong panahon ng digmaan maliban sa kasulatan ng bilihan namin sa mag-asawang Nemesio
Jacalan at Marta Trinidad na hindi nawala; cralawlawlibrary

Na, matapos naming nabili ang nabang[g]it na 3 lagay na lupa nang taong 1941, ay inakupahan na namin
at nagsimula na kaming gumawa sa lupa at pagkatapos ng digmaan at ipinagpatuloy naming muli ang
paggawa tuloy binayaran namin ang kaukulang bayad sa buis patuloy hanggang sa kasalukuyan sa ilalim ng
Tax Declaration bilang 645, 646 [,] at 647 sa pangalan ng aking asawa na si Policarpio Valte na namatay sa
Manila nuong ika 10 ng Febrero, 1963; cra lawlawlib rary

Na, bagaman at nuon pang taong 1964 ko ipinaubaya sa aking anak na si Reynosa Valte ang pangangasiwa
sa pagpapagawa sa nasabing lupa ay ginawa ko ngayon ang salaysay na ito upang sa pamamagitan ng
kasulatang ito ay siyang magsilbing kasulatan ng paglilipat at pagsasalin ko ng buo kong karapatan sa lupa
sa nasabi kong anak na si Reynosa Valte, may sapat na gulang, dalaga at naninirahan din sa 1826 Kalimbas,
Sta. Cruz, Manila; cralawlawli bra ry

Ang nasabing lupa na isinasalin at inililipat ko kay Reynosa ay walang gusot, walang pananagutang utang
kangino man at ang salinan at lipatan ng karapatang ito ay walang kuartang kabayaran sa akin kundi ito ay
dahil at alang-alang lamang sa pagmamahal at mabuting paglilingkod sa akin ng aking anak na si
Reynosa; cralawlawl ibra ry

Sa katunayan ng lahat gaya ng matutunghayan sa gawing itaas nito ako ay lumagda ng aking pangalan
ngayong ika 12 ng Septeyembre [sic], 1978, dito sa Lun[g]sod ng Cabanatuan.109 ChanRoblesVi rt ualawlib rary

Lastly, petitioners failed to show any irregularity in the proceedings before the Director of Lands for
respondent's patent application.110

The Court of Appeals ruled that petitioners were "not only . . . burdened to prove the ... fraudulent
representations" that respondent allegedly committed in her application "by clear and convincing evidence";
they were also "burdened to present sufficient evidence to overcome the presumption that official duties
have been regularly performed and that the public documents which constitute [respondent's] evidence
should not be given credence."111 Petitioners failed to overcome this burden.112

II

Resolving questions of fact is a function of the lower courts.113 This court is a collegiate body. It does not
receive evidence nor conduct trial procedures that involve the marking of documentary evidence by the
parties and hearing the direct and cross-examination of each and every witness presented for testimonial
evidence. This court does not deal with matters such as whether evidence presented deserve probative
weight or must be rejected as spurious; whether the two sides presented evidence adequate to establish
their proposition; whether evidence presented by one party can be considered as strong, clear, and
convincing when weighed and analyzed against the other party's evidence; whether the documents
presented by one party can be accorded full faith and credit considering the other party's protests; or
whether certain inconsistencies in the party's body of proofs can justify not giving these evidence weight.114

The doctrine on hierarchy of courts ensures that the different levels of the judiciary can perform its
designated roles in an effective and efficient manner.115 As the court of last resort, this court should not be
burdened with functions falling within the causes in the first instance116 so that it can focus on its
fundamental tasks under the Constitution.117 This court leads the judiciary by breaking new ground or
further reiterating precedents in light of new circumstances or confusion in the bench and bar.118Thus,
"[r]ather than a court of first instance or as a repetition of the actions of the Court of Appeals, this court
promulgates these doctrinal devices in order that it truly performs that role."119

Since this court is not a trier of facts, we are not duty-bound to re-examine evidence already considered by
the lower courts.120 Factual findings by the Court of Appeals, when supported by substantial evidence, are
generally conclusive and binding on the parties and will no longer be reviewed by this court.121

III

Nonetheless, the burden of proving that respondent employed fraud in her free patent application falls on
petitioners who made this assertion.122 Petitioners failed to overcome this burden.

In Republic v. Bellate,123 this court discussed the nature of fraud as follows: chanRoblesvi rtua lLawl ibra ry
[T]he fraud must consist in an intentional omission of facts required by law to be stated in the application or
a willful statement of a claim against the truth. It must show some specific acts intended to deceive and
deprive another of his [or her] right. The fraud must be actual and extrinsic, not merely constructive
or intrinsic; the evidence thereof must be clear, convincing[,] and more than merely
preponderant, because the proceedings which are assailed as having been fraudulent are judicial
proceedings which by law, are presumed to have been fair and regular.124 (Emphasis in the original) ChanRob les Vi rtualaw lib rary

Different kinds of fraud exist, but the law allowing fraud as a ground for a review or reopening of a land
registration decree contemplates actual and extrinsic fraud.125

Actual fraud "proceeds from an intentional deception practiced by means of the misrepresentation or
concealment of a material fact."126 Extrinsic fraud "is employed to deprive parties of their day in court and
thus prevent them from asserting their right to the property registered in the name of the applicant."127

Petitioners did not allege nor show any irregularity in the free patent application proceedings conducted
before the Director of Lands. The presumption that official duty has been regularly performed128 stands. The
Court of Appeals' discussion of the processes that had been complied with in the proceedings before
respondent's free patent application was approved is as follows: cha nRoblesvi rt ual Lawlib rary

As borne by the records, the representatives of the Director of Lands conducted an investigation to ascertain
the truth of the averments stated in petitioner's free patent application before it was approved. Petitioner
was also required to present witnesses (thus, the joint affidavit of on Procopio Vallega and Pedro Mendoza)
to attest to the truthfulness of the facts stated in the application. Petitioner likewise posted a notice of her
free patent application in three conspicuous places in the municipality where the subject lot is located in
compliance with Sections 45 and 46 of the above-law on the filing of adverse claims therein.129 ChanRob les Virtualawl ibra ry

ChanRobles Vi rtualaw lib rary

IV

The free patent application dated July 6, 1978 for the land "[i]dentical to Lot No. 1035-B of plan Csd-03-
000514-I"130 states that the land contains an area of "7 hectares, 22 ares, and 55 centares, a sketch of
which is attached."131 This same area was stated in the Notice of Application for Free Patent.132

Petitioner Mendoza was one of the witnesses stated in respondent's free patent application, and he even
executed the Joint Affidavit in Support of the Patent Application attesting to respondent's continuous
occupation and cultivation of the land herself or through her predecessors-in-interest "since July 4, 1945, or
prior thereto, and it is free from claims and conflicts."133 Procopio Vallega and Mendoza declared in their
Joint Affidavit as follows: chanRoble svirtual Lawlib rary

1. That we personally know Reynosa Valte who has filed Free Patent Application No. 2409 for
a tract of land located in the Municipality of Lupao, Province of N. Ecija; cralawlawlib ra ry

2. That we are actual residents of the said municipality of Lupao, Nueva Ecija and we know
the land applied for very well; c ralawlawli bra ry

3. That the said applicant has continuously occupied and cultivated the land himself and/or
thru his predecessors-in-interest since July 4, 1945, or prior thereto and it is free from
claims and conflicts; cralawlawl ibra ry

4. That we are not related to the applicant either by consaguinity or by affinity and we are not
personally interested in the land applied for; and

5. That to the best of our knowledge, belief and information, the applicant is a natural born
citizen of the Philippines and is not the owner of more than twenty four (24) hectares of
land in the Philippines.134

OCT No. P-10119 dated January 16, 1979 covers the same area of "7 hectares, 22 ares, 55 centares,
according to the official plat of the survey thereof on file in the Bureau of Lands, Manila and described on the
back hereof."135

Petitioners only filed their protest against respondent's free patent application on December 6, 1982, raising
fraud regarding who has actual possession and cultivation of the land.136 Based on the summary of facts in
the Decisions below, they did not question land identity.
Petitioners now imply an overlapping of land in that Lot 1305-B does not have an area of 7.2255 hectares as
this area includes the three-hectare Lot 1305-A in petitioner Gonzales' name.137

Petitioners argue in their Reply that they "have consistently asserted that respondent has only an area of
[one] hectare or two, and, her FPA No. 12409 (E-590098) is tainted with misrepresentation by claiming that
she owns all lots 1035-A, 1035-B, 1035-C[,] and 1035-D."138 They submit that respondent's free patent
application was for Lot No. 1035-B that has two (2) hectares, not 7.2255 hectares as respondent claimed,
and she only presented a Deed of Sale covering Lot No. 1035-C that has 1.2829 hectares.139

Respondent counters that "[i]f only petitioners raised this issue below, then respondent could have proven
that petitioner Jose Gonzales' [three-hectare] land known as Lot 1035-A is distinct and separate from
respondents' 7.2255 hectares land known as Lot 1035-B."140 If petitioner Gonzales indeed owns two (2)
hectares of respondent's land, then he should have included this in his free patent application for Lot 1035-A
filed even before respondent's application.141 Respondent's Comment attached, among other documents,
copies of Tax Declaration No. 05-14021-00489 in the name of Jose Gonzales covering Lot No. 1035-A with
an area of 3 hectares142 and Tax Declaration No. 05-14021-00111 in the name of Reynosa Valte covering
Lot No. 1035-B with an area of 7.2255 hectares.143

Since this factual issue was not raised in the protest, it was not addressed in the Decisions below. The
Decisions of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources Secretary, the Office of the President,
and the Court of Appeals dealt with petitioners' submission that respondent employed fraud in claiming
actual possession and cultivation of the land.

Claims of overlapping titles require the assistance of geodetic engineering experts, and trial courts often
direct the Department of Environment and Natural Resources Land Management Bureau to conduct a
verification/relocation survey.144 There is no showing that petitioners questioned the survey that resulted in
the 7.2255 hectare area of Lot 1305-B.

Petitioners cannot now raise the factual issue on land identity. A change of theory on appeal offends due
process and fair play.145

The Notice of Application for Free Patent also provides that "[a]ll adverse claims to the tract of land above-
described must be filed in the Bureau of Lands on or before the 7th day of August 1978. Any claim not so
filed will be forever barred."146

Petitioners only filed their protest on December 6, 1982,147 after Patent No. 586435 had been issued on
December 28, 1978148 and even after the Registry of Deeds had issued Original Certificate of Title No. P-
10119 on January 16, 1979.149

Section 32 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree, governs
the review of registration decrees:cha nRoblesvi rtua lLaw lib rary

Section 32. Review of decree of registration; Innocent purchaser for value. The decree of registration shall
not be reopened or revised by reason of absence, minority, or other disability of any person adversely
affected thereby, nor by any proceeding in any court for reversing judgments, subject, however, to the
right of any person, including the government and the branches thereof, deprived of land or of any
estate or interest therein by such adjudication or confirmation of title obtained by actual fraud,
to file in the proper Court of First Instance a petition for reopening and review of the decree of
registration not later than one year from and after the date of the entry of such decree of
registration, but in no case shall such petition be entertained by the court where an innocent purchaser for
value has acquired the land or an interest therein, whose rights may be prejudiced. Whenever the phrase
"innocent purchaser for value" or an equivalent phrase occurs in this Decree, it shall be deemed to include
an innocent lessee, mortgagee, or other encumbrancer for value. Upon the expiration of said period of one
year, the decree of registration and the certificate of title issued shall become incontrovertible. Any person
aggrieved by such decree of registration in any case may pursue his remedy by action for damages against
the applicant or any other persons responsible for the fraud.150 (Emphasis supplied) ChanR obles Virtualawl ibra ry

Petitioners did not explain why they did not file the proper petition before the trial court or within the one-
year period as provided in Presidential Decree No. 1529 above. Their right to action, thus, already
prescribed.
 VI

Section 101 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 allows actions by the state for the reversion of land fraudulently
granted to private individuals even when they are filed after the lapse of the one-year period.151 However,
the state has not yet initiated such case.

In any event, petitioners failed to overcome their burden to prove fraud by respondent in her claim of
continuous occupation and cultivation of the land. As observed by the Court of Appeals, petitioner Mendoza
admitted against his interest when he stated in his Joint Affidavit that respondent "has continuously
occupied and cultivated the land."152 Elmirando Sabado's testimony regarding petitioners' occupation of the
land in 1929 also lacks credibility as he was only four years old in 1929.153 This court has disregarded similar
testimonies when it was shown that the witness was then too young to understand the concept of the
possession of a large tract of land.154

VII

In her free patent application for the 7.2255-hectare land in Nueva Ecija, respondent declared that her "post
office address is 1826 Kalimbas, Sta. Cruz, Manila."155 In her Comment, she also recognized petitioners as
her tenants but claimed that petitioner Mendoza's tillage is only 1.7759 hectares while petitioner Gonzales'
tillage is only 0.7713 hectares.156

This court has ruled that an applicant's failure to state in the free patent application that other parties are
also in possession of the land applied for "clearly constitutes a concealment of a material fact amounting to
fraud and misrepresentation within the context of [Section 91 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended],
sufficient enough to cause ipso facto the cancellation of their patent and title."157

Interestingly, petitioner Mendoza was listed as a witness in respondent's free patent application,158and he
even executed the Joint Affidavit appended to the application, declaring that the "applicant has continuously
occupied and cultivated the land himself and/or thru his predecessors-in-interest since July 4, 1945, or prior
thereto and it is free from claims and conflicts."159

Section 44 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 provides that the occupation and cultivation is "either by himself
or through his predecessors-in-interest."160 Section 44 applies to free patents while Section 48(b) governs
judicial confirmation of an imperfect or incomplete title: chanRoble svirtual Lawlib ra ry

While the above-quoted provision [Section 44] does provide for a 30-year period of occupation and
cultivation of the land, Section 44 of the Public Land Act applies to free patents, and not to judicial
confirmation of an imperfect or incomplete title to which Section 48(b) applies.

The distinction between Sections 44 and 48(b) of the Public Land Act was recognized by Mr. Justice Puno, in
his separate opinion in the case of Cruz v. Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources, in which he
discussed the development of the Regalian doctrine in the Philippine legal system -
Registration under the Public Land Act and Land Registration Act recognizes the concept of ownership under
the civil law. This ownership is based on adverse possession for a specified period, and harkens to
Section 44 of the Public Land Act on administrative legalization (free patent) of imperfect or incomplete titles
and Section 48(b) and (c) of the same Act on the judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete
titles.161(Emphasis supplied) Ch anRobles Virtualawl ibra ry

The Court of Appeals gave more weight to Miguela dela Fuente's Sinumpaang Salaylay dated September 12,
1978 regarding the cultivation of the land by respondent's parents, who are her predecessors-in-interest: cha nRoblesv irt ual Lawlib rary

[E]ven if we take respondents' [Mendoza and Gonzales] evidence at its face value, it does not sufficiently
establish nor convey the purported fact and the nature of the latter's possession thereof and that such
possession indeed started in the years 1929-1930. In any case, petitioner [Valte] was able to present a
Certification from the MAPO dated March 27, 1995 which revealed that the nature of respondents'
possession of the subject lot was merely that of tenants. In addition, petitioner was able to present
the Sinumpaang Salaysay dated September 12, 1978 of Miguela dela Fuente, petitioner's mother who stated
that she and her husband, Policarpio, bought the subject lot in 1941 and from then on until 1964, when the
subject lot was transferred under the care of petitioner, she and Policarpio cultivated the same and paid the
real property taxes thereon.162 (Citations omitted) ChanRoble sVirt ualawlib ra ry

ChanRobles Vi rtualaw lib rary

VIII

Lastly, Presidential Decree No. 152, entitled Prohibiting the Employment or Use of Share Tenants in
Complying with Requirements of Law Regarding Entry, Occupation, Improvement and Cultivation of Public
Lands, Amending for the Purpose Certain Provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as Amended, Otherwise
Known as the Public Land Act, was enacted on March 13, 1973. It provides that: chanRoblesvi rtua lLawl ib rary

2. The employment or use of share tenants in whatever form for purposes of complying with the
requirements of the Public Land Act regarding entry, occupation, improvement and cultivation is hereby
prohibited and any violation hereof shall constitute a ground for the denial of the application, cancellation of
the grant and forfeiture of improvements on the land in favor of the government.163 ChanRobles Virtualawl ibra ry

Petitioners argue that respondent does not possess nor cultivate the land,164 and her employment of tenants
over 2.6367 hectares violates Presidential Decree No. 152.165

Respondent counters that Presidential Decree No. 152 does not apply as this law applies only to lands of
public domain, while the land has already been privately owned as early as 1929 and was already subject of
cadastral proceedings.166 She argues that her free patent application in 1978 was for the recognition of her
vested title to the land.167

Petitioners' argument that they are tenants of the land, thus, respondent violated Presidential Decree No.
152, fails to convince.

The Director of Lands, subject to review by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
Secretary, has exclusive jurisdiction over the disposition and management of public lands.168Questions on
the identity of the land require its technical determination.169 Petitioners did not allege nor show any
irregularity in the free patent application proceedings before the Director of Lands on the 7.2255-parcel of
land; thus, the presumption that official duty has been regularly performed170stands.

Petitioners cannot rely on the Municipal Agrarian Reform Office Certification dated March 27, 1995
recognizing their tillage for a combined area of 2.6367 hectares.171 This was only issued in 1995. It does not
show that petitioners were employed as tenants for purposes of complying with the requirements of the
Public Land Act on occupation and cultivation of the land. It does not disprove a finding of occupation and
cultivation over the land since 1941 by respondent's parents, her predecessors-in-interest. This Certification
already states respondent as the landowner with title in her name: chanRoblesv irt ual Lawlib rary

Name of Landowner : Reynosa Valte

Title No. : OCT-P-10119
Survey
: Psd-03-024497 (OLT)
No.
Location : San Isidro, Lupao NE172
This court has also held that "once the patent is registered and the corresponding certificate of title is
issued, the land ceases to be part of the public domain and becomes private property."173

Section 101 of Commonwealth No. 141 allows actions for the reversion of land fraudulently granted to
private individuals filed even after the lapse of the one-year period,174 but this must be initiated by the
state.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals Decision in CA-G.R. SPNo. 60312
is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED. chanroblesvi rtua llawli bra ry

Carpio, (Chairperson), Brion, Del Castillo, and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

Endnotes:

Republic of the Philippines v. Guerrero, 520 Phil. 296, 306 (2006) [Per J. Garcia, Second Division].
1

2
RULES OF COURT, Rule 45, sec. 1.

3
Pres. Decree No. 1529 (1978), sec. 32.

4
Republic of the Philippines v. Bellate, G.R. No. 175685, August 7, 2013, 703 SCRA 210, 222 [Per J. Brion,
Second Division], quoting Libudan v. Gil, 150-A Phil. 362 (1972) [Per J. Antonio, Second Division].
5
Republic v. Heirs of Alejaga, Sr., 441 Phil. 656, 663 and 674 (2002) [Per J. Panganiban, Third
Division], citing Republic v. Court of Appeals, 325 Phil. 636 (1996) [Per J. Mendoza, Second Division].

Rollo, p. 8, Petition.
6

7
Id. at 31, Petition: "In view of the foregoing, the Office of the President's decision dated April 26, 2000, is
correct. As respondent Reynosa Valte's acts of numerous fraudulent and untruthful narrations or assertion of
material facts are indubitably on word, then her OCTNo. P-10119, be declared null and void, and the
decision of the Office of the President be reinstated. Other relief and remedy as are just, equitable and
lawful are also prayer for."

8
Id. at 58. The free patent application was dated July 6, 1978. The DENR January 20, 1994 Decision states
that the free patent application was filed on July 6, 1978 (Id. at 52), while the Petition alleged that the free
patent application was filed on December 15, 1978 (Id. at 11).

9
Id., Free Patent Application No. (III-2) 12409 (E-590098).

10
Id. The free patent application states that the parcel of land is "[i]dentical to Lot No. 1035-B, Cad-03-
000514-D."

11
Id. at 35, Court of Appeals Decision.

12
Id. at 58.

13
Id. at 126, Notice of Application for Free Patent.

14
Id. at 53, DENR Decision dated January 20, 1994.

15
Id.

16
Id.

17
Id.

18
Id. at 127, Order of Approval.

19
Id. at 60, Original Certificate of Title No. P. 10119.

20
Id. at 47, Office of the President Decision dated April 26, 2000.

21
Id. at 35, Court of Appeals Decision.

22
Id.

23
Id. at 36.

24
Id. at 47, Office of the President Decision dated April 26, 2000.

25
Id. at 48, Office of the President Decision dated April 26, 2000.

26
Id.

27
Id.

28
Id.

29
Id. at 55, DENR January 20, 1994 Decision Dated January 20, 1994.

30
Id. at 48, Office of the President Decision dated April 26, 2000.

31
Id. at 56, DENR Decision dated January 20, 1994.
32
Id. at 52-57. The Decision was penned by Secretary Angel C. Alcala.

33
Id. at 57, DENR Decision dated January 20, 1994.

34
Id. at 49, Office of the President Decision dated April 26, 2000.

35
Id. at 36, Court of Appeals Decision.

36
Id.

37
Id. at 37.

38
Id. at 36.

39
Id.

40
Id.

41
Id. at 36-37.

42
The Decision was penned by Secretary Antonio H. Cerilles.

Rollo, p. 37, Court of Appeals Decision.

43

44
Id. at 44.

45
Id. at 47-51. The Decision was signed by Executive Secretary Ronaldo B. Zamora, by the authority of the
President.

46
Id. at 38, Court of Appeals Decision.

47
Id. at 51, Office of the President Decision dated April 26, 2000.

Valte v. Court of Appeals, 477 Phil. 214, 222 (2004) [Per J. Carpio Morales, Third Division].
48

49
Id.

50
Id. at 223.

Valte v. Court of Appeals, 477 Phil. 214 (2004) [Per J. Carpio Morales, Third Division].
51

52
Id. at 225.

Rollo, pp. 34-44. The Decision was penned by Associate Justice Rodrigo V. Cosico and concurred in by
53

Associate Justices Regalado E. Maambong and Lucenito N. Tagle of the Seventh Division, Court of Appeals
Manila.

54
Id. at 46, Court of Appeals Resolution.

55
Id. at 43, Court of Appeals Decision.

56
Id. at 26, Petition.

57
Id.

58
Id. at 27.

59
Id. at 28.

60
Id. at 29.
61
Id. at 31.

62
Id. at 95, Comment.

63
Id. at 98.

64
Id. at 100.

65
Id. at 101.

66
Id. at 102.

67
Id. at 103-104.

68
Id. at 107.

69
Id. at 113.

70
Id. at 115.

71
Id. at 139, Reply.

72
Id. at 140.

73
Id. at 141-142.

74
Id. at 143.

Medina v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 137582, August 29, 2012, 679 SCRA 191, 201 [J. Perez, Second
75

Division].

76
Id.

Rollo, p. 40, Court of Appeals Decision.

77

Borromeo v. Mina, G.R. No. 193747, June 5, 2013, 697 SCRA 516, 524 [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe, Second
78

Division].

79
RULES OF COURT, Rule 131, sec. 3(m).

80
Pres. Decree No. 1529 (1978), sec. 32.

Republic v. Heirs of Alejaga, Sr., 441 Phil. 656, 663 and 674 (2002) [Per J. Panganiban, Third
81

Division], citing Republic v. Court of Appeals, 325 Phil. 636 (1994) [Per J. Mendoza, Second Division].

Rollo, p. 58, Free Patent Application.

82

83
Com. Act No. 141 (1936), as amended by Rep. Act No. 782 (1952), sec. 44. See also Secretary of
Department of Agrarian Reform, G.R. No. 195412, February 4, 2015 10 [Per J. Reyes, Third Division].
Section 44 has been amended by Republic Act No. 6940, March 28, 1990, to read:

SEC. 44. Any natural-born citizen of the Philippines who is not the owner of more than twelve (12) hectares
& who, for at least (30) years prior to the effectivity of this amendatory Act, has continuously occupied &
cultivated, either by himself or through his predecessors-in-interest a tract or tracts of agricultural public
lands subject to disposition, who shall have paid the real estate tax thereon while the same has not been
occupied by any person shall be entitled, under the provisions of this Chapter, to have a free patent issued
to him for such tract or tracts of such land not to exceed twelve (12) hectares. See also Del Rosario-Igbiten
v. Republic of the Philippines, 484 Phil. 145, 157 (2004) [Per J. Chico-Nazario, Second Division].

Encinares v. Achero, 613 Phil. 391, 403 (2009) [Per J. Nachura, Third Division], citing Republic v. Court of
84

Appeals, 406 Phil. 597, 606 (2001) [Per J. Ynares-Santiago, First Division].
85
Com. Act No. 141 (1936), sec. 91, as amended.

86
CIVIL CODE, art. 1456.

Bagunu v. Spouses Aggabao, 671 Phil. 183, 193 (2011) [Per J. Brion, Second Division].
87

Republic of the Philippines v. Guerrero, 520 Phil. 296, 306 (2006) [Per J .Garcia, Second Division].
88

89
RULES OF COURT, Rule 45, sec. 1.

See for example Bagunu v. Spouses Aggabao, 671 Phil. 183, 193 (2011) [Per J. Brion, Second
90

Division], citing Triumph International [Phils.], Inc. v. Apostol, 607 Phil. 157 (2009) [Per J. Carpio, First
Division].

Rollo, p. 30, Petition.

91

92
Binayug v. Ugaddan, G.R. No. 181623, December 5, 2012, 687 SCRA 260, 271 [Per J. Leonardo-De
Castro, First Division].

93
Id. at 271-272, citing Bukidnon Doctors' Hospital, Inc. v. Metropolitan Bank and Trust Co., 501 Phil. 516,
526 (2005) [Per C.J. Davide, Jr., First Division].

94
Rollo, p. 56, DENR Decision dated January 20, 1994.

95
Id. at 47, Office of the President Decision dated April 26, 2000.

96
Id. at 49.

97
Id. at 51.

98
Id. at 50-51.

Id. at 43, Court of Appeals Decision.

99

100
Id. at 39.

101
Id. at 40.

102
Id.

103
Id.

104
Id. at 40-41.

105
Id. at 41, Court of Appeals Decision.

106
Id. at 128. The Certification was signed by OIC-MARO Elizabeth C. Jara.

107
Id. at 41, Court of Appeals Decision.

108
Id.

Id. at 123, Sinumpaang Salaysay; Valte v. Court of Appeals, 477 Phil. 214, 225 (2004) [Per J. Carpio
109

Morales, Third Division].

110
Id. at 41, Court of Appeals Decision.

111
Id. at 42-43.

112
Id. at 43.

113
Angeles v. Pascual, 673 Phil. 499, 505 (2011) [Per J. Bersamin, First Division].
114
Id.

115
See Diocese of Bacolod v. COMELEC, G.R. 205728, January 21, 2015 [Per J. Leonen, En Banc] for its
discussion on the roles of the different levels of the judiciary.

116
Diocese of Bacolod v. COMELEC, G.R. 205728, January 21, 2015 [Per J. Leonen, En Banc], citing Vergara
v. Suelto, 240 Phil. 719, 732-733 (1987) [Per J. Narvasa, First Division].

117
Id., citing Banez, Jr. v. Conception, G.R. No. 159508, August 29, 2012, 679 SCRA 237, 250 [Per J.
Bersamin, First Division].

118
Id.

119
Id. at 14.

120
Medina v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 137582, August 29, 2012, 679 SCRA 191, 201 [Per J. Perez, Second
Division].

121
Id.

Republic of the Philippines v. Guerrero, 520 Phil. 296, 310 (2006) [Per J. Garcia, Second Division], citing
122

Mangahas v. Court of Appeals, 364 Phil. 12 (1999) [Per J. Purisima, Third Division].

G.R. No. 175685, August 7, 2013, 703 SCRA 210 [Per J. Brion, Second Divison].
123

124
Id. at 222, quoting Libudan v. Gil, 150-A Phil. 362 (1972) [Per J. Antonio, Second Division].

Republic of the Philippines v. Guerrero, 520 Phil. 296, 309 (2006) [Per J. Garcia, Second Division].
125

See also Encinares v. Achero, 613 Phil. 391,404 (2009) [Per J. Nachura, Third Division].

126
Id.

127
Id., citing Heirs of Roxas v. Court of Appeals, 337 Phil. 41 (1997) [Per J. Romero, Second Division].

128
RULES OF COURT, Rule 131 sec. 3(m).

Rollo, p. 42, Court of Appeals Decision.

129

130
Id. at 58 and 124, Free Patent Application.

131
Id.

132
Id. at 126, Notice of Application.

133
Id. at 125, Joint Affidavit.

134
Id.; Valte v. Court of Appeals, 477 Phil. 214, 225 (2004) [Per J. Carpio Morales, Third Division].

135
Id. at 60, Original Certificate of Title.

136
Id. at 47, Office of the President Decision dated April 26, 2000.

137
Id. at 26-28, Petition.

138
Id. at 140, Reply.

139
Id. at 141-142.

140
Id. at 98, Comment.
141
Id. at 100.

142
Id. at 188, Tax Declaration No. 05-14021-00489.

143
Id. at 199, Tax Declaration No. 05-14021-00111.

Heirs of Pabaus v. Heirs of Yutiamco, 670 Phil. 151, 163 (2011) [Per J. Villarama, Jr., First Division].
144

Borromeo v. Mina, G.R. No. 193747, June 5, 2013, 697 SCRA 516, 524 [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe, Second
145

Division].

146
Id. at 126, Notice of Application.

147
Id. at 47, Office of the President Decision dated April 26, 2000.

148
Id. at 127, Approval of Application and Issuance of Patent.

149
Id. at 60, Original Certificate of Title.

150
Pres. Decree No. 1529 (1978), sec. 32.

Alegria v. Drilon, 580 Phil. 413, 419 (2008) [Per J. Carpio, First Division] and Republic v. Heirs of Alejaga,
151

Sr., 441 Phil. 656, 663 and 674 (2002) [Per J. Panganiban, Third Division], citing Republic v. Court of
Appeals, 325 Phil. 636 (1996) [Per J. Mendoza, Second Division].

152
Id. at 40, Court of Appeals Decision.

153
Id.

154
See Republic of the Philippines v. Alconaba, 471 Phil. 607, 619 (2004) [Per C.J. Davide, Jr., First
Division].

155
Id. at 58, Free Patent Application.

Id. at 110 and 112, Comment.

156

Heirs of Alcaraz v. Republic of the Philippines, 502 Phil 521, 531-532 (2005) [Per J. Garcia, Third
157

Division].

158
Id. at 58, Free Patent Application.

159
Id. at 40, Court of Appeals Decision.

Com. Act No. 141 (1936), sec. 44. See also Encinares v. Achero, 613 Phil. 391, 403 (2009) [Per J.
160

Nachura, Third Division], citing Republic v. Court of Appeals, 406 Phil. 597, 606 (2001).

Del Rosario-Igtiben v. Republic of the Philippines, 484 Phil. 145, 157-158 (2004) [Per J. Chico-Nazario,
161

Second Division].

Rollo, p. 41, Court of Appeals Decision.

162

163
Pres. Decree No. 152 (1973).

Rollo, p. 29, Petition.

164

165
Id. at 31.

166
Id. at 113, Comment.

167
Id. at 115.

Bagunu v. Spouses Aggabao, 671 Phil. 183, 199-200 (2011) [Per J. Brion, Second Division], citing Section
168
5 of Exec. Order No. 192 and Section 3 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended.

Bagunu v. Spouses Aggabao, 671 Phil. 183, 200 (2011) [Per J. Brion, Second Division], citing Villaflor v.
169

Court of Appeals, 345 Phil. 524 (1997) [Per J. Panganiban, Third Division].

170
RULES OF COURT, Rule 131 sec. 3(m).

Rollo, p. 145, Reply.

171

172
Id. at 128, Certification.

Republic v. Bellate, G.R. No. 175685, August 7, 2013, 703 SCRA 210, 221 [Per J. Brion, Second
173

Division]; Lee v. Dela Paz, 619 Phil. 514, 534 (2009) [Per J. Chico-Nazario, Third Division], citing Director of
Lands v. De Luna, 110 Phil. 28, 31 (1960).

Republic v. Heirs of Alejaga, Sr., 441 Phil. 656, 663 and 674 (2002) [Per J. Panganiban, Third
174

Division], citing Republic v. Court of Appeals, 325 Phil. 636 (1996) [Per J. Mendoza, Second Division].