as lost income for the use of the lot until possession is restored
to the latter; and that Santiago be directed to pay plaintiff Ceroferr
[G.R. No. 139539. February 5, 2002] CEROFERR REALTY
CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and
ERNESTO D. SANTIAGO, respondents.
DECISION
PARDO, J.:
The Case
This is an appeal via certiorari[1] from the decision of the
Court of Appeals[2] dismissing petitioners appeal from the
order[3] of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 93, Quezon City,
which dismissed petitioners complaint for damages and
injunction with preliminary injunction, as well as its
resolution[4]denying reconsideration.[5]
The Facts
The facts, as found by the Court of Appeals,[6] are as follows:
On March 16, 1994, plaintiff (Ceroferr Realty Corporation) filed
with the Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch 93, a
complaint[7] against defendant Ernesto D. Santiago (Santiago),
for damages and injunction, with preliminary injunction. In the
complaint, Ceroferr prayed that Santiago and his agents be
enjoined from - claiming possession and ownership over Lot No.
68 of the Tala Estate Subdivision, Quezon City, covered by TCT
No. RT-90200 (334555); that Santiago and his agents be
prevented from making use of the vacant lot as a jeepney
terminal; that Santiago be ordered to pay Ceroferr P650.00 daily
moral, actual and exemplary damages and attorneys fees, plus
expenses of litigation.
In his answer, defendant Santiago alleged that the vacant lot
referred to in the complaint was within Lot No. 90 of the Tala
Estate Subdivision, covered by his TCT No. RT-78 110
(3538); that he was not claiming any portion of Lot No. 68 claimed
by Ceroferr; that he had the legal right to fence Lot No. 90 since
this belonged to him, and he had a permit for the purpose; that
Ceroferr had no color of right over Lot No. 90 and, hence, was
not entitled to an injunction to prevent Santiago from exercising
acts of ownership thereon; and that the complaint did not state a
cause of action.
In the course of the proceedings, an important issue
metamorphosed as a result of the conflicting claims of the parties
over the vacant lot actually used as a jeepney terminal the exact
identity and location thereof. There was a verification survey,
followed by a relocation survey, whereby it would appear that the
vacant lot is inside Lot No. 68. The outcome of the survey,
however, was vigorously objected to by defendant who insisted
that the area is inside his lot. Defendant, in his manifestation
dated November 2, 1994, adverted to the report of a geodetic
engineer. Mariano V. Flotildes, to the effect that the disputed
portion is inside the boundaries of Lot No. 90 of the Tala Estate
Subdivision which is separate and distinct from Lot No. 68, and
that the two lots are separated by a concrete fence.
Because of the competing claims of ownership of the parties over
the vacant lot, it became inevitable that the eye of the storm
centered on the correctness of property boundaries which would
necessarily result in an inquiry as to the regularity and validity of
the respective titles of the parties. While both parties have been
brandishing separate certificates of title, defendant asserted a
superior claim as against that of the plaintiff in that, according to
defendant, his title has been confirmed through judicial
reconstitution proceedings, whereas plaintiffs title does not carry
any technical description of the property except only as it is
designated in the title as Lot No. 68 of the Tala Estate
Subdivision.
It thus became clear, at least from the viewpoint of defendant,
that the case would no longer merely involve a simple case of
collection of damages and injunction which was the main
objective of the complaint - but a review of the title of defendant
vis--vis that of plaintiff. At this point, defendant filed a motion to
dismiss the complaint premised primarily on his contention that
the trial court cannot adjudicate the issue of damages without
passing over the conflicting claims of ownership of the parties
over the disputed portion.
On May 14, 1996, the trial court issued the order now subject of
this appeal which, as earlier pointed out, dismissed the case for
lack of cause of action and lack of jurisdiction. The court held that
plaintiff was in effect impugning the title of defendant which could
not be done in the case for damages and injunction before it. The
court cited the hoary rule that a Torens certificate of title cannot
be the subject of collateral attack but can only be challenged
through a direct proceeding. It concluded that it could not proceed
to decide plaintiffs claim for damages and injunction for lack of
jurisdiction because its judgment would depend upon a
determination of the validity of defendants title and the identity of
the land covered by it.
From this ruling, plaintiff appealed to this court insisting that the
complaint stated a valid cause of action which was determinable
from the face thereof, and that, in any event, the trial court could
proceed to try and decide the case before it since, under present
law, there is now no substantial distinction between the general
jurisdiction vested in a regional trial court and its limited
jurisdiction when acting as a land registration court, citing Ignacio
v. Court of Appeals 246 SCRA 242 (1995).
On March 26, 1999, the Court of Appeals promulgated a
decision dismissing the appeal.[8] On May 13, 1999, petitioner
filed with the Court of Appeals a motion for reconsideration of the
decision.[9] On July 29, 1999, the Court of Appeals denied
petitioners motion for reconsideration for lack of merit.[10]
Hence, this appeal.[11]
The Issues
The issues are: (1) whether Ceroferrs complaint states a
sufficient cause of action and (2) whether the trial court has
jurisdiction to determine the identity and location of the vacant lot
involved in the case.
The Courts Ruling
We grant the petition.
The rules of procedure require that the complaint must state
a concise statement of the ultimate facts or the essential facts
constituting the plaintiffs cause of action. A fact is essential if it
cannot be stricken out without leaving the statement of the cause
of action inadequate. A complaint states a cause of action only
when it has its three indispensable elements, namely: (1) a right
in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever
law it arises or is created; (2) an obligation on the part of the
named defendant to respect or not to violate such right; and (3)
an act or omission on the part of such defendant violative of the
right of plaintiff or constituting a breach of the obligation of
defendant to the plaintiff for which the latter may maintain an
action for recovery of damages.[12] If these elements are not
extant, the complaint becomes vulnerable to a motion to dismiss
on the ground of failure to state a cause of action.[13]
These elements are present in the case at bar.
 The complaint[14] alleged that petitioner Ceroferr
owned Lot 68 covered by TCT No. RT-90200
(334555). Petitioner Ceroferr used a portion of Lot 68 as a
jeepney terminal.
The complaint further alleged that
respondent Santiago claimed the portion of Lot 68 used as a
jeepney terminal since he claimed that the jeepney terminal was
within Lot 90 owned by him and covered by TCT No. RT-781 10
(3538) issued in his name.
Despite clarification from petitioner Ceroferr that the jeepney
terminal was within Lot 68 and not within Lot 90,
respondent Santiago persisted in his plans to have the area
fenced. He applied for and was issued a fencing permit by the
Building Official, Quezon City. It was even alleged in the
complaint that respondent- Santiago was preventing petitioner
Ceroferr and its agents from entering the property under threats
of bodily harm and destroying existing structures thereon.
A defendant who moves to dismiss the complaint on the
ground of lack of cause of action, as in this case, hypothetically
admits all the averments thereof. The test of sufficiency of the
facts found in a complaint as constituting a cause of action is
whether or not admitting the facts alleged the court can render a
valid judgement upon the same in accordance with the prayer
thereof. The hypothetical admission extends to the relevant and
material facts well pleaded in the complaint and inferences fairly
deducible therefrom. Hence, if the allegations in the complaint
furnish sufficient basis by which the complaint can be maintained,
the same should not be dismissed regardless of the defense that
may be assessed by the defendants.[15]
In this case, petitioner Ceroferrs cause of action has been
sufficiently averred in the complaint. If it were admitted that the
right of ownership of petitioner Ceroferr to the peaceful use and
possession of Lot 68 was violated by respondent Santiagos act
of encroachment and fencing of the same, then petitioner
Ceroferr would be entitled to damages.
On the issue of jurisdiction, we hold that the trial court has
jurisdiction to determine the identity and location of the vacant lot
in question.
Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by law and is
determined by the allegations of the complaint irrespective of
whether the plaintiff is entitled to all or some of the claims
asserted therein.[16] The jurisdiction of a court over the subject
matter is determined by the allegations of the complaint and
cannot be made to depend upon the defenses set up in the
answer or pleadings filed by the defendant.[17]
While the lack of jurisdiction of a court may be raised at any
stage of an action, nevertheless, the party raising such question
may be estopped if he has actively taken part in the very
proceedings which he questions and he only objects to the courts
jurisdiction because the judgment or the order subsequently
rendered is adverse to him.[18]
In this case, respondent Santiago may be considered
estopped to question the jurisdiction of the trial court for he took
an active part in the case. In his answer, respondent Santiago did
not question the jurisdiction of the trial court to grant the reliefs
prayed for in the complaint. His geodetic engineers were present
in the first and second surveys that the LRA conducted. It was
only when the second survey report showed results adverse to
his case that he submitted a motion to dismiss.
Both parties in this case claim that the vacant lot is within their
property. This is an issue that can be best resolved by the trial
court in the exercise of its general jurisdiction.
After the land has been originally registered, the Court of
Land Registration ceases to have jurisdiction over contests
concerning the location of boundary lines. In such case, the
action in personam has to be instituted before an ordinary court
of general jurisdiction.[19]
The regional trial court has jurisdiction to determine the
precise identity and location of the vacant lot used as a jeepney
terminal.
The Fallo

IN VIEW WHEREOF, we GRANT the petition. We REVERSE

the decision of the Court of Appeals[20] and the order of the trial
court[21] dismissing the case. We remand the case to the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 93, Quezon City, for further
proceedings.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
 Factual Antecedents
ASIAN CONSTRUCTION AND G.R. No. 176949
DEVELOPMENT On January 6, 2000, respondent Lourdes K. Mendoza, sole proprietor
CORPORATION, of Highett Steel Fabricators (Highett), filed before the Regional Trial
Petitioner,
Court (RTC) of Caloocan City, Branch 126, a Complaint[4] for a sum of
Present:
money, docketed as Civil Case No. C-19100, against petitioner Asian
LEONARDO-DE Construction and Development Corporation, a duly registered
CASTRO,* domestic corporation.
Acting Chairperson,
- versus- PERALTA,** In the complaint, respondent alleged that from the period
BERSAMIN,
August 7, 1997 to March 4, 1998, petitioner purchased from Highett
DEL CASTILLO, and
various fabricated steel materials and supplies amounting
PERLAS-
BERNABE,*** JJ. to P1,206,177.00, exclusive of interests;[5] that despite demand,
petitioner failed and/or refused to pay;[6] and that due to the failure
LOURDES K. MENDOZA, Promulgated: and/or refusal of petitioner to pay the said amount, respondent was
Respondent. June 27, 2012 compelled to engage the services of counsel.[7]
x---------------------------------------------------
-----x
Petitioner moved for a bill of particulars on the ground that no
DECISION copies of the purchase orders and invoices were attached to the
complaint to enable petitioner to prepare a responsive pleading to the
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
complaint.[8] The RTC, however, in an Order dated March 1, 2000,
In civil cases, the party with the most convincing evidence denied the motion.[9] Accordingly, petitioner filed its Answer with
prevails. Counterclaim[10] denying liability for the claims and interposing the
defense of lack of cause of action.[11]
This Petition for Review on Certiorari[1] under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court assails the Decision[2] dated April 28, 2006 and the To prove her case, respondent presented the testimonies of (1)
Resolution[3]dated March 9, 2007 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA- Artemio Tejero (Tejero), the salesman of Highett who confirmed the
G.R. CV No. 69180.
delivery of the supplies and materials to petitioner, and (2) Arvin
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Cheng, the General Manager of Highett.[12]

The presentation of evidence for petitioner, however, was
deemed waived and terminated due to the repeated non-appearance
of petitioner and its counsel.[13]
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
On December 1, 2000, the RTC rendered a Decision[14] in favor
of respondent, to wit:
On appeal, the CA affirmed with modification the Decision of the
RTC. The decretal portion of the CA Decision[16] reads:
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the RTC [Br.
126, Caloocan City] dated December 1, 2000 is
hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION, in that
the reckoning point for the computation of the 1%
monthly interest shall be 30 days from date of each
delivery.
SO ORDERED.[17]

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing,

judgment is hereby rendered ordering the [petitioner]
corporation to pay the [respondent] the following: Petitioner sought reconsideration but the same was
unavailing.[18]
a. P1,206,177.00, representing the
principal amount, which is the purchase
price of the materials and other supplies Issues
ordered by and delivered to [petitioner];
Hence, this petition raising the following issues:
b. P244,288.59, representing the
accrued interest as of August 31, 1999 plus
xxx additional interest to be computed at the I. WHETHER X X X THE CHARGE INVOICES ARE
rate of 12% per annum until the total ACTIONABLE DOCUMENTS.
indebtedness is paid in full;
II. WHETHER X X X THE DELIVERY OF THE
c. P150,000.00 for and as Attorneys ALLEGED MATERIALS [WAS] DULY PROVEN.
fees; and
III. WHETHER X X X RESPONDENT IS ENTITLED
d. Cost of suit. TO ATTORNEYS FEES.[19]

SO ORDERED.[15]
Petitioners Arguments

Petitioner argues that a charge or sales invoice is not an
actionable document; thus, petitioners failure to deny under oath its
genuineness and due execution does not constitute an admission
thereof.[20] Petitioner likewise insists that respondent was not able to
prove her claim as the invoices offered as evidence were not properly
authenticated by her witnesses.[21] Lastly, petitioner claims that the CA
erred in affirming the award of attorneys fees as the RTC Decision
failed to expressly state the basis for the award thereof.[22]
Respondents Arguments
Respondent, in her Comment,[23] prays for the dismissal of the petition
contending that the arguments raised by petitioner are a mere rehash
of those presented and already passed upon by the CA.[24] She
maintains that charge invoices are actionable documents,[25] and that
these were properly identified and authenticated by witness Tejero,
who testified that upon delivery of the supplies and materials, the
invoices were stamped received by petitioners
employee.[26] Respondent contends that the award of attorneys fees
was justified as the basis for the award was clearly established during
the trial.[27]
Our Ruling
The petition is partly meritorious.
The charge invoices
are not actionable
documents
Section 7 of Rule 8 of the Rules of Court states:
SEC. 7. Action or defense based on document.
Whenever an action or defense is based upon a written
instrument or document, the substance of such
instrument or document shall be set forth in the
pleading, and the original or a copy thereof shall be
attached to the pleading as an exhibit, which shall be
deemed to be a part of the pleading, or said copy may
with like effect be set forth in the pleading. (Emphasis
supplied.)
Based on the foregoing provision, a document is actionable
when an action or defense is grounded upon such written instrument
or document. In the instant case, the Charge Invoices[28] are not
actionable documents per se as these only provide details on the
alleged transactions.[29] These documents need not be attached to or
stated in the complaint as these are evidentiary in nature.[30] In fact,
respondents cause of action is not based on these documents but on
the contract of sale between the parties.
Delivery of the supplies
and materials was duly
proved
But although the Charge Invoices are not actionable
documents, we find that these, along with the Purchase Orders,[31] are
sufficient to prove that petitioner indeed ordered supplies and materials award of attorneys fees in the amount of P150,000.00 is
from Highett and that these were delivered to petitioner. hereby DELETED.

Moreover, contrary to the claim of petitioner, the Charge SO ORDERED.

Invoices were properly identified and authenticated by witness Tejero
who was present when the supplies and materials were delivered to
petitioner and when the invoices were stamped received by petitioners
employee, Roel Barandon.[32]

It bears stressing that in civil cases, only a preponderance of

evidence or greater weight of the evidence is required.[33] In this case,
except for a bare denial, no other evidence was presented by petitioner
to refute respondents claim. Thus, we agree with the CA that the
evidence preponderates in favor of respondent.

Basis for the award of

Attorneys fees must be
stated in the decision

However, with respect to the award of attorneys fees to

respondent, we are constrained to disallow the same as the
rationale for the award was not stated in
the text of the RTC Decision but only in the dispositive portion.[34]

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby PARTLY

GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated April 28, 2006 and the
Resolution dated March 9, 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV No. 69180 are hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. The
 G.R. No. 183034, March 12, 2014
SPOUSES FERNANDO AND MA. ELENA
SANTOS, Petitioners, v. LOLITA ALCAZAR, REPRESENTED
BY HER ATTORNEY-IN-FACT DELFIN CHUA, Respondent.
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
This is to certify that I acknowledge my obligation in the amount
of One Million Four Hundred Fifty Six Thousand (P1,456,000),
Philippine Currency with LEGAZPI COLOR CENTER, LEGAZPI
CITY.

DECISION Signed at No. 32 Agno St. Banaue, Quezon City on December

12, 2000.
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
(signed)
The rule that the genuineness and due execution of the FERNANDO T. SANTOS
instrument shall be deemed admitted, unless the adverse party Debtor
specifically denies them under oath, applies only to parties to
such instrument.
Signed in the presence of:chanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Assailed in this Petition for Review on Certiorari1
are the
September 27, 2007 Decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in (signed)
CA-G.R. CV No. 87935, entitled Lolita Alcazar, represented by TESS ALCAZAR
her Attorney-in-Fact, Delfin Chua, Plaintiff-Appellee, versus Proprietress
Spouses Fernando T. Santos, Defendants-Appellants, and its Legazpi Color Center
May 23, 2008 Resolution3 denying petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration. Witnesses in the signing:chanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Factual Antecedents (signed) (signed)

DELFIN A. CHUA AILEEN C.
In February 2001, respondent Lolita Alcazar, proprietor of EDADES6crallawlibrary
Legazpi Color Center (LCC), instituted through her attorney-in-
fact Delfin Chua a Complaint4 for sum of money against the Respondent alleged in her
petitioners, spouses Fernando and Ma. Elena Santos, to collect Complaint:chanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
the value of paint and construction materials obtained by the latter
from LCC amounting to P1,456,000.00, which remained unpaid x x x x
despite written demand. The case was docketed as Civil Case
No. 9954 and assigned to Branch 5 of the Regional Trial Court of 4. That as part of the agreement, defendants also obligated
Legazpi City. Respondents cause of action is based on a themselves to pay plaintiff at the rate of 3% interest per month
document entitled Acknowledgment5 apparently executed by based on the unpaid principal, to cover the cost of money;
hand by petitioner Fernando, thus:chanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
5. That as of December, 2000, the total obligation of defendants
with plaintiff which consists of principal and interest was
P1,456,000.00, a copy of the document where defendants
acknowledged their unpaid obligation is hereto attached as
Annex B; (referring to the above Acknowledgment)
6. That on January 5, 2001, plaintiff sent a final demand to
defendants to pay the indebtedness, but said demand fell on deaf
ears and defendants did not even bother to communicate with
plaintiff, copy of the demand letter is hereto attached as Annex
C;7
She thus prayed that judgment be rendered ordering petitioners
to pay her the sum of P1,456,000.00, with interest at the rate of
3% per month; attorneys fees in the amount of P72,800.00, and
P1,500.00 per court appearance; and costs of the suit.
In their Answer,8 petitioners sought the dismissal of the
Complaint, alleging among others that -
4. Paragraph 5 is specifically denied as the document which
Defendant Fernando T. Santos signed does not reflect the true
contract or intention of the parties, the actionable document is
incorrect and has to be reformed to reflect the real indebtedness
of the defendants;
5. Paragraph 6 of the complaint is specifically denied as the
same does not reflect the correct amount. The defendants[]
computation is that the amount of P600,000.00 is the only amount
due and the instrument used as the actionable document does
not reflect the correct substance of the transaction and indicates
a reformation of the actionable document;
6. Paragraph 7 is specifically denied as defendants are willing to
pay the correct amount, not the amount in the complaint as the
same does not indicate the correct amount owing to the plaintiff;
xxxx
VERIFICATION
I, Fernando T. Santos[,] of legal age, Filipino[,] married and
resident of Banawe, Quezon City[,] under oath
declare:chanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
1. That I am the defendant in the above entitled
case;
2. That I have read and understood the
contents thereof and affirm that the
allegations contained therein are true and
correct of my personal knowledge[;]
3. That I have not commenced any other action
or proceeding involving x x x the same
issues in the Supreme Court, Court of
Appeals or any other tribunal/agency[;]
4. That to the best of my knowledge, no such
action or proceeding involving the same
issues in the Supreme Court, Court of
Appeals or any other tribunal/agency [is
pending];
5. That if I should thereafter learn that a similar
action or proceeding has been filed or is
pending before the Supreme Court, Court of
Appeals or any other tribunal/agency, I
undertake to report the fact within 5 days
therefrom to this court.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set [my] hand this
April 18, 2001 x x x.
(signed)
Fernando T. Santos
Defendant9
 petitioners counsel failed to appear, prompting the trial court to
Pre-trial was conducted. On September 26, 2005, the trial court issue an Order15 1) denying petitioners March 15, 2006 motion
issued its Pre-trial Order10 setting forth the matters taken up to reset for lack of merit and for violating Section 4, Rule 15 of the
during the pre-trial conference and the schedule of hearings. The 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure;16 2) declaring that petitioners have
presentation of respondents evidence was set on October 10; waived their right to present evidence; and 3) declaring that Civil
November 8 and 21; and December 6 and 13, 2005. Petitioners Case No. 9954 is deemed submitted for decision.
were scheduled to present their case on January 9 and 23; and
February 6, 2006.11crallawlibrary Petitioners went up to the CA on certiorari. Docketed as CA-G.R.
SP. No. 93889, the Petition questioned the denial of petitioners
On November 8, 2005, respondent presented her evidence and demurrer. Meanwhile, they filed a Motion for
testified in court as the lone witness. On November 21, 2005, Reconsideration17 of the March 20, 2006 Order denying their
she made a formal offer of her evidence and rested her case. motion to reset, but the trial court denied the same in an Order
dated April 24, 2006.18crallawlibrary
On January 17, 2006, petitioners filed a Demurrer to
Evidence,12 which respondent opposed. Petitioners argued that The Decision of the Regional Trial Court
the Acknowledgment - respondents Exhibit A which was
presented in court - was not an original copy and thus On June 27, 2006, the trial court rendered its Decision19 in Civil
inadmissible; petitioners receipt of the written demand was not Case No. 9954, which contained the following decretal
proved; the alleged deliveries of paint and construction materials portion:chanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
were not covered by delivery receipts; and respondents
testimony was merely hearsay and uncorroborated. WHEREFORE, Premises Considered, judgment is rendered
ordering the defendants to pay the plaintiff the following amounts,
On January 26, 2006, the trial court issued an Order13 denying to wit:chanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
petitioners demurrer for lack of merit. In the same Order, the trial 1. The sum of 1,456,000 pesos plus interest thereon at the legal
court scheduled the presentation of petitioners evidence in the rate commencing from the time the complaint was filed in court
morning and afternoon sessions of February 20, 2006. until such time such amount has been paid in full;
2. The sum of 10,000 pesos as litigation expenses; and
Petitioners moved to reconsider the trial courts January 26, 2006 3. The sum of 25,000 pesos as attorneys fees.
Order. On February 20, 2006, the trial court issued an The defendants shall pay the costs of suit.
Order14 denying petitioners Motion for Reconsideration and
scheduled the presentation of evidence for the petitioners on Needless to say, the counterclaim in the Answer is Dismissed.
March 20, 2006.
SO ORDERED.20crallawlibrary
On March 15, 2006, petitioners moved to reset the March 20,
2006 scheduled hearing, on the ground that on said date and
time, their counsel was to appear in another scheduled case. The trial court essentially held that petitioners, in their Answer,
admitted that they entered into transactions with the respondent
On March 20, 2006, or the day of the scheduled hearing, for the delivery of paint and construction materials, which
remained unpaid; that from the Acknowledgment, Exhibit A,
signed by Fernando and duly presented, authenticated, and
identified by respondent during trial, petitioners admitted that their
unpaid obligation - including interest - amounted to
P1,456,000.00; and that petitioners plea for reformation has no
basis.
Petitioners filed their Motion for Reconsideration,21 arguing that
the trial court should not have pre-empted CA-G.R. SP No.
93889, and instead should have awaited the resolution thereof;
that the Acknowledgment was signed by Fernando alone, and
thus the judgment should not bind his co-defendant and herein
petitioner Ma. Elena Santos; that petitioners liability has not been
established since no delivery receipts, invoices and statements
of account were presented during trial to show delivery of paint
and construction materials; that respondent was unable to
present the original of the Acknowledgment, which puts the
Decision of the trial court - declaring that the original thereof was
presented and authenticated by respondent - in serious doubt;
and that there is no evidentiary basis to hold petitioners liable for
P1,456,000.00.
In an Order22 dated August 8, 2006, the trial court denied
petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.
The Assailed Court of Appeals Decision
Petitioners interposed an appeal with the CA. Docketed as CA-
G.R. CV No. 87935, the ruling in the appeal is the subject of the
present Petition. Petitioners claimed that the trial court erred in
allowing respondent to present her evidence ex parte; the
Acknowledgment has not been authenticated; the adjudged
liability in the amount of P1,456,000.00 was not sufficiently
proved by respondent, as she failed to present receipts and
statements of account which would show the true amount of their
obligation, including interest; the trial court based its findings on
erroneous conclusions, assumptions and inferences; and the trial
court erred in declaring them to have waived their right to present
evidence.
Meanwhile, in CA-G.R. SP. No. 93889, the CA issued its
Decision23 dated March 30, 2007, dismissing
petitioners certiorari petition and sustaining the trial courts
denial of their demurrer. The CA held that petitioners failed to
deny specifically under oath the genuineness and due execution
of the Acknowledgment; consequently, 1) its genuineness and
due execution are deemed admitted, 2) there was thus no need
to present the original thereof, and 3) petitioners liability was
sufficiently established.24 The CA added that under the
circumstances, certiorari was not the proper remedy; petitioners
should have gone to trial and awaited the trial courts Decision,
which they could appeal if adverse. The Decision became final
and executory on April 27, 2007.25crallawlibrary
On September 27, 2007, the CA issued the herein assailed
Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 87935, which held as
follows:chanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DENIED and consequently
DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.26crallawlibrary
The CA held that in their Answer, petitioners admitted that they
owed respondent, albeit to the extent of P600,000.00; this judicial
admission of liability required no further proof. And with this
admission of liability, the Acknowledgment which was duly
authenticated and formally offered in evidence was sufficient to
establish their liability, and no further proof in the form of receipts
and statements of account was required. The appellate court
stated that Fernandos categorical admission of liability as
contained in the Acknowledgment as well as petitioners
admissions in their Answer sufficed. It held further that
respondent was competent to testify on the Acknowledgment as
she was a signatory therein.
 PETITIONERS IN ITS DECISION DATED JULY 20, 2004 AND
The CA likewise held that since they failed to oppose the THUS SET ASIDE AND REMANDED TO THE COURT A QUO
Acknowledgment in the court below as a result of their having THE CASE FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS BUT THE SAME
waived their right to present evidence, petitioners cannot now WAS COUNTERMANDED IN THE ASSAILED DECISION.
belatedly question the document. Moreover, their claim of a
lesser liability in the amount of P600,000.00 remained to be plain CONTRARY TO THE FINDINGS OF THE COURT OF
unsubstantiated allegations as a result of their failure to refute APPEALS, PETITIONERS DID NOT ADMIT IN THEIR ANSWER
respondents evidence and present their own. THAT THEY ARE INDEBTED TO RESPONDENT IN THE
AMOUNT OF P1,456,000.00.
Finally, the CA held that petitioners were not deprived of due
process during trial; on the contrary, they were afforded sufficient THE COURT OF APPEALS FAILED TO RULE ON THE
opportunity to participate in the proceedings by way of constant ABSENCE OF ANY RECORD OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE
strict reminders by the court and several continuances, but they PRE-TRIAL CONFERENCE HELD ON SEPTEMBER 26, 2005.
failed to take part in the proceedings.
THE COURT OF APPEALS SHOULD HAVE SERIOUSLY
Petitioners moved to reconsider, but in the second assailed May CONSIDERED TACKLING THE ISSUE OF PRESUMPTIONS,
23, 2008 disposition, the appellate court stood its ground. Thus, INFERENCES, AND MISCONCEPTION OF FACTS USED BY
the instant Petition seeking a reversal of the assailed CA THE COURT A QUO [IN ARRIVING AT] ITS FINDINGS AND
dispositions and the dismissal of the Complaint in Civil Case No. CONCLUSIONS.
9954.
PETITIONERS WERE NOT DULY NOTIFIED OF THE
Issues NOVEMBER 8, 2005 HEARING IN VIOLATION OF SECTIONS
4 AND 5 [OF RULE 15] OF THE RULES OF COURT WHICH
THE COURT OF APPEALS FAILED TO RULE.
Petitioners now raise the following issues for the Courts
resolution:chanRoblesVirtualawlibrary PETITIONERS HAVE BEEN DEPRIVED OF THEIR DAY IN
COURT WHEN THEY WERE CONSIDERED TO HAVE WAIVED
IN THE RESOLUTION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS, THE THEIR RIGHT TO PRESENT EVIDENCE AND THE CASE
ARGUMENT IN PETITIONERS MOTION FOR SUBMITTED FOR DECISION, THE CONTRARY RULING OF
RECONSIDERATION THAT RESPONDENT FAILED TO THE COURT OF APPEALS NOTWITHSTANDING.28
PRODUCE AND PRESENT THE ORIGINAL COPY OF THE
ACKNOWLEDGMENT RECEIPT EXHIBIT A WHICH IS A
VIOLATION OF THE BEST EVIDENCE RULE, WAS NOT Petitioners Arguments
ACTED UPON AND CONSIDERED REHASH.
Petitioners, in their Petition and Reply,29 assert that during the
THE COURT OF APPEALS27 FOUND THE NEED FOR proceedings below, only a photocopy of the Acknowledgment
RECEIPTS OF STATEMENTS OF ACCOUNT TO BE was presented and identified by respondent even as the original
PRESENTED REFLECTING THE ACTUAL OBLIGATION OF was not lost, the same having been made part of the record of
the case when respondents evidence was first presented ex
parte.30 For this reason, they argue that the photocopy presented
and offered in evidence is inadmissible and could not be the basis
for arriving at a finding of liability on their part, pursuant to the
best evidence rule.
Petitioners further point out that in the first CA disposition,
specifically in CA-G.R. CV No. 71187, the appellate courts
Thirteenth Division ruled that in establishing petitioners
pecuniary liability, receipts and statements of account reflecting
the actual amount of their obligation and interest thereon were
necessary. Later on, in CA-G.R. CV No. 87935, the same
division of the CA made a complete turnaround, declaring that
receipts and statements of account were no longer
necessary. For petitioners, this retraction by the CA was
irregular.
Petitioners add that the pre-trial conference in Civil Case No.
9954 is a sham, as there are no records to show that it was ever
conducted. Consequently, this irregularity renders the
proceedings below - including the assailed judgment - null and
void. They add that the trial court irregularly proceeded to receive
respondents evidence ex parte on November 8, 2005 despite
lack of notice of hearing.
Next, petitioners point out inconsistencies and erroneous
assumptions made by the appellate court which formed the basis
of its decision, such as Ma. Elenas undue inclusion in the
judgment of liability, when it is evident from the Acknowledgment
that it was executed and signed by Fernando alone.
Finally, petitioners submit that in denying a continuance of the
March 20, 2006 hearing and declaring them to have waived their
right to present evidence, the trial court deprived them of their day
in court.
Respondents Arguments
In her Comment,31 respondent counters that the Petition presents
no valid cause for the Courts exercise of its power of review; that
the issues raised therein have been duly taken up and
conclusively resolved by the CA; that with the finality of the
Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 93889, petitioners may no longer
raise any issue pertaining to the Acknowledgment, the
genuineness and due execution of which they are considered to
have admitted; and that with the resolution by the CA of the
issues revived in the Petition, petitioners are guilty of forum
shopping.
Respondent adds that petitioners are bound by the proceedings
taken during the pre-trial conference, and may not pretend to be
ignorant of the hearing dates agreed upon and set by the trial
court. Respondent argues that petitioners may not claim to be
oblivious of the pre-trial conference itself, since their
representative was present all throughout the proceedings, and a
pre-trial order was issued thereafter which contained the matters
taken up during pre-trial and the hearing dates scheduled by the
court.
Our Ruling
The Court denies the Petition.
Respondents failure to present the original copy of the
Acknowledgment during the taking of her testimony for the
second time, and the presentation of a mere photocopy thereof
at said hearing, does not materially affect the outcome of the
case. It was a mere procedural inadvertence that could have
been cured and did not affect petitioners cause in any
manner. As conceded by them and as held by the CA, the
original exists and was made part of the records of the case when
respondents evidence was first taken. Though respondent now
claims that she had lost the original, the CA proclaimed that the
document resides in the record. This would explain then why
respondent cannot find it in her possession; it is with the court as
an exhibit. Besides, it evidently appears that there is no question
raised on the authenticity and contents of the photocopy that was
presented and identified in court; petitioners merely insist that the
photocopy is inadmissible as a result of respondents failure to
present the original, which they nevertheless admit to exist and is
found and included in the record of the case.
While it is a basic rule of evidence that the original copy prevails
over a mere photocopy,32 there is no harm if in a case, both the
original and a photocopy thereof are authenticated, identified and
formally offered in evidence by the party proponent.
More to the point is the fact that petitioners failed to deny
specifically under oath the genuineness and due execution of the
Acknowledgment in their Answer. The effect of this is that the
genuineness and due execution of the Acknowledgment is
deemed admitted. By the admission of the genuineness and
due execution [of such document] is meant that the party whose
signature it bears admits that he signed it or that it was signed by
another for him with his authority; that at the time it was signed it
was in words and figures exactly as set out in the pleading of the
party relying upon it; that the document was delivered; and that
any formal requisites required by law, such as a seal, an
acknowledgment, or revenue stamp, which it lacks, are waived
by him. Hence, such defenses as that the signature is a forgery
x x x; or that it was unauthorized x x x; or that the party charged
signed the instrument in some other capacity than that alleged in
the pleading setting it out x x x; or that it was never delivered x x
x, are cut off by the admission of its genuineness and due
execution.33crallawlibrary
There is no need for proof of execution and authenticity with
respect to documents the genuineness and due execution of
which are admitted by the adverse party.34 With the consequent
admission engendered by petitioners failure to properly deny the
Acknowledgment in their Answer, coupled with its proper
authentication, identification and offer by the respondent, not to
mention petitioners admissions in paragraphs 4 to 6 of their
Answer that they are indeed indebted to respondent, the Court
believes that judgment may be had solely on the document, and
there is no need to present receipts and other documents to prove
the claimed indebtedness. The Acknowledgment, just as an
ordinary acknowledgment receipt, is valid and binding between
the parties who executed it, as a document evidencing the loan
agreement they had entered into.35 The absence of rebutting
evidence occasioned by petitioners waiver of their right to
present evidence renders the Acknowledgment as the best
evidence of the transactions between the parties and the
consequential indebtedness incurred.36 Indeed, the effect of the
admission is such that a prima facie case is made for the plaintiff
which dispenses with the necessity of evidence on his part and
entitles him to a judgment on the pleadings unless a special
defense of new matter, such as payment, is interposed by the
defendant.37crallawlibrary
However, as correctly argued by petitioners, only Fernando may
be held liable for the judgment amount of P1,456,000.00, since
Ma. Elena was not a signatory to the Acknowledgment. She may
be held liable only to the extent of P600,000.00, as admitted by
her and Fernando in paragraph 5 of their Answer; no case against
her may be proved over and beyond such amount, in the absence
of her signature and an acknowledgment of liability in the
Acknowledgment. The rule that the genuineness and due
execution of the instrument shall be deemed admitted, unless the
adverse party specifically denies them under oath, applies only
to parties to the document.38crallawlibrary
As for petitioners claim that in CA-G.R. CV No. 87935, the same
division of the CA made a complete turnaround from its original
pronouncement in CA-G.R. CV No. 71187 - thus doing away with
the requirement of presenting receipts and statements of account
which it originally required in the latter case, the Court finds no
irregularity in this. The admission of liability resulting from
petitioners admission of indebtedness in their Answer and other
pleadings,39 their failure to specifically deny under oath the
genuineness and due execution of the Acknowledgment, as well
as their waiver of their right to present evidence - all these did
away with the necessity of producing receipts and statements of
account which would otherwise be required under normal
circumstances.
On the claim that they were denied their day in court, the Court
notes that despite reminders and admonitions by the trial court,
petitioners caused several continuances of trial, which
understandably prompted the trial court to finally deny their March
15, 2006 motion to reset the scheduled March 20 hearing and
declare a waiver of their right to present evidence. Thus, as
found by the CA,
In its September 26, 2005 Pre-Trial Order, the trial
court fixed the hearing dates with a firm declaration
that the same shall be strictly followed and all
postponements made by the parties shall be
deducted from such partys allotted time to present
evidence.
When plaintiff-appellee finished her presentation of
evidence ahead of schedule, the appellants were
again advised of their schedule for presentation of
evidence - i.e., December 6 and 13, 2005 and
January 9 and 23 and February 6, 2006. Despite
said schedule, the appellants failed to appear in
court.
On January 9, 2006, the lower court reiterated the
scheduled hearing set on January 26, 2006 and
included February 20, 2006 as an additional
hearing date.
Instead of presenting their evidence, the appellants
filed a Demurrer to Evidence on January 17, 2006
which, however, was denied by the trial court in its
Order dated January 26, 2006.
On February 20, 2006, the trial court again allowed
another hearing date - March 20, 2006 - to afford
the appellants added opportunity to present their
evidence.
The foregoing clearly show that not only were appellants given
an opportunity to be heard, an added mileage in due process was
extended to them by the trial court.40
Petitioners submit further that the trial courts subsequent denial
of their motion for continuance of the March 20, 2006 hearing was
improper. Yet again, the Court does not subscribe to this
view. Petitioners filed their motion to reset the March 20, 2006
previously scheduled hearing, but the trial court did not act on the
motion. Instead of attending the March 20, 2006 hearing,
petitioners counsel proceeded to absent himself and attended
the supposed hearing of another case. This was improper. As
we have held before,
[A] party moving for postponement should be in court on the day
set for trial if the motion is not acted upon favorably before that
day. He has no right to rely either on the liberality of the court or
on the generosity of the adverse party. x x x
[A]n attorney retained in a case the trial of which is set for a date
on which he knows he cannot appear because of his engagement
in another trial set previously on the same date, has no right to
presume that the court will necessarily grant him continuance.
The most ethical thing for him to do in such a situation is to inform
the prospective client of all the facts so that the latter may retain
another attorney, If the client, having full knowledge of all the
facts, still retain[s] the attorney, he assumes the risk himself and
cannot complain of the consequences if the postponement is
denied and finds himself without attorney to represent him at the
trial.41
The grant or denial of a motion for postponement rests on the
courts sound discretion; it is a matter of privilege, not a right. A
movant for postponement should not assume beforehand that his
motion will be granted. The grant or denial of a motion for
postponement is a matter that is addressed to the sound
discretion of the trial court. Indeed, an order declaring a party to
have waived the right to present evidence for performing dilatory
actions upholds the trial courts duty to ensure that trial proceeds
despite the deliberate delay and refusal to proceed on the part of
one party.42crallawlibrary

On the other questions raised by petitioners, specifically that the

pre-trial conference is a sham for lack of records of the
proceedings, and that the November 8, 2005 hearing where
respondents evidence was taken ex parte was irregular for lack
of a notice of hearing - the Court finds them to be without merit. It
is evident that a pre-trial conference was held, and that
petitioners representative was present therein; moreover, the
proceedings were covered by the required pre-trial order, which
may itself be considered a record of the pre-trial.43 In said order,
the November 8, 2005 pre-scheduled hearing was particularly
specified.44 Thus, from the very start, petitioners knew of the
November 8 hearing; if they failed to attend, no fault may be
attributed to the trial court.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The September 27,

2007 Decision and May 23, 2008 Resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 87935 are AFFIRMED,
with MODIFICATION in that petitioner Ma. Elena Santos is held
liable for the principal and interest only to the extent of
P600,000.00.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 89114 December 2, 1991
FRANCISCO S. TANTUICO, JR., petitioner,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, PRESIDENTIAL
COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT, MATEO A. T.
CAPARAS, AND THE SANDIGANBAYAN, respondents.
Kenny H. Tantuico for petitioner.
PADILLA, J.:p
In this petition for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition with a
prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and/or
restraining order, the petitioner seeks to annul and set aside the
resolution of the Sandiganbayan, dated 21 April 1989, denying
his motion for a bill of particulars as well as its resolution, dated
29 May 1989, which denied his motion for reconsideration; to
compel the respondent PCGG to prepare and file a bill of
particulars, or that said respondent be ordered to exclude
petitioner as defendant in Civil Case No. 0035 should they fail to
submit the said bill of particulars; and to enjoin the respondent
Sandiganbayan from further proceeding against petitioner until
the bill of particulars is submitted, claiming that the respondent
Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack of jurisdiction in promulgating the aforesaid resolutions
and that there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy and adequate
remedy for him in the ordinary course of law other than the
present petition.
As prayed for, this Court issued on 1 August 1989 a temporary
restraining order "effective immediately and continuing until
further orders from this Court, ordering the respondent
Sandiganbayan to CEASE and DESIST from further proceeding
in Civil Case No. 0035 (PCGG 35), entitled "Republic of the
Philippines vs. Benjamin (Kokoy) Romualdez, et al." pending
before it. 1
The antecedents are as follows:
On 31 July 1987, the Republic of the Philippines, represented by
the PCGG, and assisted by the Office of the Solicitor General,
filed with the Sandiganbayan Civil Case No. 0035, entitled
"Republic of the Philippines vs. Benjamin (Kokoy) Romualdez, et
al." for reconveyance, reversion, accounting, restitution and
damages. 2
The principal defendants in the said Civil Case No. 0035 are
Benjamin (Kokoy) Romualdez, Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda
R. Marcos.
Petitioner Francisco S. Tantuico, Jr. was included as defendant
in Civil Case No. 0035 on the theory that: (1) he acted in unlawful
concert with the principal defendants in the misappropriation and
theft of public funds, plunder of the nation's wealth, extortion,
blackmail, bribery, embezzlement and other acts of corruption,
betrayal of public trust and brazen abuse of power; 3 (2) he acted
as dummy, nominee or agent, by allowing himself to be
incorporator, director, board member and/or stockholder of
corporations beneficially held and/or controlled by the principal
defendants; 4 (3) he acted singly or collectively, and/or in
unlawful concert with one another, in flagrant breach of public
trust and of their fiduciary obligations as public officers, with gross
and scandalous abuse of right and power and in brazen violation
of the Constitution and laws of the Philippines, embarked upon a
systematic plan to accumulate ill-gotten wealth ; 5 (4) he
(petitioner) taking undue advantage of his position as Chairman
of the Commission on Audit and with grave failure to perform his
constitutional duties as such Chairman, acting in concert with
defendants Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos,
facilitated and made possible the withdrawals, disbursements
and questionable use of government funds; 6 and (5) he acted as
dummy, nominee and/or agent by allowing himself to be used as
instrument in accumulating ill-gotten wealth through government ii) What ministries or Departments,
concessions, orders and/or policies prejudicial to plaintiff, or to be offices or agencies of the government
incorporator, director, or member of corporations beneficially held were involved in these questionable
and/or controlled by defendants Ferdinand E. Marcos, Imelda R. use of government funds;
Marcos, Benjamin (Kokoy) Romualdez and Juliette Gomez
Romualdez in order to conceal and prevent recovery of assets iii) What are the names of the auditors
illegally obtained. 7 who had the original audit jurisdiction
over the said withdrawals,
On 11 April 1988, after his motion for production and inspection disbursements and questionable use
of documents 8 was denied by respondent court in its of government funds;
resolution 9 dated 9 March 1988, petitioner filed a Motion for a
Bill of Particulars, 10 alleging inter alia that he is sued for acts iv) How much government funds were
allegedly committed by him as (a) a public officer-Chairman of the involved in these questionable-
Commission on Audit, (b) as a private individual, and (c) in both disbursements, individually and in
capacities, in a complaint couched in too general terms and shorn totally?
of particulars that would inform him of the factual and legal basis
thereof, and that to enable him to understand and know with v) Were the disbursements brought to
certainty the particular acts allegedly committed by him and which herein defendant for action on pre-
he is now charged with culpability, it is necessary that plaintiff audit, post-audit or otherwise or
furnish him the particulars sought therein relative to the where they initiated and/or allowed
averments in paragraphs 2, 9(a), 15, 7 and 17 of the Second release by herein defendant alone,
Amended Complaint so that he can intelligently prepare his without them undergoing usual
responsive pleading and prepare for trial. The particulars sought governmental audit procedures, or in
for in the said motion are as follows: violation thereof.?

a. Relative to the averments in paragraphs 2, 9(a)
and l5 of the Second Amended Complaint:
i) What are the dates of the
resolutions (if on appeal) or the acts
(if otherwise) issued or performed by
herein defendant which allowed the
facilitation of, and made possible the,
withdrawals, disbursements and
questionable use of government
funds;
vi) What were herein defendant's
other acts or omission or participation
in the matter of allowing such
disbursements and questionable use
of government funds, if any?
b. Relative to paragraphs 7 and 17 of the Second
Amended Complaint:
i) In what particular contract, dealing,
transaction and/or relationship of any
nature of Ferdinand E. Marcos,
Imelda R. Marcos, Juliette Gomez
Romualdez or Benjamin T.
Romualdez did herein defendant act
as dummy, nominee or agent? Please
specify the dealings, the dates, the
corporations or entities involved, the
government offices involved and the
private and public documents, if any,
showing herein defendant's
complicity, since he is not aware of
any such instance. More basically,
please specify whether the defendant
is a dummy or nominee or agent and
of which corporation or transaction?
ii) What particular government
concession, order and/or policy
obtained by Ferdinand E. Marcos, or
Imelda R. Marcos, or Juliette Gomez
Romualdez and/or Benjamin T.
Romualdez allowed them either
singly or jointly to accumulate ill-
gotten wealth by using herein
defendant as instrument for their
accomplishment. Likewise please
identify the nature of the transactions,
the dates and the document showing
complicity on the part of herein
defendant; he is not aware of any
such instance.
iii) Please specify the name or
denominate the particular
government concession, order and/or
policy prejudicial to the interest of the
government which was obtained by
either of the above-named four
defendants through the participation
of herein defendant as a dummy,
nominee or agent of herein
defendant. Please likewise identify
the government office involved, the
dates and other particulars, likewise
defendant is not aware of any such
instance.
iv) Please name and specify the
corporation whether stock or non-
stock, whether government or private,
beneficially held and/or controlled by
either of the four above defendants,
where herein defendant is an
incorporator, director or member and
where his inclusion as such
incorporator, director or member of
the corporation was made in order to
conceal and prevent recovery of
assets illegally obtained by the
aforementioned four defendants, how
many shares are involved and what
are their values, how and when have
they been acquired.
The Solicitor General, for and in behalf of respondents (except
the respondent Sandiganbayan), opposed the motion.11 After
the petitioner had filed his reply 12 thereto, the respondent
Sandiganbayan promulgated on 21 April 1990 a
resolution 13 denying the petitioner's motion for a bill of
particulars on the ground that the particulars sought by petitioner
are evidentiary in nature, the pertinent part of which resolution
reads, as follows:
We are of the considered opinion that the
allegations in the Expanded Complaint are quite
clear and sufficient enough for defendant-movant to
know the nature and scope of the causes of action
upon which plaintiff seeks relief. They provide the
 factual scenario which, coupled with other
allegations set forth in the "Common Averments"
and further specified in the "Specific Averments" of
herein defendant-movant and his co-defendants'
illegal acts which are within defendant-movant's
peculiar and intimate knowledge as a government
official and corporate executive, will enable him to
make the proper admission, denials or
qualifications, set out affirmative and/or special
defenses and thereafter prepare for trial.
Evidentiary facts or matters are not essential in the
pleading of the cause of action, nor to details or
probative value or particulars of evidence by which
these material evidence are to be established
(Remitere vs. Yulu, 6 SCRA 251). The matters
which he seeks are evidentiary in nature and, being
within his intimate or personal knowledge, may be
denied or admitted by him or if deemed necessary,
be the subject of other forms of discovery. 14
Petitioner moved for reconsideration 15 but this was denied by
respondent Sandiganbayan in its resolution 16 dated 29 May
1990.
Hence, petitioner filed the present petition.
The principal issue to be resolved in the case at bar is whether or
not the respondent Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse of
discretion in issuing the disputed resolutions.
Petitioner argues that the allegations of the Second Amended
Complaint in Civil Case No. 0035 (PCGG 35) pertaining to him
state only conclusions of fact and law, inferences of facts from
facts not pleaded and mere presumptions, not ultimate facts as
required by the Rules of Court.
On the other hand, the respondent Sandiganbayan, by and
through the Solicitor General, contends that the essential
elements of an action for recovery of ill-gotten wealth are: (1) an
accumulation of assets, properties and other possessions; (2) of
former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, Mrs. Imelda Romualdez
Marcos, their close relatives, subordinates, business associates,
dummies, agents, or nominees; and (3) whose value is out of
proportion to their known lawful income, and that the ultimate
facts establishing these three (3) essential elements of an action
for recovery of ill-gotten wealth are sufficiently alleged in the
complaint. Hence, petitioner is not entitled to a bill of particulars.
A complaint is defined as a concise statement of the ultimate facts
constituting the plaintiff's cause or causes of action.17 Like all
other pleadings allowed by the Rules of Court, 18 the complaint
shall contain in a methodical and logical form a plain, concise and
direct statement of the ultimate facts on which the plaintiff relies
for his claim, omitting the statement of mere evidentiary
facts. 19 Its office, purpose or function is to inform the defendant
clearly and definitely of the claims made against him so that he
may be prepared to meet the issues at the trial. The complaint
should inform the defendant of all the material facts on which the
plaintiff relies to support his demand; it should state the theory of
a cause of action which forms the bases of the plaintiff's claim of
liability. 20
The rules on pleading speak of two (2) kinds of facts: the first, the
"ultimate facts", and the second, the "evidentiary facts."
In Remitere vs. Vda. de Yulo, 21 the term "ultimate facts" was
defined and explained as follows:
The term "ultimate facts" as used in Sec. 3, Rule 3
of the Rules of Court, means the essential facts
constituting the plaintiffs cause of action. A fact is
essential if it cannot be stricken out without leaving
the statement of the cause of action insufficient. . .
. (Moran, Rules of Court, Vol. 1, 1963 ed., p. 213).
Ultimate facts are important and substantial facts
which either directly form the basis of the primary
 right and duty, or which directly make up the
wrongful acts or omissions of the defendant. The
term does not refer to the details of probative matter
or particulars of evidence by which these material
elements are to be established. It refers to principal,
determinate, constitutive facts, upon the existence
of which, the entire cause of action rests.
while the term "evidentiary fact" has been defined in the
following tenor:
Those facts which are necessary for determination
of the ultimate facts; they are the premises upon
which conclusions of ultimate facts are
based. Womack v. Industrial Comm., 168 Colo.
364,451 P. 2d 761, 764. Facts which furnish
evidence of existence of some other fact. 22
Where the complaint states ultimate facts that constitute the three
(3) essential elements of a cause of action, namely: (1) the legal
right of the plaintiff, (2) the correlative obligation of the defendant,
and (3) the act or omission of the defendant in violation of said
legal right, the complaint states a cause of action, otherwise, the
complaint must succumb to a motion to dismiss on that ground of
failure to state a cause of action. 23 However, where the
allegations of the complaint are vague, indefinite, or in the form
of conclusions, the proper recourse would be, not a motion to
dismiss, but a motion for a bill of particulars. 24 Thus, Section 1,
Rule 12 of the Rules of Court provides:
Before responding to a pleading or, if no responsive
pleading is permitted by these rules, within ten (10)
days after service of the pleading upon him, a party
may move for a more definite statement or for a bill
of particulars of any matter which is not averred with
sufficient definiteness or particularity to enable him
properly to prepare his responsive pleading or to
prepare for trial. Such motion shall point out the
defects complained of and the details desired.
In this connection, the following allegations have been held as
mere conclusions of law, inferences from facts not alleged or
opinion of the pleader: (a) the allegations that defendants
appellees were "actuated by ulterior motives, contrary to law and
morals, with abuse of their advantageous position as employers,
in gross and evident bad faith and without giving plaintiff . . . his
due, wilfully, maliciously, unlawfully, and in summary and
arbitrary manner", are conclusions of law, inferences from facts
not alleged and expressions of opinion unsupported by factual
premises; 25 (b) an allegation of duty in terms unaccompanied by
a statement of facts showing the existence of the duty, is a mere
conclusion of law, unless there is a relation set forth from which
the law raises the duty; 26 (c) an averment . . . that an act was
"unlawful" or "wrongful" is a mere legal conclusion or opinion of
the pleader; 27 (d) the allegation that there was a violation of trust
was plainly a conclusion of law, for "a mere allegation that it was
the duty of a party to do this or that, or that he was guilty of a
breach of duty, is a statement of a conclusion, not of a
fact;" 28 (e) an allegation that a contract is valid or void, is a mere
conclusion of law; 29 (f) the averment in the complaint that
"defendant usurped the office of Senator of the Philippines" is a
conclusion of law not a statement of fact inasmuch as the
particular facts on which the alleged usurpation is predicated are
not set forth therein; 30 and (g) the averment that "with intent of
circumventing the constitutional prohibition that 'no officer or
employee in the civil service shall be removed or suspended
except for cause as provided by law', respondents maliciously
and illegally for the purpose of political persecution and political
vengeance, reverted the fund of the salary item . . . and
furthermore eliminated or abolished the said position effective 1
July 1960" is a mere conclusion of law unsupported by factual
premises. 31
Bearing in mind the foregoing rules on pleading and case law, let
us now examine the allegations of the Second Amended
Complaint against the petitioner to determine whether or no they
were averred with sufficient definiteness or particularity to enable
him properly to prepare his responsive pleading or to prepare for
trial. If the allegations of the said complaint are vague, indefinite
or in the form of conclusions, then petitioner is entitled to a bill of
particulars.
The allegations in the complaint pertaining to the alleged culpable
and unlawful acts of herein petitioner are quoted hereunder as
follows:
GENERAL AVERMENTS
OF
DEFENDANTS' ILLEGAL ACTS
9. (a) From the early years of his presidency,
Defendant Ferdinand E. Marcos took undue
advantage of his powers as President. All
throughout the period from September 21, 1972 to
February 25, 1986, he gravely abused his powers
under martial law and ruled as Dictator under the
1973 Marcos-promulgated Constitution. Defendant
Ferdinand E. Marcos, together with other
Defendants, acting singly or collectively, and/or in
unlawful concert with one another, in flagrant
breach of public trust and of their fiduciary
obligations as public officers, with gross and
scandalous abuse of right and power and in brazen
violation of the Constitution and laws of the
Philippines, embarked upon a systematic plan to
accumulate ill-gotten wealth;
(b) Upon his unfettered discretion, and sole
authority, for the purpose of implementing the plan
referred to above, Defendant Ferdinand E. Marcos
ordered and caused, among others:
(b-i) the massive and unlawful
withdrawal of funds, securities,
reserves and other assets and
property from the National Treasury,
the Central Bank, the other financial
institutions and depositories of
Plaintiff;
(b-ii) the transfer of such funds,
securities, reserves and other assets
and property to payees or transferees
of his choice and whether and in what
manner such transactions should be
recorded in the books and records of
these institutions and other
depositories of Plaintiff;
10. Among others, in furtherance of the plan and
acting in the manner referred to above, in unlawful
concerted with one another and with gross abuse of
power and authority, Defendants Ferdinand E.
Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos;
xxx xxx xxx
b. Converted government-owned and
controlled corporations into private
enterprises and appropriated them
and/or their assets for their own
benefit and enrichment;
c. Awarded contracts with the
Government to their relatives,
business associates, dummies,
nominees, agents or persons who
were beholden to said Defendants,
under terms and conditions grossly
and manifestly disadvantageous to
the Government;
d. Misappropriated, embezzled
and/or converted to their own use
funds of Government financial
institutions, particularly those
allocated to the Office of the
President and other ministries and
agencies of the Government
including, those conveniently
denominated as intelligence or
counter-insurgency funds, as well as
funds provided to Plaintiff by foreign
countries, multinationals, public and
private financial institutions;
e. Raided Government financial and
banking institutions of billions of
pesos in loans, guarantees and other
types of financial accommodations to
finance dubious and/or overpriced
projects of favored corporations or
individuals and misused and/or
converted to their own use and
benefit deposits found therein to the
financial ruin of Plaintiff and the
Filipino people;
xxx xxx xxx
h. Sold, conveyed and/or transferred
Government property, real and/or
personal, to corporations beneficially
held and/ or controlled by them or
through third persons, under such
terms and conditions grossly and
manifestly disadvantageous to the
Government;
i. Engaged in other illegal and
improper acts and practices designed
to defraud Plaintiff and the Filipino
people, or otherwise misappropriated
and converted to their own use,
benefit and enrichment the lawful
patrimony and revenues of Plaintiff
and the Filipino people.
11. Among the assets acquired by Defendants in
the manner above-described and discovered by the
Commission in the exercise of its official
responsibilities are funds and other property listed
in Annex "A" hereof and made an integral part of
this Complaint.
12. Defendants, acting singly or collectively, and/or
in unlawful concert with one another, for the
purpose of preventing disclosure and avoiding
discovery of their unmitigated plunder of the
National Treasury and of their other illegal acts, and
employing the services of prominent lawyers,
accountants, financial experts, businessmen and
other persons, deposited, kept and invested funds,
securities and other assets estimated at billions of
US dollars in various banks, financial institutions,
trust or investment companies and with persons
here and abroad.
V
SPECIFIC AVERMENTS
OF
 DEFENDANTS' ILLEGAL ACTS
xxx xxx xxx
14. Defendants Benjamin (Kokoy) Romualdez and
Juliette Gomez Romualdez, acting by themselves
and/or in unlawful concert with Defendants
Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos, and
taking undue advantage of their relationship,
influence and connection with the latter Defendant
spouses, engaged in devices, schemes and
strategems to unjustly enrich themselves at the
expense of Plaintiff and the Filipino people, among
others:
(a) obtained, with the active collaboration of
Defendants Senen J. Gabaldon, Mario D.
Camacho, Mamerto Nepomuceno, Carlos J.
Valdes, Delia Tantuico, Jovencio F. Cinco, Cesar
C. Zalamea and Francisco Tantuico, control of
some of the biggest business enterprises in the
Philippines, such as, the Manila Electric Company
(MERALCO), Benguet Consolidated Mining
Corporation (BENGUET) and the Pilipinas Shell
Corporation, by employing devious financial
schemes and techniques calculated to require the
massive infusion and hemmorrhage of government
funds with minimum or negligible "cashout" from
Defendant Benjamin Romualdez. The following are
the general features of a classic take-over bid by
Defendant Benjamin Romualdez:
xxx xxx xxx
(ii) The shares were held in the name
of corporations which were organized
soldely (sic) for the purpose of holding
title to them. These corporations did
not have any operating history nor
any financial track record. Projected
cash flow consisted almost solely of
future and contingent dividends on
the shares held. In spite of these
limitations, these companies enjoyed
excellent credit lines from banks and
other financial institutions, as
evidenced by the millions of pesos in
loan and guarantees outstanding in
their books;
(iii) The "seed money" used to wrest
control came from government and
taxpayers' money in the form of
millions of pesos in loans, guarantees
and standby L/C's from government
financial institutions, notably the DBP
and PNB, which were in turn
rediscounted with the Central Bank;
(iv) Additional funding was provided
from the related interests; and
(v) This intricate (sic) skein of inter-
corporate dealings was controlled
and administered by an exclusive and
closely knit group of interlocking
directorate and officership
xxx xxx xxx
(g) Secured, in a veiled attempt to justify
MERALCO's anomalous acquisition of the electric
cooperatives, with the active collaborations of
Defendants Cesar E. A. Virata, Juanita R. Remulla,
Isidro Rodriguez, Jose C. Hernandez, Pedro
Dumol, Ricardo C. Galing, Francisco C. Gatmaitan,
Mario D. Camacho and the rest of the Defendants,
the approval by Defendant Ferdinand E. Marcos
and his cabinet of the so-called "Three-Year
Program for the Extension of MERALCO's Services
to Areas Within The 60-kilometer Radius of Manila",
which required government capital investment
amounting to millions of pesos;
xxx xxx xxx
(1) Caused the National Investment and
Development Corporation (NIDC) to dispose of its
interest in the oil plants located in Tanauan, Leyte,
which were owned and operated by its subsidiary,
the NIDC Oil Mills, Inc., in favor of the SOLO II, Inc.,
a corporation beneficially held and controlled by
Defendant Benjamin Romualdez, with the active
collaboration of Defendants Jose
Sandejas, Francisco Tantuico and Dominador G.
Ingco, under terms and conditions grossly
disadvantageous to NIDC, to the grave and
irreparable damage of Plaintiff and the Filipino
people.
(2) Defendant Francisco Tantuico, taking undue
advantage of his position as Chairman of the
Commission on Audit and with grave failure to
perform his constitutional duties as such Chairman,
acting in concert with Defendants Ferdinand E.
Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos, facilitated and made
possible the withdrawals, disbursements and
questionable use of government funds as stated in
the foregoing paragraphs to the grave and
irreparable damage and injury of Plaintiff and the
entire Filipino people.
xxx xxx xxx
17. The following Defendants acted as dummies,
nominees and/ or agents by allowing themselves (i)
to be used as instruments in accumulating ill-gotten
wealth through government concessions, orders
and/or policies prejudicial to Plaintiff, or (ii) to be
incorporators, directors, or members of
corporations held and/or controlled by Defendants
Ferdinand E. Marcos, Imelda R. Marcos, Benjamin
(Kokoy) Romualdez, and Juliette Gomez
Romualdez in order conceal (sic) and prevent
recovery of assets illegally obtained: Francisco
Tantuico . . .
17.a. THE NAMES OF SOME OF THE
CORPORATIONS BENEFICALLY HELD AND/OR
CONTROLLED BY THE DEFENDANTS
BENJAMIN (KOKOY) ROMUALDEZ, FERDINAND
E. MARCOS AND IMELDA R. MARCOS WHERE
THE POSITIONS/PARTICIPATIONS AND/OR
INVOLVEMENTS OF SOME OF THE
DEFENDANTS AS DUMMIES, NOMINEES
AND/OR AGENTS ARE INDICATED ARE LISTED
IN ANNEX "B" HEREOF AND MADE AN
INTEGRAL PART OF THIS COMPLAINT.
xxx xxx xxx
18. The acts of Defendants, singly or collectively,
and/or in unlawful concert with one another,
constitute gross abuse of official position and
authority, flagrant breach of public trust and
fiduciary obligations, acquisition of unexplained
wealth, brazen abuse of official position and
authority, flagrant breach of public trust and
fiduciary obligations, acquisition of unexplained
wealth, brazen abuse of right and power, unjust
enrichment, violation of the Constitution and laws of
the Republic of the Philippines, to the grave and
 irreparable damage of Plaintiff and the Filipino
people. (Emphasis supplied)
Let us now analyze and discuss the allegations of the complaint
in relation to which the petitioner pleads for a bill of particulars.
As quoted above, paragraph 9(a) of the complaint alleges that
"Defendant Ferdinand E. Marcos, together with other
Defendants, acting singly or collectively, and/or in unlawful
concert with one another, in flagrant breach of public trust and of
their fiduciary obligations as public officers, with gross and
scandalous abuse of right and power and in brazen violation of
the Constitution and laws of the Philippines, embarked upon a
systematic plan to accumulate ill-gotten wealth." In the light of the
rules on pleading and case law cited above, the allegations that
defendant Ferdinand E. Marcos, together with the other
defendants "embarked upon a systematic plan to accumulate ill-
gotten wealth" and that said defendants acted "in flagrant breach
of public trust and of their fiduciary obligations as public officers,
with gross and scandalous abuse of right and in brazen violation
of the Constitution and laws of the Philippines", are conclusions
of law unsupported by factual premises.
Nothing is said in the complaint about the petitioner's acts in
execution of the alleged "systematic plan to accumulate ill-gotten
wealth", or which are supposed to constitute "flagrant breach of
public trust", "gross and scandalous abuse of right and power",
and "violations of the Constitution and laws of the Philippines".
The complaint does not even allege what duties the petitioner
failed to perform, or the particular rights he abused.
Likewise, paragraph 15 avers that "defendant Francisco
Tantuico, taking undue advantage of his position as Chairman of
the Commission on Audit and with grave failure to perform his
constitutional duties as such Chairman, acting in concert with
Defendants Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos
facilitated and made possible the withdrawals, disbursements
and questionable use of government funds as stated in the
foregoing paragraphs to the grave and irreparable damage and
injury of Plaintiff and the entire Filipino people." In like manner,
the allegation that petitioner "took undue advantage of his
position as Chairman of the Commission on Audit," that he "failed
to perform his constitutional duties as such Chairman," and acting
in concert with Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos,
"facilitated and made possible the withdrawals, disbursements,
and questionable use of government funds as stated in the
foregoing paragraphs, to the grave and irreparable damage and
injury of plaintiff and the entire Filipino people", are mere
conclusions of law. Nowhere in the complaint is there any
allegation as to how such duty came about, or what petitioner's
duties were, with respect to the alleged withdrawals and
disbursements or how petitioner facilitated the alleged
withdrawals, disbursements, or conversion of public funds and
properties, nor an allegation from where the withdrawals and
disbursements came from, except for a general allegation that
they came from the national treasury. On top of that, the
complaint does not even contain any factual allegation which
would show that whatever withdrawals, disbursements, or
conversions were made, were indeed subject to audit by the
COA.
In this connection, it may well be stated that the Commission on
Audit (COA) is an independent, constitutional commission, which
has no power or authority to withdraw, disburse, or use funds and
property pertaining to other government offices or agencies. This
is done by the agency or office itself, the chief or head of which is
primarily and directly responsible for the funds and property
pertaining to such office or agency. 32 The COA is merely
authorized to audit, examine and settle accounts of the various
government offices or agencies, and this task is performed not by
the Chairman of the COA but by the COA auditors assigned to
the government office or agency subject to COA audit.
Thus, in each agency of the government, there is an auditing unit
headed by an auditor, whose duty is to audit and settle the
accounts, funds, financial transactions, and resources of the
agency under his audit jurisdiction. 33 The decision of the auditor
is appealable to the Regional Director, 34 whose decision, is in
turn, appealable to the COA Manager. 35 Any party dissatisfied
with the decision of the COA Manager may bring the matter on
appeal to the Commission proper, a collegiate body exercising
quasi-judicial functions, composed of three (3) COA
Commissioners, with the COA Chairman as presiding
officer. 36 It is only at this stage that the COA Chairman would
come to know of the matter and be called upon to act on the
same, and only if an aggrieved party brings the matter on appeal.
In other words, the Chairman of the COA does not participate or
personally audit all disbursements and withdrawals of
government funds, as well as transactions involving government
property. The averments in the particular paragraph of the
complaint merely assume that petitioner participated in or
personally audited all disbursements and withdrawals of
government funds, and all transactions involving government
property. Hence, the alleged withdrawals, disbursements and
questionable use of government funds could not have been, as
held by respondent Sandiganbayan, "within the peculiar and
intimate knowledge of petitioner as Chairman of the COA."
The complaint further avers in paragraph 17 that "(t)he following
Defendants acted as dummies, nominees and/or agents by
allowing themselves (i) to be instruments in accumulating ill-
gotten wealth through government concessions, order and/or
policies prejudicial to Plaintiff, or (ii) to be incorporators, directors,
or members of corporations beneficially held and/or controlled by
Defendant Ferdinand E. Marcos, Imelda R. Marcos, Benjamin
(Kokoy) T. Romualdez and Juliette Gomez Romualdez in order
to conceal and prevent recovery of assets illegally obtained:
Francisco Tantuico . . ." 37 Again, the allegation that petitioner
acted as dummy, nominee, or agent by allowing himself "to be
used as instrument in accumulating ill-gotten wealth through
government concessions, orders and/or policies prejudicial to
Plaintiff" or "to be (an) incorporator, director, or member of
corporations beneficially held and/or controlled" by the Marcoses
and Romualdezes, is a conclusion of law without factual basis.
The complaint does not contain any allegation as to how
petitioner became, or why he is perceived to be, a dummy,
nominee or agent. Besides, there is no averment in the complaint
how petitioner allowed himself to be used as instrument in the
accumulation of ill-gotten wealth, what the concessions, orders
and/or policies prejudicial to plaintiff are, why they are prejudicial,
and what petitioner had to do with the granting, issuance, and or
formulation of such concessions, orders, and/or policies.
Moreover, Annex "A" of the complaint lists down sixty-one (61)
corporations which are supposed to be beneficially owned or
controlled by the Marcoses and Romualdezes. However, the
complaint does not state which corporations petitioner is
supposed to be a stockholder, director, member, dummy,
nominee and/or agent. More significantly, the petitioner's name
does not even appear in Annex "B" of the complaint, which is a
listing of the alleged "Positions and Participations of Some
Defendants".
The allegations in the complaint, above-referred to, pertaining to
petitioner are, therefore, deficient in that they merely articulate
conclusions of law and presumptions unsupported by factual
premises. Hence, without the particulars prayed for in petitioner's
motion for a bill of particulars, it can be said the petitioner can not
intelligently prepare his responsive pleading and for trial.
Furthermore, the particulars prayed for, such as, names of
persons, names of corporations, dates, amounts involved,
specification of property for identification purposes, the particular
transactions involving withdrawals and disbursements, and a
statement of other material facts as would support the
conclusions and inferences in the complaint, are not evidentiary
in nature. On the contrary, those particulars are material facts that
should be clearly and definitely averred in the complaint in order
that the defendant may, in fairness, be informed of the claims
made against him to the end that he may be prepared to meet the the herein petitioner are deficient because the averments therein
issues at the trial. are mere conclusions of law or presumptions, unsupported by
factual premises.
Thus, it has been held that the purpose or object of a bill of
particulars is In the light of the foregoing, the respondent Sandiganbayan acted
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
. . . to amplify or limit a pleading, specify more jurisdiction in promulgating the questioned resolutions.
minutely and particularly a claim or defense set up
and pleaded in general terms, give information, not WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the resolutions
contained in the pleading, to the opposite party and dated 21 April 1989 and 29 May 1989 are hereby ANNULLED
the court as to the precise nature, character, scope, and SET ASIDE. The respondents are hereby ordered to
and extent of the cause of action or defense relied PREPARE and FILE a Bill of Particulars containing the facts
on by the pleader, and apprise the opposite party of prayed for by petitioner within TWENTY (20) DAYS from notice,
the case which he has to meet, to the end that the and should they fail to submit the said Bill of Particulars,
proof at the trial may be limited to the matters respondent Sandiganbayan is ordered TO EXCLUDE the herein
specified, and in order that surprise at, and petitioner as defendant in Civil Case No. 0035.
needless preparation for, the trial may be avoided,
and that the opposite party may be aided in framing SO ORDERED.
his answering pleading and preparing for trial. It has
also been stated that it is the function or purpose of
a bill of particulars to define, clarify, particularize,
and limit or circumscribe the issues in the case, to
expedite the trial, and assist the court. A general
function or purpose of a bill of particulars is to
prevent injustice or do justice in the case when that
cannot be accomplished without the aid of such a
bill. 38

Anent the contention of the Solicitor General that the petitioner is

not entitled to a bill of particulars because the ultimate facts
constituting the three (3) essential elements of a cause of action
for recovery of ill-gotten wealth have been sufficiently alleged in
the complaint, it would suffice to state that in a motion for a bill of
particulars, the only question to be resolved is whether or not the
allegations of the complaint are averred with sufficient
definiteness or particularity to enable the movant properly to
prepare his responsive pleading and to prepare for trial. As
already discussed, the allegations of the complaint pertaining to
 SECOND DIVISION required prior approval of the board of trustees. Thus, on 23 May
[G.R. No. 189496 : February 01, 2012] 2008, petitioner filed a Complaint[3] for sum of money, breach of
contract and damages against herein respondent UST and
D.M. FERRER & ASSOCIATES CORPORATION, USTHI when the latter failed to pay petitioner despite repeated
PETITIONER, VS. UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS,
demands.
RESPONDENT.
In impleading respondent UST, petitioner alleged that the
DECISION
former took complete control over the business and operation of
SERENO, J.:
USTHI, as well as the completion of the construction project.
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule
It also pointed out that the Articles of Incorporation of
45 of the Revised Rules of Court. Petitioner assails the Court of
USTHI provided that, upon dissolution, all of the latters assets
Appeals (CA) Resolution[1] promulgated on 26 June 2009
shall be transferred without any consideration and shall inure to
dismissing the formers Petition for Certiorari, and the
the benefit of UST. It appears that USTHI passed a Resolution
Resolution[2] dated 3 September 2009 denying the subsequent
on 10 January 2008 dissolving the corporation by shortening its
Motion for Reconsideration.
corporate term of existence from 16 March 2057 to 31 May 2008.
The facts are undisputed:
Finally, petitioner alleged that respondent, through its
On 25 November 2005, petitioner and University of Santo rector, Fr. Dela Rosa, O.P., verbally assured the former of the
Tomas Hospital, Inc. (USTHI) entered into a Project Management payment of USTHIs outstanding obligations.
Contract for the renovation of the 4th and 5th floors of the Clinical
Thus, petitioner posited in part that UST may be impleaded
Division Building, Nurse Call Room and Medical Records,
in the case under the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil,
Medical Arts Tower, Diagnostic Treatment Building and Pay
wherein respondent UST and USTHI would be considered to be
Division Building.
acting as one corporate entity, and UST may be held liable for the
On various dates, petitioner demanded from USTHI the alleged obligations due to petitioner.
payment of the construction costs amounting to P17,558,479.39.
Subsequently, respondent filed its Motion to Dismiss dated
However, on 16 April 2008, the University of Santo Tomas (UST),
12 June 2008.[4] It alleged that the Complaint failed to state a
through its rector, Fr. Rolando V. Dela Rosa, wrote a letter
cause of action, and that the claim was unenforceable under the
informing petitioner that its claim for payment had been denied,
provisions of the Statute of Frauds.
because the Project Management Contract was without the
 On 4 August 2008, Judge Bernelito R. Fernandez of
Branch 97 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City
granted the motion and dismissed the Complaint insofar as
respondent UST was concerned.[5]
First, basing its findings on the documents submitted in
support of the Complaint, the RTC held that respondent was not
a real party-in-interest, and that it was not privy to the contract
executed between USTHI and petitioner. Second, the court
pointed out that the alleged verbal assurances of Fr. Dela Rosa
should have been in writing to make these assurances binding
and demandable.
Petitioner sought a reconsideration of the RTC Order and
asserted that only allegations of the Complaint, and not the
attached documents, should have been the basis of the trial
courts ruling, consistent with the rule that the cause of action can
be determined only from the facts alleged in the Complaint. It also
insisted that the Statute of Frauds was inapplicable, since
USTHIs obligation had already been partially executed.[6]
On 5 October 2008, petitioner filed an Urgent Motion for
Voluntary Inhibition[7] on the ground that Judge Fernandez was
an alumnus of respondent UST.
Thereafter, Judge Fernandez issued an Order[8] inhibiting
himself from the case, which was consequently re-raffled to
Branch 76 presided by Judge Alexander S. Balut.
On 16 April 2009, Judge Balut dismissed the Motion for
Reconsideration filed by petitioner,[9] upholding the initial findings
of Judge Fernandez declaring that respondent UST was not a
real party-in-interest, and that Fr. Dela Rosas alleged assurances
of payment were unenforceable.
Subsequently, petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari under
Rule 65 with the CA.[10] Petitioner alleged that the trial court
committed grave abuse of discretion when it granted respondents
Motion to Dismiss on the basis of the documents submitted in
support of the Complaint, and not solely on the allegations stated
therein. Petitioner pointed out that the allegations raised
questions of fact and law, which should have been threshed out
during trial, when both parties would have been given the chance
to present evidence supporting their respective allegations.
However, on 26 June 2009, the CA issued the assailed
Resolution and dismissed the Petition on the ground that a
petition under Rule 65 is the wrong remedy to question the RTCs
Order that completely disposes of the case. Instead, petitioner
should have availed itself of an appeal under Rule 41 of the Rules
of Court.
Petitioner moved for a reconsideration of the
Resolution.[11] It pointed out that the present case falls under the
enumerated exceptions of Rule 41, in particular, while the main
case is still pending, no appeal may be made from a judgment or
final order for or against one or more of several parties or in
separate claims, counterclaims, cross-claims and third-party
complaints.
On 3 September 2009, the CA denied the Motion for
Reconsideration through its second assailed Resolution, holding
that the motion raised no new issues or substantial grounds that
would merit the reconsideration of the court.
Hence this Petition.
Petitioner raises two grounds in the present Petition: first,
whether the CA erred in dismissing the Petition for Certiorari by
failing to consider the exception in Sec. 1(g) of Rule 41 of the
Rules of Court; second, whether the trial court committed grave
abuse of discretion when it held that the Complaint stated no
cause of action.
We rule for petitioner.
Respondent insists that petitioner should have first filed a
notice of appeal before the RTC, and the appeal should have
been subsequently denied before recourse to the CA was made.
This contention holds no water.
In Jan-Dec Construction Corp. v. Court of Appeals,[12] we
held that a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is the proper
remedy to question the dismissal of an action against one of the
parties while the main case is still pending. This is the general
rule in accordance with Rule 41, Sec. 1(g). In that case, ruled
thus:
Evidently, the CA erred in dismissing
petitioner's petition for certiorari from the Order of
the RTC dismissing the complaint against
respondent. While Section 1, Rule 41 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure states that an appeal may
be taken only from a final order that completely
disposes of the case, it also provides several
exceptions to the rule, to wit: (a) an order denying a
motion for new trial or reconsideration; (b) an order
denying a petition for relief or any similar motion
seeking relief from judgment; (c) an interlocutory
order; (d) an order disallowing or dismissing an
appeal; (e) an order denying a motion to set aside
a judgment by consent, confession or compromise
on the ground of fraud, mistake or duress, or any
other ground vitiating consent; (f) an order of
execution; (g) a judgment or final order for or
against one or more of several parties or in
separate claims, counterclaims, cross-claims and
third-party complaints, while the main case is
pending, unless the court allows an appeal
therefrom; and (h) an order dismissing an action
without prejudice. In the foregoing instances, the
aggrieved party may file an appropriate special civil
action for certiorari under Rule 65.
In the present case, the Order of the RTC
dismissing the complaint against respondent is
a final order because it terminates the
proceedings against respondent but it falls
within exception (g) of the Rule since the case
involves two defendants, Intermodal and herein
respondent and the complaint against
Intermodal is still pending. Thus, the remedy of
a special civil action for certiorari availed of by
petitioner before the CA was proper and the CA
erred in dismissing the petition. (Emphasis
supplied)
Clearly, in the case at bar, the CA also erred when it
dismissed the Petition filed before it.
 Anent the second issue, we also agree with petitioner that discretion when it dismissed the case against respondent for lack
the Complaint states a cause of action against respondent UST. of cause of action. The trial court relied on the contract executed
In Abacan v. Northwestern University, Inc.,[13] we said: between petitioner and USTHI, when the court should have
instead considered merely the allegations stated in the
It is settled that the existence of a cause of
action is determined by the allegations in the Complaint.
complaint. In resolving a motion to dismiss based
on the failure to state a cause of action, only the WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition
facts alleged in the complaint must be considered. is GRANTED. Branch 76 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
The test is whether the court can render a valid
City is hereby ordered to REINSTATE respondent University of
judgment on the complaint based on the facts
alleged and the prayer asked for. Indeed, the Santo Tomas as a defendant in C.C. No. 0862635.
elementary test for failure to state a cause of action
is whether the complaint alleges facts which if true
would justify the relief demanded. Only ultimate
facts and not legal conclusions or evidentiary SO ORDERED.
facts, which should not be alleged in the
complaint in the first place, are considered for
purposes of applying the test. (Emphasis
supplied)

While it is admitted that respondent UST was not a party

to the contract, petitioner posits that the former is nevertheless
liable for the construction costs. In support of its position,
petitioner alleged that (1) UST and USTHI are one and the same
corporation; (2) UST stands to benefit from the assets of USTHI
by virtue of the latters Articles of Incorporation; (3) respondent
controls the business of USTHI; and (4) USTs officials have
performed acts that may be construed as an acknowledgement
of respondents liability to petitioner.

Obviously, these issues would have been best resolved

during trial. The RTC therefore committed grave abuse of