A.C. No.

5299 August 19, 2003

ATTY. ISMAEL G. KHAN, JR., Assistant Court Administrator and Chief, Public Information
Office,Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. RIZALINO T. SIMBILLO, Respondent.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 157053 August 19, 2003

ATTY. RIZALINO T. SIMBILLO, Petitioner,

vs.
IBP COMMISSION ON BAR DISCIPLINE and ATTY. ISMAEL G. KHAN, JR., in his capacity as Assistant
Court Administrator and Chief, Public Information Office, Respondents.

RESOLUTION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

This administrative complaint arose from a paid advertisement that appeared in the July 5, 2000 issue of the
newspaper, Philippine Daily Inquirer, which reads: "ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE Specialist 532-4333/521-
2667."1

Ms. Ma. Theresa B. Espeleta, a staff member of the Public Information Office of the Supreme Court, called up the
published telephone number and pretended to be an interested party. She spoke to Mrs. Simbillo, who claimed that
her husband, Atty. Rizalino Simbillo, was an expert in handling annulment cases and can guarantee a court decree
within four to six months, provided the case will not involve separation of property or custody of children. Mrs.
Simbillo also said that her husband charges a fee of P48,000.00, half of which is payable at the time of filing of the
case and the other half after a decision thereon has been rendered.

Further research by the Office of the Court Administrator and the Public Information Office revealed that similar
advertisements were published in the August 2 and 6, 2000 issues of the Manila Bulletin and August 5, 2000 issue
of The Philippine Star.2

On September 1, 2000, Atty. Ismael G. Khan, Jr., in his capacity as Assistant Court Administrator and Chief of the
Public Information Office, filed an administrative complaint against Atty. Rizalino T. Simbillo for improper
advertising and solicitation of his legal services, in violation of Rule 2.03 and Rule 3.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court. 3

In his answer, respondent admitted the acts imputed to him, but argued that advertising and solicitation per se are not
prohibited acts; that the time has come to change our views about the prohibition on advertising and solicitation; that
the interest of the public is not served by the absolute prohibition on lawyer advertising; that the Court can lift the
ban on lawyer advertising; and that the rationale behind the decades-old prohibition should be abandoned. Thus, he
prayed that he be exonerated from all the charges against him and that the Court promulgate a ruling that
advertisement of legal services offered by a lawyer is not contrary to law, public policy and public order as long as it
is dignified.4

The case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for investigation, report and recommendation. 5 On
June 29, 2002, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline passed Resolution No. XV-2002-306,6 finding respondent
guilty of violation of Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Rule 138, Section 27 of the
Rules of Court, and suspended him from the practice of law for one (1) year with the warning that a repetition of
similar acts would be dealt with more severely. The IBP Resolution was noted by this Court on November 11,
2002.7

In the meantime, respondent filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration, 8 which was denied by the IBP in
Resolution No. XV-2002-606 dated October 19, 20029

Hence, the instant petition for certiorari, which was docketed as G.R. No. 157053 entitled, "Atty. Rizalino T.
Simbillo, Petitioner versus IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, Atty. Ismael G. Khan, Jr., Asst. Court Administrator
and Chief, Public Information Office, Respondents." This petition was consolidated with A.C. No. 5299 per the
Courts Resolution dated March 4, 2003.

In a Resolution dated March 26, 2003, the parties were required to manifest whether or not they were willing to
submit the case for resolution on the basis of the pleadings.10 Complainant filed his Manifestation on April 25, 2003,
stating that he is not submitting any additional pleading or evidence and is submitting the case for its early resolution
on the basis of pleadings and records thereof. 11 Respondent, on the other hand, filed a Supplemental Memorandum
on June 20, 2003.

We agree with the IBPs Resolutions Nos. XV-2002-306 and XV-2002-606.

Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility read:

Rule 2.03. A lawyer shall not do or permit to be done any act designed primarily to solicit legal business.

Rule 3.01. A lawyer shall not use or permit the use of any false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, undignified,
self-laudatory or unfair statement or claim regarding his qualifications or legal services.

Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court states:

SEC. 27. Disbarment and suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefor. A member of the bar may
be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice or other
gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before the admission to practice, or for a
willful disobedience appearing as attorney for a party without authority to do so.

It has been repeatedly stressed that the practice of law is not a business. 12 It is a profession in which duty to public
service, not money, is the primary consideration. Lawyering is not primarily meant to be a money-making venture,
and law advocacy is not a capital that necessarily yields profits. 13 The gaining of a livelihood should be a secondary
consideration.14 The duty to public service and to the administration of justice should be the primary consideration of
lawyers, who must subordinate their personal interests or what they owe to themselves. 15 The following elements
distinguish the legal profession from a business:

1. A duty of public service, of which the emolument is a by-product, and in which one may attain the
highest eminence without making much money;

2. A relation as an "officer of the court" to the administration of justice involving thorough sincerity,
integrity and reliability;

3. A relation to clients in the highest degree of fiduciary;

4. A relation to colleagues at the bar characterized by candor, fairness, and unwillingness to resort to
current business methods of advertising and encroachment on their practice, or dealing directly with their
clients.16
There is no question that respondent committed the acts complained of. He himself admits that he caused the
publication of the advertisements. While he professes repentance and begs for the Courts indulgence, his contrition
rings hollow considering the fact that he advertised his legal services again after he pleaded for compassion and after
claiming that he had no intention to violate the rules. Eight months after filing his answer, he again advertised his
legal services in the August 14, 2001 issue of the Buy & Sell Free Ads Newspaper. 17 Ten months later, he caused the
same advertisement to be published in the October 5, 2001 issue of Buy & Sell. 18Such acts of respondent are a
deliberate and contemptuous affront on the Courts authority.

What adds to the gravity of respondents acts is that in advertising himself as a self-styled "Annulment of Marriage
Specialist," he wittingly or unwittingly erodes and undermines not only the stability but also the sanctity of an
institution still considered sacrosanct despite the contemporary climate of permissiveness in our society. Indeed, in
assuring prospective clients that an annulment may be obtained in four to six months from the time of the filing of
the case,19 he in fact encourages people, who might have otherwise been disinclined and would have refrained from
dissolving their marriage bonds, to do so.

Nonetheless, the solicitation of legal business is not altogether proscribed. However, for solicitation to be proper, it
must be compatible with the dignity of the legal profession. If it is made in a modest and decorous manner, it would
bring no injury to the lawyer and to the bar.20 Thus, the use of simple signs stating the name or names of the lawyers,
the office and residence address and fields of practice, as well as advertisement in legal periodicals bearing the same
brief data, are permissible. Even the use of calling cards is now acceptable. 21 Publication in reputable law lists, in a
manner consistent with the standards of conduct imposed by the canon, of brief biographical and informative data is
likewise allowable. As explicitly stated in Ulep v. Legal Clinic, Inc.:22

Such data must not be misleading and may include only a statement of the lawyers name and the names of his
professional associates; addresses, telephone numbers, cable addresses; branches of law practiced; date and place of
birth and admission to the bar; schools attended with dates of graduation, degrees and other educational distinctions;
public or quasi-public offices; posts of honor; legal authorships; legal teaching positions; membership and offices in
bar associations and committees thereof, in legal and scientific societies and legal fraternities; the fact of listings in
other reputable law lists; the names and addresses of references; and, with their written consent, the names of clients
regularly represented.

The law list must be a reputable law list published primarily for that purpose; it cannot be a mere supplemental
feature of a paper, magazine, trade journal or periodical which is published principally for other purposes. For that
reason, a lawyer may not properly publish his brief biographical and informative data in a daily paper, magazine,
trade journal or society program. Nor may a lawyer permit his name to be published in a law list the conduct,
management, or contents of which are calculated or likely to deceive or injure the public or the bar, or to lower
dignity or standing of the profession.

The use of an ordinary simple professional card is also permitted. The card may contain only a statement of his
name, the name of the law firm which he is connected with, address, telephone number and special branch of law
practiced. The publication of a simple announcement of the opening of a law firm or of changes in the partnership,
associates, firm name or office address, being for the convenience of the profession, is not objectionable. He may
likewise have his name listed in a telephone directory but not under a designation of special branch of law.
(emphasis and italics supplied)

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent RIZALINO T. SIMBILLO is found GUILTY of violation of
Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court. He
is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for ONE (1) YEAR effective upon receipt of this Resolution. He is
likewise STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar offense will be dealt with more severely.

Let copies of this Resolution be entered in his record as attorney and be furnished the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and all courts in the country for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.
Vitug, (Acting Chairman),Carpio, and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman ), abroad, on official business.

A.C. No. 9387 June 20, 2012

(Formerly CBD Case No. 05-1562)

EMILIA R. HERNANDEZ, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. VENANCIO B. PADILLA, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

SERENO, J.:

This is a disbarment case filed by Emilia Hernandez (complainant) against her lawyer, Atty. Venancio B. Padilla
(respondent) of Padilla Padilla Bautista Law Offices, for his alleged negligence in the handling of her case.

The records disclose that complainant and her husband were the respondents in an ejectment case filed against them
with the Regional Trial Court of Manila (RTC).

In a Decision1 dated 28 June 2002, penned by Judge Rosmari D. Carandang (Judge Carandang), the RTC ordered
that the Deed of Sale executed in favor of complainant be cancelled; and that the latter pay the complainant therein,
Elisa Duigan (Duigan), attorneys fees and moral damages.

Complainant and her husband filed their Notice of Appeal with the RTC. Thereafter, the Court of Appeals (CA)
ordered them to file their Appellants Brief. They chose respondent to represent them in the case. On their behalf, he
filed a Memorandum on Appeal instead of an Appellants Brief. Thus, Duigan filed a Motion to Dismiss the Appeal.
The CA granted the Motion in a Resolution2 dated 16 December 2003.

No Motion for Reconsideration (MR) of the Resolution dismissing the appeal was filed by the couple. Complainant
claims that because respondent ignored the Resolution, he acted with "deceit, unfaithfulness amounting to
malpractice of law."3 Complainant and her husband failed to file an appeal, because respondent never informed them
of the adverse decision. Complainant further claims that she asked respondent "several times" about the status of the
appeal, but "despite inquiries he deliberately withheld response [sic]," to the damage and prejudice of the spouses. 4

The Resolution became final and executory on 8 January 2004. Complainant was informed of the Resolution
sometime in July 2005, when the Sheriff of the RTC came to her house and informed her of the Resolution.

On 9 September 2005, complainant filed an Affidavit of Complaint 5 with the Committee on Bar Discipline of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), seeking the disbarment of respondent on the following grounds: deceit,
malpractice, and grave misconduct. Complainant prays for moral damages in the amount of 350,000.

Through an Order6 dated 12 September 2005, Director of Bar Discipline Rogelio A. Vinluan ordered respondent to
submit an answer to the Complaint. In his Counter-Affidavit/Answer,7 respondent prayed for the outright dismissal
of the Complaint.

Respondent explained that he was not the lawyer of complainant. He averred that prior to the mandatory conference
set by the IBP on 13 December 2005, he had never met complainant, because it was her husband who had personally
transacted with him. According to respondent, the husband "despondently pleaded to me to prepare a Memorandum
on Appeal because according to him the period given by the CA was to lapse within two or three days." 8 Thus,
respondent claims that he filed a Memorandum on Appeal because he honestly believed that "it is this pleading
which was required."9

Before filing the Memorandum, respondent advised complainants husband to settle the case. The latter allegedly
"gestured approval of the advice." 10

After the husband of complainant picked up the Memorandum for filing, respondent never saw or heard from him
again and thus assumed that the husband heeded his advice and settled the case. When respondent received an Order
from the CA requiring him to file a comment on the Motion to Dismiss filed by Duigan, he "instructed his office
staff to contact Mr. Hernandez thru available means of communication, but to no avail." 11 Thus, when complainants
husband went to the office of respondent to tell the latter that the Sheriff of the RTC had informed complainant of
the CAs Resolution dismissing the case, respondent was just as surprised. The lawyer exclaimed, "KALA KO BA
NAKIPAG AREGLO NA KAYO."12

In his 5 January 2009 Report,13 IBP Investigating Commissioner Leland R. Villadolid, Jr. found that respondent
violated Canons 5, 17, and 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (the Code). He recommended that
respondent be suspended from practicing law from 3 to 6 months.

The board of governors of the IBP issued Resolution No. XIX-2010-452 on 28 August 2010. Therein, they resolved
to adopt and approve the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner. Respondent was
suspended from the practice of law for six months.

Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration.14 He prayed for the relaxation of the application of the Canons of the
Code. On 14 January 2012, the IBP board of governors passed Resolution No. XX-2012-1715 partly granting his
Motion and reducing the penalty imposed to one-month suspension from the practice of law.

Pursuant to Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, acting Director for Bar Discipline Dennis A.B. Funa, through a
letter16 addressed to then Chief Justice Renato C. Corona, transmitted the documents pertaining to the disbarment
Complaint against respondent.

We adopt the factual findings of the board of governors of the IBP. This Court, however, disagrees with its Decision
to reduce the penalty to one-month suspension. We thus affirm the six-month suspension the Board originally
imposed in its 28 August 2010 Resolution.

Respondent insists that he had never met complainant prior to the mandatory conference set for the disbarment
Complaint she filed against him. However, a perusal of the Memorandum of Appeal filed in the appellate court
revealed that he had signed as counsel for the defendant-appellants therein, including complainant and her
husband.17 The pleading starts with the following sentence: "DEFENDANT[S]-APPELLANTS, by counsel, unto
this Honorable Court submit the Memorandum and further allege that: x x x." 18 Nowhere does the document say that
it was filed only on behalf of complainants husband.

It is further claimed by respondent that the relation created between him and complainants husband cannot be
treated as a "client-lawyer" relationship, viz:

It is no more than a client needing a legal document and had it prepared by a lawyer for a fee. Under the factual
milieu and circumstances, it could not be said that a client entrusted to a lawyer handling and prosecution of his case
that calls for the strict application of the Code; x x x19

As proof that none of them ever intended to enter into a lawyer-client relationship, he also alleges that complainants
husband never contacted him after the filing of the Memorandum of Appeal. According to respondent, this behavior
was "very unusual if he really believed that he engaged" the formers services. 20
Complainant pointed out in her Reply21 that respondent was her lawyer, because he accepted her case and an
acceptance fee in the amount of 7,000.

According to respondent, however, "[C]ontrary to the complainants claim that he charged 7,000 as acceptance
fee," "the fee was only for the preparation of the pleading which is even low for a Memorandum of Appeal: x x x." 22

Acceptance of money from a client establishes an attorney-client relationship and gives rise to the duty of fidelity to
the clients cause.23 Once a lawyer agrees to handle a case, it is that lawyers duty to serve the client with
competence and diligence.24 Respondent has failed to fulfill this duty.

According to respondent, he merely drafted the pleading that complainants husband asked from him. Respondent
also claims that he filed a Memorandum of Appeal, because he "honestly believed" that this was the pleading
required, based on what complainants husband said.

The IBP Investigating Commissioners observation on this matter, in the 5 January 2009 Report, is correct.
Regardless of the particular pleading his client may have believed to be necessary, it was respondents duty to know
the proper pleading to be filed in appeals from RTC decisions, viz:

Having seen the Decision dated 18 June 2002 of the trial court, respondent should have known that the mode of
appeal to the Court of Appeals for said Decision is by ordinary appeal under Section 2(a) Rule 41 of the1997
Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. In all such cases, Rule 44 of the said Rules applies. 25

When the RTC ruled against complainant and her husband, they filed a Notice of Appeal. Consequently, what
should apply is the rule on ordinary appealed cases or Rule 44 of the Rules on Civil Procedure. Rule 44 requires that
the appellants brief be filed after the records of the case have been elevated to the CA. Respondent, as a litigator,
was expected to know this procedure. Canon 5 of the Code reads:

CANON 5 A lawyer shall keep abreast of legal developments, participate in continuing legal education
programs, support efforts to achieve high standards in law schools as well as in the practical training of law students
and assist in disseminating information regarding the law and jurisprudence.

The obligations of lawyers as a consequence of their Canon 5 duty have been expounded in Dulalia, Jr. v. Cruz, 26to
wit:

It must be emphasized that the primary duty of lawyers is to obey the laws of the land and promote respect for the
law and legal processes. They are expected to be in the forefront in the observance and maintenance of the rule of
law. This duty carries with it the obligation to be well-informed of the existing laws and to keep abreast with legal
developments, recent enactments and jurisprudence. It is imperative that they be conversant with basic legal
principles. Unless they faithfully comply with such duty, they may not be able to discharge competently and
diligently their obligations as members of the bar. Worse, they may become susceptible to committing mistakes.

In his MR, respondent begged for the consideration of the IBP, claiming that the reason for his failure to file the
proper pleading was that he "did not have enough time to acquaint himself thoroughly with the factual milieu of the
case." The IBP reconsidered and thereafter significantly reduced the penalty originally imposed.

Respondents plea for leniency should not have been granted.

The supposed lack of time given to respondent to acquaint himself with the facts of the case does not excuse his
negligence.

Rule 18.02 of the Code provides that a lawyer shall not handle any legal matter without adequate preparation. While
it is true that respondent was not complainants lawyer from the trial to the appellate court stage, this fact did not
excuse him from his duty to diligently study a case he had agreed to handle. If he felt he did not have enough time to
study the pertinent matters involved, as he was approached by complainants husband only two days before the
expiration of the period for filing the Appellants Brief, respondent should have filed a motion for extension of time
to file the proper pleading instead of whatever pleading he could come up with, just to "beat the deadline set by the
Court of Appeals."27

Moreover, respondent does not deny that he was given notice of the fact that he filed the wrong pleading. However,
instead of explaining his side by filing a comment, as ordered by the appellate court, he chose to ignore the CAs
Order. He claims that he was under the presumption that complainant and her husband had already settled the case,
because he had not heard from the husband since the filing of the latters Memorandum of Appeal.

This explanation does not excuse respondents actions.

First of all, there were several remedies that respondent could have availed himself of, from the moment he received
the Notice from the CA to the moment he received the disbarment Complaint filed against him. But because of his
negligence, he chose to sit on the case and do nothing.

Second, respondent, as counsel, had the duty to inform his clients of the status of their case. His failure to do so
amounted to a violation of Rule 18.04 of the Code, which reads:

18.04 - A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall respond within a reasonable time to
the clients request for information.

If it were true that all attempts to contact his client proved futile, the least respondent could have done was to inform
the CA by filing a Notice of Withdrawal of Appearance as counsel. He could have thus explained why he was no
longer the counsel of complainant and her husband in the case and informed the court that he could no longer
contact them.28 His failure to take this measure proves his negligence.

Lastly, the failure of respondent to file the proper pleading and a comment on Duigans Motion to Dismiss is
negligence on his part.1wphi1 Under 18.03 of the Code, a lawyer is liable for negligence in handling the clients
case, viz:

Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith
shall render him liable.

Lawyers should not neglect legal matters entrusted to them, otherwise their negligence in fulfilling their duty would
render them liable for disciplinary action.29

Respondent has failed to live up to his duties as a lawyer. When a lawyer violates his duties to his client, he engages
in unethical and unprofessional conduct for which he should be held accountable. 30

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Venancio Padilla is found guilty of violating Rules 18.02, 18.03, 18.04, as well as
Canon 5 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Hence, he is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for SIX (6)
MONTHS and STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or a similar offense will be dealt with more
severely.

Let copies of this Resolution be entered into the personal records of respondent as a member of the bar and
furnished to the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and the Court Administrator for circulation to
all courts of the country for their information and guidance.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Associate Justice

Footnotes

1
Rollo, Vol. I, pp. 14-24.
2
Id. at 43-44.
3
Id. at 1.
4
Id.
5
Id. at 1-2.
6
Id. at 45.
7
Id. at 52-56.
8
Id at 53.
9
Id at 54.
10
Id.
11
Id.
12
Id.
13
Rollo, Vol. II, pp. 2-15.
14
Id. at 16-20.
15
Rollo, Vol. II (page not indicated).
16
Id. at.
17
See rollo, Vol. I, p. 39.
18
Id. at 25.
19
Rollo, Vol. II, p. 18.
20
Id at 19.
21
Rollo, Vol. I, pp. 76-77.
22
Rollo, Vol. II, p. 18.
23
Fernandez v. Atty. Cabrera, 463 Phil. 352 (2003).
24
Code of Professional Responsibility, Canon 18.
25
Rollo, Vol. II, pp. 9-10
26
A.C. No. 6854, 27 April 2007, 522 SCRA 244, 255 citing Santiago v. Rafanan, A.C. No. 6252, 483 Phil.
94, 105(2004).
27
Rollo, Vol. II, p. 18.
28
"Sec. 26. Change of attorneys. - An attorney may retire at any time from any action or special
proceeding, by the written consent of his client filed in court. He may also retire at any time from an action
or special proceeding, without the consent of his client, should the court, on notice to the client and
attorney, and on hearing, determine that he ought to be allowed to retire. In case of substitution, the name
of the attorney newly employed shall be entered on the docket of the court in place of the former one, and
written notice of the change shall be given to the adverse party." (Rules of Court, Rule 138, Sec. 26)
29
Perea v. Atty. Almadro, 447 Phil. 434 (2003).
30
Fernandez, supra note 23.

A.M. No. 08-6-352-RTC August 19, 2009

QUERY OF ATTY. KAREN M. SILVERIO-BUFFE, FORMER Clerk of Court - BRANCH 81, ROMBLON,
ROMBLON - ON THE PROHIBITION FROM ENGAGING IN THE PRIVATE PRACTICE OF LAW.

DECISION

BRION, J.:
This administrative matter started as a letter-query dated March 4, 2008 of Atty. Karen M. Silverio-Buffe (Atty.
Buffe) addressed to the Office of the Court Administrator, which query the latter referred to the Court for
consideration. In the course of its action on the matter, the Court discovered that the query was beyond pure policy
interpretation and referred to the actual situation of Atty. Buffe, and, hence, was a matter that required concrete
action on the factual situation presented.

The query, as originally framed, related to Section 7(b)(2) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6713, as amended (or the
Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees). This provision places a limitation on
public officials and employees during their incumbency, and those already separated from government employment
for a period of one (1) year after separation, in engaging in the private practice of their profession. Section 7(b)(2) of
R.A. No. 6713 provides:

SECTION 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions. In addition to acts and omissions of public officials and
employees now prescribed in the Constitution and existing laws, the following shall constitute prohibited acts and
transactions of any public official and employee and are hereby declared to be unlawful:

xxx

(b) Outside employment and other activities related thereto. Public officials and employees during their
incumbency shall not:

xxx

(2) Engage in the private practice of their profession unless authorized by the Constitution or law, provided,
that such practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with their official functions; or

xxx

These prohibitions shall continue to apply for a period of one (1) year after resignation, retirement, or separation
from public office, except in the case of subparagraph (b) (2) above, but the professional concerned cannot practice
his profession in connection with any matter before the office he used to be with, in which case the one-year
prohibition shall likewise apply.

In her letter-query, Atty. Buffe posed these questions: "Why may an incumbent engage in private practice under
(b)(2), assuming the same does not conflict or tend to conflict with his official duties, but a non-incumbent like
myself cannot, as is apparently prohibited by the last paragraph of Sec. 7? Why is the former allowed, who is still
occupying the very public position that he is liable to exploit, but a non-incumbent like myself who is no longer in
a position of possible abuse/exploitation cannot?"1

The query arose because Atty. Buffe previously worked as Clerk of Court VI of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 81 of Romblon; she resigned from her position effective February 1, 2008. Thereafter (and within the one-
year period of prohibition mentioned in the above-quoted provision), she engaged in the private practice of law by
appearing as private counsel in several cases before RTC-Branch 81 of Romblon.

Atty. Buffe alleged that Section 7(b)(2) of R.A. No. 6713 gives preferential treatment to an incumbent public
employee, who may engage in the private practice of his profession so long as this practice does not conflict or tend
to conflict with his official functions. In contrast, a public official or employee who has retired, resigned, or has been
separated from government service like her, is prohibited from engaging in private practice on any matter before the
office where she used to work, for a period of one (1) year from the date of her separation from government
employment.

Atty. Buffe further alleged that the intention of the above prohibition is to remove the exercise of clout, influence or
privity to insider information, which the incumbent public employee may use in the private practice of his
profession. However, this situation did not obtain in her case, since she had already resigned as Clerk of Court of
RTC-Branch 18 of Romblon. She advanced the view that she could engage in the private practice of law before
RTC-Branch 81 of Romblon, so long as her appearance as legal counsel shall not conflict or tend to conflict with her
former duties as former Clerk of Court of that Branch.

Then Deputy Court Administrator (now Court Administrator) Jose P. Perez made the following observations when
the matter was referred to him:

The general intent of the law, as defined in its title is "to uphold the time-honored principle of public office being a
public trust." Section 4 thereof provides for the norms of conduct of public officials and employees, among others:
(a) commitment to public interest; (b) professionalism; and (c) justness and sincerity. Of particular significance is
the statement under professionalism that "[t]hey [public officials and employees] shall endeavor to discourage
wrong perceptions of their roles as dispensers or peddlers of undue patronage.

Thus, it may be well to say that the prohibition was intended to avoid any impropriety or the appearance of
impropriety which may occur in any transaction between the retired government employee and his former
colleagues, subordinates or superiors brought about by familiarity, moral ascendancy or undue influence, as the case
may be.21avvphi1

Subsequently, in a Minute Resolution dated July 15, 2008, we resolved to refer this case to the Office of the Chief
Attorney (OCAT) for evaluation, report and recommendation. 3 The OCAT took the view that:

The premise of the query is erroneous. She interprets Section 7 (b) (2) as a blanket authority for an incumbent clerk
of court to practice law. Clearly, there is a misreading of that provision of law. 4 and further observed:

The confusion apparently lies in the use of the term "such practice" after the phrase "provided that." It may indeed
be misinterpreted as modifying the phrase "engage in the private practice of their profession" should be prefatory
sentence that public officials "during their incumbency shall not" be disregarded. However, read in its entirety, "such
practice" may only refer to practice "authorized by the Constitution or law" or the exception to the prohibition
against the practice of profession. The term "law" was intended by the legislature to include "a memorandum or a
circular or an administrative order issued pursuant to the authority of law."

xxx

The interpretation that Section 7 (b) (2) generally prohibits incumbent public officials and employees from engaging
in the practice of law, which is declared therein a prohibited and unlawful act, accords with the constitutional policy
on accountability of public officers stated in Article XI of the Constitution

xxx

The policy thus requires public officials and employees to devote full time public service so that in case of conflict
between personal and public interest, the latter should take precedence over the former. 5[Footnotes omitted]

With respect to lawyers in the judiciary, the OCAT pointed to Section 5, Canon 3 of the Code of Conduct for Court
Personnel the rule that deals with outside employment by an incumbent judicial employee and which limits such
outside employment to one that "does not require the practice of law." 6 The prohibition to practice law with respect
to any matter where they have intervened while in the government service is reiterated in Rule 6.03, Canon 6 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, which governs the conduct of lawyers in the government service. 7

In view of the OCAT findings and recommendations, we issued an En Banc Resolution dated November 11, 2008
directing the Court Administrator to draft and submit to the Court a circular on the practice of profession during
employment and within one year from resignation, retirement from or cessation of employment in the Judiciary. We
likewise required the Executive Judge of the RTC of Romblon to (i) verify if Atty. Buffe had appeared as counsel
during her incumbency as clerk of court and after her resignation in February 2008, and (ii) submit to the Court a
report on his verification.8

In compliance with this our Resolution, Executive Judge Ramiro R. Geronimo of RTC-Branch 81 of Romblon
reported the following appearances made by Atty. Buffe:

(1) Civil Case No. V-1564, entitled Oscar Madrigal Moreno, Jr. et al. versus Leonardo M. Macalam, et al.
on February 19, 2008, March 4, 2008, April 10, 2008 and July 9, 2008 as counsel for the plaintiffs;

(2) Civil Case No. V-1620, entitled Melchor M. Manal versus Zosimo Malasa, et al., on (sic) February,
2008, as counsel for the plaintiff;

(3) Civil Case No. V-1396, entitled Solomon Y. Mayor versus Jose J. Mayor, on February 21, 2008, as
counsel for the plaintiff; and

(4) Civil Case No. V-1639, entitled Philippine National Bank versus Sps. Mariano and Olivia Silverio, on
April 11, 2008 and July 9, 2008, as counsel for the defendants.

Atty. Buffe herself was furnished a copy of our November 11, 2008 En Banc Resolution and she filed a
Manifestation (received by the Court on February 2, 2009) acknowledging receipt of our November 11, 2008
Resolution. She likewise stated that her appearances are part of Branch 81 records. As well, she informed the Court
that she had previously taken the following judicial remedies in regard to the above query:

1. SCA No. 089119028 (Annex C), filed with Branch 54 of the RTC Manila, which had been dismissed
without prejudice on July 23, 2008 (Annex D) a recourse taken when undersigned was still a private
practitioner;

2. SCA No. 08120423 (Annex A), filed with Branch 17 of the RTC of Manila, which had been also
dismissed (with or without prejudice) on December 4, 2008 (Annex B) a recourse taken when
undersigned was already a public prosecutor appearing before the same Branch 81, after she took her oath
of office as such on August 15, 2008.[Emphasis supplied]

She also made known her intent to elevate the dismissal of the above cases "so that eventually, the Honorable
Supreme Court may put to rest the legal issue/s presented in the above petitions which is, why is it that R.A. No.
6713, Sec. 7 (b)(2) and last par. thereof, apparently contains an express prohibition (valid or invalid) on the private
practice of undersigneds law profession, before Branch 81, while on the other hand not containing a similar,
express prohibition in regard to undersigneds practice of profession, before the same court, as a public prosecutor
within the supposedly restricted 1-year period?"

OUR ACTION AND RULING

Preliminary Considerations

As we stated at the outset, this administrative matter confronts us, not merely with the task of determining how the
Court will respond to the query, both with respect to the substance and form (as the Court does not give
interpretative opinions9 but can issue circulars and regulations relating to pleading, practice and procedure in all
courts10 and in the exercise of its administrative supervision over all courts and personnel thereof 11), but also with
the task of responding to admitted violations of Section 7 (b)(2) of R.A. No. 6713 and to multiple recourses on the
same subject.

After our directive to the Office of the Court Administrator to issue a circular on the subject of the query for the
guidance of all personnel in the Judiciary, we consider this aspect of the present administrative matter a finished
task, subject only to confirmatory closure when the OCA reports the completion of the undertaking to us.
Atty. Buffes admitted appearance, before the very same branch she served and immediately after her resignation, is
a violation that we cannot close our eyes to and that she cannot run away from under the cover of the letter-query
she filed and her petition for declaratory relief, whose dismissal she manifested she would pursue up to our level.
We note that at the time she filed her letter-query (on March 4, 2008), Atty. Buffe had already appeared before
Branch 81 in at least three (3) cases. The terms of Section 7 (b)(2) of R.A. No. 6713 did not deter her in any way and
her misgivings about the fairness of the law cannot excuse any resulting violation she committed. In other words,
she took the risk of appearing before her own Branch and should suffer the consequences of the risk she took.

Nor can she hide behind the two declaratory relief petitions she filed, both of which were dismissed, and her intent
to elevate the dismissal to this Court for resolution. The first, filed before the RTC, Branch 54, Manila, was
dismissed on July 23, 2008 because the "court declined to exercise the power to declare rights as prayed for in the
petition, as any decision that may be rendered will be inutile and will not generally terminate the uncertainty or
controversy."12 The second, filed with the RTC, Branch 17, Manila, was dismissed for being an inappropriate
remedy after the dismissal ordered by the RTC, Branch 54, Manila, on December 4, 2008.13 Under these
circumstances, we see nothing to deter us from ruling on Atty. Buffes actions, as no actual court case other than the
present administrative case, is now actually pending on the issue she raised. On the contrary, we see from Atty.
Buffes recourse to this Court and the filing of the two declaratory petitions the intent to shop for a favorable answer
to her query. We shall duly consider this circumstance in our action on the case.

A last matter to consider before we proceed to the merits of Atty. Buffes actions relates to possible objections on
procedural due process grounds, as we have not made any formal directive to Atty. Buffe to explain why she should
not be penalized for her appearance before Branch 81 soon after her resignation from that Branch. The essence of
due process is the grant of the opportunity to be heard; what it abhors is the lack of the opportunity to be
heard.14 The records of this case show that Atty. Buffe has been amply heard with respect to her actions. She was
notified, and she even responded to our November 11, 2008 directive for the Executive Judge of the RTC of
Romblon to report on Atty. Buffes appearances before Branch 81; she expressly manifested that these appearances
were part of the Branch records. Her legal positions on these appearances have also been expressed before this
Court; first, in her original letter-query, and subsequently, in her Manifestation. Thus, no due process consideration
needs to deter us from considering the legal consequences of her appearances in her previous Branch within a year
from her resignation.

The Governing Law: Section 7 of R.A. No. 6713

Section 7 of R.A. No. 6713 generally provides for the prohibited acts and transactions of public officials and
employees. Subsection (b)(2) prohibits them from engaging in the private practice of their profession during their
incumbency. As an exception, a public official or employee can engage in the practice of his or her profession under
the following conditions: first, the private practice is authorized by the Constitution or by the law; and second, the
practice will not conflict, or tend to conflict, with his or her official functions.

The Section 7 prohibitions continue to apply for a period of one year after the public official or employees
resignation, retirement, or separation from public office, except for the private practice of profession under
subsection (b)(2), which can already be undertaken even within the one-year prohibition period. As an exception to
this exception, the one-year prohibited period applies with respect to any matter before the office the public officer
or employee used to work with.

The Section 7 prohibitions are predicated on the principle that public office is a public trust; and serve to remove
any impropriety, real or imagined, which may occur in government transactions between a former government
official or employee and his or her former colleagues, subordinates or superiors. The prohibitions also promote the
observance and the efficient use of every moment of the prescribed office hours to serve the public. 15

Parenthetically, in the case of court employees, Section 7(b)(2) of R.A. No. 6713 is not the only prohibition to
contend with; Section 5, Canon 3 of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel also applies. The latter provision
provides the definitive rule on the "outside employment" that an incumbent court official or court employee may
undertake in addition to his official duties:
Outside employment may be allowed by the head of office provided it complies with all of the following
requirements:

(a) The outside employment is not with a person or entity that practices law before the courts or conducts
business with the Judiciary;

(b) The outside employment can be performed outside of normal working hours and is not incompatible
with the performance of the court personnels duties and responsibilities;

(c) That outside employment does not require the practice of law; Provided, however, that court personnel
may render services as professor, lecturer, or resource person in law schools, review or continuing
education centers or similar institutions;

(d) The outside employment does not require or induce the court personnel to disclose confidential
information acquired while performing officials duties;

(e) The outside employment shall not be with the legislative or executive branch of government, unless
specifically authorized by the Supreme Court.

Where a conflict of interest exists, may reasonably appear to exist, or where the outside employment reflects
adversely on the integrity of the Judiciary, the court personnel shall not accept outside employment. [Emphasis
supplied]

In both the above discussed aspect of R.A. No. 6713 and the quoted Canon 3, the practice of law is covered; the
practice of law is a practice of profession, while Canon 3 specifically mentions any outside employment requiring
the practice of law. In Cayetano v. Monsod,16 we defined the practice of law as any activity, in and out of court, that
requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience. Moreover, we ruled that to
engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts which are characteristics of the profession; to practice law is to
give notice or render any kind of service, which device or service requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge
or skill.17 Under both provisions, a common objective is to avoid any conflict of interest on the part of the employee
who may wittingly or unwittingly use confidential information acquired from his employment, or use his or her
familiarity with court personnel still with the previous office.

After separation from the service, Section 5, Canon 3 of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel ceases to apply as
it applies specifically to incumbents, but Section 7 and its subsection (b)(2) of R.A. No. 6713 continue to apply to
the extent discussed above. Atty. Buffes situation falls under Section 7.

Atty. Buffes Situation

A distinctive feature of this administrative matter is Atty. Buffes admission that she immediately engaged in private
practice of law within the one-year period of prohibition stated in Section 7(b)(2) of R.A. No. 6713. We find it
noteworthy, too, that she is aware of this provision and only objects to its application to her situation; she perceives
it to be unfair that she cannot practice before her old office Branch 81 for a year immediately after resignation,
as she believes that her only limitation is in matters where a conflict of interest exists between her appearance as
counsel and her former duties as Clerk of Court. She believes that Section 7 (b)(2) gives preferential treatment to
incumbent public officials and employees as against those already separated from government employment.

Atty. Buffe apparently misreads the law. As the OCAT aptly stated, she interprets Section 7 (b)(2) as a blanket
authority for an incumbent clerk of court to practice law. We reiterate what we have explained above, that the
general rule under Section 7 (b)(2) is to bar public officials and employees from the practice of their professions; it
is unlawful under this general rule for clerks of court to practice their profession. By way of exception, they can
practice their profession if the Constitution or the law allows them, but no conflict of interest must exist between
their current duties and the practice of their profession. As we also mentioned above, no chance exists for lawyers in
the Judiciary to practice their profession, as they are in fact expressly prohibited by Section 5, Canon 3 of the Code
of Conduct for Court Personnel from doing so. Under both the general rule and the exceptions, therefore, Atty.
Buffes basic premise is misplaced.

As we discussed above, a clerk of court can already engage in the practice of law immediately after her separation
from the service and without any period limitation that applies to other prohibitions under Section 7 of R.A. No.
6713. The clerk of courts limitation is that she cannot practice her profession within one year before the office
where he or she used to work with. In a comparison between a resigned, retired or separated official or employee, on
the one hand, and an incumbent official or employee, on the other, the former has the advantage because the
limitation is only with respect to the office he or she used to work with and only for a period of one year. The
incumbent cannot practice at all, save only where specifically allowed by the Constitution and the law and only in
areas where no conflict of interests exists. This analysis again disproves Atty. Buffes basic premises.

A worrisome aspect of Atty. Buffes approach to Section 7 (b)(2) is her awareness of the law and her readiness to
risk its violation because of the unfairness she perceives in the law. We find it disturbing that she first violated the
law before making any inquiry. She also justifies her position by referring to the practice of other government
lawyers known to her who, after separation from their judicial employment, immediately engaged in the private
practice of law and appeared as private counsels before the RTC branches where they were previously employed.
Again we find this a cavalier attitude on Atty. Buffes part and, to our mind, only emphasizes her own willful or
intentional disregard of Section 7 (b)(2) of R.A. No. 6713.

By acting in a manner that R.A. No. 6713 brands as "unlawful," Atty. Buffe contravened Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides:

CANON 1 A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND
PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND FOR LEGAL PROCESSES

xxx

Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

As indicated by the use of the mandatory word "shall," this provision must be strictly complied with. Atty. Buffe
failed to do this, perhaps not with an evil intent, considering the misgivings she had about Section 7 (b)(2)s
unfairness. Unlawful conduct under Rule 1.01 of Canon 1, however, does not necessarily require the element of
criminality, although the Rule is broad enough to include it.18 Likewise, the presence of evil intent on the part of the
lawyer is not essential to bring his or her act or omission within the terms of Rule 1.01, when it specifically prohibits
lawyers from engaging in unlawful conduct.19 Thus, we find Atty. Buffe liable under this quoted Rule.

We also find that Atty. Buffe also failed to live up to her lawyers oath and thereby violated Canon 7 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility when she blatantly and unlawfully practised law within the prohibited period by
appearing before the RTC Branch she had just left. Canon 7 states:

CANON 7. A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND THE DIGNITY OF THE
LEGAL PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR. [Emphasis supplied]

By her open disregard of R.A. No. 6713, she thereby followed the footsteps of the models she cited and wanted to
replicate the former court officials who immediately waded into practice in the very same court they came from.
She, like they, disgraced the dignity of the legal profession by openly disobeying and disrespecting the law. 20 By her
irresponsible conduct, she also eroded public confidence in the law and in lawyers. 21 Her offense is not in any way
mitigated by her transparent attempt to cover up her transgressions by writing the Court a letter-query, which she
followed up with unmeritorious petitions for declaratory relief, all of them dealing with the same Section 7 (b)(2)
issue, in the hope perhaps that at some point she would find a ruling favorable to her cause. These are acts whose
implications do not promote public confidence in the integrity of the legal profession. 22
Considering Atty. Buffes ready admission of violating Section 7(b)(2), the principle of res ipsa loquitur finds
application, making her administratively liable for violation of Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 and Canon 7 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.23 In several cases, the Court has disciplined lawyers without further inquiry or resort to
any formal investigation where the facts on record sufficiently provided the basis for the determination of their
administrative liability.

In Prudential Bank v. Castro,24 the Court disbarred a lawyer without need of any further investigation after
considering his actions based on records showing his unethical misconduct; the misconduct not only cast dishonor
on the image of both the Bench and the Bar, but was also inimical to public interest and welfare. In this regard, the
Court took judicial notice of several cases handled by the errant lawyer and his cohorts that revealed their modus
operandi in circumventing the payment of the proper judicial fees for the astronomical sums they claimed in their
cases.25 The Court held that those cases sufficiently provided the basis for the determination of respondents'
administrative liability, without need for further inquiry into the matter under the principle of res ipsa loquitur.26

Also on the basis of this principle, we ruled in Richards v. Asoy, 27 that no evidentiary hearing is required before the
respondent may be disciplined for professional misconduct already established by the facts on record.

We applied the principle of res ipsa loquitur once more in In re: Wenceslao Laureta28 where we punished a lawyer
for grave professional misconduct solely based on his answer to a show-cause order for contempt and without going
into a trial-type hearing. We ruled then that due process is satisfied as long as the opportunity to be heard is given to
the person to be disciplined.29

Likewise in Zaldivar v. Gonzales,30 the respondent was disciplined and punished for contempt for his slurs regarding
the Courts alleged partiality, incompetence and lack of integrity on the basis of his answer in a show-cause order
for contempt. The Court took note that the respondent did not deny making the negative imputations against the
Court through the media and even acknowledged the correctness of his degrading statements. Through a per curiam
decision, we justified imposing upon him the penalty of suspension in the following tenor:

The power to punish for contempt of court does not exhaust the scope of disciplinary authority of the Court over
lawyers. The disciplinary authority of the Court over members of the Bar is but corollary to the Court's exclusive
power of admission to the Bar. A lawyer is not merely a professional but also an officer of the court and as such, he
is called upon to share in the task and responsibility of dispensing justice and resolving disputes in society. Any act
on his part which visibly tends to obstruct, pervert, or impede and degrade the administration of justice constitutes
both professional misconduct calling for the exercise of disciplinary action against him, and contumacious conduct
warranting application of the contempt power.31

These cases clearly show that the absence of any formal charge against and/or formal investigation of an errant
lawyer do not preclude the Court from immediately exercising its disciplining authority, as long as the errant lawyer
or judge has been given the opportunity to be heard. As we stated earlier, Atty. Buffe has been afforded the
opportunity to be heard on the present matter through her letter-query and Manifestation filed before this Court.

A member of the bar may be penalized, even disbarred or suspended from his office as an attorney, for violation of
the lawyers oath and/or for breach of the ethics of the legal profession as embodied in the Code of Professional
Responsibility.32 The appropriate penalty on an errant lawyer depends on the exercise of sound judicial discretion
based on the surrounding facts.33

In this case, we cannot discern any mitigating factors we can apply, save OCATs observation that Atty Buffes
letter-query may really reflect a misapprehension of the parameters of the prohibition on the practice of the law
profession under Section 7 (b) (2) of R.A. No. 6713. Ignorance of the law, however, is no excuse, particularly on a
matter as sensitive as practice of the legal profession soon after ones separation from the service. If Atty. Buffe is
correct in the examples she cited, it is time to ring the bell and to blow the whistle signaling that we cannot allow
this practice to continue.1avvphi1
As we observed earlier,34 Atty. Buffe had no qualms about the simultaneous use of various fora in expressing her
misgivings about the perceived unfairness of Section 7 of R.A. 6713. She formally lodged a query with the Office of
the Court Administrator, and soon after filed her successive petitions for declaratory relief. Effectively, she exposed
these fora to the possibility of embarrassment and confusion through their possibly differing views on the issue she
posed. Although this is not strictly the forum-shopping that the Rules of Court prohibit, what she has done is
something that we cannot help but consider with disfavor because of the potential damage and embarrassment to the
Judiciary that it could have spawned. This is a point against Atty. Buffe that cancels out the leniency we might have
exercised because of the OCATs observation about her ignorance of and misgivings on the extent of the prohibition
after separation from the service.

Under the circumstances, we find that her actions merit a penalty of fine of 10,000.00, together with a stern
warning to deter her from repeating her transgression and committing other acts of professional misconduct. 35This
penalty reflects as well the Courts sentiments on how seriously the retired, resigned or separated officers and
employees of the Judiciary should regard and observe the prohibition against the practice of law with the office that
they used to work with.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we find Atty. Karen M. Silverio-Buffe GUILTY of professional misconduct
for violating Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 and Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. She is hereby FINED in
the amount of Ten Thousand Pesos (10,000.00), and STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of this violation and
the commission of other acts of professional misconduct shall be dealt with more severely.

Let this Decision be noted in Atty. Buffes record as a member of the Bar.

SO ORDERED.

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

A.C. No. 7434 August 23, 2007

SPS. AMADOR and ROSITA TEJADA, Petitioners,

vs.
ATTY. ANTONIUTTI K. PALAA, Respondent.

DECISION

VELASCO, JR., J.:

Petitioners-spouses Rosita and Amador Tejada filed a Complaint Affidavit before the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) to initiate disbarment proceedings against respondent Atty. Antoniutti K. Palaa for his continued
refusal to settle his long overdue loan obligation to the complainants, in violation of his sworn duty as a lawyer to do
justice to every man and Rule 7.03 of Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

More specifically, the complaint alleges that:

3. Sometime on January, 2001, respondent lawyer Antoniutti K. Palana taking advantage of his special
knowledge as a lawyer represented to the petitioners that he has an alleged parcel of land covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. (73196) 16789 and that he needs an amount of One Hundred Thousand
Pesos (P100,000.00) so that he could reconstitute the torrens title on the same;

4. Respondent then induced by sweet promises and assurances petitioners spouses to finance such
undertaking with a solemn commitment on his part that after he has already reconstituted such torrens title,
he will deliver the same to the petitioners spouses as security for the amount they had financed;
 Thereafter, petitioner spouses shall earn an amount of P70,000.00 from the P100,000.00 they had financed
or all and [sic] all, respondent lawyer shall pay petitioner spouses a total amount of P170,000.00;

5. The agreement between the petitioner spouses and respondent lawyer, Antoniutti K. Palana in this regard
is being partly evidenced by their written agreement thereon dated January 12, 2001, a xerox copy of which
is hereto attached as Annex "A". Likewise, the receipt by the respondent of the P100,000.00 is being
evidenced in the bottom part of page 1 of the agreement;

6. Under the clear terms of their agreement, respondent lawyer Antoniutti K. Palana solemnly assured
petitioner spouses that he will reconstitute, deliver the reconstituted title and give the P170,000.00 to the
petitioners spouses all within a period of three months reckoned from their execution of their written
agreement dated January 12, 2001;

7. However, after respondent lawyer, Antoniutti K. Palana had gotten the P100,000.00 amount from the
petitioner spouses, respondent from that time on up to the present had intentionally evaded the performance
of his due, just, legal and demandable obligations to petitioner spouses.

It turned out that all his assurances that he had a torrens title, he will reconstitute the same and deliver an
amount of P170,000.00 to petitioner spouses were all fraudulent representations on his part or else were
only fictitious in character to defraud petitioner spouses of their hard owned monies;

xxxx

9. Legal demands had already been made to respondent lawyer to fulfill all his moral and legal
responsibilities to petitioner spouses but all of said demands simply went unheeded. A xerox copy of the
two legal demand letters to respondent lawyer in this regard is hereto attached as Annex "B" and "C." 1

Despite due notice, respondent failed to file his answer to the complaint as required by the Commission on Bar
Discipline of the IBP. Respondent likewise failed to appear on the scheduled date of the mandatory conference
despite due notice.

Thus, on March 10, 2005, the IBP declared respondent to have waived his right to submit evidence and to participate
further in the proceedings of the case.

After a careful consideration of the pleadings and evidence submitted by the complainants ex parte, Investigating
Commissioner Elpidio G. Soriano III submitted his February 1, 2006 Report to the IBP Board of Governors,
recommending respondent's suspension from the practice of law for three (3) months.

Based on said Report, petitioners were able to satisfactorily prove the following: that Rosita Tejada and respondent
and his companion executed a written agreement (Annex "A"); that respondent received the amount of one hundred
thousand pesos (PhP 100,000) from Rosita Tejada pursuant to said agreement; and that petitioners sent a demand
letter to respondent (Annex "C"), but, until now, respondent has failed to settle his obligation. Petitioners, however,
failed to present evidence to show that respondent fraudulently represented himself to be the owner of the aforesaid
lot. Noting respondents indifference to the proceedings of the case, the Investigating Commissioner cited Ngayan v.
Tugade,2 where the Supreme Court considered respondents failure to answer the complaint and his failure to appear
in four hearings below as evidence of his flouting resistance to a lawful order of the court, and illustrate his
despiciency to his oath of office in violation of Section 3, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.

Thus, for respondents misconduct, the Investigating Commissioner recommended respondents suspension for a
period of three (3) months, guided by Supreme Court rulings in analogous cases, viz: Sanchez v. Somoso,3 where
the lawyer was suspended for six (6) months for having issued personal checks from a closed bank account and
subsequently refused to pay for his medical expenses despite demand after the checks were dishonored; Constantino
v. Saludares,4 where the lawyer was suspended for three (3) months for his unwarranted refusal to pay a personal
loan despite demand; and Lizaso v. Amante,5 where the lawyer was suspended indefinitely for his failure to return
and account for the money delivered to him for investment purposes.6

In its November 18, 2006 Resolution, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved said report and
recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner, "considering Respondent's continued refusal to settle his
obligation to the complainants and for his failure to participate in the proceedings before the Commission of Bar
Discipline."7

After a review of the records and especially sans the submittal of any response or evidence from respondent, we find
no reason to disturb the findings of Commissioner Soriano.

Respondent, like all other members of the bar, is expected to always live up to the standards embodied in the Code
of Professional Responsibility, particularly the following Canons, viz:

CANON 1 A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and for
legal processes.

Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

Rule 1.02 A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in
the legal system.

CANON 7 A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession, and support the
activities of the Integrated Bar.

Rule 7.03 A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor should
he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.

Membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. A high sense of morality, honesty, and fair dealing is
expected and required of a member of the bar. Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that "a
lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct." The nature of the office of a lawyer
requires that s/he shall be of good moral character. This qualification is not only a condition precedent to the
admission to the legal profession, but its continued possession is essential to maintain ones good standing in the
profession.8

Indeed, the strength of the legal profession lies in the dignity and integrity of its members. As previously explained
in Sipin-Nabor v. Baterina:

A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession.1avvphi1 The trust and confidence
necessarily reposed by clients requires in the attorney a high standard and appreciation of his duty to his clients, his
profession, the courts and the public. The bar must maintain a high standard of legal proficiency as well as of
honesty and fair dealing. Generally speaking, a lawyer can do honor to the legal profession by faithfully performing
his duties to society, to the bar, to the courts and to his clients. To this end, members of the legal fraternity can do
nothing that might tend to lessen in any degree the confidence of the public in the fidelity, honesty and integrity of
the profession.9

In the instant case, respondents unjustified withholding of petitioners money years after it became due and
demandable demonstrates his lack of integrity and fairness, and this is further highlighted by his lack of regard for
the charges brought against him. Instead of meeting the charges head on, respondent did not bother to file an answer
nor did he participate in the proceedings to offer a valid explanation for his conduct.
The Court has emphatically stated that when the integrity of a member of the bar is challenged, it is not enough that
s/he denies the charges against him; s/he must meet the issue and overcome the evidence against him/her. S/he must
show proof that s/he still maintains that degree of morality and integrity which at all times is expected of him/her.10

Finally, respondents acts, which violated the Lawyer's Oath "to delay no man for money or malice" as well as the
Code of Professional Responsibility, warrant the imposition of disciplinary sanctions against him.

With respect to the recommendation to suspend respondent Palaa for three (3) months, we find that the sanction is
not commensurate to the breach committed and disrespect to the Court exhibited by the erring member of the bar.
We increase the suspension to six (6) months in view of our ruling in Barrientos v. Libiran-Meteoro.11

We find that the complainants could not have been defrauded without the representations of respondent that he can
easily have the torrens title of his lot reconstituted with his special knowledge as a legal practitioner as long as he is
provided PhP 100,000 to finance the reconstitution. Respondent knew that his representations were false since the
filing fee for a petition for reconstitution in 2001 was only PhP 3,145, and other expenses including the publication
of the filing of the petition could not have cost more than PhP 20,000. It is clear that he employed deceit in
convincing complainants to part with their hard earned money and the latter could not have been easily swayed to
lend the money were it not for his misrepresentations and failed promises as a member of the bar. Moreover, when
he failed to pay his just and legal obligation, he disobeyed the provisions of the Civil Code which is one of the
substantive laws he vowed to uphold when he took his oath as a lawyer. Lastly, to aggravate his misconduct, he
totally ignored the directives of the IBP to answer the complaint when he fully knew as a lawyer that the compulsory
bar organization was merely deputized by this Court to undertake the investigation of complaints against lawyers,
among which is the instant complaint. In short, his disobedience to the IBP is in reality a gross and blatant disrespect
to the Court. Lawyers fully know, as respondent is aware or at least is assumed to know, that lawyers like him
cannot disobey the orders and resolutions of the Court. Failing in this duty as a member of the bar which is being
supervised by the Court under the Constitution, we find that a heavier sanction should fall on respondent.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Antoniutti K. Palaa is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period
of six (6) months and is ordered to settle his loan obligation to petitioners-spouses Amador and Rosita Tejada within
two (2) months from the date of this Decisions promulgation.

This Decision is immediately executory.

SO ORDERED.

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice

Footnotes

1
Rollo, pp. 2-3.
2
G.R. No. 2490, February 7, 1991, 193 SCRA 779.
3
A.C. No. 6061, October 3, 2003, 412 SCRA 569.
4
A.C. No. 2029, December 7, 1993, 228 SCRA 233.
5
A.C. No. 2019, June 3, 1991, 198 SCRA 1.
6
Rollo, pp. 34-37.
7
Id. at 27.
8
Schulz v. Flores, A.C. No. 4219, December 8, 2003, 417 SCRA 159, 160.
9
A.C. No. 4073, June 28, 2001, 360 SCRA 6, 10.
10
Reyes v. Gaa, A.M. No. 1048, July 14, 1995, 246 SCRA 64, 67.
11
A.C. No. 6408, August 31, 2004, 437 SCRA 209.

A.C. No. 6396 October 25, 2005

ROSALIE DALLONG-GALICINAO, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. VIRGIL R. CASTRO, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

Tinga, J.:

This administrative case concerns a lawyer who hurled invectives at a Clerk of Court. Members of the bar decorum
must at all times comfort themselves in a manner befitting their noble profession.

Complainant Atty. Rosalie Dallong-Galicinao is the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bambang,
Nueva Vizcaya. On 8 May 2003, she filed with the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP) a Complaint-Affidavit1 with supporting documents2 against respondent Atty. Virgil R. Castro
for Unprofessional Conduct, specifically violation of Canon 7, Rule 7.03, Canon 8 and Rule 8.02 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.3 The charge in the complaint is summed up as follows:

Respondent Atty. Castro was a private practitioner and Vice-President of IBP-Nueva Vizcaya Chapter. On 5 May
2003, respondent went to complainants office to inquire whether the complete records of Civil Case No. 784,
entitled Sps. Crispino Castillano v. Sps. Federico S. Castillano and Felicidad Aberin, had already been remanded to
the court of origin, MCTC Dupax del Norte, Alfonso Castaned, Nueva Vizcaya. It must be noted that respondent
was not the counsel of record of either party in Civil Case No. 784.

Complainant informed respondent that the record had not yet been transmitted since a certified true copy of the
decision of the Court of Appeals should first be presented to serve as basis for the transmittal of the records to the
court of origin. To this respondent retorted scornfully, "Who will certify the Court of Appeals Decision, the Court
of Appeals? You mean to say, I would still have to go to Manila to get a certified true copy?" Surprised at this
outburst, complainant replied, "Sir, its in the Rules but you could show us the copy sent to the party you claim to be
representing." Respondent then replied, "Then you should have notified me of the said requirement. That was two
weeks ago and I have been frequenting your office since then, but you never bothered to notify me." Complainant
replied, "It is not our duty, Sir, to notify you of the said requirement."

Respondent then answered, "You mean to say it is not your duty to remand the record of the case?" Complainant
responded, "No, Sir, I mean, its not our duty to notify you that you have to submit a copy of the Court of Appeals
decision." Respondent angrily declared in Ilocano, "Kayat mo nga saw-en, awan pakialam yon? Kasdiay?" ("You
mean to say you dont care anymore? Is that the way it is?") He then turned and left the office, banging the door on
his way out to show his anger. The banging of the door was so loud it was heard by the people at the adjacent RTC,
Branch 30 where a hearing was taking place.4

After a few minutes, respondent returned to the office, still enraged, and pointed his finger at complainant and
shouted, "Ukinnan, no adda ti unget mo iti kilientek haan mo nga ibales kaniak ah!" ("Vulva of your mother! If you
are harboring ill feelings against my client, dont turn your ire on me!") Complainant was shocked at respondents
words but still managed to reply, "I dont even know your client, Sir." Respondent left the office and as he passed by
complainants window, he again shouted, "Ukinnam nga babai!" ("Vulva of your mother, you woman!")5

Complainant suffered acute embarrassment at the incident, as it happened in her office of which she was, and still is,
the head and in front of her staff. She felt that her credibility had been tarnished and diminished, eliciting doubt on
her ability to command full respect from her staff.6

The Complaint-Affidavit, filed three days after the incident, was supported by an Affidavit7 signed by employees of
RTC-Bambang, Nueva Vizcaya who witnessed the incident. The Affidavit narrated the same incident as witnessed
by the said employees. A Motion to File Additional Affidavit/Documentary Evidence was filed by complainant on 25
September 2003.8
On 26 May 2003, the CBD-IBP issued an Order9 requiring respondent to submit his answer to the complaint.
Respondent submitted his Compliance10 dated 18 June 2003. Respondent explained that he was counsel for the
plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 847, entitled Sps. Federico Castillano, et al. v. Sps. Crispin Castillano, et al., filed with
the RTC of Nueva Vizcaya, Branch 30. He learned of the finality of the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
No. 64962 with respect to Civil Case No. 847 before the lower court. Prior to the incident, he went to the office of
the complainant to request for the transmittal of the records of the case to the MCTC and the complainant reassured
him of the same.

Respondent admits having inquired about the status of the transmittal of the records on 5 May 2003. However, he
has no explanation as to what transpired on that day. Instead, he narrates that on 25 May 2003, twelve days after the
incident, the records had not yet been transmitted, and he subsequently learned that these records were returned to
the court of origin.

The hearing for the administrative complaint before the CBD was set on 25 September 2003 by the Investigating
Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan. However, on said date, only complainant appeared. The latter also moved that
the case be submitted for resolution.11 Respondent later on filed a Manifestation stating that the reason for his non-
appearance was because he was still recuperating from physical injuries and that he was not mentally fit to prepare
the required pleadings as his vehicle was rained with bullets on 19 August 2003. He also expressed his public
apology to the complainant in the same Manifestation.12

Complainant filed a Manifestation expressing her desire not to appear on the next hearing date in view of
respondents public apology, adding that respondent personally and humbly asked for forgiveness which she
accepted.13

The Investigating Commissioner recommended that respondent be reprimanded and warned that any other complaint
for breach of his professional duties shall be dealt with more severely.14 The IBP submitted to this Court a Notice of
Resolution adopting and approving the recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner.15

At the onset, it should be noted that respondent was not the counsel of record of Civil Case No. 784. Had he been
counsel of record, it would have been easy for him to present the required certified true copy of the decision of the
Court of Appeals. He need not have gone to Manila to procure a certified true copy of the decision since the Court of
Appeals furnishes the parties and their counsel of record a duplicate original or certified true copy of its decision.

His explanation that he will enter his appearance in the case when its records were already transmitted to the MCTC
is unacceptable. Not being the counsel of record and there being no authorization from either the parties to represent
them, respondent had no right to impose his will on the clerk of court.

Rule 8.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states:

Rule 8.02A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, encroach upon the professional employment of another lawyer;
however, it is the right of any lawyer, without fear or favor, to give proper advice and assistance to those seeking
relief against unfaithful or neglectful counsel.

Through his acts of constantly checking the transmittal of the records of Civil Case No. 784, respondent deliberately
encroached upon the legal functions of the counsel of record of that case. It does not matter whether he did so in
good faith.

Moreover, in the course of his questionable activities relating to Civil Case No. 784, respondent acted rudely
towards an officer of the court. He raised his voice at the clerk of court and uttered at her the most vulgar of
invectives. Not only was it ill-mannered but also unbecoming considering that he did all these to a woman and in
front of her subordinates.
As held in Alcantara v. Atty. Pefianco,16 respondent ought to have realized that this sort of public behavior can only
bring down the legal profession in the public estimation and erode public respect for it. 17 These acts violate Rule
7.03, Canon 8 and Rule 8.01, to wit:

Rule 7.03 A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflect on his fitness to practice law, now shall he,
whether in public or private life behave in scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.

Canon 8 A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and candor toward his professional colleagues,
and shall avoid harassing tactics against opposing counsel.

Rule 8.01 A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is abusive, offensive or otherwise
improper.

Moreover, Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility demands that lawyers conduct themselves with
courtesy, fairness and candor toward their fellow lawyers. Lawyers are duty bound to uphold the dignity of the legal
profession. They must act honorably, fairly and candidly towards each other and otherwise conduct themselves
without reproach at all times.18

As correctly evaluated by the Investigating Commissioner, respondent did not categorically deny the charges in the
complaint. Instead, he gave a lengthy narration of the prefatory facts of the case as well as of the incident on 5 May
2003.

Complainant also alleged in her Complaint-Affidavit that respondents uncharacteristic behavior was not an isolated
incident. He has supposedly done the same to Attys. Abraham Johnny G. Asuncion and Temmy Lambino, the latter
having filed a case against respondent pending before this Court. 19 We, however, cannot acknowledge such
allegation absent any evidence showing the veracity of such claim. No affidavits to that effect were submitted by
either Atty. Asuncion or Atty. Lambino.

Nonetheless, the penalty to be imposed should be tempered owing to the fact that respondent had apologized to the
complainant and the latter had accepted it. This is not to say, however, that respondent should be absolved from his
actuations. People are accountable for the consequences of the things they say and do even if they repent afterwards.
The fact remains that things done cannot be undone and words uttered cannot be taken back. Hence, he should bear
the consequences of his actions.

The highest reward that can be bestowed on lawyers is the esteem of their brethren. This esteem cannot be
purchased, perfunctorily created, or gained by artifice or contrivance. It is born of sharp contexts and thrives despite
conflicting interest. It emanates solely from integrity, character, brains and skills in the honorable performance of
professional duty.20

WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent is hereby FINED in the amount of TEN THOUSAND
(10,000.00) PESOS with a warning that any similar infraction with be dealt with more severely. Let a copy of
this Decision be furnished the Bar Confidant for appropriate annotation in the record of the respondent.

SO ORDERED.

DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice

A.C. No. 8920 September 28, 2011

JUDGE RENE B. BACULI, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. MELCHOR A. BATTUNG, Respondent.

DECISION

BRION, J.:

Before us is the resolution1 of the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) finding Atty.
Melchor Battung liable for violating Rule 11.03, Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and
recommending that he be reprimanded. The complainant is Judge Rene B. Baculi, Presiding Judge of the Municipal
Trial Court in Cities, Branch 2, Tuguegarao City. The respondent, Atty. Battung, is a member of the Bar with postal
address on Aguinaldo St., Tuguegarao City.

Background

Judge Baculi filed a complaint for disbarment2 with the Commission on Discipline of the IBP against the
respondent, alleging that the latter violated Canons 113 and 124 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Violation of Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility

Judge Baculi claimed that on July 24, 2008, during the hearing on the motion for reconsideration of Civil Case No.
2502, the respondent was shouting while arguing his motion. Judge Baculi advised him to tone down his voice but
instead, the respondent shouted at the top of his voice. When warned that he would be cited for direct contempt, the
respondent shouted, "Then cite me!"5 Judge Baculi cited him for direct contempt and imposed a fine of P100.00.
The respondent then left.

While other cases were being heard, the respondent re-entered the courtroom and shouted, "Judge, I will file gross
ignorance against you! I am not afraid of you!" 6 Judge Baculi ordered the sheriff to escort the respondent out of the
courtroom and cited him for direct contempt of court for the second time.

After his hearings, Judge Baculi went out and saw the respondent at the hall of the courthouse, apparently waiting
for him. The respondent again shouted in a threatening tone, "Judge, I will file gross ignorance against you! I am not
afraid of you!" He kept on shouting, "I am not afraid of you!" and challenged the judge to a fight. Staff and lawyers
escorted him out of the building.7

Judge Baculi also learned that after the respondent left the courtroom, he continued shouting and punched a table at
the Office of the Clerk of Court.8

Violation of Canon 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility

According to Judge Baculi, the respondent filed dilatory pleadings in Civil Case No. 2640, an ejectment case.

Judge Baculi rendered on October 4, 2007 a decision in Civil Case No. 2640, which he modified on December 14,
2007. After the modified decision became final and executory, the branch clerk of court issued a certificate of
finality. The respondent filed a motion to quash the previously issued writ of execution, raising as a ground the
motion to dismiss filed by the defendant for lack of jurisdiction. Judge Baculi asserted that the respondent knew as a
lawyer that ejectment cases are within the jurisdiction of First Level Courts and the latter was merely delaying the
speedy and efficient administration of justice.

The respondent filed his Answer,9 essentially saying that it was Judge Baculi who disrespected him. 10 We quote
from his Answer:
 23. I only told Judge Rene Baculi I will file Gross ignorance of the Law against him once inside the court
room when he was lambasting me[.]

24. It was JUDGE BACULI WHO DISRESPECTED ME. He did not like that I just submit the Motion for
Reconsideration without oral argument because he wanted to have an occasion to just HUMILIATE ME
and to make appear to the public that I am A NEGLIGENT LAWYER, when he said "YOU JUSTIFY
YOUR NEGLIGENCE BEFORE THIS COURT" making it an impression to the litigants and the public
that as if I am a NEGLIGENT, INCOMPETENT, MUMBLING, and IRRESPONSIBLE LAWYER.

25. These words of Judge Rene Baculi made me react[.]

xxxx

28. Since I manifested that I was not going to orally argue the Motion, Judge Rene Baculi could have just
made an order that the Motion for Reconsideration is submitted for resolution, but what he did was that he
forced me to argue so that he will have the room to humiliate me as he used to do not only to me but almost
of the lawyers here (sic).

Atty. Battung asked that the case against him be dismissed.

The IBP conducted its investigation of the matter through Commissioner Jose de la Rama, Jr. In his Commissioners
Report,11 Commissioner De la Rama stated that during the mandatory conference on January 16, 2009, both parties
merely reiterated what they alleged in their submitted pleadings. Both parties agreed that the original copy of the
July 24, 2008 tape of the incident at the courtroom would be submitted for the Commissioners review. Judge Baculi
submitted the tape and the transcript of stenographic notes on January 23, 2009.

Commissioner De la Rama narrated his findings, as follows: 12

At the first part of the hearing as reflected in the TSN, it was observed that the respondent was calm. He politely
argued his case but the voice of the complainant appears to be in high pitch. During the mandatory conference, it
was also observed that indeed, the complainant maintains a high pitch whenever he speaks. In fact, in the TSN,
where there was already an argument, the complainant stated the following:

Court: Do not shout.

Atty. Battung: Because the court is shouting.

Court: This court has been constantly under this kind of voice Atty. Battung, we are very sorry if you do not want to
appear before my court, then you better attend to your cases and do not appear before my court if you do not want to
be corrected! (TSN, July 24, 2008, page 3)

(NOTE: The underlined words "we are very sorry" [ were] actually uttered by Atty. Battung while the judge was
saying the quoted portion of the TSN)

That it was during the time when the complainant asked the following questions when the undersigned noticed that
Atty. Battung shouted at the presiding judge.

Court: Did you proceed under the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure?

*
Atty. Battung: It is not our fault Your Honor to proceed because we were asked to present our evidence ex parte.
Your Honor, so, if should we were ordered (sic) by the court to follow the rules on summary procedure. (TSN page
3, July 24, 2008)

It was observed that the judge uttered the following:

Court: Do not shout.

Atty. Battung: Because the court is shouting.

(Page 3, TSN July 24, 2008)

Note: * it was at this point when the respondent shouted at the complainant.

Thereafter, it was observed that both were already shouting at each other.

Respondent claims that he was provoked by the presiding judge that is why he shouted back at him. But after
hearing the tape, the undersigned in convinced that it was Atty. Battung who shouted first at the complainant.

Presumably, there were other lawyers and litigants present waiting for their cases to be called. They must have
observed the incident. In fact, in the joint-affidavit submitted by Elenita Pacquing et al., they stood as one in saying
that it was really Atty. Battung who shouted at the judge that is why the latter cautioned him "not to shout."

The last part of the incident as contained in page 4 of the TSN reads as follows:

Court: You are now ordered to pay a fine of 100.00.

Atty. Battung: We will file the necessary action against this court for gross ignorance of the law.

Court: Yes, proceed.

(NOTE: Atty. Battung went out the courtroom)

Court: Next case.

Interpreter: Civil Case No. 2746.

(Note: Atty. Battung entered again the courtroom)

Atty. Battung: But what we do not like (not finished)

Court: The next time

Atty. Battung: We would like to clear

Court: Sheriff, throw out the counsel, put that everything in record. If you want to see me, see me after the court.

Next case.

Civil Case No. 2746 for Partition and Damages, Roberto Cabalza vs. Teresita Narag, et al.
(nothing follows)

Commissioner De la Rama found that the respondent failed to observe Canon 11 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility that requires a lawyer to observe and maintain respect due the courts and judicial officers. The
respondent also violated Rule 11.03 of Canon 11 that provides that a lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive
or menacing language or behavior before the courts. The respondents argument that Judge Baculi provoked him to
shout should not be given due consideration since the respondent should not have shouted at the presiding judge; by
doing so, he created the impression that disrespect of a judge could be tolerated. What the respondent should have
done was to file an action before the Office of the Court Administrator if he believed that Judge Baculi did not act
according to the norms of judicial conduct.

With respect to the charge of violation of Canon 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, Commissioner De la
Rama found that the evidence submitted is insufficient to support a ruling that the respondent had misused the
judicial processes to frustrate the ends of justice.

Commissioner De la Rama recommended that the respondent be suspended from the practice of law for six (6)
months.

On October 9, 2010, the IBP Board of Governors passed a Resolution adopting and approving the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner, with the modification that the respondent be reprimanded.

The Courts Ruling

We agree with the IBPs finding that the respondent violated Rule 11.03, Canon 11 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Atty. Battung disrespected Judge Baculi by shouting at him inside the courtroom during court
proceedings in the presence of litigants and their counsels, and court personnel. The respondent even came back to
harass Judge Baculi. This behavior, in front of many witnesses, cannot be allowed. We note that the respondent
continued to threaten Judge Baculi and acted in a manner that clearly showed disrespect for his position even after
the latter had cited him for contempt. In fact, after initially leaving the court, the respondent returned to the
courtroom and disrupted the ongoing proceedings. These actions were not only against the person, the position and
the stature of Judge Baculi, but against the court as well whose proceedings were openly and flagrantly disrupted,
and brought to disrepute by the respondent.

Litigants and counsels, particularly the latter because of their position and avowed duty to the courts, cannot be
allowed to publicly ridicule, demean and disrespect a judge, and the court that he represents. The Code of
Professional Responsibility provides:

Canon 11 - A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due the courts and to judicial officers and should insist
on similar conduct by others.

Rule 11.03 - A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing language or behavior before the Courts.

We ruled in Roxas v. De Zuzuarregui, Jr.13 that it is the duty of a lawyer, as an officer of the court, to uphold the
dignity and authority of the courts. Respect for the courts guarantees the stability of the judicial institution; without
this guarantee, the institution would be resting on very shaky foundations.

A lawyer who insults a judge inside a courtroom completely disregards the latters role, stature and position in our
justice system. When the respondent publicly berated and brazenly threatened Judge Baculi that he would file a case
for gross ignorance of the law against the latter, the respondent effectively acted in a manner tending to erode the
public confidence in Judge Baculis competence and in his ability to decide cases. Incompetence is a matter that,
even if true, must be handled with sensitivity in the manner provided under the Rules of Court; an objecting or
complaining lawyer cannot act in a manner that puts the courts in a bad light and bring the justice system into
disrepute.
The IBP Board of Governors recommended that Atty. Battung be reprimanded, while the Investigating
Commissioner recommended a penalty of six (6) months suspension.

We believe that these recommended penalties are too light for the offense.

In Re: Suspension of Atty. Rogelio Z. Bagabuyo, Former Senior State Prosecutor,14 we suspended Atty. Bagabuyo
for one year for violating Rule 11.05, Canon 11, and Rule 13.02, Canon 13 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, and for violating the Lawyers Oath for airing his grievances against a judge in newspapers and radio
programs. In this case, Atty. Battungs violations are no less serious as they were committed in the courtroom in the
course of judicial proceedings where the respondent was acting as an officer of the court, and before the litigating
public. His actions were plainly disrespectful to Judge Baculi and to the court, to the point of being scandalous and
offensive to the integrity of the judicial system itself.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, Atty. Melchor A. Battung is found GUILTY of violating Rule 11.03,
Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, for which he is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one
(1) year effective upon the finality of this Decision. He is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of a similar
offense shall be dealt with more severely.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be appended to the respondents personal
record as an attorney; the Integrated Bar of the Philippines; the Department of Justice; and all courts in the country,
for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.

ARTURO D. BRION*
Associate Justice

A.C. No. 5439 January 22, 2007

CLARITA J. SAMALA, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. LUCIANO D. VALENCIA, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

Before us is a complaint1 dated May 2, 2001 filed by Clarita J. Samala (complainant) against Atty. Luciano D.
Valencia (respondent) for Disbarment on the following grounds: (a) serving on two separate occasions as counsel
for contending parties; (b) knowingly misleading the court by submitting false documentary evidence; (c) initiating
numerous cases in exchange for nonpayment of rental fees; and (d) having a reputation of being immoral by siring
illegitimate children.

After respondent filed his Comment, the Court, in its Resolution of October 24, 2001, referred the case to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation. 2

The investigation was conducted by Commissioner Demaree Jesus B. Raval. After a series of hearings, the parties
filed their respective memoranda 3 and the case was deemed submitted for resolution.

Commissioner Wilfredo E.J.E. Reyes prepared the Report and Recommendation 4 dated January 12, 2006. He found
respondent guilty of violating Canons 15 and 21 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and recommended the
penalty of suspension for six months.
In a minute Resolution 5 passed on May 26, 2006, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the report and
recommendation of Commissioner Reyes but increased the penalty of suspension from six months to one year.

We adopt the report of the IBP Board of Governors except as to the issue on immorality and as to the recommended
penalty.

On serving as counsel for contending parties.

Records show that in Civil Case No. 95-105-MK, filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 272, Marikina
City, entitled "Leonora M. Aville v. Editha Valdez" for nonpayment of rentals, herein respondent, while being the
counsel for defendant Valdez, also acted as counsel for the tenants Lagmay, Valencia, Bustamante and Bayuga 6 by
filing an Explanation and Compliance before the RTC. 7

In Civil Case No. 98-6804 filed in the Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC), Branch 75, Marikina City, entitled "Editha
S. Valdez and Joseph J. Alba, Jr. v. Salve Bustamante and her husband" for ejectment, respondent represented
Valdez against Bustamante - one of the tenants in the property subject of the controversy. Defendants appealed to
the RTC, Branch 272, Marikina City docketed as SCA Case No. 99-341-MK. In his decision dated May 2,
2000,8 Presiding Judge Reuben P. dela Cruz 9 warned respondent to refrain from repeating the act of being counsel
of record of both parties in Civil Case No. 95-105-MK.

But in Civil Case No. 2000-657-MK, filed in the RTC, Branch 273, Marikina City, entitled "Editha S. Valdez v.
Joseph J. Alba, Jr. and Register of Deeds of Marikina City," respondent, as counsel for Valdez, filed a Complaint for
Rescission of Contract with Damages and Cancellation of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 275500 against Alba,
respondent's former client in Civil Case No. 98-6804 and SCA Case No. 99-341-MK.

Records further reveal that at the hearing of November 14, 2003, respondent admitted that in Civil Case No. 95-105-
MK, he was the lawyer for Lagmay (one of the tenants) but not for Bustamante and Bayuga 10 albeit he filed the
Explanation and Compliance for and in behalf of the tenants. 11 Respondent also admitted that he represented Valdez
in Civil Case No. 98-6804 and SCA Case No. 99-341-MK against Bustamante and her husband but denied being the
counsel for Alba although the case is entitled "Valdez and Alba v. Bustamante and her husband," because Valdez
told him to include Alba as the two were the owners of the property 12 and it was only Valdez who signed the
complaint for ejectment. 13 But, while claiming that respondent did not represent Alba, respondent, however, avers
that he already severed his representation for Alba when the latter charged respondent with estafa. 14 Thus, the filing
of Civil Case No. 2000-657-MK against Alba.

Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer shall not represent
conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.

A lawyer may not, without being guilty of professional misconduct, act as counsel for a person whose interest
conflicts with that of his present or former client. 15 He may not also undertake to discharge conflicting duties any
more than he may represent antagonistic interests. This stern rule is founded on the principles of public policy and
good taste. 16 It springs from the relation of attorney and client which is one of trust and confidence. Lawyers are
expected not only to keep inviolate the client's confidence, but also to avoid the appearance of treachery and double-
dealing for only then can litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to their lawyers, which is of paramount
importance in the administration of justice. 17

One of the tests of inconsistency of interests is whether the acceptance of a new relation would prevent the full
discharge of the lawyer's duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to the client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or
double-dealing in the performance of that duty. 18

The stern rule against representation of conflicting interests is founded on principles of public policy and good taste.
It springs from the attorney's duty to represent his client with undivided fidelity and to maintain inviolate the client's
confidence as well as from the injunction forbidding the examination of an attorney as to any of the privileged
communications of his client. 19
An attorney owes loyalty to his client not only in the case in which he has represented him but also after the relation
of attorney and client has terminated. 20 The bare attorney-client relationship with a client precludes an attorney from
accepting professional employment from the client's adversary either in the same case 21 or in a different but related
action. 22 A lawyer is forbidden from representing a subsequent client against a former client when the subject
matter of the present controversy is related, directly or indirectly, to the subject matter of the previous litigation in
which he appeared for the former client. 23

We held in Nombrado v. Hernandez 24 that the termination of the relation of attorney and client provides no
justification for a lawyer to represent an interest adverse to or in conflict with that of the former client. The reason
for the rule is that the client's confidence once reposed cannot be divested by the expiration of the professional
employment. 25 Consequently, a lawyer should not, even after the severance of the relation with his client, do
anything which will injuriously affect his former client in any matter in which he previously represented him nor
should he disclose or use any of the client's confidences acquired in the previous relation. 26

In this case, respondent's averment that his relationship with Alba has long been severed by the act of the latter of
not turning over the proceeds collected in Civil Case No. 98-6804, in connivance with the complainant, is
unavailing. Termination of the attorney-client relationship precludes an attorney from representing a new client
whose interest is adverse to his former client. Alba may not be his original client but the fact that he filed a case
entitled "Valdez and Alba v. Bustamante and her husband," is a clear indication that respondent is protecting the
interests of both Valdez and Alba in the said case. Respondent cannot just claim that the lawyer-client relationship
between him and Alba has long been severed without observing Section 26, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court wherein
the written consent of his client is required.

In Gonzales v. Cabucana, Jr., 27 citing the case of Quiambao v. Bamba, 28 we held that:

The proscription against representation of conflicting interests applies to a situation where the opposing parties are
present clients in the same action or in an unrelated action. It is of no moment that the lawyer would not be called
upon to contend for one client that which the lawyer has to oppose for the other client, or that there would be no
occasion to use the confidential information acquired from one to the disadvantage of the other as the two actions
are wholly unrelated. It is enough that the opposing parties in one case, one of whom would lose the suit, are present
clients and the nature or conditions of the lawyer's respective retainers with each of them would affect the
performance of the duty of undivided fidelity to both clients. 29

Respondent is bound to comply with Canon 21 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which states that "a
lawyer shall preserve the confidences and secrets of his client even after the attorney-client relation is terminated."

The reason for the prohibition is found in the relation of attorney and client, which is one of trust and confidence of
the highest degree. A lawyer becomes familiar with all the facts connected with his client's case. He learns from his
client the weak points of the action as well as the strong ones. Such knowledge must be considered sacred and
guarded with care. 30

From the foregoing, it is evident that respondent's representation of Valdez and Alba against Bustamante and her
husband, in one case, and Valdez against Alba, in another case, is a clear case of conflict of interests which merits a
corresponding sanction from this Court. Respondent may have withdrawn his representation in Civil Case No. 95-
105-MK upon being warned by the court, 31 but the same will not exculpate him from the charge of representing
conflicting interests in his representation in Civil Case No. 2000-657-MK.

Respondent is reminded to be more cautious in accepting professional employments, to refrain from all appearances
and acts of impropriety including circumstances indicating conflict of interests, and to behave at all times with
circumspection and dedication befitting a member of the Bar, especially observing candor, fairness and loyalty in all
transactions with his clients. 32

On knowingly misleading the court by submitting false documentary evidence.

Complainant alleges that in Civil Case No. 00-7137 filed before MTC, Branch 75 for ejectment, respondent
submitted TCT No. 273020 as evidence of Valdez's ownership despite the fact that a new TCT No. 275500 was
already issued in the name of Alba on February 2, 1995.

Records reveal that respondent filed Civil Case No. 00-7137 on November 27, 2000 and presented TCT No. 273020
as evidence of Valdez's ownership of the subject property. 33 During the hearing before Commissioner Raval,
respondent avers that when the Answer was filed in the said case, that was the time that he came to know that the
title was already in the name of Alba; so that when the court dismissed the complaint, he did not do anything
anymore. 34 Respondent further avers that Valdez did not tell him the truth and things were revealed to him only
when the case for rescission was filed in 2002.

Upon examination of the record, it was noted that Civil Case No. 2000-657-MK for rescission of contract and
cancellation of TCT No. 275500 was also filed on November 27, 2000, 35 before RTC, Branch 273, Marikina City,
thus belying the averment of respondent that he came to know of Alba's title only in 2002 when the case for
rescission was filed. It was revealed during the hearing before Commissioner Raval that Civil Case Nos. 00-7137
and 2000-657-MK were filed on the same date, although in different courts and at different times.

Hence, respondent cannot feign ignorance of the fact that the title he submitted was already cancelled in lieu of a
new title issued in the name of Alba in 1995 yet, as proof of the latter's ownership.

Respondent failed to comply with Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides that a lawyer
shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be
mislead by any artifice. It matters not that the trial court was not misled by respondent's submission of TCT No.
273020 in the name of Valdez, as shown by its decision dated January 8, 2002 36 dismissing the complaint for
ejectment. What is decisive in this case is respondent's intent in trying to mislead the court by presenting TCT No.
273020 despite the fact that said title was already cancelled and a new one, TCT No. 275500, was already issued in
the name of Alba.

In Young v. Batuegas,37 we held that a lawyer must be a disciple of truth. He swore upon his admission to the Bar
that he will "do no falsehood nor consent to the doing of any in court" and he shall "conduct himself as a lawyer
according to the best of his knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to his
clients." 38He should bear in mind that as an officer of the court his high vocation is to correctly inform the court
upon the law and the facts of the case and to aid it in doing justice and arriving at correct conclusion. 39 The courts,
on the other hand, are entitled to expect only complete honesty from lawyers appearing and pleading before them.
While a lawyer has the solemn duty to defend his client's rights and is expected to display the utmost zeal in defense
of his client's cause, his conduct must never be at the expense of truth.

A lawyer is the servant of the law and belongs to a profession to which society has entrusted the administration of
law and the dispensation of justice. 40 As such, he should make himself more an exemplar for others to emulate. 41

>On initiating numerous cases in exchange for nonpayment of rental fees.

Complainant alleges that respondent filed the following cases: (a) Civil Case No. 2000-657-MK at the RTC, Branch
272; (b) Civil Case No. 00-7137 at the MTC, Branch 75; and (c) I.S. Nos. 00-4439 and 01-036162 both entitled
"Valencia v. Samala" for estafa and grave coercion, respectively, before the Marikina City Prosecutor. Complainant
claims that the two criminal cases were filed in retaliation for the cases she filed against Lagmay docketed as I.S.
No. 00-4306 for estafa and I.S. No. 00-4318 against Alvin Valencia (son of respondent) for trespass to dwelling.

As culled from the records, Valdez entered into a retainer agreement with respondent. As payment for his services,
he was allowed to occupy the property for free and utilize the same as his office pursuant to their retainer
agreement. 42
Respondent filed I.S. Nos. 00-4439 43 and 01-036162 44 both entitled "Valencia v. Samala" for estafa and grave
coercion, respectively, to protect his client's rights against complainant who filed I.S. No. 00-4306 45 for estafa
against Lagmay, and I.S. No. 00-4318 46 against Alvin Valencia 47 for trespass to dwelling.

We find the charge to be without sufficient basis. The act of respondent of filing the aforecited cases to protect the
interest of his client, on one hand, and his own interest, on the other, cannot be made the basis of an administrative
charge unless it can be clearly shown that the same was being done to abuse judicial processes to commit injustice.

The filing of an administrative case against respondent for protecting the interest of his client and his own right
would be putting a burden on a practicing lawyer who is obligated to defend and prosecute the right of his client.

On having a reputation for being immoral by siring illegitimate children.

We find respondent liable for being immoral by siring illegitimate children.

During the hearing, respondent admitted that he sired three children by Teresita Lagmay who are all over 20 years of
age, 48 while his first wife was still alive. He also admitted that he has eight children by his first wife, the youngest
of whom is over 20 years of age, and after his wife died in 1997, he married Lagmay in 1998. 49Respondent further
admitted that Lagmay was staying in one of the apartments being claimed by complainant. However, he does not
consider his affair with Lagmay as a relationship 50 and does not consider the latter as his second family. 51 He
reasoned that he was not staying with Lagmay because he has two houses, one in Muntinlupa and another in
Marikina. 52

In this case, the admissions made by respondent are more than enough to hold him liable on the charge of
immorality. During the hearing, respondent did not show any remorse. He even justified his transgression by saying
that he does not have any relationship with Lagmay and despite the fact that he sired three children by the latter, he
does not consider them as his second family. It is noted that during the hearing, respondent boasts in telling the
commissioner that he has two houses - in Muntinlupa, where his first wife lived, and in Marikina, where Lagmay
lives. 53 It is of no moment that respondent eventually married Lagmay after the death of his first wife. The fact still
remains that respondent did not live up to the exacting standard of morality and decorum required of the legal
profession.

Under Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. It may be difficult to specify the degree of moral delinquency that may
qualify an act as immoral, yet, for purposes of disciplining a lawyer, immoral conduct has been defined as that
"conduct which is willful, flagrant, or shameless, and which shows a moral indifference to the opinion of respectable
members of the community. 54 Thus, in several cases, the Court did not hesitate to discipline a lawyer for keeping a
mistress in defiance of the mores and sense of morality of the community. 55 That respondent subsequently married
Lagmay in 1998 after the death of his wife and that this is his first infraction as regards immorality serve to mitigate
his liability.

ACCORDINGLY, the Court finds respondent Atty. Luciano D. Valencia GUILTY of misconduct and violation of
Canons 21, 10 and 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for
three (3) years, effective immediately upon receipt of herein Resolution.

Let copies of this Resolution be furnished all courts of the land, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines as well as the
Office of the Bar Confidant for their information and guidance, and let it be entered in respondent's personal records.

SO ORDERED.

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ

Associate Justice
A.C. No. 5829 October 28, 2003

DANIEL LEMOINE, complainant,

vs.
ATTY. AMADEO E. BALON, JR., respondent.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

On December 17, 1999, complainant Daniel Lemoine, a French national, filed a verified complaint 1 against
respondent Atty. Amadeo E. Balon, Jr., for estafa and misconduct before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. The
case, docketed as CBD Case No. 99-679, was referred by the Commission on Bar Discipline to an Investigator for
investigation, report and recommendation.

The facts that spawned the filing of the complaint are as follows:

In early 1998, complainant filed a car insurance claim with the Metropolitan Insurance Company (Metropolitan
Insurance), the insurer of his vehicle which was lost. As complainant encountered problems in pursuing his claim
which was initially rejected,2 his friend, a certain Jesus "Jess" Garcia (Garcia), arranged for the engagement of
respondents services.

By letter3 of October 21, 1998 addressed to Elde Management, Inc., "ATTN: Mr. Daniel Lemoine," under whose
care complainant could be reached, respondent advised complainant, whom he had not before met, that for his legal
services he was charging "25% of the actual amount being recovered. . . payable upon successful recovery;" an
advance payment of P50,000.00 "to be charged [to complainant] to be deducted from whatever amount [would] be
successfully collected;" P1,000.00 "as appearance and conference fee for each and every court hearings, conferences
outside our law office and meetings before the Office of the Insurance Commission which will be also charged to
our 25% recovery fee;" and legal expenses "such as but not limited to filing fee, messengerial and postage expenses .
. . and other miscellaneous but related expenses," to be charged to complainants account which would be
reimbursed upon presentation of statement of account.

The letter-proposal of respondent regarding attorneys fees does not bear complainants conformity, he not having
agreed therewith.

It appears that Metropolitan Insurance finally offered to settle complainants claim, for by letter 4 of December
9,1998 addressed to it, respondent confirmed his acceptance of its offer to settle the claim of complainant "in an ex-
gratia basis of 75% of his policy coverage which is therefore FIVE HUNDRED TWENTY FIVE THOUSAND
(P525,000.00) PESOS."

A day or a few days before December 23, 1998 when complainant left for France,5 he, on the advice of respondent,
signed an already prepared undated Special Power of Attorney6 authorizing respondent and/or Garcia to bring any
action against Metropolitan Insurance for the satisfaction of complainants claim as well as to "negotiate, sign,
compromise[,] encash and receive payment" from it. The Special Power of Attorney was later dated December 23,
1998 on which same date Metropolitan Insurance issued a Chinabank Check No. 841172 payable to complainant in
the amount of P525,000.00 as full settlement of the claim.7 The check was received by respondent.

In the meantime, complainant returned to the Philippines in early January 1999 but left again on the 24th of the same
month.8 On inquiry about the status of his claim, Garcia echoed to complainant what respondent had written him
(Garcia) in respondents letter 9 of March 26, 1999 that the claim was still pending with Metropolitan Insurance and
that it was still subject of negotiations in which Metropolitan Insurance offered to settle it
for P350,000.00representing fifty percent thereof. In the same letter to Garcia, respondent suggested the acceptance
of the offer of settlement to avoid a protracted litigation.
On December 6, 1999, on complainants personal visit to the office of Metropolitan Insurance, he was informed that
his claim had long been settled via a December 23, 1998 check given to respondent the year before. 10Complainant
lost no time in going to the law office of respondent who was not around, however, but whom he was able to talk by
telephone during which he demanded that he turn over the proceeds of his claim. 11

Respondent thereupon faxed to complainant a December 7, 1999 letter 12 wherein he acknowledged having in his
possession the proceeds of the encashed check which he retained, however, as attorneys lien pending complainants
payment of his attorneys fee, equivalent to fifty percent (50%) of entire amount collected. In the same letter,
respondent protested what he branded as the "uncivilized and unprofessional behavior" complainant "reportedly
demonstrated" at respondents office. Respondent winded up his letter as follows, quoted verbatim:

We would like to make it clear that we cannot give you the aforesaid amount until and unless our attorneys fees will
be forthwith agreed and settled. In the same manner, should you be barbaric and uncivilized with your
approached, we will not hesitate to make a proper representation with the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation
for the authenticity of your visa, Department of Labor and Employment for your working status, Bureau of Internal
Revenue for your taxation compliance and the National Bureau of Investigation [with] which we have a good
network...

While it [is your] prerogative to file a legal action against us, it is also our prerogative to file a case against you. We
will rather suggest if you could request your lawyer to just confer with us for the peaceful settlement of this matter.
(Underscoring and emphasis supplied)

As despite written demands,13 respondent refused to turn over the proceeds of the insurance claim and to
acknowledge the unreasonableness of the attorneys fees he was demanding, complainant instituted the
administrative action at bar on December 17, 1999.

In his Complaint-Affidavit, complainant alleged that "[i]t appears that there was irregularity with the check," it
having been issued payable to him, but "and/or AMADEO BALON" was therein intercalated after his
(complainants) name.14 1awphi1.nt

Maintaining that respondent was entitled to only P50,000.00 in attorneys fees,15 complainant decried respondents
continued possession of the proceeds of his claim16 and his misrepresentations that the recovery thereof was fraught
with difficulties.17

In his Counter-Affidavit18 of February 18, 2000, respondent asserted that his continued retention of the proceeds of
complainants claim is in lawful exercise of his lien for unpaid attorneys fees. He expressed readiness, however, to
account for and turn them over once he got paid fifty percent (50%) thereof, he citing the so called contingent fee
billing method of "no cure, no pay" adopted by practicing lawyers in the insurance industry as the basis of the
amount of his attorneys fees,19 which to him was justified in the absence of an attorney-client contract between him
and complainant, the latter having rejected respondents letter-proposal of October 21, 1998.20

Respondent also highlighted the value of the time and efforts he extended in pursuing complainants claim and the
expenses he incurred in connection therewith. He went on to assert that his inability to contact complainant whose
whereabouts he did not know prompted him to encash the check and keep the proceeds thereof in conformity with
the Special Power of Attorney executed in his favor. 21

During the hearings conducted by the IBP Investigator, complainant echoed his allegations in his Complaint-
Affidavit and stressed that he turned down as unreasonable respondents proposal in his October 21, 1998 letter that
he be paid 25% of the actual amount collected for his legal services. 22 And he presented documentary evidence,
including the March 26, 1999 letter of respondent informing his co-attorney-in-fact Garcia of the supposedly still
unrecovered claim and suggesting acceptance of the purported offer of Metropolitan Insurance to settle
complainants claim at P350,000.00.
Explaining how his above-mentioned March 26, 1999 letter to Garcia came about, respondent declared that it was
made upon Garcias request, intended for a certain Joel Ramiscal (Ramiscal) who was said to be Garcias business
partner.23

Respondent later submitted a June 13, 2001 Supplement24 to his Counter-Affidavit reiterating his explanation that it
was on Garcias express request that he wrote the March 26, 1999 letter, which was directed to the fax number of
Ramiscal.1vvphi1.nt

Additionally, respondent declared that in the first week of May 1999, on the representation of Garcia that he had
talked to complainant about respondents retention of fifty percent (50%) of the insurance proceeds for professional
fees less expenses,25 he gave Garcia, on a staggered basis, the total amount of P233,000.00 which, so respondent
averred, is the amount of insurance claim complainant is entitled to receive less attorneys fees and expenses. 26 Thus,
respondent claimed that he gave Garcia the amount of P30,000.00 on May 31, 1999 at Dulcinea Restaurant in
Greenbelt, Makati; the amounts of P50,000.00, P20,000.00 and P30,000.00 on different occasions at his
(respondents) former address through his executive secretary Sally I. Leonardo; the amount of P20,000.00 at the
office of his (respondents) former employer Commonwealth Insurance Company through his subordinate Glen V.
Roxas; and several other payments at Dulcinea, and at Manila Intercontinental Hotels coffee shop sometime
in October 1999.27 Respondent submitted the separate sworn statements of Leonardo and Roxas. 28

Explaining why no written memorandum of the turn over of various payments to Garcia was made, respondent
alleged that there was no need therefor since he very well knew Garcia who is a co-Rotarian and co-attorney-in-fact
and whom he really dealt with regarding complainants claim. 29

Respondent furthermore declared that he rejected complainants offer to pay him P50,000.00 for his services,
insisting that since there had been no clear-cut agreement on his professional fees and it was through him that
Metropolitan Insurance favorably reconsidered its initial rejection of complainants claim, he is entitled to a
contingent fee of 50% of the net proceeds thereof.30

Finally, respondent declared that he, in connection with his follow-up of the insurance claim, incurred representation
expenses of P35,000.00, entertainment and other representation expenses on various occasions of P10,000.00, and
transportation and gasoline expenses and parking fees of P5,000.00; 31 and that his retention of complainants money
was justified in light of his apprehension that complainant, being an alien without a valid working permit in the
Philippines, might leave the country anytime without settling his professional fees. 32

The Investigating Commissioner, by Report and Recommendation33 of October 26, 2001, found respondent guilty of
misconduct and recommended that he be disbarred and directed to immediately turn over to complainant the sum of
P475,000.00 representing the amount of the P525,000.00 insurance claim less respondents professional fees of
P50,000.00, as proposed by complainant.

The Board of Govenors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, acting on the Investigators Report, issued
Resolution No. XV-2002-40134 on August 3,2002, reading:

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this
Resolution/Decision as Annex "A"; and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and
the applicable laws and rules, with modification, and considering respondents dishonesty which amounted to grave
misconduct and grossly unethical behavior which caused dishonor, not merely to respondent but the noble
profession to which he belongs, Respondent is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six (6)
months with the directive to turn over the amount of Five Hundred Twenty Five Thousand (P525,000.00) Pesos to
the complainant without prejudice to respondents right to claim attorneys fees which he may collect in the proper
forum. (Underscoring supplied)

The records of the case are before this Court for final action.
Respondent, by a Motion for Reconsideration35 filed with this Court, assails the Investigating Commissioners
Report and Recommendation as not supported by clear, convincing and satisfactory proof. He prays for the
reopening of the case and its remand to the Investigator so that Garcia can personally appear for his (respondents)
confrontation.

There is no need for a reopening of the case. The facts material to its resolution are either admitted or documented.

This Court is in full accord with the findings of the IBP Investigator that respondent violated the following
provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility, to wit:

RULE 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

xxx

CANON 15 - A lawyer shall observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all his dealings and transactions with his clients.

RULE 15.06 - A lawyer shall not state or imply that he is able to influence any public official, tribunal or legislative
body.

xxx

CANON 16 - A lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client that may come into his possession.

RULE 16.01 - A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from the client.

RULE 16.02 - A lawyer shall keep the funds of each client separate and apart from his own and those of others kept
by him.

RULE 16.03 - A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due or upon demand. However, he
shall have a lien over the funds and may apply so much thereof as may be necessary to satisfy his lawful fees and
disbursements, giving notice promptly thereafter to his client. He shall also have a lien to the same extent on all
judgments and executions he has secured for his client as provided for in the Rules of Court.

xxx

CANON 17 - A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust and confidence in
him.

xxx

RULE 18.04 - A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall respond within a reasonable
time to the clients request for information.

xxx

RULE 21.02 - A lawyer shall not, to the disadvantage of his client, use information acquired in the course of
employment, nor shall he use the same to his advantage or that of a third person, unless the client with full
knowledge of the circumstances consents thereto.

Specifically with respect to above-quoted provision of Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, the
Filipino lawyers principal source of ethical rules, which Canon 16 bears on the principal complaint of complainant,
a lawyer must hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client that he may come to possess. This commandment
entails certain specific acts to be done by a lawyer such as rendering an accounting of all money or property
received for or from the client36 as well as delivery of the funds or property to the client when due or upon
demand.37 Respondent breached this Canon when after he received the proceeds of complainants insurance claim,
he did not report it to complainant, who had a given address in Makati, or to his co-attorney-in-fact Garcia who was
his contact with respect to complainant.

In fact, long after respondent received the December 23, 1998 check for P525,000.00 he, by his letter of March 26,
1999 to Garcia, had even the temerity to state that the claim was still pending and recommend "acceptance of the
50% offer . . . which is P350,000.00 pesos." His explanation that he prepared and sent this letter on Garcias express
request is nauseating. A lawyer, like respondent, would not and should not commit prevarication, documented at
that, on the mere request of a friend.

By respondents failure to promptly account for the funds he received and held for the benefit of his client, he
committed professional misconduct.38 Such misconduct is reprehensible at a greater degree, for it was obviously
done on purpose through the employment of deceit to the prejudice of complainant who was kept in the dark about
the release of the check, until he himself discovered the same, and has to date been deprived of the use of the
proceeds thereof.

A lawyer who practices or utilizes deceit in his dealings with his client not only violates his duty of fidelity, loyalty
and devotion to the clients cause but also degrades himself and besmirches the fair name of an honorable
profession.39

That respondent had a lien on complainants funds for his attorneys fees did not relieve him of his duty to account
for it.40 The lawyers continuing exercise of his retaining lien presupposes that the client agrees with the amount of
attorneys fees to be charged. In case of disagreement or when the client contests that amount for being
unconscionable, however, the lawyer must not arbitrarily apply the funds in his possession to the payment of his
fees.41 He can file, if he still deems it desirable, the necessary action or proper motion with the proper court to fix the
amount of such fees.42

In respondents case, he never had the slightest attempt to bring the matter of his compensation for judicial
determination so that his and complainants sharp disagreement thereon could have been put to an end. Instead,
respondent stubbornly and in bad faith held on to complainants funds with the obvious aim of forcing complainant
to agree to the amount of attorneys fees sought. This is an appalling abuse by respondent of the exercise of an
attorneys retaining lien which by no means is an absolute right and cannot at all justify inordinate delay in the
delivery of money and property to his client when due or upon demand.

Respondent was, before receiving the check, proposing a 25% attorneys fees. After he received the check and after
complainant had discovered its release to him, he was already asking for 50%, objection to which complainant
communicated to him. Why respondent had to doubly increase his fees after the lapse of about one year when all the
while he has been in custody of the proceeds of the check defies comprehension. At any rate, it smacks of
opportunism, to say the least.

As for respondents claim in his June 2001 Supplement to his Counter-Affidavit that he had on several occasions
from May 1999 to October 1999 already delivered a total of P233,000.00 out of the insurance proceeds to Garcia in
trust for complainant, this does not persuade, for it is bereft of any written memorandum thereof. It is difficult to
believe that a lawyer like respondent could have entrusted such total amount of money to Garcia without
documenting it, especially at a time when, as respondent alleged, he and Garcia were not in good terms. 43 Not only
that. As stated earlier, respondents Counter-Affidavit of February 18, 2000 and his December 7, 1999 letter to
complainant unequivocally contained his express admission that the total amount of P525,000.00 was in his custody.
Such illogical, futile attempt to exculpate himself only aggravates his misconduct. Respondents claim discredited,
the affidavits of Leonardo and Roxas who, acting allegedly for him, purportedly gave Garcia some amounts forming
part of the P233,000.00 are thus highly suspect and merit no consideration.

The proven ancillary charges against respondent reinforce the gravity of his professional misconduct.
The intercalation of respondents name to the Chinabank check that was issued payable
solely in favor ofcomplainant as twice certified by Metropolitan Insurance44 is clearly a brazen act of falsification of
a commercial document which respondent resorted to in order to encash the check.

Respondents threat in his December 7, 1999 letter to expose complainant to possible sanctions from certain
government agencies with which he bragged to have a "good network" reflects lack of character, self-respect, and
justness.

It bears noting that for close to five long years respondent has been in possession of complainants funds in the
amount of over half a million pesos. The deceptions and lies that he peddled to conceal, until its discovery by
complainant after about a year, his receipt of the funds and his tenacious custody thereof in a grossly oppressive
manner point to his lack of good moral character. Worse, by respondents turnaround in his Supplement to his
Counter-Affidavit that he already delivered to complainants friend Garcia the amount of P233,000.00 which, so
respondent claims, is all that complainant is entitled to, he in effect has declared that he has nothing more to turn
over to complainant. Such incredible position is tantamount to a refusal to remit complainants funds, and gives rise
to the conclusion that he has misappropriated them.45

In fine, by respondents questioned acts, he has shown that he is no longer fit to remain a member of the noble
profession that is the law.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Amadeo E. Balon, Jr., is found GUILTY of malpractice, deceit and gross
misconduct in the practice of his profession as a lawyer and he is hereby DISBARRED. The Office of the Clerk of
Court is directed to strike out his name from the Roll of Attorneys and to inform all courts and the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines of this Decision.

Respondent is ordered to turn over to complainant, Daniel Lemoine, the amount of P525,000.00 within thirty (30)
days from notice, without prejudice to whatever judicial action he may take to recover his attorneys fees and
purported expenses incurred in securing the release thereof from Metropolitan Insurance.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez,
Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, and Tinga, JJ., concur.

Ynares-Santiago, J., on leave.

[ A.C. No. 8235, January 27, 2015 ]

JOSELITO F. TEJANO, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. BENJAMIN F. BATERINA, RESPONDENT.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

Before the Court is a verified administrative complaint for disbarment against Atty. Benjamin F. Baterina.

The Facts

On 26 March 2009, Joselito F. Tejano filed an Affidavit-Complaint[1] before the Office of the Court Administrator
(OCA) of the Supreme Court against Judge Dominador LL. Arquelada, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Vigan City, Ilocos Sur, Branch 21, and Tejano's own counsel, Atty. Baterina.

Tejano accused Judge Arquelada of acting in conspiracy with Atty. Baterina for the former to take possession of his
(Tejano) property, which was the subject matter of litigation in the judge's court.

The case stems from Civil Case No. 4046-V, a suit for recovery of possession and damages filed by Tejano, his
mother and sisters against the Province of Ilocos Sur. The property involved in the suit is a strip of land located at
the northern portion of Lot No. 5663 in Tamag, Vigan City. The lot was wholly owned by Tejano's family, but the
Province of Ilocos Sur constructed an access road stretching from the provincial highway in the east to the
provincial government's motor pool in the west without instituting the proper expropriation proceedings.[2]

The case was raffled off to Branch 21 of the Vigan City RTC in October 1988. Four judges would hear the case
before Judge Arquelada became the branch's presiding judge in 2001.[3] Prior to his appointment to the bench,
however, Judge Arquelada was one of the trial prosecutors assigned to Branch 21, and in that capacity represented
the Province of Ilocos Sur in Civil Case No. 4046-V.[4]

In his Affidavit-Complaint, Tejano accused Judge Arquelada of colluding with Atty. Baterina in the former's bid to
"take possession" of their property and was "collecting rentals from squatters who had set up their businesses inside
the whole of Lot [No.] 5663." In support of his accusations, Tejano attached a copy of Transfer Certificate of Title
No. T-43004[5] covering Lot No. 5663 in the name of Karen Laderas, purportedly the daughter of Judge Arquelada;
receipts of rents paid to Terencio Florendo,[6] sheriff at Judge Arquelada's sala at the Vigan City RTC; receipts of
rents paid to Aida Calibuso,[7] who was expressly designated by Laderas as her attorney-in-fact[8] in collecting said
rents; and receipts of rents paid to Edgar Arquelada, Judge Arquelada's brother.[9]

As to his counsel, Tejano claims that Atty. Baterina "miserably failed to advance [his] cause." Specifically, Tejano
alleged that Atty. Baterina (1) failed to object when the trial court pronounced that he and his co-plaintiffs had
waived their right to present evidence after several postponements in the trial because his mother was ill and
confined at the hospital;[10] (2) manifested in open court that he would file a motion for reconsideration of the order
declaring their presentation of evidence terminated but failed to actually do so;[11] (3) not only failed to file said
motion for reconsideration, but also declared in open court that they would not be presenting any witnesses without
consulting his clients;[12] and (4) failed to comply with the trial court's order to submit their formal offer of
exhibits.[13]

In a letter dated 27 March 2009, then Court Administrator (now Supreme Court Associate Justice) Jose P. Perez
informed Tejano that the OCA has no jurisdiction over Atty. Baterina since it only has administrative supervision
over officials and employees of the judiciary. However, Tejano was informed to file the complaint against his
counsel at the Office of the Bar Confidant, and that the complaint against Judge Arquelada was already "being acted
upon" by the OCA.[14]

In a Resolution dated 6 July 2009, the Court required Atty. Baterina to file a Comment on the complaint within 10
days from notice.[15] Failing to comply with the Court's order, Atty. Baterina was ordered to show cause why he
should not be disciplinarily dealt with and once again ordered to comply with the Court's 6 July 2009 Order.[16]

In his Compliance dated 28 March 2010, Atty. Baterina explained that he had been recuperating from a kidney
transplant when he received a copy of the complaint. He begged the Court's indulgence and said that his failure to
comply was "not at all intended to show disrespect to the orders of the Honorable Tribunal."[17]

Atty. Baterina also denied the allegation of bad faith and negligence in handling the Tejano case. He explained that
the reason he could not attend to the case was that in 2002, after the initial presentation of the plaintiffs' case, he was
suspended by the Court from the practice of law for two years.[18] He alleged that this fact was made known to
Tejano's mother and sister. However, the trial court did not order plaintiffs to secure the services of another lawyer.
On the contrary, it proceeded to hear the case, and plaintiffs were not represented by a lawyer until the termination
of the case.[19] Atty. Baterina instead points to the "displayed bias" and "undue and conflict of interest"[20] of
Judge Arquelada as the culprit in Tejano's predicament.
The Court, in its 19 July 2010 Resolution, found Atty. Baterina's explanation "not satisfactory" and admonished him
"to be more heedful of the Court's directives in order to avoid delay in the disposition of [the] case." The Court also
referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.

IBP Investigation, Report and Recommendation

After the proceedings, the IBP's Commission on Bar Discipline promulgated its Report and
Recommendation,[21] part of which reads:

First, it appears that respondent's failure to appear in representation of his clients in the said civil case before the
RTC was due to his two-year suspension from the practice of law in 2001. While this is a justified reason for his
non-appearance, respondent, however, manifestly failed to properly inform the RTC of this fact. That way, the RTC
would have, in the meantime, ordered plaintiffs to seek the services of another lawyer. Respondent's contention that
the fact of his suspension was nonetheless circularized to all courts of the Philippines including the RTC is
unavailing. Still, respondent should have exerted prudence in properly informing the RTC of his suspension in order
to protect the interests of his clients.

Moreover, while he relayed such fact of suspension to his clients, there is no showing that he explained the
consequences to them, or that he advised them to seek another counsel's assistance in the meantime. Clearly
therefore, respondent's inaction falls short of the diligence required of him as a lawyer.

Second, it must be recalled that the RTC in the said case required the plaintiffs therein to submit their formal offer of
evidence. However, respondent did not bother to do so, in total disregard of the RTC's Order dated 8 November
2004. Respondent's bare excuse that he remembers making an oral offer thereof deserves no merit because the
records of this case clearly reveal the contrary. Because of the said inaction of respondent, his clients' case was
dismissed by the RTC.

xxxx

From the foregoing, it is clear that respondent's acts constitute sufficient ground for disciplinary action against him.
His gross negligence under the circumstances cannot be countenanced. It is, therefore, respectfully recommended
that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for two (2) years, and be fined in the amount of Fifty
Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00), considering that this is his second disciplinary action. x x x.[22]

On 20 March 2013, the IBP Board of Governors adopted the following resolution:

RESOLUTION NO. XX-2013-237

Adm. Case No. 8235
Joselito F. Tejano vs.
Atty. Benjamin F. Baterina

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED and APPROVED, with
modification, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein
made part of this Resolution as Annex "A", and finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on
record and the applicable laws and rules and considering that Respondent is guilty of gross negligence, Atty.
Benjamin F. Baterina is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for two (2) years. However, the Fine of Fifty
Thousand Pesos imposed on respondent is hereby deleted.[23]

The Court's Ruling

The Court adopts the IBP's report and recommendation, with modification as to the penalty.
The Code of Professional Responsibility governing the conduct of lawyers states:

CANON 18 A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE.

xxxx

RULE 18.03 A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith
shall render him liable.

RULE 18.04 A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall respond within a reasonable
time to the client's request for information.

Lawyers have a "fourfold duty to society, the legal profession, the courts and their clients," and must act "in
accordance with the values and norms of the legal profession as embodied in the Code of Professional
Responsibility."[24]

When a lawyer agrees to take up a client's cause, he makes a commitment to exercise due diligence in protecting the
latter's rights. Once a lawyer's services are engaged, "he is duty bound to serve his client with competence, and to
attend to his client's cause with diligence, care and devotion regardless of whether he accepts it for a fee or for free.
He owes fidelity to such cause and must always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed on him."[25] A
lawyer's acceptance to take up a case "impliedly stipulates [that he will] carry it to its termination, that is, until the
case becomes final and executory."[26]

Atty. Baterina's duty to his clients did not automatically cease with his suspension. At the very least, such
suspension gave him a concomitant responsibility to inform his clients that he would be unable to attend to their case
and advise them to retain another counsel.

A lawyer even one suspended from practicing the profession owes it to his client to not "sit idly by and leave the
rights of his client in a state of uncertainty."[27] The client "should never be left groping in the dark" and instead
must be "adequately and fully informed about the developments in his case."[28]

Atty. Baterina practically abandoned this duty when he allowed the proceedings to run its course without any effort
to safeguard his clients' welfare in the meantime. His failure to file the required pleadings on his clients' behalf
constitutes gross negligence in violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility[29] and renders him subject to
disciplinary action.[30] The penalties for a lawyer's failure to file the required brief or pleading range from warning,
reprimand, fine, suspension, or in grave cases, disbarment.[31]

Further, Atty. Baterina's reckless disregard for orders and directives of the courts is unbecoming of a member of the
Bar. His conduct has shown that he has little respect for rules, court processes, and even for the Court's disciplinary
authority. Not only did he fail to follow the trial court's orders in his clients' case, he even disregarded court orders
in his own disciplinary proceedings.

Considering Atty. Baterina's medical condition at that time, a simple explanation to the Court would have sufficed.
Instead, however, he simply let the orders go unheeded, neglecting his duty to the Court.

Lawyers, as this Court has previously emphasized, "are particularly called upon to obey court orders and processes
and are expected to stand foremost in complying with court directives being themselves officers of the
court."[32] As such, Atty. Baterina should "know that a resolution of this Court is not a mere request but an order
which should be complied with promptly and completely."[33]

Proper Penalty
In Spouses Soriano v. Reyes, the Court held that "the appropriate penalty on an errant lawyer depends on the
exercise of sound judicial discretion based on the surrounding facts."[34]

The Court notes that in 2001, Atty. Baterina was also suspended for two years after being found guilty of gross
misconduct.[35] In that case, Araceli Sipin-Nabor filed a complaint against Atty. Baterina for failing to file her
Answer with Counterclaim in a case for quieting of title and recovery of possession where she and her siblings were
defendants. Because of such failure, Sipin-Nabor was declared by the trial court to be in default and unable to
present her evidence, and which, in turn, resulted in a decision adverse to her.

Atty. Baterina was also found to have "convert[ed] the money of his client to his own personal use without her
consent" and "deceiv[ed] the complainant into giving him the amount of P2,000.00 purportedly to be used for filing
an answer with counterclaim," which he never did.

The Court likewise noted in that case Atty. Baterina's "repeated failure to comply with the resolutions of the Court
requiring him to comment on the complaint [which] indicates a high degree of irresponsibility tantamount to willful
disobedience to the lawful orders of the Supreme Court."[36]

These two disciplinary cases against Atty. Baterina show a pattern of neglecting his duty to his clients, as well as a
propensity for disrespecting the authority of the courts. Such incorrigible behavior is unacceptable and will not be
tolerated among the members of the Bar.

For this reason, the Court deems it proper to impose on Atty. Baterina a longer suspension period of five (5) years.

WHEREFORE, Atty. Benjamin F. Baterina is found GUILTY of gross negligence. He is SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for five (5) years. He is also STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or a similar offense
will be dealt with more severely.

This decision shall take effect immediately and copies thereof furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be
appended to respondent's personal record, and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.

The Office of the Court Administrator is directed to circulate copies of this decision to all courts.

SO ORDERED.

Sereno, (Chief Justice), on leave.

Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-De Castro, Peralta, Bersamin, Del Castillo, Villarama, Jr., Perez, Mendoza, Reyes, Perlas-
Bernabe, Leonen, andJardeleza, JJ., concur.
Carpio, J., Acting Chief Justice per Special Order No. 1914 dated 27 January 2015.
Brion, J., on official leave.

G.R. No. 155224 August 23, 2006

VINSON B. PINEDA, Petitioner,

vs.
ATTY. CLODUALDO C. DE JESUS, ATTY. CARLOS AMBROSIO and ATTY. EMMANUEL
MARIANO,Respondents.

DECISION

CORONA, J.:

The subject of this petition for review is the April 30, 2002 decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
68080 which modified the order2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City, Branch 151, in JDRC Case No.
2568 entitled Ma. Aurora D. Pineda v. Vinson B. Pineda.
The facts follow.

On April 6, 1993, Aurora Pineda filed an action for declaration of nullity of marriage against petitioner Vinson
Pineda in the RTC of Pasig City, Branch 151, docketed as JDRC Case No. 2568. Petitioner was represented by
respondents Attys. Clodualdo de Jesus, Carlos Ambrosio and Emmanuel Mariano.

During the pendency of the case, Aurora proposed a settlement to petitioner regarding her visitation rights over their
minor child and the separation of their properties. The proposal was accepted by petitioner and both parties
subsequently filed a motion for approval of their agreement. This was approved by the trial court. On November 25,
1998, the marriage between petitioner and Aurora Pineda was declared null and void.

Throughout the proceedings, respondent counsels were well-compensated.3 They, including their relatives and
friends, even availed of free products and treatments from petitioners dermatology clinic. This notwithstanding,
they billed petitioner additional legal fees amounting to P16.5 million4 which the latter, however, refused to pay.
Instead, petitioner issued them several checks totaling P1.12 million5 as "full payment for settlement." 6

Still not satisfied, respondents filed in the same trial court7 a motion

for payment of lawyers fees for P50 million.8

On April 14, 2000, the trial court ordered petitioner to pay P5 million to Atty. de Jesus, P2 million to Atty.
Ambrosio and P2 million to Atty. Mariano.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals reduced the amount as follows: P1 million to Atty. de Jesus, P500,000 to Atty.
Ambrosio and P500,000 to Atty. Mariano. The motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, this recourse.

The issues raised in this petition are:

(1) whether the Pasig RTC, Branch 151 had jurisdiction over the claim for additional legal fees and

(2) whether respondents were entitled to additional legal fees.

First, a lawyer may enforce his right to his fees by filing the necessary petition as an incident of the main action in
which his services were rendered or in an independent suit against his client. The former is preferable to avoid
multiplicity of suits.9

The Pasig RTC, Branch 151, where the case for the declaration of nullity of marriage was filed, had jurisdiction over
the motion for the payment of legal fees. Respondents sought to collect P50 million which was equivalent to 10% of
the value of the properties awarded to petitioner in that case. Clearly, what respondents were demanding was
additional payment for legal services rendered in the same case.

Second, the professional engagement between petitioner and respondents was governed by the principle ofquantum
meruit which means "as much as the lawyer deserves."10 The recovery of attorneys fees on this basis is permitted,
as in this case, where there is no express agreement for the payment of attorneys fees. Basically, it is a legal
mechanism which prevents an unscrupulous client from running away with the fruits of the legal services of counsel
without paying for it. In the same vein, it avoids unjust enrichment on the part of the lawyer himself.

Further, Rule 20.4 of the Code of Professional Responsibility advises lawyers to avoid controversies with clients
concerning their compensation and to resort to judicial action only to prevent imposition, injustice or fraud. Suits to
collect fees should be avoided and should be filed only when circumstances force lawyers to resort to it. 11

In the case at bar, respondents motion for payment of their lawyers fees was not meant to collect what was justly
due them; the fact was, they had already been adequately paid.
Demanding P50 million on top of the generous sums and perks already given to them was an act of unconscionable
greed which is shocking to this Court.

As lawyers, respondents should be reminded that they are members of an honorable profession, the primary vision
of which is justice. It is respondents despicable behavior which gives lawyering a bad name in the minds of some
people. The vernacular has a word for it: nagsasamantala. The practice of law is a decent profession and not a
money-making trade. Compensation should be but a mere incident.12

Respondents claim for additional legal fees was not justified. They could not charge petitioner a fee based on
percentage, absent an express agreement to that effect. The payments to them in cash, checks, free products and
services from petitioners business all of which were not denied by respondents more than sufficed for the
work they did. The "full payment for settlement" 13 should have discharged petitioners obligation to them.

The power of this Court to reduce or even delete the award of attorneys fees cannot be denied. Lawyers are officers
of the Court and they participate in the fundamental function of administering justice. 14 When they took their oath,
they submitted themselves to the authority of the Court and subjected their professional fees to judicial control. 15

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby PARTIALLY GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals dated
April 30, 2002 in CAG.R. CV No. 68080 is hereby MODIFIED. The award of additional attorneys fees in favor
of respondents is hereby DELETED.

SO ORDERED.

RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice