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II
The ancientmode mayhave seemedall powerfulin its Diocletianic
form,but it was actuallyin manyways fairlyfragile,and between
circa400 and circa600 it collapsedin thewesternpartsoftheempire;
thiscollapse is the crux of my article.It mustneverbe forgotten,
however,thatthe empiredid not fall in the east, and in my final
sectionI willpose thecontrasting historyofByzantium,in inevitably
summary fashion.
The particularvulnerability oftheancientmodelayin itsrelation-
ship to privatelanded property,in this instancethe feudalmode,
thoughthe same problemshad posed themselvesless drasticallyin
theperiodof theriseof theslavemode. The stategave considerable
wealth to those who controlledit, thanksto taxation,but in an
economicsystemas undevelopedas the ancientworld even at its
height,therewas not much that could be done with this wealth
exceptput it into land. As the rich obtainedland, however,they
also obtainedtaxliability.Theirprivateinterests as landownerswere
thusin contradiction withtheirinterestsas rulersand clientsof the
state. If theirlands were large, theirprivateinterestsoutweighed
theirpublic ones. And althoughthe financialresourcesof the state
werestilla powerfulfocusof loyaltythroughtheirpotentialities for
enrichment, thedirectcommitment to privateownershipofproperty
tendedto be a firmerforcethan the more mediatedopportunities
offered bycontroloverstateresources.The richbegansystematically
to evade taxation.The structures of the feudalmode were,in other
words,moresolid thantherivalstructures of theancientmode, for
17
On late Rome as the ancientmode: Hindess and Hirst,Pre-Capitalist Modesof
Production,pp. io6-8; Carandini,Anatomiadella scimmia,pp. I34-7. I differfrom
bothofthesein myanalyses.On citiesand taxation:Jones,LaterRomanEmpire,pp.
456-8, 732-57, and, for a major legal text from458, Novellae Maioriani, ii (in
the basic edn. of the Theodosian Code, Theodosianilibrixvi cum constitutionibus
sirmondianis, ed. T. Mommsen,2 vols, Berlin,I905, ii pp. I57-9). For Late Roman
urbanideology,classic instancesare Ausonius,Ordo nobiliumurbium:Burdigala,or
SidoniusApollinaris,Epistolae,v. 20, vii. 9, 15, viii. 8, etc.
landlordswerepreparedto choosefeudalsocialrelationsratherthan
the ancientrelationsexpressedthroughtax. Benefitsfromthe state
had neverjustifiedthe weightof taxesin the eyesof peasants,and
nor did they any longer for landlords. Tax evasion spread; the
imperialmachinebegan to be starvedof funds.Large-scalelanded
property increasedtoo,partlyindeedthroughtheextensionofpatron-
age, thusincreasingthe possibilitiesof tax evasion.A viciouscircle
ensued, a fatalinvolutionof the state.19
Contradictions do not necessarilyget pushed to the pointwhere
something breaks.Tax evasionin theeastdid notlead to thecollapse
ofthestate.The difference in thewestwas provided,as I have said,
by the Germanic invasions. These were essentiallyan external,
almostcontingent force;but theycrackedthestructure ofthestate.
Indeed, theydefeatedit militarily,at least in the Vandal conquest
of Africaafter429 and the Visigothic-Frankish take-overof Gaul
and Spain afterthe 460s. The fifth-century wars kept the army
sufficientlyoccupied to make mass tax evasiona politicallypractic-
able activitytoo. But initiallythe barbarianscaused a crisis of
ideologicalhegemony, fromwhichmuchof thereststemmed.In the
earlyfifthcentury,writersforthefirsttimebeginto givetheimpres-
sion thatthe durationof the Roman empiremightbe finite;hardly
ever,even in the third-century invasions,had theydone that.The
sack of Rome in 4I0 by the Visigoths,thougha trivialdetailin the
militaryhistoryof the fifthcentury,gave manypeople (including
Augustineof Hippo) a sense of thepossibleend of theempire.The
settlementof the defeatedVisigothsin Aquitainein 418, though
perhapsa strategicvictoryfortheRomanstate(and byno meansthe
firstadmissionof barbariansettlers),introducedforthefirsttimea
stable semi-independent foreignbody into the "civilized" world.
The possibilityof alternativepolitiesbecame more than a mirage.
The third-century invasionshad producedlocal secessions- theso-
called "Gallic" empirebeingthe mostimportant - but thesewere
faithfulscale models of the empire,and controlledby men who
were,at leastin principle,aimingat universalrule. This was incon-
ceivable to the German kings, the occasional pipe-dreamapart;
howeverRoman theycould make theirstates,thesewere not the
empire.It is sometimesevenpossiblethatlocal aristocrats, alienated
by the rigidand rapaciousfiscal-administrative of the
centralization
19TheodosianCode, xi. 24.I-6 (ed. Mommsen,i, pp. 613-15);Libanius,Orationes,
xlvii.4-17 (thestandardcommentary forbothoftheseis F. de Zulueta,De Patrociniis
vicorum, Oxford,I909); Salvian,De guberationedei,iv. 20-I, 30-I, v. 17-45(ed. G.
Lagarrigue,Sourceschretiennes, ccxx,Paris, 1975); cf.NovellaeMaioriani,ii. 4 (ed.
Mommsen,ii, p. I59). Secondaryworks:Patlagean,Pauvreteeconomique etpauvrete
sociale,pp. 287-96 (by farthe most sensitiveanalysis);Jones,LaterRomanEmpire,
pp. 773-81; Foraboschi,"Fattorieconomici",pp. 73-83; Whittaker,"Inflationand
the Economy",pp. I3-I4.
What we have just looked at, in effect,are the main lines of the
historyof late Roman taxationin thewest.In therestofthissection
I shall tryto step back and describewhat has happenedin more
general,structuralterms,beforelayingout an impressionof the
initialpatternsof the feudal social formationthatemergedin the
earlymedievalperiod.
The firstpointto be emphasizedis thatwe are not dealingwith
the simplereplacementof one mode of productionby another.The
ancientmode coexistedwiththe feudalmode in 300 and 700: that
is, surplusextractionwas takenin separableprocessesin both tax
and rent,theone goingto a distantpublicpower(mediatedthrough
thecitiesat leastwhiletheempirelasted),theothergoingto a more
immediate,thoughoftenabsentee,landlord.The relationshipsof
the cultivatorto the stateand to the landlordwere fundamentally
different,thedifferencebeingstilldescribablein termsoftheopposi-
tionbetweenpublic and private,on thelevelsof bothproperty and
finance,and also of loyalty,interestand obligation.Both modes,
then,coexisted- antagonistically - in the same social formation.
22 In
general,on Germantaxation,see F. Thibault'sstillusefularticlesin Nouvelle
revuehistorique de droitfrancaiset etranger,3rd ser., xxv (I901), pp. 698-728,xxvi
(I902), pp. 32-48, xxviii(I904), pp. 53-79, 165-96,xxxi(1907), pp. 49-71, 205-36.
For the Visigoths,see P. D. King, Law and Societyin the Visigothic Kingdom
(Cambridge,I972), pp. 62-77 (stateexpensesstillincludedsome garrisons),withC.
Sanchez-Albornoz,"El tributumquadrigesimale",in Melangesd'histoire du moyen
dge dediesa la memoire de Louis Halphen(Paris, 1951), pp. 645-58. For Franks,F.
Lot, L'imp6tfoncieret la capitation personellesousle bas-empire et a l'epoquefranque
(Bibliothequede l'Ecole des hautes etudes, Sciences historiqueset philologiques,
ccliii,Paris, I928), pp. 83-II8, is stillthemastersurvey.See also (fortheinferenda)
F. Lot, "Un granddomainea l'6poque franque:Ardinen Poitou", Cinquantenaire de
l'Ecole pratiquedes hautesetudes,2 vols. (Bibliothequede l'Ecole des hautesetudes,
Sciences historiqueset philologiques,ccxxx, Paris, I92I), ii, pp. I09-29, and the
instructive recentdiscussionof someof thewaystaxationbrokedownin W. Goffart,
"Old and New in MerovingianTaxation",Past and Present,no. 96 (Aug. I982), pp.
3-21. Gregoryof Tours, Historiafrancorum, iii.36, iv.2, v.28, 34, vii. 5, 23, ix.30,
x.7 (ed. B. Kruschand W. Levison,M.G.H., ScriptoresrerumMerovingicarum i.i,
Hanover,I885, pp. I3I-2, I36, 233-4,239-4I, 336-7,343-4,448-9,488). The io per
cent figurederivesfromLot's calculations(Impotfoncieret capitation pp.
personelle,
85-6) of Chilperic'sattemptedtaxationof Limoges,if thefiguresare accurate(but is
ChlotarI reallytheninsistingon a thirdof churchrevenuesin the 54os?: Historia
francorum, iv.2). Tolls: F. L. Ganshof,"A proposdu tonlieusous les merovingiens",
Studiin onoredi Amintore Fanfani,6 vols. (Milan, I962), i, pp. 293-3I5. For theland
taxin LombardItaly,see references in C. J. Wickham,EarlyMedievalItaly:Central
Government and Local Society,400-Iooo (London, I98I), p. 40.
30 For all
this,see, forexample,H. Fichtenau,The CarolingianEmpire,trans.P.
Munz (Oxford, 1957); J. M. Wallace-Hadrill,Early GermanicKingship(Oxford,
I97I); R. McKitterick,The FrankishChurchand theCarolingian Reforms (London,
I977); P. J. Fouracre,"The CareerofEbroin"(Univ. ofLondon Ph.D. thesis,1981).
I am gratefulto Paul Fouracreformuch help and discussionon theseand related
matters.For peasantsand the state,see n. 33 below.
IV
The detailsoftheindividualhistoryofthevariouspartsoftheempire
of course differfromthesemodels,posed forthe mostpartin the
contextof the developmentof France and Italy. We cannotlook
at themall. Byzantium,however,producessome veryinstructive
contrastsin its evolution,and I willfinishby pointingsomeof them
out. As we have seen, thefourthto fifth centuriessaw thegrowthof
the structuraloppositionbetweenstateand landownersin the east
as much as the west; what we know of sixth-century Egypt also
showsconsiderableadvancesby largeownersin one of the firmest
reservesofan independentpeasantryin theempire.But thestatedid
notfall.It did notevenfallin theeasternequivalentofthebarbarian
invasions,theseventh-century occupationof Syriaand Egyptby the
Arabs and of the Balkans by the Slavs. Why not?
The firstproblemthathas to be facedherein makingcomparisons
withthe west is whetherthe two historiesare strictlycomparable.
The fifthcenturysaw theoverrunning of everypartof thewest;the
seventhcenturyin theeast at leastlefttheByzantineswithAnatolia
and theAegean.But, as alreadynoted,thepointabouttheGermanic
statesis not thattheyreplacedthe westernempire;it is thatthey
ultimately failedto reproducethestatepoweroftheirRomanprede-
cessors. The tax-raisingstate continuedin the east both in the
Byzantineand Arab partsof the formerunitaryempire.Not only
this,buttheseventhto eighthcenturiesin Byzantiumappearto show
an eclipse of aristocraticpower. The statepatronizedgeneralsand
theirarmies,at theexpenseof thelocal civilaristocracies;thelatter
thuslost theirindependentroleto new statesubordinateswho were
initiallymore reliable, and indeed more useful. The old noble
familiesdisappearfromoursources;itis notuntiltheninthand tenth
centuriesthat they(or, more likely,the new militarylandowning
families)returnin thetextsto troublethesmoothfunctioning ofthe
mechanismsofgovernment. In thepower-struggle betweenstateand
aristocracyat themomentofcrisis,it was thearistocracy whichlost.
As argued above, the Byzantinearistocracywas perhapsnot so
35 See Duby, Early Growthof theEuropeanEconomy,passim.