Chapter 23

Lumanlaw V. Peralta: *

Violation of the Right to Speedy Trial

The Facts

Petitioner Lumanlaw was charged with illegal

possession of a dangerous drug in November 2002.
He was detained in the Manila City Jail by virtue of a
Commitment Order. From the time of his arrest in
2002 up to the filing of the instant Petition in 2004,
his arraignment was postponed a total of 14 times
for various reasons, such as the absence of
petitioners counsel, the trial judges unavailability,
and the jail wardens failure to bring him to court. [1]

These postponements resulted in his detention

for almost two years, without the benefit of an
arraignment. Thus, he filed two Motions to Dismiss
the Information against him, on the ground that his
right to speedy trial had been violated. Both
Motions were denied by respondent judge. [2]

Petitioner filed a Petition for Mandamus under

Rule 65, arguing that respondents failure to act
expeditiously on his arraignment violated his right
to speedy trial and justified the dismissal of the
charge against him. [3]

The Issues

The issues were as follows:

1. Whether there was a violation of the right to
speedy trial
2. Whether mandamus was the proper remedy

The Courts Ruling

The Petition was granted in a unanimous ruling

penned by the Chief Justice. [4]
The right of the
accused to speedy trial was deemed violated
because, for almost two years, the trial court had
unreasonably failed to conduct the arraignment of
petitioner. For this violation of his constitutional
right, the Court ruled that he could compel the
dismissal of the Information against him through a
petition for mandamus.

First Issue:
Violation of the Right to Speedy Trial

The 30-day period for an arraignment provided in

the Speedy Trial Act is not absolute. Judicial
proceedings do not exist in a vacuum, but have to
contend with the realities of everyday life. Rather
than merely making mathematical calculations of
periods that have elapsed between stages, one
should consider if the delays were vexatious,
capricious, oppressive, or unjustified. [5]

This Court reviewed the reasons for the

postponements in the case and found that the
violation of petitioners right to speedy trial was
manifest, given the length and the unreasonableness
of a majority of the delays. It saw in the fourteen
postponements a lack of earnest effort on the part of
respondent to conduct the arraignment as soon as
the court calendar allowed. [6]

An arraignment takes, at most, ten minutes of

the courts business and does not normally entail
legal gymnastics. It consists simply of reading to
accused persons the charges leveled against them,
ensuring their understanding of those charges, and
obtaining their plea to the charges. A prudent and
resolute judge can conduct an arraignment as soon
as the accused is presented before the court. For
this reason alone, the high tribunal was astonished
that the lower court could not complete this simple
but fundamental stage in the proceedings. [7]

The absence of petitioners counsel de parte

during arraignment was not a valid reason to
postpone it. It would have been more prudent for
the judge to have appointed a counsel de oficio for
purposes of arraignment only. This course of action
became more compelling in the instant case when
the accused himself requested the appointment.
Thus, the decision of respondent to deny the request
was unreasonable, without legal basis, and generally
attributable to his inflexibility as regards
contingencies. [8]

The foremost cause for the lengthy delay was

the repeated failure of the jail wardens to bring
petitioner to court. Although the deferment of the
arraignment until the accused was presented was
justified, [9]
the problem could have easily been
averted by efficient court management. As an
administrator, respondent judge should have
supervised [10]
his clerk of court to ensure a timely
service of the produce orders on the wardens of the
Manila City Jail. Judges who set the pace for greater
efficiency, diligence and dedication can prompt their
personnel to be more diligent and efficient in the
performance of official duties. [11]

The Court held that, under the given

circumstances, respondent failed to assert his
authority actively, so as to expedite the
proceedings. He allowed the listlessness of the
parties, his staff, and the jail wardens to dictate the
pace of the proceedings. As further aggravation, he
did not exert any effort to expedite the arraignment
even after petitioner had filed two urgent Motions to
Dismiss. [12]

Judges should be more deliberate in their

actions and make full use of their authority to
expedite proceedings. [13]
Delays in the disposition of
cases erode the faith and confidence of our people in
the judiciary, lower its standards, and bring it into
disrepute. [14]

Second Issue:
Mandamus as the Proper Remedy

Well-established is the principle that a writ of

mandamus may be issued to control the exercise of
discretion. The issuance of the writ is warranted
when, in the performance of a duty, there is undue
delay that can be characterized as a grave abuse of
discretion resulting in manifest injustice. The
numerous and unreasonable postponements in the
present case displayed an abusive exercise of
discretion, in total disregard of the constitutional
rights of petitioner. In fact, respondents Orders
denying his Motions to Dismiss did not even bother
to explain the reasonableness of the bases for the
postponements. [15]

Also, established in this jurisdiction is the

general rule that a writ of mandamus is available to
the accused to compel a dismissal of the case. [16]

Respondent judge argued for the dismissal of

the instant Petition on the ground that petitioner
had not moved for a reconsideration of the trial
courts Order dated May 3, 2004. The former
insisted that a prerequisite to a mandamus petition
was a motion for reconsideration -- a remedy that
was plain, speedy, and adequate in the ordinary
course of law. [17]

This general rule cited by respondent was not

impervious to exceptions. In the face of
extraordinary and compelling reasons, the
availability of another remedy did not preclude a
resort to a special civil action under Rule 65. Since
the delays in the case at bar had been ordered in
total disregard of the constitutional rights of
petitioner, the instant case easily fell under those
exceptions. [18]

This Court will not deny a writ of mandamus on

purely technical matters, like the failure of a party
to seek reconsideration and to follow the hierarchy
of courts, if that party would be deprived of
substantive rights. Procedural rules will not be
strictly enforced if their enforcement would result in
a miscarriage of justice. This principle holds,
especially when a petition is meritorious and the
trial judge has clearly violated the petitioners
constitutional rights. The protection of our peoples
civil liberties overwhelms all rules of procedure.
This Court has the duty to safeguard liberty;
hence, it will always uphold the basic
constitutional rights of our people, especially
the weak and the marginalized. [19]

*
GR No. 164953, February 13, 2006, per Panganiban, CJ.
[1]
Decision, pp. 3-8.
[2]
Id. at 6-8.
[3]
Id. at 8-9.
[4]
First Division. The Decision was concurred in by
Justices Consuelo Ynares-Santiago, Ma. Alicia Austria-
Martinez, and Minita V. Chico-Nazario. Justice Romeo J.
Callejo Sr. was on leave.
[5]
Decision, pp. 11-12.
[6]
Id. at 14.
[7]
Id. at 15.
[8]
Id. at 15-18.
[9]
Sec. 1(b) of Rule 116 of the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure.
[10]
Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 3, Rule 3.09, requires
judges to organize and supervise the court personnel to
ensure the prompt and efficient dispatch of business x x x.
[11]
Decision, pp. 18-19.
[12]
Id. at 25.
[13]
Id. at 18-21.
[14]
Id. at 21.
[15]
Id. at 21-22.
[16]
Id. at 22 (citing Himagan v. People, 237 SCRA 538,
October 7, 1994; Acebedo v. Hon. Sarmiento, 146 Phil 820,
December 16, 1970; Esguerra v. De la Costa, 66 Phil 134,
August 30, 1938).
[17]
Id. at 22-23.
[18]
Id. at 23-25.
[19]
Id. at 25-26.

Chapter 23

Lumanlaw V. Peralta: *

Violation of the Right to Speedy Trial

The Facts
 Petitioner Lumanlaw was charged with illegal
possession of a dangerous drug in November 2002.
He was detained in the Manila City Jail by virtue of a
Commitment Order. From the time of his arrest in
2002 up to the filing of the instant Petition in 2004,
his arraignment was postponed a total of 14 times
for various reasons, such as the absence of
petitioners counsel, the trial judges unavailability,
and the jail wardens failure to bring him to court. [1]

These postponements resulted in his detention

for almost two years, without the benefit of an
arraignment. Thus, he filed two Motions to Dismiss
the Information against him, on the ground that his
right to speedy trial had been violated. Both
Motions were denied by respondent judge. [2]

Petitioner filed a Petition for Mandamus under

Rule 65, arguing that respondents failure to act
expeditiously on his arraignment violated his right
to speedy trial and justified the dismissal of the
charge against him. [3]
 The Issues

The issues were as follows:

1. Whether there was a violation of the right to
speedy trial
2. Whether mandamus was the proper remedy

The Courts Ruling

The Petition was granted in a unanimous ruling

penned by the Chief Justice. [4]
The right of the
accused to speedy trial was deemed violated
because, for almost two years, the trial court had
unreasonably failed to conduct the arraignment of
petitioner. For this violation of his constitutional
right, the Court ruled that he could compel the
dismissal of the Information against him through a
petition for mandamus.

First Issue:
Violation of the Right to Speedy Trial
 The 30-day period for an arraignment provided in
the Speedy Trial Act is not absolute. Judicial
proceedings do not exist in a vacuum, but have to
contend with the realities of everyday life. Rather
than merely making mathematical calculations of
periods that have elapsed between stages, one
should consider if the delays were vexatious,
capricious, oppressive, or unjustified. [5]

This Court reviewed the reasons for the

postponements in the case and found that the
violation of petitioners right to speedy trial was
manifest, given the length and the unreasonableness
of a majority of the delays. It saw in the fourteen
postponements a lack of earnest effort on the part of
respondent to conduct the arraignment as soon as
the court calendar allowed. [6]

An arraignment takes, at most, ten minutes of

the courts business and does not normally entail
legal gymnastics. It consists simply of reading to
accused persons the charges leveled against them,
ensuring their understanding of those charges, and
obtaining their plea to the charges. A prudent and
resolute judge can conduct an arraignment as soon
as the accused is presented before the court. For
this reason alone, the high tribunal was astonished
that the lower court could not complete this simple
but fundamental stage in the proceedings. [7]

The absence of petitioners counsel de parte

during arraignment was not a valid reason to
postpone it. It would have been more prudent for
the judge to have appointed a counsel de oficio for
purposes of arraignment only. This course of action
became more compelling in the instant case when
the accused himself requested the appointment.
Thus, the decision of respondent to deny the request
was unreasonable, without legal basis, and generally
attributable to his inflexibility as regards
contingencies. [8]

The foremost cause for the lengthy delay was

the repeated failure of the jail wardens to bring
petitioner to court. Although the deferment of the
arraignment until the accused was presented was
justified, [9]
the problem could have easily been
averted by efficient court management. As an
administrator, respondent judge should have
supervised [10]
his clerk of court to ensure a timely
service of the produce orders on the wardens of the
Manila City Jail. Judges who set the pace for greater
efficiency, diligence and dedication can prompt their
personnel to be more diligent and efficient in the
performance of official duties. [11]

The Court held that, under the given

circumstances, respondent failed to assert his
authority actively, so as to expedite the
proceedings. He allowed the listlessness of the
parties, his staff, and the jail wardens to dictate the
pace of the proceedings. As further aggravation, he
did not exert any effort to expedite the arraignment
even after petitioner had filed two urgent Motions to
Dismiss. [12]

Judges should be more deliberate in their

actions and make full use of their authority to
expedite proceedings. [13]
Delays in the disposition of
cases erode the faith and confidence of our people in
the judiciary, lower its standards, and bring it into
disrepute. [14]

Second Issue:
Mandamus as the Proper Remedy

Well-established is the principle that a writ of

mandamus may be issued to control the exercise of
discretion. The issuance of the writ is warranted
when, in the performance of a duty, there is undue
delay that can be characterized as a grave abuse of
discretion resulting in manifest injustice. The
numerous and unreasonable postponements in the
present case displayed an abusive exercise of
discretion, in total disregard of the constitutional
rights of petitioner. In fact, respondents Orders
denying his Motions to Dismiss did not even bother
to explain the reasonableness of the bases for the
postponements. [15]
 Also, established in this jurisdiction is the
general rule that a writ of mandamus is available to
the accused to compel a dismissal of the case. [16]

Respondent judge argued for the dismissal of

the instant Petition on the ground that petitioner
had not moved for a reconsideration of the trial
courts Order dated May 3, 2004. The former
insisted that a prerequisite to a mandamus petition
was a motion for reconsideration -- a remedy that
was plain, speedy, and adequate in the ordinary
course of law. [17]

This general rule cited by respondent was not

impervious to exceptions. In the face of
extraordinary and compelling reasons, the
availability of another remedy did not preclude a
resort to a special civil action under Rule 65. Since
the delays in the case at bar had been ordered in
total disregard of the constitutional rights of
petitioner, the instant case easily fell under those
exceptions. [18]
 This Court will not deny a writ of mandamus on
purely technical matters, like the failure of a party
to seek reconsideration and to follow the hierarchy
of courts, if that party would be deprived of
substantive rights. Procedural rules will not be
strictly enforced if their enforcement would result in
a miscarriage of justice. This principle holds,
especially when a petition is meritorious and the
trial judge has clearly violated the petitioners
constitutional rights. The protection of our peoples
civil liberties overwhelms all rules of procedure.
This Court has the duty to safeguard liberty;
hence, it will always uphold the basic
constitutional rights of our people, especially
the weak and the marginalized. [19]

*
GR No. 164953, February 13, 2006, per Panganiban, CJ.
[1]
Decision, pp. 3-8.
[2]
Id. at 6-8.
[3]
Id. at 8-9.
[4]
First Division. The Decision was concurred in by
Justices Consuelo Ynares-Santiago, Ma. Alicia Austria-
Martinez, and Minita V. Chico-Nazario. Justice Romeo J.
Callejo Sr. was on leave.
[5]
Decision, pp. 11-12.
[6]
Id. at 14.
[7]
Id. at 15.
[8]
Id. at 15-18.
[9]
Sec. 1(b) of Rule 116 of the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure.
[10]
Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 3, Rule 3.09, requires
judges to organize and supervise the court personnel to
ensure the prompt and efficient dispatch of business x x x.
[11]
Decision, pp. 18-19.
[12]
Id. at 25.
[13]
Id. at 18-21.
[14]
Id. at 21.
[15]
Id. at 21-22.
[16]
Id. at 22 (citing Himagan v. People, 237 SCRA 538,
October 7, 1994; Acebedo v. Hon. Sarmiento, 146 Phil 820,
December 16, 1970; Esguerra v. De la Costa, 66 Phil 134,
August 30, 1938).
[17]
Id. at 22-23.
[18]
Id. at 23-25.
[19]
Id. at 25-26.