Pleadings are not totally privileged

Ilusorio v. Bildner1
Respondents Ma. Erlinda Bildner and Lily Raqueo were charged by
Erlinda K. Ilusorio (petitioner) before the Metropolitan Trial Court
(MeTC) of Pasig City with perjury arising from their filing, on behalf of
Lakeridge Development Corp. (LDC), of a petition in the Makati City
Regional Trial Court (RTC) for issuance of new owners duplicate
copy of Certificate of Condominium Title (CCT) No. 21578 covering a
condominium unit in Makati.

It is confronting the sole issue raised by petitioner whether the

questioned petitions of respondents are, as the MeTC held and which
the RTC affirmed, absolutely privileged on the basis of Flordelis and
Aquino.

The issue had already been addressed by the Court in Choa v.

People,[34] in this wise:

Sison and Aquino both involve libel cases. In Sison, this Court
categorically stressed that the term "absolute privilege" (or "qualified
privilege") has an "established technical meaning, in connection with
civil actions for libel and slander." x x x x.

x x x x.

The Flordelis case is likewise not in point. There, Flordelis was

charged with perjury for having alleged false statements in his verified
answer. This Court held that no perjury could be committed by
Flordelis because "an answer to a complaint in an ordinary civil action
need not be under oath," thus, "it is at once apparent that one
element of the crime of perjury is absent x x x, namely, that the sworn
statement complained of must be required by law." [35] (Italics in the
original; underscoring supplied)

Verily, both the MeTC and the RTC misappreciated this Courts
rulings in Flordelis and Aquino as respondents petitions-bases of the
subject Informations for perjury are required by law to be under oath.

Choa v. People of the Philippines2

Petitioner then claims that since the petition for naturalization is a
pleading, the allegations therein are absolutely privileged and cannot
be used for any criminal prosecution against him, citing Sison vs.
David,[20] People vs. Aquino[21] and Flordelis vs. Himalaloan.[22]

1
G.R. No. 173935-38, 23 December 2008.
2
G.R. No. 142011, 14 March 2003.
The argument is unavailing. Sison and Aquino both involve libel
cases. In Sison, this Court categorically stressed that the term
"absolute privilege" (or "qualified privilege") has an "established
technical meaning, in connection with civil actions for libel and
slander." The purpose of the privilege is to ensure that "members of
the legislature, judges of courts, jurors, lawyers, and witnesses may
speak their minds freely and exercise their respective functions
without incurring the risk of a criminal prosecution or an action for the
recovery of damages. It is granted in aid and for the advantage of the
administration of justice."[23] Certainly, in the present case, petitioner
cannot seek refuge under the absolutely privileged communication
rule since the false statements he made in his petition for
naturalization has instead made a mockery of the administration of
justice.

The Flordelis case is likewise not in point. There, Flordelis was

charged with perjury for having alleged false statements in his verified
answer. This Court held that no perjury could be committed by
Flordelis because "an answer to a complaint in an ordinary civil action
need not be under oath," thus, "it is at once apparent that one
element of the crime of perjury is absent x x x, namely, that the sworn
statement complained of must be required by law."[24]

Anent the alleged violation of petitioner's constitutional right to equal

protection, suffice it to state that such right cannot be invoked to
protect his criminal act.

In People vs. Cainglet,[25] this Court emphatically stressed that

"every interest of public policy demands that perjury be not shielded
by artificial refinements and narrow technicalities. For perjury strikes
at the administration of the laws. It is the policy of the law that judicial
proceedings and judgments be fair and free from fraud, and that
litigants and parties be encouraged to tell the truth, and that they be
punished if they do not."

People of the Philippines v. Cainglet3

In the same way, therefore, the State may criminally prosecute for
perjury the party who obtains registration through fraud, such as by
stating false assertions in the sworn answer required of applicants in
cadastral proceedings.

For the Court, therefore, to sustain appellee's view would be to

unduly discriminate in the prosecution of persons charged with
falsification or perjury. While public policy, on one hand, demands an

3
G.R. Nos. L-21493-94, 29 April 1966.
end to litigation, and hence puts forward the doctrine of res judicata,
yet, on the other hand, every interest of public policy demands that
perjury be not shielded by artificial refinements and narrow
technicalities. For perjury strikes at the very administration of the
laws.5 It is the policy of the law that judicial proceedings and
judgments shall be fair and free from fraud, and that litigants and
parties be encouraged to tell the truth, and that they be punished if
they do not.
For perjury to exist, (1) there must be a sworn statement that is required by
law; (2) it must be made under oath before a competent officer; (3) the statement
contains a deliberate assertion of falsehood; and (4) the false declaration is with
regard to a material matter.[48]

The presence of the first two elements is not disputed by the petitioner and they
are indeed present in the instant case. The sworn statements which contained the
alleged falsehoods in this case were submitted in support of the petition for
involuntary dissolution, as required by Sections 105 and 121 of the Corporation
Code.

Willfully means intentionally, with evil intent and legal malice, with
consciousness that the alleged perjurious statement is false with the intent
that it should be received as a statement of what was true in fact. It is
equivalent to knowingly. Deliberately implies meditated as distinguished
from inadvertent acts. It must appear that the accused knows his statement
to be false or is consciously ignorant of its truth.