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An S5 DIODOREAN MODA L SYSTEM

M. J. WHITE

As is n o w we ll known, the alethic modalities we re n o rma lly


conceived i n temporal te rms b y the ancients (I). I n p a rticu la r
the Megarian logician Diodorus Cronos defined a possible pro-
position as one that e ith e r is n o w o r w i l l be true, a n imp o s-
sible proposition as one that is n o w false and w i l l a lwa ys be
false, a necessary proposition a s o n e t h a t i s n o w t ru e a n d
will a lwa ys b e true, a n d a nonnecessary proposition as o n e
that either is n o w false o r w i l l be false (
2
historical and lo g ica lo f A rt h u r P rio r has p ro ve n e sp e cia lly
fru
). itfu
T lhi ne t h e r coen te
s mp
e oara rry ca nha lytica
l st u d y o f Diodorean
modalities)).
b o t h
In the John Locke Lectures f o r 1956 (la te r incorporated in to
his b o o k Time and Mo d a lit y [12]) P rio r presents a n analysis
of the Diodorean concepts o f possibility and necessity in terms
of in fin ite ma trice s o r ro ws o f t ru t h va lu e s
Cresswell
. A s aHp tly
u remark.
g h e Prior
s was th in kin g of propositions as
things
a nwh icdh co u ld change t h e ir tru th -va lu e s (co u ld become
true o r become false) w i t h the passage o f time)). ([61, p. 262.)
Propositions, i n other words, a re conceived as te mp o ra lly in -
determinate. P rio r's in fin ite ma trice s (ro ws) o f l ' s and O's re -
present the tru th and falsity, respectively, o f a proposition a t
successive time s (mo vin g f ro m le f t to rig h t). Consequently, a
given va lu a tio n i s a n assignment o f such a n in f in it e ma t ri x
(rather than a single 1 o r 0 ) t o each propositional va ria b le .
Each va lu a tio n then proceeds t o assign ma trice s t o co mp le x
propositional wff's in the expected recursive way. For example,
a valuation V
ithat
w has
i l l 1 a t a ll points wh e re the ma t rix assigned b y V
ai ts os i ( g p
n
t o
a (I) See t he discussion in Hin t ik k a [5], es pec ially Chs. V I I I and I X.
w( f
Editio
f 2 secundo I I I , in Patrologioe Cursus Completus , V ol. 64, ed. J . P. Migne
(Paris, 1847), p.511.
o )
A
f s
t r
h e
e p
f o
r
o t
r e
md
' i
478 M . J. W HI TE

has a 1 o r where the ma trix assigned b y V, to lp has a 1. Mo st


importantly, V , w i l l assign to a wf f o f the f o rm 'Mg ' a ma t rix
that has a 1 a t ju st those points where the ma t rix assigned b y
V, to g has a 1 either at the corresponding point or at any point
to the rig h t o f the corresponding point. V, w i l l assign to a wf f
of the fo rm 'Lg' a ma trix that has a 1 a t just those points where
the ma trix assigned by V, to g has a 1 both at the corresponding
point and a t a ll points to the rig h t o f the corresponding point.
A w f f is then he ld t o b e Diodorean thesis o r theorem i f f a ll
valuations (a ll possibles assignments o f in fin ite sequences t o
its propositional variables) re su lt i n the wf f 's being assigned
the sequence wit h l' s throughout.
The mo d a l P C whose theorems a re ju st those th a t can b e
shown to be Diodorean theses b y means o f the ma t rix method
has been designated D. In Time and Mo d a lity P rio r speculated
that D is equivalent to the Lewis system S4. Ho we ve r, i t was
soon found that a syste m stronger than S4 is needed t o a xio -
matize t h e Diodorean syste m D. I n 1957 P rio r noted th a t a
formula investigated b y P. T. Geach ('),

1. ML p L M p ,

is n o t an S4 theorem b u t is a Diodorean thesis. Du mme tt and


Lemmon [4 ] n a me d t h e syste m fo rme d b y a d d in g 1 t o t h e
axioms o f S4 S4.2. A lso in 1957, Lemmon discovered another
proof that D is stronger than S4: the wf f

2. L(Lp L q ) V L(Lq D Lp).

is a D theorem but not a theorem o f S4 o r S4.2 (


formed
4 b y adding 2 to the axioms o f S4 Dummett and Lemmon
[41
). named
T h eS4.3.s Thyis ssystem
t e thm e y showed t o contain S4.2. A t
roughly the same time Hin t ikka discovered another Diodorean
thesis that is n o t derivable in S4:

3. (Mp M q ) ( M ( p .Mq ) V M ( q Mp )).


(n) I n [121, pp. 25ff. There Prior uses 3 in plac e of O.
(
4
)
T
h
e
d
i
s
c
o
A N S5 DI O DO RE A N M O DA L SYSTEM 4 7 9

This w f f was la te r proved equivalent to Lemmon's 2 (


5 Finally, Dummett discovered another wf f that is a Diodorean
theorem
). (i.e., is ve rifie d b y Prior's ma t rix method) b u t can be
proved not to be derivable in S4.3:

4. L(L(p D Lp) D Lp) D (ML p D Lp).

Prior reports in Past, Present and Future ([13], p. 29) th a t th is


formula was shortened b y Geach to

5. L(L(p D Lp) D p) D (ML p D p).

In turn, P rio r ([131, p. 29) has shown 5 to be equivalent to the


fo llo win g wff:

6. (ML p L ( -
p D
PriorMthen( proceeded
p to show that the reason 6 is ve rifie d b y
his ma
M t rix method
but is not an S4.3 theorem is that the ma t rix
method
p does) n
) o t a llo w f o r the p o ssib ility th a t t ime mig h t be
dense) but the axioms o f S4.3, in effect, leave open the question
of the
D density o r discreteness o f time. K rip ke and Bu ll F1.1 (in -
dependently)
p se ttle d the issue o f th e axiomatization o f D b y
showing
. th a t S4.3 axiomatizes t h e Diod orea n mo d a litie s (i n
the sense me re ly of possibility as presentness-or-futurity) if the
assumption o f discrete t ime i s n o t made, wh ile S4.3 p lu s 6
axiomatize the Diodorean modalities i f such an assumption is
madei.e., a xio ma tize D o r ju s t those theses ve rif ia b le b y
Prior's ma t rix method (
5
). (
in 5t h e lat t er's re v ie w o f Tim e a n d Mo d a lit y i n t h e Philos ophic al Rev iew,
67 )(1958), p p . 401-404. Th e equiv alenc e o f 2 a n d 3 wa s p ro v e d b y P r io r
in Pg K l, K 2 a n d Relat ed M o d a l Systems, No t r e Da me J o u rn a l o f Fo rma l
Logic,
r 5:4 (October, 1964), pp. 299-304.
(')
i M o r e c omplete accounts o f t h e v arious systems bet ween S4 a n d S5,
together
o wit h f urt her bibliographic al information, can be found in P rior [131,
pp.r 23-31, a n d Hughes a n d Cres s well [61, pp. 260-267. Th e relat ions among
ther v arious modal systems between S4 and S5 are s pelled out in Soboc ins k i
[151.
e
p
o
r
t
s
i
n
[
1
3
480 M . J. W HI TE

Although e ith e r the system D o r th e we a ke r S4.3 captures


the fundamental Dio d o re a n concepts o f p o ssib ilit y a s p re -
sentness-or-futurity a n d necessity a s presentness-and-perma-
nent-futurity, n e ith e r system re a lly expresses th e fa ta lism o r
logical determinism that ancient sources ascribe to Diodorus.
This ma y seem a peculiar comment, since most contemporary
analyses o f Diodorus' system have regarded it as fa ta listic (
However,
7 the principal reason wh y most contemporary students
).
(including myself) (
stems
9 f ro m the consideration o f te mp o ra lly determinate p ro -
positions,
) h a v i.e., e propositions conceived as being fo re ve r tie d to
a
s g ive o n time. Diodorus wo u ld seem to have no reason n o t to
regard
r e gsuch a propositions
r d (e.g., A sea battle occurs on Ma y 22,
18050
e d as being eternally true if true and eternally false if false.
But,
t according
h to Diodorus' temporal account of the modalities,
such
e a t e mp o ra lly d e te rmin a te p ro p o sitio n w o u l d t h e n b e
necessary
D i o if true,
d impossible if false.
o To r ascribe e some
a fo rm o f logical determinism to Diodorus on
this
n basis, h o we ve r, is re a lly t o refuse t o ta ke se rio u sly th e
sconcept y o f a proposition as a te mp o ra lly indeterminate entity.
It
s is analogous
t e t o re g a rd in g a co n te mp o ra ry mo d a l syste m
with
m a sp o ssib le -wo rld s se ma n tic in te rp re ta tio n a s e n t a ilin g
fatalism because such a system entails that 'world-determinate'
or 'wo rld -in d e xe d ' (
9
particular possible wo rld ,e.g., Ca rte r is elected President in
)
p (r o p o s i t i
o
'Mas 7n ter s A rg u me n t ' o f Diodorus , A me ric a n P hilos ophic al Q u a rt e rly , 1 : 2
((April,
) p 1964),r o es p pecoially p. 110. This art ic le, i n a modif ied f orm, appears as
Ch.
s i t i o kna [5]. See als o P. M. SCHUILL, L e Dominat eur e t les Pos -
S DC i n Hin t ik
sibles (Paris, 1960).
s e
(e
'tion, (fbort hc oming
8 o i n Erk enninis ). A ls o i n a p a p e r A ris t o t le a n d Te m -
u
porally
)f n Relat ivde Modalities , (f ort hc oming i n Analy s is ).
' (Io
in
t 9nrTh e Na t u re o f Nec es s ity (Ox ford, 1974). I believ e t h a t imp lic it i n Hin -
tikka's
o )ae discussion o f Aris t ot le's famous s ea-battle problem ([5], Ch. VIII) is
a pA xo in t c onc erning t h e re la t io n bet ween t e mp o ra lly det erminat e propos i-
n
a
tions la and a t emporal ac c ount o f t he alet hic modalit ies s imila r t o t he p o in t
I mak
vrm e in this paragraph.
i
tp
n
il
P
ce
L
l,
A
t
e
N
h

T
e
D
Iid
N
i
o
G
s
d
A N S5 DI O DO RE A N M O DA L SYSTEM 4 8 1

1976 in wo rld a) are necessary (true at a ll wo rld s) i f true and


impossible (true in no wo rld ) if false.
If th e a scrip tio n o f fa ta lism t o a Diodorean mo d a l syste m
such as D in vo lve s no mo re th a t th e t a cit imp o rta tio n o f the
semantical entities (times, i n the case o f D) employed in th e
evaluation of wffs of the system into those ve ry wils, analogous
arguments c a n b e constructed demonstrating t h e 'f a t a list ic
consequences' o f other modal systems that are not u su a lly re -
garded as fatalistic. How, then, might the determinism espoused
by Diodorus be captured wit h in a modal system with o u t 'co l-
lapsing' that system, i.e., with o u t destroying the distinction be-
tween cp and Lcp and between cp and Mcp fo r a ll propositions cp ?
Cicero reports th a t Diodorus h e ld th a t whatever w i l l hap-
pen necessarily w i l l happen. (") Represented a s a p o te n tia l
Diodorem thesis, this cla im becomes

7. Fp D LFp.

Analyzing 'L' in the Diodorean manner, we fin d that the sense


of 7 is the fo llo win g : i f it (now) w i l l be th e case that p, then
it is (now) and always w i l l be true that it w i l l be the case that
p. Th e cla im has lit t le p rima facie p la u sib ility and cle a rly is
not ve rifie d b y Prior's ma t rix method, i.e., is not a theorem o f
D. Ho we ve r, i t is f a irly obvious th a t the assumption o f eter-
nal recurrence o r cyclica l t ime wo u ld v e ri f y t h e fo rmu la .
Given this assumption, i f it is tru e that a proposition w i l l be-
come true, it is n o w and fo re ve r hereafter true that it w i l l be-
come true. Although it is not known whether Diodorus h imse lf
subscribed t o th e concept o f cyclica l time, th e re is abundant
evidence th a t th e n o tio n o f eternal recurrence wa s co mmo n
in a n tiq u ity and was tied, f ro m Aristo tle 's De Generatione e t
Corruptione on, to necessary coming-to-be or, in other words,
to th e necessary occurrence o f events (") I n p a rticu la r, t h e
doctrine o f cyclica l time was ascribed to the determinist Stoic

(1o) De Fat 7. 13.


(
1
1
)
D
e
G
e
n
.
e
482 M . J. W HI TE

inheritors o f the Megarian logical tra d itio n (


1 2d e te rmin istic Diodorean syste m D ' t h a t w i l l y ie ld 7 a s a
a
theorem.
). T h u s , I
p Prior's
r o inpfinoite sma terix method can be adapted fo r the purpose
of representing theoremhood b i t h is strengthened Diodorean
system. Consider the subset M' o f the set M of infinite matrices
such t h a t each m M ' i s constituted o f e te rn a lly re cu rre n t
finite subsections o r 'runs'. I t ca n be seen th a t each m m M'
verifies 7 and that, in general, such matrices capture the idea
of eternal recurrence. Thus I propose that a wf f is a theorem of
D' i f a n d o n ly i f i t i s ve rif ie d (assigned a ma t rix w i t h l ' s
throughout) b y each m M ' . Since M' is a subset o f M, each
theorem o f D (wit ve rifie d b y each m M ) w i l l be a theorem
of D'.
Fortunately, t h e a xio ma tiza tio n o f D ' seems co n sid e ra b ly
simpler than the axiomatization o f D proved to be. Th e most
in tu itive w a y is t o a d jo in t o t h e classical P C a xio ms f o r a
tense logic fo r circu la r time (wit h operators 'P' [ it will, a t least
once, be the case that] and 'G' [ it will always be the case that])
and to define 'L' and ' M i n terms o f these operators. Thus the
following seems a wo rka b le axiomatization o f D':
Rules:

Ri. Fro m 1p, infer 1Gp

Definitions:

Dl. Fp
D2. M p p F p
D3. L p p Gp

Axioms:

A l. G(p q ) ( G p D Gq)
A2. Gp p [ o r p F p )

ORIGEN, Cont ra Ceis um 4. 12, 4. 68, and 5. 20. A ls o Lactantios, Div inae
Ins titutiones 7. 23.
A N S5 DI O DO RE A N M O DA L SYSTEM 4 8 3

A3. Gp D GGp [ o r FFp D Fp]


ALL p D G G p [ o r p D GFp] (" )

Adapting a standard n a tu ra l deduction p ro o f technique t o


our new system (any uniform substitution instance of an axiom
may occur as a lin e in a proof; i f a wf f cp in a proof depends
on n o assumptions, Gfp ma y o ccu r as a lin e i n th e proof), i t
can be shown that 7 is provable. First, 7 is b y definition equi-
valent to

7'. Fp F p GFp.

then,

1. Fp Ass.
2. Fp D GFFp A4 (Fpip), A x i
3. GFFp 1, 2, D
4. FFp D Fp A3,
E A xI
5. G(FFp D Fp) 4, GI
6. G(FFp D Pp) D (GFFp D GFp) A l (FFpip, Fp/q), A x I
7. CIFFp D GFp 5, 6, D
8. CFI) E3, 7, DE
9. Fp G F p 1
10 ,1-9, D
. 8I
TheF question arises a s t o th e re la tio n o , f th e 'p u re mo d a l'
p
fragment o f D' t o tra d itio n a l mo d a l systems. Since o u r postu-
latesDf o r circu la r t ime insure th a t th e a n te rio rity-p o ste rio rity
relation
F among times (t < t') is reflexive, tra n sitive , and sym-
metrical,
p the relation ( t t ' if f t < t' V t = t ' ) also posses-
ses these
G characteristics. I t is t h e la t t e r re la tio n , o f course,
that Fserves as the 'accessibility relation' in semantically in te r-
preting
p 'L' and 'M' in a Diodorean modal logic. Since the acces-
sib ility re la tio n among possible wo rld s i n th e possible-world
interpretation o f the L e wis S5 syste m is also re fle xive , t ra n -

(IS) See P rio r [13], pp. 176-178, f o r alt ernat iv e ax iomatiz ations o f c irc ular
time.
484 M . J. W HI TE

sitive, a n d symme trica l, o n e wo u ld expect t h e 'p u re mo d a l'


fragment to D' t o coincide wit h S5 (
axiom
14 for S5,
) I n f a c t , a
c h 8.aM pr D a LMp,
c t e r i s t i c

can be proved in D'. 8 is d e fin itio n a lly equivalent to

8'. p V Fp D (p V Fp) G(p V Fp).

The proof of the latter thesis in D' is rather lengthy but simple:
1. p F p Ass.
12. p Ass.
3. p F p A2, A x i
4. F p 2, 3, D
5. F p D GFFp E
A 4(Fpip), A xI
6. G F F p 4, 5, DE
7-10. G F p [as in steps 5-8 of previous proof]

11. F p Ass.
12. p F p 11, V I
13. F p D p V Fp 11-12, D I
14. G ( F p D p V Fp) 13, GI
15. G ( F p D p V Fp) D A l (Fpip, p V Fp/q),
(GFp D G(p V Fp)) A xI
16. G F p D G(p V Fp) 14, 15, DE

17. GPI) D G(p V Fp) 16, Reit


18. G(p V Fp) 10, 17, DE
19. p V Fp 2, V I
20. (p V Pp) G(p V Fp) 18, 19,1
21. p D (p V Fp) G(p V Fp) 2-20, D I
22-39. Pp D (p V Fp) G(p V Fp) [as in steps 4-21]
40. (p V Fp) G(p V Fp) 1, 21, 39, V E
41. p V Fp D (p v FP) G(p V Fp) 1-40, D
I

(
define
1 G as H, o r bot h as L, and use k nown postulates f o r S5. ([13], p. 64.)
4
)
P
r
i
o
r
n
o
t
A N S5 DI O DO RE A N M O DA L SYSTEM 4 8 5

The system D' thus represents a d e te rmin istic b u t n o n -trivia l


Diodorean mo d a l system; it , i n o th e r words, supplies a Dio -
dorean account o f 'necessary becoming', th e necessary occur-
rence of events. Wh ile 7 and

9. Pp D MFp

are theorems of the system, the fo llo win g formulae are not:

10. p D Lp
*11. p

The truth of 10 o r 11 wo u ld indeed result in the collapse o f the


Diodorean system and, in effect, yie ld a 'sta tic universe'. I t is
interesting to note that A risto tle , in Metaphysics 0 , 3, cla ims
that the e a rlie r Megarians' refusal to distinguish the modalities
of necessity and p o ssib ility fro m the mo d a lity o f a ctu a lity has
precisely t h is effect. Th e Diodorean syste m D' ma y th u s b e
interpreted as a n answer to Aristo tle , i.e., a wa y to preserve
a f o rm o f fa ta lism wit h o u t 'destroying becoming' wit h in th e
context o f a temporal account o f the alethic modalities.

POSTSCRIPT

A question o f mild in te re st is wh e th e r there e xists a n S5


Diodorean modal system that does not entail the fatalistic con-
sequences o f D '
. T h e
'multi-looped' system o f time in wh ich a ll the loops intersect
a ant least
in s wone
e point, e.g., Fig u re 1 b e lo w.
r
s e e
m s
a f f i
r m a t
i v e .
C o
n s
Rescher and Urquhart ([141, p.133) als o not e t he relat ion bet ween c irc ular
itime and
d S5 when the alethic modalit ies are defined t emporally .
e r
a
486 M . J. W HI TE

Here, too, th e r e l a t i o n w i l l be re fle xive , tra n sitive , a n d


symmetrical. He n ce ' M ' a n d 1 ' , se ma n tica lly in te rp re te d i n
terms o f this relation, w i l l behave according to th e S5 mo d a l
postulates. However, the set T of times standing in this relation
can be thought of as the set of possible times: Mcp is tru e n o w
iff cp is true now or at some possible future time (in some loop);
Up is true n o w iff 415 is true n o w and at a ll possible future times
(throughout a ll loops). Actu a l time mig h t be specified in terms
of the loop one is 'n o w traversing' (minus the p o in t jo in in g its
'beginning' and 'end'). That is, actual time mig h t be conceived
as non-cyclical and linear. Consequently, the tru th o f Fp (wit h
axioms f o r the tense operator g i v e n f o r actual time ) need
not entail the truth of 1.1p, and the tru th of ,
the
- tru th of MFp (").
,
Arizona
F p n State e e Un
d ive rsity
n o Mt i c h a e l J. WHITE
e n t a i l

BIBLIOGRAPHY

[1] BULL, R. A., A n A lgebraic St udy o f Diodorean Mo d a l Systems, J o u r-


nal of Sy mbolic Logic (JSL), 30:1 (Marc h, 1965), 58-64.
[2] A No t e o n t h e Mo d a l Ca lc u li S4.2 a n d S4.3, Ze it s c h rill f a r
mathematische L o g ik u n d G rundlagen d e r Ma t h e ma t ik ( ZM L ) , 1 0
(1964), 53-55.
[3] COCCHIARELLA, N. B. Modalit y wit h in Tens e Logic (Abs trac t), JSL, 31:4
(December, 1966), 690-691.
[4] DUMMET, M. A. E., a n d LEMMON, E. J. Modal Logic s bet ween S4 and S5
ZML, 5 (1959), 250-264.
[5] HINTIKKA, J . Tim e a n d Nec es s ity : Studies i n Aris t ot le's Th e o ry o f M o -
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[6] HUGHES, G . E., a n d CRESSWELL, M . J. A n I nt roduc t ion t o M o d a l L o g ic
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[
8 phic a Fennic a: Mo d a l and Many -v alued Logic s (1963), 83-94.
]

S(
and-permanent-futurity
e 1 , pos s ibilit y as pres entnes s -or-futurity a n d o f L e m-
mon's
m 3 542 modific ation o f this model in P rior [13], pp. 27-28.
a )
n C
t f
i .
c t
a h
l e
Cd
o i
n s
A N S5 DI O DO RE A N M O DA L SYSTEM 4 8 7

[9] LEMMON, E. J. Algebraic Semantics f or Modal Logics I, JSL, 31:1 (Marc h,


1966), 46-65.
[101 PRIOR, A . N. Diodoran Modalit ies , Philos ophic al Q u a rt e rly (St . A n -
drews), 5:20 (J uly , 1955), 205-213.
[ I I ] T e n s e Logic a n d t h e Co n t in u it y o f Time, S t udia Logic a, 1 3
(1962), 133-148.
[12] T i m e and Modalit y (Ox ford, 1957).
[13] P a s t , Present and Fut ure (Ox ford, 1967).
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1971).
[15] SOBOCIiiSKI, B. Mo d a l Sy s t em S4.4, N o t r e Da me J o u rn a l o f Fo r m a l
Logic, 5:4 (October, 1964), 305-312.
[16] R e m a r k s a b o u t t h e Ax iomat iz at ions o f Ce rt a in M o d a l Sy s -
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