1 The Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution apportioned two

EN BANC legislative districts for the Province of Maguindanao. The first legislative
BAI SANDRA S. A. SEMA, G.R. No. 177597 district consists of Cotabato City and eight municipalities.[3] Maguindanao
Petitioner, - versus - forms part of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM), created
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS under its Organic Act, Republic Act No. 6734 (RA 6734), as amended by
and DIDAGEN P. DILANGALEN, Republic Act No. 9054 (RA 9054).[4] Although under the Ordinance,
Respondents. Cotabato City forms part of Maguindanaos first legislative district, it is not
x------------------------x part of the ARMM but of Region XII, having voted against its inclusion in the
PERFECTO F. MARQUEZ, G.R. No. 178628 ARMM in the plebiscite held in November 1989.
Petitioner,
Present: On 28 August 2006, the ARMMs legislature, the ARMM Regional
Assembly, exercising its power to create provinces under Section 19, Article
PUNO, C.J., VI of RA 9054,[5] enacted Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act No. 201 (MMA
QUISUMBING, Act 201) creating the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan composed of the eight
YNARES-SANTIAGO, municipalities in the first district of Maguindanao. MMA Act 201 provides:
CARPIO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, Section 1. The Municipalities of Barira, Buldon, Datu Odin Sinsuat,
CORONA, Kabuntalan, Matanog, Parang, Sultan Kudarat, Sultan Mastura, and Upi are
CARPIO MORALES, hereby separated from the Province of Maguindanao and constituted into a
- versus - AZCUNA, distinct and independent province, which is hereby created, to be known as
TINGA, the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan.
CHICO-NAZARIO,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA, xxxx
REYES,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, and Sec. 5. The corporate existence of this province shall commence upon the
BRION, JJ. appointment by the Regional Governor or election of the governor and
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Promulgated: majority of the regular members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan.
Respondent. July 16, 2008
The incumbent elective provincial officials of the Province of
Maguindanao shall continue to serve their unexpired terms in the province
DECISION that they will choose or where they are residents: Provided, that where an
CARPIO, J.: elective position in both provinces becomes vacant as a consequence of the
The Case creation of the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan, all incumbent elective
provincial officials shall have preference for appointment to a higher elective
vacant position and for the time being be appointed by the Regional
These consolidated petitions[1] seek to annul Resolution No. 7902, Governor, and shall hold office until their successors shall have been elected
dated 10 May 2007, of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) treating and qualified in the next local elections; Provided, further, that they shall
Cotabato City as part of the legislative district of the Province of Shariff continue to receive the salaries they are receiving at the time of the approval
Kabunsuan.[2] of this Act until the new readjustment of salaries in accordance with law.
Provided, furthermore, that there shall be no diminution in the number of the
The Facts members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the mother province.
 Except as may be provided by national law, the existing legislative
district, which includes Cotabato as a part thereof, shall remain.
Later, three new municipalities[6] were carved out of the original nine
municipalities constituting Shariff Kabunsuan, bringing its total number of
municipalities to 11. Thus, what was left of Maguindanao were the
municipalities constituting its second legislative district. Cotabato City,
although part of Maguindanaos first legislative district, is not part of the
Province of Maguindanao.
The voters of Maguindanao ratified Shariff Kabunsuans creation in a
plebiscite held on 29 October 2006.
On 6 February 2007, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cotabato City passed
Resolution No. 3999 requesting the COMELEC to clarify the status of
Cotabato City in view of the conversion of the First District of Maguindanao
into a regular province under MMA Act 201.
In answer to Cotabato Citys query, the COMELEC issued Resolution
No. 07-0407 on 6 March 2007 "maintaining the status quo with Cotabato City
as part of Shariff Kabunsuan in the First Legislative District of Maguindanao.
Resolution No. 07-0407, which adopted the recommendation of the
COMELECs Law Department under a Memorandum dated 27 February
2007,[7] provides in pertinent parts:
Considering the foregoing, the Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby
resolves, to adopt the recommendation of the Law Department that pending
the enactment of the appropriate law by Congress, to maintain the status
quo with Cotabato City as part of Shariff Kabunsuan in the First Legislative
District of Maguindanao. (Emphasis supplied)
However, in preparation for the 14 May 2007 elections, the COMELEC
promulgated on 29 March 2007 Resolution No. 7845 stating that
Maguindanaos first legislative district is composed only of Cotabato City
because of the enactment of MMA Act 201.[8]
On 10 May 2007, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 7902, subject
of these petitions, amending Resolution No. 07-0407 by renaming the
legislative district in question as Shariff Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato
City (formerly First District of Maguindanao with Cotabato City).[9]
In G.R. No. 177597, Sema, who was a candidate in the 14 May 2007
elections for Representative of Shariff Kabunsuan with Cotabato City,
prayed for the nullification of COMELEC Resolution No. 7902 and the
exclusion from canvassing of the votes cast in Cotabato City for that office.
Sema contended that Shariff Kabunsuan is entitled to one representative in
Congress under Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution[10] and Section
3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution.[11] Thus, Sema asserted
that the COMELEC acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction in issuing
Resolution No. 7902 which maintained the status quo in Maguindanaos first
legislative district despite the COMELECs earlier directive in Resolution No.
7845 designating Cotabato City as the lone component of Maguindanaos
reapportioned first legislative district.[12] Sema further claimed that in
issuing Resolution No. 7902, the COMELEC usurped Congress power to
create or reapportion legislative districts.
In its Comment, the COMELEC, through the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG), chose not to reach the merits of the case and merely
contended that (1) Sema wrongly availed of the writ of certiorari to nullify
COMELEC Resolution No. 7902 because the COMELEC issued the same in the
exercise of its administrative, not quasi-judicial, power and (2) Semas prayer
for the writ of prohibition in G.R. No. 177597 became moot with the
proclamation of respondent Didagen P. Dilangalen (respondent Dilangalen)
on 1 June 2007 as representative of the legislative district of Shariff
Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City.
In his Comment, respondent Dilangalen countered that Sema is
estopped from questioning COMELEC Resolution No. 7902 because in her
certificate of candidacy filed on 29 March 2007, Sema indicated that she was
seeking election as representative of Shariff Kabunsuan including Cotabato
City. Respondent Dilangalen added that COMELEC Resolution No. 7902 is
constitutional because it did not apportion a legislative district for Shariff
Kabunsuan or reapportion the legislative districts in Maguindanao but merely
renamed Maguindanaos first legislative district. Respondent Dilangalen
further claimed that the COMELEC could not reapportion Maguindanaos first
legislative district to make Cotabato City its sole component unit as the
power to reapportion legislative districts lies exclusively with Congress, not to
mention that Cotabato City does not meet the minimum population
requirement under Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution for the
creation of a legislative district within a city.[13]
Sema filed a Consolidated Reply controverting the matters raised in
respondents Comments and reiterating her claim that the COMELEC acted
ultra vires in issuing Resolution No. 7902.
In the Resolution of 4 September 2007, the Court required the parties in
G.R. No. 177597 to comment on the issue of whether a province created by
the ARMM Regional Assembly under Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 is
entitled to one representative in the House of Representatives without need
of a national law creating a legislative district for such new province. The
parties submitted their compliance as follows:
(1) Sema answered the issue in the affirmative on the following grounds: (a)
the Court in Felwa v. Salas[14] stated that when a province is created by
statute, the corresponding representative district comes into existence
neither by authority of that statute which cannot provide otherwise nor
by apportionment, but by operation of the Constitution, without a
reapportionment; (b) Section 462 of Republic Act No. 7160 (RA 7160)
affirms the apportionment of a legislative district incident to the creation of
a province; and (c) Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution and Section 3
of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution mandate the apportionment
of a legislative district in newly created provinces.
(2) The COMELEC, again represented by the OSG, apparently abandoned its
earlier stance on the propriety of issuing Resolution Nos. 07-0407 and 7902
and joined causes with Sema, contending that Section 5 (3), Article VI of the
Constitution is self-executing. Thus, every new province created by the
ARMM Regional Assembly is ipso facto entitled to one representative in the
House of Representatives even in the absence of a national law; and
(3) Respondent Dilangalen answered the issue in the negative on the
following grounds: (a) the province contemplated in Section 5 (3), Article
VI of the Constitution is one that is created by an act of Congress taking into
account the provisions in RA 7160 on the creation of provinces; (b) Section
3, Article IV of RA 9054 withheld from the ARMM Regional Assembly the
power to enact measures relating to national elections, which encompasses
the apportionment of legislative districts for members of the House of
Representatives; (c) recognizing a legislative district in every province the
ARMM Regional Assembly creates will lead to the disproportionate
representation of the ARMM in the House of Representatives as the Regional
Assembly can create provinces without regard to the requirements in Section
461 of RA 7160; and (d) Cotabato City, which has a population of less than
250,000, is not entitled to a representative in the House of Representatives.
On 27 November 2007, the Court heard the parties in G.R. No.
177597 in oral arguments on the following issues: (1) whether Section 19,
Article VI of RA 9054, delegating to the ARMM Regional Assembly the power
to create provinces, is constitutional; and (2) if in the affirmative, whether a
province created under Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 is entitled to one
representative in the House of Representatives without need of a national
law creating a legislative district for such new province.[15]
In compliance with the Resolution dated 27 November 2007, the parties in
G.R. No. 177597 filed their respective Memoranda on the issues raised in the
oral arguments.[16] On the question of the constitutionality of Section 19,
Article VI of RA 9054, the parties in G.R. No. 177597 adopted the following
positions:
(1) Sema contended that Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 is constitutional
(a) as a valid delegation by Congress to the ARMM of the power to create
provinces under Section 20 (9), Article X of the Constitution granting to the
autonomous regions, through their organic acts, legislative powers over
other matters as may be authorized by law for the promotion of the general
welfare of the people of the region and (b) as an amendment to Section 6
of RA 7160.[17] However, Sema concedes that, if taken literally, the grant in
Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 to the ARMM Regional Assembly of the
power to prescribe standards lower than those mandated in RA 7160 in the
creation of provinces contravenes Section 10, Article X of the
Constitution.[18] Thus, Sema proposed that Section 19 should be construed
as prohibiting the Regional Assembly from prescribing standards x x x that
do not comply with the minimum criteria under RA 7160.[19]
(2) Respondent Dilangalen contended that Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054
is unconstitutional on the following grounds: (a) the power to create
provinces was not among those granted to the autonomous regions under
Section 20, Article X of the Constitution and (b) the grant under Section 19,
Article VI of RA 9054 to the ARMM Regional Assembly of the power to
prescribe standards lower than those mandated in Section 461 of RA 7160
on the creation of provinces contravenes Section 10, Article X of the
Constitution and the Equal Protection Clause; and
(3) The COMELEC, through the OSG, joined causes with respondent
Dilangalen (thus effectively abandoning the position the COMELEC adopted
in its Compliance with the Resolution of 4 September 2007) and contended
that Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 is unconstitutional because (a) it
contravenes Section 10 and Section 6,[20] Article X of the Constitution and
(b) the power to create provinces was withheld from the autonomous
regions under Section 20, Article X of the Constitution.
On the question of whether a province created under Section 19, Article VI
of RA 9054 is entitled to one representative in the House of Representatives
without need of a national law creating a legislative district for such new
province, Sema and respondent Dilangalen reiterated in their Memoranda the
positions they adopted in their Compliance with the Resolution of 4
September 2007. The COMELEC deemed it unnecessary to submit its position
on this issue considering its stance that Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 is
unconstitutional.
The pendency of the petition in G.R. No. 178628 was disclosed during the
oral arguments on 27 November 2007. Thus, in the Resolution of 19
February 2008, the Court ordered G.R. No. 178628 consolidated with G.R.
No. 177597. The petition in G.R. No. 178628 echoed Sema's contention that
the COMELEC acted ultra vires in issuing Resolution No. 7902 depriving
the voters of Cotabato City of a representative in the House of
Representatives. In its Comment to the petition in G.R. No. 178628,
the COMELEC, through the OSG, maintained the validity of COMELEC
Resolution No. 7902 as a temporary measure pending the enactment by
Congress of the appropriate law.
The Issues
The petitions raise the following issues:
I. In G.R. No. 177597:
(A) Preliminarily
(1) whether the writs of Certiorari, Prohibition, and Mandamus are proper to
test the constitutionality of COMELEC Resolution No. 7902; and
(2) whether the proclamation of respondent Dilangalen as representative of
Shariff Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City mooted the petition in G.R.
No. 177597.
(B) On the merits
(1) whether Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, delegating to the ARMM
Regional Assembly the power to create provinces, cities, municipalities and
barangays, is constitutional; and
(2) if in the affirmative, whether a province created by the ARMM Regional
Assembly under MMA Act 201 pursuant to Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054
is entitled to one representative in the House of Representatives without
need of a national law creating a legislative district for such province.
II. In G.R No. 177597 and G.R No. 178628, whether COMELEC Resolution
No. 7902 is valid for maintaining the status quo in the first legislative district
of Maguindanao (as Shariff Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City
[formerly First District of Maguindanao with Cotabato City]), despite the
creation of the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan out of such district (excluding
Cotabato City).
The Ruling of the Court
The petitions have no merit. We rule that (1) Section 19, Article VI of
RA 9054 is unconstitutional insofar as it grants to the ARMM Regional
Assembly the power to create provinces and cities; (2) MMA Act 201 creating
the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan is void; and (3) COMELEC Resolution No.
7902 is valid.
On the Preliminary Matters
The Writ of Prohibition is Appropriate
to Test the Constitutionality of
Election Laws, Rules and Regulations
The purpose of the writ of Certiorari is to correct grave abuse of discretion
by any tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
functions.[21] On the other hand, the writ of Mandamus will issue to compel
a tribunal, corporation, board, officer, or person to perform an act which the
law specifically enjoins as a duty.[22] True, the COMELEC did not issue
Resolution No. 7902 in the exercise of its judicial or quasi-judicial
functions.[23] Nor is there a law which specifically enjoins the COMELEC to
exclude from canvassing the votes cast in Cotabato City for representative of
Shariff Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City. These, however, do not
justify the outright dismissal of the petition in G.R. No. 177597 because
Sema also prayed for the issuance of the writ of Prohibition and we have
long recognized this writ as proper for testing the constitutionality of election
laws, rules, and regulations.[24]
Respondent Dilangalens Proclamation
Does Not Moot the Petition
 There is also no merit in the claim that respondent Dilangalens
proclamation as winner in the 14 May 2007 elections for representative of
Shariff Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City mooted this petition. This
case does not concern respondent Dilangalens election. Rather, it involves
an inquiry into the validity of COMELEC Resolution No. 7902, as well as the
constitutionality of MMA Act 201 and Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054.
Admittedly, the outcome of this petition, one way or another, determines
whether the votes cast in Cotabato City for representative of the district of
Shariff Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City will be included in the
canvassing of ballots. However, this incidental consequence is no reason for
us not to proceed with the resolution of the novel issues raised here. The
Courts ruling in these petitions affects not only the recently concluded
elections but also all the other succeeding elections for the office in question,
as well as the power of the ARMM Regional Assembly to create in the future
additional provinces.
On the Main Issues
Whether the ARMM Regional Assembly
Can Create the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan
The creation of local government units is governed by Section 10,
Article X of the Constitution, which provides:
Sec. 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created,
divided, merged, abolished or its boundary substantially altered except in
accordance with the criteria established in the local government code and
subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the
political units directly affected.
Thus, the creation of any of the four local government units province, city,
municipality or barangay must comply with three conditions. First, the
creation of a local government unit must follow the criteria fixed in the Local
Government Code. Second, such creation must not conflict with any
provision of the Constitution. Third, there must be a plebiscite in the political
units affected.
There is neither an express prohibition nor an express grant of
authority in the Constitution for Congress to delegate to regional or local
legislative bodies the power to create local government units. However,
under its plenary legislative powers, Congress can delegate to local
legislative bodies the power to create local government units, subject to
reasonable standards and provided no conflict arises with any provision of
the Constitution. In fact, Congress has delegated to provincial boards, and
city and municipal councils, the power to create barangays within their
jurisdiction,[25] subject to compliance with the criteria established in the
Local Government Code, and the plebiscite requirement in Section 10, Article
X of the Constitution. However, under the Local Government Code, only x
x x an Act of Congress can create provinces, cities or municipalities.[26]
Under Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, Congress delegated to the
ARMM Regional Assembly the power to create provinces, cities, municipalities
and barangays within the ARMM. Congress made the delegation under its
plenary legislative powers because the power to create local government
units is not one of the express legislative powers granted by the Constitution
to regional legislative bodies.[27] In the present case, the question arises
whether the delegation to the ARMM Regional Assembly of the power to
create provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays conflicts with any
provision of the Constitution.
There is no provision in the Constitution that conflicts with the
delegation to regional legislative bodies of the power to create municipalities
and barangays, provided Section 10, Article X of the Constitution is followed.
However, the creation of provinces and cities is another matter. Section 5
(3), Article VI of the Constitution provides, Each city with a population of at
least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one
representative in the House of Representatives. Similarly, Section 3 of the
Ordinance appended to the Constitution provides, Any province that may
hereafter be created, or any city whose population may hereafter increase to
more than two hundred fifty thousand shall be entitled in the immediately
following election to at least one Member x x x.
Clearly, a province cannot be created without a legislative district because it
will violate Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution as well as Section 3 of
the Ordinance appended to the Constitution. For the same reason, a city
with a population of 250,000 or more cannot also be created without a
legislative district. Thus, the power to create a province, or a city with a
population of 250,000 or more, requires also the power to create a legislative
district. Even the creation of a city with a population of less than 250,000
involves the power to create a legislative district because once the citys
population reaches 250,000, the city automatically becomes entitled to one
representative under Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution and Section
3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution. Thus, the power to create
a province or city inherently involves the power to create a legislative district.

For Congress to delegate validly the power to create a province or city, it
must also validly delegate at the same time the power to create a legislative
district. The threshold issue then is, can Congress validly delegate to the
ARMM Regional Assembly the power to create legislative districts for the
House of Representatives? The answer is in the negative.
Legislative Districts are Created or Reapportioned
Only by an Act of Congress
Under the present Constitution, as well as in past[28] Constitutions, the
power to increase the allowable membership in the House of
Representatives, and to reapportion legislative districts, is vested exclusively
in Congress. Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution provides:
SECTION 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not
more than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law,
who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the
provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the
number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and
progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected
through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral
parties or organizations.
xxxx
(3) Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous,
compact, and adjacent territory. Each city with a population of at least two
hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one
representative.
(4) Within three years following the return of every census, the Congress
shall make a reapportionment of legislative districts based on the standards
provided in this section. (Emphasis supplied)
Section 5 (1), Article VI of the Constitution vests in Congress the power to
increase, through a law, the allowable membership in the House of
Representatives. Section 5 (4) empowers Congress to reapportion legislative
districts. The power to reapportion legislative districts necessarily includes
the power to create legislative districts out of existing ones. Congress
exercises these powers through a law that Congress itself enacts, and not
through a law that regional or local legislative bodies enact. The allowable
membership of the House of Representatives can be increased, and new
legislative districts of Congress can be created, only through a national law
passed by Congress. In Montejo v. COMELEC,[29] we held that the power
of redistricting x x x is traditionally regarded as part of the power (of
Congress) to make laws, and thus is vested exclusively in Congress.
This textual commitment to Congress of the exclusive power to create or
reapportion legislative districts is logical. Congress is a national legislature
and any increase in its allowable membership or in its incumbent
membership through the creation of legislative districts must be embodied in
a national law. Only Congress can enact such a law. It would be anomalous
for regional or local legislative bodies to create or reapportion legislative
districts for a national legislature like Congress. An inferior legislative body,
created by a superior legislative body, cannot change the membership of the
superior legislative body.
The creation of the ARMM, and the grant of legislative powers to its Regional
Assembly under its organic act, did not divest Congress of its exclusive
authority to create legislative districts. This is clear from the Constitution and
the ARMM Organic Act, as amended. Thus, Section 20, Article X of the
Constitution provides:
SECTION 20. Within its territorial jurisdiction and subject to the provisions of
this Constitution and national laws, the organic act of autonomous regions
shall provide for legislative powers over:
(1) Administrative organization;
(2) Creation of sources of revenues;
(3) Ancestral domain and natural resources;
(4) Personal, family, and property relations;
(5) Regional urban and rural planning development;
(6) Economic, social, and tourism development;
(7) Educational policies;
(8) Preservation and development of the cultural heritage; and
(9) Such other matters as may be authorized by law for the promotion
of the general welfare of the people of the region.
Nothing in Section 20, Article X of the Constitution authorizes autonomous
regions, expressly or impliedly, to create or reapportion legislative districts
for Congress.
On the other hand, Section 3, Article IV of RA 9054 amending the ARMM
Organic Act, provides, The Regional Assembly may exercise legislative
power x x x except on the following matters: x x x (k) National elections. x x
x. Since the ARMM Regional Assembly has no legislative power to enact
laws relating to national elections, it cannot create a legislative district whose
representative is elected in national elections. Whenever Congress enacts a
law creating a legislative district, the first representative is always elected in
the next national elections from the effectivity of the law.[30]
Indeed, the office of a legislative district representative to Congress is a
national office, and its occupant, a Member of the House of Representatives,
is a national official.[31] It would be incongruous for a regional legislative
body like the ARMM Regional Assembly to create a national office when its
legislative powers extend only to its regional territory. The office of a district
representative is maintained by national funds and the salary of its occupant
is paid out of national funds. It is a self-evident inherent limitation on the
legislative powers of every local or regional legislative body that it can only
create local or regional offices, respectively, and it can never create a
national office.
To allow the ARMM Regional Assembly to create a national office is to allow
its legislative powers to operate outside the ARMMs territorial jurisdiction.
This violates Section 20, Article X of the Constitution which expressly limits
the coverage of the Regional Assemblys legislative powers [w]ithin its
territorial jurisdiction x x x.
The ARMM Regional Assembly itself, in creating Shariff Kabunsuan,
recognized the exclusive nature of Congress power to create or reapportion
legislative districts by abstaining from creating a legislative district for Shariff
Kabunsuan. Section 5 of MMA Act 201 provides that:
Except as may be provided by national law, the existing legislative district,
which includes Cotabato City as a part thereof, shall remain. (Emphasis
supplied)
However, a province cannot legally be created without a legislative district
because the Constitution mandates that each province shall have at least
one representative. Thus, the creation of the Province of Shariff
Kabunsuan without a legislative district is unconstitutional.
Sema, petitioner in G.R. No. 177597, contends that Section 5 (3),
Article VI of the Constitution, which provides:
Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous,
compact, and adjacent territory. Each city with a population of at least two
hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one
representative. (Emphasis supplied)
and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution, which states:
Any province that may hereafter be created, or any city whose population
may hereafter increase to more than two hundred fifty thousand shall be
entitled in the immediately following election to at least one Member or such
number of Members as it may be entitled to on the basis of the number of its
inhabitants and according to the standards set forth in paragraph (3),
Section 5 of Article VI of the Constitution. The number of Members
apportioned to the province out of which such new province was created or
where the city, whose population has so increased, is geographically located
shall be correspondingly adjusted by the Commission on Elections but such
adjustment shall not be made within one hundred and twenty days before
the election. (Emphasis supplied)
serve as bases for the conclusion that the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan,
created on 29 October 2006, is automatically entitled to one member in the
House of Representatives in the 14 May 2007 elections. As further support
for her stance, petitioner invokes the statement in Felwa that when a
province is created by statute, the corresponding representative district
comes into existence neither by authority of that statute which cannot
provide otherwise nor by apportionment, but by operation of the
Constitution, without a reapportionment.
The contention has no merit.
First. The issue in Felwa, among others, was whether Republic Act
No. 4695 (RA 4695), creating the provinces of Benguet, Mountain Province,
Ifugao, and Kalinga-Apayao and providing for congressional representation in
the old and new provinces, was unconstitutional for creati[ng] congressional
districts without the apportionment provided in the Constitution. The Court
answered in the negative, thus:
The Constitution ordains:
The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than
one hundred and twenty Members who shall be apportioned among the
several provinces as nearly as may be according to the number of their
respective inhabitants, but each province shall have at least one Member.
The Congress shall by law make an apportionment within three years after
the return of every enumeration, and not otherwise. Until such
apportionment shall have been made, the House of Representatives shall
have the same number of Members as that fixed by law for the National
Assembly, who shall be elected by the qualified electors from the present
Assembly districts. Each representative district shall comprise as far as
practicable, contiguous and compact territory.
Pursuant to this Section, a representative district may come into
existence: (a) indirectly, through the creation of a province for each
province shall have at least one member in the House of Representatives;
or (b) by direct creation of several representative districts within a province.
The requirements concerning the apportionment of representative districts
and the territory thereof refer only to the second method of creation of
representative districts, and do not apply to those incidental to the creation
of provinces, under the first method. This is deducible, not only from the
general tenor of the provision above quoted, but, also, from the fact that the
apportionment therein alluded to refers to that which is made by an Act of
Congress. Indeed, when a province is created by statute, the corresponding
representative district, comes into existence neither by authority of that
statute which cannot provide otherwise nor by apportionment, but by
operation of the Constitution, without a reapportionment.
There is no constitutional limitation as to the time when, territory of,
or other conditions under which a province may be created, except, perhaps,
if the consequence thereof were to exceed the maximum of 120
representative districts prescribed in the Constitution, which is not the effect
of the legislation under consideration. As a matter of fact, provinces have
been created or subdivided into other provinces, with the consequent
creation of additional representative districts, without complying with the
aforementioned requirements.[32] (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, the Court sustained the constitutionality of RA 4695 because
(1) it validly created legislative districts indirectly through a special law
enacted by Congress creating a province and (2) the creation of the
legislative districts will not result in breaching the maximum number of
legislative districts provided under the 1935 Constitution. Felwa does not
apply to the present case because in Felwa the new provinces were created
by a national law enacted by Congress itself. Here, the new province was
created merely by a regional law enacted by the ARMM Regional Assembly.
What Felwa teaches is that the creation of a legislative district by Congress
does not emanate alone from Congress power to reapportion legislative
districts, but also from Congress power to create provinces which cannot be
created without a legislative district. Thus, when a province is created, a
legislative district is created by operation of the Constitution because the
Constitution provides that each province shall have at least one
representative in the House of Representatives. This does not detract from
the constitutional principle that the power to create legislative districts
belongs exclusively to Congress. It merely prevents any other legislative
body, except Congress, from creating provinces because for a legislative
body to create a province such legislative body must have the power to
create legislative districts. In short, only an act of Congress can trigger the
creation of a legislative district by operation of the Constitution. Thus, only
Congress has the power to create, or trigger the creation of, a legislative
district.
Moreover, if as Sema claims MMA Act 201 apportioned a legislative district to
Shariff Kabunsuan upon its creation, this will leave Cotabato City as the lone
component of the first legislative district of Maguindanao. However,
Cotabato City cannot constitute a legislative district by itself because as of
the census taken in 2000, it had a population of only 163,849. To constitute
Cotabato City alone as the surviving first legislative district of Maguindanao
will violate Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution which requires that
[E]ach city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand x x x,
shall have at least one representative.
Second. Semas theory also undermines the composition and independence
of the House of Representatives. Under Section 19,[33] Article VI of RA
9054, the ARMM Regional Assembly can create provinces and cities within
the ARMM with or without regard to the criteria fixed in Section 461 of RA
7160, namely: minimum annual income of P20,000,000, and minimum
contiguous territory of 2,000 square kilometers or minimum population of
250,000.[34] The following scenarios thus become distinct possibilities:
(1) An inferior legislative body like the ARMM Regional Assembly can create
100 or more provinces and thus increase the membership of a superior
legislative body, the House of Representatives, beyond the maximum
limit of 250 fixed in the Constitution (unless a national law provides
otherwise);
(2) The proportional representation in the House of Representatives based
on one representative for at least every 250,000 residents will be negated
because the ARMM Regional Assembly need not comply with the requirement
in Section 461(a)(ii) of RA 7160 that every province created must have a
population of at least 250,000; and
(3) Representatives from the ARMM provinces can become the majority in
the House of Representatives through the ARMM Regional Assemblys
continuous creation of provinces or cities within the ARMM.
The following exchange during the oral arguments of the petition in G.R. No.
177597 highlights the absurdity of Semas position that the ARMM Regional
Assembly can create provinces:
Justice Carpio:
So, you mean to say [a] Local Government can create legislative district[s]
and pack Congress with their own representatives [?]
Atty. Vistan II:[35]
Yes, Your Honor, because the Constitution allows that.
Justice Carpio:
So, [the] Regional Assembly of [the] ARMM can create and create x x x
provinces x x x and, therefore, they can have thirty-five (35) new
representatives in the House of Representatives without Congress agreeing
to it, is that what you are saying? That can be done, under your theory[?]
Atty. Vistan II:
Yes, Your Honor, under the correct factual circumstances.
Justice Carpio:
Under your theory, the ARMM legislature can create thirty-five (35) new
provinces, there may be x x x [only] one hundred thousand (100,000)
[population], x x x, and they will each have one representative x x x to
Congress without any national law, is that what you are saying?
Atty. Vistan II:
Without law passed by Congress, yes, Your Honor, that is what we are
saying.
xxxx
Justice Carpio:
So, they can also create one thousand (1000) new provinces, sen[d] one
thousand (1000) representatives to the House of Representatives without a
national law[,] that is legally possible, correct?
Atty. Vistan II:
Yes, Your Honor.[36] (Emphasis supplied)
Neither the framers of the 1987 Constitution in adopting the provisions in
Article X on regional autonomy,[37] nor Congress in enacting RA 9054,
envisioned or intended these disastrous consequences that certainly would
wreck the tri-branch system of government under our Constitution. Clearly,
the power to create or reapportion legislative districts cannot be delegated
by Congress but must be exercised by Congress itself. Even the ARMM
Regional Assembly recognizes this.
The Constitution empowered Congress to create or reapportion
legislative districts, not the regional assemblies. Section 3 of the Ordinance
to the Constitution which states, [A]ny province that may hereafter be
created x x x shall be entitled in the immediately following election to at least
one Member, refers to a province created by Congress itself through a
national law. The reason is that the creation of a province increases the
actual membership of the House of Representatives, an increase that only
Congress can decide. Incidentally, in the present 14th Congress, there are
219[38] district representatives out of the maximum 250 seats in the House
of Representatives. Since party-list members shall constitute 20 percent of
total membership of the House, there should at least be 50 party-list seats
available in every election in case 50 party-list candidates are proclaimed
winners. This leaves only 200 seats for district representatives, much less
than the 219 incumbent district representatives. Thus, there is a need now
for Congress to increase by law the allowable membership of the House,
even before Congress can create new provinces.
It is axiomatic that organic acts of autonomous regions cannot prevail
over the Constitution. Section 20, Article X of the Constitution expressly
provides that the legislative powers of regional assemblies are limited
[w]ithin its territorial jurisdiction and subject to the provisions of the
Constitution and national laws, x x x. The Preamble of the ARMM Organic
Act (RA 9054) itself states that the ARMM Government is established within
the framework of the Constitution. This follows Section 15, Article X of the
Constitution which mandates that the ARMM shall be created x x x within
the framework of this Constitution and the national sovereignty as well as
territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines.
The present case involves the creation of a local government unit that
necessarily involves also the creation of a legislative district. The Court will
not pass upon the constitutionality of the creation of municipalities and
barangays that does not comply with the criteria established in Section 461
of RA 7160, as mandated in Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, because
the creation of such municipalities and barangays does not involve the
creation of legislative districts. We leave the resolution of this issue to an
appropriate case. ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
In summary, we rule that Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, insofar as
it grants to the ARMM Regional Assembly the power to create provinces and WE CONCUR:
cities, is void for being contrary to Section 5 of Article VI and Section 20 of
Article X of the Constitution, as well as Section 3 of the Ordinance appended
to the Constitution. Only Congress can create provinces and cities because
the creation of provinces and cities necessarily includes the creation of
legislative districts, a power only Congress can exercise under Section 5,
Article VI of the Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the REYNATO S. PUNO
Constitution. The ARMM Regional Assembly cannot create a province Chief Justice
without a legislative district because the Constitution mandates that every
province shall have a legislative district. Moreover, the ARMM Regional
Assembly cannot enact a law creating a national office like the office of a
district representative of Congress because the legislative powers of the
ARMM Regional Assembly operate only within its territorial jurisdiction as
provided in Section 20, Article X of the Constitution. Thus, we rule that MMA LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Act 201, enacted by the ARMM Regional Assembly and creating the Province Associate Justice
of Shariff Kabunsuan, is void.

Resolution No. 7902 Complies with the Constitution

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Consequently, we hold that COMELEC Resolution No. 7902, preserving the Associate Justice
geographic and legislative district of the First District of Maguindanao with
Cotabato City, is valid as it merely complies with Section 5 of Article VI and
Section 20 of Article X of the Constitution, as well as Section 1 of the
Ordinance appended to the Constitution.
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
WHEREFORE, we declare Section 19, Article VI of Republic Act No. Associate Justice
9054 UNCONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it grants to the Regional Assembly of
the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao the power to create provinces
and cities. Thus, we declare VOID Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act No. 201 RENATO C. CORONA
creating the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan. Consequently, we rule that Associate Justice
COMELEC Resolution No. 7902 is VALID.

Let a copy of this ruling be served on the President of the Senate and the
Speaker of the House of Representatives.

SO ORDERED.
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice
ADOLFO S. AZCUNA
Associate Justice
DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice
RUBEN T. REYES
Associate Justice
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate Justice
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that
the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[1] In G.R. No. 177597, for the writs of certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus; in G.R. No. 178628, for declaratory relief and for the writs of
prohibition and mandamus.
[2] The petitioner in G.R. No. 177597, Bai Sandra S. A. Sema
(Sema), further seeks to compel the COMELEC to exclude from the
canvassing the votes cast in Cotabato City for representative of the
legislative district in question in the 14 May 2007 elections. On the other
hand, the petitioner in G.R. No. 178628, Perfecto Marquez, prays
that the Court order the COMELEC to conduct a special election
for representative of the First District of Maguindanao with Cotabato City.
[3] Barira, Buldon, Datu Odin Sinsuat, Kabuntalan, Matanog,
Parang, Sultan Kudarat, and Upi. The second legislative district is composed
of 19 municipalities (Talitay, Talayan, Guindulungan, Datu Saudi Ampatuan,
Datu Piang, Shariff Aguak, Datu Unsay, Mamasapano, South Upi, Ampatuan,
Datu Abdullah Sangki, Buluan, Datu Paglas, Gen, S.K. Pendatun, Sultan Sa
Barongis, Rajah Buayan, Pagalungan, Pagagawan and Paglat).
[4] The enactment of the organic acts for the autonomous regions
of the Cordilleras and Muslim Mindanao is mandated under Sections 18 and
19, Article X of the 1987 Constitution.
[5] The provision reads:
SECTION 19. Creation, Division or Abolition of Provinces, Cities,
Municipalities or Barangay. The Regional Assembly may create, divide,
merge, abolish, or substantially alter boundaries of provinces, cities,
municipalities, or barangay in accordance with the criteria laid down by
Republic Act No. 7160, the Local Government Code of 1991, subject to the
approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units
directly affected. The Regional Assembly may prescribe standards lower than
those mandated by Republic Act No. 7160, the Local Government Code of
1991, in the creation, division, merger, abolition, or alteration of the
boundaries of provinces, cities, municipalities, or barangay. Provinces, cities,
municipalities, or barangay created, divided, merged, or whose boundaries
are altered without observing the standards prescribed by Republic Act No.
7160, the Local Government Code of 1991, shall not be entitled to any share
of the taxes that are allotted to the local governments units under the
provisions of the Code.
The financial requirements of the provinces, cities, municipalities, or
barangay so created, divided, or merged shall be provided by the Regional
Assembly out of the general funds of the Regional Government.
The holding of a plebiscite to determine the will of the majority of the
voters of the areas affected by the creation, division, merger, or whose
boundaries are being altered as required by Republic Act No. 7160, the Local
Government Code of 1991, shall, however, be observed.
The Regional Assembly may also change the names of local government
units, public places and institutions, and declare regional holidays. (Emphasis
supplied)
Before the enactment of RA 9054, the power to create provinces,
cities, municipalities, and barangays was vested in Congress (for provinces,
cities and municipalities) and in the sangguniang panlalawigan and
sangguniang panlungsod (for barangays). (See Sections 384, 448, and 460
of Republic Act No. 7160 or the Local Government Code of 1991.)
[6] Sultan Mastura (created from Sultan Kudarat), Northern
Kabuntulan (created from Kabuntulan) and Datu Blah Sinsuat (created from
Upi).
[7] The Memorandum reads in pertinent parts:
The record shows the former province of Maguindanao was
divided into two new provinces (Shariff Kabunsuan and Maguindanao), in
view of Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act (MMAA) No. 201, which authority
was conferred to under Section 17, Article VI of Republic Act No. 9054 giving
the ARMM, thru its Regional Legislative Assembly, the power to legislate laws
including the enactment of the Local Government Code of ARMM.
The newly created province of Shariff Kabunsuan comprises the
municipalities of Barira, Buldon, Datu Odin Sinsuat, Kabuntalan, Matanog,
Parang, Sultan Kudarat, Sultan Mastura, Upi and Datu Blah, including
Cotabato City [which] belongs to the first district of Maguindanao province.
It must be emphasized that Cotabato City is not included as part
of ARMM although geographically located within the first district of the
former Maguindanao province. Cotabato City is not voting for provincial
officials. This is the reason why Cotabato City was not specifically mentioned
as part of the newly created province of Shariff Kabunsuan.
Geographically speaking since [sic] Cotabato City is located within
the newly created province of Shariff Kabunsuan having been bounded by
municipalities of Sultan Kudarat, Datu Odin Sinsuat and Kabuntalan as its
nearest neighbors. Following the rule in establishing legislative district, it
shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact and adjacent
territory.
However, legally speaking, it may arise question of legality [sic] if
Cotabato City will be appended as part of the newly created Shariff
Kabunsuan province. Under our Constitution [it is] only Congress that shall
make a reapportionment of legislative districts based on the standards
provided for under Section 5(1) of Article VI.
xxxx
In order to avoid controversy on the matter, pending the
enactment of appropriate law by Congress, it would be prudent and logically
feasible to maintain status quo with Cotabato City as part of Shariff
Kabunsuan in the first district of Maguindanao.
[8] Resolution No. 7845 pertinently provides:
WHEREAS, the Province of Maguindanao consists of two
legislative districts, with Cotabato City as part of the first legislative district.
WHEREAS, Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act No. 201 provided for
the creation of the new Province of Shariff Kabunsuan comprising the
municipalities of Barira, Buldon, Datu Odin Sinsuat, Kabuntalan, Matanog,
Parang, Sultan Kudarat, Sultan Mastura and Upi, all of the first legislative
district of the mother Province of Maguindanao, except Cotabato City which
is not part of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao; while the
remaining municipalities of Talisay, Talayan, Guindulungan, Datu Saudi
Ampatuan, Datu Piang, Shariff Aguak, Datu Unsay, Mamasapano, South Upi,
Ampatuan, Datu Abdullah Sangki, Buluan, Datu Paglas, Gen. S. K. Pendatun,
Sultan Sa Barongis, Rajah Buayan, Pagalungan, Pagagawan, and Paglat, all
of the second legislative district of the mother Province of Maguindanao,
shall remain with said province;
WHEREAS, the last paragraph of Section 5 of Muslim Mindanao
Autonomy (MMA) Act No. 201 provides that (e)xcept as may be provided by
national law, the existing legislative district, which includes Cotabato City as
a part thereof, shall remain.;
WHEREAS, by reason of said provision of MMA Act No. 201, the
first legislative district of the Province of Maguindanao is now made up of
Cotabato City only, and its second legislative district, the municipalities of
Talisay, Talayan, Guindulungan, Datu Saudi Ampatuan, Datu Piang, Shariff
Aguak, Datu Unsay, Mamasapano, South Upi, Ampatuan, Datu Abdullah
Sangki, Buluan, Datu Paglas, Gen. S. K. Pendatun, Sultan Sa Barongis, Rajah
Buayan, Pagalungan, Pagagawan, and Paglat[.] (Emphasis supplied)
In the earlier Resolution No. 7801, dated 11 January 2007, the
COMELEC allocated one legislative seat each for the provinces of
Maguindanao and Shariff Kabunsuan for the 14 May 2007 elections.
[9] Resolution No. 7902 reads in full:
This pertains to the amendment of Minute Resolution No. 07-
0407 dated March 6, 2007, entitled, IN THE MATTER OF THE
MEMORANDUM OF ATTY. WYNNE B. ASDALA, ACTING DIRECTOR III, LAW
DEPARTMENT, RELATIVE TO THE STUDY/RECOMMENDATION OF SAID
DEPARTMENT RE: CONVERSION OF THE FIRST DISTRICT OF
MAGUINDANAO INTO A REGULAR PROVINCE PER MINUTE RESOLUTION
NO. 07-0297 DATED FEBRUARY 20, 2007. The dispositive portion of which
reads:
Considering the foregoing, the Commission RESOLVED, as it
hereby RESOLVES, to adopt the recommendation of the Law Department
that pending the enactment of the appropriate law by Congress, to maintain
status quo with Cotabato City as part of Shariff Kabunsuan in the First
District of Maguindanao.
The Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, to amend
the pertinent portion of Minute Resolution No. 07-0407 to now read, as
follows[:]
[]Considering the foregoing, the Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby
RESOLVES, that the district shall be known as Shariff Kabunsuan Province
with Cotabato City (formerly First District of Maguindanao with Cotabato
City).
Let the Executive Director advise the Sangguniang Panlalawigan
of Cotabato City accordingly. (Emphasis in the original)
[10] Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable,
contiguous, compact, and adjacent territory. Each city with a population of at
least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one
representative.
[11] Any province that may hereafter be created, or any city whose
population may hereafter increase to more than two hundred fifty thousand
shall be entitled in the immediately following election to at least one Member
or such number of Members as it may be entitled to on the basis of the
number of its inhabitants and according to the standards set forth in
paragraph (3), Section 5 of Article VI of the Constitution. The number of
Members apportioned to the province out of which such new province was
created or where the city, whose population has so increased, is
geographically located shall be correspondingly adjusted by the Commission
on Elections but such adjustment shall not be made within one hundred and
twenty days before the election.
[12] Consistent with her claim that Cotabato City is not part of
Shariff Kabunsuans legislative district, petitioner filed with the COMELEC a
petition for the disqualification of respondent Dilangalen as candidate for
representative of that province (docketed as SPA No. A07-0).
[13] Respondent Dilangalen asserts, and petitioner does not dispute,
that as of 2000, Cotabato City had a population of 163,849, falling short of
the minimum population requirement in Section 5 (3), Article VI of the
Constitution which provides: Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as
practicable, contiguous, compact, and adjacent territory. Each city with a
population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall
have at least one representative. (Emphasis supplied)
[14] 124 Phil. 1226 (1966).
[15] As provided in the Resolution of 16 October 2007.
[16] The Court also required Sema to submit with her Memorandum
the certifications from the Department of Finance, the Lands Management
Bureau, the National Statistics Office, and the Department of Interior and
Local Government that at the time of the creation of Shariff Kabunsuan on
28 August 2006 it met the requisites for the creation of a province under
Section 461 of RA 7160.
[17] SEC. 6. Authority to Create Local Government Units. - A local
government unit may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its
boundaries substantially altered either by law enacted by Congress in the
case of a province, city or municipality, or any other political subdivision, or
by ordinance passed by the sangguniang panlalawigan or sangguniang
panlungsod concerned in the case of a barangay located within its territorial
jurisdiction, subject to such limitations and requirements prescribed in this
Code.
[18] SECTION 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may
be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered,
except in accordance with the criteria established in the Local Government
Code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in
the political units directly affected.
[19] Rollo, p. 229.
[20] SECTION 6. Local government units shall have a just share, as
determined by law, in the national taxes which shall be automatically
released to them.
[21] Section 1, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
[22] Section 3, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
[23] See, however, Macabago v. Commission on Elections (440 Phil.
683 [2002]) where the Court held that a petition for certiorari under Rule 65
will lie to question the constitutionality of an election regulation if the
COMELEC has acted capriciously or whimsically, with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
[24] Social Weather Stations, Inc. v. COMELEC, 409 Phil. 571
(2001); Mutuc v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. L-32717, 26 November
1970, 36 SCRA 228.
[25] Sections 385 and 386, RA 7160.
[26] Sections 441, 449 and 460, RA 7160.
[27] Section 20, Article X, Constitution.
[28] See Section 2, Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution and Section
5, Article VI of the 1935 Constitution.
[29] 312 Phil. 492, 501 (1995).
[30] Section 48 of Republic Act No. 8507 (Charter of Paraaque
City) provides:
Section 48. Legislative District. As a highly-urbanized city, the
City of Paraaque shall have its own legislative district with the first
representative to be elected in the next national election after the passage of
this Act. (Emphasis supplied)
Section 50 of Republic Act No. 7839 (Charter of City of Pasig)
provides:
Section 50. Legislative District. As highly urbanized, the City of
Pasig shall have its own legislative district with the first representative to be
elected in the next national elections after the passage of this Act. (Emphasis
supplied)
Section 58 of Republic Act No. RA 9230 provides:
Section 58. Representative District. The City of San Jose del
Monte shall have its own representative district to commence in the next
national election after the effectivity of this Act. (Emphasis supplied)
Section 7 of Republic Act No. 9355 provides:
Section 7. Legislative District. The Province of Dinagat Islands
shall constitute one, separate legislative district to commence in the next
national election after the effectivity of this Act. (Emphasis supplied)
[31] In his Concurring Opinion in Paras v. Commission on
Elections (332 Phil. 56, 66 [1996]), then Associate Justice (later Chief
Justice) Hilario G. Davide, Jr. stated:
The term regular local election must be confined to the regular
election of elective local officials, as distinguished from the regular election
of national officials. The elective national officials are the President, Vice-
President, Senators and Congressmen. The elective local officials are
Provincial Governors, Vice-Governors of provinces, Mayors and Vice-Mayors
of cities and municipalities, Members of the Sanggunians of provinces, cities
and municipalities, punong barangays and members of the sangguniang
barangays, and the elective regional officials of the Autonomous Region of
Muslim Mindanao. These are the only local elective officials deemed
recognized by Section 2(2) of Article IX-C of the Constitution, which
provides:
SEC. 2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise the following powers
and functions:
xxxx
(2) Exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests
relating to the elections, returns, and qualifications of all elective regional,
provincial, and city officials, and appellate jurisdiction over all contests
involving elective municipal officials decided by trial courts of general
jurisdiction, or involving elective barangay officials decided by trial courts of
limited jurisdiction. (Emphasis supplied)
[32] Supra note 13 at 1235-1236.
[33] See note 3.
[34] Section 461 provides: Requisites for Creation. (a) A
province may be created if it has an average annual income, as certified by
the Department of Finance, of not less than Twenty million pesos
(P20,000,000.00) based on 1991 constant prices and either of the following
requisites:
(i) a contiguous territory of at least two
thousand (2,000) square kilometers, as certified by the Lands
Management Bureau; or
(ii) a population of not less than two hundred fifty thousand
(250,000) inhabitants as certified by the National Statistics Office: Provided,
That, the creation thereof shall not reduce the land area, population, and
income of the original unit or units at the time of said creation to less than
the minimum requirements prescribed herein.
(b) The territory need not be contiguous if it
comprise two (2) or more islands or is separated by a chartered city
or cities which do not contribute to the income of the province.
(c) The average annual income shall include the
income accruing to the general fund, exclusive of special funds, trust
funds, transfers and non-recurring income.
[35] Atty. Edgardo Carlos B. Vistan II, counsel for petitioner in G.R.
No. 177597.
[36] TSN (27 November 2007), pp. 64-69.
[37] Unlike the 1935 and the 1973 Constitutions, the 1987
Constitution mandates, in Section 15, Article X, the creation of autonomous
regions in the Cordilleras and Muslim Mindanao to foster political autonomy.
See Cordillera Broad Coalition v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 79956, 29
January 1990, 181 SCRA 495.
[38] Website of House of Representatives as of 12 May 2008.
2
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-114783 December 8, 1994
ROBERT V. TOBIAS, RAMON M. GUZMAN, TERRY T. LIM, GREGORIO
D. GABRIEL, and ROBERTO R. TOBIAS, JR. petitioners,
vs.
HON. CITY MAYOR BENJAMIN S. ABALOS, CITY TREASURER
WILLIAM MARCELINO, and THE SANGGUNIANG PANLUNGSOD, all
of the City of Mandaluyong, Metro Manila, respondents.
Estrella, Bautista & Associates for petitioners.
BIDIN, J.:
Invoking their rights as taxpayers and as residents of Mandaluyong, herein
petitioners assail the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7675, otherwise
known as "An Act Converting the Municipality of Mandaluyong into a Highly
Urbanized City to be known as the City of Mandaluyong."
Prior to the enactment of the assailed statute, the municipalities of
Mandaluyong and San Juan belonged to only one legislative district. Hon.
Ronaldo Zamora, the incumbent congressional representative of this
legislative district, sponsored the bill which eventually became R.A. No. 7675.
President Ramos signed R.A. No. 7675 into law on February 9, 1994.
Pursuant to the Local Government Code of 1991, a plebiscite was held on
April 10, 1994. The people of Mandaluyong were asked whether they
approved of the conversion of the Municipality of Mandaluyong into a highly
urbanized city as provided under R.A. No. 7675. The turnout at the plebiscite
was only 14.41% of the voting population. Nevertheless, 18,621 voted "yes"
whereas 7,911 voted "no." By virtue of these results, R.A. No. 7675 was
deemed ratified and in effect.
Petitioners now come before this Court, contending that R.A. No. 7675,
specifically Article VIII, Section 49 thereof, is unconstitutional for being
violative of three specific provisions of the Constitution.
Article VIII, Section 49 of R.A. No. 7675 provides:
As a highly-urbanized city, the City of Mandaluyong shall have its own
legislative district with the first representative to be elected in the next
national elections after the passage of this Act. The remainder of the former
legislative district of San Juan/Mandaluyong shall become the new legislative
district of San Juan with its first representative to be elected at the same
election.
Petitioner's first objection to the aforequoted provision of R.A. No. 7675 is
that it contravenes the "one subject-one bill" rule, as enunciated in Article
VI, Section 26(1) of the Constitution, to wit:
Sec. 26(1). Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one
subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof.
Petitioners allege that the inclusion of the assailed Section 49 in the subject
law resulted in the latter embracing two principal subjects, namely: (1) the
conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city; and (2) the division
of the congressional district of San Juan/Mandaluyong into two separate
districts.
Petitioners contend that the second aforestated subject is not germane to
the subject matter of R.A. No. 7675 since the said law treats of the
conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city, as expressed in the
title of the law. Therefore, since Section 49 treats of a subject distinct from
that stated in the title of the law, the "one subject-one bill" rule has not been
complied with.
Petitioners' second and third objections involve Article VI, Sections 5(1) and
(4) of the Constitution, which provide, to wit:
Sec. 5(1). The House of Representatives shall be composed of not
more than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law,
who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the
provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the
number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and
progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected
through a party list system of registered national, regional and sectoral
parties or organizations.

Sec. 5(4). Within three years following the return of every census, the
Congress shall make a reapportionment of legislative districts based on the
standard provided in this section.
Petitioners argue that the division of San Juan and Mandaluyong into
separate congressional districts under Section 49 of the assailed law has
resulted in an increase in the composition of the House of Representatives
beyond that provided in Article VI, Sec. 5(1) of the Constitution.
Furthermore, petitioners contend that said division was not made pursuant
to any census showing that the subject municipalities have attained the
minimum population requirements. And finally, petitioners assert that Section
49 has the effect of preempting the right of Congress to reapportion
legislative districts pursuant to Sec. 5(4) as aforecited.
The contentions are devoid of merit.
Anent the first issue, we agree with the observation of the Solicitor General
that the statutory conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city
with a population of not less than two hundred fifty thousand indubitably
ordains compliance with the "one city-one representative" proviso in the
Constitution:
. . . Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or
each province, shall have at least one representative" (Article VI, Section
5(3), Constitution).
Hence, it is in compliance with the aforestated constitutional mandate that
the creation of a separate congressional district for the City of Mandaluyong
is decreed under Article VIII, Section 49 of R.A. No. 7675.
Contrary to petitioners' assertion, the creation of a separate congressional
district for Mandaluyong is not a subject separate and distinct from the
subject of its conversion into a highly urbanized city but is a natural and
logical consequence of its conversion into a highly urbanized city. Verily, the
title of R.A. No. 7675, "An Act Converting the Municipality of Mandaluyong
Into a Highly Urbanized City of Mandaluyong" necessarily includes and
contemplates the subject treated under Section 49 regarding the creation of
a separate congressional district for Mandaluyong.
Moreover, a liberal construction of the "one title-one subject" rule has been
invariably adopted by this court so as not to cripple or impede legislation.
Thus, in Sumulong v. Comelec (73 Phil. 288 [1941]), we ruled that the
constitutional requirement as now expressed in Article VI, Section 26(1)
"should be given a practical rather than a technical construction. It should be
sufficient compliance with such requirement if the title expresses the general
subject and all the provisions are germane to that general subject."
The liberal construction of the "one title-one subject" rule had been further
elucidated in Lidasan v. Comelec (21 SCRA 496 [1967]), to wit:
Of course, the Constitution does not require Congress to employ in the title
of an enactment, language of such precision as to mirror, fully index or
catalogue all the contents and the minute details therein. It suffices if the
title should serve the purpose of the constitutional demand that it inform the
legislators, the persons interested in the subject of the bill and the public, of
the nature, scope and consequences of the proposed law and its operation"
(emphasis supplied).
Proceeding now to the other constitutional issues raised by petitioners to the
effect that there is no mention in the assailed law of any census to show that
Mandaluyong and San Juan had each attained the minimum requirement of
250,000 inhabitants to justify their separation into two legislative districts,
the same does not suffice to strike down the validity of R.A. No. 7675. The
said Act enjoys the presumption of having passed through the regular
congressional processes, including due consideration by the members of
Congress of the minimum requirements for the establishment of separate
legislative districts. At any rate, it is not required that all laws emanating
from the legislature must contain all relevant data considered by Congress in
the enactment of said laws.
As to the contention that the assailed law violates the present limit on the
number of representatives as set forth in the Constitution, a reading of the
applicable provision, Article VI, Section 5(1), as aforequoted, shows that the
present limit of 250 members is not absolute. The Constitution clearly
provides that the House of Representatives shall be composed of not more
than 250 members, "unless otherwise provided by law." The inescapable
import of the latter clause is that the present composition of Congress may
be increased, if Congress itself so mandates through a legislative enactment.
Therefore, the increase in congressional representation mandated by R.A.
No. 7675 is not unconstitutional.
Thus, in the absence of proof that Mandaluyong and San Juan do not qualify
to have separate legislative districts, the assailed Section 49 of R.A.
No. 7675 must be allowed to stand.
As to the contention that Section 49 of R.A. No. 7675 in effect preempts the
right of Congress to reapportion legislative districts, the said argument
borders on the absurd since petitioners overlook the glaring fact that it was
Congress itself which drafted, deliberated upon and enacted the assailed
law, including Section 49 thereof. Congress cannot possibly preempt itself on
a right which pertains to itself.

Aside from the constitutional objections to R.A. No. 7675, petitioners present
further arguments against the validity thereof.

Petitioners contend that the people of San Juan should have been made to
participate in the plebiscite on R.A. No. 7675 as the same involved a change
in their legislative district. The contention is bereft of merit since the
principal subject involved in the plebiscite was the conversion of
Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city. The matter of separate district
representation was only ancillary thereto. Thus, the inhabitants of San Juan
were properly excluded from the said plebiscite as they had nothing to do
with the change of status of neighboring Mandaluyong.

Similarly, petitioners' additional argument that the subject law has resulted in
"gerrymandering," which is the practice of creating legislative districts to
favor a particular candidate or party, is not worthy of credence. As correctly
observed by the Solicitor General, it should be noted that Rep. Ronaldo
Zamora, the author of the assailed law, is the incumbent representative of
the former San Juan/Mandaluyong district, having consistently won in both
localities. By dividing San Juan/Mandaluyong, Rep. Zamora's constituency
has in fact been diminished, which development could hardly be considered
as favorable to him.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo,

Quiason, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

Feliciano, J., is on leave.

3
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 118577 March 7, 1995
JUANITO MARIANO, JR. et al., petitioners,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, THE MUNICIPALITY OF MAKATI,
HON. JEJOMAR BINAY, THE MUNICIPAL TREASURER, AND
SANGGUNIANG BAYAN OF MAKATI, respondents.
G.R. No. 118627 March 7, 1995
JOHN R. OSMEA, petitioner,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, THE MUNICIPALITY OF MAKATI, HON.
JEJOMAR BINAY, MUNICIPAL TREASURER, AND SANGGUNIANG BAYAN OF
MAKATI, respondents.
PUNO, J.:
At bench are two (2) petitions assailing certain provisions of Republic Act No.
7854 as unconstitutional. R.A. No. 7854 as unconstitutional. R.A. No. 7854 is
entitled, "An Act Converting the Municipality of Makati Into a Highly
Urbanized City to be known as the City of Makati." 1
G.R. No. 118577 involves a petition for prohibition and declaratory relief. It
was filed by petitioners Juanito Mariano, Jr., Ligaya S. Bautista, Teresita
Tibay, Camilo Santos, Frankie Cruz, Ricardo Pascual, Teresita Abang,
Valentina Pitalvero, Rufino Caldoza, Florante Alba, and Perfecto Alba. Of the
petitioners, only Mariano, Jr., is a resident of Makati. The others are
residents of Ibayo Ususan, Taguig, Metro Manila. Suing as taxpayers, they
assail as unconstitutional sections 2, 51, and 52 of R.A. No. 7854 on the
following grounds:
1. Section 2 of R.A. No. 7854 did not properly identify the land area or
territorial jurisdiction of Makati by metes and bounds, with technical
descriptions, in violation of Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, in
relation to Sections 7 and 450 of the Local Government Code;
2. Section 51 of R.A. No. 7854 attempts to alter or restart the "three
consecutive term" limit for local elective officials, in violation of Section 8,
Article X and Section 7, Article VI of the Constitution.
3. Section 52 of R.A. No. 7854 is unconstitutional for:
(a) it increased the legislative district of Makati only by special law (the
Charter in violation of the constitutional provision requiring a general
reapportionment law to be passed by Congress within three (3) years
following the return of every census;
(b) the increase in legislative district was not expressed in the title of the
bill; and
(c) the addition of another legislative district in Makati is not in accord
with Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution for as of the latest survey
(1990 census), the population of Makati stands at only 450,000.
G.R. No. 118627 was filed by the petitioner John H. Osmea as senator,
taxpayer, and concerned citizen. Petitioner assails section 52 of R.A. No.
7854 as unconstitutional on the same grounds as aforestated.
We find no merit in the petitions.
I
Section 2, Article I of R.A. No. 7854 delineated the land areas of the
proposed city of Makati, thus:
Sec. 2. The City of Makati. The Municipality of Makati shall be converted
into a highly urbanized city to be known as the City of Makati, hereinafter
referred to as the City, which shall comprise the present territory of the
Municipality of Makati in Metropolitan Manila Area over which it has
jurisdiction bounded on the northeast by Pasig River and beyond by the City
of Mandaluyong and the Municipality of Pasig; on the southeast by the
municipalities of Pateros and Taguig; on the southwest by the City of Pasay
and the Municipality of Taguig; and, on the northwest, by the City of Manila.
The foregoing provision shall be without prejudice to the resolution by the
appropriate agency or forum of existing boundary disputes or cases involving
questions of territorial jurisdiction between the City of Makati and the
adjoining local government units. (Emphasis supplied)
In G.R. No. 118577, petitioners claim that this delineation violates sections 7
and 450 of the Local Government Code which require that the area of a local
government unit should be made by metes and bounds with technical
descriptions. 2
The importance of drawing with precise strokes the territorial boundaries of
a local unit of government cannot be overemphasized. The boundaries must
be clear for they define the limits of the territorial jurisdiction of a local
government unit. It can legitimately exercise powers of government only
within the limits, its acts are ultra vires. Needless to state, any uncertainty in
the boundaries of local government units will sow costly conflicts in the
exercise of governmental powers which ultimately will prejudice the people's
welfare. This is the evil sought to avoided by the Local Government Code in
requiring that the land area of a local government unit must be spelled out in
metes and bounds, with technical descriptions.
Given the facts of the cases at bench, we cannot perceive how this evil can
be brought about by the description made in section 2 of R.A. No. 7854,
Petitioners have not demonstrated that the delineation of the land area of
the proposed City of Makati will cause confusion as to its boundaries. We
note that said delineation did not change even by an inch the land area
previously covered by Makati as a municipality. Section 2 did not add,
subtract, divide, or multiply the established land area of Makati. In language
that cannot be any clearer, section 2 stated that, the city's land area "shall
comprise the present territory of the municipality."
The deliberations of Congress will reveal that there is a legitimate reason
why the land area of the proposed City of Makati was not defined by metes
and bounds, with technical descriptions. At the time of the consideration of
R.A. No. 7854, the territorial dispute between the municipalities of Makati
and Taguig over Fort Bonifacio was under court litigation. Out of a becoming
sense of respect to co-equal department of government, legislators felt that
the dispute should be left to the courts to decide. They did not want to
foreclose the dispute by making a legislative finding of fact which could
decide the issue. This would have ensued if they defined the land area of the
proposed city by its exact metes and bounds, with technical descriptions. 3
We take judicial notice of the fact that Congress has also refrained from
using the metes and bounds description of land areas of other local
government units with unsettled boundary disputes. 4
We hold that the existence of a boundary dispute does not per se present an
insurmountable difficulty which will prevent Congress from defining with
reasonable certitude the territorial jurisdiction of a local government unit. In
the cases at bench, Congress maintained the existing boundaries of the
proposed City of Makati but as an act of fairness, made them subject to the
ultimate resolution by the courts. Considering these peculiar circumstances,
we are not prepared to hold that section 2 of R.A. No. 7854 is
unconstitutional. We sustain the submission of the Solicitor General in this
regard, viz.:
Going now to Sections 7 and 450 of the Local Government Code, it is beyond
cavil that the requirement stated therein, viz.: "the territorial jurisdiction of
newly created or converted cities should be described by meted and bounds,
with technical descriptions" was made in order to provide a means by
which the area of said cities may be reasonably ascertained. In other words,
the requirement on metes and bounds was meant merely as tool in the
establishment of local government units. It is not an end in itself. Ergo, so
long as the territorial jurisdiction of a city may be reasonably ascertained,
i.e., by referring to common boundaries with neighboring municipalities, as
in this case, then, it may be concluded that the legislative intent behind the
law has been sufficiently served.
Certainly, Congress did not intends that laws creating new cities must
contain therein detailed technical descriptions similar to those appearing in
Torrens titles, as petitioners seem to imply. To require such description in
the law as a condition sine qua non for its validity would be to defeat the
very purpose which the Local Government Code to seeks to serve. The
manifest intent of the Code is to empower local government units and to
give them their rightful due. It seeks to make local governments more
responsive to the needs of their constituents while at the same time serving
as a vital cog in national development. To invalidate R.A. No. 7854 on the
mere ground that no cadastral type of description was used in the law would
serve the letter but defeat the spirit of the Code. It then becomes a case of
the master serving the slave, instead of the other way around. This could not
be the intendment of the law.
Too well settled is the rule that laws must be enforced when ascertained,
although it may not be consistent with the strict letter of the statute. Courts
will not follow the letter of the statute when to do so would depart from the
true intent of the legislature or would otherwise yield conclusions
inconsistent with the general purpose of the act. (Torres v. Limjap, 56 Phil.,
141; Taada v. Cuenco, 103 Phil. 1051; Hidalgo v. Hidalgo, 33 SCRA 1105).
Legislation is an active instrument of government, which, for purposes of
interpretation, means that laws have ends to achieve, and statutes should be
so construed as not to defeat but to carry out such ends and purposes
(Bocolbo v. Estanislao, 72 SCRA 520). The same rule must indubitably apply
to the case at bar.
II
Petitioners in G.R. No. 118577 also assail the constitutionality of section 51,
Article X of R.A. No. 7854. Section 51 states:
Sec. 51. Officials of the City of Makati. The represent elective officials of
the Municipality of Makati shall continue as the officials of the City of Makati
and shall exercise their powers and functions until such time that a new
election is held and the duly elected officials shall have already qualified and
assume their offices: Provided, The new city will acquire a new corporate
existence. The appointive officials and employees of the City shall likewise
continues exercising their functions and duties and they shall be
automatically absorbed by the city government of the City of Makati.
They contend that this section collides with section 8, Article X and section 7,
Article VI of the Constitution which provide:
Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials,
which shall be determined by law, shall be three years and no such official
shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of
the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in
the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 7. The Members of the House of Representatives shall be elected for a
term of three years which shall begin, unless otherwise provided by law, at
noon on the thirtieth day of June next following their election.
No Member of the House of Representatives shall serve for more than three
consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time
shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for
the full term for which he was elected.
Petitioners stress that under these provisions, elective local officials,
including Members of the House of Representative, have a term of three (3)
years and are prohibited from serving for more than three (3) consecutive
terms. They argue that by providing that the new city shall acquire a new
corporate existence, section 51 of R.A. No. 7854 restarts the term of the
present municipal elective officials of Makati and disregards the terms
previously served by them. In particular, petitioners point that section 51
favors the incumbent Makati Mayor, respondent Jejomar Binay, who has
already served for two (2) consecutive terms. They further argue that should
Mayor Binay decide to run and eventually win as city mayor in the coming
elections, he can still run for the same position in 1998 and seek another
three-year consecutive term since his previous three-year consecutive term
as municipal mayor would not be counted. Thus, petitioners conclude that
said section 51 has been conveniently crafted to suit the political ambitions
of respondent Mayor Binay.
We cannot entertain this challenge to the constitutionality of section 51. The
requirements before a litigant can challenge the constitutionality of a law are
well delineated. They are: 1) there must be an actual case or controversy;
(2) the question of constitutionality must be raised by the proper party; (3)
the constitutional question must be raised at the earliest possible
opportunity; and (4) the decision on the constitutional question must be
necessary to the determination of the case itself. 5
Petitioners have far from complied with these requirements. The petition is
premised on the occurrence of many contingent events, i.e., that Mayor
Binay will run again in this coming mayoralty elections; that he would be re-
elected in said elections; and that he would seek re-election for the same
position in the 1998 elections. Considering that these contingencies may or
may not happen, petitioners merely pose a hypothetical issue which has yet
to ripen to an actual case or controversy. Petitioners who are residents of
Taguig (except Mariano) are not also the proper parties to raise this abstract
issue. Worse, they hoist this futuristic issue in a petition for declaratory relief
over which this Court has no jurisdiction.
III
Finally, petitioners in the two (2) cases at bench assail the constitutionality of
section 52, Article X of R.A. No. 7854. Section 52 of the Charter provides:
Sec. 52. Legislative Districts. Upon its conversion into a highly-urbanized
city, Makati shall thereafter have at least two (2) legislative districts that
shall initially correspond to the two (2) existing districts created under
Section 3(a) of Republic Act. No. 7166 as implemented by the Commission
on Elections to commence at the next national elections to be held after the
effectivity of this Act. Henceforth, barangays Magallanes, Dasmarias and
Forbes shall be with the first district, in lieu of Barangay Guadalupe-Viejo
which shall form part of the second district. (emphasis supplied)
They contend. that the addition of another legislative district in Makati is
unconstitutional for: (1) reapportionment 6 cannot made by a special law,
(2) the addition of a legislative district is not expressed in the title of the bill
7 and (3) Makati's population, as per the 1990 census, stands at only four
hundred fifty thousand (450,000).
These issues have been laid to rest in the recent case of Tobias v. Abalos. 8
In said case, we ruled that reapportionment of legislative districts may be
made through a special law, such as in the charter of a new city. The
Constitution 9 clearly provides that Congress shall be composed of not more
than two hundred fifty (250) members, unless otherwise fixed by law. As
thus worded, the Constitution did not preclude Congress from increasing its
membership by passing a law, other than a general reapportionment of the
law. This is its exactly what was done by Congress in enacting R.A. No. 7854
and providing for an increase in Makati's legislative district. Moreover, to hold
that reapportionment can only be made through a general apportionment
law, with a review of all the legislative districts allotted to each local
government unit nationwide, would create an inequitable situation where a
new city or province created by Congress will be denied legislative
representation for an indeterminate period of time. 10 The intolerable
situations will deprive the people of a new city or province a particle of their
sovereignty. 11 Sovereignty cannot admit of any kind of subtraction. It is
indivisible. It must be forever whole or it is not sovereignty.
Petitioners cannot insist that the addition of another legislative district in
Makati is not in accord with section 5(3), Article VI 12 of the Constitution for
as of the latest survey (1990 census), the population of Makati stands at only
four hundred fifty thousand (450,000). 13 Said section provides, inter alia,
that a city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand (250,000)
shall have at least one representative. Even granting that the population of
Makati as of the 1990 census stood at four hundred fifty thousand
(450,000), its legislative district may still be increased since it has met the
minimum population requirement of two hundred fifty thousand (250,000).
In fact, section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution provides
that a city whose population has increased to more than two hundred fifty
thousand (250,000) shall be entitled to at least one congressional
representative. 14
Finally, we do not find merit in petitioners' contention that the creation of an
additional legislative district in Makati should have been expressly stated in
the title of the bill. In the same case of Tobias v. Abalos, op cit., we
reiterated the policy of the Court favoring a liberal construction of the "one
title-one subject" rule so as not to impede legislation. To be sure, with
Constitution does not command that the title of a law should exactly mirror,
fully index, or completely catalogue all its details. Hence, we ruled that "it
should be sufficient compliance if the title expresses the general subject and
all the provisions are germane to such general subject."
WHEREFORE, the petitions are hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Regalado, Romero, Bellosillo, Melo,
Quiason, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza and Francisco, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
DAVIDE, JR., J., concurring:
I concur in the well written opinion of Mr. Justice Reynato S. Puno. I wish,
however, to add a few observations.
I.
Section 10, Article X of the Constitution provides that "[n]o province, city,
municipality or barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its
boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria
established in the local government code and subject to the approval by a
majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly
affected." These criteria are now set forth in Section 7 of the Local
Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160). One of these is that the
territorial jurisdiction of the local government unit to be created or converted
should be properly identified by metes and bounds with technical
descriptions.
The omission of R.A. No. 7854 (An Act Converting the Municipality of Makati
Into a Highly Urbanized City to be Known as the City of Makati) to describe
the territorial boundaries of the city by metes and bounds does not make
R.A. No. 7854 unconstitutional or illegal. The Constitution does not provide
for a description by metes and bounds as a condition sine qua non for the
creation of a local government unit or its conversion from one level to
another. The criteria provided for in Section 7 of R.A. No. 7854 are not
absolute, for, as a matter of fact, the section starts with the clause "as a
general rule." The petitioners' reliance on Section 450 of R.A. No. 7160 is
unavailing Said section only applies to the conversion of a municipality or a
cluster of barangays into a COMPONENT CITY, not a highly urbanized city. It
pertinently reads as follows:
Sec. 450. Requisite for creation. (a) A municipality or a cluster of
barangays may be converted into a component city if it has an average
annual income, as certified by the Department of Finance, of at least Twenty
million pesos (P20,000,000.00) for the last two (2) consecutive years based
on 1991 constant prices, and if it has either of the following requisites:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) The territorial jurisdiction of a newly created city shall be properly
identified by metes and bounds. . . .
The constitution classifies cities as either highly urbanized or component.
Section 12 of Article X thereof provides:
Sec. 12. Cities that are highly urbanized, as determined by law, and
component cities whose charters prohibit their voters from voting for
provincial elective officials, shall be independent of the province. The voters
of component cities within a province, whose charters contain no such
prohibition, shall not be deprived of their right to vote for elective provincial
officials.
And Section 451 of R.A. No. 7160 provides:
Sec. 451. Cities Classified. A city may either be component or highly
urbanized: Provided, however, That the criteria established in this Code shall
not affect the classification and corporate status of existing cities.
Independent component cities are those component cities whose charters
prohibit their voters from voting for provincial elective officials. Independent
component cities shall be independent of the province.
II.
Strictly speaking, the increase in the number of legislative seats for the City
of Makati provided for in R.A. No. 7854 is not an increase justified by the
clause unless otherwise fixed by law in paragraph 1, Section 5, Article VI of
the Constitution. That clause contemplates of the reapportionment
mentioned in the succeeding paragraph (4) of the said Section which reads
in full as follows:
Within three years following the return of every census, the Congress shall
make a reapportionment of legislative districts based on the standards
provided in this section.
In short, the clause refers to a general reapportionment law.
The increase under R.A. No. 7854 is a permissible increase under Sections 1
and 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution which reads:
Sec. 1. For purposes of the election of Members of the House of
Representatives of the First Congress of the Philippines under the
Constitution proposed by the 1986 Constitutional Commission and
subsequent elections, and until otherwise provided by law, the Members
thereof shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the
provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila Area as follows:
METROPOLITAN MANILA AREA
xxx xxx xxx
MAKATI one (1)
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 3. Any province that may hereafter be created, or any city whose
population may hereafter increase to more than two hundred fifty thousand
shall be entitled in the immediately following election to at least one Member
or such number of Members as it may be entitled to on the basis of the
number of its inhabitants and according to the standards set forth in
paragraph (3), Section 5 of Article VI of the Constitution. The number of
Members apportioned to the province out of which such new province was
created, or where the city, whose population has so increased, is
geographically located shall be correspondingly adjusted by the Commission
on Elections but such adjustment shall not be made within one hundred and
twenty days before the election. (Emphases supplied)
Separate Opinions
DAVIDE, JR., J., concurring:
I concur in the well written opinion of Mr. Justice Reynato S. Puno. I wish,
however, to add a few observations.
I.
Section 10, Article X of the Constitution provides that "[n]o province, city,
municipality or barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its
boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria
established in the local government code and subject to the approval by a
majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly
affected." These criteria are now set forth in Section 7 of the Local
Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160). One of these is that the
territorial jurisdiction of the local government unit to be created or converted
should be properly identified by metes and bounds with technical
descriptions.
The omission of R.A. No. 7854 (An Act Converting the Municipality of Makati
Into a Highly Urbanized City to be Known as the City of Makati) to describe
the territorial boundaries of the city by metes and bounds does not make
R.A. No. 7854 unconstitutional or illegal. The Constitution does not provide
for a description by metes and bounds as a condition sine qua non for the
creation of a local government unit or its conversion from one level to
another. The criteria provided for in Section 7 of R.A. No. 7854 are not
absolute, for, as a matter of fact, the section starts with the clause "as a
general rule." The petitioners' reliance on Section 450 of R.A. No. 7160 is
unavailing Said section only applies to the conversion of a municipality or a
cluster of barangays into a COMPONENT CITY, not a highly urbanized city. It
pertinently reads as follows:
Sec. 450. Requisite for creation. (a) A municipality or a cluster of
barangays may be converted into a component city if it has an average
annual income, as certified by the Department of Finance, of at least Twenty
million pesos (P20,000,000.00) for the last two (2) consecutive years based
on 1991 constant prices, and if it has either of the following requisites:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) The territorial jurisdiction of a newly created city shall be properly
identified by metes and bounds. . . .
The constitution classifies cities as either highly urbanized or component.
Section 12 of Article X thereof provides:
Sec. 12. Cities that are highly urbanized, as determined by law, and
component cities whose charters prohibit their voters from voting for
provincial elective officials, shall be independent of the province. The voters
of component cities within a province, whose charters contain no such
prohibition, shall not be deprived of their right to vote for elective provincial
officials.
And Section 451 of R.A. No. 7160 provides:
Sec. 451. Cities Classified. A city may either be component or highly
urbanized: Provided, however, That the criteria established in this Code shall
not affect the classification and corporate status of existing cities.
Independent component cities are those component cities whose charters
prohibit their voters from voting for provincial elective officials. Independent
component cities shall be independent of the province.
II.
Strictly speaking, the increase in the number of legislative seats for the City
of Makati provided for in R.A. No. 7854 is not an increase justified by the
clause unless otherwise fixed by law in paragraph 1, Section 5, Article VI of
the Constitution. That clause contemplates of the reapportionment
mentioned in the succeeding paragraph (4) of the said Section which reads
in full as follows:
Within three years following the return of every census, the Congress shall
make a reapportionment of legislative districts based on the standards
provided in this section.
In short, the clause refers to a general reapportionment law.
The increase under R.A. No. 7854 is a permissible increase under Sections 1
and 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution which reads:
Sec. 1. For purposes of the election of Members of the House of
Representatives of the First Congress of the Philippines under the
Constitution proposed by the 1986 Constitutional Commission and
subsequent elections, and until otherwise provided by law, the Members
thereof shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the
provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila Area as follows:
METROPOLITAN MANILA AREA
xxx xxx xxx
MAKATI one (1)
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 3. Any province that may hereafter be created, or any city whose
population may hereafter increase to more than two hundred fifty thousand
shall be entitled in the immediately following election to at least one Member
or such number of Members as it may be entitled to on the basis of the
number of its inhabitants and according to the standards set forth in
paragraph (3), Section 5 of Article VI of the Constitution. The number of
Members apportioned to the province out of which such new province was
created, or where the city, whose population has so increased, is
geographically located shall be correspondingly adjusted by the Commission
on Elections but such adjustment shall not be made within one hundred and
twenty days before the election. (Emphases supplied)
Footnotes
1 R.A. No. 7854 is a consolidation of House Bill No. 12240 sponsored
by Congressman Joker Arroyo and Senate Bill No. 1244 sponsored by
Senator Vicente Sotto III.
2 Sec. 7. Creation and Conversion. As a general rule, the creation of
a local government unit or its conversion from one level to another level shall
be based on verifiable indicators of viability and projected capacity to provide
services, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
(c) Land Area. It must be contiguous, unless it comprises two (2) or
more islands or is separated by a local government unit independent of the
others; properly identified by metes and bounds with technical descriptions
and sufficient to provide for such basic services and facilities to meet the
requirements of its populace.
Compliance with the foregoing indicators shall be attested to by the
Department of Finance the National Statistics Office (NSO), and the Lands
Management Bureau (LMB) of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR).
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 450. Requisites for Creation. . . .
(b) The territorial jurisdiction of a newly-created city shall be properly
identified by metes and bounds. . . .
3 August 18, 1994, Senate Deliberations on H.B. No. 12240, pp. 23-28.
4 Ibid, citing as example the City of Mandaluyong.
5 Dumlao v. COMELEC, 95 SCRA 392 (19180); Cruz, Constitutional
Law, 1991 ed., p. 24.
6 Section 5(4), Article VI of the Constitution provides:
(4) Within three years following the return of every census, the
Congress shall make a reapportionment of legislative districts based on the
standards provided in this section.
7 Section 26(1), Article VI of the Constitution provides:
Sec. 26 (1) Every bill passed by the Congress shall, embrace only one
subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof.
8 G.R. No. 114783, December 8, 1994.
9 Section 5(1), Article VI.
10 In this connection, we take judicial notice of the fact that since 1986
up to this time, Congress has yet to pass a general reapportionment law.
11 Section 1, Article II provides that "the Philippines is a democratic and
republican state. Sovereignty resides in the people and all government
authority from them."
12 Sec. 5. . . .
(3) Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable,
contiguous, compact, and adjacent territory. Each city with a population of at
least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one
representative.
xxx xxx xxx

13 As per the certificate issued by Administration Tomas Africa of the

National Census and Statistics Office, the population of Makati as of 1994
stood at 508,174; August 4, 1994, Senate Deliberations on House Bill No.
12240 (converting Makati into a highly urbanized city), p. 15.

14 Sec. 3 provides: "Any province that may hereafter be created, or any

city whose population may hereafter increase to more than two hundred fifty
thousand shall be entitled in the immediately following election to at least
one Member or such number of Members as it may be entitled to on the
basis of the number of its inhabitants and according to the standards set
forth in paragraph (3), Section 5 of Article VI of the Constitution. The
number of Members apportioned to the province out of which such new
province was created or where the city, whose population has so increased,
is geographically located shall be correspondingly adjusted by the
Commission on Elections but such adjustment shall not be made within one
hundred, and twenty days before the election."
4 In our predisposition to discover the original intent of a statute, courts
EN BANC become the unfeeling pillars of the status quo. Little do we realize that
statutes or even constitutions are bundles of compromises thrown our way
ELEAZAR P. QUINTO and by their framers. Unless we exercise vigilance, the statute may already be
GERINO A. TOLENTINO, JR., out of tune and irrelevant to our day.[1] It is in this light that we should
Petitioners, address the instant case.

- versus - Before the Court is a petition for prohibition and certiorari, with prayer for
the issuance of a temporary restraining order and a writ of preliminary
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, injunction, assailing Section 4(a) of Resolution No. 8678 of the Commission
Respondent. on Elections (COMELEC). In view of pressing contemporary events, the
petition begs for immediate resolution.

The Antecedents
G.R. No. 189698
This controversy actually stems from the law authorizing the
Present: COMELEC to use an automated election system (AES).

PUNO, C.J., On December 22, 1997, Congress enacted Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8436,
CARPIO, entitled AN ACT AUTHORIZING THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS TO USE
CORONA, AN AUTOMATED ELECTION SYSTEM IN THE MAY 11, 1998 NATIONAL OR
CARPIO MORALES, LOCAL ELECTIONS AND IN SUBSEQUENT NATIONAL AND LOCAL
CHICO-NAZARIO, ELECTORAL EXERCISES, PROVIDING FUNDS THEREFOR AND FOR OTHER
VELASCO, JR., PURPOSES. Section 11 thereof reads:
NACHURA,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, SEC. 11. Official Ballot.The Commission shall prescribe the size and form of
BRION, the official ballot which shall contain the titles of the positions to be filled
PERALTA, and/or the propositions to be voted upon in an initiative, referendum or
BERSAMIN, plebiscite. Under each position, the names of candidates shall be arranged
DEL CASTILLO, alphabetically by surname and uniformly printed using the same type size. A
ABAD, and fixed space where the chairman of the Board of Election inspectors shall affix
VILLARAMA, JR., JJ. his/her signature to authenticate the official ballot shall be provided.

Promulgated: Both sides of the ballots may be used when necessary.

December 1, 2009 For this purpose, the deadline for the filing of certificate of
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x candidacy/petition for registration/manifestation to participate in the election
shall not be later than one hundred twenty (120) days before the elections:
Provided, That, any elective official, whether national or local, running for
DECISION any office other than the one which he/she is holding in a permanent
capacity, except for president and vice president, shall be deemed resigned
NACHURA, J.: only upon the start of the campaign period corresponding to the position for
which he/she is running: Provided, further, That, unlawful acts or omissions
applicable to a candidate shall take effect upon the start of the aforesaid
campaign period: Provided, finally, That, for purposes of the May 11, 1998
elections, the deadline for filing of the certificate of candidacy for the
positions of President, Vice President, Senators and candidates under the
Party-List System as well as petitions for registration and/or manifestation to
participate in the Party-List System shall be on February 9, 1998 while the
deadline for the filing of certificate of candidacy for other positions shall be
on March 27, 1998.
The official ballots shall be printed by the National Printing Office and/or the
Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas at the price comparable with that of private
printers under proper security measures which the Commission shall adopt.
The Commission may contract the services of private printers upon
certification by the National Printing Office/Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas that it
cannot meet the printing requirements. Accredited political parties and
deputized citizens' arms of the Commission may assign watchers in the
printing, storage and distribution of official ballots.
To prevent the use of fake ballots, the Commission through the Committee
shall ensure that the serial number on the ballot stub shall be printed in
magnetic ink that shall be easily detectable by inexpensive hardware and
shall be impossible to reproduce on a photocopying machine and that
identification marks, magnetic strips, bar codes and other technical and
security markings, are provided on the ballot.
The official ballots shall be printed and distributed to each city/municipality
at the rate of one (1) ballot for every registered voter with a provision of
additional four (4) ballots per precinct.[2]
Almost a decade thereafter, Congress amended the law on January 23, 2007
by enacting R.A. No. 9369, entitled AN ACT AMENDING REPUBLIC ACT NO.
8436, ENTITLED AN ACT AUTHORIZING THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
TO USE AN AUTOMATED ELECTION SYSTEM IN THE MAY 11, 1998
NATIONAL OR LOCAL ELECTIONS AND IN SUBSEQUENT NATIONAL AND
LOCAL ELECTORAL EXERCISES, TO ENCOURAGE TRANSPARENCY,
CREDIBILITY, FAIRNESS AND ACCURACY OF ELECTIONS, AMENDING FOR
THE PURPOSE BATAS PAMPANSA BLG. 881, AS AMEMDED, REPUBLIC ACT
NO. 7166 AND OTHER RELATED ELECTION LAWS, PROVIDING FUNDS
THEREFOR AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES. Section 13 of the amendatory law
modified Section 11 of R.A. No. 8436, thus:
SEC. 13. Section 11 of Republic Act No. 8436 is hereby amended to read as
follows:
Section 15. Official Ballot.The Commission shall prescribe the format of
the electronic display and/or the size and form of the official ballot, which
shall contain the titles of the position to be filled and/or the propositions to
be voted upon in an initiative, referendum or plebiscite. Where practicable,
electronic displays must be constructed to present the names of all
candidates for the same position in the same page or screen, otherwise, the
electronic displays must be constructed to present the entire ballot to the
voter, in a series of sequential pages, and to ensure that the voter sees all of
the ballot options on all pages before completing his or her vote and to allow
the voter to review and change all ballot choices prior to completing and
casting his or her ballot. Under each position to be filled, the names of
candidates shall be arranged alphabetically by surname and uniformly
indicated using the same type size. The maiden or married name shall be
listed in the official ballot, as preferred by the female candidate. Under each
proposition to be vote upon, the choices should be uniformly indicated using
the same font and size.
A fixed space where the chairman of the board of election inspectors shall
affix his/her signature to authenticate the official ballot shall be provided.
For this purpose, the Commission shall set the deadline for the filing of
certificate of candidacy/petition of registration/manifestation to participate in
the election. Any person who files his certificate of candidacy within this
period shall only be considered as a candidate at the start of the campaign
period for which he filed his certificate of candidacy: Provided, That, unlawful
acts or omissions applicable to a candidate shall take effect only upon the
start of the aforesaid campaign period: Provided, finally, That any person
holding a public appointive office or position, including active members of
the armed forces, and officers and employees in government-owned or -
controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his/her
office and must vacate the same at the start of the day of the filing of
his/her certificate of candidacy.
Political parties may hold political conventions to nominate their official
candidates within thirty (30) days before the start of the period for filing a
certificate of candidacy.
With respect to a paper-based election system, the official ballots shall be
printed by the National Printing Office and/or the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas
at the price comparable with that of private printers under proper security
measures which the Commission shall adopt. The Commission may contract
the services of private printers upon certification by the National Printing
Office/Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas that it cannot meet the printing
requirements. Accredited political parties and deputized citizens arms of the
Commission shall assign watchers in the printing, storage and distribution of
official ballots.
To prevent the use of fake ballots, the Commission through the Committee
shall ensure that the necessary safeguards, such as, but not limited to, bar
codes, holograms, color shifting ink, microprinting, are provided on the
ballot.
The official ballots shall be printed and distributed to each city/municipality
at the rate of one ballot for every registered voter with a provision of
additional three ballots per precinct.[3]
Pursuant to its constitutional mandate to enforce and administer election
laws, COMELEC issued Resolution No. 8678,[4] the Guidelines on the Filing
of Certificates of Candidacy (CoC) and Nomination of Official Candidates of
Registered Political Parties in Connection with the May 10, 2010 National and
Local Elections. Sections 4 and 5 of Resolution No. 8678 provide:
SEC. 4. Effects of Filing Certificates of Candidacy.a) Any person holding a
public appointive office or position including active members of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines, and other officers and employees in government-
owned or controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned
from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy.
b) Any person holding an elective office or position shall not be considered
resigned upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy for the same or any
other elective office or position.
SEC. 5. Period for filing Certificate of Candidacy.The certificate of
candidacy shall be filed on regular days, from November 20 to 30, 2009,
during office hours, except on the last day, which shall be until midnight.
Alarmed that they will be deemed ipso facto resigned from their offices the
moment they file their CoCs, petitioners Eleazar P. Quinto and Gerino A.
Tolentino, Jr., who hold appointive positions in the government and who
intend to run in the coming elections,[5] filed the instant petition for
prohibition and certiorari, seeking the declaration of the afore-quoted Section
4(a) of Resolution No. 8678 as null and void.
The Petitioners Contention
1. Petitioners contend that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when
it issued the assailed Resolution. They aver that the advance filing of CoCs
for the 2010 elections is intended merely for the purpose of early printing of
the official ballots in order to cope with time limitations. Such advance filing
does not automatically make the person who filed the CoC a candidate at the
moment of filing. In fact, the law considers him a candidate only at the start
of the campaign period. Petitioners then assert that this being so, they
should not be deemed ipso facto resigned from their government offices
when they file their CoCs, because at such time they are not yet treated by
law as candidates. They should be considered resigned from their respective
offices only at the start of the campaign period when they are, by law,
already considered as candidates.[6]
2. Petitioners also contend that Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369, the basis of the
assailed COMELEC resolution, contains two conflicting provisions. These must
be harmonized or reconciled to give effect to both and to arrive at a
declaration that they are not ipso facto resigned from their positions upon
the filing of their CoCs.[7]
3. Petitioners further posit that the provision considering them as ipso facto
resigned from office upon the filing of their CoCs is discriminatory and
violates the equal protection clause in the Constitution.[8]
The Respondents Arguments
On the procedural aspect of the petition, the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG), representing respondent COMELEC, argues that petitioners
have no legal standing to institute the suit. Petitioners have not yet filed
their CoCs, hence, they are not yet affected by the assailed provision in the
COMELEC resolution. The OSG further claims that the petition is premature
or unripe for judicial determination. Petitioners have admitted that they are
merely planning to file their CoCs for the coming 2010 elections. Their
interest in the present controversy is thus merely speculative and contingent
upon the filing of the same. The OSG likewise contends that petitioners
availed of the wrong remedy. They are questioning an issuance of the
COMELEC made in the exercise of the latters rule-making power. Certiorari
under Rule 65 is then an improper remedy.[9]
On the substantive aspect, the OSG maintains that the COMELEC did
not gravely abuse its discretion in phrasing Section 4(a) of Resolution No.
8678 for it merely copied what is in the law. The OSG, however, agrees with
petitioners that there is a conflict in Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369 that should
be resolved. According to the OSG, there seems to be no basis to consider
appointive officials as ipso facto resigned and to require them to vacate their
positions on the same day that they file their CoCs, because they are not yet
considered as candidates at that time. Further, this deemed resigned
provision existed in Batas Pambansa Bilang (B.P. Blg.) 881, and no longer
finds a place in our present election laws with the innovations brought about
by the automated system.[10]
Our Ruling
I.
At first glance, the petition suffers from an incipient procedural defect. What
petitioners assail in their petition is a resolution issued by the COMELEC in
the exercise of its quasi-legislative power. Certiorari under Rule 65, in
relation to Rule 64, cannot be availed of, because it is a remedy to question
decisions, resolutions and issuances made in the exercise of a judicial or
quasi-judicial function.[11] Prohibition is also an inappropriate remedy,
because what petitioners actually seek from the Court is a determination of
the proper construction of a statute and a declaration of their rights
thereunder. Obviously, their petition is one for declaratory relief,[12] over
which this Court does not exercise original jurisdiction.[13]
However, petitioners raise a challenge on the constitutionality of the
questioned provisions of both the COMELEC resolution and the law. Given
this scenario, the Court may step in and resolve the instant petition.
The transcendental nature and paramount importance of the issues raised
and the compelling state interest involved in their early resolutionthe
period for the filing of CoCs for the 2010 elections has already started and
hundreds of civil servants intending to run for elective offices are to lose
their employment, thereby causing imminent and irreparable damage to their
means of livelihood and, at the same time, crippling the governments
manpowerfurther dictate that the Court must, for propriety, if only from a
sense of obligation, entertain the petition so as to expedite the adjudication
of all, especially the constitutional, issues.
In any event, the Court has ample authority to set aside errors of practice or
technicalities of procedure and resolve the merits of a case. Repeatedly
stressed in our prior decisions is the principle that the Rules were
promulgated to provide guidelines for the orderly administration of justice,
not to shackle the hand that dispenses it. Otherwise, the courts would be
consigned to being mere slaves to technical rules, deprived of their judicial
discretion.[14]
II.
To put things in their proper perspective, it is imperative that we trace the
brief history of the assailed provision. Section 4(a) of COMELEC Resolution
No. 8678 is a reproduction of the second proviso in the third paragraph of
Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369, which for ready reference is quoted as follows:
For this purpose, the Commission shall set the deadline for the filing of
certificate of candidacy/petition for registration/manifestation to participate
in the election. Any person who files his certificate of candidacy within this
period shall only be considered as a candidate at the start of the campaign
period for which he filed his certificate of candidacy: Provided, That,
unlawful acts or omissions applicable to a candidate shall take effect only
upon the start of the aforesaid campaign period: Provided, finally, That any
person holding a public appointive office or position, including active
members of the armed forces, and officers and employees in government-
owned or -controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned
from his/her office and must vacate the same at the start of the day of the
filing of his/her certificate of candidacy.[15]
Notably, this proviso is not present in Section 11 of R.A. No. 8436, the law
amended by R.A. No. 9369. The proviso was lifted from Section 66 of B.P.
Blg. 881 or the Omnibus Election Code (OEC) of the Philippines, which reads:
Sec. 66. Candidates holding appointive office or position.Any person
holding a public appointive office or position, including active members of
the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and officers and employees in
government-owned or controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso facto
resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy.
It may be recalledin inverse chronologythat earlier, Presidential Decree
No. 1296, or the 1978 Election Code, contained a similar provision, thus
SECTION 29. Candidates holding appointive office or position. Every
person holding a public appointive office or position, including active
members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and officers and employees
in government-owned or controlled corporations, shall ipso facto cease in his
office or position on the date he files his certificate of candidacy. Members of
the Cabinet shall continue in the offices they presently hold notwithstanding
the filing of certificate of candidacy, subject to the pleasure of the President
of the Philippines.

Much earlier, R.A. No. 6388, or the Election Code of 1971, likewise stated in
its Section 23 the following:
SECTION 23. Candidates Holding Appointive Office or Position. Every
person holding a public appointive office or position, including active
members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and every officer or
employee in government-owned or controlled corporations, shall ipso facto
cease in his office or position on the date he files his certificate of candidacy:
Provided, That the filing of a certificate of candidacy shall not affect
whatever civil, criminal or administrative liabilities which he may have
incurred.
Going further back in history, R.A. No. 180, or the Revised Election Code
approved on June 21, 1947, also provided that
SECTION 26. Automatic cessation of appointive officers and employees who
are candidates. Every person holding a public appointive office or position
shall ipso facto cease in his office or position on the date he files his
certificate of candidacy.
During the Commonwealth era, Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 725, entitled
AN ACT TO PROVIDE FOR THE NEXT ELECTION FOR PRESIDENT AND
VICE-PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES, SENATORS AND MEMBERS OF THE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, AND APPROPRIATING THE NECESSARY
FUNDS THEREFOR, approved on January 5, 1946, contained, in the last
paragraph of its Section 2, the following:
A person occupying any civil office by appointment in the government or any
of its political subdivisions or agencies or government-owned or controlled
corporations, whether such office by appointive or elective, shall be
considered to have resigned from such office from the moment of the filing
of such certificate of candidacy.
Significantly, however, C.A. No. 666, entitled AN ACT TO PROVIDE FOR THE
FIRST ELECTION FOR PRESIDENT AND VICE-PRESIDENT OF THE
PHILIPPINES, SENATORS, AND MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, UNDER THE CONSTITUTION AND THE AMENDMENTS
THEREOF, enacted without executive approval on June 22, 1941, the
precursor of C.A. No. 725, only provided for automatic resignation of
elective, but not appointive, officials.
Nevertheless, C.A. No. 357, or the Election Code approved on August 22,
1938, had, in its Section 22, the same verbatim provision as Section 26 of
R.A. No. 180.
The earliest recorded Philippine law on the subject is Act No. 1582, or the
Election Law enacted by the Philippine Commission in 1907, the last
paragraph of Section 29 of which reads:
Sec. 29. Penalties upon officers. x x x.
No public officer shall offer himself as a candidate for election, nor shall he
be eligible during the time that he holds said public office to election, at any
municipal, provincial or Assembly election, except for reelection to the
position which he may be holding, and no judge of the Court of First
Instance, justice of the peace, provincial fiscal, or officer or employee of the
Bureau of Constabulary or of the Bureau of Education shall aid any candidate
or influence in any manner or take any part in any municipal, provincial, or
Assembly election under penalty of being deprived of his office and being
disqualified to hold any public office whatever for a term of five years:
Provided, however, That the foregoing provisions shall not be construed to
deprive any person otherwise qualified of the right to vote at any election.
From this brief historical excursion, it may be gleaned that the second
proviso in the third paragraph of Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369that any
person holding a public appointive office or position, including active
members of the armed forces, and officers, and employees in government-
owned or controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned
from his/her office and must vacate the same at the start of the day of the
filing of his/her certificate of candidacytraces its roots to the period of the
American occupation.
In fact, during the deliberations of Senate Bill No. 2231, the bill later to be
consolidated with House Bill No. 5352 and enacted as R.A. No. 9369, Senator
Richard Gordon, the principal author of the bill, acknowledged that the said
proviso in the proposed legislative measure is an old provision which was
merely copied from earlier existing legislation, thus
Senator Osmea. May I just opine here and perhaps obtain the
opinion of the good Sponsor. This reads like, ANY PERSON HOLDING
[means currently] A PUBLIC APPOINTIVE POSITION SHALL BE
CONSIDERED IPSO FACTO RESIGNED [which means that the prohibition
extends only to appointive officials] INCLUDING ACTIVE MEMBERS OF THE
ARMED FORCES, OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES This is a prohibition, Mr.
President. This means if one is chairman of SSS or PDIC, he is deemed ipso
facto resigned when he files his certificate of candidacy. Is that the
intention?
Senator Gordon. This is really an old provision, Mr. President.
Senator Osmea. It is in bold letters, so I think it was a Committee
amendment.
Senator Gordon. No, it has always been there.
Senator Osmea. I see.
Senator Gordon. I guess the intention is not to give them undue
advantage, especially certain people.
Senator Osmea. All right.[16]
In that Senate deliberation, however, Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago
expressed her concern over the inclusion of the said provision in the new
law, given that the same would be disadvantageous and unfair to potential
candidates holding appointive positions, while it grants a consequent
preferential treatment to elective officials, thus
Senator Santiago. On page 15, line 31, I know that this is a losing
cause, so I make this point more as a matter of record than of any feasible
hope that it can possibly be either accepted or if we come to a division of the
House, it will be upheld by the majority.
I am referring to page 15, line 21. The proviso begins: PROVIDED
FINALLY, THAT ANY PERSON HOLDING A PUBLIC APPOINTIVE
OFFICESHALL BE CONSIDERED IPSO FACTO RESIGNED FROM HIS/HER
OFFICE.
The point that I made during the appropriate debate in the past in
this Hall is that there is, for me, no valid reason for exempting elective
officials from this inhibition or disqualification imposed by the law. If we are
going to consider appointive officers of the government, including AFP
members and officers of government-owned and controlled corporations, or
any other member of the appointive sector of the civil service, why should it
not apply to the elective sector for, after all, even senators and congressmen
are members of the civil service as well?
Further, it is self-serving for the Senate, or for the Congress in
general, to give an exception to itself which is not available to other similarly
situated officials of government. Of course, the answer is, the reason why
we are special is that we are elected. Since we are imposing a
disqualification on all other government officials except ourselves, I think, it
is the better part of delicadeza to inhibit ourselves as well, so that if we want
to stay as senators, we wait until our term expires. But if we want to run for
some other elective office during our term, then we have to be considered
resigned just like everybody else. That is my proposed amendment. But if it
is unacceptable to the distinguished Sponsor, because of sensitivity to the
convictions of the rest of our colleagues, I will understand.
Senator Gordon. Mr. President, I think the suggestion is well-
thought of. It is a good policy. However, this is something that is already in
the old law which was upheld by the Supreme court in a recent case that the
rider was not upheld and that it was valid.[17]
The obvious inequality brought about by the provision on automatic
resignation of appointive civil servants must have been the reason why
Senator Recto proposed the inclusion of the following during the period of
amendments: ANY PERSON WHO FILES HIS CERTIFICATE OF CANDIDACY
WITHIN THIS PERIOD SHALL ONLY BE CONSIDERED AS A CANDIDATE AT
THE START OF THE CAMPAIGN PERIOD FOR WHICH HE FILED HIS
COC.[18] The said proviso seems to mitigate the situation of disadvantage
afflicting appointive officials by considering persons who filed their CoCs as
candidates only at the start of the campaign period, thereby, conveying the
tacit intent that persons holding appointive positions will only be considered
as resigned at the start of the campaign period when they are already
treated by law as candidates.
Parenthetically, it may be remembered that Section 67 of the OEC and
Section 11 of R.A. No. 8436 contained a similar provision on automatic
resignation of elective officials upon the filing of their CoCs for any office
other than that which they hold in a permanent capacity or for President or
Vice-President. However, with the enactment of R.A. No. 9006, or the Fair
Election Act,[19] in 2001, this provision was repealed by Section 14[20] of
the said act. There was, thus, created a situation of obvious discrimination
against appointive officials who were deemed ipso facto resigned from their
offices upon the filing of their CoCs, while elective officials were not.
This situation was incidentally addressed by the Court in Farias v. The
Executive Secretary[21] when it ruled that
Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006
Is Not Violative of the Equal
Protection Clause of the Constitution
The petitioners contention, that the repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus
Election Code pertaining to elective officials gives undue benefit to such
officials as against the appointive ones and violates the equal protection
clause of the constitution, is tenuous.
The equal protection of the law clause in the Constitution is not absolute, but
is subject to reasonable classification. If the groupings are characterized by
substantial distinctions that make real differences, one class may be treated
and regulated differently from the other. The Court has explained the nature
of the equal protection guarantee in this manner:
The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor and individual
or class privilege, as well as hostile discrimination or the oppression of
inequality. It is not intended to prohibit legislation which is limited either in
the object to which it is directed or by territory within which it is to operate.
It does not demand absolute equality among residents; it merely requires
that all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and
conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced. The equal
protection clause is not infringed by legislation which applies only to those
persons falling within a specified class, if it applies alike to all persons within
such class, and reasonable grounds exist for making a distinction between
those who fall within such class and those who do not.
Substantial distinctions clearly exist between elective officials and appointive
officials. The former occupy their office by virtue of the mandate of the
electorate. They are elected to an office for a definite term and may be
removed therefrom only upon stringent conditions. On the other hand,
appointive officials hold their office by virtue of their designation thereto by
an appointing authority. Some appointive officials hold their office in a
permanent capacity and are entitled to security of tenure while others serve
at the pleasure of the appointing authority.
Another substantial distinction between the two sets of officials is that under
Section 55, Chapter 8, Title I, Subsection A. Civil Service Commission, Book V
of the Administrative Code of 1987 (Executive Order No. 292), appointive
officials, as officers and employees in the civil service, are strictly prohibited
from engaging in any partisan political activity or take part in any election
except to vote. Under the same provision, elective officials, or officers or
employees holding political offices, are obviously expressly allowed to take
part in political and electoral activities.
By repealing Section 67 but retaining Section 66 of the Omnibus Election
Code, the legislators deemed it proper to treat these two classes of officials
differently with respect to the effect on their tenure in the office of the filing
of the certificates of candidacy for any position other than those occupied by
them. Again, it is not within the power of the Court to pass upon or look
into the wisdom of this classification.
Since the classification justifying Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006, i.e.,
elected officials vis-a-vis appointive officials, is anchored upon material and
significant distinctions and all the persons belonging under the same
classification are similarly treated, the equal protection clause of the
Constitution is, thus, not infringed.[22]
However, it must be remembered that the Court, in Farias, was intently
focused on the main issue of whether the repealing clause in the Fair
Election Act was a constitutionally proscribed rider, in that it unwittingly
failed to ascertain with stricter scrutiny the impact of the retention of the
provision on automatic resignation of persons holding appointive positions
(Section 66) in the OEC, vis--vis the equal protection clause. Moreover, the
Courts vision in Farias was shrouded by the fact that petitioners therein,
Farias et al., never posed a direct challenge to the constitutionality of
Section 66 of the OEC. Farias et al. rather merely questioned, on
constitutional grounds, the repealing clause, or Section 14 of the Fair
Election Act. The Courts afore-quoted declaration in Farias may then very
well be considered as an obiter dictum.
III.
The instant case presents a rare opportunity for the Court, in view of the
constitutional challenge advanced by petitioners, once and for all, to settle
the issue of whether the second proviso in the third paragraph of Section 13
of R.A. No. 9369, a reproduction of Section 66 of the OEC, which, as shown
above, was based on provisions dating back to the American occupation, is
violative of the equal protection clause.
But before delving into the constitutional issue, we shall first address the
issues on legal standing and on the existence of an actual controversy.
Central to the determination of locus standi is the question of whether a
party has alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as
to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of
issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult
constitutional questions.[23] In this case, petitioners allege that they will be
directly affected by COMELEC Resolution No. 8678 for they intend, and they
all have the qualifications, to run in the 2010 elections. The OSG, for its part,
contends that since petitioners have not yet filed their CoCs, they are not yet
candidates; hence, they are not yet directly affected by the assailed
provision in the COMELEC resolution.
The Court, nevertheless, finds that, while petitioners are not yet candidates,
they have the standing to raise the constitutional challenge, simply because
they are qualified voters. A restriction on candidacy, such as the challenged
measure herein, affects the rights of voters to choose their public officials.
The rights of voters and the rights of candidates do not lend themselves to
neat separation; laws that affect candidates always have at least some
theoretical, correlative effect on voters.[24] The Court believes that both
candidates and voters may challenge, on grounds of equal protection, the
assailed measure because of its impact on voting rights.[25]
In any event, in recent cases, this Court has relaxed the stringent direct
injury test and has observed a liberal policy allowing ordinary citizens,
members of Congress, and civil organizations to prosecute actions involving
the constitutionality or validity of laws, regulations and rulings.[26]
We have also stressed in our prior decisions that the exercise by this Court of
judicial power is limited to the determination and resolution of actual cases
and controversies.[27] The Court, in this case, finds that an actual case or
controversy exists between the petitioners and the COMELEC, the body
charged with the enforcement and administration of all election laws.
Petitioners have alleged in a precise manner that they would engage in the
very acts that would trigger the enforcement of the provisionthey would
file their CoCs and run in the 2010 elections. Given that the assailed
provision provides for ipso facto resignation upon the filing of the CoC, it
cannot be said that it presents only a speculative or hypothetical obstacle to
petitioners candidacy.[28]
IV.
Having hurdled what the OSG posed as obstacles to judicial review, the
Court now delves into the constitutional challenge.
It is noteworthy to point out that the right to run for public office touches on
two fundamental freedoms, those of expression and of association. This
premise is best explained in Mancuso v. Taft,[29] viz.:
Freedom of expression guarantees to the individual the opportunity to write
a letter to the local newspaper, speak out in a public park, distribute
handbills advocating radical reform, or picket an official building to seek
redress of grievances. All of these activities are protected by the First
Amendment if done in a manner consistent with a narrowly defined concept
of public order and safety. The choice of means will likely depend on the
amount of time and energy the individual wishes to expend and on his
perception as to the most effective method of projecting his message to the
public. But interest and commitment are evolving phenomena. What is an
effective means for protest at one point in time may not seem so effective at
a later date. The dilettante who participates in a picket line may decide to
devote additional time and resources to his expressive activity. As his
commitment increases, the means of effective expression changes, but the
expressive quality remains constant. He may decide to lead the picket line,
or to publish the newspaper. At one point in time he may decide that the
most effective way to give expression to his views and to get the attention of
an appropriate audience is to become a candidate for public office-means
generally considered among the most appropriate for those desiring to effect
change in our governmental systems. He may seek to become a candidate
by filing in a general election as an independent or by seeking the
nomination of a political party. And in the latter instance, the individual's
expressive activity has two dimensions: besides urging that his views be the
views of the elected public official, he is also attempting to become a
spokesman for a political party whose substantive program extends beyond
the particular office in question. But Cranston has said that a certain type of
its citizenry, the public employee, may not become a candidate and may not
engage in any campaign activity that promotes himself as a candidate for
public office. Thus the city has stifled what may be the most important
expression an individual can summon, namely that which he would be willing
to effectuate, by means of concrete public action, were he to be selected by
the voters.
It is impossible to ignore the additional fact that the right to run for office
also affects the freedom to associate. In Williams v. Rhodes, supra, the Court
used strict review to invalidate an Ohio election system that made it virtually
impossible for third parties to secure a place on the ballot. The Court found
that the First Amendment protected the freedom to associate by forming and
promoting a political party and that that freedom was infringed when the
state effectively denied a party access to its electoral machinery. The
Cranston charter provision before us also affects associational rights, albeit in
a slightly different way. An individual may decide to join or participate in an
organization or political party that shares his beliefs. He may even form a
new group to forward his ideas. And at some juncture his supporters and
fellow party members may decide that he is the ideal person to carry the
group's standard into the electoral fray. To thus restrict the options available
to political organization as the Cranston charter provision has done is to limit
the effectiveness of association; and the freedom to associate is intimately
related with the concept of making expression effective. Party access to the
ballot becomes less meaningful if some of those selected by party machinery
to carry the party's programs to the people are precluded from doing so
because those nominees are civil servants.
Whether the right to run for office is looked at from the point of view of
individual expression or associational effectiveness, wide opportunities exist
for the individual who seeks public office. The fact of candidacy alone may
open previously closed doors of the media. The candidate may be invited to
discuss his views on radio talk shows; he may be able to secure equal time
on television to elaborate his campaign program; the newspapers may cover
his candidacy; he may be invited to debate before various groups that had
theretofore never heard of him or his views. In short, the fact of candidacy
opens up a variety of communicative possibilities that are not available to
even the most diligent of picketers or the most loyal of party followers. A
view today, that running for public office is not an interest protected by the
First Amendment, seems to us an outlook stemming from an earlier era
when public office was the preserve of the professional and the wealthy.
Consequently we hold that candidacy is both a protected First Amendment
right and a fundamental interest. Hence any legislative classification that
significantly burdens that interest must be subjected to strict equal
protection review.[30]
Here, petitioners interest in running for public office, an interest
protected by Sections 4 and 8 of Article III of the Constitution, is breached
by the proviso in Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369. It is now the opportune time
for the Court to strike down the said proviso for being violative of the equal
protection clause and for being overbroad.
In considering persons holding appointive positions as ipso facto
resigned from their posts upon the filing of their CoCs, but not considering as
resigned all other civil servants, specifically the elective ones, the law unduly
discriminates against the first class. The fact alone that there is substantial
distinction between those who hold appointive positions and those occupying
elective posts, does not justify such differential treatment.
In order that there can be valid classification so that a discriminatory
governmental act may pass the constitutional norm of equal protection, it is
necessary that the four (4) requisites of valid classification be complied with,
namely:
(1) It must be based upon substantial distinctions;
(2) It must be germane to the purposes of the law;
(3) It must not be limited to existing conditions only; and
(4) It must apply equally to all members of the class.
The first requirement means that there must be real and substantial
differences between the classes treated differently. As illustrated in the fairly
recent Mirasol v. Department of Public Works and Highways,[31] a real and
substantial distinction exists between a motorcycle and other motor vehicles
sufficient to justify its classification among those prohibited from plying the
toll ways. Not all motorized vehicles are created equala two-wheeled
vehicle is less stable and more easily overturned than a four-wheel vehicle.
Nevertheless, the classification would still be invalid if it does not comply
with the second requirementif it is not germane to the purpose of the law.
Justice Isagani A. Cruz (Ret.), in his treatise on constitutional law, explains,
The classification, even if based on substantial distinctions, will still
be invalid if it is not germane to the purpose of the law. To illustrate, the
accepted difference in physical stamina between men and women will justify
the prohibition of the latter from employment as miners or stevedores or in
other heavy and strenuous work. On the basis of this same classification,
however, the law cannot provide for a lower passing average for women in
the bar examinations because physical strength is not the test for admission
to the legal profession. Imported cars may be taxed at a higher rate than
locally assembled automobiles for the protection of the national economy,
but their difference in origin is no justification for treating them differently
when it comes to punishing violations of traffic regulations. The source of the
vehicle has no relation to the observance of these rules.[32]
The third requirement means that the classification must be enforced
not only for the present but as long as the problem sought to be corrected
continues to exist. And, under the last requirement, the classification would
be regarded as invalid if all the members of the class are not treated
similarly, both as to rights conferred and obligations imposed.[33]
Applying the four requisites to the instant case, the Court finds that
the differential treatment of persons holding appointive offices as opposed to
those holding elective ones is not germane to the purposes of the law.
The obvious reason for the challenged provision is to prevent the use
of a governmental position to promote ones candidacy, or even to wield a
dangerous or coercive influence on the electorate. The measure is further
aimed at promoting the efficiency, integrity, and discipline of the public
service by eliminating the danger that the discharge of official duty would be
motivated by political considerations rather than the welfare of the
public.[34] The restriction is also justified by the proposition that the entry of
civil servants to the electoral arena, while still in office, could result in
neglect or inefficiency in the performance of duty because they would be
attending to their campaign rather than to their office work.
If we accept these as the underlying objectives of the law, then the
assailed provision cannot be constitutionally rescued on the ground of valid
classification. Glaringly absent is the requisite that the classification must be
germane to the purposes of the law. Indeed, whether one holds an
appointive office or an elective one, the evils sought to be prevented by the
measure remain. For example, the Executive Secretary, or any Member of
the Cabinet for that matter, could wield the same influence as the Vice-
President who at the same time is appointed to a Cabinet post (in the recent
past, elected Vice-Presidents were appointed to take charge of national
housing, social welfare development, interior and local government, and
foreign affairs). With the fact that they both head executive offices, there is
no valid justification to treat them differently when both file their CoCs for
the elections. Under the present state of our law, the Vice-President, in the
example, running this time, let us say, for President, retains his position
during the entire election period and can still use the resources of his office
to support his campaign.
As to the danger of neglect, inefficiency or partisanship in the discharge of
the functions of his appointive office, the inverse could be just as true and
compelling. The public officer who files his certificate of candidacy would be
driven by a greater impetus for excellent performance to show his fitness for
the position aspired for.
Mancuso v. Taft,[35] cited above, explains that the measure on
automatic resignation, which restricts the rights of civil servants to run for
officea right inextricably linked to their freedom of expression and
association, is not reasonably necessary to the satisfaction of the state
interest. Thus, in striking down a similar measure in the United States,
Mancuso succinctly declares
In proceeding to the second stage of active equal protection review,
however, we do see some contemporary relevance of the Mitchell decision.
National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, supra. In order for the Cranston charter
provision to withstand strict scrutiny, the city must show that the exclusion
of all government employees from candidacy is necessary to achieve a
compelling state interest. And, as stated in Mitchell and other cases dealing
with similar statutes, see Wisconsin State Employees, supra; Broadrick,
supra, government at all levels has a substantial interest in protecting the
integrity of its civil service. It is obviously conceivable that the impartial
character of the civil service would be seriously jeopardized if people in
positions of authority used their discretion to forward their electoral
ambitions rather than the public welfare. Similarly if a public employee
pressured other fellow employees to engage in corrupt practices in return for
promises of post-election reward, or if an employee invoked the power of the
office he was seeking to extract special favors from his superiors, the civil
service would be done irreparable injury. Conversely, members of the public,
fellow-employees, or supervisors might themselves request favors from the
candidate or might improperly adjust their own official behavior towards him.
Even if none of these abuses actually materialize, the possibility of their
occurrence might seriously erode the public's confidence in its public
employees. For the reputation of impartiality is probably as crucial as the
impartiality itself; the knowledge that a clerk in the assessor's office who is
running for the local zoning board has access to confidential files which could
provide pressure points for furthering his campaign is destructive
regardless of whether the clerk actually takes advantage of his opportunities.
For all of these reasons we find that the state indeed has a compelling
interest in maintaining the honesty and impartiality of its public work force.
We do not, however, consider the exclusionary measure taken by Cranston-a
flat prohibition on office-seeking of all kinds by all kinds of public employees-
as even reasonably necessary to satisfaction of this state interest. As Justice
Marshall pointed out in Dunn v. Blumstein, [s]tatutes affecting constitutional
rights must be drawn with precision. For three sets of reasons we conclude
that the Cranston charter provision pursues its objective in a far too heavy-
handed manner and hence must fall under the equal protection clause. First,
we think the nature of the regulation-a broad prophylactic rule-may be
unnecessary to fulfillment of the city's objective. Second, even granting some
sort of prophylactic rule may be required, the provision here prohibits
candidacies for all types of public office, including many which would pose
none of the problems at which the law is aimed. Third, the provision
excludes the candidacies of all types of public employees, without any
attempt to limit exclusion to those employees whose positions make them
vulnerable to corruption and conflicts of interest.
There is thus no valid justification to treat appointive officials differently from
the elective ones. The classification simply fails to meet the test that it
should be germane to the purposes of the law. The measure encapsulated
in the second proviso of the third paragraph of Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369
and in Section 66 of the OEC violates the equal protection clause.
V.
The challenged provision also suffers from the infirmity of being
overbroad.
First, the provision pertains to all civil servants holding appointive posts
without distinction as to whether they occupy high positions in government
or not. Certainly, a utility worker in the government will also be considered
as ipso facto resigned once he files his CoC for the 2010 elections. This
scenario is absurd for, indeed, it is unimaginable how he can use his position
in the government to wield influence in the political world.
While it may be admitted that most appointive officials who seek public
elective office are those who occupy relatively high positions in government,
laws cannot be legislated for them alone, or with them alone in mind. For
the right to seek public elective office is universal, open and unrestrained,
subject only to the qualification standards prescribed in the Constitution and
in the laws. These qualifications are, as we all know, general and basic so as
to allow the widest participation of the citizenry and to give free rein for the
pursuit of ones highest aspirations to public office. Such is the essence of
democracy.
Second, the provision is directed to the activity of seeking any and all public
offices, whether they be partisan or nonpartisan in character, whether they
be in the national, municipal or barangay level. Congress has not shown a
compelling state interest to restrict the fundamental right involved on such a
sweeping scale.[36]
Specific evils require specific treatments, not through overly broad measures
that unduly restrict guaranteed freedoms of the citizenry. After all,
sovereignty resides in the people, and all governmental power emanates
from them.
Mancuso v. Taft,[37] on this point, instructs
As to approaches less restrictive than a prophylactic rule, there exists the
device of the leave of absence. Some system of leaves of absence would
permit the public employee to take time off to pursue his candidacy while
assuring him his old job should his candidacy be unsuccessful. Moreover, a
leave of absence policy would eliminate many of the opportunities for
engaging in the questionable practices that the statute is designed to
prevent. While campaigning, the candidate would feel no conflict between
his desire for election and his publicly entrusted discretion, nor any conflict
between his efforts to persuade the public and his access to confidential
documents. But instead of adopting a reasonable leave of absence policy,
Cranston has chosen a provision that makes the public employee cast off the
security of hard-won public employment should he desire to compete for
elected office.
The city might also promote its interest in the integrity of the civil service by
enforcing, through dismissal, discipline, or criminal prosecution, rules or
statutes that treat conflict of interests, bribery, or other forms of official
corruption. By thus attacking the problem directly, instead of using a broad
prophylactic rule, the city could pursue its objective without unduly
burdening the First Amendment rights of its employees and the voting rights
of its citizens. Last term in Dunn v. Blumstein, the Supreme Court faced an
analogous question when the State of Tennessee asserted that the interest
of ballot box purity justified its imposition of one year and three month
residency requirements before a citizen could vote. Justice Marshall stated,
inter alia, that Tennessee had available a number of criminal statutes that
could be used to punish voter fraud without unnecessary infringement on the
newcomer's right to vote. Similarly, it appears from the record in this case
that the Cranston charter contains some provisions that might be used
against opportunistic public employees.
Even if some sort of prophylactic rule is necessary, we cannot say that
Cranston has put much effort into tailoring a narrow provision that attempts
to match the prohibition with the problem. The charter forbids a Cranston
public employee from running for any office, anywhere. The prohibition is
not limited to the local offices of Cranston, but rather extends to statewide
offices and even to national offices. It is difficult for us to see that a public
employee running for the United States Congress poses quite the same
threat to the civil service as would the same employee if he were running for
a local office where the contacts and information provided by his job related
directly to the position he was seeking, and hence where the potential for
various abuses was greater. Nor does the Cranston charter except the public
employee who works in Cranston but aspires to office in another local
jurisdiction, most probably his town of residence. Here again the charter
precludes candidacies which can pose only a remote threat to the civil
service. Finally, the charter does not limit its prohibition to partisan office-
seeking, but sterilizes also those public employees who would seek
nonpartisan elective office. The statute reviewed in Mitchell was limited to
partisan political activity, and since that time other courts have found the
partisan-nonpartisan distinction a material one. See Kinnear, supra;
Wisconsin State Employees, supra; Gray v. Toledo, supra. While the line
between nonpartisan and partisan can often be blurred by systems whose
true characters are disguised by the names given them by their architects, it
seems clear that the concerns of a truly partisan office and the temptations it
fosters are sufficiently different from those involved in an office removed
from regular party politics to warrant distinctive treatment in a charter of this
sort.
The third and last area of excessive and overinclusive coverage of the
Cranston charter relates not to the type of office sought, but to the type of
employee seeking the office. As Justice Douglas pointed out in his dissent in
Mitchell, 330 U.S. at 120-126, 67 S.Ct. 556, restrictions on administrative
employees who either participate in decision-making or at least have some
access to information concerning policy matters are much more justifiable
than restrictions on industrial employees, who, but for the fact that the
government owns the plant they work in, are, for purposes of access to
official information, identically situated to all other industrial workers. Thus, a
worker in the Philadelphia mint could be distinguished from a secretary in an
office of the Department of Agriculture; so also could a janitor in the public
schools of Cranston be distinguished from an assistant comptroller of the
same city. A second line of distinction that focuses on the type of employee
is illustrated by the cases of Kinnear and Minielly, supra. In both of these
cases a civil service deputy decided to run for the elected office of sheriff.
The courts in both cases felt that the no-candidacy laws in question were
much too broad and indicated that perhaps the only situation sensitive
enough to justify a flat rule was one in which an inferior in a public office
electorally challenged his immediate superior. Given all these considerations,
we think Cranston has not given adequate attention to the problem of
narrowing the terms of its charter to deal with the specific kinds of conflict-
of-interest problems it seeks to avoid.
We also do not find convincing the arguments that after-hours campaigning
will drain the energy of the public employee to the extent that he is
incapable of performing his job effectively and that inevitable on-the-job
campaigning and discussion of his candidacy will disrupt the work of others.
Although it is indisputable that the city has a compelling interest in the
performance of official work, the exclusion is not well-tailored to effectuate
that interest. Presumably the city could fire the individual if he clearly shirks
his employment responsibilities or disrupts the work of others. Also, the
efficiency rationale common to both arguments is significantly
underinclusive. It applies equally well to a number of non-political,
extracurricular activities that are not prohibited by the Cranston charter.
Finally, the connection between after-hours campaigning and the state
interest seems tenuous; in many cases a public employee would be able to
campaign aggressively and still continue to do his job well.[38]
Incidentally, Clements v. Fashing[39] sustained as constitutional a provision
on the automatic resignation of District Clerks, County Clerks, County
Judges, County Treasurers, Criminal District Attorneys, County Surveyors,
Inspectors of Hides and Animals, County Commissioners, Justices of the
Peace, Sheriffs, Assessors and Collectors of Taxes, District Attorneys, County
Attorneys, Public Weighers, and Constables if they announce their candidacy
or if they become candidates in any general, special or primary election.
In Clements, it may be readily observed that a provision treating differently
particular officials, as distinguished from all others, under a classification that
is germane to the purposes of the law, merits the stamp of approval from
American courts. Not, however, a general and sweeping provision, and more
so one violative of the second requisite for a valid classification, which is on
its face unconstitutional.
On a final note, it may not be amiss to state that the Americans, from whom
we copied the provision in question, had already stricken down a similar
measure for being unconstitutional. It is high-time that we, too, should
follow suit and, thus, uphold fundamental liberties over age-old, but barren,
restrictions to such freedoms.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The second
proviso in the third paragraph of Section 13 of Republic Act No. 9369,
Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code and Section 4(a) of COMELEC
Resolution No. 8678 are declared as UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate Justice
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO
Associate Justice
ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice
MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.
Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that
the conclusions in the above decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[1] Salvacion v. Central Bank of the Philippines, G.R. No. 94723,
August 21, 1997, 278 SCRA 27, 28.
[2] Emphasis supplied.
[3] Emphasis supplied.
[4] Promulgated on October 6, 2009.
[5] Petitioner Eleazar P. Quinto is the Undersecretary for Field
Operations of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR). He intends to run for Representative in the 4th Congressional [19] Entitled AN ACT TO ENHANCE THE HOLDING OF FREE,
District of Pangasinan. Petitioner Gerino A. Tolentino, Jr. is the OIC-Director ORDERLY, HONEST, PEACEFUL AND CREDIBLE ELECTIONS THROUGH FAIR
of the Land Management Bureau of the DENR. He likewise desires to run for ELECTION PRACTICES, approved on February 12, 2001.
City Councilor in the 4th District of Manila. (Rollo, pp. 8-9.) [20] Sec. 14 of R.A. No. 9006 provides:
[6] Rollo, pp. 10-13. SEC. 14 Repealing Clause.Sections 67 and 85 of the Omnibus
[7] Id. at 11. Election Code (Batas Pambansa Blg. 881) and Sections 10 and 11 of Republic
[8] Id. at 12-13. Act No. 6646 are hereby repealed. As a consequence, the first proviso in the
[9] Comment of the OSG, pp. 11-26. third paragraph of Section 11 of Republic Act No. 8436 is rendered
ineffective. All laws, presidential decrees, executive orders, rules and
[10] Id. at 27-40. regulations, or any part thereof inconsistent with the provisions of this Act
[11] The first paragraph of Sec. 1 of Rule 65 provides: are hereby repealed or modified or amended accordingly.
SECTION 1. Petition for certiorari.When any tribunal, board or [21] 463 Phil. 179, 205-208 (2003).
officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in [22] Citations omitted.
excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, nor any plain, [23] Province of Batangas v. Romulo, G.R. No. 152774, May 27,
speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person 2004, 429 SCRA 736, 755.
aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the [24] Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 143 (1972).
facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or [25] Mancuso v. Taft, 476 F.2d 187, 190 (1973).
modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting [26] David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. Nos. 171396, 171409,
such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require. (See Patalinghug v. 171485, 171483, 171400, 171489 and 171424, May 3, 2006, 489 SCRA 160,
Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 178767, January 30, 2008, 543 SCRA 218.
175, 184-185.) [27] Dumlao v. COMELEC, G.R. No. L-52245, January 22, 1980, 95
[12] The first paragraph of Sec. 1 of Rule 63 provides: SCRA 392, 401. This case explains the standards that have to be followed in
SECTION 1. Who may file petition.Any person interested under the exercise of the power of judicial review, namely: (1) the existence of an
a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, or whose rights are appropriate case; (2) an interest personal and substantial by the party
affected by a statute, executive order or regulation, ordinance, or any other raising the constitutional question; (3) the plea that the function be
governmental regulation may, before breach or violation thereof, bring an exercised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the necessity that the
action in the appropriate Regional Trial Court to determine any question of constitutional question be passed upon in order to decide the case.
construction or validity arising, and for a declaration of his rights or duties, [28] Clements v. Fashing, 457 U.S. 957, 960; 102 S.Ct. 2836, 2843
thereunder. (See Almeda v. Bathala Marketing Industries, Inc., G.R. No. (1982).
150806, January 28, 2008, 542 SCRA 470, 478-479; John Hay Peoples [29] Supra note 25, at 195-196.
Alternative Coalition v. Lim, G.R. No. 119775, October 24, 2003, 414 SCRA [30] Citations omitted.
356, 369.)
[13] Salvacion v. Central Bank of the Philippines, supra note 1, at [31] G.R. No. 158793, June 8, 2006, 490 SCRA 318, 351-352.
39.
[14] MCC Industrial Sales Corporation v. Ssangyong Corporation, [32] Cruz, Constitutional Law (1998 ed.), p. 131.
G.R. No. 170633, October 17, 2007, 536 SCRA 408, 433. [33] Id. at 131-132.
[15] Emphasis supplied. [34] Fort v. Civil Service Commission of the County of Alameda, 61
[16] Record of the Senate, Vol. III, Session No. 29, September 27, Cal.2d 331, 336; 392 P.2d 385, 388; 38 Cal.Rptr. 625, 628 (1964).
2006, pp. 69-70.
[17] Record of the Senate, Vol. III, Session No. 12, August 16,
2006, pp. 71-72. [35] Supra note 25, at 198-199.
[18] Senate Records and Archives, 13th CP, 3rd Regular Session, [36] Kinnear v. City and County of San Francisco, 61 Cal.2d 341,
Vol. III, August 1, 2006, p. 25. 343; 392 P.2d 391, 392; 38 Cal.Rptr. 631, 632 (1964).
[37] Supra note 25, at 199-201.
[38] Citations omitted.
[39] Supra note 28.
5
Prior to Republic Act No. 9716, the Province of Camarines Sur was estimated
to have a population of 1,693,821,2 distributed among four (4) legislative
Republic of the Philippines districts in this wise:
SUPREME COURT
Manila District Municipalities/Cities Population
1st District Del Gallego
EN BANC Ragay
Lupi
G.R. No. 189793 April 7, 2010 Sipocot
Cabusao Libmanan
SENATOR BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III and MAYOR JESSE Minalabac
ROBREDO, Petitioners, Pamplona
vs. Pasacao
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS represented by its Chairman JOSE San Fernando
A.R. MELO and its Commissioners, RENE V. SARMIENTO, 417,304
NICODEMO T. FERRER, LUCENITO N. TAGLE, ARMANDO VELASCO,
ELIAS R. YUSOPH AND GREGORIO LARRAZABAL, Respondents. 2nd District Gainza
Milaor
DECISION Naga
Pili
PEREZ, J.: Ocampo Canaman
Camaligan
This case comes before this Court by way of a Petition for Certiorari and Magarao
Prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. In this original action, Bombon
petitioners Senator Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III and Mayor Jesse Robredo, Calabanga
as public officers, taxpayers and citizens, seek the nullification as 474,899
unconstitutional of Republic Act No. 9716, entitled "An Act Reapportioning
the Composition of the First (1st) and Second (2nd) Legislative Districts in 3rd District Caramoan
the Province of Camarines Sur and Thereby Creating a New Legislative Garchitorena
District From Such Reapportionment." Petitioners consequently pray that the Goa
respondent Commission on Elections be restrained from making any Lagonoy
issuances and from taking any steps relative to the implementation of Presentacion Sangay
Republic Act No. 9716. San Jose
Tigaon
Republic Act No. 9716 originated from House Bill No. 4264, and was Tinamba
signed into law by President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo on 12 October 2009. It Siruma
took effect on 31 October 2009, or fifteen (15) days following its publication 372,548
in the Manila Standard, a newspaper of general circulation.1 In substance,
the said law created an additional legislative district for the Province of 4th District Iriga
Camarines Sur by reconfiguring the existing first and second legislative Baao
districts of the province. Balatan
Bato Buhi
Bula
Nabua
429,070 Balatan
Bato Buhi
Following the enactment of Republic Act No. 9716, the first and second Bula
districts of Camarines Sur were reconfigured in order to create an additional Nabua 429,070
legislative district for the province. Hence, the first district municipalities of Republic Act No. 9716 is a well-milled legislation. The factual recitals by both
Libmanan, Minalabac, Pamplona, Pasacao, and San Fernando were combined parties of the origins of the bill that became the law show that, from the
with the second district municipalities of Milaor and Gainza to form a new filing of House Bill No. 4264 until its approval by the Senate on a vote of
second legislative district. The following table3 illustrates the thirteen (13) in favor and two (2) against, the process progressed step by
reapportionment made by Republic Act No. 9716: step, marked by public hearings on the sentiments and position of the local
officials of Camarines Sur on the creation of a new congressional district, as
District Municipalities/Cities Population well as argumentation and debate on the issue, now before us, concerning
1st District Del Gallego the stand of the oppositors of the bill that a population of at least 250,000 is
Ragay required by the Constitution for such new district.4
Lupi
Sipocot Petitioner Aquino III was one of two senators who voted against the
Cabusao approval of the Bill by the Senate. His co-petitioner, Robredo, is the Mayor of
176,383 Naga City, which was a part of the former second district from which the
municipalities of Gainza and Milaor were taken for inclusion in the new
2nd District Libmanan second district. No other local executive joined the two; neither did the
Minalabac representatives of the former third and fourth districts of the province.
Pamplona
PasacaoSan Fernando Petitioners contend that the reapportionment introduced by Republic Act No.
Gainza 9716, runs afoul of the explicit constitutional standard that requires a
Milaor minimum population of two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) for the
276,777 creation of a legislative district.5 The petitioners claim that the
reconfiguration by Republic Act No. 9716 of the first and second districts of
3rd District (formerly 2nd District) Naga Camarines Sur is unconstitutional, because the proposed first district will end
Pili up with a population of less than 250,000 or only 176,383.
Ocampo
Canaman Camaligan Petitioners rely on Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution as basis
Magarao for the cited 250,000 minimum population standard.6 The provision reads:
Bombon
Calabanga 439,043 Article VI
4th District (formerly 3rd District) Caramoan
Garchitorena Section 5. (1) x x x x
Goa
Lagonoy (2) x x x x
Presentacion Sangay
San Jose (3) Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous,
Tigaon compact, and adjacent territory. Each city with a population of at least two
Tinamba hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one
Siruma 372,548 representative.
5th District (formerly 4th District) Iriga
Baao (4) x x x x (Emphasis supplied).

The petitioners posit that the 250,000 figure appearing in the above-cited
provision is the minimum population requirement for the creation of a
legislative district.7 The petitioners theorize that, save in the case of a newly
created province, each legislative district created by Congress must be
supported by a minimum population of at least 250,000 in order to be valid.8
Under this view, existing legislative districts may be reapportioned and
severed to form new districts, provided each resulting district will represent a
population of at least 250,000. On the other hand, if the reapportionment
would result in the creation of a legislative seat representing a
populace of less than 250,000 inhabitants, the reapportionment
must be stricken down as invalid for non-compliance with the
minimum population requirement.
In support of their theory, the petitioners point to what they claim is the
intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution to adopt a population
minimum of 250,000 in the creation of additional legislative seats.9 The
petitioners argue that when the Constitutional Commission fixed the original
number of district seats in the House of Representatives to two hundred
(200), they took into account the projected national population of fifty five
million (55,000,000) for the year 1986.10 According to the petitioners, 55
million people represented by 200 district representatives translates to
roughly 250,000 people for every one (1) representative.11 Thus, the
250,000 population requirement found in Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987
Constitution is actually based on the population constant used by the
Constitutional Commission in distributing the initial 200 legislative seats.
Thus did the petitioners claim that in reapportioning legislative districts
independently from the creation of a province, Congress is bound to observe
a 250,000 population threshold, in the same manner that the Constitutional
Commission did in the original apportionment.
Verbatim, the submission is that:
1. Republic Act 9716 is unconstitutional because the newly apportioned first
district of Camarines Sur failed to meet the population requirement for the
creation of the legislative district as explicitly provided in Article VI, Section
5, Paragraphs (1) and (3) of the Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance
appended thereto; and
2. Republic Act 9716 violates the principle of proportional representation as
provided in Article VI, Section 5 paragraphs (1), (3) and (4) of the
Constitution.12
The provision subject of this case states:
Article VI
Section 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more
than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who
shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces,
cities and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of
their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive
ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party-
list system of registered national, regional and sectoral parties or
organizations.
(2) x x x x
(3) Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous,
compact, and adjacent territory. Each city with a population of at least two
hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one
representative.
(4) Within three years following the return of every census, the Congress
shall make a reapportionment of legislative districts based on the standards
provided in this section.
On the other hand, the respondents, through the Office of the Solicitor
General, seek the dismissal of the present petition based on procedural and
substantive grounds.
On procedural matters, the respondents argue that the petitioners are guilty
of two (2) fatal technical defects: first, petitioners committed an error in
choosing to assail the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 9716 via the
remedy of Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court; and
second, the petitioners have no locus standi to question the constitutionality
of Republic Act No. 9716.
On substantive matters, the respondents call attention to an apparent
distinction between cities and provinces drawn by Section 5(3), Article VI of
the 1987 Constitution. The respondents concede the existence of a 250,000
population condition, but argue that a plain and simple reading of the
questioned provision will show that the same has no application with respect
to the creation of legislative districts in provinces.13 Rather, the 250,000
minimum population is only a requirement for the creation of a legislative
district in a city.
In sum, the respondents deny the existence of a fixed population
requirement for the reapportionment of districts in provinces. Therefore,
Republic Act No. 9716, which only creates an additional legislative district
within the province of Camarines Sur, should be sustained as a perfectly
valid reapportionment law.
We first pass upon the threshold issues.
The respondents assert that by choosing to avail themselves of the remedies
of Certiorari and Prohibition, the petitioners have committed a fatal
procedural lapse. The respondents cite the following reasons:
1. The instant petition is bereft of any allegation that the respondents had
acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion.1avvphi1
2. The remedy of Certiorari and Prohibition must be directed against a
tribunal, board, officer or person, whether exercising judicial, quasi-judicial,
or ministerial functions. Respondents maintain that in implementing Republic
Act No. 9716, they were not acting as a judicial or quasi-judicial body, nor
were they engaging in the performance of a ministerial act.
3. The petitioners could have availed themselves of another plain, speedy
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Considering that the
main thrust of the instant petition is the declaration of unconstitutionality of
Republic Act No. 9716, the same could have been ventilated through a
petition for declaratory relief, over which the Supreme Court has only
appellate, not original jurisdiction.
The respondents likewise allege that the petitioners had failed to show that
they had sustained, or is in danger of sustaining any substantial injury as a
result of the implementation of Republic Act No. 9716. The respondents,
therefore, conclude that the petitioners lack the required legal standing to
question the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 9716.
This Court has paved the way away from procedural debates when
confronted with issues that, by reason of constitutional importance, need a
direct focus of the arguments on their content and substance.
The Supreme Court has, on more than one occasion, tempered the
application of procedural rules,14 as well as relaxed the requirement of locus
standi whenever confronted with an important issue of overreaching
significance to society.15
Hence, in Del Mar v. Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation
(PAGCOR)16 and Jaworski v. PAGCOR,17 this Court sanctioned momentary
deviation from the principle of the hierarchy of courts, and took original
cognizance of cases raising issues of paramount public importance. The
Jaworski case ratiocinates:
Granting arguendo that the present action cannot be properly treated as a
petition for prohibition, the transcendental importance of the issues involved
in this case warrants that we set aside the technical defects and take primary
jurisdiction over the petition at bar. One cannot deny that the issues raised
herein have potentially pervasive influence on the social and moral well
being of this nation, specially the youth; hence, their proper and just
determination is an imperative need. This is in accordance with the well-
entrenched principle that rules of procedure are not inflexible tools designed
to hinder or delay, but to facilitate and promote the administration of justice.
Their strict and rigid application, which would result in technicalities that
tend to frustrate, rather than promote substantial justice, must always be
eschewed. (Emphasis supplied)
Anent the locus standi requirement, this Court has already uniformly ruled in
Kilosbayan v. Guingona,18 Tatad v. Executive Secretary,19 Chavez v. Public
Estates Authority20 and Bagong Alyansang Makabayan v. Zamora,21 just to
name a few, that absence of direct injury on the part of the party seeking
judicial review may be excused when the latter is able to craft an issue of
transcendental importance. In Lim v. Executive Secretary,22 this Court held
that in cases of transcendental importance, the cases must be settled
promptly and definitely, and so, the standing requirements may be relaxed.
This liberal stance has been echoed in the more recent decision on Chavez v.
Gonzales.23
Given the weight of the issue raised in the instant petition, the foregoing
principles must apply. The beaten path must be taken. We go directly to the
determination of whether or not a population of 250,000 is an indispensable
constitutional requirement for the creation of a new legislative district in a
province.
We deny the petition.
We start with the basics. Any law duly enacted by Congress carries with it
the presumption of constitutionality.24 Before a law may be declared
unconstitutional by this Court, there must be a clear showing that a specific
provision of the fundamental law has been violated or transgressed. When
there is neither a violation of a specific provision of the Constitution nor any
proof showing that there is such a violation, the presumption of
constitutionality will prevail and the law must be upheld. To doubt is to
sustain.25
There is no specific provision in the Constitution that fixes a 250,000
minimum population that must compose a legislative district.
As already mentioned, the petitioners rely on the second sentence of Section
5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, coupled with what they perceive to
be the intent of the framers of the Constitution to adopt a minimum
population of 250,000 for each legislative district.
The second sentence of Section 5(3), Article VI of the Constitution,
succinctly provides: "Each city with a population of at least two hundred
fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one representative."
The provision draws a plain and clear distinction between the entitlement of
a city to a district on one hand, and the entitlement of a province to a district
on the other. For while a province is entitled to at least a representative,
with nothing mentioned about population, a city must first meet a population
minimum of 250,000 in order to be similarly entitled.
The use by the subject provision of a comma to separate the phrase "each
city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand" from the
phrase "or each province" point to no other conclusion than that the 250,000
minimum population is only required for a city, but not for a province. 26
Plainly read, Section 5(3) of the Constitution requires a 250,000 minimum
population only for a city to be entitled to a representative, but not so for a
province.
The 250,000 minimum population requirement for legislative districts in cities
was, in turn, the subject of interpretation by this Court in Mariano, Jr. v.
COMELEC.27
In Mariano, the issue presented was the constitutionality of Republic Act No.
7854, which was the law that converted the Municipality of Makati into a
Highly Urbanized City. As it happened, Republic Act No. 7854 created an
additional legislative district for Makati, which at that time was a lone district.
The petitioners in that case argued that the creation of an additional district
would violate Section 5(3), Article VI of the Constitution, because the
resulting districts would be supported by a population of less than 250,000,
considering that Makati had a total population of only 450,000. The Supreme
Court sustained the constitutionality of the law and the validity of the newly
created district, explaining the operation of the Constitutional phrase "each
city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand," to wit:
Petitioners cannot insist that the addition of another
legislative district in Makati is not in accord with section 5(3), Article
VI of the Constitution for as of the latest survey (1990 census), the
population of Makati stands at only four hundred fifty thousand
(450,000). Said section provides, inter alia, that a city with a
population of at least two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) shall
have at least one representative. Even granting that the population
of Makati as of the 1990 census stood at four hundred fifty thousand
(450,000), its legislative district may still be increased since it has
met the minimum population requirement of two hundred fifty
thousand (250,000). In fact, Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to
the Constitution provides that a city whose population has increased
to more than two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) shall be entitled
to at least one congressional representative.28 (Emphasis supplied)
The Mariano case limited the application of the 250,000 minimum population
requirement for cities only to its initial legislative district. In other words,
while Section 5(3), Article VI of the Constitution requires a city to have a
minimum population of 250,000 to be entitled to a representative, it does
not have to increase its population by another 250,000 to be
entitled to an additional district.
There is no reason why the Mariano case, which involves the creation of an
additional district within a city, should not be applied to additional districts in
provinces. Indeed, if an additional legislative district created within a city is
not required to represent a population of at least 250,000 in order to be
valid, neither should such be needed for an additional district in a province,
considering moreover that a province is entitled to an initial seat by the mere
fact of its creation and regardless of its population.
Apropos for discussion is the provision of the Local Government Code on the
creation of a province which, by virtue of and upon creation, is entitled to at
least a legislative district. Thus, Section 461 of the Local Government Code
states:
Requisites for Creation. (a) A province may be created if it has an average
annual income, as certified by the Department of Finance, of not less than
Twenty million pesos (P20,000,000.00) based on 1991 constant prices and
either of the following requisites:
(i) a contiguous territory of at least two thousand (2,000) square kilometers,
as certified by the Lands Management Bureau; or
(ii) a population of not less than two hundred fifty thousand (250,000)
inhabitants as certified by the National Statistics Office.
Notably, the requirement of population is not an indispensable requirement,
but is merely an alternative addition to the indispensable income
requirement.
Mariano, it would turn out, is but a reflection of the pertinent ideas that ran
through the deliberations on the words and meaning of Section 5 of Article
VI.
The whats, whys, and wherefores of the population requirement of "at least
two hundred fifty thousand" may be gleaned from the records of the
Constitutional Commission which, upon framing the provisions of Section 5 of
Article VI, proceeded to form an ordinance that would be appended to the
final document. The Ordinance is captioned "APPORTIONING THE SEATS OF
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE CONGRESS OF THE
PHILIPPINES TO THE DIFFERENT LEGISLATIVE DISTRICTS IN PROVINCES
AND CITIES AND THE METROPOLITAN MANILA AREA." Such records would
show that the 250,000 population benchmark was used for the 1986
nationwide apportionment of legislative districts among provinces, cities and
Metropolitan Manila. Simply put, the population figure was used to determine
how many districts a province, city, or Metropolitan Manila should have.
Simply discernible too is the fact that, for the purpose, population had to be
the determinant. Even then, the requirement of 250,000 inhabitants was not
taken as an absolute minimum for one legislative district. And, closer to the
point herein at issue, in the determination of the precise district within the
province to which, through the use of the population benchmark, so many
districts have been apportioned, population as a factor was not the sole,
though it was among, several determinants.
From its journal,29 we can see that the Constitutional Commission originally
divided the entire country into two hundred (200) districts, which
corresponded to the original number of district representatives. The 200
seats were distributed by the Constitutional Commission in this manner: first,
one (1) seat each was given to the seventy-three (73) provinces and the ten
(10) cities with a population of at least 250,000;30 second, the remaining
seats were then redistributed among the provinces, cities and the
Metropolitan Area "in accordance with the number of their inhabitants on the
basis of a uniform and progressive ratio."31 Commissioner Davide, who later
became a Member and then Chief Justice of the Court, explained this in his
sponsorship remark32 for the Ordinance to be appended to the 1987
Constitution:
Commissioner Davide: The ordinance fixes at 200 the number of legislative
seats which are, in turn, apportioned among provinces and cities with a
population of at least 250, 000 and the Metropolitan Area in accordance with
the number of their respective inhabitants on the basis of a uniform and
progressive ratio. The population is based on the 1986 projection, with the
1980 official enumeration as the point of reckoning. This projection indicates
that our population is more or less 56 million. Taking into account the
mandate that each city with at least 250, 000 inhabitants and each province
shall have at least one representative, we first allotted one seat for each of
the 73 provinces, and each one for all cities with a population of at least 250,
000, which are the Cities of Manila, Quezon, Pasay, Caloocan, Cebu, Iloilo,
Bacolod, Cagayan de Oro, Davao and Zamboanga. Thereafter, we then
proceed[ed] to increase whenever appropriate the number of seats for the
provinces and cities in accordance with the number of their inhabitants on
the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio. (Emphasis supplied).
Thus was the number of seats computed for each province and city.
Differentiated from this, the determination of the districts within the province
had to consider "all protests and complaints formally received" which, the
records show, dealt with determinants other than population as already
mentioned.
Palawan is a case in point. Journal No. 107 of the Constitutional Commission
narrates:
INTERPELLATION OF MR. NOLLEDO:
Mr. Nolledo inquired on the reason for including Puerto Princesa in the
northern towns when it was more affinity with the southern town of Aborlan,
Batarasa, Brookes Point, Narra, Quezon and Marcos. He stated that the First
District has a greater area than the Second District. He then queried whether
population was the only factor considered by the Committee in redistricting.
Replying thereto, Mr. Davide explained that the Committee took into account
the standards set in Section 5 of the Article on the Legislative Department,
namely: 1) the legislative seats should be apportioned among the provinces
and cities and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with their
inhabitants on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio; and 2) the
legislative district must be compact, adjacent and contiguous.
Mr. Nolledo pointed out that the last factor was not met when Puerto
Princesa was included with the northern towns. He then inquired what is the
distance between Puerto Princesa from San Vicente.
xxxx
Thereupon, Mr. Nolledo stated that Puerto Princesa has a population of
75,480 and based on the apportionment, its inclusion with the northern
towns would result in a combined population of 265,000 as against only
186,000 for the south. He added that Cuyo and Coron are very important
towns in the northern part of Palawan and, in fact, Cuyo was the capital of
Palawan before its transfer to Puerto Princesa. He also pointed out that there
are more potential candidates in the north and therefore if Puerto Princesa
City and the towns of Cuyo and Coron are lumped together, there would be
less candidates in the south, most of whose inhabitants are not interested in
politics. He then suggested that Puerto Princesa be included in the south or
the Second District.
Mr. Davide stated that the proposal would be considered during the period of
amendments. He requested that the COMELEC staff study said proposal.33
"PROPOSED AMENDMENT OF MR. NOLLEDO
On the districting of Palawan, Mr. Nolledo pointed out that it was explained
in the interpellations that District I has a total population of 265,358
including the City of Puerto Princesa, while the Second District has a total
population of 186,733. He proposed, however, that Puerto Princesa be
included in the Second District in order to satisfy the contiguity requirement
in the Constitution considering that said City is nearer the southern towns
comprising the Second District.
In reply to Mr. Monsods query, Mr. Nolledo explained that with the proposed
transfer of Puerto Princesa City to the Second District, the First District would
only have a total population of 190,000 while the Second District would have
262,213, and there would be no substantial changes.
Mr. Davide accepted Mr. Nolledos proposal to insert Puerto Princesa City
before the Municipality of Aborlan.
There being no objection on the part of the Members the same was
approved by the Body.
APPROVAL OF THE APPORTIONMENT AND DISTRICTING OF PALAWAN
There being no other amendment, on motion of Mr. Davide, there being no
objection, the apportionment and districting for the province of Palawan was
approved by the Body.34
The districting of Palawan disregarded the 250,000 population figure. It was
decided by the importance of the towns and the city that eventually
composed the districts.
Benguet and Baguio are another reference point. The Journal further
narrates:
At this juncture, Mr. Davide informed the Body that Mr. Regalado made a
reservation with the Committee for the possible reopening of the approval of
Region I with respect to Benguet and Baguio City.
REMARKS OF MR. REGALADO
Mr. Regalado stated that in the formulation of the Committee, Baguio City
and Tuba are placed in one district. He stated that he was toying with the
idea that, perhaps as a special consideration for Baguio because it is the
summer capital of the Philippines, Tuba could be divorced from Baguio City
so that it could, by itself, have its own constituency and Tuba could be
transferred to the Second District together with Itogon. Mr. Davide, however,
pointed out that the population of Baguio City is only 141,149.
Mr. Regalado admitted that the regular population of Baguio may be lower
during certain times of the year, but the transient population would increase
the population substantially and, therefore, for purposes of business and
professional transactions, it is beyond question that population-wise, Baguio
would more than qualify, not to speak of the official business matters,
transactions and offices that are also there.
Mr. Davide adverted to Director de Limas statement that unless Tuba and
Baguio City are united, Tuba will be isolated from the rest of Benguet as the
place can only be reached by passing through Baguio City. He stated that the
Committee would submit the matter to the Body.
Upon inquiry of the Chair whether he is insisting on his amendment, Mr.
Regalado stated that the Body should have a say on the matter and that the
considerations he had given are not on the demographic aspects but on the
fact that Baguio City is the summer capital, the venue and situs of many
government offices and functions.
On motion of Mr. Davide, there being no objection, the Body approved the
reconsideration of the earlier approval of the apportionment and districting
of Region I, particularly Benguet.
Thereafter, on motion of Mr. Davide, there being no objection, the
amendment of Mr. Regalado was put to a vote. With 14 Members voting in
favor and none against, the amendment was approved by the Body.
Mr. Davide informed that in view of the approval of the amendment,
Benguet with Baguio City will have two seats. The First District shall
comprise of the municipalities of Mankayan, Buguias, Bakun, Kabayan,
Kibungan, Bokod, Atok, Kapangan, Tublay, La Trinidad, Sablan, Itogon and
Tuba. The Second District shall comprise of Baguio City alone.
There being no objection, the Body approved the apportionment and
districting of Region I.35
Quite emphatically, population was explicitly removed as a factor.
It may be additionally mentioned that the province of Cavite was divided into
districts based on the distribution of its three cities, with each district having
a city: one district "supposed to be a fishing area; another a vegetable and
fruit area; and the third, a rice growing area," because such consideration
"fosters common interests in line with the standard of compactness."36 In
the districting of Maguindanao, among the matters discussed were "political
stability and common interest among the people in the area" and the
possibility of "chaos and disunity" considering the "accepted regional,
political, traditional and sectoral leaders."37 For Laguna, it was mentioned
that municipalities in the highland should not be grouped with the towns in
the lowland. For Cebu, Commissioner Maambong proposed that they should
"balance the area and population."38
Consistent with Mariano and with the framer deliberations on district
apportionment, we stated in Bagabuyo v. COMELEC39 that:
x x x Undeniably, these figures show a disparity in the population sizes of the
districts. The Constitution, however, does not require mathematical
exactitude or rigid equality as a standard in gauging equality of
representation. x x x. To ensure quality representation through commonality
of interests and ease of access by the representative to the constituents, all
that the Constitution requires is that every legislative district should
comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact and adjacent territory.
(Emphasis supplied).
This 2008 pronouncement is fresh reasoning against the uncompromising
stand of petitioner that an additional provincial legislative district, which does
not have at least a 250,000 population is not allowed by the Constitution.
The foregoing reading and review lead to a clear lesson.
Neither in the text nor in the essence of Section 5, Article VI of the
Constitution can, the petition find support. And the formulation of the
Ordinance in the implementation of the provision, nay, even the Ordinance
itself, refutes the contention that a population of 250,000 is a constitutional
sine qua non for the formation of an additional legislative district in a
province, whose population growth has increased beyond the 1986 numbers.
Translated in the terms of the present case:
1. The Province of Camarines Sur, with an estimated population of 1,693,821
in 2007 is based on the formula and constant number of 250,000 used by
the Constitutional Commission in nationally apportioning legislative districts
among provinces and cities entitled to two (2) districts in addition to the
four (4) that it was given in the 1986 apportionment. Significantly, petitioner
Aquino concedes this point.40 In other words, Section 5 of Article VI as
clearly written allows and does not prohibit an additional district for the
Province of Camarines Sur, such as that provided for in Republic Act No.
9786;
2. Based on the pith and pitch of the exchanges on the Ordinance on the
protests and complaints against strict conformity with the population
standard, and more importantly based on the final districting in the
Ordinance on considerations other than population, the reapportionment or
the recomposition of the first and second legislative districts in the Province
of Camarines Sur that resulted in the creation of a new legislative district is
valid even if the population of the new district is 176,383 and not 250,000 as
insisted upon by the petitioners.
3. The factors mentioned during the deliberations on House Bill No. 4264,
were:
(a) the dialects spoken in the grouped municipalities;
(b) the size of the original groupings compared to that of the regrouped
municipalities;
(c) the natural division separating the municipality subject of the discussion
from the reconfigured District One; and
 Associate Justice DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
(d) the balancing of the areas of the three districts resulting from the Associate Justice
redistricting of Districts One and Two.41 LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO
Each of such factors and in relation to the others considered together, with Associate Justice
the increased population of the erstwhile Districts One and Two, point to the (On Official Leave)
utter absence of abuse of discretion, much less grave abuse of discretion,42 ROBERTO A. ABAD*
that would warrant the invalidation of Republic Act No. 9716. Associate Justice MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.
Associate Justice
To be clear about our judgment, we do not say that in the reapportionment JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA
of the first and second legislative districts of Camarines Sur, the number of Associate Justice
inhabitants in the resulting additional district should not be considered. Our
ruling is that population is not the only factor but is just one of several other CERTIFICATION
factors in the composition of the additional district. Such settlement is in
accord with both the text of the Constitution and the spirit of the letter, so Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified
very clearly given form in the Constitutional debates on the exact issue that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
presented by this petition.1avvphi1 before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. Republic Act No. 9716 REYNATO S. PUNO
entitled "An Act Reapportioning the Composition of the First (1st) and Chief Justice
Second (2nd) Legislative Districts in the Province of Camarines Sur and
Thereby Creating a New Legislative District From Such Reapportionment" is
a VALID LAW.

SO ORDERED.

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate Justice
ARTURO D. BRION
 This is an original action for Prohibition to declare unconstitutional
Republic Act No. 9591 (RA 9591), creating a legislative district for the city of
Malolos, Bulacan, for violating the minimum population requirement for the

6
creation of a legislative district in a city.

EN BANC Antecedents

Before 1 May 2009, the province of Bulacan was represented in

VICTORINO B. ALDABA, G.R No. 188078 Congress through four legislative districts. The First Legislative District
CARLO JOLETTE S. FAJARDO, comprised of the city of Malolos[1] and the municipalities of Hagonoy,
JULIO G. MORADA, and Present: Calumpit, Pulilan, Bulacan, and Paombong. On 1 May 2009, RA 9591 lapsed
MINERVA ALDABA MORADA, into law, amending Malolos City Charter,[2] by creating a separate
Petitioners, PUNO, C.J., legislative district for the city. At the time the legislative bills for RA 9591
CARPIO, were filed in Congress in 2007, namely, House Bill No. 3162 (later converted
CORONA, to House Bill No. 3693) and Senate Bill No. 1986, the population of Malolos
CARPIO MORALES, City was 223,069. The population of Malolos City on 1 May 2009 is a
VELASCO, JR., contested fact but there is no dispute that House Bill No. 3693 relied on an
NACHURA, undated certification issued by a Regional Director of the National Statistics
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, Office (NSO) that the projected population of the Municipality of Malolos will
BRION, be 254,030 by the year 2010 using the population growth rate of 3.78
- versus - PERALTA, between 1995 to 2000.[3]
BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO, Petitioners, taxpayers, registered voters and residents of Malolos City,
ABAD, filed this petition contending that RA 9591 is unconstitutional for failing to
VILLARAMA, JR., meet the minimum population threshold of 250,000 for a city to merit
PEREZ, and representation in Congress as provided under Section 5(3), Article VI of the
MENDOZA, JJ. 1987 Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the 1987
Constitution.

In its Comment to the petition, the Office of the Solicitor

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Promulgated: General (OSG) contended that Congress use of projected
Respondent. January 25, 2010 population is non-justiciable as it involves a determination on the
x------------------------------------------------- wisdom of the standard adopted by the legislature to determine
- -x compliance with [a constitutional requirement].[4]

The Ruling of the Court

DECISION
We grant the petition and declare RA 9591 unconstitutional for
CARPIO, J.: being violative of Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and
Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution

The Case The 1987 Constitution requires that for a city to have a legislative
district, the city must have a population of at least two hundred fifty
thousand.[5] The only issue here is whether the City of Malolos has a
population of at least 250,000, whether actual or projected, for the purpose
of creating a legislative district for the City of Malolos in time for the 10 May
2010 elections. If not, then RA 9591 creating a legislative district in the City
of Malolos is unconstitutional.
House Bill No. 3693 cites the undated Certification of Regional Director
Alberto N. Miranda of Region III of the National Statistics Office (NSO) as
authority that the population of the City of Malolos will be 254,030 by the
year 2010. The Certification states that the population of Malolos, Bulacan
as of May 1, 2000 is 175,291. The Certification further states that it was
issued upon the request of Mayor Danilo A. Domingo of the City of Malolos
in connection with the proposed creation of Malolos City as a lone
congressional district of the Province of Bulacan.[6]
The Certification of Regional Director Miranda, which is based on
demographic projections, is without legal effect because Regional Director
Miranda has no basis and no authority to issue the Certification. The
Certification is also void on its face because based on its own growth rate
assumption, the population of Malolos will be less than 250,000 in the year
2010. In addition, intercensal demographic projections cannot be made for
the entire year. In any event, a city whose population has increased to
250,000 is entitled to have a legislative district only in the immediately
following election[7] after the attainment of the 250,000 population.
First, certifications on demographic projections can be issued only if such
projections are declared official by the National Statistics Coordination Board
(NSCB). Second, certifications based on demographic projections can be
issued only by the NSO Administrator or his designated certifying officer.
Third, intercensal population projections must be as of the middle of every
year.
Section 6 of Executive Order No. 135[8] dated 6 November 1993 issued by
President Fidel V. Ramos provides:
SECTION 6. Guidelines on the Issuance of Certification of Population sizes
Pursuant to Section 7, 386, 442, 450, 452, and 461 of the New Local
Government Code.
(a) The National Statistics Office shall issue certification on data that it
has collected and processed as well as on statistics that it has estimated.
(b) For census years, certification on population size will be based on
actual population census counts; while for the intercensal years, the
certification will be made on the basis of a set of demographic projections or
estimates declared official by the National Statistical Coordination Board
(NSCB).
(c) Certification of population census counts will be made as of the
census reference date, such as May 1, 1990, while those of intercensal
population estimates will be as of middle of every year.
(d) Certification of population size based on projections may specify the
range within which the true count is deemed likely to fall. The range will
correspond to the official low and high population projections.
(e) The smallest geographic area for which a certification on population
size may be issued will be the barangay for census population counts, and
the city or municipality for intercensal estimates. If an LGU wants to conduct
its own population census, during offcensus years, approval must be sought
from the NSCB and the conduct must be under the technical supervision of
NSO from planning to data processing.
(f) Certifications of population size based on published census results
shall be issued by the Provincial Census Officers or by the Regional Census
Officers. Certifications based on projections or estimates, however, will be
issued by the NSO Administrator or his designated certifying officer.
(Emphasis supplied)
The Certification of Regional Director Miranda does not state that the
demographic projections he certified have been declared official by the
NSCB. The records of this case do not also show that the Certification of
Regional Director Miranda is based on demographic projections declared
official by the NSCB. The Certification, which states that the population of
Malolos will be 254,030 by the year 2010, violates the requirement that
intercensal demographic projections shall be as of the middle of every
year. In addition, there is no showing that Regional Director Miranda has
been designated by the NSO Administrator as a certifying officer for
demographic projections in Region III. In the absence of such official
designation, only the certification of the NSO Administrator can be given
credence by this Court.
Moreover, the Certification states that the total population of Malolos,
Bulacan as of May 1, 2000 is 175,291. The Certification also states that the
population growth rate of Malolos is 3.78% per year between 1995 and
2000. Based on a growth rate of 3.78% per year, the population of Malolos
of 175,291 in 2000 will grow to only 241,550 in 2010.
Also, the 2007 Census places the population of Malolos at 223,069 as of 1
August 2007.[9] Based on a growth rate of 3.78%, the population of
Malolos will grow to only 248,365 as of 1 August 2010. Even if the growth
rate is compounded yearly, the population of Malolos of 223,069 as of 1
August 2007 will grow to only 249,333 as of 1 August 2010.[10]
All these conflict with what the Certification states that the population of
Malolos will be 254,030 by the year 2010. Based on the Certifications own
growth rate assumption, the population of Malolos will be less than 250,000
before the 10 May 2010 elections. Incidentally, the NSO has no published
population projections for individual municipalities or cities but only for entire
regions and provinces.[11]
Executive Order No. 135 cannot simply be brushed aside. The OSG,
representing respondent Commission on Elections, invoked Executive Order
No. 135 in its Comment, thus:
Here, based on the NSO projection, the population of the
Municipality of Malolos will be 254,030 by the year 2010 using the population
growth rate of 3.78 between 1995-2000. This projection issued by the
authority of the NSO Administrator is recognized under Executive Order No.
135 (The Guidelines on the Issuance of Certification of Population Sizes),
which states:
xxx
(d) Certification of population size based on projections may specify
the range within which the true count is deemed likely to fall. The range will
correspond to the official low and high population projections.
xxx
(f) Certifications of population size based on published census results
shall be issued by the Provincial Census Officers or by the Regional Census
Officers. Certifications based on projections or estimates, however, will be
issued by the NSO Administrator or his designated certifying officer.[12]
(Emphasis supplied)
Any population projection forming the basis for the creation of a legislative
district must be based on an official and credible source. That is why the
OSG cited Executive Order No. 135, otherwise the population projection
would be unreliable or speculative.
Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution provides:
Any province that may be created, or any city whose population may
hereafter increase to more than two hundred fifty thousand shall be entitled
in the immediately following election to at least one Member or such number
of members as it may be entitled to on the basis of the number of its
inhabitants and according to the standards set forth in paragraph (3),
Section 5 of Article VI of the Constitution. xxx. (Emphasis supplied)
A city that has attained a population of 250,000 is entitled to a legislative
district only in the immediately following election. In short, a city must
first attain the 250,000 population, and thereafter, in the immediately
following election, such city shall have a district representative. There is no
showing in the present case that the City of Malolos has attained or will
attain a population of 250,000, whether actual or projected, before the 10
May 2010 elections.
Clearly, there is no official record that the population of the City of Malolos
will be at least 250,000, actual or projected, prior to the 10 May 2010
elections, the immediately following election after the supposed attainment
of such population. Thus, the City of Malolos is not qualified to have a
legislative district of its own under Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987
Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the 1987
Constitution.
On the OSGs contention that Congress choice of means to comply with the
population requirement in the creation of a legislative district is non-
justiciable, suffice it to say that questions calling for judicial determination of
compliance with constitutional standards by other branches of the
government are fundamentally justiciable. The resolution of such questions
falls within the checking function of this Court under the 1987 Constitution to
determine whether there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of
the Government.[13]
Even under the 1935 Constitution, this Court had already ruled, The
overwhelming weight of authority is that district apportionment laws are
subject to review by the courts.[14] Compliance with constitutional
standards on the creation of legislative districts is important because the
aim of legislative apportionment is to equalize population and voting power
among districts.[15]
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. We DECLARE Republic Act No. 9591
UNCONSTITUTIONAL for being violative of Section 5(3), Article VI of the
1987 Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the 1987
Constitution.
SO ORDERED.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO ARTURO D. BRION

Associate Justice Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice

ROBERTO A. ABAD
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. Associate Justice
Associate Justice
MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.
Associate Justice

JOSE P. PEREZ
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA Associate Justice
Associate Justice

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO JOSE C. MENDOZA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that
the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[1] Under Section 57 of Republic Act No. 8754, the Charter of the
City of Malolos.
[2] Id.
[3] Senate Journal, Session No. 49, 9 February 2009, Fourteenth
Congress, p. 1557.
[4] Rollo, p. 64.
[5] Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution provides: Each
legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact
and adjacent territory. Each city with a population of at least two hundred
fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one representative.
(Emphasis supplied)
Moreover, Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the
1987 Constitution provides: Any province that may be created, or any city
whose population may hereafter increase to more than two hundred fifty
thousand shall be entitled in the immediately following election to at least
one Member or such number of members as it may be entitled to on the
basis of the number of its inhabitants and according to the standards set
forth in paragraph (3), Section 5 of Article VI of the Constitution. xxx.
(Emphasis supplied)
[6] The Certification reads in full:
National Statistics Office
Region III
CERTIFICATION
To whom it may concern:
This is to certify that based on the 2000 census of population in
housing census 2000 conducted by the National Statistics Office, the total
population of Malolos, Bulacan as of May 1, 2000 is 175,291.
This is to certify that the results of the census 2000 were
proclaimed and declared official by the President of the Philippines under
Proclamation No. 28, dated April 18, 2001.
It is further certified that the projected population of the
Municipality of Malolos will be 254,030 by the year 2010 using the population
growth rate of 3.78 between 1995 to 2000. Please note that the computation
was just based on the conventional method and not taking into account
other factors that may affect the base population. Hence, the projected
population may reach more than 250,000 in consideration of the other
factors like future or past fertility, mortality, and migration within the locality
for the year 2010.
This certification is issued upon the request of Mayor Danilo A.
Domingo of the City of Malolos in connection with the proposed creation of
Malolos City as a lone congressional district of the Province of Bulacan.
By authority of the
Administrator
(Sgd) ALBERTO N.
MIRANDA
Regional
Director
[7] Section 3, Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution.
[8] Providing for the Establishment of a Well-Coordinated Local
Level Statistical System.
[9] Annex F of Petition, which is a copy of the 2007 Census from
the National Statistics Office.
[10] There is no basis to compound the growth rate of a population
over a three-year period because the children born during the
three-year period could not possibly give birth to their own children.
[11] http://www.census.gov.ph/data
/sectordata/popproj_tab3r.html, accessed 22 December 2009.
[12] Rollo, p. 62.
[13] Section 1, Article VIII, Constitution.
[14] Macias v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. L-18684, 14
September 1961, 3 SCRA 1.
[15] Bagabuyo v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 176970, 8
December 2008, 573 SCRA 290.
7
by our Bill of Rights. Indeed, our democracy is built on genuine recognition
of, and respect for, diversity and difference in opinion.
Republic of the Philippines
Supreme Court Since ancient times, society has grappled with deep disagreements about the
Baguio City definitions and demands of morality. In many cases, where moral
convictions are concerned, harmony among those theoretically opposed is an
EN BANC insurmountable goal. Yet herein lies the paradox philosophical justifications
about what is moral are indispensable and yet at the same time powerless to
ANG LADLAD LGBT PARTY create agreement. This Court recognizes, however, that practical solutions
are preferable to ideological stalemates; accommodation is better than
G.R. No. 190582 intransigence; reason more worthy than rhetoric. This will allow persons of
represented herein by its Chair, diverse viewpoints to live together, if not harmoniously, then, at least, civilly.
DANTON REMOTO,
Petitioner, Factual Background

- versus -
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
Promulgated:
Respondent.
April 8, 2010
x-------------------------------------------------
-------x
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
... [F]reedom to differ is not limited to things that do not matter much. That
would be a mere shadow of freedom. The test of its substance is the right to
differ as to things that touch the heart of the existing order.
Justice Robert A. Jackson
West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette[1]
One unavoidable consequence of everyone having the freedom to
choose is that others may make different choices choices we would not
make for ourselves, choices we may disapprove of, even choices that may
shock or offend or anger us. However, choices are not to be legally
prohibited merely because they are different, and the right to disagree and
debate about important questions of public policy is a core value protected
This is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, with an
application for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction, filed by Ang Ladlad
LGBT Party (Ang Ladlad) against the Resolutions of the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) dated November 11, 2009[2] (the First Assailed
Resolution) and December 16, 2009[3] (the Second Assailed Resolution) in
SPP No. 09-228 (PL) (collectively, the Assailed Resolutions). The case has its
roots in the COMELECs refusal to accredit Ang Ladlad as a party-list
organization under Republic Act (RA) No. 7941, otherwise known as the
Party-List System Act.[4]
Ang Ladlad is an organization composed of men and women who identify
themselves as lesbians, gays, bisexuals, or trans-gendered individuals
(LGBTs). Incorporated in 2003, Ang Ladlad first applied for registration with
the COMELEC in 2006. The application for accreditation was denied on the
ground that the organization had no substantial membership base. On
August 17, 2009, Ang Ladlad again filed a Petition[5] for registration with the
COMELEC.
Before the COMELEC, petitioner argued that the LGBT community is a
marginalized and under-represented sector that is particularly disadvantaged
because of their sexual orientation and gender identity; that LGBTs are
victims of exclusion, discrimination, and violence; that because of negative
societal attitudes, LGBTs are constrained to hide their sexual orientation; and
that Ang Ladlad complied with the 8-point guidelines enunciated by this
Court in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. Commission on Elections.[6]
Ang Ladlad laid out its national membership base consisting of individual
members and organizational supporters, and outlined its platform of
governance.[7]
On November 11, 2009, after admitting the petitioners evidence, the
COMELEC (Second Division) dismissed the Petition on moral grounds, stating
that:
x x x This Petition is dismissible on moral grounds. Petitioner defines the
Filipino Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender (LGBT) Community, thus:
x x x a marginalized and under-represented sector that is
particularly disadvantaged because of their sexual orientation and gender
identity.
and proceeded to define sexual orientation as that which:
x x x refers to a persons capacity for profound emotional, affectional and
sexual attraction to, and intimate and sexual relations with, individuals of a
different gender, of the same gender, or more than one gender.
This definition of the LGBT sector makes it crystal clear that
petitioner tolerates immorality which offends religious beliefs. In Romans
1:26, 27, Paul wrote:
For this cause God gave them up into vile affections, for even
their women did change the natural use into that which is against nature:
And likewise also the men, leaving the natural use of the woman, burned in
their lust one toward another; men with men working that which is
unseemly, and receiving in themselves that recompense of their error which
was meet.
In the Koran, the hereunder verses are pertinent:
For ye practice your lusts on men in preference to women ye are
indeed a people transgressing beyond bounds. (7.81) And we rained down
on them a shower (of brimstone): Then see what was the end of those who
indulged in sin and crime! (7:84) He said: O my Lord! Help Thou me
against people who do mischief (29:30).
As correctly pointed out by the Law Department in its Comment
dated October 2, 2008:
The ANG LADLAD apparently advocates sexual immorality as
indicated in the Petitions par. 6F: Consensual partnerships or relationships
by gays and lesbians who are already of age. It is further indicated in par.
24 of the Petition which waves for the record: In 2007, Men Having Sex with
Men or MSMs in the Philippines were estimated as 670,000 (Genesis 19 is
the history of Sodom and Gomorrah).
Laws are deemed incorporated in every contract, permit, license,
relationship, or accreditation. Hence, pertinent provisions of the Civil Code
and the Revised Penal Code are deemed part of the requirement to be
complied with for accreditation.
ANG LADLAD collides with Article 695 of the Civil Code which
defines nuisance as Any act, omission, establishment, business, condition of
property, or anything else which x x x (3) shocks, defies; or disregards
decency or morality x x x
It also collides with Article 1306 of the Civil Code: The
contracting parties may establish such stipulations, clauses, terms and
conditions as they may deem convenient, provided they are not contrary to
law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy. Art 1409 of the Civil
Code provides that Contracts whose cause, object or purpose is contrary to
law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy are inexistent and
void from the beginning.
Finally to safeguard the morality of the Filipino community, the
Revised Penal Code, as amended, penalizes Immoral doctrines, obscene
publications and exhibitions and indecent shows as follows:
Art. 201. Immoral doctrines, obscene publications and
exhibitions, and indecent shows. The penalty of prision mayor or a fine
ranging from six thousand to twelve thousand pesos, or both such
imprisonment and fine, shall be imposed upon:
1. Those who shall publicly expound or proclaim doctrines openly
contrary to public morals;
2. (a) The authors of obscene literature, published with their
knowledge in any form; the editors publishing such literature; and the
owners/operators of the establishment selling the same;
(b) Those who, in theaters, fairs, cinematographs or any
other place, exhibit indecent or immoral plays, scenes, acts or shows, it
being understood that the obscene literature or indecent or immoral plays,
scenes, acts or shows, whether live or in film, which are prescribed by virtue
hereof, shall include those which: (1) glorify criminals or condone crimes; (2)
serve no other purpose but to satisfy the market for violence, lust or
pornography; (3) offend any race or religion; (4) tend to abet traffic in and
use of prohibited drugs; and (5) are contrary to law, public order, morals,
good customs, established policies, lawful orders, decrees and edicts.

3. Those who shall sell, give away or exhibit films, prints,
engravings, sculpture or literature which are offensive to morals.
Petitioner should likewise be denied accreditation not only for
advocating immoral doctrines but likewise for not being truthful when it said
that it or any of its nominees/party-list representatives have not violated or
failed to comply with laws, rules, or regulations relating to the elections.
Furthermore, should this Commission grant the petition, we will
be exposing our youth to an environment that does not conform to the
teachings of our faith. Lehman Strauss, a famous bible teacher and writer in
the U.S.A. said in one article that older practicing homosexuals are a threat
to the youth. As an agency of the government, ours too is the States
avowed duty under Section 13, Article II of the Constitution to protect our
youth from moral and spiritual degradation.[8]
When Ang Ladlad sought reconsideration,[9] three commissioners voted to
overturn the First Assailed Resolution (Commissioners Gregorio Y. Larrazabal,
Rene V. Sarmiento, and Armando Velasco), while three commissioners voted
to deny Ang Ladlads Motion for Reconsideration (Commissioners Nicodemo
T. Ferrer, Lucenito N. Tagle, and Elias R. Yusoph). The COMELEC Chairman,
breaking the tie and speaking for the majority in his Separate Opinion,
upheld the First Assailed Resolution, stating that:
I. The Spirit of Republic Act No. 7941
Ladlad is applying for accreditation as a sectoral party in the
party-list system. Even assuming that it has properly proven its under-
representation and marginalization, it cannot be said that Ladlads expressed
sexual orientations per se would benefit the nation as a whole.
Section 2 of the party-list law unequivocally states that the
purpose of the party-list system of electing congressional representatives is
to enable Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and under-represented
sectors, organizations and parties, and who lack well-defined political
constituencies but who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of
appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole, to become
members of the House of Representatives.
If entry into the party-list system would depend only on the
ability of an organization to represent its constituencies, then all
representative organizations would have found themselves into the party-list
race. But that is not the intention of the framers of the law. The party-list
system is not a tool to advocate tolerance and acceptance of misunderstood
persons or groups of persons. Rather, the party-list system is a tool for the
realization of aspirations of marginalized individuals whose interests are also
the nations only that their interests have not been brought to the attention
of the nation because of their under representation. Until the time comes
when Ladlad is able to justify that having mixed sexual orientations and
transgender identities is beneficial to the nation, its application for
accreditation under the party-list system will remain just that.
II. No substantial differentiation
In the United States, whose equal protection doctrine pervades
Philippine jurisprudence, courts do not recognize lesbians, gays,
homosexuals, and bisexuals (LGBT) as a special class of individuals. x x x
Significantly, it has also been held that homosexuality is not a constitutionally
protected fundamental right, and that nothing in the U.S. Constitution
discloses a comparable intent to protect or promote the social or legal
equality of homosexual relations, as in the case of race or religion or belief.
xxxx
Thus, even if societys understanding, tolerance, and acceptance
of LGBTs is elevated, there can be no denying that Ladlad constituencies are
still males and females, and they will remain either male or female protected
by the same Bill of Rights that applies to all citizens alike.
xxxx
IV. Public Morals
x x x There is no question about not imposing on Ladlad Christian
or Muslim religious practices. Neither is there any attempt to any particular
religious groups moral rules on Ladlad. Rather, what are being adopted as
moral parameters and precepts are generally accepted public morals. They
are possibly religious-based, but as a society, the Philippines cannot ignore
its more than 500 years of Muslim and Christian upbringing, such that some
moral precepts espoused by said religions have sipped [sic] into society and
these are not publicly accepted moral norms.
V. Legal Provisions
But above morality and social norms, they have become part of
the law of the land. Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code imposes the
penalty of prision mayor upon Those who shall publicly expound or proclaim
doctrines openly contrary to public morals. It penalizes immoral doctrines,
obscene publications and exhibition and indecent shows. Ang Ladlad
apparently falls under these legal provisions. This is clear from its Petitions
paragraph 6F: Consensual partnerships or relationships by gays and
lesbians who are already of age It is further indicated in par. 24 of the
Petition which waves for the record: In 2007, Men Having Sex with Men or
MSMs in the Philippines were estimated as 670,000. Moreoever, Article 694
of the Civil Code defines nuisance as any act, omission x x x or anything
else x x x which shocks, defies or disregards decency or morality x x x.
These are all unlawful.[10]
On January 4, 2010, Ang Ladlad filed this Petition, praying that the
Court annul the Assailed Resolutions and direct the COMELEC to
grant Ang Ladlads application for accreditation. Ang Ladlad also
sought the issuance ex parte of a preliminary mandatory injunction against
the COMELEC, which had previously announced that it would begin printing
the final ballots for the May 2010 elections by January 25, 2010.
On January 6, 2010, we ordered the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) to
file its Comment on behalf of COMELEC not later than 12:00 noon of January
11, 2010.[11] Instead of filing a Comment, however, the OSG filed a Motion
for Extension, requesting that it be given until January 16, 2010 to
Comment.[12] Somewhat surprisingly, the OSG later filed a Comment in
support of petitioners application.[13] Thus, in order to give COMELEC the
opportunity to fully ventilate its position, we required it to file its own
comment.[14] The COMELEC, through its Law Department, filed its
Comment on February 2, 2010.[15]
In the meantime, due to the urgency of the petition, we issued a temporary
restraining order on January 12, 2010, effective immediately and continuing
until further orders from this Court, directing the COMELEC to cease and
desist from implementing the Assailed Resolutions.[16]
Also, on January 13, 2010, the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) filed a
Motion to Intervene or to Appear as Amicus Curiae, attaching thereto its
Comment-in-Intervention.[17] The CHR opined that the denial of Ang
Ladlads petition on moral grounds violated the standards and principles of
the Constitution, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), and the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). On January 19,
2010, we granted the CHRs motion to intervene.
On January 26, 2010, Epifanio D. Salonga, Jr. filed his Motion to
Intervene[18] which motion was granted on February 2, 2010.[19]
The Parties Arguments
Ang Ladlad argued that the denial of accreditation, insofar as it justified the
exclusion by using religious dogma, violated the constitutional guarantees
against the establishment of religion. Petitioner also claimed that the
Assailed Resolutions contravened its constitutional rights to
privacy, freedom of speech and assembly, and equal protection of
laws, as well as constituted violations of the Philippines
international obligations against discrimination based on sexual
orientation.
The OSG concurred with Ang Ladlads petition and argued that the
COMELEC erred in denying petitioners application for registration since there
was no basis for COMELECs allegations of immorality. It also opined that
LGBTs have their own special interests and concerns which should have been
recognized by the COMELEC as a separate classification. However, insofar
as the purported violations of petitioners freedom of speech, expression,
and assembly were concerned, the OSG maintained that there had been no
restrictions on these rights.
In its Comment, the COMELEC reiterated that petitioner does not have a
concrete and genuine national political agenda to benefit the nation and that
the petition was validly dismissed on moral grounds. It also argued for the
first time that the LGBT sector is not among the sectors enumerated by the
Constitution and RA 7941, and that petitioner made untruthful statements in
its petition when it alleged its national existence contrary to actual
verification reports by COMELECs field personnel.
Our Ruling
We grant the petition.
Compliance with the Requirements of the Constitution and Republic Act No.
7941
The COMELEC denied Ang Ladlads application for registration on the ground
that the LGBT sector is neither enumerated in the Constitution and RA 7941,
nor is it associated with or related to any of the sectors in the enumeration.
Respondent mistakenly opines that our ruling in Ang Bagong Bayani stands Boys Legion Metro Manila
for the proposition that only those sectors specifically enumerated in the law Cagayan de Oro People Like Us (CDO PLUS)
or related to said sectors (labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous Cant Live in the Closet, Inc. (CLIC) Metro Manila
cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, Cebu Pride Cebu City
overseas workers, and professionals) may be registered under the party-list Circle of Friends
system. As we explicitly ruled in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. Dipolog Gay Association Zamboanga del Norte
Commission on Elections,[20] the enumeration of marginalized and Gay, Bisexual, & Transgender Youth Association (GABAY)
under-represented sectors is not exclusive. The crucial element is not Gay and Lesbian Activists Network for Gender Equality
whether a sector is specifically enumerated, but whether a particular (GALANG) Metro Manila
organization complies with the requirements of the Constitution and RA Gay Mens Support Group (GMSG) Metro Manila
7941. Gay United for Peace and Solidarity (GUPS) Lanao del Norte
Iloilo City Gay Association Iloilo City
Respondent also argues that Ang Ladlad made untruthful statements in its Kabulig Writers Group Camarines Sur
petition when it alleged that it had nationwide existence through its Lesbian Advocates Philippines, Inc. (LEAP)
members and affiliate organizations. The COMELEC claims that upon LUMINA Baguio City
verification by its field personnel, it was shown that save for a few isolated Marikina Gay Association Metro Manila
places in the country, petitioner does not exist in almost all provinces in the Metropolitan Community Church (MCC) Metro Manila
country.[21] Naga City Gay Association Naga City
This argument that petitioner made untruthful statements in its petition ONE BACARDI
when it alleged its national existence is a new one; previously, the Order of St. Aelred (OSAe) Metro Manila
COMELEC claimed that petitioner was not being truthful when it said that it PUP LAKAN
or any of its nominees/party-list representatives have not violated or failed to RADAR PRIDEWEAR
comply with laws, rules, or regulations relating to the elections. Nowhere Rainbow Rights Project (R-Rights), Inc. Metro Manila
was this ground for denial of petitioners accreditation mentioned or even San Jose del Monte Gay Association Bulacan
alluded to in the Assailed Resolutions. This, in itself, is quite curious, Sining Kayumanggi Royal Family Rizal
considering that the reports of petitioners alleged non-existence were Society of Transexual Women of the Philippines (STRAP)
already available to the COMELEC prior to the issuance of the First Assailed Metro Manila
Resolution. At best, this is irregular procedure; at worst, a belated Soul Jive Antipolo, Rizal
afterthought, a change in respondents theory, and a serious violation of The Link Davao City
petitioners right to procedural due process. Tayabas Gay Association Quezon
Womens Bisexual Network Metro Manila
Nonetheless, we find that there has been no misrepresentation. A cursory Zamboanga Gay Association Zamboanga City[23]
perusal of Ang Ladlads initial petition shows that it never claimed to exist in
each province of the Philippines. Rather, petitioner alleged that the LGBT
community in the Philippines was estimated to constitute at least 670,000 Since the COMELEC only searched for the names ANG LADLAD LGBT or
persons; that it had 16,100 affiliates and members around the country, and LADLAD LGBT, it is no surprise that they found that petitioner had no
4,044 members in its electronic discussion group.[22] Ang Ladlad also presence in any of these regions. In fact, if COMELECs findings are to be
represented itself to be a national LGBT umbrella organization with affiliates believed, petitioner does not even exist in Quezon City, which is registered
around the Philippines composed of the following LGBT networks: as Ang Ladlads principal place of business.

Abra Gay Association Against this backdrop, we find that Ang Ladlad has sufficiently demonstrated
Aklan Butterfly Brigade (ABB) Aklan its compliance with the legal requirements for accreditation. Indeed, aside
Albay Gay Association from COMELECs moral objection and the belated allegation of non-existence,
Arts Center of Cabanatuan City Nueva Ecija nowhere in the records has the respondent ever found/ruled that Ang Ladlad
is not qualified to register as a party-list organization under any of the
requisites under RA 7941 or the guidelines in Ang Bagong Bayani. The
difference, COMELEC claims, lies in Ang Ladlads morality, or lack thereof.
Religion as the Basis for Refusal to Accept Ang Ladlads Petition for
Registration
Our Constitution provides in Article III, Section 5 that [n]o law shall be
made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof. At bottom, what our non-establishment clause calls for is
government neutrality in religious matters.[24] Clearly, governmental
reliance on religious justification is inconsistent with this policy of
neutrality.[25] We thus find that it was grave violation of the non-
establishment clause for the COMELEC to utilize the Bible and the Koran to
justify the exclusion of Ang Ladlad.
Rather than relying on religious belief, the legitimacy of the Assailed
Resolutions should depend, instead, on whether the COMELEC is able to
advance some justification for its rulings beyond mere conformity to religious
doctrine. Otherwise stated, government must act for secular purposes and in
ways that have primarily secular effects. As we held in Estrada v.
Escritor:[26]
x x x The morality referred to in the law is public and necessarily
secular, not religious as the dissent of Mr. Justice Carpio holds. "Religious
teachings as expressed in public debate may influence the civil public order
but public moral disputes may be resolved only on grounds articulable in
secular terms." Otherwise, if government relies upon religious beliefs in
formulating public policies and morals, the resulting policies and morals
would require conformity to what some might regard as religious programs
or agenda. The non-believers would therefore be compelled to conform to a
standard of conduct buttressed by a religious belief, i.e., to a "compelled
religion," anathema to religious freedom. Likewise, if government based its
actions upon religious beliefs, it would tacitly approve or endorse that belief
and thereby also tacitly disapprove contrary religious or non-religious views
that would not support the policy. As a result, government will not provide
full religious freedom for all its citizens, or even make it appear that those
whose beliefs are disapproved are second-class citizens.
In other words, government action, including its proscription of
immorality as expressed in criminal law like concubinage, must have a
secular purpose. That is, the government proscribes this conduct because it
is "detrimental (or dangerous) to those conditions upon which depend the
existence and progress of human society" and not because the conduct is
proscribed by the beliefs of one religion or the other. Although admittedly,
moral judgments based on religion might have a compelling influence on
those engaged in public deliberations over what actions would be considered
a moral disapprobation punishable by law. After all, they might also be
adherents of a religion and thus have religious opinions and moral codes
with a compelling influence on them; the human mind endeavors to regulate
the temporal and spiritual institutions of society in a uniform manner,
harmonizing earth with heaven. Succinctly put, a law could be religious or
Kantian or Aquinian or utilitarian in its deepest roots, but it must have an
articulable and discernible secular purpose and justification to pass scrutiny
of the religion clauses. x x x Recognizing the religious nature of the Filipinos
and the elevating influence of religion in society, however, the Philippine
constitution's religion clauses prescribe not a strict but a benevolent
neutrality. Benevolent neutrality recognizes that government must pursue its
secular goals and interests but at the same time strive to uphold religious
liberty to the greatest extent possible within flexible constitutional limits.
Thus, although the morality contemplated by laws is secular, benevolent
neutrality could allow for accommodation of morality based on religion,
provided it does not offend compelling state interests.[27]
Public Morals as a Ground to Deny Ang Ladlads Petition for
Registration
Respondent suggests that although the moral condemnation of
homosexuality and homosexual conduct may be religion-based, it has long
been transplanted into generally accepted public morals. The COMELEC
argues:
Petitioners accreditation was denied not necessarily because their
group consists of LGBTs but because of the danger it poses to the people
especially the youth. Once it is recognized by the government, a sector
which believes that there is nothing wrong in having sexual relations with
individuals of the same gender is a bad example. It will bring down the
standard of morals we cherish in our civilized society. Any society without a
set of moral precepts is in danger of losing its own existence.[28]
We are not blind to the fact that, through the years, homosexual conduct,
and perhaps homosexuals themselves, have borne the brunt of societal
disapproval. It is not difficult to imagine the reasons behind this censure
religious beliefs, convictions about the preservation of marriage, family, and
procreation, even dislike or distrust of homosexuals themselves and their
perceived lifestyle. Nonetheless, we recall that the Philippines has not seen
fit to criminalize homosexual conduct. Evidently, therefore, these generally
accepted public morals have not been convincingly transplanted into the
realm of law.[29]
The Assailed Resolutions have not identified any specific overt immoral act
performed by Ang Ladlad. Even the OSG agrees that there should have
been a finding by the COMELEC that the groups members have committed
or are committing immoral acts.[30] The OSG argues:
x x x A person may be sexually attracted to a person of the same
gender, of a different gender, or more than one gender, but mere attraction
does not translate to immoral acts. There is a great divide between thought
and action. Reduction ad absurdum. If immoral thoughts could be penalized,
COMELEC would have its hands full of disqualification cases against both the
straights and the gays. Certainly this is not the intendment of the law.[31]
Respondent has failed to explain what societal ills are sought to be
prevented, or why special protection is required for the youth. Neither has
the COMELEC condescended to justify its position that petitioners admission
into the party-list system would be so harmful as to irreparably damage the
moral fabric of society. We, of course, do not suggest that the state is
wholly without authority to regulate matters concerning morality, sexuality,
and sexual relations, and we recognize that the government will and should
continue to restrict behavior considered detrimental to society. Nonetheless,
we cannot countenance advocates who, undoubtedly with the loftiest of
intentions, situate morality on one end of an argument or another, without
bothering to go through the rigors of legal reasoning and explanation. In
this, the notion of morality is robbed of all value. Clearly then, the bare
invocation of morality will not remove an issue from our scrutiny.
We also find the COMELECs reference to purported violations of our penal
and civil laws flimsy, at best; disingenuous, at worst. Article 694 of the Civil
Code defines a nuisance as any act, omission, establishment, condition of
property, or anything else which shocks, defies, or disregards decency or
morality, the remedies for which are a prosecution under the Revised Penal
Code or any local ordinance, a civil action, or abatement without judicial
proceedings.[32] A violation of Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code, on the
other hand, requires proof beyond reasonable doubt to support a criminal
conviction. It hardly needs to be emphasized that mere allegation of violation
of laws is not proof, and a mere blanket invocation of public morals cannot
replace the institution of civil or criminal proceedings and a judicial
determination of liability or culpability.
As such, we hold that moral disapproval, without more, is not a sufficient
governmental interest to justify exclusion of homosexuals from participation
in the party-list system. The denial of Ang Ladlads registration on purely
moral grounds amounts more to a statement of dislike and disapproval of
homosexuals, rather than a tool to further any substantial public interest.
Respondents blanket justifications give rise to the inevitable conclusion that
the COMELEC targets homosexuals themselves as a class, not because of
any particular morally reprehensible act. It is this selective targeting that
implicates our equal protection clause.
Equal Protection
Despite the absolutism of Article III, Section 1 of our Constitution, which
provides nor shall any person be denied equal protection of the laws,
courts have never interpreted the provision as an absolute prohibition on
classification. Equality, said Aristotle, consists in the same treatment of
similar persons.[33] The equal protection clause guarantees that no person
or class of persons shall be deprived of the same protection of laws which is
enjoyed by other persons or other classes in the same place and in like
circumstances.[34]
Recent jurisprudence has affirmed that if a law neither burdens a
fundamental right nor targets a suspect class, we will uphold the
classification as long as it bears a rational relationship to some legitimate
government end.[35] In Central Bank Employees Association, Inc. v. Banko
Sentral ng Pilipinas,[36] we declared that [i]n our jurisdiction, the standard
of analysis of equal protection challenges x x x have followed the rational
basis test, coupled with a deferential attitude to legislative classifications and
a reluctance to invalidate a law unless there is a showing of a clear and
unequivocal breach of the Constitution.[37]
The COMELEC posits that the majority of the Philippine population considers
homosexual conduct as immoral and unacceptable, and this constitutes
sufficient reason to disqualify the petitioner. Unfortunately for the
respondent, the Philippine electorate has expressed no such belief. No law
exists to criminalize homosexual behavior or expressions or parties about
homosexual behavior. Indeed, even if we were to assume that public
opinion is as the COMELEC describes it, the asserted state interest here
that is, moral disapproval of an unpopular minority is not a legitimate state
interest that is sufficient to satisfy rational basis review under the equal
protection clause. The COMELECs differentiation, and its unsubstantiated
claim that Ang Ladlad cannot contribute to the formulation of legislation that
would benefit the nation, furthers no legitimate state interest other than
disapproval of or dislike for a disfavored group.
From the standpoint of the political process, the lesbian, gay, bisexual, and
transgender have the same interest in participating in the party-list system
on the same basis as other political parties similarly situated. State intrusion
in this case is equally burdensome. Hence, laws of general application
should apply with equal force to LGBTs, and they deserve to participate in
the party-list system on the same basis as other marginalized and under-
represented sectors.
It bears stressing that our finding that COMELECs act of differentiating
LGBTs from heterosexuals insofar as the party-list system is concerned does
not imply that any other law distinguishing between heterosexuals and
homosexuals under different circumstances would similarly fail. We disagree
with the OSGs position that homosexuals are a class in themselves for the
purposes of the equal protection clause.[38] We are not prepared to single
out homosexuals as a separate class meriting special or differentiated
treatment. We have not received sufficient evidence to this effect, and it is
simply unnecessary to make such a ruling today. Petitioner itself has merely
demanded that it be recognized under the same basis as all other groups
similarly situated, and that the COMELEC made an unwarranted and
impermissible classification not justified by the circumstances of the case.
Freedom of Expression and Association
Under our system of laws, every group has the right to promote its agenda
and attempt to persuade society of the validity of its position through normal
democratic means.[39] It is in the public square that deeply held convictions
and differing opinions should be distilled and deliberated upon. As we held
in Estrada v. Escritor:[40]
In a democracy, this common agreement on political and moral
ideas is distilled in the public square. Where citizens are free, every opinion,
every prejudice, every aspiration, and every moral discernment has access to
the public square where people deliberate the order of their life together.
Citizens are the bearers of opinion, including opinion shaped by, or
espousing religious belief, and these citizens have equal access to the public
square. In this representative democracy, the state is prohibited from
determining which convictions and moral judgments may be proposed for
public deliberation. Through a constitutionally designed process, the people
deliberate and decide. Majority rule is a necessary principle in this
democratic governance. Thus, when public deliberation on moral judgments
is finally crystallized into law, the laws will largely reflect the beliefs and
preferences of the majority, i.e., the mainstream or median groups.
Nevertheless, in the very act of adopting and accepting a constitution and
the limits it specifies including protection of religious freedom "not only for
a minority, however small not only for a majority, however large but for
each of us" the majority imposes upon itself a self-denying ordinance. It
promises not to do what it otherwise could do: to ride roughshod over the
dissenting minorities.
Freedom of expression constitutes one of the essential foundations of a
democratic society, and this freedom applies not only to those that are
favorably received but also to those that offend, shock, or disturb. Any
restriction imposed in this sphere must be proportionate to the legitimate
aim pursued. Absent any compelling state interest, it is not for the COMELEC
or this Court to impose its views on the populace. Otherwise stated, the
COMELEC is certainly not free to interfere with speech for no better reason
than promoting an approved message or discouraging a disfavored one.
This position gains even more force if one considers that homosexual
conduct is not illegal in this country. It follows that both expressions
concerning ones homosexuality and the activity of forming a political
association that supports LGBT individuals are protected as well.
Other jurisdictions have gone so far as to categorically rule that even
overwhelming public perception that homosexual conduct violates public
morality does not justify criminalizing same-sex conduct.[41] European and
United Nations judicial decisions have ruled in favor of gay rights claimants
on both privacy and equality grounds, citing general privacy and equal
protection provisions in foreign and international texts.[42] To the extent
that there is much to learn from other jurisdictions that have reflected on the
issues we face here, such jurisprudence is certainly illuminating. These
foreign authorities, while not formally binding on Philippine courts, may
nevertheless have persuasive influence on the Courts analysis.
In the area of freedom of expression, for instance, United States courts have
ruled that existing free speech doctrines protect gay and lesbian rights to
expressive conduct. In order to justify the prohibition of a particular
expression of opinion, public institutions must show that their actions were
caused by something more than a mere desire to avoid the discomfort and
unpleasantness that always accompany an unpopular viewpoint.[43]
With respect to freedom of association for the advancement of ideas and
beliefs, in Europe, with its vibrant human rights tradition, the European Court
of Human Rights (ECHR) has repeatedly stated that a political party may
campaign for a change in the law or the constitutional structures of a state if
it uses legal and democratic means and the changes it proposes are
consistent with democratic principles. The ECHR has emphasized that
political ideas that challenge the existing order and whose realization is
advocated by peaceful means must be afforded a proper opportunity of
expression through the exercise of the right of association, even if such ideas
may seem shocking or unacceptable to the authorities or the majority of the
population.[44] A political group should not be hindered solely because it
seeks to publicly debate controversial political issues in order to find
solutions capable of satisfying everyone concerned.[45] Only if a political
party incites violence or puts forward policies that are incompatible with
democracy does it fall outside the protection of the freedom of association
guarantee.[46]
We do not doubt that a number of our citizens may believe that homosexual
conduct is distasteful, offensive, or even defiant. They are entitled to hold
and express that view. On the other hand, LGBTs and their supporters, in all
likelihood, believe with equal fervor that relationships between individuals of
the same sex are morally equivalent to heterosexual relationships. They, too,
are entitled to hold and express that view. However, as far as this Court is
concerned, our democracy precludes using the religious or moral views of
one part of the community to exclude from consideration the values of other
members of the community.
Of course, none of this suggests the impending arrival of a golden
age for gay rights litigants. It well may be that this Decision will only serve
to highlight the discrepancy between the rigid constitutional analysis of this
Court and the more complex moral sentiments of Filipinos. We do not
suggest that public opinion, even at its most liberal, reflect a clear-cut strong
consensus favorable to gay rights claims and we neither attempt nor expect
to affect individual perceptions of homosexuality through this Decision.
The OSG argues that since there has been neither prior restraint nor
subsequent punishment imposed on Ang Ladlad, and its members have not
been deprived of their right to voluntarily associate, then there has been no
restriction on their freedom of expression or association. The OSG argues
that:
There was no utterance restricted, no publication censored, or
any assembly denied. [COMELEC] simply exercised its authority to review
and verify the qualifications of petitioner as a sectoral party applying to
participate in the party-list system. This lawful exercise of duty cannot be
said to be a transgression of Section 4, Article III of the Constitution.
xxxx
A denial of the petition for registration x x x does not deprive the
members of the petitioner to freely take part in the conduct of elections.
Their right to vote will not be hampered by said denial. In fact, the right to
vote is a constitutionally-guaranteed right which cannot be limited.
As to its right to be elected in a genuine periodic election,
petitioner contends that the denial of Ang Ladlads petition has the clear and
immediate effect of limiting, if not outrightly nullifying the capacity of its
members to fully and equally participate in public life through engagement in
the party list elections.
This argument is puerile. The holding of a public office is not a right but a
privilege subject to limitations imposed by law. x x x[47]
The OSG fails to recall that petitioner has, in fact, established its
qualifications to participate in the party-list system, and as advanced by
the OSG itself the moral objection offered by the COMELEC was not a
limitation imposed by law. To the extent, therefore, that the petitioner has
been precluded, because of COMELECs action, from publicly expressing its
views as a political party and participating on an equal basis in the political
process with other equally-qualified party-list candidates, we find that there
has, indeed, been a transgression of petitioners fundamental rights.
Non-Discrimination and International Law
In an age that has seen international law evolve geometrically in scope and
promise, international human rights law, in particular, has grown dynamically
in its attempt to bring about a more just and humane world order. For
individuals and groups struggling with inadequate structural and
governmental support, international human rights norms are particularly
significant, and should be effectively enforced in domestic legal systems so
that such norms may become actual, rather than ideal, standards of conduct.
Our Decision today is fully in accord with our international obligations to
protect and promote human rights. In particular, we explicitly recognize the
principle of non-discrimination as it relates to the right to electoral
participation, enunciated in the UDHR and the ICCPR.
The principle of non-discrimination is laid out in Article 26 of the
ICCPR, as follows:
Article 26
 All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any
discrimination to the equal protection of the law. In this respect, the law
shall prohibit any discrimination and guarantee to all persons equal and
effective protection against discrimination on any ground such as race,
colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social
origin, property, birth or other status.
In this context, the principle of non-discrimination requires that laws of
general application relating to elections be applied equally to all persons,
regardless of sexual orientation. Although sexual orientation is not
specifically enumerated as a status or ratio for discrimination in Article 26 of
the ICCPR, the ICCPR Human Rights Committee has opined that the
reference to sex in Article 26 should be construed to include sexual
orientation.[48] Additionally, a variety of United Nations bodies have
declared discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation to be prohibited
under various international agreements.[49]
The UDHR provides:
Article 21.
(1) Everyone has the right to take part in the government of his country,
directly or through freely chosen representatives.
Likewise, the ICCPR states:
Article 25
Every citizen shall have the right and the opportunity, without any of the
distinctions mentioned in article 2 and without unreasonable restrictions:
(a) To take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly or through freely
chosen representatives;
(b) To vote and to be elected at genuine periodic elections which shall be
by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret ballot,
guaranteeing the free expression of the will of the electors;
(c) To have access, on general terms of equality, to public service in his
country.
As stated by the CHR in its Comment-in-Intervention, the scope
of the right to electoral participation is elaborated by the Human Rights
Committee in its General Comment No. 25 (Participation in Public Affairs and
the Right to Vote) as follows:
1. Article 25 of the Covenant recognizes and protects the right of every
citizen to take part in the conduct of public affairs, the right to vote and to
be elected and the right to have access to public service. Whatever form of
constitution or government is in force, the Covenant requires States to adopt
such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to ensure that
citizens have an effective opportunity to enjoy the rights it protects. Article
25 lies at the core of democratic government based on the consent of the
people and in conformity with the principles of the Covenant.
xxxx
15. The effective implementation of the right and the opportunity to stand
for elective office ensures that persons entitled to vote have a free choice of
candidates. Any restrictions on the right to stand for election, such as
minimum age, must be justifiable on objective and reasonable criteria.
Persons who are otherwise eligible to stand for election should not be
excluded by unreasonable or discriminatory requirements such as education,
residence or descent, or by reason of political affiliation. No person should
suffer discrimination or disadvantage of any kind because of that person's
candidacy. States parties should indicate and explain the legislative
provisions which exclude any group or category of persons from elective
office.[50]
We stress, however, that although this Court stands willing to assume the
responsibility of giving effect to the Philippines international law obligations,
the blanket invocation of international law is not the panacea for all social
ills. We refer now to the petitioners invocation of the Yogyakarta Principles
(the Application of International Human Rights Law In Relation to Sexual
Orientation and Gender Identity),[51] which petitioner declares to reflect
binding principles of international law.
At this time, we are not prepared to declare that these Yogyakarta Principles
contain norms that are obligatory on the Philippines. There are declarations
and obligations outlined in said Principles which are not reflective of the
current state of international law, and do not find basis in any of the sources
of international law enumerated under Article 38(1) of the Statute of the
International Court of Justice.[52] Petitioner has not undertaken any
objective and rigorous analysis of these alleged principles of international law
to ascertain their true status.
We also hasten to add that not everything that society or a certain Chief Justice
segment of society wants or demands is automatically a human right. This
is not an arbitrary human intervention that may be added to or subtracted
from at will. It is unfortunate that much of what passes for human rights
today is a much broader context of needs that identifies many social desires
as rights in order to further claims that international law obliges states to
sanction these innovations. This has the effect of diluting real human rights, ANTONIO T. CARPIO
and is a result of the notion that if wants are couched in rights language, Associate Justice
then they are no longer controversial. RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice
Using even the most liberal of lenses, these Yogyakarta Principles, consisting
of a declaration formulated by various international law professors, are at
best de lege ferenda and do not constitute binding obligations on the
Philippines. Indeed, so much of contemporary international law is
characterized by the soft law nomenclature, i.e., international law is full of
principles that promote international cooperation, harmony, and respect for CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
human rights, most of which amount to no more than well-meaning desires, Associate Justice
without the support of either State practice or opinio juris.[53] PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
As a final note, we cannot help but observe that the social issues presented
by this case are emotionally charged, societal attitudes are in flux, even the
psychiatric and religious communities are divided in opinion. This Courts
role is not to impose its own view of acceptable behavior. Rather, it is to
apply the Constitution and laws as best as it can, uninfluenced by public
opinion, and confident in the knowledge that our democracy is resilient ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
enough to withstand vigorous debate. Associate Justice
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED. The Resolutions of Associate Justice
the Commission on Elections dated November 11, 2009 and December 16,
2009 in SPP No. 09-228 (PL) are hereby SET ASIDE. The Commission on
Elections is directed to GRANT petitioners application for party-list
accreditation.
SO ORDERED.
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO Associate Justice
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
REYNATO S. PUNO Associate Justice
ROBERTO A. ABAD [4] An Act Providing For The Election Of Party-List Representatives
Associate Justice Through The Party-List System, And Appropriating Funds Therefor (1995).
[5] Rollo, pp. 89-101.
[6] 412 Phil. 308 (2001).
[7] Ang Ladlad outlined its platform, viz:
As a party-list organization, Ang Ladlad is willing to
research, introduce, and work for the passage into law of legislative
MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR. measures under the following platform of government:
Associate Justice a) introduction and support for an anti-discrimination bill that will ensure
JOSE P. PEREZ equal rights for LGBTs in employment and civil life;
Associate Justice b) support for LGBT-related and LGBT-friendly businesses that will
contribute to the national economy;
c) setting up of micro-finance and livelihood projects for poor and
physically challenged LGBT Filipinos;
d) setting up of care centers that will take care of the medical, legal,
pension, and other needs of old and abandoned LGBTs. These centers will be
JOSE C. MENDOZA set up initially in the key cities of the country; and
Associate Justice e) introduction and support for bills seeking the repeal of laws used to
harass and legitimize extortion against the LGBT community. Rollo, p. 100.
[8] Id. at 36-39. Citations omitted. Italics and underscoring in original
text.
[9] Id. at 77-88.
[10] Id. at 50-54. Emphasis and underscoring supplied.
[11] Id. at 121.
[12] Id. at 129-132.
[13] Id. at 151-283.
[14] Id. at 284.
CERTIFICATION [15] Id. at 301-596.
[16] Id. at 126.
[17] Id. at 133-160.
[18] Id. at 288-291.
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby [19] Id. at 296.
certified that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in [20] Supra note 6.
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the [21] It appears that on September 4, 2009, the Second Division
Court. directed the various COMELEC Regional Offices to verify the existence,
status, and capacity of petitioner. In its Comment, respondent submitted
copies of various reports stating that ANG LADLAD LGBT or LADLAD LGBT
REYNATO S. PUNO did not exist in the following areas: Batangas (October 6, 2009); Romblon
Chief Justice (October 6, 2009); Palawan (October 16, 2009); Sorsogon (September 29,
2009); Cavite, Marinduque, Rizal (October 12, 2009); Basilan, Maguindanao,
[1] 319 U.S. 624, 640-42 (1943). Lanao del Sur, Sulu, Tawi Tawi (October 19, 2009); Biliran, Leyte, Southern
[2] Rollo, pp. 33-40. Leyte, Samar, Eastern Samar, Northern Samar (October 19, 2009); Albay,
[3] Id. at 41-74. Camarines Sur, Camarines Norte, Catanduanes, Masbate, Sorsogon (October
25, 2009); Ilocos Sur, Ilocos Norte, La Union, Pangasinan (October 23,
2009); North Cotabato, Sarangani, South Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat (October
23, 2009); Aklan, Antique, Iloilo and Negros Occidental (October 25, 2009);
Bohol, Cebu, Siquijor (October 24, 2009); Negros Oriental (October 26,
2009); Cordillera Administrative Region (October 30, 2009); Agusan del
Norte, Agusan del Sur, Dinagat Islands, Surigao del Norte, Surigao del Sur
(October 26, 2009); Cagayan de Oro, Bukidnon, Camiguin, MIsamis Oriental,
Lanao del Norte (October 31, 2009); Laguna (November 2, 2009); Occidental
Mindoro, Oriental Mindoro (November 13, 2009); Quezon (November 24,
2009); Davao City, Davao del Sur, Davao del Norte, Compostela Valley,
Davao Oriental (November 19, 2009); Caloocan, Las Pinas, Makati,
Mandaluyong, Manila, Marikina, Muntinlupa, Navotas, Paranaque, Pasay,
Pasig, Pateros, Quezon City, San Juan, Taguig, Valenzuela (December 16,
2009). Rollo, pp.323-596.
[22] Id. at 96.
[23] Id. at 96-97.
[24] BERNAS, THE 1987 CONSTITUTION OF THE PHILIPPINES: A
COMMENTARY 346 (2009).
[25] Estrada v. Escritor, 455 Phil. 411 (2003), citing Smith, S., "The Rise
and Fall of Religious Freedom in Constitutional Discourse", 140 UNIVERSITY
OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW, 149, 160 (1991).
[26] 455 Phil. 411 (2003).
[27] Id. at 588-589.
[28] Rollo, p. 315.
[29] In Anonymous v. Radam, A.M. No. P-07-2333, December 19, 2007,
541 SCRA 12, citing Concerned Employee v. Mayor, A.M. No. P-02-1564, 23
November 2004, 443 SCRA 448, we ruled that immorality cannot be judged
based on personal bias, specifically those colored by particular mores. Nor
should it be grounded on "cultural" values not convincingly demonstrated to
have been recognized in the realm of public policy expressed in the
Constitution and the laws. At the same time, the constitutionally guaranteed
rights (such as the right to privacy) should be observed to the extent that
they protect behavior that may be frowned upon by the majority.
[30] Rollo, pp. 178.
[31] Id. at 179-180.
[32] CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Art. 699.
[33] POLITICS VII. 14.
[34] Abakada Guro Party v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 168056,
September 1, 2005, 2005, 469 SCRA 1, 139.
[35] In BERNAS, THE 1987 CONSTITUTION OF THE PHILIPPINES: A
COMMENTARY 139-140 (2009), Fr. Joaquin Bernas, S.J. writes:
For determining the reasonableness of classification, later
jurisprudence has developed three kinds of test[s] depending on the subject
matter involved. The most demanding is the strict scrutiny test which
requires the government to show that the challenged classification serves a
compelling state interest and that the classification is necessary to serve that
interest. This [case] is used in cases involving classifications based on race,
national origin, religion, alienage, denial of the right to vote, interstate
migration, access to courts, and other rights recognized as fundamental.
Next is the intermediate or middle-tier scrutiny test which
requires government to show that the challenged classification serves an
important state interest and that the classification is at least substantially
related to serving that interest. This is applied to suspect classifications like
gender or illegitimacy.
The most liberal is the minimum or rational basis scrutiny
according to which government need only show that the challenged
classification is rationally related to serving a legitimate state interest. This is
the traditional rationality test and it applies to all subjects other than those
listed above.
[36] 487 Phil. 531, 583 (2004).
[37] Id. at 584. See also Mid-States Freight Lines v. Bates, 111 N.Y.S.
2d 568.
[38] The OSG argues that [w]hile it is true that LGBTs are immutably
males and females, and they are protected by the same Bill of Rights that
applies to all citizens alike, it cannot be denied that as a sector, LGBTs have
their own special interests and concerns. Rollo, p. 183.
[39] Article III, Section 4 of the Constitution provides that [n]o law
shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of the
press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the
government for redress of grievances.
[40] Supra note 26.
[41] In Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), the US Supreme
Court first upheld the constitutionality of a Georgia sodomy law that
criminalized oral and anal sex in private between consenting adults when
applied to homosexuals. Seventeen years later the Supreme Court directly
overruled Bowers in Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), holding that
"Bowers was not correct when it was decided, and it is not correct today."
In Lawrence, the US Supreme Court has held that the
liberty protected by the Constitution allows homosexual persons the right to
choose to enter into intimate relationships, whether or not said relationships
were entitled to formal or legal recognition.
Our prior cases make two propositions abundantly clear. First, the fact that
the governing majority in a State has traditionally viewed a particular
practice as immoral is not a sufficient reason for upholding a law prohibiting
the practice; neither history nor tradition could save a law prohibiting
miscegenation from constitutional attack. Second, individual decisions by
married persons, concerning the intimacies of their physical relationship,
even when not intended to produce offspring, are a form of liberty
protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Moreover, this protection extends to intimate choices by unmarried as well
as married persons.
The present case does not involve minors. It does not involve persons who
might be injured or coerced or who are situated in relationships where
consent might not easily be refused. It does not involve public conduct or
prostitution. It does not involve whether the government must give formal
recognition to any relationship that homosexual persons seek to enter. The
case does involve two adults who, with full and mutual consent from each
other, engaged in sexual practices common to a homosexual lifestyle. The
petitioners are entitled to respect for their private lives. The State cannot
demean their existence or control their destiny by making their private
sexual conduct a crime. Their right to liberty under the Due Process Clause
gives them the full right to engage in their conduct without intervention of
the government. It is a promise of the Constitution that there is a realm of
personal liberty which the government may not enter. The Texas statute
furthers no legitimate state interest which can justify its intrusion into the
personal and private life of the individual.
In similar fashion, the European Court of Human Rights has ruled that the
avowed state interest in protecting public morals did not justify interference
into private acts between homosexuals. In Norris v. Ireland, the European
Court held that laws criminalizing same-sex sexual conduct violated the right
to privacy enshrined in the European Convention.
The Government are in effect saying that the Court is precluded from
reviewing Irelands observance of its obligation not to exceed what is
necessary in a democratic society when the contested interference with an
Article 8 (Art. 8) right is in the interests of the "protection of morals". The
Court cannot accept such an interpretation. x x x.
x x x The present case concerns a most intimate aspect of private life.
Accordingly, there must exist particularly serious reasons before
interferences on the part of public authorities can be legitimate x x x.
x x x Although members of the public who regard homosexuality as immoral
may be shocked, offended or disturbed by the commission by others of
private homosexual acts, this cannot on its own warrant the application of
penal sanctions when it is consenting adults alone who are involved. (Norris
v. Ireland (judgment of October 26, 1988, Series A no. 142, pp. 20-21,
46); Marangos v. Cyprus (application no. 31106/96, Commission's report of 3
December 1997, unpublished)).
The United Nations Human Rights Committee came to a
similar conclusion in Toonen v. Australia (Comm. No. 488/1992 U.N. GAOR
Hum. Rts. Comm., 50th Sess., U.N. Doc. CCPR/c/50/D/488/1992 (1994)),
involving a complaint that Tasmanian laws criminalizing consensual sex
between adult males violated the right to privacy under Article 17 of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. The Committee held:
x x x it is undisputed that adult consensual sexual activity in
private is covered by the concept of privacy x x x any interference with
privacy must be proportional to the end sought and be necessary in the
circumstances of any given case.
[42] See Toonen v. Australia, (Comm. No. 488/1992 U.N. GAOR Hum.
Rts. Comm., 50th Sess., U.N. Doc. CCPR/c/50/D/488/1992 (1994)); Dudgeon
v. United Kingdom, 45 Eur. H.R. Rep. 52 (1981) (decision by the European
Court of Human Rights, construing the European Convention on Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms); Norris v. Ireland, 13 Eur. Ct. H.R. 186
(1991); Modinos v. Cyprus, 16 Eur. H.R. Rep. 485 (1993). See also, L. and
V. v Austria (2003-I 29; (2003) 36 EHRR 55) and S.L. v Austria (2003-I 71;
(2003) 37 EHRR 39), where the European Court considered that Austrias
differing age of consent for heterosexual and homosexual relations was
discriminatory; it embodied a predisposed bias on the part of a heterosexual
majority against a homosexual minority, which could not amount to
sufficient justification for the differential treatment any more than similar
negative attitudes towards those of a different race, origin or colour.
[43] See Fricke v. Lynch, 491 F. Supp. 381 (1980) and Gay Student
Services v. Texas A&M University, 737 F. 2d 1317 (1984).
[44] Case of the United Macedonian Organisation Ilinden and Others v.
Bulgaria Application No. 5941/00; Judgment of January 20, 2006. Note that
in Baczkowski and Others v. Poland, Application No. 1543/06; Judgment of
May 3, 2007, the ECHR unanimously ruled that the banning of an LGBT gay
parade in Warsaw was a discriminatory violation of Article 14 of the ECHR,
which provides:
The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in [the]
Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any ground such as
sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or
social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or other
status.
It also found that banning LGBT parades violated the groups
freedom of assembly and association. Referring to the hallmarks of a
democratic society, the Court has attached particular importance to
pluralism, tolerance and broadmindedness. In that context, it has held that
although individual interests must on occasion be subordinated to those of a
group, democracy does not simply mean that the views of the majority must
always prevail: a balance must be achieved which ensures the fair and
proper treatment of minorities and avoids any abuse of a dominant position.
[45] Case of Freedom & Democracy Party (OZDEP) v. Turkey,
Application No. 23885/94; Judgment of December 8, 1999.
[46] Article 11 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (European Convention) provides:
Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and to freedom of
association with others, including the right to form and to join trade unions
for the protection of his interests.
2. No restrictions shall be placed on the exercise of these
rights other than such as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a
democratic society in the interests of national security or public safety, for
the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals or
for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. This article shall not
prevent the imposition of lawful restrictions on the exercise of these rights by
members of the armed forces, of the police or of the administration of the
State. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, 213 U.N.T.S. 222, entered into force September 3, 1953, as
amended by Protocols Nos. 3, 5, 8, and 11 which entered into force on
September 21, 1970, December 20, 1971, January 1, 1990, and November
1, 1998, respectively.
* Note that while the state is not permitted to discriminate
against homosexuals, private individuals cannot be compelled to accept or
condone homosexual conduct as a legitimate form of behavior. In Hurley v.
Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc. (515 U.S.
557 (1995)), the US Supreme Court discussed whether anti-discrimination
legislation operated to require the organizers of a private St. Patricks Day
parade to include among the marchers an Irish-American gay, lesbian, and
bisexual group. The court held that private citizens organizing a public
demonstration may not be compelled by the state to include groups that
impart a message the organizers do not want to be included in their
demonstration. The court observed:
[A] contingent marching behind the organizations banner
would at least bear witness to the fact that some Irish are gay, lesbian, or
bisexual, and the presence of the organized marchers would suggest their
view that people of their sexual orientations have as much claim to
unqualified social acceptance as heterosexuals x x x. The parades organizers
may not believe these facts about Irish sexuality to be so, or they may object
to unqualified social acceptance of gays and lesbians or have some other
reason for wishing to keep GLIBs message out of the parade. But whatever
the reason, it boils down to the choice of a speaker not to propound a
particular point of view, and that choice is presumed to lie beyond the
governments power to control.
So, too, in Boy Scouts of America v. Dale (530 U.S. 640 [2000]),
the US Supreme Court held that the Boy Scouts of America could not be
compelled to accept a homosexual as a scoutmaster, because the Boy
Scouts believe that homosexual conduct is inconsistent with the values it
seeks to instill in its youth members; it will not promote homosexual
conduct as a legitimate form of behavior.
When an expressive organization is compelled to associate with a
person whose views the group does not accept, the organizations message
is undermined; the organization is understood to embrace, or at the very
least tolerate, the views of the persons linked with them. The scoutmasters
presence would, at the very least, force the organization to send a
message, both to the youth members and the world, that the Boy Scouts
accepts homosexual conduct as a legitimate form of behavior.
[47] Rollo, pp. 197-199.
[48] In Toonen v. Australia, supra note 42, the Human Rights
Committee noted that in its view the reference to sex in Articles 2,
paragraph 2, and 26 is to be taken as including sexual orientation.
[49] The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) has
dealt with the matter in its General Comments, the interpretative texts it
issues to explicate the full meaning of the provisions of the Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. In General Comments Nos. 18 of 2005
(on the right to work) (Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,
General Comment No. 18: The right to work, E/C.12/GC/18, November 24,
2005), 15 of 2002 (on the right to water) (Committee on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 15: The right to water,
E/C.12/2002/11, November 26, 2002) and 14 of 2000 (on the right to the
highest attainable standard of health) (Committee on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 14: The right to the highest attainable
standard of health, E/C.12/2000/4, August 14, 2000), it has indicated that
the Covenant proscribes any discrimination on the basis of, inter-alia, sex
and sexual orientation.
The Committee on the Rights of the Child (CRC) has also
dealt with the issue in a General Comment. In its General Comment No. 4 of
2003, it stated that, State parties have the obligation to ensure that all
human beings below 18 enjoy all the rights set forth in the Convention [on
the Rights of the Child] without discrimination (Article 2), including with
regard to race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion,
national, ethnic or social origin, property, disability, birth or other status.
These grounds also cover [inter alia] sexual orientation. (Committee on the
Rights of the Child, General Comment No. 4: Adolescent health and
development in the context of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, July
1, 2003, CRC/GC/2003/4).
The Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against
Women (CEDAW), has, on a number of occasions, criticized States for
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. For example, it also
addressed the situation in Kyrgyzstan and recommended that, lesbianism be
reconceptualized as a sexual orientation and that penalties for its practice be
abolished (Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Elimination of
Discrimination Against Women regarding Kyrgyzstan, February 5, 1999,
A/54/38 at par. 128).
[50] General Comment No. 25: The right to participate in public affairs, f) Undertake targeted programmes to provide social support for all
voting rights and the right of equal access to public service (Art. 25) persons experiencing gender transitioning or reassignment. (Emphasis ours)
December 16, 1996. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.7. [53] See Pharmaceutical and Health Care Association of the Philippines
[51] The Yogyakarta Principles on the Application of International v. Secretary of Health, G.R. No. 173034, October 9, 2007, 535 SCRA 265,
Human Rights Law in relation to Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity is a where we explained that soft law does not fall into any of the categories of
set of international principles relating to sexual orientation and gender international law set forth in Article 38, Chapter III of the 1946 Statute of
identity, intended to address documented evidence of abuse of rights of the International Court of Justice. It is, however, an expression of non-
lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) individuals. It contains 29 binding norms, principles, and practices that influence state behavior. Certain
Principles adopted by human rights practitioners and experts, together with declarations and resolutions of the UN General Assembly fall under this
recommendations to governments, regional intergovernmental institutions, category.
civil society, and the United Nations.
[52] One example is Principle 3 (The Right to Recognition Before the
Law), which provides:
Everyone has the right to recognition everywhere as a
person before the law. Persons of diverse sexual orientations and gender
identities shall enjoy legal capacity in all aspects of life. Each persons self-
defined sexual orientation and gender identity is integral to their personality
and is one of the most basic aspects of self-determination, dignity and
freedom. No one shall be forced to undergo medical procedures, including
sex reassignment surgery, sterilization or hormonal therapy, as a
requirement for legal recognition of their gender identity. No status, such as
marriage or parenthood, may be invoked as such to prevent the legal
recognition of a persons gender identity. No one shall be subjected to
pressure to conceal, suppress or deny their sexual orientation or gender
identity.
States shall:
a) Ensure that all persons are accorded legal capacity in civil matters,
without discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation or gender identity,
and the opportunity to exercise that capacity, including equal rights to
conclude contracts, and to administer, own, acquire (including through
inheritance), manage, enjoy and dispose of property;
b) Take all necessary legislative, administrative and other measures to
fully respect and legally recognise each persons self-defined gender identity;
c) Take all necessary legislative, administrative and other measures to
ensure that procedures exist whereby all State-issued identity papers which
indicate a persons gender/sex including birth certificates, passports,
electoral records and other documents reflect the persons profound self-
defined gender identity;
d) Ensure that such procedures are efficient, fair and non-
discriminatory, and respect the dignity and privacy of the person concerned;
e) Ensure that changes to identity documents will be recognized in all
contexts where the identification or disaggregation of persons by gender is
required by law or policy;
8 Prologue
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 136781. October 6, 2000]
VETERANS FEDERATION PARTY, ALYANSANG BAYANIHAN NG MGA
MAGSASAKA, MANGGAGAWANG BUKID AT MANGINGISDA, ADHIKAIN AT
KILUSAN NG ORDINARYONG TAO PARA SA LUPA, PABAHAY AT KAUNLARAN,
and LUZON FARMERS PARTY, petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, PAG-ASA, SENIOR CITIZENS, AKAP AKSYON, PINATUBO,
NUPA, PRP, AMIN, PAG-ASA, MAHARLIKA, OCW-UNIFIL, PCCI, AMMA-
KATIPUNAN, KAMPIL, BANTAY-BAYAN, AFW, ANG LAKAS OCW, WOMEN-
POWER, INC., FEJODAP, CUP, VETERANS CARE, 4L, AWATU, PMP, ATUCP,
NCWP, ALU, BIGAS, COPRA, GREEN, ANAKBAYAN, ARBA, MINFA, AYOS, ALL
COOP, PDP-LABAN, KATIPUNAN, ONEWAY PRINT, AABANTE KA PILIPINAS --
All Being Party-List Parties/Organizations -- and Hon. MANUEL B. VILLAR, JR.
in His Capacity as Speaker of the House of Representatives, respondents.
[G.R. No. 136786. October 6, 2000]
AKBAYAN! (CITIZENS' ACTION PARTY), ADHIKAIN AT KILUSAN NG
ORDINARYONG TAO PARA SA LUPA, PABAHAY AT KAUNLARAN (AKO), and
ASSOCIATION OF PHILIPPINE ELECTRIC COOPERATIVES (APEC),
petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (COMELEC), HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES represented by Speaker Manuel B. Villar, PAG-ASA,
SENIOR CITIZENS, AKAP, AKSYON, PINATUBO, NUPA, PRP, AMIN,
MAHARLIKA, OCW, UNIFIL, PCCI, AMMA-KATIPUNAN, KAMPIL, BANTAY-
BAYAN, AFW, ANG LAKAS OCW, WOMENPOWER INC., FEJODAP, CUP,
VETERANS CARE, FOUR "L", AWATU, PMP, ATUCP, NCWP, ALU, BIGAS,
COPRA, GREEN, ANAK-BAYAN, ARBA, MINFA, AYOS, ALL COOP, PDP-LABAN,
KATIPUNAN, ONEWAY PRINT, AABANTE KA PILIPINAS, respondents.
[G.R. No. 136795. October 6, 2000]
ALAGAD (PARTIDO NG MARALITANG-LUNGSOD), NATIONAL
CONFEDERATION OF SMALL COCONUT FARMERS' ORGANIZATIONS
(NCSFCO), and LUZON FARMERS' PARTY (BUTIL), petitioners, vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, SENIOR CITIZENS, AKAP, AKSYON,
PINATUBO, NUPA, PRP, AMIN, PAG-ASA, MAHARLIKA, OCW, UNIFIL, PCCI,
AMMA-KATIPUNAN, KAMPIL, BANTAY-BAYAN, AFW, ANG LAKAS OCW,
WOMENPOWER INC., FEJODAP, CUP, VETERANS CARE, 4L, AWATU, PMP,
ATUCP, NCWP, ALU, BIGAS, COPRA, GREEN, ANAK-BAYAN, ARBA, MINFA,
AYOS, ALL COOP, PDP-LABAN, KATIPUNAN, ONEWAY PRINT, and AABANTE
KA PILIPINAS, respondents.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:*
To determine the winners in a Philippine-style party-list election, the
Constitution and Republic Act (RA) No. 7941 mandate at least four inviolable
parameters. These are:
First, the twenty percent allocation - the combined number of all party-list
congressmen shall not exceed twenty percent of the total membership of the
House of Representatives, including those elected under the party list.
Second, the two percent threshold - only those parties garnering a minimum
of two percent of the total valid votes cast for the party-list system are
qualified to have a seat in the House of Representatives;
Third, the three-seat limit - each qualified party, regardless of the number of
votes it actually obtained, is entitled to a maximum of three seats; that is,
one qualifying and two additional seats.
Fourth, proportional representation - the additional seats which a qualified
party is entitled to shall be computed in proportion to their total number of
votes.
Because the Comelec violated these legal parameters, the assailed
Resolutions must be struck down for having been issued in grave abuse of
discretion. The poll body is mandated to enforce and administer election-
related laws. It has no power to contravene or amend them. Neither does it
have authority to decide the wisdom, propriety or rationality of the acts of
Congress.
Its bounden duty is to craft rules, regulations, methods and formulas to
implement election laws -- not to reject, ignore, defeat, obstruct or
circumvent them.
In fine, the constitutional introduction of the party-list system - a normal
feature of parliamentary democracies - into our presidential form of
government, modified by unique Filipino statutory parameters, presents new
paradigms and novel questions, which demand innovative legal solutions
convertible into mathematical formulations which are, in turn, anchored on
time-tested jurisprudence.
The Case
Before the Court are three consolidated Petitions for Certiorari (with
applications for the issuance of a temporary restraining order or writ of
preliminary injunction) under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, assailing (1) the
October 15, 1998 Resolution[1] of the Commission on Elections (Comelec),
Second Division, in Election Matter 98-065;[2] and (2) the January 7, 1999
Resolution[3] of the Comelec en banc, affirming the said disposition. The
assailed Resolutions ordered the proclamation of thirty-eight (38) additional
party-list representatives "to complete the full complement of 52 seats in the
House of Representatives as provided under Section 5, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution and R.A. 7941.
The Facts and the Antecedents
Our 1987 Constitution introduced a novel feature into our presidential system
of government -- the party-list method of representation. Under this system,
any national, regional or sectoral party or organization registered with the
Commission on Elections may participate in the election of party-list
representatives who, upon their election and proclamation, shall sit in the
House of Representatives as regular members.[4] In effect, a voter is given
two (2) votes for the House -- one for a district congressman and another for
a party-list representative.[5]
Specifically, this system of representation is mandated by Section 5, Article
VI of the Constitution, which provides:
Sec. 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more
than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who
shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces,
cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of
their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive
ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected by a party-list
system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.
(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the
total number of representatives including those under the party-list. For
three consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution, one half of
the seats allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by
law, by selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous
cultural communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may be
provided by law, except the religious sector.
Complying with its constitutional duty to provide by law the selection or
election of party-list representatives, Congress enacted RA 7941 on March
3, 1995. Under this statutes policy declaration, the State shall "promote
proportional representation in the election of representatives to the House of
Representatives through a party-list system of registered national, regional
and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof, which will enable
Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors,
organizations and parties, and who lack well-defined political constituencies
but who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate
legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole, to become members of the
House of Representatives. Towards this end, the State shall develop and
guarantee a full, free and open party system in order to attain the broadest
possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of
Representatives by enhancing their chances to compete for and win seats in
the legislature, and shall provide the simplest scheme possible. (italics
ours.)
The requirements for entitlement to a party-list seat in the House are
prescribed by this law (RA 7941) in this wise:
Sec. 11. Number of Party-List Representatives. -- The party-list
representatives shall constitute twenty per centum (20%) of the total
number of the members of the House of Representatives including those
under the party-list.
For purposes of the May 1998 elections, the first five (5) major political
parties on the basis of party representation in the House of Representatives
at the start of the Tenth Congress of the Philippines shall not be entitled to
participate in the party-list system.
In determining the allocation of seats for the second vote, the following
procedure shall be observed:
(a) The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the
highest to the lowest based on the number of votes they garnered during
the elections.
(b) The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent
(2%) of the total votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one
seat each; Provided, That those garnering more than two percent (2%) of
the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total
number of votes; Provided, finally, That each party, organization, or coalition
shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats.
Pursuant to Section 18 of RA 7941, the Comelec en banc promulgated
Resolution No. 2847, prescribing the rules and regulations governing the
election of party-list representatives through the party-list system.
Election of the Fourteen Party-List Representatives
On May 11, 1998, the first election for party-list representation was held
simultaneously with the national elections. A total of one hundred twenty-
three (123) parties, organizations and coalitions participated. On June 26,
1998, the Comelec en banc proclaimed thirteen (13) party-list
representatives from twelve (12) parties and organizations, which had
obtained at least two percent of the total number of votes cast for the party-
list system. Two of the proclaimed representatives belonged to Petitioner
APEC, which obtained 5.5 percent of the votes. The proclaimed winners and
the votes cast in their favor were as follows:[6]
Party/Organization/ Number of Percentage of Nominees
Coalition Votes Obtained Total Votes
1. APEC 503,487 5.5% Rene M. Silos
Melvyn D. Eballe
2. ABA 321,646 3.51% Leonardo Q. Montemayor
3. ALAGAD 312,500 3.41% Diogenes S. Osabel
4. VETERANS 304,802 3.33% Eduardo P. Pilapil
FEDERATION
5. PROMDI 255,184 2.79% Joy A.G. Young
6. AKO 239,042 2.61% Ariel A. Zartiga
7. NCSCFO 238,303 2.60% Gorgonio P. Unde
8. ABANSE! PINAY 235,548 2.57% Patricia M. Sarenas
9. AKBAYAN 232,376 2.54% Loreta Ann P. Rosales
10. BUTIL 215,643 2.36% Benjamin A. Cruz
11. SANLAKAS 194,617 2.13% Renato B. Magtubo
12. COOP-NATCCO 189,802 2.07% Cresente C. Paez
After passing upon the results of the special elections held on July 4, 18, and
25, 1998, the Comelec en banc further determined that COCOFED (Philippine
Coconut Planters Federation, Inc.) was entitled to one party-list seat for
having garnered 186,388 votes, which were equivalent to 2.04 percent of
the total votes cast for the party-list system. Thus, its first nominee, Emerito
S. Calderon, was proclaimed on September 8, 1998 as the 14th party-list
representative.[7]
On July 6, 1998, PAG-ASA (Peoples Progressive Alliance for Peace and Good
Government Towards Alleviation of Poverty and Social Advancement) filed
with the Comelec a "Petition to Proclaim [the] Full Number of Party-List
Representatives provided by the Constitution." It alleged that the filling up of
the twenty percent membership of party-list representatives in the House of
Representatives, as provided under the Constitution, was mandatory. It
further claimed that the literal application of the two percent vote
requirement and the three-seat limit under RA 7941 would defeat this
constitutional provision, for only 25 nominees would be declared winners,
short of the 52 party-list representatives who should actually sit in the
House.
Thereafter, nine other party-list organizations[8] filed their respective
Motions for Intervention, seeking the same relief as that sought by PAG-ASA
on substantially the same grounds. Likewise, PAG-ASAs Petition was joined
by other party-list organizations in a Manifestation they filed on August 28,
1998. These organizations were COCOFED, Senior Citizens, AKAP, AKSYON,
PINATUBO, NUPA, PRP, AMIN, PCCI, AMMA-KATIPUNAN, OCW-UNIFIL,
KAMPIL, MAHARLIKA, AFW, Women Power, Inc., Ang Lakas OCW, FEJODAP,
CUP, Veterans Care, Bantay Bayan, 4L, AWATU, PMP, ATUCP, ALU and
BIGAS.
On October 15, 1998, the Comelec Second Division promulgated the
present assailed Resolution granting PAG-ASA's Petition. It also
ordered the proclamation of herein 38 respondents who, in addition to the
14 already sitting, would thus total 52 party-list representatives. It held that
"at all times, the total number of congressional[9] seats must be filled up by
eighty (80%) percent district representatives and twenty (20%) percent
party-list representatives." In allocating the 52 seats, it disregarded the two
percent-vote requirement prescribed under Section 11 (b) of RA 7941.
Instead, it identified three "elements of the party-list system,"
which should supposedly determine "how the 52 seats should be
filled up." First, "the system was conceived to enable the marginalized
sectors of the Philippine society to be represented in the House of
Representatives." Second, "the system should represent the broadest sectors
of the Philippine society." Third, "it should encourage [the] multi-party
system. (Boldface in the original.) Considering these elements, but ignoring
the two percent threshold requirement of RA 7941, it concluded that "the
party-list groups ranked Nos. 1 to 51 x x x should have at least one
representative. It thus disposed as follows:
"WHEREFORE, by virtue of the powers vested in it by the Constitution, the
Omnibus Election Code (B.P. 881), Republic Act No. 7941 and other election
laws, the Commission (Second Division) hereby resolves to GRANT the
instant petition and motions for intervention, to include those similarly
situated.
ACCORDINGLY, the nominees from the party-list hereinbelow enumerated
based on the list of names submitted by their respective parties, 21. 4L
organizations and coalitions are PROCLAIMED as party-list representatives,
to wit: 22. AWATU

1. SENIOR CITIZENS 23. PMP

2. AKAP 24. ATUCP

3. AKSYON 25. NCWP

4. PINATUBO 26. ALU

5. NUPA 27. BIGAS

6. PRP 28. COPRA

7. AMIN 29. GREEN

8. PAG-ASA 30. ANAKBAYAN

9. MAHARLIKA 31. ARBA

10. OCW-UNIFIL 32. MINFA

11. FCL 33. AYOS

12. AMMA-KATIPUNAN 34. ALL COOP

13. KAMPIL 35. PDP-LABAN

14. BANTAY BAYAN 36. KATIPUNAN

15. AFW 37. ONEWAY PRINT

16. ANG LAKAS OCW 38. AABANTE KA PILIPINAS

17. WOMENPOWER, INC. to complete the full complement of 52 seats in the House of Representatives
as provided in Section 5, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and R.A. 7941.
18. FEJODAP
The foregoing disposition sums up a glaring bit of inconsistency and flip-
19. CUP flopping. In its Resolution No. 2847 dated June 25, 1996, the Comelec en
banc had unanimously promulgated a set of Rules and Regulations
20. VETERANS CARE Governing the Election of x x x Party-List Representatives Through the Party-
List System. Under these Rules and Regulations, one additional seat shall be
given for every two percent of the vote, a formula the Comelec illustrated in
its Annex A. It apparently relied on this method when it proclaimed the 14
incumbent party-list solons (two for APEC and one each for the 12 other
qualified parties). However, for inexplicable reasons, it abandoned said
unanimous Resolution and proclaimed, based on its three elements, the
Group of 38 private respondents.[10]
Contention of the 12 parties who were proclaimed winners on the
basis of 2% requirement vote
The twelve (12) parties and organizations, which had earlier been proclaimed
winners on the basis of having obtained at least two percent of the votes
cast for the party-list system, objected to the proclamation of the 38 parties
and filed separate Motions for Reconsideration. They contended that (1)
under Section 11 (b) of RA 7941, only parties, organizations or coalitions
garnering at least two percent of the votes for the party-list system were
entitled to seats in the House of Representatives; and (2) additional seats,
not exceeding two for each, should be allocated to those which had garnered
the two percent threshold in proportion to the number of votes cast for the
winning parties, as provided by said Section 11.
Ruling of the Comelec En Banc
Noting that all the parties -- movants and oppositors alike - had agreed that
the twenty percent membership of party-list representatives in the House
"should be filled up, the Comelec en banc resolved only the issue
concerning the apportionment or allocation of the remaining seats. In other
words, the issue was: Should the remaining 38 unfilled seats allocated to
party-list solons be given (1) to the thirteen qualified parties that had each
garnered at least two percent of the total votes, or (2) to the Group of 38 -
herein private respondents - even if they had not passed the two percent
threshold?
The poll body held that to allocate the remaining seats only to those who
had hurdled the two percent vote requirement "will mean the concentration
of representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of
Representatives to thirteen organizations representing two political parties,
three coalitions and four sectors: urban poor, veterans, women and
peasantry x x x. Such strict application of the 2% 'threshold' does not serve
the essence and object of the Constitution and the legislature -- to develop
and guarantee a full, free and open party system in order to attain the
broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the
House of Representatives x x x. Additionally, it "will also prevent this
Commission from complying with the constitutional and statutory decrees for
party-list representatives to compose 20% of the House of Representatives.
Thus, in its Resolution dated January 7, 1999, the Comelec en banc, by a
razor-thin majority -- with three commissioners concurring[11] and two
members[12] dissenting -- affirmed the Resolution of its Second Division. It,
however, held in abeyance the proclamation of the 51st party (AABANTE KA
PILIPINAS), "pending the resolution of petitions for correction of manifest
errors.
Without expressly declaring as unconstitutional or void the two percent vote
requirement imposed by RA 7941, the Commission blithely rejected and
circumvented its application, holding that there were more important
considerations than this statutory threshold.
Consequently, several petitions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus,
with prayers for the issuance of temporary restraining orders or writs of
preliminary injunction, were filed before this Court by the parties and
organizations that had obtained at least two per cent of the total votes cast
for the party-list system.[13] In the suits, made respondents together with
the Comelec were the 38 parties, organizations and coalitions that had been
declared by the poll body as likewise entitled to party-list seats in the House
of Representatives. Collectively, petitioners sought the proclamation of
additional representatives from each of their parties and organizations, all of
which had obtained at least two percent of the total votes cast for the party-
list system.
On January 12, 1999, this Court issued a Status Quo Order directing the
Comelec to CEASE and DESIST from constituting itself as a National Board
of Canvassers on 13 January 1999 or on any other date and proclaiming as
winners the nominees of the parties, organizations and coalitions
enumerated in the dispositive portions of its 15 October 1998 Resolution or
its 7 January 1999 Resolution, until further orders from this Court.
On July 1, 1999, oral arguments were heard from the parties. Atty. Jeremias
U. Montemayor appeared for petitioners in GR No. 136781; Atty. Gregorio A.
Andolana, for petitioners in GR No. 136786; Atty. Rodante D. Marcoleta for
petitioners in GR No. 136795; Attys. Ricardo Blancaflor and Pete Quirino
Quadra, for all the private respondents; Atty. Porfirio V. Sison for Intervenor
NACUSIP; and Atty. Jose P. Balbuena for Respondent Comelec. Upon
invitation of the Court, retired Comelec Commissioner Regalado E.
Maambong acted as amicus curiae. Solicitor General Ricardo P. Galvez
appeared, not for any party but also as a friend of the Court.
Thereafter, the parties and the amici curiae were required to submit their
respective Memoranda in amplification of their verbal arguments.[14]
The Issues
The Court believes, and so holds, that the main question of how to
determine the winners of the subject party-list election can be fully settled
by addressing the following issues:
1. Is the twenty percent allocation for party-list representatives mentioned in
Section 5 (2), Article VI of the Constitution, mandatory or is it merely a
ceiling? In other words, should the twenty percent allocation for party-list
solons be filled up completely and all the time?
2. Are the two percent threshold requirement and the three-seat limit
provided in Section 11 (b) of RA 7941 constitutional?
3. If the answer to Issue 2 is in the affirmative, how should the additional
seats of a qualified party be determined?
The Courts Ruling
The Petitions are partly meritorious. The Court agrees with petitioners
that the assailed Resolutions should be nullified, but disagrees that
they should all be granted additional seats.
First Issue: Whether the Twenty Percent Constitutional Allocation Is
Mandatory
The pertinent provision[15] of the Constitution on the composition of the
House of Representatives reads as follows:
Sec. 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more
than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who
shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces,
cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of
their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive
ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected by a party-list
system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.
(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the
total number of representatives including those under the party-list. For
three consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution, one half of
the seats allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by
law, by selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous
cultural communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may be
provided by law, except the religious sector.
Determination of the Total Number of Party-List Lawmakers
Clearly, the Constitution makes the number of district representatives the
determinant in arriving at the number of seats allocated for party-list
lawmakers, who shall comprise "twenty per centum of the total number of
representatives including those under the party-list." We thus translate this
legal provision into a mathematical formula, as follows:
No. of district representatives
---------------------------------- x .20 = No. of party-list
.80 representatives
This formulation[16] means that any increase in the number of district
representatives, as may be provided by law, will necessarily result in a
corresponding increase in the number of party-list seats. To illustrate,
considering that there were 208 district representatives to be elected during
the 1998 national elections, the number of party-list seats would be 52,
computed as follows:
208
-------- x .20 = 52
.80
The foregoing computation of seat allocation is easy enough to comprehend.
The problematic question, however, is this: Does the Constitution require all
such allocated seats to be filled up all the time and under all circumstances?
Our short answer is No.
Twenty Percent Allocation a Mere Ceiling
The Constitution simply states that "[t]he party-list representatives shall
constitute twenty per centum of the total number of representatives
including those under the party-list.
According to petitioners, this percentage is a ceiling; the mechanics by which
it is to be filled up has been left to Congress. In the exercise of its
prerogative, the legislature enacted RA 7941, by which it prescribed that a
party, organization or coalition participating in the party-list election must
obtain at least two percent of the total votes cast for the system in order to
qualify for a seat in the House of Representatives.
Petitioners further argue that the constitutional provision must be construed
together with this legislative requirement. If there is no sufficient number of
participating parties, organizations or coalitions which could hurdle the two
percent vote threshold and thereby fill up the twenty percent party-list
allocation in the House, then naturally such allocation cannot be filled up
completely. The Comelec cannot be faulted for the "incompleteness," for
ultimately the voters themselves are the ones who, in the exercise of their
right of suffrage, determine who and how many should represent them.
On the other hand, Public Respondent Comelec, together with the
respondent parties, avers that the twenty percent allocation for party-list
lawmakers is mandatory, and that the two percent vote requirement in RA
7941 is unconstitutional, because its strict application would make it
mathematically impossible to fill up the House party-list complement.
We rule that a simple reading of Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution,
easily conveys the equally simple message that Congress was vested with
the broad power to define and prescribe the mechanics of the party-list
system of representation. The Constitution explicitly sets down only the
percentage of the total membership in the House of Representatives
reserved for party-list representatives.
In the exercise of its constitutional prerogative, Congress enacted RA 7941.
As said earlier, Congress declared therein a policy to promote "proportional
representation" in the election of party-list representatives in order to enable
Filipinos belonging to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors to
contribute legislation that would benefit them. It however deemed it
necessary to require parties, organizations and coalitions participating in the
system to obtain at least two percent of the total votes cast for the party-list
system in order to be entitled to a party-list seat. Those garnering more than
this percentage could have "additional seats in proportion to their total
number of votes. Furthermore, no winning party, organization or coalition
can have more than three seats in the House of Representatives. Thus the
relevant portion of Section 11(b) of the law provides:
(b) The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent
(2%) of the total votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one
seat each; Provided, That those garnering more than two percent (2%) of
the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total
number of votes; Provided, finally, That each party, organization, or coalition
shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats.
Considering the foregoing statutory requirements, it will be shown presently
that Section 5 (2), Article VI of the Constitution is not mandatory. It
merely provides a ceiling for party-list seats in Congress.
On the contention that a strict application of the two percent threshold may
result in a mathematical impossibility, suffice it to say that the prerogative
to determine whether to adjust or change this percentage requirement rests
in Congress.[17] Our task now, as should have been the Comelecs, is not to
find fault in the wisdom of the law through highly unlikely scenarios of
clinical extremes, but to craft an innovative mathematical formula that can,
as far as practicable, implement it within the context of the actual election
process.
Indeed, the function of the Supreme Court, as well as of all judicial and
quasi-judicial agencies, is to apply the law as we find it, not to reinvent or
second-guess it. Unless declared unconstitutional, ineffective, insufficient or
otherwise void by the proper tribunal, a statute remains a valid command of
sovereignty that must be respected and obeyed at all times. This is the
essence of the rule of law.
Second Issue: The Statutory Requirement and Limitation
The Two Percent Threshold
In imposing a two percent threshold, Congress wanted to ensure that only
those parties, organizations and coalitions having a sufficient number of
constituents deserving of representation are actually represented in
Congress. This intent can be gleaned from the deliberations on the proposed
bill. We quote below a pertinent portion of the Senate discussion:
SENATOR GONZALES: For purposes of continuity, I would want to follow up
a point that was raised by, I think, Senator Osmea when he said that a
political party must have obtained at least a minimum percentage to be
provided in this law in order to qualify for a seat under the party-list system.
They do that in many other countries. A party must obtain at least 2 percent
of the votes cast, 5 percent or 10 percent of the votes cast. Otherwise, as I
have said, this will actually proliferate political party groups and those who
have not really been given by the people sufficient basis for them to
represent their constituents and, in turn, they will be able to get to the
Parliament through the backdoor under the name of the party-list system,
Mr. President."[18]
A similar intent is clear from the statements of the bill sponsor in the House
of Representatives, as the following shows:
MR. ESPINOSA. There is a mathematical formula which this computation is
based at, arriving at a five percent ratio which would distribute equitably the
number of seats among the different sectors. There is a mathematical
formula which is, I think, patterned after that of the party list of the other
parliaments or congresses, more particularly the Bundestag of
Germany.[19]
Moreover, even the framers of our Constitution had in mind a minimum-vote
requirement, the specification of which they left to Congress to properly
determine. Constitutional Commissioner Christian S. Monsod explained:
MR. MONSOD. x x x We are amenable to modifications in the minimum
percentage of votes. Our proposal is that anybody who has two-and-a-half
percent of the votes gets a seat. There are about 20 million who cast their
votes in the last elections. Two-and-a-half percent would mean 500,000
votes. Anybody who has a constituency of 500,000 votes nationwide
deserves a seat in the Assembly. If we bring that down to two percent, we
are talking about 400,000 votes. The average vote per family is three. So,
here we are talking about 134,000 families. We believe that there are many
sectors who will be able to get seats in the Assembly because many of them
have memberships of over 10,000. In effect, that is the operational
implication of our proposal. What we are trying to avoid is this selection of
sectors, the reserve seat system. We believe that it is our job to open up the
system and that we should not have within that system a reserve seat. We
think that people should organize, should work hard, and should earn their
seats within that system.[20]
The two percent threshold is consistent not only with the intent of the
framers of the Constitution and the law, but with the very essence of
"representation." Under a republican or representative state, all government
authority emanates from the people, but is exercised by representatives
chosen by them.[21] But to have meaningful representation, the elected
persons must have the mandate of a sufficient number of people. Otherwise,
in a legislature that features the party-list system, the result might be the
proliferation of small groups which are incapable of contributing significant
legislation, and which might even pose a threat to the stability of Congress.
Thus, even legislative districts are apportioned according to "the number of
their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive
ratio"[22] to ensure meaningful local representation.
All in all, we hold that the statutory provision on this two percent
requirement is precise and crystalline. When the law is clear, the function of
courts is simple application, not interpretation or circumvention.[23]
The Three-Seat-Per-Party Limit
An important consideration in adopting the party-list system is to promote
and encourage a multiparty system of representation. Again, we quote
Commissioner Monsod:
MR. MONSOD. Madam President, I just want to say that we suggested or
proposed the party list system because we wanted to open up the political
system to a pluralistic society through a multiparty system. But we also
wanted to avoid the problems of mechanics and operation in the
implementation of a concept that has very serious shortcomings of
classification and of double or triple votes. We are for opening up the
system, and we would like very much for the sectors to be there. That is why
one of the ways to do that is to put a ceiling on the number of
representatives from any single party that can sit within the 50 allocated
under the party list system. This way, we will open it up and enable sectoral
groups, or maybe regional groups, to earn their seats among the fifty. x x
x.[24]
Consistent with the Constitutional Commission's pronouncements, Congress
set the seat-limit to three (3) for each qualified party, organization or
coalition. "Qualified" means having hurdled the two percent vote threshold.
Such three-seat limit ensures the entry of various interest-representations
into the legislature; thus, no single group, no matter how large its
membership, would dominate the party-list seats, if not the entire House.
We shall not belabor this point, because the validity of the three-seat limit is
not seriously challenged in these consolidated cases.
Third Issue: Method of Allocating Additional Seats
Having determined that the twenty percent seat allocation is merely a
ceiling, and having upheld the constitutionality of the two percent vote
threshold and the three-seat limit imposed under RA 7941, we now proceed
to the method of determining how many party-list seats the qualified parties,
organizations and coalitions are entitled to. The very first step - there is no
dispute on this - is to rank all the participating parties, organizations and
coalitions (hereafter collectively referred to as "parties") according to the
votes they each obtained. The percentage of their respective votes as
against the total number of votes cast for the party-list system is then
determined. All those that garnered at least two percent of the total votes
cast have an assured or guaranteed seat in the House of Representatives.
Thereafter, "those garnering more than two percent of the votes shall be
entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes." The
problem is how to distribute additional seats "proportionally," bearing in
mind the three-seat limit further imposed by the law.
One Additional Seat Per Two Percent Increment
One proposed formula is to allocate one additional seat for every additional
proportion of the votes obtained equivalent to the two percent vote
requirement for the first seat.[25] Translated in figures, a party that wins at
least six percent of the total votes cast will be entitled to three seats;
another party that gets four percent will be entitled to two seats; and one
that gets two percent will be entitled to one seat only. This proposal has the
advantage of simplicity and ease of comprehension. Problems arise,
however, when the parties get very lop-sided votes -- for example, when
Party A receives 20 percent of the total votes cast; Party B, 10 percent; and
Party C, 6 percent. Under the method just described, Party A would be
entitled to 10 seats; Party B, to 5 seats and Party C, to 3 seats. Considering
the three-seat limit imposed by law, all the parties will each uniformly have
three seats only. We would then have the spectacle of a party garnering two
or more times the number of votes obtained by another, yet getting the
same number of seats as the other one with the much lesser votes. In effect,
proportional representation will be contravened and the law rendered
nugatory by this suggested solution. Hence, the Court discarded it.
The Niemeyer Formula
Another suggestion that the Court considered was the Niemeyer formula,
which was developed by a German mathematician and adopted by Germany
as its method of distributing party-list seats in the Bundestag. Under this
formula, the number of additional seats to which a qualified party would be
entitled is determined by multiplying the remaining number of seats to be
allocated by the total number of votes obtained by that party and dividing
the product by the total number of votes garnered by all the qualified
parties. The integer portion of the resulting product will be the number of
additional seats that the party concerned is entitled to. Thus:
No. of remaining seats
to be allocated No. of additional
--------------------------- x No. of votes of = seats of party
Total no. of votes of party concerned concerned
qualified parties (Integer.decimal)
The next step is to distribute the extra seats left among the qualified parties
in the descending order of the decimal portions of the resulting products.
Based on the 1998 election results, the distribution of party-list seats under
the Niemeyer method would be as follows:
Party Number of Guaranteed Additional Extra Total
Votes Seats Seats Seats
1. APEC 503,487 1 5.73 1 7
2. ABA 321,646 1 3.66 1 5
3. ALAGAD 312,500 1 3.55 4
4. VETERANS 304,802 1 3.47 4
FEDERATION
5. PROMDI 255,184 1 2.90 1 4
6. AKO 239,042 1 2.72 1 4
7. NCSCFO 238,303 1 2.71 1 4
8. ABANSE! PINAY 235,548 1 2.68 1 4
9. AKBAYAN 232,376 1 2.64 1 4
10. BUTIL 215,643 1 2.45 3
11. SANLAKAS 194,617 1 2.21 3
12. COOP-NATCCO 189,802 1 2.16 3
13. COCOFED 186,388 1 2.12 3
Total 3,429,338 13 32 7 52
However, since Section 11 of RA 7941 sets a limit of three (3) seats for each
party, those obtaining more than the limit will have to give up their excess
seats. Under our present set of facts, the thirteen qualified parties will each
be entitled to three seats, resulting in an overall total of 39. Note that like
the previous proposal, the Niemeyer formula would violate the principle of
"proportional representation," a basic tenet of our party-list system.
The Niemeyer formula, while no doubt suitable for Germany, finds no
application in the Philippine setting, because of our three-seat limit and the
non-mandatory character of the twenty percent allocation. True, both our
Congress and the Bundestag have threshold requirements -- two percent for
us and five for them. There are marked differences between the two models,
however. As ably pointed out by private respondents,[26] one half of the
German Parliament is filled up by party-list members. More important, there
are no seat limitations, because German law discourages the proliferation of
small parties. In contrast, RA 7941, as already mentioned, imposes a three-
seat limit to encourage the promotion of the multiparty system. This major
statutory difference makes the Niemeyer formula completely inapplicable to
the Philippines.
Just as one cannot grow Washington apples in the Philippines or Guimaras
mangoes in the Arctic because of fundamental environmental differences,
neither can the Niemeyer formula be transplanted in toto here because of
essential variances between the two party-list models.
The Legal and Logical Formula for the Philippines
It is now obvious that the Philippine style party-list system is a unique
paradigm which demands an equally unique formula. In crafting a legally
defensible and logical solution to determine the number of additional seats
that a qualified party is entitled to, we need to review the parameters of the
Filipino party-list system.
As earlier mentioned in the Prologue, they are as follows:
First, the twenty percent allocation - the combined number of all party-list
congressmen shall not exceed twenty percent of the total membership of the
House of Representatives, including those elected under the party list.
Second, the two percent threshold - only those parties garnering a minimum
of two percent of the total valid votes cast for the party-list system are
qualified to have a seat in the House of Representatives;
Third, the three-seat limit - each qualified party, regardless of the number of
votes it actually obtained, is entitled to a maximum of three seats; that is,
one qualifying and two additional seats.
Fourth, proportional representation - the additional seats which a qualified
party is entitled to shall be computed in proportion to their total number of
votes.
The problem, as already stated, is to find a way to translate proportional
representation into a mathematical formula that will not contravene,
circumvent or amend the above-mentioned parameters.
After careful deliberation, we now explain such formula, step by step.
Step One. There is no dispute among the petitioners, the public and the
private respondents, as well as the members of this Court, that the initial
step is to rank all the participating parties, organizations and coalitions from
the highest to the lowest based on the number of votes they each received.
Then the ratio for each party is computed by dividing its votes by the total
votes cast for all the parties participating in the system. All parties with at
least two percent of the total votes are guaranteed one seat each. Only
these parties shall be considered in the computation of additional seats. The
party receiving the highest number of votes shall thenceforth be referred to
as the first party.
Step Two. The next step is to determine the number of seats the first party
is entitled to, in order to be able to compute that for the other parties. Since
the distribution is based on proportional representation, the number of seats
to be allotted to the other parties cannot possibly exceed that to which the
first party is entitled by virtue of its obtaining the most number of votes.
For example, the first party received 1,000,000 votes and is determined to
be entitled to two additional seats. Another qualified party which received
500,000 votes cannot be entitled to the same number of seats, since it
garnered only fifty percent of the votes won by the first party. Depending on
the proportion of its votes relative to that of the first party whose number of
seats has already been predetermined, the second party should be given less
than that to which the first one is entitled.
The other qualified parties will always be allotted less additional seats than
the first party for two reasons: (1) the ratio between said parties and the
first party will always be less than 1:1, and (2) the formula does not admit of
mathematical rounding off, because there is no such thing as a fraction of a
seat. Verily, an arbitrary rounding off could result in a violation of the twenty
percent allocation. An academic mathematical demonstration of such
incipient violation is not necessary because the present set of facts, given
the number of qualified parties and the voting percentages obtained, will
definitely not end up in such constitutional contravention.
The Court has previously ruled in Guingona Jr. v. Gonzales[27] that a
fractional membership cannot be converted into a whole membership of one
when it would, in effect, deprive another party's fractional membership. It
would be a violation of the constitutional mandate of proportional
representation. We said further that "no party can claim more than what it is
entitled to x x x.
In any case, the decision on whether to round off the fractions is better left
to the legislature. Since Congress did not provide for it in the present law,
neither will this Court. The Supreme Court does not make the law; it merely
applies it to a given set of facts.
Formula for Determining Additional Seats for the First Party
Now, how do we determine the number of seats the first party is entitled to?
The only basis given by the law is that a party receiving at least two percent
of the total votes shall be entitled to one seat. Proportionally, if the first
party were to receive twice the number of votes of the second party, it total of three seats; and the party receiving six percent, additional seats in
should be entitled to twice the latter's number of seats and so on. The proportion to those of the first party.
formula, therefore, for computing the number of seats to which the first
party is entitled is as follows: Formula for Additional Seats of Other Qualified Parties

Number of votes Step Three The next step is to solve for the number of additional seats that
of first party Proportion of votes of the other qualified parties are entitled to, based on proportional
-------------------- = first party relative to representation. The formula is encompassed by the following complex
Total votes for total votes for party-list system fraction:
party-list system
If the proportion of votes received by the first party without rounding it off is No. of votes of
equal to at least six percent of the total valid votes cast for all the party list concerned party
groups, then the first party shall be entitled to two additional seats or a total ------------------
of three seats overall. If the proportion of votes without a rounding off is Total no. of votes
equal to or greater than four percent, but less than six percent, then the first Additional seats for party-list system No. of additional
party shall have one additional or a total of two seats. And if the proportion for concerned = ----------------------- x seats allocated to
is less than four percent, then the first party shall not be entitled to any party No. of votes of the first party
additional seat. first party
------------------
We adopted this six percent bench mark, because the first party is not Total no. of votes
always entitled to the maximum number of additional seats. Likewise, it for party list system
would prevent the allotment of more than the total number of available In simplified form, it is written as follows:
seats, such as in an extreme case wherein 18 or more parties tie for the
highest rank and are thus entitled to three seats each. In such scenario, the No. of votes of
number of seats to which all the parties are entitled may exceed the Additional seats concerned party No. of additional
maximum number of party-list seats reserved in the House of for concerned = ------------------ x seats allocated to
Representatives. party No. of votes of the first party
first party
Applying the above formula, APEC, which received 5.5% of the total votes Thus, in the case of ABA, the additional number of seats it would be entitled
cast, is entitled to one additional seat or a total of two seats. to is computed as follows:

Note that the above formula will be applicable only in determining the
number of additional seats the first party is entitled to. It cannot be used to
determine the number of additional seats of the other qualified parties. As
explained earlier, the use of the same formula for all would contravene the
proportional representation parameter. For example, a second party obtains
six percent of the total number of votes cast. According to the above
formula, the said party would be entitled to two additional seats or a total of
three seats overall. However, if the first party received a significantly higher
amount of votes -- say, twenty percent -- to grant it the same number of
seats as the second party would violate the statutory mandate of
proportional representation, since a party getting only six percent of the
votes will have an equal number of representatives as the one obtaining
twenty percent. The proper solution, therefore, is to grant the first party a
No. of votes of
Additional seats ABA No. of additional
for concerned = -------------------- x seats allocated to
party (ABA) No. of votes of the first party
first party (APEC)
Substituting actual values would result in the following equation:
Additional seats 321,646
for concerned = ----------- x 1 = .64 or 0 additional seat, since
party (ABA) 503,487 rounding off is not to be applied
Applying the above formula, we find the outcome of the 1998 party-list
election to be as follows:
Organization Votes %age of Initial No. Additional Total
Garnered Total Votes of Seats Seats
1. APEC 503,487 5.50% 1 1 2
2. ABA 321,646 3.51% 1 321,646 / 503,487 * 1 = 0.64 1
3. ALAGAD 312,500 3.41% 1 312,500 / 503,487 * 1 = 0.62 1
4. VETERANS 304,802 3.33% 1 304,802 / 503,487 * 1 = 0.61 1
FEDERATION
5. PROMDI 255,184 2.79% 1 255,184 / 503,487 * 1 = 0.51 1
6. AKO 239,042 2.61% 1 239,042 / 503,487 * 1 = 0.47 1
7. NCSFO 238,303 2.60% 1 238,303 / 503,487 * 1 = 0.47 1
8. ABANSE! 235,548 2.57% 1 321,646 / 503,487 * 1 = 0.47 1
PINAY
9. AKBAYAN! 232,376 2.54% 1 232,376 / 503,487 * 1 = 0.46 1
10. BUTIL 215,643 2.36% 1 215,643 / 503,487 * 1 = 0.43 1
11. SANLAKAS 194,617 2.13% 1 194,617 / 503,487 * 1 = 0.39 1
12. COOP- 189,802 2.07% 1 189,802 / 503,487 * 1 = 0.38 1
NATCCO
13. COCOFED 186,388 2.04% 1 186,388 / 503,487 * 1 = 0.37 1
Incidentally, if the first party is not entitled to any additional seat, then the
ratio of the number of votes for the other party to that for the first one is
multiplied by zero. The end result would be zero additional seat for each of
the other qualified parties as well.
The above formula does not give an exact mathematical representation of
the number of additional seats to be awarded since, in order to be entitled to
one additional seat, an exact whole number is necessary. In fact, most of the
actual mathematical proportions are not whole numbers and are not rounded
off for the reasons explained earlier. To repeat, rounding off may result in
the awarding of a number of seats in excess of that provided by the law.
Furthermore, obtaining absolute proportional representation is restricted by
the three-seat-per-party limit to a maximum of two additional slots. An
increase in the maximum number of additional representatives a party may
be entitled to would result in a more accurate proportional representation.
But the law itself has set the limit: only two additional seats. Hence, we need
to work within such extant parameter.
The net result of the foregoing formula for determining additional seats
happily coincides with the present number of incumbents; namely, two for
the first party (APEC) and one each for the twelve other qualified parties.
Hence, we affirm the legality of the incumbencies of their nominees, albeit
through the use of a different formula and methodology.
In his Dissent, Justice Mendoza criticizes our methodology for being too
strict. We say, however, that our formula merely translated the Philippine
legal parameters into a mathematical equation, no more no less. If Congress
in its wisdom decides to modify RA 7941 to make it less strict, then the
formula will also be modified to reflect the changes willed by the lawmakers.
Epilogue
In sum, we hold that the Comelec gravely abused its discretion in ruling that
the thirty-eight (38) herein respondent parties, organizations and coalitions
are each entitled to a party-list seat, because it glaringly violated two
requirements of RA 7941: the two percent threshold and proportional
representation.
In disregarding, rejecting and circumventing these statutory provisions, the
Comelec effectively arrogated unto itself what the Constitution expressly and
wholly vested in the legislature: the power and the discretion to define the
mechanics for the enforcement of the system. The wisdom and the propriety
of these impositions, absent any clear transgression of the Constitution or
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, are
beyond judicial review.[28]
Indeed, the Comelec and the other parties in these cases - both petitioners
and respondents - have failed to demonstrate that our lawmakers gravely
abused their discretion in prescribing such requirements. By grave abuse of
discretion is meant such capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment
equivalent to lack or excess of jurisdiction.[29]
The Comelec, which is tasked merely to enforce and administer election-
related laws,[30] cannot simply disregard an act of Congress exercised
within the bounds of its authority. As a mere implementing body, it cannot
judge the wisdom, propriety or rationality of such act. Its recourse is to draft
an amendment to the law and lobby for its approval and enactment by the
legislature.
Furthermore, a reading of the entire Constitution reveals no violation of any
of its provisions by the strict enforcement of RA 7941. It is basic that to
strike down a law or any of its provisions as unconstitutional, there must be
a clear and unequivocal showing that what the Constitution prohibits, the
statute permits.[31]
Neither can we grant petitioners prayer that they each be given additional
seats (for a total of three each), because granting such plea would plainly
and simply violate the proportional representation mandated by Section 11
(b) of RA 7941.
The low turnout of the party-list votes during the 1998 elections should not
be interpreted as a total failure of the law in fulfilling the object of this new
system of representation. It should not be deemed a conclusive indication
that the requirements imposed by RA 7941 wholly defeated the
implementation of the system. Be it remembered that the party-list system,
though already popular in parliamentary democracies, is still quite new in our
presidential system. We should allow it some time to take root in the
consciousness of our people and in the heart of our tripartite form of
republicanism. Indeed, the Comelec and the defeated litigants should not
despair.

Quite the contrary, the dismal result of the first election for party-list
representatives should serve as a challenge to our sectoral parties and
organizations. It should stir them to be more active and vigilant in their
campaign for representation in the State's lawmaking body. It should also
serve as a clarion call for innovation and creativity in adopting this novel
system of popular democracy.

With adequate information dissemination to the public and more active

sectoral parties, we are confident our people will be more responsive to
future party-list elections. Armed with patience, perseverance and
perspicacity, our marginalized sectors, in time, will fulfill the Filipino dream of
full representation in Congress under the aegis of the party-list system,
Philippine style.

WHEREFORE, the Petitions are hereby partially GRANTED. The assailed

Resolutions of the Comelec are SET ASIDE and NULLIFIED. The
proclamations of the fourteen (14) sitting party-list representatives - two for
APEC and one each for the remaining twelve (12) qualified parties - are
AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Purisima, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, Ynares-Santiago,

and De Leon Jr., JJ., concur.
Bellosillo, Melo, and Vitug, JJ., in the result.
Puno, J., see separate concurring opinion.
Mendoza, J., dissents.
Kapunan, and Quisumbing, JJ., join the opinion of J. Mendoza.
9
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 147589 June 26, 2001
ANG BAGONG BAYANI-OFW LABOR PARTY (under the acronym
OFW), represented herein by its secretary-general, MOHAMMAD
OMAR FAJARDO, petitioner,
vs.
ANG BAGONG BAYANI-OFW LABOR PARTY GO! GO! PHILIPPINES; THE
TRUE MARCOS LOYALIST ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES; PHILIPPINE
LOCAL AUTONOMY; CITIZENS MOVEMENT FOR JUSTICE, ECONOMY,
ENVIRONMENT AND PEACE; CHAMBER OF REAL ESTATE BUILDERS
ASSOCIATION; SPORTS & HEALTH ADVANCEMENT FOUNDATION, INC.;
ANG LAKAS NG OVERSEAS CONTRACT WORKERS (OCW); BAGONG BAYANI
ORGANIZATION and others under "Organizations/Coalitions" of Omnibus
Resolution No. 3785; PARTIDO NG MASANG PILIPINO; LAKAS NUCD-UMDP;
NATIONALIST PEOPLE'S COALITION; LABAN NG DEMOKRATIKONG
PILIPINO; AKSYON DEMOKRATIKO; PDP-LABAN; LIBERAL PARTY;
NACIONALISTA PARTY; ANG BUHAY HAYAANG YUMABONG; and others
under "Political Parties" of Omnibus Resolution No. 3785. respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 147613 June 26, 2001
BAYAN MUNA, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; NATIONALIST PEOPLE'S COALITION
(NPC); LABAN NG DEMOKRATIKONG PILIPINO (LDP); PARTIDO NG MASANG
PILIPINO (PMP); LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP; LIBERAL PARTY; MAMAMAYANG
AYAW SA DROGA; CREBA; NATIONAL FEDERATION OF SUGARCANE
PLANTERS; JEEP; and BAGONG BAYANI ORGANIZATION, respondents.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The party-list system is a social justice tool designed not only to give more
law to the great masses of our people who have less in life, but also to
enable them to become veritable lawmakers themselves, empowered to
participate directly in the enactment of laws designed to benefit them. It
intends to make the marginalized and the underrepresented not merely
passive recipients of the State's benevolence, but active participants in the
mainstream of representative democracy. Thus, allowing all individuals and
groups, including those which now dominate district elections, to have the
same opportunity to participate in party-list elections would desecrate this
lofty objective and mongrelize the social justice mechanism into an atrocious
veneer for traditional politics.
The Case
Before us are two Petitions under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, challenging
Omnibus Resolution No. 3785 1 issued by the Commission on Elections
(Comelec) on March 26, 2001. This Resolution approved the participation of
154 organizations and parties, including those herein impleaded, in the 2001
party-list elections. Petitioners seek the disqualification of private
respondents, arguing mainly that the party-list system was intended to
benefit the marginalized and underrepresented; not the mainstream political
parties, the non-marginalized or overrepresented.
The Factual Antecedents
With the onset of the 2001 elections, the Comelec received several Petitions
for registration filed by sectoral parties, organizations and political parties.
According to the Comelec, "[v]erifications were made as to the status and
capacity of these parties and organizations and hearings were scheduled day
and night until the last party w[as] heard. With the number of these
petitions and the observance of the legal and procedural requirements,
review of these petitions as well as deliberations takes a longer process in
order to arrive at a decision and as a result the two (2) divisions
promulgated a separate Omnibus Resolution and individual resolution on
political parties. These numerous petitions and processes observed in the
disposition of these petition[s] hinder the early release of the Omnibus
Resolutions of the Divisions which were promulgated only on 10 February
2001." 2
Thereafter, before the February 12, 2001 deadline prescribed under Comelec
Resolution No. 3426 dated December 22, 2000, the registered parties and
organizations filed their respective Manifestations, stating their intention to
participate in the party-list elections. Other sectoral and political parties and
organizations whose registrations were denied also filed Motions for
Reconsideration, together with Manifestations of their intent to participate in
the party-list elections. Still other registered parties filed their Manifestations
beyond the deadline.

The Comelec gave due course or approved the Manifestations (or
accreditations) of 154 parties and organizations, but denied those of several
others in its assailed March 26, 2001 Omnibus Resolution No. 3785, which
we quote:
"We carefully deliberated the foregoing matters, having in mind that this
system of proportional representation scheme will encourage multi-partisan
[sic] and enhance the inability of small, new or sectoral parties or
organization to directly participate in this electoral window.
"It will be noted that as defined, the 'party-list system' is a 'mechanism of
proportional representation' in the election of representatives to the House of
Representatives from national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations
or coalitions thereof registered with the Commission on Elections.
"However, in the course of our review of the matters at bar, we must
recognize the fact that there is a need to keep the number of sectoral
parties, organizations and coalitions, down to a manageable level, keeping
only those who substantially comply with the rules and regulations and more
importantly the sufficiency of the Manifestations or evidence on the Motions
for Reconsiderations or Oppositions." 3
On April 10, 2001, Akbayan Citizens Action Party filed before the Comelec a
Petition praying that "the names of [some of herein respondents] be deleted
from the 'Certified List of Political Parties/Sectoral
Parties/Organizations/Coalitions Participating in the Party List System for the
May 14, 2001 Elections' and that said certified list be accordingly amended."
It also asked, as an alternative, that the votes cast for the said respondents
not be counted or canvassed, and that the latter's nominees not be
proclaimed. 4 On April 11, 2001, Bayan Muna and Bayan Muna-Youth also
filed a Petition for Cancellation of Registration and Nomination against some
of herein respondents. 5
On April 18, 2001, the Comelec required the respondents in the two
disqualification cases to file Comments within three days from notice. It also
set the date for hearing on April 26, 2001, 6 but subsequently reset it to May
3, 2001. 7 During the hearing, however, Commissioner Ralph C. Lantion
merely directed the parties to submit their respective memoranda. 8
Meanwhile, dissatisfied with the pace of the Comelec, Ang Bagong Bayani-
OFW Labor Party filed a Petition 9 before this Court on April 16, 2001. This
Petition, docketed as GR No. 147589, assailed Comelec Omnibus Resolution
No. 3785. In its Resolution dated April 17, 2001, 10 the Court directed
respondents to comment on the Petition within a non-extendible period of
five days from notice. 11
On April 17, 2001, Petitioner Bayan Muna also filed before this Court a
Petition, 12 docketed as GR No. 147613, also challenging Comelec Omnibus
Resolution No. 3785. In its Resolution dated May 9, 2001, 13 the Court
ordered the consolidation of the two Petitions before it; directed respondents
named in the second Petition to file their respective Comments on or before
noon of May 15, 2001; and called the parties to an Oral Argument on May
17, 2001. It added that the Comelec may proceed with the counting and
canvassing of votes cast for the party-list elections, but barred the
proclamation of any winner therein, until further orders of the Court.
Thereafter, Comments 14 on the second Petition were received by the Court
and, on May 17, 2001, the Oral Argument was conducted as scheduled. In
an Order given in open court, the parties were directed to submit their
respective Memoranda simultaneously within a non-extendible period of five
days. 15
Issues:
During the hearing on May 17, 2001, the Court directed the parties
to address the following issues:
"1. Whether or not recourse under Rule 65 is proper under the premises.
More specifically, is there no other plain, speedy or adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law?
"2. Whether or not political parties may participate in the party-list elections.
"3. Whether or not the party-list system is exclusive to 'marginalized and
underrepresented' sectors and organizations.
"4. Whether or not the Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in
promulgating Omnibus Resolution No. 3785." 16
The Court's Ruling
The Petitions are partly meritorious. These cases should be remanded
to the Comelec which will determine, after summary evidentiary hearings,
whether the 154 parties and organizations enumerated in the assailed
Omnibus Resolution satisfy the requirements of the Constitution and RA
7941, as specified in this Decision.
First Issue:
Recourse Under Rule 65
Respondents contend that the recourse of both petitioners under Rule 65 is
improper because there are other plain, speedy and adequate remedies in
the ordinary course of law. 17 The Office of the Solicitor General argues that
petitioners should have filed before the Comelec a petition either for
disqualification or for cancellation of registration, pursuant to Sections 19,
20, 21 and 22 of Comelec Resolution No. 3307-A 18 dated November 9,
2000. 19
We disagree. At bottom, petitioners attack the validity of Comelec Omnibus
Resolution 3785 for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion,
insofar as it allowed respondents to participate in the party-list elections of
2001. Indeed, under both the Constitution 20 and the Rules of Court, such
challenge may be brought before this Court in a verified petition for certiorari
under Rule 65.
Moreover, the assailed Omnibus Resolution was promulgated by Respondent
Commission en banc; hence, no motion for reconsideration was possible, it
being a prohibited pleading under Section 1 (d), Rule 13 of the Comelec
Rules of Procedure. 21
The Court also notes that Petitioner Bayan Muna had filed before the
Comelec a Petition for Cancellation of Registration and Nomination against
some of herein respondents. 22 The Comelec, however, did not act on that
Petition. In view of the pendency of the elections, Petitioner Bayan Muna
sought succor from this Court, for there was no other adequate recourse at
the time. Subsequent events have proven the urgency of petitioner's action;
to this date, the Comelec has not yet formally resolved the Petition before it.
But a resolution may just be a formality because the Comelec, through the
Office of the Solicitor General, has made its position on the matter quite
clear.
In any event, this case presents an exception to the rule that certiorari shall
lie only in the absence of any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy. 23
It has been held that certiorari is available, notwithstanding the presence of
other remedies, "where the issue raised is one purely of law, where public
interest is involved, and in case of urgency." 24 Indeed, the instant case is
indubitably imbued with public interest and with extreme urgency, for it
potentially involves the composition of 20 percent of the House of
Representatives.
Moreover, this case raises transcendental constitutional issues on the party-
list system, which this Court must urgently resolve, consistent with its duty
to "formulate guiding and controlling constitutional principles, precepts,
doctrines, or rules." 25
Finally, procedural requirements "may be glossed over to prevent a
miscarriage of justice, when the issue involves the principle of social justice x
x x when the decision sought to be set aside is a nullity, or when the need
for relief is extremely urgent and certiorari is the only adequate and speedy
remedy available." 26
Second Issue:
Participation of Political Parties
In its Petition, Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party contends that "the
inclusion of political parties in the party-list system is the most objectionable
portion of the questioned Resolution." 27 For its part, Petitioner Bayan Muna
objects to the participation of "major political parties." 28 On the other hand,
the Office of the Solicitor General, like the impleaded political parties,
submits that the Constitution and RA No. 7941 allow political parties to
participate in the party-list elections. It argues that the party-list system is, in
fact, open to all "registered national, regional and sectoral parties or
organizations." 29
We now rule on this issue. Under the Constitution and RA 7941, private
respondents cannot be disqualified from the party-list elections, merely on
the ground that they are political parties. Section 5, Article VI of the
Constitution provides that members of the House of Representatives may "be
elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and
sectoral parties or organizations."
Furthermore, under Sections 7 and 8, Article IX (C) of the Constitution,
political parties may be registered under the party-list system.
"Sec. 7. No votes cast in favor of a political party, organization, or coalition
shall be valid, except for those registered under the party-list system as
provided in this Constitution.
"Sec. 8. Political parties, or organizations or coalitions registered under the
party-list system, shall not be represented in the voters' registration boards,
boards of election inspectors, boards of canvassers, or other similar bodies.
However, they shall be entitled to appoint poll watchers in accordance with
law." 30

During the deliberations in the Constitutional Commission, Comm. Christian
S. Monsod pointed out that the participants in the party-list system may "be
a regional party, a sectoral party, a national party, UNIDO, 31 Magsasaka, or
a regional party in Mindanao." 32 This was also clear from the following
exchange between Comms. Jaime Tadeo and Blas Ople: 33
"MR. TADEO. Naniniwala ba kayo na ang party list ay pwedeng paghati-
hatian ng UNIDO, PDP-Laban, PNP, Liberal at Nacionalista?
MR. OPLE. Maaari yan sapagkat bukas ang party list system sa lahat ng mga
partido."
Indeed, Commissioner Monsod stated that the purpose of the party-list
provision was to open up the system, in order to give a chance to parties
that consistently place third or fourth in congressional district elections to
win a seat in Congress. 34 He explained: "The purpose of this is to open the
system. In the past elections, we found out that there were certain groups or
parties that, if we count their votes nationwide, have about 1,000,000 or
1,500,000 votes. But they were always third or fourth place in each of the
districts. So, they have no voice in the Assembly. But this way, they would
have five or six representatives in the Assembly even if they would not win
individually in legislative districts. So, that is essentially the mechanics, the
purpose and objectives of the party-list system."
For its part, Section 2 of RA 7941 also provides for "a party-list system of
registered national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations or
coalitions thereof, x x x." Section 3 expressly states that a "party" is "either a
political party or a sectoral party or a coalition of parties." More to the point,
the law defines "political party" as "an organized group of citizens advocating
an ideology or platform, principles and policies for the general conduct of
government and which, as the most immediate means of securing their
adoption, regularly nominates and supports certain of its leaders and
members as candidates for public office."
Furthermore, Section 11 of RA 7941 leaves no doubt as to the participation
of political parties in the party-list system. We quote the pertinent provision
below:
"x x x
"For purposes of the May 1998 elections, the first five (5) major political
parties on the basis of party representation in the House of Representatives
at the start of the Tenth Congress of the Philippines shall not be entitled to
participate in the party-list system.
x x x"
Indubitably, therefore, political parties even the major ones -- may
participate in the party-list elections.
Third Issue:
Marginalized and Underrepresented
That political parties may participate in the party-list elections does not
mean, however, that any political party -- or any organization or group for
that matter -- may do so. The requisite character of these parties or
organizations must be consistent with the purpose of the party-list system,
as laid down in the Constitution and RA 7941. Section 5, Article VI of the
Constitution, provides as follows:
"(1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two
hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be
elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and
the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their
respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio,
and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list
system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.
(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the
total number of representatives including those under the party list. For
three consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution, one-half of
the seats allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by
law, by selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous
cultural communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may be
provided by law, except the religious sector." (Emphasis supplied.)
Notwithstanding the sparse language of the provision, a distinguished
member of the Constitutional Commission declared that the purpose of the
party-list provision was to give "genuine power to our people" in Congress.
Hence, when the provision was discussed, he exultantly announced: "On this
first day of August 1986, we shall, hopefully, usher in a new chapter to our
national history, by giving genuine power to our people in the legislature."
35
The foregoing provision on the party-list system is not self-executory. It is, in
fact, interspersed with phrases like "in accordance with law" or "as may be
provided by law"; it was thus up to Congress to sculpt in granite the lofty
objective of the Constitution. Hence, RA 7941 was enacted. It laid out the
statutory policy in this wise:
"SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. -- The State shall promote proportional
representation in the election of representatives to the House of
Representatives through a party-list system of registered national, regional
and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof, which will enable
Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors,
organizations and parties, and who lack well-defined political constituencies
but who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate
legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole, to become members of the
House of Representatives. Towards this end, the State shall develop and
guarantee a full, free and open party system in order to attain the broadest
possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of
Representatives by enhancing their chances to compete for and win seats in
the legislature, and shall provide the simplest scheme possible."
The Marginalized and Underrepresented to Become Lawmakers
Themselves
The foregoing provision mandates a state policy of promoting proportional
representation by means of the Filipino-style party-list system, which will
"enable" the election to the House of Representatives of Filipino citizens,
1. who belong to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations
and parties; and
2. who lack well-defined constituencies; but
3. who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate
legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole.
The key words in this policy are "proportional representation," "marginalized
and underrepresented," and "lack of well-defined constituencies."
"Proportional representation" here does not refer to the number of people in
a particular district, because the party-list election is national in scope.
Neither does it allude to numerical strength in a distressed or oppressed
group. Rather, it refers to the representation of the "marginalized and
underrepresented" as exemplified by the enumeration in Section 5 of the
law; namely, "labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas
workers, and professionals."
However, it is not enough for the candidate to claim representation of the
marginalized and underrepresented, because representation is easy to claim
and to feign. The party-list organization or party must factually and truly
represent the marginalized and underrepresented constituencies mentioned
in Section 5. 36 Concurrently, the persons nominated by the party-list
candidate-organization must be "Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized
and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties."
Finally, "lack of well-defined constituenc[y] " refers to the absence of a
traditionally identifiable electoral group, like voters of a congressional district
or territorial unit of government. Rather, it points again to those with
disparate interests identified with the "marginalized or underrepresented."
In the end, the role of the Comelec is to see to it that only those Filipinos
who are "marginalized and underrepresented" become members of Congress
under the party-list system, Filipino-style.
The intent of the Constitution is clear: to give genuine power to the
people, not only by giving more law to those who have less in life, but more
so by enabling them to become veritable lawmakers themselves. Consistent
with this intent, the policy of the implementing law, we repeat, is likewise
clear: "to enable Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and
underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, x x x, to become
members of the House of Representatives." Where the language of the law
is clear, it must be applied according to its express terms. 37
The marginalized and underrepresented sectors to be represented under the
party-list system are enumerated in Section 5 of RA 7941, which states:
"SEC. 5. Registration. -- Any organized group of persons may register as a
party, organization or coalition for purposes of the party-list system by filing
with the COMELEC not later than ninety (90) days before the election a
petition verified by its president or secretary stating its desire to participate
in the party-list system as a national, regional or sectoral party or
organization or a coalition of such parties or organizations, attaching thereto
its constitution, by-laws, platform or program of government, list of officers,
coalition agreement and other relevant information as the COMELEC may
require: Provided, that the sector shall include labor, peasant, fisherfolk,
urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women,
youth, veterans, overseas workers, and professionals."
While the enumeration of marginalized and underrepresented sectors is not
exclusive, it demonstrates the clear intent of the law that not all sectors can
be represented under the party-list system. It is a fundamental principle of
statutory construction that words employed in a statute are interpreted in
connection with, and their meaning is ascertained by reference to, the words
and the phrases with which they are associated or related. Thus, the
meaning of a term in a statute may be limited, qualified or specialized by
those in immediate association. 38
The Party-List System Desecrated by the OSG Contentions
Notwithstanding the unmistakable statutory policy, the Office of the Solicitor
General submits that RA No. 7941 "does not limit the participation in the
party-list system to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors of
society." 39 In fact, it contends that any party or group that is not
disqualified under Section 6 40 of RA 7941 may participate in the elections.
Hence, it admitted during the Oral Argument that even an organization
representing the super rich of Forbes Park or Dasmarias Village could
participate in the party-list elections. 41
The declared policy of RA 7941 contravenes the position of the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG). We stress that the party-list system seeks to enable
certain Filipino citizens specifically those belonging to marginalized and
underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties to be elected to the
House of Representatives. The assertion of the OSG that the party-list
system is not exclusive to the marginalized and underrepresented disregards
the clear statutory policy. Its claim that even the super-rich and
overrepresented can participate desecrates the spirit of the party-list system.
Indeed, the law crafted to address the peculiar disadvantages of Payatas
hovel dwellers cannot be appropriated by the mansion owners of Forbes
Park. The interests of these two sectors are manifestly disparate; hence, the
OSG's position to treat them similarly defies reason and common sense. In
contrast, and with admirable candor, Atty. Lorna Patajo-Kapunan 42
admitted during the Oral Argument that a group of bankers, industrialists
and sugar planters could not join the party-list system as representatives of
their respective sectors. 43
While the business moguls and the mega-rich are, numerically speaking, a
tiny minority, they are neither marginalized nor underrepresented, for the
stark reality is that their economic clout engenders political power more
awesome than their numerical limitation. Traditionally, political power does
not necessarily emanate from the size of one's constituency; indeed, it is
likely to arise more directly from the number and amount of one's bank
accounts.
It is ironic, therefore, that the marginalized and underrepresented in our
midst are the majority who wallow in poverty, destitution and infirmity. It
was for them that the party-list system was enacted -- to give them not only
genuine hope, but genuine power; to give them the opportunity to be
elected and to represent the specific concerns of their constituencies; and
simply to give them a direct voice in Congress and in the larger affairs of the
State. In its noblest sense, the party-list system truly empowers the masses
and ushers a new hope for genuine change. Verily, it invites those
marginalized and underrepresented in the past the farm hands, the fisher
folk, the urban poor, even those in the underground movement to come
out and participate, as indeed many of them came out and participated
during the last elections. The State cannot now disappoint and frustrate
them by disabling and desecrating this social justice vehicle.
Because the marginalized and underrepresented had not been able to win in
the congressional district elections normally dominated by traditional
politicians and vested groups, 20 percent of the seats in the House of
Representatives were set aside for the party-list system. In arguing that
even those sectors who normally controlled 80 percent of the seats in the
House could participate in the party-list elections for the remaining 20
percent, the OSG and the Comelec disregard the fundamental difference
between the congressional district elections and the party-list elections.
As earlier noted, the purpose of the party-list provision was to open up the
system, 44 in order to enhance the chance of sectoral groups and
organizations to gain representation in the House of Representatives through
the simplest scheme possible. 45 Logic shows that the system has been
opened to those who have never gotten a foothold within it -- those who
cannot otherwise win in regular elections and who therefore need the
"simplest scheme possible" to do so. Conversely, it would be illogical to open
the system to those who have long been within it -- those privileged sectors
that have long dominated the congressional district elections.
The import of the open party-list system may be more vividly understood
when compared to a student dormitory "open house," which by its nature
allows outsiders to enter the facilities. Obviously, the "open house" is for the
benefit of outsiders only, not the dormers themselves who can enter the
dormitory even without such special privilege. In the same vein, the open
party-list system is only for the "outsiders" who cannot get elected through
regular elections otherwise; it is not for the non-marginalized or
overrepresented who already fill the ranks of Congress.
Verily, allowing the non-marginalized and overrepresented to vie for the
remaining seats under the party-list system would not only dilute, but also
prejudice the chance of the marginalized and underrepresented, contrary to
the intention of the law to enhance it. The party-list system is a tool for the
benefit of the underprivileged; the law could not have given the same tool to
others, to the prejudice of the intended beneficiaries.
This Court, therefore, cannot allow the party-list system to be sullied and
prostituted by those who are neither marginalized nor underrepresented. It
cannot let that flicker of hope be snuffed out. The clear state policy must
permeate every discussion of the qualification of political parties and other
organizations under the party-list system.
Refutation of the Separate Opinions
The Separate Opinions of our distinguished colleagues, Justices Jose C. Vitug
and Vicente V. Mendoza, are anchored mainly on the supposed intent of the
framers of the Constitution as culled from their deliberations.
The fundamental principle in constitutional construction, however, is that the
primary source from which to ascertain constitutional intent or purpose is the
language of the provision itself. The presumption is that the words in which
the constitutional provisions are couched express the objective sought to be
attained. 46 In other words, verba legis still prevails. Only when the meaning
of the words used is unclear and equivocal should resort be made to
extraneous aids of construction and interpretation, such as the proceedings
of the Constitutional Commission or Convention, in order to shed light on
and ascertain the true intent or purpose of the provision being construed. 47
Indeed, as cited in the Separate Opinion of Justice Mendoza, this Court
stated in Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary 48 that "the debates and
proceedings of the constitutional convention [may be consulted] in order to
arrive at the reason and purpose of the resulting Constitution x x x only
when other guides fail as said proceedings are powerless to vary the terms
of the Constitution when the meaning is clear. Debates in the constitutional
convention 'are of value as showing the views of the individual members,
and as indicating the reason for their votes, but they give us no light as to
the views of the large majority who did not talk, much less of the mass or
our fellow citizens whose votes at the polls gave that instrument the force of
fundamental law. We think it safer to construe the constitution from what
appears upon its face.' The proper interpretation therefore depends more on
how it was understood by the people adopting it than in the framers'
understanding thereof."
Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution, relative to the party-list system, is
couched in clear terms: the mechanics of the system shall be provided by
law. Pursuant thereto, Congress enacted RA 7941. In understanding and
implementing party-list representation, we should therefore look at the law
first. Only when we find its provisions ambiguous should the use of
extraneous aids of construction be resorted to.
But, as discussed earlier, the intent of the law is obvious and clear from its
plain words. Section 2 thereof unequivocally states that the party-list system
of electing congressional representatives was designed to "enable
underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, and who lack well-
defined political constituencies but who could contribute to the formulation
and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a
whole x x x." The criteria for participation is well defined. Thus, there is no
need for recourse to constitutional deliberations, not even to the proceedings
of Congress. In any event, the framers' deliberations merely express their
individual opinions and are, at best, only persuasive in construing the
meaning and purpose of the constitution or statute.
Be it remembered that the constitutionality or validity of Sections 2 and 5 of
RA 7941 is not an issue here. Hence, they remain parts of the law, which
must be applied plainly and simply.
Fourth Issue:
Grave Abuse of Discretion
From its assailed Omnibus Resolution, it is manifest that the Comelec failed
to appreciate fully the clear policy of the law and the Constitution. On the
contrary, it seems to have ignored the facet of the party-list system
discussed above. The OSG as its counsel admitted before the Court that any
group, even the non-marginalized and overrepresented, could field
candidates in the party-list elections.
When a lower court, or a quasi-judicial agency like the Commission on
Elections, violates or ignores the Constitution or the law, its action can be
struck down by this Court on the ground of grave abuse of discretion. 49
Indeed, the function of all judicial and quasi-judicial instrumentalities is to
apply the law as they find it, not to reinvent or second-guess it. 50
In its Memorandum, Petitioner Bayan Muna passionately pleads for the
outright disqualification of the major political parties Respondents Lakas-
NUCD, LDP, NPC, LP and PMP on the ground that under Comelec
Resolution No. 4073, they have been accredited as the five (six, including
PDP-Laban) major political parties in the May 14, 2001 elections. It argues
that because of this, they have the "advantage of getting official Comelec
Election Returns, Certificates of Canvass, preferred poll watchers x x x." We
note, however, that this accreditation does not refer to the party-list election,
but, inter alia, to the election of district representatives for the purpose of
determining which parties would be entitled to watchers under Section 26 of
Republic Act No. 7166.
What is needed under the present circumstances, however, is a factual
determination of whether respondents herein and, for that matter, all the
154 previously approved groups, have the necessary qualifications to
participate in the party-list elections, pursuant to the Constitution and the
law.
Bayan Muna also urges us to immediately rule out Respondent Mamamayan
Ayaw sa Droga (MAD), because "it is a government entity using government
resources and privileges." This Court, however, is not a trier of facts. 51 It is
not equipped to receive evidence and determine the truth of such factual
allegations.
Basic rudiments of due process require that respondents should first be
given an opportunity to show that they qualify under the guidelines
promulgated in this Decision, before they can be deprived of their right to
participate in and be elected under the party-list system.
Guidelines for Screening Party-List Participants
The Court, therefore, deems it proper to remand the case to the Comelec for
the latter to determine, after summary evidentiary hearings, whether the 154
parties and organizations allowed to participate in the party-list elections
comply with the requirements of the law. In this light, the Court finds it
appropriate to lay down the following guidelines, culled from the law and the
Constitution, to assist the Comelec in its work.
First, the political party, sector, organization or coalition must represent the
marginalized and underrepresented groups identified in Section 5 of RA
7941. In other words, it must show -- through its constitution, articles of
incorporation, bylaws, history, platform of government and track record --
that it represents and seeks to uplift marginalized and underrepresented
sectors. Verily, majority of its membership should belong to the marginalized
and underrepresented. And it must demonstrate that in a conflict of
interests, it has chosen or is likely to choose the interest of such sectors.
Second, while even major political parties are expressly allowed by RA 7941
and the Constitution to participate in the party-list system, they must comply
with the declared statutory policy of enabling "Filipino citizens belonging to
marginalized and underrepresented sectors x x x to be elected to the House
of Representatives." In other words, while they are not disqualified merely
on the ground that they are political parties, they must show, however, that
they represent the interests of the marginalized and underrepresented. The
counsel of Aksyon Demokratiko and other similarly situated political parties
admitted as much during the Oral Argument, as the following quote shows:
"JUSTICE PANGANIBAN: I am not disputing that in my question. All I am
saying is, the political party must claim to represent the marginalized and
underrepresented sectors?
ATTY. KAPUNAN: Yes, Your Honor, the answer is yes."52
Third, in view of the objections53 directed against the registration of Ang
Buhay Hayaang Yumabong, which is allegedly a religious group, the Court
notes the express constitutional provision that the religious sector may not
be represented in the party-list system. The extent of the constitutional
proscription is demonstrated by the following discussion during the
deliberations of the Constitutional Commission:
"MR. OPLE. x x x
In the event that a certain religious sect with nationwide and even
international networks of members and supporters, in order to circumvent
this prohibition, decides to form its own political party in emulation of those
parties I had mentioned earlier as deriving their inspiration and philosophies
from well-established religious faiths, will that also not fall within this
prohibition?
MR. MONSOD. If the evidence shows that the intention is to go around the
prohibition, then certainly the Comelec can pierce through the legal
fiction."54
The following discussion is also pertinent:
"MR. VILLACORTA. When the Commissioner proposed "EXCEPT RELIGIOUS
GROUPS," he is not, of course, prohibiting priests, imams or pastors who
may be elected by, say, the indigenous community sector to represent their
group.
REV. RIGOS. Not at all, but I am objecting to anybody who represents the
Iglesia ni Kristo, the Catholic Church, the Protestant Church et cetera."55
Furthermore, the Constitution provides that "religious denominations and
sects shall not be registered."56 The prohibition was explained by a
member57 of the Constitutional Commission in this wise: "[T] he prohibition
is on any religious organization registering as a political party. I do not see
any prohibition here against a priest running as a candidate. That is not
prohibited here; it is the registration of a religious sect as a political party."58
Fourth, a party or an organization must not be disqualified under Section 6
of RA 7941, which enumerates the grounds for disqualification as follows:
"(1) It is a religious sect or denomination, organization or association
organized for religious purposes;
(2) It advocates violence or unlawful means to seek its goal;
(3) It is a foreign party or organization;
(4) It is receiving support from any foreign government, foreign political
party, foundation, organization, whether directly or through any of its
officers or members or indirectly through third parties for partisan election
purposes;
(5) It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or regulations relating to
elections;
(6) It declares untruthful statements in its petition;
(7) It has ceased to exist for at least one (1) year; or
(8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or fails to
obtain at least two per centum (2%) of the votes cast under the party-list
system in the two (2) preceding elections for the constituency in which it has
registered."59
Note should be taken of paragraph 5, which disqualifies a party or group for
violation of or failure to comply with election laws and regulations. These
laws include Section 2 of RA 7941, which states that the party-list system
seeks to "enable Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and
underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties x x x to become
members of the House of Representatives." A party or an organization,
therefore, that does not comply with this policy must be disqualified.
Fifth, the party or organization must not be an adjunct of, or a project
organized or an entity funded or assisted by, the government. By the very
nature of the party-list system, the party or organization must be a group of
citizens, organized by citizens and operated by citizens. It must be
independent of the government. The participation of the government or its
officials in the affairs of a party-list candidate is not only illegal60 and unfair
to other parties, but also deleterious to the objective of the law: to enable
citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors and
organizations to be elected to the House of Representatives.
Sixth, the party must not only comply with the requirements of the law; its
nominees must likewise do so. Section 9 of RA 7941 reads as follows:
"SEC. 9. Qualifications of Party-List Nominees. No person shall be
nominated as party-list representative unless he is a natural-born citizen of
the Philippines, a registered voter, a resident of the Philippines for a period
of not less than one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the election,
able to read and write, a bona fide member of the party or organization
which he seeks to represent for at least ninety (90) days preceding the day
of the election, and is at least twenty-five (25) years of age on the day of the
election.
In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at least be twenty-five
(25) but not more than thirty (30) years of age on the day of the election.
Any youth sectoral representative who attains the age of thirty (30) during
his term shall be allowed to continue in office until the expiration of his
term."
Seventh, not only the candidate party or organization must represent
marginalized and underrepresented sectors; so also must its nominees. To
repeat, under Section 2 of RA 7941, the nominees must be Filipino citizens
"who belong to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations
and parties." Surely, the interests of the youth cannot be fully represented
by a retiree; neither can those of the urban poor or the working class, by an
industrialist. To allow otherwise is to betray the State policy to give genuine
representation to the marginalized and underrepresented.
Eighth, as previously discussed, while lacking a well-defined political
constituency, the nominee must likewise be able to contribute to the
formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the
nation as a whole. Senator Jose Lina explained during the bicameral
committee proceedings that "the nominee of a party, national or regional, is
not going to represent a particular district x x x."61

Epilogue
The linchpin of this case is the clear and plain policy of the law: "to enable
Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors,
organizations and parties, and who lack well-defined political constituencies
but who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate
legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole, to become members of the
House of Representatives."
Crucial to the resolution of this case is the fundamental social justice
principle that those who have less in life should have more in law. The party-
list system is one such tool intended to benefit those who have less in life. It
gives the great masses of our people genuine hope and genuine power. It is
a message to the destitute and the prejudiced, and even to those in the
underground, that change is possible. It is an invitation for them to come out
of their limbo and seize the opportunity.
Clearly, therefore, the Court cannot accept the submissions of the Comelec
and the other respondents that the party-list system is, without any
qualification, open to all. Such position does not only weaken the electoral
chances of the marginalized and underrepresented; it also prejudices them.
It would gut the substance of the party-list system. Instead of generating
hope, it would create a mirage. Instead of enabling the marginalized, it
would further weaken them and aggravate their marginalization.
In effect, the Comelec would have us believe that the party-list provisions of
the Constitution and RA 7941 are nothing more than a play on dubious
words, a mockery of noble intentions, and an empty offering on the altar of
people empowerment. Surely, this could not have been the intention of the
framers of the Constitution and the makers of RA 7941.
WHEREFORE, this case is REMANDED to the Comelec, which is hereby
DIRECTED to immediately conduct summary evidentiary hearings on the
qualifications of the party-list participants in the light of the guidelines
enunciated in this Decision. Considering the extreme urgency of determining
the winners in the last party-list elections, the Comelec is directed to begin
its hearings for the parties and organizations that appear to have garnered
such number of votes as to qualify for seats in the House of Representatives.
The Comelec is further DIRECTED to submit to this Court its compliance
report within 30 days from notice hereof.1wphi1.nt
The Resolution of this Court dated May 9, 2001, directing the Comelec "to
refrain from proclaiming any winner" during the last party-list election, shall
remain in force until after the Comelec itself will have complied and reported
its compliance with the foregoing disposition.
This Decision is immediately executory upon the Commission on Elections'
receipt thereof. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Kapunan, Pardo, Buena, and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ.,
concur.
Davide, Jr., C.J., in the result.
Vitug and Mendoza, JJ., see dissenting opinion.
Quisumbing, De Leon, Jr., and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ., join the dissent of J.
Vicente M. Mendoza.
Ynares-Santiago, J., abroad on official business.
Footnotes
1 Signed by Chairman Alfredo L. Benipayo and Commissioners Luzviminda G.
Tancangco, Rufino S. B. Javier, Ralph C. Lantion, Mehol K. Sadain,
Resurreccion Z. Borra and Florentino A. Tuason Jr.
2 Omnibus Resolution No. 3785, p. 13; Rollo (GR No. 147589), p. 40.
3 Ibid., pp. 21-22; Rollo, pp. 48-49.
4 Rollo (GR No. 147589), pp. 272-273.
5 Rollo (GR No. 147589), pp. 250-263.
6 Rollo (GR No. 147589), pp. 282-283.
7 See Rollo (GR No. 147613), p. 223.
8 TSN (GR No. 147589 and 147613), May 17, 2001, p. 49.
9 Rollo (GR No. 147589), pp. 4-73.
10 Rollo (GR No. 147589), p. 74.
11 Comments were filed by MAD, Bagong Bayani, The True Marcos Loyalists,
the Comelec, Partido ng Masang Pilipino, the Liberal Party, the Office of the
Solicitor General, CREBA, Lakas-NUCD-UMDP, the Philippine Local Autonomy
Movement, Aksyon Demokratiko, Citizens' Drug Watch Foundation, Ang
Buhay Hayaang Yumabong, Ang Lakas ng OCW, and Sports and Health
Foundation.
12 Rollo (GR No. 147613), pp. 3-45.
13 Rollo (GR No. 147613), p. 46.
14 These were filed by the Office of the Solicitor General, the Comelec, the
Bagong Bayani Organization, Mamamayan Ayaw sa Droga, and the Philippine
Local Autonomy Movement.
15 Memoranda were filed by Petitioners Bayan Muna and Ang Bagong
Bayani-OFW Labor Party; and Respondents Mamamayan Ayaw sa Droga,
CREBA, the Bagong Bayani Organization, the Office of the Solicitor General,
and Aksyon Demokratiko. Manifestations instead of memoranda were filed by
Lakas-NUCD and OCW.
16 See the May 17, 2001 Resolution, p. 2; Rollo (GR No. 147613), p. 88.
17 See, e.g., the Bagong Bayani Organization's Memorandum, pp. 3-4;
Aksyon Demokratiko's Memorandum, pp. 2-3; and MAD's Memorandum, pp.
3-6.
18 Rules and regulations governing the filing of a petition for registration, a
manifestation to participate, and the names of nominees under the party-list
system of representation in connection with the May 14, 2001 national and
local elections.
19 OSG's Memorandum, pp. 6-14; Rollo (GR No. 147613), pp. 151-159.
20 Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution, provides: "Judicial power
includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government."
21 "SECTION 1. What pleadings are not allowed. The following pleadings are
not allowed:
xxx
d) motion for reconsideration of an en banc ruling, resolution, order or
decision except in election offense cases;
xxx"
22 Docketed as SPA 01-113. As earlier noted, Akbayan also filed before the
Comelec a similar Petition, docketed as SPA-01-109. See Annexes 1 and 2,
Comment of the Office of the Solicitor General; Rollo (GR No. 147589), pp.
250 et seq. and 266 et seq.
23 Section 1, Rule 65. See Filoteo v. Sandiganbayan, 263 SCRA 222, October
16, 1996; BF Corporation v. CA, 288 SCRA 267, March 27, 1998; GSIS v.
Olisa, 304 SCRA 421, March 10, 1999; National Steel Corporation v. CA, GR
No. 134437, January 31, 2000; Sahali v. Comelec, GR No. 134169, February
2, 2000
24 Republic v. Sandiganbayan, 269 SCRA 316, March 7, 1997, per
Panganiban, J. See also ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation v. Commission
on Elections, GR No. 133486, January 28, 2000; Central Bank v. Cloribel, 44
SCRA 307, April 11, 1972.
25 Salonga v. Cruz Pao, 134 SCRA 438, February 18, 1985, per Gutierrez,
Jr., J. See also Taada v. Angara, 272 SCRA 18, May 2, 1997; Guingona v.
Gonzales, 219 SCRA 326, March 1, 1993.
26 ABS-CBN v. Comelec, GR No. 133486, January 28, 2000, per Panganiban,
J.
27 Petition of Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party, p. 15; Rollo (GR No.
147589), p. 18.
28 Petition of Bayan Muna, p. 18; Rollo (GR No. 147613), p. 20.
29 OSG Comment, p. 18; Rollo (GR No. 147589), p. 244.
30 Emphasis supplied. See also 17 and 18, Article VI of the Constitution.
31 It may be noted that when the Constitution was being drafted in the early
days of the post-Marcos era, UNIDO was the dominant political party.
32 Record of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. II, p. 86.
33 Record of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. II, p. 570.
34 Record of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. II, p. 86.
35 Record of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. II, p. 561.
36 Infra.
37 Azarcon v. Sandiganbayan, 268 SCRA 747, February 26, 1997; Ramirez v.
CA, 248 SCRA 590, September 28, 1995.
38 82 C.J.S. Statutes 331.
39 OSG Comment, p. 18; Rollo (GR No. 147589), p. 244.
40 Infra.
41 TSN, May 17, 2001, pp. 147-148.
42 Counsel of Aksyon Demokratiko.
43 TSN, May 17, 2001, pp. 178-180.
44 Supra. See also 6, Article IX (C) of the Constitution, which reads: "A free
and open party system shall be allowed to evolve according to the free
choice of the people, subject to the provisions of this Article."
45 Section 2 of RA 7941 states in part as follows: "x x x. Towards this end,
the State shall develop and guarantee a full, free and open party system in
order to attain the broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or
group interests in the House of Representatives by enhancing their chances
to compete for and win seats in the legislature, and shall provide the
simplest scheme possible."
46 JM Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Land Tenure Administration, 31 SCRA 413,
February 18, 1970; cited in Ruben C. Agpalo, Statutory Construction, 1990
ed., p. 311. See also Gold Creek Mining Corp. v. Rodriguez, 66 Phil 259, 264
(1938).
47 See Agpalo, Ibid., p. 313.
48 194 SCRA 317, February 22, 1991, per Fernan, CJ; quoting
Commonwealth v. Ralph, 111 Pa 365, 3 Atl 220.
49 Taada v. Angara, 272 SCRA 18, May 2, 1997. See also Santiago v.
Guingona, 298 SCRA 756, November 18, 1998; Miranda v. Aguirre, 314 SCRA
603, September 16, 1999; Garcia v. HRET, 312 SCRA 353, August 12, 1999.
50 Veterans Federation Party et al. v. Comelec et al., GR No. 136781,
October 6, 2000.
51 See Valmonte v. Court of Appeals, 303 SCRA 278, February 18, 1999;
Inciong Jr. v. CA, 257 SCRA 578, June 26, 1996; Palomado v. NLRC, 257
SCRA 680, June 28, 1996; Heirs of the Late Teodoro Guaring Jr. v. CA, 269
SCRA 283, March 7, 1997; Sesbreo v. Central Board of Assessment Appeals,
270 SCRA 360, March 24, 1997; PCGG v. Cojuangco Jr., 302 SCRA 217,
January 27, 1999.
52 TSN, May 17, 2001, p. 180.
53 Petition of Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party, p. 16; Rollo (GR No.
147589), p. 19.
54 Record of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. I, p. 636.
55 Record of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. II, p. 589.
56 2 (5), Article IX (C).
57 Christian S. Monsod.
58 Record of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. I, p. 634
59 See also 11, Comelec Resolution No. 3307-A.
60 See 2 (4), Article IX (B) of the Constitution. See also Article 261 (o), BP
881.
61 The bicameral conference committee on the disagreeing provision of
Senate Bill No. 1913 and House Bill No. 3040, January 31, 1994, p. 4.
10
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 177271 May 4, 2007
BANTAY REPUBLIC ACT OR BA-RA 7941, represented by MR.
AMEURFINO E. CINCO, Chairman, AND URBAN POOR FOR LEGAL
REFORMS (UP-LR), represented by MRS. MYRNA P. PORCARE,
Secretary-General, Petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, BIYAHENG PINOY, KAPATIRAN NG MGA
NAKAKULONG NA WALANG SALA (KAKUSA), BARANGAY ASSOCIATION FOR
NATIONAL ADVANCEMENT AND TRANSPARENCY (BANAT), AHON PINOY,
AGRICULTURAL SECTOR ALLIANCE OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC. (AGAP),
PUWERSA NG BAYANING ATLETA (PBA), ALYANSA NG MGA GRUPONG
HALIGI NG AGHAM AT TEKNOLOHIYA PARA SA MAMAMAYAN, INC.
(AGHAM), BABAE PARA SA KAUNLARAN (BABAE KA), AKSYON SAMBAYANAN
(AKSA), ALAY SA BAYAN NG MALAYANG PROPESYUNAL AT REPORMANG
KALAKAL (ABAY-PARAK), AGBIAG TIMPUYOG ILOCANO, INC. (AGBIAG!),
ABANTE ILONGGO, INC. (ABA ILONGGO), AANGAT TAYO (AT), AANGAT ANG
KABUHAYAN (ANAK), BAGO NATIONAL CULTURAL SOCIETY OF THE
PHILIPPINES (BAGO), ANGAT ANTAS-KABUHAYAN PILIPINO MOVEMENT
(AANGAT KA PILIPINO), ARTS BUSINESS AND SCIENCE PROFESSIONAL
(ABS), ASSOSASYON NG MGA MALILIIT NA NEGOSYANTENG GUMAGANAP
INC. (AMANG), SULONG BARANGAY MOVEMENT, KASOSYO PRODUCERS
CONSUMER EXCHANGE ASSOCIATION, INC. (KASOSYO), UNITED
MOVEMENT AGAINST DRUGS (UNI-MAD), PARENTS ENABLING PARENTS
(PEP), ALLIANCE OF NEO-CONSERVATIVES (ANC), FILIPINOS FOR PEACE,
JUSTICE AND PROGRESS MOVEMENT (FPJPM), BIGKIS PINOY MOVEMENT
(BIGKIS), 1-UNITED TRANSPORT KOALISYON (1-UNTAK), ALLIANCE FOR
BARANGAY CONCERNS (ABC), BIYAYANG BUKID, INC., ALLIANCE FOR
NATIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY (ANAD), AKBAY PINOY OFW-NATIONAL
INC., (APOI), ALLIANCE TRANSPORT SECTOR (ATS), KALAHI SECTORAL
PARTY (ADVOCATES FOR OVERSEAS FILIPINO) AND ASSOCIATION OF
ADMINISTRATORS, PROFESSIONALS AND SENIORS (AAPS), Respondents.
x--------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 177314 May 4, 2007
REP. LORETTA ANN P. ROSALES, KILOSBAYAN FOUNDATION, BANTAY
KATARUNGAN FOUNDATION, Petitioners,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
DECISION
GARCIA, J.:
Before the Court are these two consolidated petitions for certiorari and
mandamus to nullify and set aside certain issuances of the Commission on
Elections (Comelec) respecting party-list groups which have manifested their
intention to participate in the party-list elections on May 14, 2007.
In the first petition, docketed as G.R. No. 177271, petitioners Bantay
Republic Act (BA-RA 7941, for short) and the Urban Poor for Legal Reforms
(UP-LR, for short) assail the various Comelec resolutions accrediting private
respondents Biyaheng Pinoy et al., to participate in the forthcoming party-list
elections on May 14, 2007 without simultaneously determining whether or
not their respective nominees possess the requisite qualifications defined in
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7941, or the "Party-List System Act" and belong to
the marginalized and underrepresented sector each seeks to represent. In
the second, docketed as G.R. No. 177314, petitioners Loreta Ann P. Rosales,
Kilosbayan Foundation and Bantay Katarungan Foundation impugn Comelec
Resolution 07-0724 dated April 3, 2007 effectively denying their request for
the release or disclosure of the names of the nominees of the fourteen (14)
accredited participating party-list groups mentioned in petitioner Rosales
previous letter-request.
While both petitions commonly seek to compel the Comelec to disclose or
publish the names of the nominees of the various party-list groups named in
the petitions,1 the petitioners in G.R. No. 177271 have the following
additional prayers: 1) that the 33 private respondents named therein be
"declare[d] as unqualified to participate in the party-list elections as sectoral
organizations, parties or coalition for failure to comply with the guidelines
prescribed by the [Court] in [Ang Bagong Bayani v. Comelec2]" and, 2)
correspondingly, that the Comelec be enjoined from allowing respondent
groups from participating in the May 2007 elections.
In separate resolutions both dated April 24, 2007, the Court en banc
required the public and private respondents to file their respective comments
on the petitions within a non-extendible period of five (5) days from notice.
Apart from respondent Comelec, seven (7) private respondents3 in G.R. No.
177271 and one party-list group4 mentioned in G.R. No. 177314 submitted
their separate comments. In the main, the separate comments of the private
respondents focused on the untenability and prematurity of the plea of
petitioners BA-RA 7941 and UP-LR to nullify their accreditation as party-list
groups and thus disqualify them and their respective nominees from
participating in the May 14, 2007 party-list elections.
The facts:
On January 12, 2007, the Comelec issued Resolution No. 7804 prescribing
rules and regulations to govern the filing of manifestation of intent to
participate and submission of names of nominees under the party-list system
of representation in connection with the May 14, 2007 elections. Pursuant
thereto, a number of organized groups filed the necessary manifestations.
Among these and ostensibly subsequently accredited by the Comelec to
participate in the 2007 elections - are 14 party-list groups, namely: (1)
BABAE KA; (2) ANG KASANGGA; (3) AKBAY PINOY; (4) AKSA; (5) KAKUSA;
(6) AHON PINOY; (7) OFW PARTY; (8) BIYAHENG PINOY; (9) ANAD; (10)
AANGAT ANG KABUHAYAN; (11) AGBIAG; (12) BANAT; (13) BANTAY LIPAD;
(14) AGING PINOY. Petitioners BA-RA 7941 and UP-LR presented a longer,
albeit an overlapping, list.
Subsequent events saw BA-RA 7941 and UP-LR filing with the Comelec an
Urgent Petition to Disqualify, thereunder seeking to disqualify the nominees
of certain party-list organizations. Both petitioners appear not to have the
names of the nominees sought to be disqualified since they still asked for a
copy of the list of nominees. Docketed in the Comelec as SPA Case No 07-
026, this urgent petition has yet to be resolved.
Meanwhile, reacting to the emerging public perception that the individuals
behind the aforementioned 14 party-list groups do not, as they should,
actually represent the poor and marginalized sectors, petitioner Rosales, in
G.R. No. 177314, addressed a letter5 dated March 29, 2007 to Director
Alioden Dalaig of the Comelecs Law Department requesting a list of that
groups nominees. Another letter6 of the same tenor dated March 31, 2007
followed, this time petitioner Rosales impressing upon Atty. Dalaig the
particular urgency of the subject request.
Neither the Comelec Proper nor its Law Department officially responded to
petitioner Rosales requests. The April 13, 2007 issue of the Manila Bulletin,
however, carried the front-page banner headline "COMELEC WONT BARE
PARTY-LIST NOMINEES",7 with the following sub-heading: "Abalos says
party-list polls not personality oriented."
On April 16, 2007, Atty. Emilio Capulong, Jr. and ex-Senator Jovito R.
Salonga, in their own behalves and as counsels of petitioner Rosales,
forwarded a letter8 to the Comelec formally requesting action and definitive
decision on Rosales earlier plea for information regarding the names of
several party-list nominees. Invoking their constitutionally-guaranteed right
to information, Messrs. Capulong and Salonga at the same time drew
attention to the banner headline adverted to earlier, with a request for the
Comelec, "collectively or individually, to issue a formal clarification, either
confirming or denying the banner headline and the alleged statement of
Chairman Benjamin Abalos, Sr. xxx" Evidently unbeknownst then to Ms.
Rosales, et al., was the issuance of Comelec en banc Resolution 07-07249
under date April 3, 2007 virtually declaring the nominees names confidential
and in net effect denying petitioner Rosales basic disclosure request. In its
relevant part, Resolution 07-0724 reads as follows:
RESOLVED, moreover, that the Commission will disclose/publicize the names
of party-list nominees in connection with the May 14, 2007 Elections only
after 3:00 p.m. on election day.
Let the Law Department implement this resolution and reply to all letters
addressed to the Commission inquiring on the party-list nominees. (Emphasis
added.)
According to petitioner Rosales, she was able to obtain a copy of the April 3,
2007 Resolution only on April 21, 2007. She would later state the
observation that the last part of the "Order empowering the Law Department
to implement this resolution and reply to all letters inquiring on the party-
list nominees is apparently a fool-proof bureaucratic way to distort and
mangle the truth and give the impression that the antedated Resolution of
April 3, 2007 is the final answer to the two formal requests of
Petitioners".10
The herein consolidated petitions are cast against the foregoing factual
setting, albeit petitioners BA-RA 7941 and UP-LR appear not to be aware,
when they filed their petition on April 18, 2007, of the April 3, 2007 Comelec
Resolution 07-0724.
To start off, petitioners BA-RA 7941 and UP-LR would have the Court cancel
the accreditation accorded by the Comelec to the respondent party-list
groups named in their petition on the ground that these groups and their
respective nominees do not appear to be qualified. In the words of
petitioners BA-RA 7941 and UP-LR, Comelec -
xxx committed grave abuse of discretion when it granted the assailed
accreditations even without simultaneously determining whether the
nominees of herein private respondents are qualified or not, or whether or
not the nominees are likewise belonging to the marginalized and
underrepresented sector they claim to represent in Congress, in accordance
with No. 7 of the eight-point guidelines prescribed by the Honorable
Supreme in the Ang Bagong Bayani11 case which states that, "not only the
candidate party or organization must represent marginalized and
underrepresented sectors; so also must its nominees." In the case of private
respondents, public respondent Comelec granted accreditations without the
required simultaneous determination of the qualification of the nominees as
part of the accreditation process of the party-list organization itself. (Words
in bracket added; italization in the original)12
The Court is unable to grant the desired plea of petitioners BA-RA 7941 and
UP-LR for cancellation of accreditation on the grounds thus advanced in their
petition. For, such course of action would entail going over and evaluating
the qualities of the sectoral groups or parties in question, particularly
whether or not they indeed represent marginalized/underrepresented
groups. The exercise would require the Court to make a factual
determination, a matter which is outside the office of judicial review by way
of special civil action for certiorari. In certiorari proceedings, the Court is not
called upon to decide factual issues and the case must be decided on the
undisputed facts on record.13 The sole function of a writ of certiorari is to
address issues of want of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion and does
not include a review of the tribunals evaluation of the evidence.14
Not lost on the Court of course is the pendency before the Comelec of SPA
Case No. 07-026 in which petitioners BA-RA 7941 and UP-LR themselves
seek to disqualify the nominees of the respondent party-list groups named in
their petition.
Petitioners BA-RA 7941s and UP-LRs posture that the Comelec committed
grave abuse of discretion when it granted the assailed accreditations without
simultaneously determining the qualifications of their nominees is without
basis. Nowhere in R.A. No. 7941 is there a requirement that the qualification
of a party-list nominee be determined simultaneously with the accreditation
of an organization. And as aptly pointed out by private respondent Babae
Para sa Kaunlaran (Babae Ka), Section 4 of R.A. No. 7941 requires a petition
for registration of a party-list organization to be filed with the Comelec "not
later than ninety (90) days before the election" whereas the succeeding
Section 8 requires the submission "not later than forty-five (45) days before
the election" of the list of names whence party-list representatives shall be
chosen.
Now to the other but core issues of the case. The petition in G.R. No.
177314 formulates and captures the main issues tendered by the petitioners
in these consolidated cases and they may be summarized as follows:
1. Whether respondent Comelec, by refusing to reveal the names of the
nominees of the various party-list groups, has violated the right to
information and free access to documents as guaranteed by the Constitution;
and
2. Whether respondent Comelec is mandated by the Constitution to disclose
to the public the names of said nominees.
While the Comelec did not explicitly say so, it based its refusal to disclose the
names of the nominees of subject party-list groups on Section 7 of R.A.
7941. This provision, while commanding the publication and the posting in
polling places of a certified list of party-list system participating groups,
nonetheless tells the Comelec not to show or include the names of the party-
list nominees in said certified list. Thus:
SEC. 7. Certified List of Registered Parties.- The COMELEC shall, not later
than sixty (60) days before election, prepare a certified list of national,
regional, or sectoral parties, organizations or coalitions which have applied or
who have manifested their desire to participate under the party-list system
and distribute copies thereof to all precincts for posting in the polling places
on election day. The names of the party-list nominees shall not be shown on
the certified list. (Emphasis added.)
And doubtless part of Comelecs reason for keeping the names of the party
list nominees away from the public is deducible from the following excerpts
of the news report appearing in the adverted April 13, 2007 issue of the
Manila Bulletin:
The Commission on Elections (COMELEC) firmed up yesterday its decision
not to release the names of nominees of sectoral parties, organizations, or
coalitions accredited to participate in the party-list election which will be held
simultaneously with the May 14 mid-term polls.
COMELEC Chairman Benjamin S. Abalos, Sr. said he and [the other five
COMELEC] Commissioners --- believe that the party list elections must not be
personality oriented.
Abalos said under [R.A.] 7941 , the people are to vote for sectoral parties,
organizations, or coalitions, not for their nominees.

He said there is nothing in R.A. 7941 that requires the Comelec to disclose
the names of nominees. xxx (Words in brackets and emphasis added)
Insofar as the disclosure issue is concerned, the petitions are impressed with
merit.
Assayed against the non-disclosure stance of the Comelec and the given
rationale therefor is the right to information enshrined in the self-
executory15 Section 7, Article III of the Constitution, viz:
Sec.7. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern
shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and papers
pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well to government
research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the
citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.
Complementing and going hand in hand with the right to information is
another constitutional provision enunciating the policy of full disclosure and
transparency in Government. We refer to Section 28, Article II of the
Constitution reading:
Sec. 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts
and implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions
involving public interest.
The right to information is a public right where the real parties in interest are
the public, or the citizens to be precise. And for every right of the people
recognized as fundamental lies a corresponding duty on the part of those
who govern to respect and protect that right. This is the essence of the Bill
of Rights in a constitutional regime.16 Without a governments acceptance of
the limitations upon it by the Constitution in order to uphold individual
liberties, without an acknowledgment on its part of those duties exacted by
the rights pertaining to the citizens, the Bill of Rights becomes a sophistry.
By weight of jurisprudence, any citizen can challenge any attempt to obstruct
the exercise of his right to information and may seek its enforcement by
mandamus.17 And since every citizen by the simple fact of his citizenship
possesses the right to be informed, objections on ground of locus standi are
ordinarily unavailing.18
Like all constitutional guarantees, however, the right to information and its
companion right of access to official records are not absolute. As articulated
in Legaspi, supra, the peoples right to know is limited to "matters of public
concern" and is further subject to such limitation as may be provided by law.
Similarly, the policy of full disclosure is confined to transactions involving
"public interest" and is subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law.
Too, there is also the need of preserving a measure of confidentiality on
some matters, such as military, trade, banking and diplomatic secrets or
those affecting national security.19
The terms "public concerns" and "public interest" have eluded precise
definition. But both terms embrace, to borrow from Legaspi, a broad
spectrum of subjects which the public may want to know, either because
these directly affect their lives, or simply because such matters naturally
whet the interest of an ordinary citizen. At the end of the day, it is for the
courts to determine, on a case to case basis, whether or not at issue is of
interest or importance to the public.
If, as in Legaspi, it was the legitimate concern of a citizen to know if certain
persons employed as sanitarians of a health department of a city are civil
service eligibles, surely the identity of candidates for a lofty elective public
office should be a matter of highest public concern and interest.
As may be noted, no national security or like concerns is involved in the
disclosure of the names of the nominees of the party-list groups in question.
Doubtless, the Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in refusing the
legitimate demands of the petitioners for a list of the nominees of the party-
list groups subject of their respective petitions. Mandamus, therefore, lies.
The last sentence of Section 7 of R.A. 7941 reading: "[T]he names of the
party-list nominees shall not be shown on the certified list" is certainly not a
justifying card for the Comelec to deny the requested disclosure. To us, the
prohibition imposed on the Comelec under said Section 7 is limited in scope
and duration, meaning, that it extends only to the certified list which the
same provision requires to be posted in the polling places on election day. To
stretch the coverage of the prohibition to the absolute is to read into the law
something that is not intended. As it were, there is absolutely nothing in R.A.
No. 7941 that prohibits the Comelec from disclosing or even publishing
through mediums other than the "Certified List" the names of the party-list
nominees. The Comelec obviously misread the limited non-disclosure aspect
of the provision as an absolute bar to public disclosure before the May 2007
elections. The interpretation thus given by the Comelec virtually tacks an
unconstitutional dimension on the last sentence of Section 7 of R.A. No.
7941.
The Comelecs reasoning that a party-list election is not an election of
personalities is valid to a point. It cannot be taken, however, to justify its
assailed non-disclosure stance which comes, as it were, with a weighty
presumption of invalidity, impinging, as it does, on a fundamental right to SO ORDERED.
information.20 While the vote cast in a party-list elections is a vote for a
party, such vote, in the end, would be a vote for its nominees, who, in CANCIO C. GARCIA
appropriate cases, would eventually sit in the House of Representatives. Associate Justice

The Court is very much aware of newspaper reports detailing the purported WE CONCUR:
reasons behind the Comelecs disinclination to release the names of party-list
nominees. It is to be stressed, however, that the Court is in the business of REYNATO S. PUNO
dispensing justice on the basis of hard facts and applicable statutory and Chief Justice
decisional laws. And lest it be overlooked, the Court always assumes, at the
first instance, the presumptive validity and regularity of official acts of LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
government officials and offices. Associate Justice CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Asscociate Justice
It has been repeatedly said in various contexts that the people have the right ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ
to elect their representatives on the basis of an informed judgment. Hence Associate Justice ANTONIO T. CARPIO
the need for voters to be informed about matters that have a bearing on Asscociate Justice
their choice. The ideal cannot be achieved in a system of blind voting, as (on leave)
veritably advocated in the assailed resolution of the Comelec. The Court, MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
since the 1914 case of Gardiner v. Romulo,21 has consistently made it clear Associate Justice (on leave)
that it frowns upon any interpretation of the law or rules that would hinder in RENATO C. CORONA
any way the free and intelligent casting of the votes in an election.22 So it Asscociate Justice
must be here for still other reasons articulated earlier. CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice ADOLFO S. AZCUNA
In all, we agree with the petitioners that respondent Comelec has a Asscociate Justice
constitutional duty to disclose and release the names of the nominees of the DANTE O. TINGA
party-list groups named in the herein petitions. Associate Justice MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Asscociate Justice
WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 177271 is partly DENIED insofar as it PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
seeks to nullify the accreditation of the respondents named therein. Associate Justice ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
However, insofar as it seeks to compel the Comelec to disclose or publish the Asscociate Justice
names of the nominees of party-list groups, sectors or organizations CERTIFICATION
accredited to participate in the May 14, 2007 elections, the same petition
and the petition in G.R. No. 177314 are GRANTED. Accordingly, the Comelec Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the
is hereby ORDERED to immediately disclose and release the names of the conclusions in the above decision had been reached in consultation before
nominees of the party-list groups, sectors or organizations accredited to the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.
participate in the May 14, 2007 party-list elections. The Comelec is further
DIRECTED to submit to the Court its compliance herewith within five (5) REYNATO S. PUNO
days from notice hereof. Chief Justice

This Decision is declared immediately executory upon its receipt by the

Comelec. Footnotes

No pronouncement as to cost.
1 At least nine (9) party-list groups subject of the second petition are 20 Ayer Productions Pty. Ltd. v. Capulong, G.R. No. L- 82380, April 29, 1988,
respondents in the first petition. 160 SCRA 861.

2 G. R. No. 147589, June 26, 2001, 359 SCRA 698. 21 G. R. No. L-8921, January 9, 1914, 26 Phil. 521.

3 ABS, Babae Ka, PEP, ANC, FPJPM, AAPS, AANGAT ka Pilipino and KALAHI. 22 Rodriquez v. Commission on Elections, G. R. No. L-61545, December 27,
1982, 119 SCRA 465.
4 AKSA.

5 Annex "E," of Petition in G.R. No. 177314.

6 Annex "F," of Petition in G.R. No. 177314.

7 Petition (G.R. 177314), p. 8.

8 Annex "G," of Petition in G.R. No. 177314.

9 Annex " B," of Petition in G.R. No. 177314.

10 Petition in G.R. SP. No.177314, p. 3.

11 Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Part v. Commission on Elections, Supra

note 2.

12 Page 5 of the petition in G. R. No. 177271.

13 Pobre v. Gonong, G. R. No. L-60575, March 16, 1987, 148 SCRA 553.

14 Sea Power Shipping Enterprises, Inc. v. CA, G.R. No. 138270, June 28,
2001, 360 SCRA 173; Oro v. Diaz, G.R. No. 140974, July 11, 2001, 361 SCRA
108.

15 Gonzales v. Narvasa, G.R. No. 140835, August 14, 2000, 337 SCRA 733.

16 Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission, G. R. No. L-72119, May 19, 1987,

150 SCRA 530, citing Cooley.

17 Tanada v. Tuvera, G. R. No. L-63915, April 24, 1985, 136 SCRA 27.

18 Bernas, The Constitution of the Philippines: A Commentary, 1996 ed., p.

334.

19 Chavez v. PCGG, G.R. No. 130716, December 9, 1998, 299 SCRA 744.