bp 22 cases

Eduardo Vaca vs. Ca

VACA VS. CA
Facts:

Eduardo Vaca is the president and owner of Ervine International while Fernando Nieto, Vacas son-in-law, is
the firms purchasing manager. They issued a check for P10,000 to the General Agency for Reconnaissance,
Detection and Security (GARDS) and drawn against China Bank. When deposited with PCIBank, the check was
dishonored for insufficiency of funds. GARDS sent a demand letter but the drawers failed to pay within the
time given (7 days from notice). A few days later, however, Vaca issued a check to GARDS for P19,866.16,
drawn against Associated Bank, replacing the dishonored check. GARDS did not return the dishonored check.
Later on, GARDS Acting Operations Manager filed a criminal suit against Vaca and Nieto for violation of BP 22.
The trial court sentenced each to 1 year imprisonment and to pay a fine of P10,000 and costs.

Issue [1]:
Whether the drawers had knowledge of insufficient funds in issuing the check.

Held [1]: Section 2 of BP 22 provides a presumption of knowledge of insufficiency of funds if the drawer fails
to maintain sufficient funds within 90 days after the date of the check, or to make arrangement for payment in
full by the drawee of such check within 5 days after receiving notice that such check has not been paid by the
drawee. Herein, the second check supposedly replacing the dishonored check is actually the payment of two
separate bills, and was issued 15 days after notice. Such replacement cannot negate the presumption that
the drawers knew of the insufficiency of funds.

Issue [2]: Whether the absence of damages incurred by the payee absolves the drawers from liability.

Held [2]: The claim that the case was simply a result of a misunderstanding between GARDS and the
drawers and that the security agency did not suffer any damage from the dishonor of the check is flimsy.
Even if the payee suffered no damage as a result of the issuance of the bouncing check, the damage to the
integrity of the banking system cannot be denied. Damage to the payee is not an element of the crime
punished in BP 22.

Note: In this case, the Court recognized the contribution of Filipino entrepreneurs to the national economy;
and that to serve the ends of criminal justice, instead of the 1 year imprisonment, a fine of double the amount
of the check involved was imposed as penalty. This was made to redeem valuable human material and
prevent unnecessary deprivation of personal liberty and economic usefulness with due regard to the
protection of the social order

king vs people gr no. 131540

BETTY KING vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 131540

Facts:
Betty King discounted with complainant Ellen Fernandez several Equitable Bank checks
postdated from July 23 to 29, 1992 in the total amount of P1, 070,000.00 in exchange
for cash in the amount of P1, 000,000.00. When the checks were deposited for
payment, they were dishonored by the drawee bank because they were drawn against
an account without sufficient funds. Betty King failed to make good the checks despite
demand. During the hearing on the merits of this case on September 17, 1998, the
prosecution offered in evidence its documentary evidence. Betty King admitted the
genuineness and due execution of the documents presented.
As noted earlier, Betty King filed a Demurrer to Evidence without leave of court. In
doing so, she waived her right to present evidence and submitted the case for judgment
on the basis of the documentary exhibits adduced by the prosecution.
In affirming the trial court, the Court of Appeals explained that the prosecution proved all
the elements of the crime. The CA also pointed out that the failure of Betty King to sign
the pretrial order was not fatal to the prosecution, because her conviction was based on
the evidence presented during the trial.
Ellen Fernandez sent Betty King a registered mail, informing the latter that the checks
had been dishonored. But the records show that petitioner did not receive it. In fact,
Postmaster Wilfredo Ulibarris letter addressed to complainants counsel certified that
the subject registered mail was returned to sender on September 22, 1992.
Issue:
(1) Admissibility of documentary evidence
(2) Sufficiency of the prosecution evidence
Held:
We emphasized that "the full payment of the amount appearing in the check within five
banking days from notice of dishonor is a complete defense. The absence of a notice of
dishonor necessarily deprives an accused an opportunity to preclude a criminal
prosecution. Accordingly, procedural due process clearly enjoins that a notice of
dishonor be actually served on petitioner. Petitioner has a right to demand and the
basic postulates of fairness require that the notice of dishonor be actually sent to and
received by her to afford her the opportunity to avert prosecution under BP 22.
Notwithstanding the clear import of the postmasters certification, the prosecution failed
to adduce any other proof that petitioner received the post office notice but unjustifiably
refused to claim the registered mail. It is possible that the drawee bank sent petitioner a
notice of dishonor, but the prosecution did not present evidence that the bank did send
it, or that petitioner actually received it. It was also possible that she was trying to flee
from complainant by staying in different addresses. Speculations and possibilities,
however, cannot take the place of proof. Conviction must rest on proof beyond
reasonable doubt. Clearly, the evidence on hand demonstrates the indelible fact that
petitioner did not receive notice that the checks had been dishonored. Necessarily, the
presumption that she knew of the insufficiency of funds cannot arise.
Thus, in order to create the prima facie presumption that the issuer knew of the
insufficiency of funds, it must be shown that he or she received a notice of dishonor
and, within five banking days thereafter, failed to satisfy the amount of the check or
make arrangement for its payment. Petitioner Betty King is ACQUITTED for failure of
the prosecution to prove all the elements of the crimes charged.
 First Issue:
Admissibility of Documentary Evidence
Because the first, the second and the third issues raised by petitioner all refer to the same matter,
they will be discussed together. She contends that the pieces of documentary evidence presented
by the prosecution during pretrial are inadmissible, because she did not sign the pretrial
agreement as required under Section 4 of Rule 118 of the Rules of Court. Hence, she argues that
there is no basis for her conviction.
True, a pretrial agreement not signed by a party is inadmissible. However, the conviction of
petitioner was based not on that agreement but on the documents submitted during the trial, all of
which were admitted without any objection from her counsel. During the hearing on September
17, 1993, the prosecution offered as evidence the dishonored checks, the return check tickets
addressed to private complainant, the notice from complainant addressed to petitioner that the
checks had been dishonored, and the postmaster's letter that the notice had been returned to
sender. Petitioner's counsel did not object to their admissibility. This is shown by the transcript
of stenographic notes taken during the hearing on September 17, 1993:
COURT: You have no objection to the admissibility, Exhibit S, 1st Indorsement of the Makati Central Post
not that the Court will believe it. Office dated 21 September 1992;
ATTY. MANGERA No, Your Honor. Exhibit T, the Philippine Postal Corporation Central
Post Office letter dated 24 September 1992,
COURT:
addressed to this representation showing that there
Exhibits "A" to "A" to "K" are admitted. were 3 notices sent to the herein accused who
received the said letter.
ATTY. MAKALINTAL:
COURT:
We offer Exhibit "L", the return-check ticket dated
July 27, 1992, relative to checks No. 021745 and Let's go to the third check slip; any objection to the
021746 indicating that these checks were returned third slip?
DAIF, drawn against insufficient funds; Exh. M,
ATTY. MANGERA:
returned check ticket dated July 28, 1992, relative to
Check No. 021727, 021711 and 021720 likewise We have no objection as to the due execution and
indicating the said checks to have been drawn against authenticity.
insufficient funds, Your Honor. Exhibit N, returned
COURT:
check ticket dated July 29, 1992, relative to Check
Nos. 021749 and 021748, having the same Admitted.
indications;
ATTY. MAKALINTAL:
Exhibits O, returned check ticket dated July 29, 1992
We are offering Exhibits Q, R, S and T, for the
relative to Check Nos. 021750 and 021753, with the
purpose of showing that there was demand duly made
same indications;
on the accused and that the same had been
Exhibits P, returned check ticket dated August 4, appropriately served by the Central Post Office
1992 relative to Check No. 021752, having the same Services of Manila.
indication as being drawn against insufficient funds;
ATTY. MANGERA:
Exhibit Q, the demand letter sent to the accused by
We admit as to the due execution and authenticity
Atty. Horacio Makalintal dated August 3, 1992;
only as to that portion, Your Honor.
Exhibit R, the letter-request for certification
addressed to the Postmaster General sent by the same COURT:
law office dated 17 September 1992, showing that the We are talking of admissibility now, so admitted. In
said letter was dispatched properly by the Central other words, at this point, he makes an offer and the
Post Office of Makati; Court will either grant admission, [admit] it in
evidence or deny it. It can deny admission if it is not So, admitted.
properly identified etcetera.
ATTY. MAKALINTAL:
ATTY. MANGERA:
With the admission of our offer, Your Honor, the
I think it is already provided. prosecution
rests.
COURT:
From the foregoing, it is clear that the prosecution evidence consisted of documents offered and
admitted during the trial. In view of this, the CA correctly ruled that Fule v. Court of Appeals
would not apply to the present controversy. In that case, a hearing was conducted during which
the prosecution presented three exhibits. However, Fule's conviction was "based solely on the
stipulation of facts made during rile pre-trial on August 8, 1985, which was not signed by the
petitioner, nor by his counsel." Because the stipulation was inadmissible in evidence under
Section 4 of Rule 118, the Court held that there was no proof of his guilt.
In the present case, petitioner's conviction was based on the evidence presented during trial, and
not on the stipulations made during the pretrial. Hence, petitioner's admissions during the trial
are governed not by the Fule ruling or by Section 4 of Rule 118, but by Section 4 of Rule 129
which reads:
Sec. 4. Judicial Admissions. An admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the course of the
proceedings in the same case, does not require proof. The admission may be contradicted only by
showing that it was made through palpable mistake or that no such admission was made.
Hence, the trial court and the Court of Appeals did not err in taking cognizance of the said
documentary evidence.
Second Issue:
Sufficiency of Prosecution Evidence
Petitioner argues that the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt the elements of
the offense. After a careful consideration of the records of this case, we believe and so rule that
the totality of the evidence presented does not support petitioner's conviction for violation of BP
22.
Sec. 1 of BP 22 defines the offense as follows:
Sec. 1. Checks without sufficient funds. Any person who makes or draws and issues any check to
apply on account or for value, knowing at the time of issue that he does not have sufficient funds
in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon its presentment,
which check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or
would have been dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid reason,
ordered the bank to stop payment, shall be punished by imprisonment of not less than thirty days
but not more than one (1) year or by a fine of not less than but not more than double the amount of
the check which fine shall in no case exceed Two hundred thousand pesos, or both such fine and
imprisonment at the discretion of the court.
The same penalty shall be imposed upon any person who having sufficient funds in or credit with
the drawee bank when he makes or draws and issues a check, shall fail to keep sufficient funds or
to maintain a credit to cover the full amount of the check if presented within a period of ninety
(90) days from the date appearing thereon, for which reason it is dishonored by the drawee bank.
Where the check is drawn by a corporation, company or entity, the person or persons who actually
signed the check in behalf of such drawer shall be liable under this Act.
Accordingly, this Court has held that the elements of the crime are as follows:
1. The accused makes, draws or issues any check to apply to account or for value.
2. The checks subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit;
or it would have been dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid
reason, ordered the bank to stop payment.
3. The accused knows at the time of the issuance that he or she does not have sufficient funds in,
or credit with, drawee bank for the payment of the check in full upon its presentment.
We shall analyze the evidence, purportedly establishing each of the aforementioned elements
which the trial and the appellate courts relied upon.
Issuance of the Questioned Checks
Contending that the prosecution failed to prove the first element, petitioner maintains that she
merely signed the questioned checks without indicating therein the date and the amount
involved. She adds that they were improperly filled up by Eileen Fernandez. Thus, she
concludes, she did not "issue" the dishonored checks in the context of the Negotiable Instruments
Law, which defines "issue" as the "first delivery of the instrument complete in form to a person
who takes it as a holder." 19
Petitioner's contentions are not meritorious. The questioned checks, marked as Exhibits "A" to
"K," contained the date of issue and the amount involved. In fact, petitioner even admitted that
she signed those checks. On the other hand, no proof was adduced to show that petitioner merely
signed them in blank, or that complainant filled them up in violation of the former's instructions
or their previous agreement. The evidence on record is clear that petitioner issued eleven checks,
all of which were duly filled up and signed by her.
Checks Dishonored
Neither are we persuaded by petitioner's argument that "there appears no evidence on record that
the subject checks were unpaid and dishonored." 20 Under Section 3 of BP 22, "the introduction
in evidence of any unpaid and dishonored check, having the drawee's refusal to pay stamped or
written thereon, or attached thereto, with the reason therefor as aforesaid, shall be prima facie
evidence of the making or issuance of said check, and the due presentment to the drawee for
payment and the dishonor thereof, and that the same was properly dishonored for the reason
written, stamped, or attached by the drawee on such dishonored check."
In the present case, the fact that the checks were dishonored was sufficiently shown by the
checks themselves, which were stamped with the words "ACCOUNT CLOSED." This was
further supported by the returned check tickets issued by PCI Bank, the depository bank, stating
that the checks had been dishonored.
Clearly, these documents constitute prima facie evidence that the drawee bank dishonored the
checks. Again, no evidence was presented to rebut the prosecution's claim.
Knowledge of Insufficiency of Funds
To hold a person liable under BP 22, it is not enough to establish that a check issued was
subsequently dishonored. It must be shown further that the person who issued the check knew "at
the time of issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the
payment of such check in full upon its presentment." Because this element involves a state of
mind which is difficult to establish, Section 2 of the law creates a prima facie presumption of
such knowledge, as follows:
Sec. 2. Evidence of knowledge of insufficient funds. The making, drawing and issuance of
a check payment of which is refused by the drawee because of insufficient funds in or
credit with such bank, when presented within ninety (90) days from the date of the check,
shall be prima facie evidence of knowledge of such insufficiency of funds or credit unless
such maker or drawer pays the holder thereof the amount due thereon, or makes
arrangements for payment in full by the drawee of such check within five (5) banking
days after receiving notice that such check has not been paid by the drawee.
In other words, the prima facie presumption arises when a check is issued. But the law also
provides that the presumption does not arise when the issuer pays the amount of the check or
makes arrangement for its payment "within five banking days after receiving notice that such
check has not been paid by the drawee." Verily, BP 22 gives the accused an opportunity to
satisfy the amount indicated in the check and thus avert prosecution. As the Court held in Lozano
v. Martinez, the aforecited provision serves to "mitigate the harshness of the law in its
application." This opportunity, however, can be used only upon receipt by the accused of a
notice of dishonor. This point was underscored by the Court in Lina Lim Lao v. Court of
Appeals:
It has been observed that the State, under this statute, actually offers the violator a "compromise
by allowing him to perform some act which operates to preempt the criminal action, and if he
opts to perform it the action is abated." This was also compared "to certain laws allowing illegal
possessors of firearms a certain period of time to surrender the illegally possessed firearms to the
Government, without incurring any criminal liability." In this light, the full payment of the
amount appearing in the check within five banking days from notice of dishonor is a "complete
defense." The absence of a notice of dishonor necessarily deprives an accused an opportunity to
preclude a criminal prosecution. Accordingly, procedural due process clearly enjoins that a
notice of dishonor be actually served on petitioner. Petitioner has a right to demand and the basic
postulates of fairness require that the notice of dishonor be actually sent to and received by her to
afford her the opportunity to avert prosecution under BP 22.
Thus, in order to create the prima facie presumption that the issuer knew of the insufficiency of
funds, it must be shown that he or she received a notice of dishonor and, within five banking
days thereafter, failed to satisfy the amount of the check or make arrangement for its payment.
To prove that petitioner knew of the insufficiency of her funds, the prosecution presented
Exhibits "Q" to "T." Based on these documents, the Court of Appeals concluded that "[p]rivate
complainant sent a demand letter to appellant to make good said checks . . .. Appellant failed to
pay the face value of the eleven checks or make arrangement for the full payment thereof within
90 days after receiving the notice." 24
Upon closer examination of these documents, we find no evidentiary basis for the holding of the
trial court and the Court of Appeals that petitioner received a notice that the checks had been
dishonored.
True, complainant sent petitioner a registered mail, as shown in Exhibit "Q" informing the latter
that the checks had been dishonored. But the records show that petitioner did not receive it. In
fact, Postmaster Wilfredo Ulibarri's letter addressed to complainant's counsel certified that the
"subject registered mail was returned to sender on September 22, 1992 . . .. "
Notwithstanding the clear import of the postmaster's certification, the prosecution failed to
adduce any other proof that petitioner received the post office notice but unjustifiably refused to
claim the registered mail. It is possible that the drawee bank sent petitioner a notice of dishonor,
but the prosecution did not present evidence that the bank did send it, or that petitioner actually
received it. It was also possible that she was trying to flee from complainant by staying in
different address. Speculations and possibilities, however, cannot take the place of proof.
Conviction must rest on proof beyond reasonable doubt. Clearly, the evidence on hand
demonstrates the indelible fact that petitioner did not receive notice that the checks had been
dishonored. Necessarily, the presumption that she knew of the insufficiency of funds cannot
arise.
Be that as it may, the Court must point out that it cannot rule on petitioner's civil liability, for the
issue was not raised in the pleadings submitted before us.
We must stress that BP 22, like all penal statutes, is construed strictly against the State and
liberally in favor of the accused. Likewise, the prosecution has the burden to prove beyond
reasonable doubt each element of the crime. Hence, the prosecution's case must rise or fall on the
strength of its own evidence, never on the weakness or even absence of that of the defense.
yulo vs people gr no. 142762

Yulo v People

Facts:

1. Josefina Dimalanta and Lilany Yulo went to Myrna Roque.

2. Dimalanta told Roque that Yulo is her BFF and that she is a good payer; and asked Roque if she
can have Yulo's checks encashed.
3. Relying on this, she agreed. She received 3 checks from Yulo in return. However, such checks
were dishonored later on since the account was already closed.
4. After failed demands, she finally filed a crim case against Yulo for violation of BP22
5. Yulo was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt in RTC. Yulo appealed to the CA, but the
decision was affirmed in toto.
6. She filed an MR, but the MR was only resolved after 3 years after filing.(affirmed againt the
decision in toto)
Issues:

WON the CA violated her right to speedy trial. NO

Ratio

1. Sec 16 Art 3 of Bill of Rights: All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their
cases before all judicial, quasi judicial, or admin bodies under this provision, any party to a a
case has the right to demand on all officials tasked with the administration of justice to expedite
its disposition. However, the concept of speedy disposition is a relative term and must
necessarily be a flexible concept. A mere mathematical reckoning of the time involved is not
sufficient. In applying the Consti guarantee, particular regard must be taken of the facts and
circumstances of each case.
2. The right to a speedy disposition of a case, like the right to speedy trial, is deemed violated
only a) when the proceedings are attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays, or
 b) when unjustified postponements of the trial are asked for and secured, or c) when without
cause or justifiable motive a long period of time is allowed to elapse without the party having
his case tried.
3. The following factors must be considered: a) length of delay b) reasons for such delay c)
assertion or failure to assert such right by the accused d) prejudice caused by the delay
4. In this case, the delay was sufficiently explained. The ponente retired during the pendency of
the MR which was filed in March 1997. The case was assigned to Assoc Justice Dadole on Feb
2000. And then she resolved the motion within 2 weeks. Thus, there was no violation!
(Not important) Issue: WON the CA erred in holding Yulo guilty beyond reasonable doubt. No

1. The elements were all proven (making or issuance of a check, knowledge that he has no/
insufficient funds, subsequent dishonor).
2. Findings of lower court and affirmed in toto by CA are entitled to great weight

vicky moster vs people gr no. 167461

VICKY MOSTER VS PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 167461

Facts:

Petitioner obtained from Presas a loan of P450,000, for which the petitioner issued as
payment three postdated PhilBank checks. The three checks were all payable to cash. Presas
testified she did not deposit the checks on their due dates upon petitioners request and
assurance that they would be replaced with cash. When she could not wait any longer, Presas
deposited Check Nos. 026138 and 026124 in her Westmont Bank account, only to be notified
later that the checks were dishonored because the account had been closed. Presas said she
did not deposit Check No. 026137 after she agreed to petitioners request to withhold its
deposit as it had not yet been funded. After receiving notice that Check Nos. 026138 and
026124 had been dishonored, Presas immediately informed petitioner thereof and demanded
payment for the value of the checks. This demand, however, went unheeded.

In a letter, Presas through counsel, demanded from petitioner the settlement of

P367,602, representing the total value of the three checks, within five days from receipt.
Petitioner, however, did not comply. Thus, three Informations for violation of B.P. Blg.
22 were filed against petitioner.

Issue:
Is petitioner guilty of a violation of BP 22?

Ruling:

NO. B.P. Blg. 22 punishes as malum prohibitum the mere issuance of a worthless
check, provided the other elements of the offense are proved. Section 1 enumerates the
elements of B.P. Blg. 22, as follows: (1) the making, drawing, and issuance of any check to
apply on account or for value; (2) the knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the
time of issue he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the
payment of the check in full upon its presentment; and (3) the subsequent dishonor of the
check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or dishonor for the same reason
had not the drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the bank to stop payment.
 Upon careful examination of the records, however, the Court found that only the first
and third elements have been established by the prosecution. By her own admission,
petitioner issued the three subject checks, two of which were presented to PhilBank but were
dishonored and stamped for the reason Account Closed. Under Section 3 of B.P. Blg. 22, the
introduction in evidence of the dishonored check, having the drawees refusal to pay stamped
or written thereon, or attached thereto, with the reason therefor as aforesaid shall be prima
facie evidence of the making or issuing of the said checks and the due presentment to the
drawee for payment and the dishonor thereof, and that the same was properly dishonored for
the reason written, stamped or attached thereto by the drawee on such dishonored checks.

As to the second element, Section 2 of B.P. Blg. 22 creates the presumption that the issuer of
the check was aware of the insufficiency of funds when he issued a check and the bank
dishonored it. This presumption, however, arises only after it is proved that the issuer had
received a written notice of dishonor and that, within five days from receipt thereof, he
failed to pay the amount of the check or to make arrangements for its payment.

Ordinarily, preponderance of evidence is sufficient to prove notice. But in criminal cases, the
quantum of proof required is proof beyond reasonable doubt. In the instant case, the
prosecution merely presented a copy of the demand letter allegedly sent to petitioner
through registered mail and the registry return card. There was no attempt to authenticate or
identify the signature on the registry return card. All that we have on record is an illegible
signature on the registry receipt as evidence that someone received the letter. As to whether
this signature is that of petitioner or her authorized agent remains a mystery. Receipts for
registered letters and return receipts do not by themselves prove receipt; they must be
properly authenticated to serve as proof of receipt of the letters, claimed to be a notice of
dishonor. Unfortunately, the prosecution presented only the testimony of Presas to prove
mailing and receipt of the demand letter

eumelia r. mitra vs people gr no. 191404

Mitra vs. People

Facts:

Petitioner Mitra was the treasurer and Cabrera (now deceased) was the President of Lucky Nine Credit Corporation
(LNCC), a corporation engaged in money lending activities. Private respondent Felicisimo Tarcelo (Tarcelo) invested money in
LNCC. As the usual practice in money placement transactions, Tarcelo was issued checks equivalent to the amounts he invested
plus the interest on his investments.
When Tarcelo presented the checks for payment, they were dishonored for the reason "account closed." Tarcelo
made several oral demands on LNCC for the payment of said checks but he was frustrated. So he filed seven information for
violation of Batas Pambansa blg. 22 (BP 22) in the amount of P925,000.00 before the MTCC. Court decided in favor if Tarcelo.
So petitioners appealed to RTC contending that : They signed the seven checks in blank with no name of the payee, no
amount stated and no date of maturity; that they did not know when and to whom those checks would be issued; that the
seven checks were made to sign at that time; and that they signed the checks so as not to delay the transactions of LNCC
because they did not regularly hold office there. Petition was still denied. Meanwhile Cabrera died. Mitra alone file a petition
for review claiming among others, that there was no Notice of Dishonor on her. CA denied for lack of merit, hence this petition;

ISSUE(S):

1. WON the elements of violation of BP 22 must be proved beyond reasonable doubt as against the corporation who carries the
account where the subject checks were drawn before liability attaches to the signatories.

2. WON there is proper service of Notice of Dishonor and demand to pay to the petitioner and the late Cabrera.
HELD:
Petition DENIED.

The convenience afforded by checks is damaged by unfunded checks that adversely affect confidence in commercial
and banking activities, and ultimately injure public interest.

1. NO. The 3rd paragraph of sec.1 of BP 22 reads: "Where the check is drawn by a corporation, company or entity, the person
or persons who actually signed the check in behalf of such drawer shall be liable under this act." This provision recognizes the
reality that a corporation can only act through its officers. Hence its wording is unequivocal and mandatory that the person who
actually signed the corporate check shall be held liable for violation of BP 22. This provision does not contain any condition,
qualification or limitation.

2. Yes. There is no dispute that Mitra signed the checks and that the bank dishonored the checks because the account had been
closed. Notice of Dishonor was properly given, but Mitra failed to pay the checks or make arrangements for their payment
within 5 days from notice. (Cite elements of violation of BP22) With all the above elements duly proven, Mitra cannot escape
the civil and criminal liabilities that BP 22 imposes for its breach.

Llamado vs ca

j.l. recuerdo vs people 395 scra 117

JOY LEE RECUERDO v . PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and COURT OF

APPEALS 395 SCRA 117 (2003)

Yolanda Floro sold a loose diamond stone valued at P420,000.00 to Joy Lee Recuerdo.
As payment for the diamond, Recuerdo gave P40,000 as downpaymentand issued 9
postdated checks. When Floro tried to deposit eight checks, only three were cleared and
the other five were dishonored due to the closure of Recuerdos account. Recuerdo
promised to convert the checks into cash but she welshed on it A demand letter was sent
to Recuerdo but she still failed to comply with her obligation. This prompted Floro
to file at the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) five informations against Recuerdo for
violation of B.P. 22. Recuerdo was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of
B.P. 22 and was sentenced to suffer imprisonment of 30 days for each count and to
restitute the amount of P200,000 to Floro. The decision was affirmed by the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) and later on, by the Court of Appeals (CA).

ISSUE:

Whether or not Recuerdo is guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violation of B.P. 22

HELD:

Recuerdo contends that since banks are not damaged by the presentment of dishonored
checks as they impose a penalty for each, only creditors/payees are unduly favored by
the law; that the law is in essence a resurrected form of 19th century imprisonment for
debt since the drawer is coerced to pay his debt on threat of imprisonment even if his
failure to pay does not arise from malice or fraud or from any criminal intent to cause
damage; and that the law is a bill of attainder as it does not leave much room for judicial
determination, the guilt of the accused having already been decided by the legislature.
These matters subject of Recuerdos contention have long been settled in the landmark
case of Lozano v. Martinez where the Court upheld the constitutionality of B. P. 22: the
gravamen of the offense punished by BP 22 is the act of making and issuing a
worthless check or a check that is dishonored upon its presentation for payment. It is
not the non-payment of an obligation which the law punishes. The law is not intended or
designed to coerce a debtor to pay his debt. The thrust of the law is to prohibit, under
pain of penal sanctions, the making of worthless checks and putting them in circulation.
Because of its deleterious effects on the public interest, the practice is proscribed by law.
The law punishes the act not as an offense against property, but an offense against
public order. The contention that B. P. 22 is a bill of attainder, one which inflicts
punishment without trial and the essence of which is the substitution of a legislative for
a judicial determination of guilt, fails. For under B. P. 22, every element of the crime is
still to be proven before the trial court to warrant a conviction for violation thereof.
Recuerdo argues that as no bank representative testified as to whether the questioned
checks were dishonored due to insufficiency of funds (sic), such element was not clearly
and convincingly proven, hence, the trial court failed to uphold her right to presumption
of innocence when she was convicted based on the sole testimony of Yolanda. Yolandas
testimony that when she deposited the checks to her depository bank they were
dishonored due to Account Closed sufficed. In fact, even Recuerdos counsel during
trial admitted the dishonor, and on that ground. In fine, the affirmance of
Recuerdos conviction is in order. In the case at bar, the Court notes that no proof, nay
allegation, was proffered that Recuerdo was not a first time offender. Considering this
and the correctness of the case, it would best serve the interests of justice if Recuerdo is
just fined to enable her to continue her dental practice so as not to deprive her of her
income, thus insuring the early settlement of the civil aspect of the case, not to mention
the FINE.

josephne domagsang vs ca gr no. 139292

Josephine Domagsang vs. CA and the People

Summary of Doctrines:
1. To secure the conviction in BP 22, a WRITTEN NOTICE of dishonour is required.
2. The law does not presume that the offender knows of the FACT OF DISHONOR from merely
making an instrument without value. As such, the accused is still entitled to notice of such
dishonour.

Facts:

Petitioner approached Ignacio Garcia, an Assistant Vice President of METROBANK, to ask for financial
assistance. Garcia accommodated petitioner and gave the latter a loan in the sum of P573,800.00. In
exchange, petitioner issued and delivered to the complainant 18 postdated checks for the repayment of
the loan. When the checks were, in time, deposited, the instruments were all dishonored by the drawee
bank for this reason: Account closed. The complainant demanded payment allegedly by calling up
petitioner at her office. Failing to receive any payment for the value of the dishonored checks, the
complainant referred the matter to his lawyer who supposedly wrote petitioner a letter of demand but that
the latter ignored the demand. (Note: the said demand letter was not presented as evidence) Hence, 18
cases for the violation of BP 22 were filed against Domagsang.

RTC Ruling as affirmed by CA:

Petitioner was convicted by the Regional Trial Court of Makati of having violated Anti-Bouncing Check
Law, on eighteen (18) counts, and sentenced her to suffer the penalty of One (1) Year imprisonment for
each count. The judgment, when appealed to the Court of Appeals was affirmed in toto by the appellate
court. A petition for certiorari was filed by petitioner to SC.

Defense raised by Domagsang:

There was no proper written letter of demand served upon her person, thus she must not be charged for
the violation of BP 22. According to Domagsang, even if she was informed of the dishonour by Garcia
through a telephone call, the same is not sufficient to convict her.

SC Ruling:

On the question of whether or not lack of written letter of demand will acquit her from the criminal
violation, the SC ruled in the positive. Note: SC enumerated some provisions of BP 22. For further
reading, please see Sections. 1 3.

Ratio / Doctrine:

To secure conviction for the vilation of BP 22, the prosecution must establish the fact that the
check was dishonoured AND that the accused has been notified in writing of the fact of
dishonour.

While, indeed, Section 2 of B.P. 22 does not state that the notice of dishonor be in writing, taken in
conjunction, however, with Section 3 of the law, i.e., "that where there are no sufficient funds in or credit
with such drawee bank, such fact shall always be explicitly stated in the notice of dishonor or refusal," a
mere oral notice or demand to pay would appear to be insufficient for conviction under the law.

The Court is convinced that both the spirit and letter of the Bouncing Checks Law would require for the
act to be punished thereunder not only that the accused issued a check that is dishonored, but that
likewise the accused has actually been notified in writing of the fact of dishonour.

Evidently, the appellate court did not give weight and credence to the assertion that a demand letter was
sent by a counsel of the complainant because of the failure of the prosecution to formally offer it in
evidence. Courts are bound to consider as part of the evidence only those which are formally offered,for
judges must base their findings strictly on the evidence submitted by the parties at the trial. Without the
written notice of dishonor, there can be no basis, considering what has heretofore been said, for
establishing the presence of "actual knowledge of insufficiency of funds.

Related Doctrine:

There is no prima facie presumption of the knowledge of dishonour in BP 22, thus notice of
dishonour (written) is required to secure conviction.

The law enumerates the elements of the crime to be :

(1) the making, drawing and issuance of any check to apply for account or for value;
(2) the knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time of issue he does not have sufficient
funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of the check in full upon its presentment;
and
(3) the subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or
dishonor for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the bank to
stop payment.

There is deemed to be a prima facie evidence of knowledge on the part of the maker, drawer or issuer of
insufficiency of funds in or credit with the drawee bank of the check issued if the dishonored check is
presented within 90 days from the date of the check and the maker or drawer fails to pay thereon or to
make arrangement with the drawee bank for that purpose.

The statute has created the prima facie presumption evidently because "knowledge" which involves a
state of mind would be difficult to establish. The presumption does not hold, however, when the maker,
drawer or issuer of the check pays the holder thereof the amount due thereon or makes arrangement for
payment in full by the drawee bank of such check within 5 banking days after receiving notice that such
check has not been paid by the drawee bank.

In Lao vs. Court of Appeals, this Court explained:

Section 2 of B.P. Blg. 22 clearly provides that this presumption arises not from the mere fact of drawing,
making and issuing a bum check; there must also be a showing that, within five banking days from receipt
of the notice of dishonor, such maker or drawer failed to pay the holder of the check the amount due
thereon or to make arrangement for its payment in full by the drawee of such check.

It has been observed that the State, under this statute, actually offers the violator a compromise by
allowing him to perform some act which operates to preempt the criminal action, and if he opts to perform
it the action is abated. This was also compared to certain laws allowing illegal possessors of firearms a
certain period of time to surrender the illegally possessed firearms to the Government, without incurring
any criminal liability. In this light, the full payment of the amount appearing in the check within five banking
days from notice of dishonor is a complete defense. The absence of a notice of dishonor necessarily
deprives an accused an opportunity to preclude a criminal prosecution. Accordingly, procedural due
process clearly enjoins that a notice of dishonor be actually served on petitioner. Petitioner has a
right to demand and the basic postulates of fairness require that the notice of dishonor be
actually sent to and received by her to afford her the opportunity to avert prosecution under B.P.
Blg. 22.

victor ting and emily chan-azajar vs ca gr no. 140665

manuel nagrampa vs ca gr no.132552

Manuel Nagrampa Vs Ca Gr No.132552

Facts:Manuel Nagrampa purchased porcelain excavator equipment from Fedcor

Trading Corporation on an installment basis. He then issued checks to be drawn against
Security Bank and Trust Company. The checks were dishonored on the ground that the
account was already closed. He was then charge with violation of BP 22. In his defense
he claimed that he is not guilty of estafa because no damage was caused to FEDCOR
and the back hoe being unserviceable was returned to FEDCOR

The trial court found him guilty and was ordered to pay FEDCOR the Court of Appeals
affirmed the decision in toto.

Issue:Whether or not he is liable for violation of BP 22 despite no notice of dishonor was

given.
Held:Yes, because the account was closed for four years prior to the transaction. He
knew fully well that the check he issued would be dishonored and the 90-day grace
period given to him by law is unavailing.

claro e. narte vs ca gr no.132552

felia marigomen vs people gr no.153451

OFELIA MARIGOMEN vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES. G.R. No. 153451. May
26, 2005.

FACTS:

Caltex sold their gas and oil to INSURECO through postdated checks. Petitioner was
the finance officer who was authorized to sign checks against INSURECO. Three
checks were dishonored due to insufficient funds. After Caltex made demands to
INSURECO, which was unheeded, they filed a complaint against petitioner for violation
of BP 22.

Petitioner contends that while she had drawn and signed the checks she was not an
employee anymore at the purchase of the products. She did not receive any telegrams
or notice of the dishonored checks. The lower ruled in favor of Caltex.

ISSUE: Whether petitioner was guilty of violating BP 22.

RULING:

The SC ruled in favor of petitioner and acquitted her. Caltex did not prove that petitioner
knew that there were insufficient funds when she drew and signed those checks. Also
the notice of dishonor should be in writing and not a verbal notice. The SC also said that
if the drawer or maker is an officer of a corporation, the notice of dishonor to the said
corporation is not notice to the employee or officer who drew or issued the check for
and in its behalf. Prosecution also failed to prove that petition receive those notices of
dishonor.