Cases On Arraignment PDF

C ases on Ar ra ig nment / Pl e a |1
A.M. No. RTJ-14-2399 November 19, 2014

[Formerly A.M. OCA IPI No. 13-4013-RTJ]
GASPAR BANDOY, Complainant,

vs.
JUDGE JOSE S. JACINTO, JR., PRESIDING JUDGE, BRANCH 45, and ACTING PRESIDING JUDGE,
BRANCH 46, both at REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, SAN JOSE, OCCIDENT AL MINDORO,
Respondent.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
For review before the Court is this administrative case against respondent Judge Jose S. Jacinto, Jr.
(Judge Jacinto, Jr.) of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branches 451 and 46,2 San Jose, Occidental
Mindoro, filed by Gaspar Bandoy (Bandoy) for Grave Abuse of Authority in relation to Criminal Case
No. 2-1928,3 entitled "People of the Philippines v. Caspar Bandoy, Peter Alfaro and Randolph
Ignacio" and Criminal Case No. Z-1910, entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Romulo De Jesus, Jr."
Complainant Bandoy alleged, inhis verified complaint,4 that he was one of the accused in Criminal
Case No. 2-1928, for Serious Illegal Detention filed by Romulo De Jesus, Jr. (De Jesus, Jr.),which was
raffled to Branch 44 of the RTC, Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro (RTC-Br. 44), with Judge Jacinto, Jr.
as the Assisting Presiding Judge. Bandoy claimed that the case was initiated by De Jesus, Jr. to get
back at him for being instrumental in the filing of an earlier criminal complaint against him for
Violation of Article XXII, Section 261, paragraph 7, number 14 of the Omnibus Election Code (Ballot
Switching). The said case was likewise raffled to RTC-Br. 44.
Bandoy also averred that he was an election watcher of former Mayor Joel Panaligan during the
2007 local elections, while De Jesus, Jr., a teacher of their municipalitys public elementary school,
was one of the chairpersons of the Board of Election Inspectors; thatthey were both assigned in
Precinct 3-A of Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro; that De Jesus, Jr. was rumored to be closely
associated with the rival mayoralty candidate, Voltaire Anthony C. Villarosa (Voltaire), son of House
representative Amelita C. Villarosa (Cong. Villarosa)and Mayor Jose Tapales Villarosa (Mayor
Villarosa) of San Jose, Occidental Mindoro; that in the said local elections, De Jesus, Jr. was caught in
the act of ballot switching, which was captured on video by a member of the media, a certain Randy
Bool; that by virtue of a search warrant from the Commission of Elections (COMELEC), De Jesus, Jr.
was caught in possession of some ballots insidehis backpack; and that as a result of this incident, De
Jesus, Jr. was criminally charged with the offense of ballot switching. Accordingly, on August 17,
2007, a warrant of arrest was issued against De Jesus, Jr.5
According to Bandoy, on August 20, 2007, De Jesus, Jr. personally appeared before Provincial
Prosecutor Levitico Salcedo to file a criminal case for Serious Illegal Detention against him, Peter
Alfaro, Randolph Ignacio, and then Election Supervisor, Atty. Judy Lorenzo (Atty. Lorenzo).
Apparently, De Jesus, Jr. did this while there was a standing warrant of arrest against him. Worse,
De Jesus, Jr. remained at-large until he was able to post bail on March 7, 2008 before then Las Pinas
RTC Judge Raul B. Villanueva.6 Because complainant Bandoy was charged with Serious Illegal
Detention, the provincial prosecutor recommended "no bail" leaving them incarcerated for
morethan two years.7
Bandoy further claims that Judge Jacinto, Jr. committed grave abuse of his authority by displaying
manifest bias and partiality in favor of De Jesus, Jr. when he granted several postponements of De
Jesus, Jr.s arraignment, originally scheduled on April 23, 2008,8 but was reset for seven times until
De Jesus, Jr. entered a plea of not guilty supposedly inside Judge Jacinto, Jr.s chambers on July 6,
2011.9
Bandoy emphasized that many of the said resettings were mostly due to De Jesus, Jr.s non-
appearance for failure to locate him at his given address. Despite these supposed obvious court
defiance, Judge Jacinto, Jr. remained lenient and seemingly tolerated his continuous non-
appearance in the courts subsequent scheduled hearings. Another example of Judge Jacinto, Jr.s
supposed unreasonable bias towards Bandoy was his lack of interest to dispose of the case of
serious illegal detention despite De Jesus, Jr.s obvious dilatory tactics and unjustified absences
when his appearance was necessary.
Bandoy, along with his co-accused, moved for reconsideration and filed a petition for review before
the Department of Justice (DOJ)to have the serious illegal detention case against them dismissed.
Meanwhile, coaccused Atty. Lorenzo filed a separate petition with the Court of Appeals (CA)and
won the case. The Court later affirmed the dismissal of the case against her. At first, the DOJ denied
their petition. Upon reconsideration, however, the DOJ, under the helm of Justice Secretary Leila De
Lima, directed the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor, Occidental Mindoro, to cause the withdrawal
of the case against Bandoy and his co-accused.10 Accordingly, the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor filed its Motion to Withdraw Information.
Judge Jacinto, Jr., in an order,11 dated July 5, 2011, denied the motion to withdraw information. In
the end, Bandoy was only able to regain temporary freedom when Judge Jacinto, Jr. finally
resolved12 to allow him to post a bail bond of 100,000.00 each or a total of 300,000.00.13
Bandoy added that Voltaire was a principal sponsor in the wedding of Judge Jacinto, Jr.s child.
Thereafter, Judge Jacinto, Jr. was assigned to another sala, while Judge Wilfredo De Joya Mayor
(Judge Mayor) became the assisting presiding judge of Branch 44. It was during this time that the
case for serious illegal detention was temporarily dismissed, but upon reconsideration, Judge
Mayor decided to reinstate and continue the case against Bandoy. Meanwhile, the case of ballot
switching against De Jesus, Jr. was dismissed on October 25, 2012,14 while their bail for the serious
illegal detention case was cancelled.15
According to complainant Bandoy, the compelling force that made him initiate this present
administrative case was because Judge Jacinto, Jr. would take over Judge Mayors assignments on
account of the latters compulsory retirement from service on December 1, 2012, which would
include their pending serious illegal detention case. He claimed that Judge Jacinto, Jr. ordered the
police and the CIDG to re-arrest him and his coaccused even though there was no warrant of arrest
against them.16 He begged the Court not to let Judge Jacinto, Jr. handle their case of serious illegal
detention for fear that they would have to endure another bout of extreme bias and partiality from
him.
In his Comment,17 Judge Jacinto, Jr. denied being an ally of the Villarosa clan.18 He also denied
having a hand in the order to arrest Bandoy and his co-accused as the Chief of PNP and the CIDG
Chief, both of Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro, merely consulted him on how to go about the order
of cancellation of bail that Judge Mayor issued. He explained "wala po akong alam sa Kautusan kaya
binasa po sa akin ang nilalaman nito sa cellphone at pagkatapos ay nagwika po akong parang may
kulang sa Kautusan at kapag nakansela ang piyansa ay babalik sila sa selda dahil wala na po silang
piyansa (as a consequence thereof)."19 Judge Jacinto, Jr. even refused to issue a warrant of arrest
when he was asked because he was not handling the case anymore.20
Bandoy, in his Reply,21 brought to the attention of the Court that Judge Jacinto, Jr., in order to
thwartthe enemies of his supposed master, Mayor Villarosa, issued warrants of arrest against ten
individuals.22 He also divulged that the audit team from the Court was personally assisted by Judge
Jacinto, Jr. and given accommodations in "Aroma Center," one of the properties of Mayor
Villarosa.23 Bandoy was thankful that Judge Jacinto, Jr. did not deny the fact that the police officials
wanted to arrest them even without a warrant of arrest.24 Bandoy showed a timeline of events
supposedly depicting how De Jesus, Jr., through the tolerance and partiality of Judge Jacinto, Jr.,
evaded arraignment on numerous occasions effectively delaying the progress of the case for ballot
switching and even actually conducting the arraignment in his chambers.25 He further reiterated
his plea not to let Judge Jacinto, Jr. preside over the affairs of Branch 44.
In his Rejoinder,26 Judge Jacinto, Jr. stated that he was again assigned as Assisting Presiding Judge
of Branch 44.27 He clarified that he indeed issued warrants of arrest against ten individuals in
connection with a serious illegal detention case against them, but only after a finding of probable
cause by the public prosecutor handling it. Judge Jacinto, Jr. reiterated that he merely affirmed the
finding of probable cause, which justified the issuance of the warrants of arrest as the charge was a
non-bailable offense.28 He likewise denied seeking any favor from Mayor Villarosa to accommodate
the audit team in their property, the Aroma Family Hotel. He explained that the audit team paid him
a "courtesy call" where he assured the team of his cooperation.29 He again restated that the police
officials merely coordinated with him as was customary because he was the Executive Judge of the
municipality.30 Judge Jacinto, Jr. believes that Bandoys accusations against him were designed to
oust him as Presiding Judge of Branches 45 and 46 of San Jose and even as Assisting Presiding Judge
of Branch 44, Mamburao, both in the province of Occidental Mindoro.31
In its Report,32 dated June 03, 2014, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) did not give
credence to Bandoys allegation that Judge Jacinto, Jr. issued an order for his arrest without a
warrant and to the insinuation that the Courts audit team was conveniently housed in Aroma
Family Hotel of the Villarosas for failure to present proof.33 The OCA observed, however, that Judge
Jacinto, Jr. never refuted the allegations of leniency over the several resettings of the arraignment of
De Jesus, Jr. and that the arraignment was held in his chambers. As such, the OCA equated his
silence to admission.34
Thus, the OCA recommended that:
1. The administrative complaint against Presiding Judge Jose S. Jacinto, Jr., Branch 45, Regional Trial
Court, San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, be RE-DOCKETED as regular administrative matter; and
2. Respondent Judge Jose Jacinto, Jr. be found GUILTY of Bias and Partiality and Gross Ignorance of
the Law and Procedure and, accordingly, be FINEDin the amount of Forty Thousand Pesos
(40,000.00) with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt with
more severely.35
The Court's Ruling
The Court agrees with the recommendation of the OCA.
Rule 3.01, Canon 3 of the Code ofJudicial Conduct mandates that a judge shall be faithful to the law
and maintain professional competence. Indeed, competence and diligence are prerequisites to the
due performance of judicial office.36
Everyone, especially a judge, is presumed to know the law. One who accepts the exalted position of
a judge owes the public and the Court the duty to maintain professional competence at all times.37
In this case, Judge Jacinto, Jr. was directly confronted with an allegation that he arraigned De Jesus,
Jr. inside his chambers.1wphi1 He was given the opportunity to answer, but he chose not to delve
into it. Ultimately, Judge Jacinto, Jr. did not squarely face the issues being imputed against him,
which was quite irregular since it was his name and his capacity as a member of the bench, that was
being challenged. As aptly observed by the OCA, "the natural instinct of man impels him to resist an
unfounded claim or imputation and defend himself. It isagainst human nature to just remain
reticent and say nothing in the face of false accusations."38 His silence introduces doubt in the
minds of the public, which is not acceptable.
Given the exacting standards required of magistrates in the application of the law and procedure,
the Court finds Judge Jacinto, Jr. administratively guilty of gross ignorance of Rule 116 of the
Revised Rules of Court, specifically Section 1(a) thereof requiring arraignment of an accused to be
made in open court, to wit:
Section 1. Arraignment and plea, how made. (a) The accused must be arraigned before the court
where the complaint or information was filed or assigned for trial. The arraignment shall be made
in open courtby the judge or clerk by furnishing the accused with a copy of the complaint or
information, reading the same in the language or dialect known to him, and asking him whether he
pleads guilty or not guilty. The prosecution may call at the trial witnesses other then those named
in the complaint or information.
(Emphasis supplied)
The procedural steps laid down in Section 1(a) of Rule 116 are not empty rituals that a judge can
take nonchalantly. Each step constitutes an integral part of that crucial stage in criminal litigation
"where the issues are joined x x x and without which the proceedings cannot advance further."39
Thus, anything less than is required by Section 1(a) of Rule 116 constitutes gross ignorance of the
law.40 There is gross ignorance of the law when the error committed by the judge was "gross or
patent, deliberate or malicious."41 It may also be committed when a judge ignores, contradicts or
fails to apply settled law and jurisprudence because of bad faith, fraud, dishonesty or corruption.42
Gross ignorance of the law or incompetence cannot be excused by a claim of good faith.43
The Court has impressed upon judges that they owe it to the public and the legal profession to
know the very law that they are supposed to apply in a given controversy.44 They are called upon
to exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance with statutes and procedural rules, to be
conversant with the basic law, and to maintain the desired professional competence.45 When a
judge displays an utter lack of familiarity with the rules, he erodes the confidence of the public in
the courts. A judge owes the public and the Court the duty to be proficient in the law and is
expected to keep abreast of laws and prevailing jurisprudence. Ignorance of the law by a judge can
easily be the mainspring of injustice.46
Canon 2,47 Rule 2.0148 and Canon 349 of the Code of Judicial Conduct likewise emphasize that
judges, as officers of the court, have the duty to see to it that justice is dispensed with evenly and
fairly. Not only must they be honest and impartial, but they must also appear to be honest and
impartial in the dispensation of justice. Judges should make sure that their acts are circumspect and
do not arouse suspicion in the minds of the public. When they fail to do so, such acts may cast doubt
upon their integrity and ultimately the judiciary in general.50 As held in Joselito Rallos, et al., vs.
Judge Ireneo Lee Gako Jr., Branch 5 RTC, Cebu City:51
Well-known is the judicial norm that "judges should not only be impartial but should also appear
impartial." Jurisprudence repeatedly teaches that litigants are entitled to nothing less than the cold
neutrality of an impartial judge. The other elements of due process, like notice and hearing, would
become meaningless if the ultimate decision is rendered by a partial or biased judge. Judges must
not only render just, correct and impartial decisions, but must do so in a manner free of any
suspicion as to their fairness, impartiality and integrity.
This reminder applies all the more sternly to municipal, metropolitan and regional trial court
judges like herein respondent, because they are judicial front-liners who have direct contact with
the litigating parties. They are the intermediaries between conflicting interests and the
embodiments of the peoples sense of justice. Thus, their official conduct should be beyond
reproach.
Here, the Court cannot fathom why the arraignment of De Jesus, Jr. was postponed from 2007 to
2011 without appropriate action coming from the court. Judge Jacinto, Jr. should have availed of
known legal remedies to compel De Jesus, Jr. to personally appear for his arraignment, but he did
not. The appearance of leniency seemingly exhibited in favor of De Jesus, Jr. gives an impression of
bias and partiality that should be addressed and corrected.1wphi1
Consequently, under Section 8(9), Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10-
SC, gross ignorance of the law or procedure is classified as a serious charge. Section 11 (A) of the
same Rule provides that the penalty to be imposed if a respondent Judge is found guilty of a serious
charge is either a fine of more than 20,000.00 but not more than 40,000.00, suspension from
office without salary and other benefits for more than three but not exceeding six months, or
dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the Court may determine, and
disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including government-
owned or controlled corporations.
The Court is aware of the other pending administrative cases against Judge Jacinto, Jr., but they
cannot be fully considered in the imposition of the penalty in this case as they are still under review
and evaluation. Thus, a fine of 40,000.0052 is deemed appropriate under the circumstances.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Judge Jose S. Jacinto, Jr. GUILTY of Gross Ignorance of the
Law and Procedure and of Bias and Partiality. Accordingly, he is FINED in the amount of Forty
Thousand (40,000.00) Pesos with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar act
shall be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. Nos. 163972-77

JOSELITO RANIERO J. DAAN,
- versus -
THE HON. SANDIGANBAYAN
March 28, 2008
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Joselito Raniero J. Daan (petitioner), one of the accused in Criminal Cases Nos. 24167-24170,
24195-24196,[1] questions the denial by the Sandiganbayan of his plea bargaining proposal.
The antecedents facts are laid down by Sandiganbayan in its Resolution dated March 25, 2004, as
follows:
Said accused,[2] together with accused Benedicto E. Kuizon, were charged before this Court for
three counts of malversation of public funds involving the sums of P3,293.00, P1,869.00, and
P13,528.00, respectively, which they purportedly tried to conceal by falsifying the time book and
payrolls for given period making it appear that some laborers worked on the construction of the
new municipal hall building of Bato, Leyte and collected their respective salaries thereon when, in
truth and in fact, they did not. Thus, in addition to the charge for malversation, the accused were
also indicted before this Court for three counts of falsification of public document by a public officer
or employee.
In the falsification cases, the accused offered to withdraw their plea of not guilty and substitute the
same with a plea of guilty, provided, the mitigating circumstances of confession or plea of guilt and
voluntary surrender will be appreciated in their favor. In the alternative, if such proposal is not
acceptable, said accused proposed instead to substitute their plea of not guilty to the crime of
falsification of public document by a public officer or employee with a plea of guilty, but to the
lesser crime of falsification of a public document by a private individual. On the other hand, in the
malversation cases, the accused offered to substitute their plea of not guilty thereto with a plea of
guilty, but to the lesser crime of failure of an accountable officer to render accounts.
Insofar as the falsification cases are concerned, the prosecution found as acceptable the proposal of
the accused to plead guilty to the lesser crime of falsification of public document by a private
individual. The prosecution explained:
With respect to the falsification cases earlier mentioned, it appears that the act of the accused in
pleading guilty for a lesser offense of falsification by a private individual defined and penalized
under Article 172 of the Revised Penal code will strengthen our cases against the principal accused,
Municipal Mayor Benedicto Kuizon, who appears to be the master mind of these criminal acts.
Insofar as the malversation cases are concerned, the prosecution was likewise amenable to the
offer of said accused to plead guilty to the lesser crime of failure of an accountable officer to render
accounts because:
x x x JOSELITO RANIERO J. DAAN has already restituted the total amount of P18,860.00 as per
official receipt issued by the provincial government of Leyte dated February 26, 2002. In short, the
damage caused to the government has already been restituted x x x.[3]
The Sandiganbayan, in the herein assailed Resolution,[4] dated March 25, 2004, denied petitioners
Motion to Plea Bargain, despite favorable recommendation by the prosecution, on the main ground
that no cogent reason was presented to justify its approval.[5]
The Sandiganbayan likewise denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration in a Resolution dated
May 31, 2004.
This compelled petitioner to file the present case for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order and/ or writ of preliminary injunction under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court.
Petitioner argues that the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in denying his plea
bargaining offer on the following grounds: first, petitioner is not an accountable officer and he
merely affixed his signature on the payrolls on a routinary basis, negating any criminal intent; and
that the amount involved is only P18,860.00, which he already restituted.[6]
The petition is meritorious.
Plea bargaining in criminal cases is a process whereby the accused and the prosecution work out a
mutually satisfactory disposition of the case subject to court approval. It usually involves the
defendant's pleading guilty to a lesser offense or to only one or some of the counts of a multi-count
indictment in return for a lighter sentence than that for the graver charge.[7]
Plea bargaining is authorized under Section 2, Rule 116 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure,
to wit:
SEC. 2. Plea of guilty to a lesser offense. At arraignment, the accused, with the consent of the
offended party and the prosecutor, may be allowed by the trial court to plead guilty to a lesser
offense which is necessarily included in the offense charged. After arraignment but before trial, the
accused may still be allowed to plead guilty to said lesser offense after withdrawing his plea of not
guilty. No amendment of the complaint or information is necessary. (sec. 4, cir. 38-98)
Ordinarily, plea bargaining is made during the pre-trial stage of the proceedings. Sections 1 and 2,
Rule 118 of the Rules of Court, require plea bargaining to be considered by the trial court at the pre-
trial conference,[8] viz:
SEC. 1. Pre-trial; mandatory in criminal cases. In all criminal cases cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan, Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court in Cities,
Municipal Trial Court and Municipal Circuit Trial Court, the court shall, after arraignment and
within thirty (30) days from the date the court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the accused,
unless a shorter period is provided for in special laws or circulars of the Supreme Court, order a
pre-trial conference to consider the following:
(a) plea bargaining;
(b) stipulation of facts;
(c) marking for identification of evidence of the parties;
(d) waiver of objections to admissibility of evidence;
(e) modification of the order of trial if the accused admits the charge but interposes a lawful
defense; and
(f) such matters as will promote a fair and expeditious trial of the criminal and civil aspects of the
case.
SEC. 2. Pre-trial agreement. All agreements or admissions made or entered during the pre-trial
conference shall be reduced in writing and signed by the accused and counsel, otherwise, they
cannot be used against the accused. The agreements covering the matters referred to in section 1 of
this Rule shall be approved by the court. (Emphasis supplied)
But it may also be made during the trial proper and even after the prosecution has finished
presenting its evidence and rested its case. Thus, the Court has held that it is immaterial that plea
bargaining was not made during the pre-trial stage or that it was made only after the prosecution
already presented several witnesses.[9]
Section 2, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court presents the basic requisites upon which plea bargaining
may be made, i.e., that it should be with the consent of the offended party and the prosecutor,[10]
and that the plea of guilt should be to a lesser offense which is necessarily included in the offense
charged. The rules however use word may in the second sentence of Section 2, denoting an exercise
of discretion upon the trial court on whether to allow the accused to make such plea.[11] Trial
courts are exhorted to keep in mind that a plea of guilty for a lighter offense than that actually
charged is not supposed to be allowed as a matter of bargaining or compromise for the convenience
of the accused.[12]
In People of the Philippines v. Villarama,[13] the Court ruled that the acceptance of an offer to plead
guilty to a lesser offense is not demandable by the accused as a matter of right but is a matter that is
addressed entirely to the sound discretion of the trial court,[14] viz:
C a s e s o n A r r a i g n m e n t / P l e a | 10
x x x In such situation, jurisprudence has provided the trial court and the Office of the Prosecutor
with a yardstick within which their discretion may be properly exercised. Thus, in People v.
Kayanan (L-39355, May 31, 1978, 83 SCRA 437, 450), We held that the rules allow such a plea only
when the prosecution does not have sufficient evidence to establish the guilt of the crime charged.
In his concurring opinion in People v. Parohinog (G.R. No. L-47462, February 28, 1980, 96 SCRA
373, 377), then Justice Antonio Barredo explained clearly and tersely the rationale or the law:
x x x (A)fter the prosecution had already rested, the only basis on which the fiscal and the court
could rightfully act in allowing the appellant to change his former plea of not guilty to murder to
guilty to the lesser crime of homicide could be nothing more nothing less than the evidence already
in the record. The reason for this being that Section 4 of Rule 118 (now Section 2, Rule 116) under
which a plea for a lesser offense is allowed was not and could not have been intended as a
procedure for compromise, much less bargaining.[15] (Emphasis supplied)
However, Villarama involved plea bargaining after the prosecution had already rested its case.
As regards plea bargaining during the pre-trial stage, as in the present case, the trial court's
exercise of its discretion should neither be arbitrary nor should it amount to a capricious and
whimsical exercise of discretion. Grave abuse of discretion implies such capricious and whimsical
exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction or, in other words, where the power is
exercised in an arbitrary manner by reason of passion, prejudice, or personal hostility; and it must
be so patent or gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform
the duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law.[16]
In the present case, the Sandiganbayan rejected petitioner's plea offer on the ground that petitioner
and the prosecution failed to demonstrate that the proposal would redound to the benefit of the
public. The Sandiganbayan believes that approving the proposal would only serve to trivialize the
seriousness of the charges against them and send the wrong signal to potential grafters in public
office that the penalties they are likely to face would be lighter than what their criminal acts would
have merited or that the economic benefits they are likely to derive from their criminal activities far
outweigh the risks they face in committing them; thus, setting to naught the deterrent value of the
laws intended to curb graft and corruption in government.[17]
Apparently, the Sandiganbayan has proffered valid reasons in rejecting petitioner's plea offer.
However, subsequent events and higher interests of justice and fair play dictate that petitioner's
plea offer should be accepted. The present case calls for the judicious exercise of this Court's equity
jurisdiction -
Equity as the complement of legal jurisdiction seeks to reach and do complete justice where courts
of law, through the inflexibility of their rules and want of power to adapt their judgments to the
special circumstances of cases, are incompetent so to do. Equity regards the spirit of and not the
letter, the intent and not the form, the substance rather than the circumstance, as it is variously
expressed by different courts.[18]
and of its power of control and supervision over the proceedings of lower courts,[19] in order to
afford equal justice to petitioner.
In People of the Philippines v. Estrada,[20] the Sandiganbayan, in its Resolution dated March 14,
2007, approved the Plea Bargaining Agreement entered into by the prosecution and one of the
accused, Charlie Atong Ang. The agreement provided that the accused undertakes to assist in the
prosecution of the case and promises to return the amount of P25,000,000.00. In approving the
Plea Bargaining Agreement, the Sandiganbayan took into consideration the timeliness of the plea
bargaining and whether the agreement complied with the requirements of Section 2, Rule 116 of
the Rules of Court. The Sandigabayan noted that the accused had already withdrawn his earlier plea
of not guilty; and that the prosecution consented to the plea of guilt to a lesser offense; and the
lesser offense, which is Corruption of Public Officials in relation to Indirect Bribery, is necessarily
included in the offense charged, which is Plunder.[21]
The Court sees no reason why the standards applied by the Sandiganbayan to Estrada should not be
applied to the present case. Records show that there was a favorable recommendation by the Office
of the Special Prosecutor to approve petitioner's motion to plea bargain. Thus, in its Memorandum
dated August 16, 2002, the Office of the Special Prosecutor rationalized:
In the cases at bar, there is no dispute that JOSELITO RANIERO J. DAAN has already restituted the
total amount of P18,860.00 as per official receipt issued by the provincial government of Leyte
dated February 26, 2002. In short, the damage caused to the government has already been
restituted by the accused.
There is also no dispute that accused DAAN voluntarily surrendered in the instant cases. Moreover,
the accused is also willing to plead guilty to a lesser offense which to our mind, merits
consideration.
With respect to the falsification cases earlier mentioned, it appears that the act of the accused in
pleading guilty for a lesser offense of falsification by private individual defined and penalized under
Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code will strengthen our cases against the principal accused, the
Municipal Mayor Benedicto Kuizon, who appears to be the master mind of these criminal acts. After
all, the movants herein JOSELITO RANIERO J. DAAN was merely designated as draftsman detailed
as foreman/timekeeper of the Municipality of Bato, Leyte.[22]
Moreover, the lesser offenses of Falsification by Private Individuals and Failure to Render Account
by an Accountable Officer are necessarily included in the crimes of Falsification of Public
Documents and Malversation of Public Funds, respectively, with which petitioner was originally
charged.
Under Article 171, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code, for the crime of Falsification of Public
Documents through an untruthful narration of facts to be established, the following elements must
concur: (a) the offender makes in a document untruthful statements in a narration of facts; (b) the
offender has a legal obligation to disclose the truth of the facts narrated; (c) the facts narrated by
the offender are absolutely false; and (d) the perversion of truth in the narration of facts was made
with the wrongful intent of injuring a third person.[23]
On the other hand, Falsification by Private Individuals penalized under Article 172, paragraph 1 of
the Revised Penal Code has the following elements: (a) the offender is a private individual or a
public officer or employee who did not take advantage of his official position; (b) the offender
committed any of the acts of falsification enumerated under Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code;
and (c) the falsification was committed in a public or official or commercial document.[24]
As regards the crime of Malversation of Public Funds defined and penalized under Article 217 of the
Revised Penal Code, with which petitioner was also charged, the elements are as follows: (a) the
offender is a public officer; (b) he has custody or control of funds or property by reason of the
duties of his office; (c) the funds or property involved are public funds or property for which he is
accountable; and (d) he has appropriated, taken or misappropriated, or has consented to, or
through abandonment or negligence permitted, the taking by another person of such funds or
property.[25] Article 217 also provides that the failure of the public officer to have duly
forthcoming such public funds or property, upon demand by a duly authorized officer, shall be
prima facie evidence that he has put such missing funds or property to personal use. In this regard,
it has been ruled that once such presumption is rebutted, then it is completely destroyed; in fact,
the presumption is never deemed to have existed at all.[26]
Meanwhile, under Article 218 of the Revised Penal Code, Failure to Render Account by an
Accountable Officer, the lesser offense which petitioner seeks to plead guilty of, the following
elements must concur: (a) the offender is a public officer; (b) the offender must be an accountable
officer for public funds or property; (c) the offender is required by law or regulation to render
accounts to the COA or to a provincial auditor; and (d) the offender fails to render an account for a
period of two months after such accounts should be rendered.[27]
Section 5, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court states when an offense includes or is included in the other,
to wit:
SEC. 5. When an offense includes or is included in another. An offense charged necessarily includes
the offense proved when some of the essential elements or ingredients of the former, as alleged in
the complaint or information, constitute the latter. And an offense charged is necessarily included
in the offense proved, when the essential ingredients of the former constitute or form part of those
constituting the latter.
An offense may be said to necessarily include another when some of the essential elements or
ingredients of the former as alleged in the complaint or information constitute the latter. And vice
versa, an offense may be said to be necessarily included in another when the essential ingredients
of the former constitute or form part of those constituting the latter.[28]
In this case, the allegations in the Informations filed against petitioner are sufficient to hold
petitioner liable for the lesser offenses. Thus, in the charge for Falsification of Public Documents,
petitioner may plead guilty to the lesser offense of Falsification by Private Individuals inasmuch as
it does not appear that petitioner took advantage of his official position in allegedly falsifying the
timebook and payroll of the Municipality of Bato, Leyte. In the same vein, with regard to the crime
of Malversation of Public Funds, while the Informations contain allegations which make out a case
for Malversation against petitioner, nevertheless, absent the element of conversion, theoretically,
petitioner may still be held liable for Failure to Render Account by an Accountable Officer if it is
shown that the failure to render account was in violation of a law or regulation that requires him to
render such an accounting within the prescribed period.
Given, therefore, that some of the essential elements of offenses charged in this case likewise
constitute the lesser offenses, then petitioner may plead guilty to such lesser offenses.
Finally, as propounded by petitioner, indeed, he is not an accountable officer in that the nature of
his duty as foreman/timekeeper does not permit or require possession or custody of local
government funds,[29] not to mention that petitioner has already restituted the amount of
P18,860.00 involved in this case. Unlike Estrada which involves a crime punishable by reclusion
perpetua to death,[30] and a whopping P25,000,000.00 taken from the public coffers, this case
tremendously pales in comparison.
Under the peculiar circumstances of the present case, where gross inequity will result in a
discriminatory dispensation of justice, the Court will not hesitate to intervene in order to equalize
the imbalance.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolutions dated March 25, 2004 and May 31, 2004
are SET ASIDE. The Sandiganbayan is hereby ORDERED to grant petitioner's Motion to Plea
Bargain. Let records of this case be REMANDED to the Sandiganbayan for further proceedings in
accordance with this Decision.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 164953

February 13, 2006
JOHN JOSEPH LUMANLAW y BULINAO,

Petitioner,
- versus -
Hon. EDUARDO B. PERALTA JR., in His Capacity as
Acting Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court
(Branch 13), Manila,
Respondent.
PANGANIBAN, CJ:
Vexatious, oppressive, unjustified and capricious delays in the arraignment violates the
constitutional right to speedy trial and speedy case disposition, particularly when the accused is
detained. Under the circumstances of the present case, mandamus is a proper remedy for relief
from prolonged detention. This Court safeguards liberty and will therefore always uphold the basic
constitutional rights of the people, especially the weak and the marginalized.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Mandamus[1] under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, seeking (1) the
dismissal of the Information filed against Petitioner John Joseph Lumanlaw y Bulinao; and (2) his
release from the Manila City Jail.
The Facts
Culled from the parties pleadings are the following undisputed facts.
Petitioner Lumanlaw was apprehended by the Western Police District near San Diego Street,
Sampaloc, Manila, on the evening of November 26, 2002, for illegal possession of a dangerous drug.
He was charged in an Information[2] filed with Branch 13 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Manila, as follows:
That on or about November 24, 2002, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, not being
lawfully authorized to possess any dangerous drug, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
knowingly have in his possession, custody and control one (1) heat sealed transparent plastic
sachet containing zero point zero one one (0.011) grams of white crystalline substance known as
SHABU containing methamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug.[3]
A Commitment Order[4] was consequently issued by Presiding Judge Luis J. Arranz directing the
detention of petitioner in the Manila City Jail and setting the latters arraignment on January 8, 2003.
On even date, petitioners counsel manifested[5] his intention to file a motion for preliminary
investigation. Because of the Manifestation, the arraignment was deferred to February 21, 2003.
The aforesaid Motion[6] was filed together with a Petition to Reduce Bail[7] on January 17, 2003.
The resolution of these matters was overtaken by Judge Arranzs retirement from public service.
Thus, the arraignment scheduled for February 21, 2003, had to be postponed. This Court
designated herein respondent, Judge Eduardo B. Peralta, Jr., as acting presiding judge of Branch 13,
Regional Trial Court, Manila, in Administrative Order No. 27-2003 issued on February 18, 2003.[8]
On March 26, 2003, the newly designated acting presiding judge issued an Order[9] setting the
arraignment of petitioner on April 23, 2003. On the latter date, the arraignment was reset to June
25, 2003, due to the public prosecutors absence.[10]
On June 25, 2003, petitioners counsel received the lower courts Order granting Lumanlaws Petition
to Reduce Bail and denying his Motion for Preliminary Investigation for having been filed beyond
the reglementary period.[11] In the same Order, the trial court set petitioners arraignment on
August 6, 2003.
The arraignment was postponed again, this time due to the absence of petitioners counsel.
According to him, he requested the court to proceed with the arraignment, with the public defender
assisting the accused, but that respondent judge denied the request on the ground that petitioner
was already represented by a counsel de parte.[12] The trial court then re-scheduled the
arraignment on September 24, 2003.[13]
In what was beginning to be a pattern of laxity, the September 24 arraignment was likewise
postponed in view of the scheduled meeting of presiding judges with accredited newspaper
publishers and was thus reset to October 1, 2003.[14]
On the latter date, respondent judge issued the following Order:[15]
In view of the draft Order dated August 6, 2003 which impeded the Produce Order for the
arraignment and pre-trial conference this afternoon of defendant John Joseph Lumanlaw in relation
to Criminal Case No. 02-208426, the arraignment and pre-trial conference are hereby reset on
December 10, 2003 at 2:00 oclock in the afternoon, on the date amenable to Atty. Ernesto Delfin, as
well as the defendant.
Again, the arraignment did not occur on December 10, 2003, because petitioner had not been
brought to the court by the wardens of the Manila City Jail. According to the trial courts Order,[16]
there was no proof of service on the Manila City Jail. The arraignment was thus reset to March 1,
2004.
Notably, a year had passed since the filing of the Information, yet Lumanlaw remained uninformed
of the charges against him, while continuing to be in detention and despair all throughout that
period of limbo. Owing to this insufferable state of affairs, petitioners counsel manifested his
intention to file a motion to dismiss on account of the violation of his clients right to a speedy
trial.[17] Accordingly, an Urgent Motion to Dismiss[18] was filed on December 19, 2003. The
Motion was heard on February 20, 2004, but was promptly denied by the trial court. The
arraignment was reset yet again to March 17, 2004.[19]
The arraignment did not take place, however, because the accused was not produced in court by the
jail wardens concerned. It turned out that the trial court had not issued a produce order to the
Manila City Jail. Another resetting was ordered for April 16, 2004.[20]
Now frustrated with the repeated postponements, petitioner filed a Second Urgent Motion to
Dismiss[21] on March 22, 2004. Relying on the provisions of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, mandating that arraignment should be held within thirty (30) days from the date the
court acquired jurisdiction over the accused, petitioner argued that the protracted delay of his
arraignment violated his constitutional right to speedy trial.[22]
On April 16, 2004, the RTC could not proceed with the arraignment. What transpired on that date is
evident from its Order:[23]
Inasmuch as the Trial Prosecutor has just furnished a copy of her Comment dated April 12, 2004 to
the defense counsel, as prayed for by Atty. Ernesto Delfin, counsel for accused John Joseph
Lumanlaw in Criminal Case No. 02-208426, he is GRANTED five (5) days from today to submit his
Reply. After which, the pending Second Urgent Motion to Dismiss dated March 21, 2004 filed on
March 22, 2004 (page 33, Record in Criminal Case No. 02-208426) will be deemed submitted for
resolution.
Meanwhile, without prejudice to the resolution of the pending motion, the arraignment and pre-
trial conference of John Joseph Lumanlaw are hereby tentatively scheduled on May 26, 2004 at 2:00
oclock in the afternoon.
On May 26, 2004, the arraignment could not be conducted, again because of the Manila City Jails
failure to bring petitioner to the court despite notice.[24] On the same day, his counsel received[25]
the trial courts Order[26] dated May 3, 2004, denying his Second Urgent Motion to Dismiss. The
arraignment was reset to June 16, 2004.[27]
On this date, it was respondent judges absence that caused the postponement of the arraignment,
which was reset to July 21, 2004.[28] But on that date, no hearing was conducted in Branch 13
because of the ongoing semestral inventory of cases in respondent judges regular sala, Branch
17.[29]
Hence, the present Petition.[30]
The Issues
Petitioner raises the following issues for our consideration:

Whether or not the failure of public respondent to conduct the arraignment of the petitioner
despite the delay of one (1) year, nine (9) months and four (4) days constitute undue and
unjustifiable delay in violation of his constitutional right to speedy trial.
Whether or not such undue and unjustifiable delay would warrant the dismissal of the Information
filed against the petitioner.
That should the decision by the Honorable Supreme Court be one finding merit in this Petition,
whether or not the said decision is binding upon the newly appointed presiding judge of Regional
Trial Court, Branch 13, Manila, as successor of public respondent.[31]
On the other hand, respondent asks whether the Petition for Mandamus should be given due
course. [32]
On the whole, the issues may be reduced to the following: 1) whether there was a violation of the
right to speedy trial, warranting a quashal of the Information against petitioner; and 2) whether
mandamus is the proper remedy.
The Courts Ruling
The Petition is meritorious.
Main Issue:
Right to Speedy Trial
Arraignment is a vital stage in criminal proceedings in which the accused are formally informed of
the charges against them.[33] The proper conduct of the arraignment is provided in Rule 116 of the
Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure. A perusal of the provision shows that arraignment is not a
mere formality, but an integral part of due process.[34] Particularly, it implements the
constitutional right of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against
them and their right to speedy trial.
On this point, petitioner argues that, by respondents failure to act expeditiously on his arraignment,
his right to speedy trial was violated. He points out the fourteen postponements that resulted in his
intolerable detention for almost two years. Moreover, he cites Section 2 of Supreme Court Circular
No. 38-98 (implementing Republic Act No. 8493, otherwise known as The Speedy Trial Act of
1998), which provides that arraignment shall be held within thirty days from the date the court
acquired jurisdiction over the accused.
On the other hand, respondent counters that there were no capricious and oppressive delays that
would justify a dismissal of the Information. The Office of the Solicitor General points to the
participation of petitioner himself in the protracted proceedings, such as his filing of a Motion for
Preliminary Investigation and his counsels absence from one of the scheduled hearings.[35]
Speedy Trial Construed
The thirty-day period invoked by petitioner was construed in Solar Team Entertainment, Inc. v.
How.[36] It was held in that case that the period was not absolute. Certain delays were allowed by
law and excluded from the computation of the time within which trial must commence. The Court
ruled that those exclusions should reflect the fundamentally recognized principle that the concept
of speedy trial is a relative term and must necessarily be a flexible concept.[37] It held further that
courts must strive to maintain a delicate balance between the demands of due process and the
strictures of speedy trial, on the one hand; and, on the other, the right of the State to prosecute
crimes and rid society of criminals.
Indeed, judicial proceedings do not exist in a vacuum. They must contend with the realities of
everyday life. Thus, a sensible assessment of their conduct must consider several factors, rather
than a mere mathematical calculation of periods that have elapsed between stages. Jurisprudence
has set forth the following guidelines:
x x x. [T]he right to a speedy disposition of a case, like the right to speedy trial, is deemed violated
only when the proceeding is attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays; or when
unjustified postponements of the trial are asked for and secured, or when without cause or
justifiable motive a long period of time is allowed to elapse without the party having his case tried.
Equally applicable is the balancing test used to determine whether a defendant has been denied his
right to a speedy trial, or a speedy disposition of a case for that matter, in which the conduct of both
the prosecution and the defendant are weighed, and such factors as length of the delay, reason for
the delay, the defendants assertion or non-assertion of his right, and prejudice to the defendant
resulting from the delay, are considered.[38]
Reasonable Postponements
It should be stressed that petitioner never acquiesced to the seemingly endless postponements of
the arraignment. He asserted his right to speedy trial twice, but was denied by respondent in both
instances. Considering that petitioner has been under detention since December 2002, we need not
belabor the prejudice, distress, and anxiety he suffered as a result of the delayed arraignment.
We concede that the bases for some of the delays were completely sound, such as the retirement of
Judge Arranz[39] and the manifestation of petitioner that the latter would be filing a Motion for
Preliminary Investigation.[40] Those matters were manifestly not intended to delay the
proceedings in Criminal Case No. 02-208426.
The delay caused by Judge Arranzs retirement may be deemed a normal part of the ordinary
conduct of court business and was not necessarily unreasonable. The second ground was the right
of the accused accorded by Section 7 of Rule 112 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure.[41]
Verily, petitioners request for a preliminary investigation before arraignment was well-advised, in
view of the rule that failure to do so would constitute a waiver of the right.[42] Thus, it has been
held that though the conduct of a preliminary investigation may hold back the progress of a case,
such investigation is necessary so that the defendants right will not be compromised or sacrificed at
the altar of expediency.[43]
Unjustified Delay
This Court reviewed the other reasons for the postponements in this case, but finds them far from
being reasonable. There were fourteen postponements in all. Going over the causes for the delays,
we see the lack of earnest effort on the part of respondent to conduct the arraignment as soon as
the court calendar would allow. Most of the postponements could have easily been avoided if he
had been more keen on respecting and upholding petitioners constitutional right to speedy trial
and speedy disposition.
Given the length and the unreasonableness of the majority of the delays, a violation of the right of
petitioner to speedy trial becomes manifest. Almost two years[44] elapsed from the filing of the
Information against him until the filing of this Petition; incredibly, he has not been arraigned. An
arraignment takes, at most, ten minutes of the courts business and does not normally entail legal
gymnastics. It consists simply of reading to the accused the charges leveled against them, ensuring
their understanding of those charges, and obtaining their plea to the charges. A prudent and
resolute judge can conduct an arraignment as soon as the accused are presented before the court.
In fact, by fixing a period of only thirty days from the filing of the information to the conduct of an
arraignment, RA 8493 recognizes that this fundamental right should and can be done with minimal
delay. For this reason alone, we are astonished that the court a quo could not complete such a
simple but fundamental stage in the proceedings. The protracted delay became all the more
oppressive and vexatious when viewed from the perspective that the liberty of the accused was
being curtailed for the entire duration.
Postponement Due to
Absence of Counsel
It will be recalled that the arraignment set for August 6, 2003, was postponed by the trial court due
to the absence of the counsel of petitioner. [45] The latter sought to proceed with the arraignment
by requesting the assistance of the public defender as counsel de oficio, but the request was denied
on the flimsy ground that the accused already had a counsel de parte. We find no legal basis for the
trial courts action.
The appointment of a counsel de oficio in the absence of the defendants counsel de parte is not
prohibited,[46] not even by the Constitution,[47] especially when the accused themselves request
that appointment. In fact, the court has a mandatory duty to appoint a counsel de oficio when the
accused have no counsel of choice at the time of their arraignment.[48] People v. Serzo[49] held
thus:
x x x [A]n accused may exercise his right to counsel by electing to be represented either by a court-
appointed lawyer or by one of his own choice. While his right to be represented by counsel is
immutable, his option to secure the services of counsel de parte, however, is not absolute. The court
is obliged to balance the privilege to retain a counsel of choice against the state's and the offended
party's equally important right to speedy and adequate justice. Thus, the court may restrict the
accused's option to retain a counsel de parte if the accused insists on an attorney he cannot afford,
or the chosen counsel is not a member of the bar, or the attorney declines to represent the accused
for a valid reason, e.g. conflict of interest and the like.[50]
Like other personal rights, the right to a counsel de parte is waivable, so long as 1) the waiver is not
contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals or good customs; or prejudicial to a third person
with a right recognized by law; and 2) the waiver is unequivocally, knowingly and intelligently
made.[51]
Applying these principles, it would have been more prudent for respondent judge to have
appointed a counsel de oficio for purposes of arraignment only. This course of action became more
compelling in the instant case when petitioner himself requested the appointment.[52] To be sure,
he would not have been prejudiced by that action, provided there was a proper observance of Rule
116 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. Under Section 8 of this rule, before proceeding with
the arraignment, the court is mandated to give the appointed counsel de oficio reasonable time to
consult with the accused as to the latters plea.[53]
Clearly, respondent judges postponement of the arraignment on August 6, 2003, had no substantial
basis. Thus, the postponement, initially caused by the absence of petitioners counsel, became
unreasonable and ultimately attributable to respondents inflexibility as regards contingencies.
Responsibility of Judges
in Minimizing Delay
The foremost cause for the lengthy delay in this case was the repeated failure of the jail wardens to
bring the accused to court. No less than four court settings,[54] spanning seven months, were
postponed on this ground alone. To be sure, this recurring circumstance was caused, in different
instances, by the failure of the court personnel to issue the produce order on time and by the
dereliction of the jail wardens. Remarkably, although respondent judge was justified in deferring
the arraignment until the accused was presented,[55] the problem could have been easily averted
by efficient court management.
In his role as administrator, respondent should have supervised his clerk of court to ensure a
timely service of the produce order on the wardens of the Manila City Jail. Judges must keep a
watchful eye on the level of performance and conduct of the court personnel under their immediate
supervision, who are primarily employed to aid in the administration of justice. Judges who set the
pace for greater efficiency, diligence and dedication, could prompt their personnel to be more
diligent and efficient in the performance of official duties. For certain, leniency in the administrative
supervision of court personnel must be avoided.[56]
We stress the need to remind judges to exhibit more diligence and efficiency in the performance of
their judicial duties to avoid loss of faith and confidence in the administration of justice. Rule 3.09 of
Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct requires them to organize and supervise the court
personnel to ensure the prompt and efficient dispatch of business x x x. Additionally, Section 5(d) of
Rule 135 confers upon every court the power to control the conduct of its ministerial officers and of
all other persons who in any manner are connected with a case before it.
Respondent did not exercise his prerogatives in administering speedy justice. Instead, he was
content with issuing reminders[57] that miserably failed to resolve the problem expeditiously. We
can only conclude from the distinct circumstances of the case that he failed to assert actively his
authority to expedite the proceedings.
Instead of being proactive and steering the course of the proceedings with deliberate dispatch,
respondent tended to be passive and reactive by allowing the pace of the proceedings to be dictated
by the listlessness of the parties, his staff, and the jail wardens. Judges should be more deliberate in
their actions and, within the bounds of law, make full use of their authority to expedite proceedings
while continuing to respect the rights of parties to ventilate their respective causes fully.
Indeed, judges are required to dispose of the courts business expeditiously, in accordance with
Rule 3.05 of Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, which we quote:
A judge shall dispose of the courts business promptly and decide cases within the required period.
This Court has constantly impressed upon judges the need to act promptly on their cases. Delay in
the disposition of cases erodes the faith and confidence of our people in the judiciary, lowers its
standards, and brings it into disrepute.[58]
In the light of the numerous and unreasonable delays in the arraignment of petitioner, the sought
for dismissal of the Information filed against him is in order.
Second Issue:
Propriety of a Petition for Mandamus
Respondent maintains that mandamus is not the proper remedy, because he did not neglect his
duties. Considering the above findings of inordinate delay, respondents contention evidently has no
leg to stand on.
It is established that a writ of mandamus may be issued to control the exercise of discretion[59]
when, in the performance of duty, there is undue delay that can be characterized as a grave abuse of
discretion resulting in manifest injustice.[60] In view of our finding of unwarranted delays in the
conduct of the arraignment of petitioner, he has indeed the right to demand -- through a writ of
mandamus -- expeditious action from all officials tasked with the administration of justice. Thus, he
may not only demand that his arraignment be held but, ultimately, that the information against him
be dismissed on the ground of the violation of his right to speedy trial.
Mandamus is a proper recourse for citizens who seek to enforce a public right and to compel the
performance of a public duty, most especially when the public right involved is mandated by the
Constitution.[61] Besides, it has long been established in this jurisdiction that the writ of
mandamus is available to the accused to compel a dismissal of the case.[62]
Respondent argues for the dismissal of the instant Petition on the ground that petitioner did not
move for a reconsideration of the trial courts Order dated May 3, 2004. Respondent insists that a
motion for reconsideration is a prerequisite to a mandamus petition, because the former remedy is
plain, speedy, and adequate in the ordinary course of law.[63] Indeed, his contention expresses the
general rule, but is not impervious to exceptions.
In the face of extraordinary and compelling reasons, it has been held that the availability of another
remedy does not preclude a resort to a special civil action under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
These reasons arise when, among others, the assailed order issued with grave abuse of discretion is
null,[64] when the available remedy will not afford expeditious relief,[65] and when a motion for
reconsideration will be useless.[66]
The instant case falls under these exceptional cases. To begin with, the numerous and unreasonable
postponements displayed an abusive exercise of discretion. The delays were ordered in total
disregard of the constitutional right of petitioner. In fact, the Orders denying his motions to dismiss
did not even bother to explain the reasonableness of the bases for the postponements. The Order
dated February 20, 2004, contains only this general statement:
Pending resolution of certain incidents as chronicled by the Court in open court, and given the Trial
Prosecutors objections thereto lifted from the record as to why the arraignment and pre-trial
conference of the [petitioner] John Joseph Lumanlaw y Bolinao were not scheduled forwith (sic) as
expected by counsel for the defense, the Court opted to DENY the Urgent Motion to Dismiss dated
December 17, 2003 in Criminal Case No. 02-208426.[67]
After enumerating all the causes for the postponements, the Second Urgent Motion to Dismiss was
denied by respondent in the Order dated May 3, 2004, in words that were just as vague, as shown
below:
Based on the foregoing chronological backdrop, there were causes that justified the suspension of
the arraignment that shall be excluded in computing the period for arraignment per Section 1 (g),
Rule 116 of the 2000 Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, thusly:
Unless a shorter period is provided by special law or Supreme Court circular, the arraignment shall
be held within thirty (30) days from the date the court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the
accused. The time of the pendency of a motion to quash or for a bill of particulars or other causes
justifying suspension of the arraignment shall be excluded in computing the period.
Accordingly, the Second Urgent Motion to Dismiss dated March 21, 2004 from defense counsel in
Criminal Case No. 02-208426 must be and is hereby DENIED. x x x.[68]
The Orders did not even discuss why the postponements were justified, or which of them could be
excluded from the computation of the prescribed period. Absent any discussion of these matters,
baseless was the court a quos conclusion that there was no violation of petitioners right to speedy
trial. A veritable display of capriciousness cannot be countenanced when weighed against an
immutable right protected by the Constitution.
As further aggravation, respondent did not exert any effort to expedite the arraignment even after
petitioner had filed two urgent motions to dismiss. Indeed, there was basis for the latters belief that
filing a motion for reconsideration would have been only an exercise in futility.[69]
Respondent also contends that the instant Petition should be dismissed for disregarding the
hierarchy of courts. This Court has full discretionary power to take cognizance of a petition filed
directly with it.[70] In the interest of speedy justice, the Court deemed it best to take cognizance of
the present Petition, notwithstanding the hierarchy of courts. Remanding the legal issues to the
Court of Appeals would have only exacerbated the violation of petitioners rights.
It is the policy of this Court not to deny a writ of mandamus on purely technical matters, if a party
would be deprived of substantive rights. Procedural rules should not be strictly enforced when
their enforcement would result in a miscarriage of justice. This principle holds, especially when a
petition is meritorious and the trial judge clearly violated petitioners constitutional right. The
protection of our peoples civil liberties overwhelms all rules of procedure. These rules are mere
tools for facilitating the attainment of justice. As explicitly provided in the Rules of Court itself, they
shall be liberally construed in order to promote their objective of securing a just, speedy, and
inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding.[71]
Let it be known that this Court will not shirk from the responsibility -- nay, the duty -- to set aside
all obstacles to the fortification of every citizens constitutionally enshrined rights. We will not
condone or give our imprimatur to the sluggish pace of the proceedings below. The Court has the
duty to safeguard liberty; hence, it will always uphold the basic constitutional rights of our people,
especially the weak and the marginalized.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. Criminal Case No. 02-208425-26 pending before Branch 13
of the Manila Regional Trial Court is DISMISSED. Petitioner is hereby ordered RELEASED from the
Manila City Jail, where he is currently detained, unless he is being held for any other lawful cause.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
G.R. No. 188314

Plaintiff-Appellee,
- versus
KHADDAFY JANJALANI, GAMAL B. BAHARAN a.k.a. Tapay, ANGELO TRINIDAD a.k.a. Abu
Khalil, GAPPAL BANNAH ASALI a.k.a. Maidan or Negro, JAINAL SALI a.k.a. Abu Solaiman,
ROHMAT ABDURROHIM a.k.a. Jackie or Zaky, and other JOHN and JANE DOES, Accused,
GAMAL B. BAHARAN a.k.a. Tapay, ANGELO TRINIDAD a.k.a. Abu Khalil, and ROHMAT
ABDURROHIM a.k.a. Abu Jackie or Zaky,
Promulgated:
January 10, 2011

Accused-Appellants.
DECISION
SERENO, J.:
Before the Court is an appeal from the Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated 30 June 2008,
which affirmed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City in Criminal Case Nos. 05-476
and 05-4777 dated 18 October 2005. The latter Decision convicted the three accused-appellants
namely, Gamal B. Baharan a.k.a. Tapay, Angelo Trinidad a.k.a. Abu Khalil, and Rohmat Abdurrohim
a.k.a. Abu Jackie or Zaky of the complex crime of multiple murder and multiple frustrated murder,
and sentenced them to suffer the penalty of death by lethal injection. The CA modified the sentence
to reclusion perpetua as required by Republic Act No. 9346 (Act Abolishing the Imposition of Death
Penalty).
Statement of Facts
The pertinent facts, as determined by the trial court, are as follows:
On 14 February 2005, an RRCG bus was plying its usual southbound route, from its Navotas bus
terminal towards its Alabang bus terminal via Epifanio de los Santos Avenue (EDSA). Around 6:30
to 7:30 in the evening, while they were about to move out of the Guadalupe-EDSA southbound bus
stop, the bus conductor noticed two men running after the bus. The two insisted on getting on the
bus, so the conductor obliged and let them in.
According to Elmer Andales, the bus conductor, he immediately became wary of the two men,
because, even if they got on the bus together, the two sat away from each other one sat two seats
behind the driver, while the other sat at the back of the bus. At the time, there were only 15
passengers inside the bus. He also noticed that the eyes of one of the men were reddish. When he
approached the person near the driver and asked him whether he was paying for two passengers,
the latter looked dumb struck by the question. He then stuttered and said he was paying for two
and gave PhP20. Andales grew more concerned when the other man seated at the back also paid for
both passengers. At this point, Andales said he became more certain that the two were up to no
good, and that there might be a holdup.
Afterwards, Andales said he became more suspicious because both men kept on asking him if the
bus was going to stop at Ayala Avenue. The witness also noticed that the man at the back appeared
to be slouching, with his legs stretched out in front of him and his arms hanging out and hidden
from view as if he was tinkering with something. When Andales would get near the man, the latter
would glare at him. Andales admitted, however, that he did not report the suspicious characters to
the police.
As soon as the bus reached the stoplight at the corner of Ayala Avenue and EDSA, the two men
insisted on getting off the bus. According to Andales, the bus driver initially did not want to let them
off the bus, because a Makati ordinance prohibited unloading anywhere except at designated bus
stops. Eventually, the bus driver gave in and allowed the two passengers to alight. The two
immediately got off the bus and ran towards Ayala Avenue. Moments after, Andales felt an
explosion. He then saw fire quickly engulfing the bus. He ran out of the bus towards a nearby mall.
After a while, he went back to where the bus was. He saw their bus passengers either lying on the
ground or looking traumatized. A few hours after, he made a statement before the Makati Police
Station narrating the whole incident.
The prosecution presented documents furnished by the Department of Justice, confirming that
shortly before the explosion, the spokesperson of the Abu Sayyaf Group Abu Solaiman announced
over radio station DZBB that the group had a Valentines Day gift for former President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo. After the bombing, he again went on radio and warned of more bomb attacks.
As stipulated during pretrial, accused Trinidad gave ABS-CBN News Network an exclusive interview
some time after the incident, confessing his participation in the Valentines Day bombing incident. In
another exclusive interview on the network, accused Baharan likewise admitted his role in the
bombing incident. Finally, accused Asali gave a television interview, confessing that he had supplied
the explosive devices for the 14 February 2005 bombing. The bus conductor identified the accused
Baharan and Trinidad, and confirmed that they were the two men who had entered the RRCG bus
on the evening of 14 February.
Members of the Abu Sayyaf Group namely Khaddafy Janjalani, Gamal B. Baharan, Angelo Trinidad,
Gappal Bannah Asali, Jainal Asali, Rohmat Abdurrohim a.k.a. Abu Jackie or Zaky, and other John and
Jane Does were then charged with multiple murder and multiple frustrated murder. Only Baharan,
Trinidad, Asali, and Rohmat were arrested, while the other accused remain at-large.
On their arraignment for the multiple murder charge (Crim. Case No. 05-476), Baharan, Trinidad,
and Asali all entered a plea of guilty. On the other hand, upon arraignment for the multiple
frustrated murder charge (Crim. Case No. 05-477), accused Asali pled guilty. Accused Trinidad and
Baharan pled not guilty. Rohmat pled not guilty to both charges. During the pretrial hearing, the
parties stipulated the following:
1.) The jurisdiction of this court over the offenses charged.
2.) That all three accused namely alias Baharan, Trinidad, and Asali admitted knowing one
another before February 14, 2005.
3.) All the same three accused likewise admitted that a bomb exploded in the RRCG bus
while the bus was plying the EDSA route fronting the MRT terminal which is in front of the Makati
Commercial Center.
4.) Accused Asali admitted knowing the other accused alias Rohmat whom he claims taught
him how to make explosive devices.
5.) The accused Trinidad also admitted knowing Rohmat before the February 14 bombing
incident.
6.) The accused Baharan, Trinidad, and Asali all admitted to causing the bomb explosion
inside the RRCG bus which left four people dead and more or less forty persons injured.
7.) Both Baharan and Trinidad agreed to stipulate that within the period March 20-24 each
gave separate interviews to the ABS-CBN news network admitting their participation in the
commission of the said crimes, subject of these cases.
8.) Accused Trinidad and Baharan also admitted to pleading guilty to these crimes, because
they were guilt-stricken after seeing a man carrying a child in the first bus that they had entered.
9.) Accused Asali likewise admitted that in the middle of March 2005 he gave a television
news interview in which he admitted that he supplied the explosive devices which resulted in this
explosion inside the RRCG bus and which resulted in the filing of these charges.
10.) Finally, accused Baharan, Trinidad, and Asali admitted that they are members of the Abu
Sayyaf.[1]
In the light of the pretrial stipulations, the trial court asked whether accused Baharan and Trinidad
were amenable to changing their not guilty pleas to the charge of multiple frustrated murder,
considering that they pled guilty to the heavier charge of multiple murder, creating an apparent
inconsistency in their pleas. Defense counsel conferred with accused Baharan and Trinidad and
explained to them the consequences of the pleas. The two accused acknowledged the
inconsistencies and manifested their readiness for re-arraignment. After the Information was read
to them, Baharan and Trinidad pled guilty to the charge of multiple frustrated murder.[2]
After being discharged as state witness, accused Asali testified that while under training with the
Abu Sayyaf in 2004, Rohmat, a.k.a Abu Jackie or Zaky, and two other persons taught him how to
make bombs and explosives. The trainees were told that they were to wage battles against the
government in the city, and that their first mission was to plant bombs in malls, the Light Railway
Transit (LRT), and other parts of Metro Manila.
As found by the trial court, Asali, after his training, was required by the Abu Sayyaf leadership,
specifically Abu Solaiman and Rohmat, to secure eight kilos of TNT, a soldering gun, aluminum
powder, a tester, and Christmas lights, all of which he knew would be used to make a bomb. He then
recalled that sometime in November to December 2004, Trinidad asked him for a total of 4 kilos of
TNT that is, 2 kilos on two separate occasions. Rohmat allegedly called Asali to confirm that
Trinidad would get TNT from Asali and use it for their first mission. The TNT was allegedly placed
in two buses sometime in December 2004, but neither one of them exploded.
Asali then testified that the night before the Valentines Day bombing, Trinidad and Baharan got
another two kilos of TNT from him. Late in the evening of 14 February, he received a call from Abu
Solaiman. The latter told Asali not to leave home or go to crowded areas, since the TNT taken by
Baharan and Trinidad had already been exploded in Makati. Thirty minutes later, Trinidad called
Asali, repeating the warning of Abu Solaiman. The next day, Asali allegedly received a call from
accused Rohmat, congratulating the former on the success of the mission.[3] According to Asali,
Abu Zaky specifically said, Sa wakas nag success din yung tinuro ko sayo.
Assignment of Errors
Accused-appellants raise the following assignment of errors:
I. The trial court gravely erred in accepting accused-appellants plea of guilt despite
insufficiency of searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the
consequences of the said plea.
II. The trial court gravely erred in finding that the guilt of accused-appellants for the crimes
charged had been proven beyond reasonable doubt.[4]
First Assignment of Error
Accused-appellants Baharan and Trinidad argue that the trial court did not conduct a searching
inquiry after they had changed their plea from not guilty to guilty. The transcript of stenographic
notes during the 18 April 2005 re-arraignment before the Makati Regional Trial Court is
reproduced below:
COURT : Anyway, I think what we should have to do, considering the stipulations that were agreed
upon during the last hearing, is to address this matter of pleas of not guilty entered for the
frustrated murder charges by the two accused, Mr. Trinidad and Mr. Baharan, because if you will
recall they entered pleas of guilty to the multiple murder charges, but then earlier pleas of not
guilty for the frustrated multiple murder charges remain [I]s that not inconsistent considering the
stipulations that were entered into during the initial pretrial of this case? [If] you will recall, they
admitted to have caused the bomb explosion that led to the death of at least four people and injury
of about forty other persons and so under the circumstances, Atty Pea, have you discussed this
matter with your clients?
ATTY. PEA : Then we should be given enough time to talk with them. I havent conferred with them
about this with regard to the multiple murder case.
COURT : Okay. So let us proceed now. Atty. Pea, can you assist the two accused because if they are
interested in withdrawing their [pleas], I want to hear it from your lips.
ATTY. PEA : Yes, your Honor.

(At this juncture, Atty. Pea confers with the two accused, namely Trinidad and Baharan)
I have talked to them, your Honor, and I have explained to them the consequence of their pleas,
your Honor, and that the plea of guilt to the murder case and plea of not guilty to the frustrated
multiple murder actually are inconsistent with their pleas.
COURT : With matters that they stipulated upon?
ATTY. PEA : Yes, your Honor. So, they are now, since they already plead guilt to the murder case,
then they are now changing their pleas, your Honor, from not guilty to the one of guilt. They are
now ready, your Honor, for re-arraignment.
INTERPRETER: (Read again that portion [of the information] and translated it in Filipino in a
clearer way and asked both accused what their pleas are).
Your Honor, both accused are entering separate pleas of guilt to the crime charged.
COURT : All right. So after the information was re-read to the accused, they have withdrawn their
pleas of not guilty and changed it to the pleas of guilty to the charge of frustrated murder. Thank
you. Are there any matters you need to address at pretrial now? If there are none, then I will
terminate pretrial and accommodate[5]
As early as in People v. Apduhan, the Supreme Court has ruled that all trial judges must refrain from
accepting with alacrity an accused's plea of guilty, for while justice demands a speedy
administration, judges are duty bound to be extra solicitous in seeing to it that when an accused
pleads guilty, he understands fully the meaning of his plea and the import of an inevitable
conviction.[6] Thus, trial court judges are required to observe the following procedure under
Section 3, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court:
SEC. 3. Plea of guilty to capital offense; reception of evidence. When the accused pleads guilty to a
capital offense, the court shall conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full
comprehension of the consequences of his plea and shall require the prosecution to prove his guilt
and the precise degree of culpability. The accused may also present evidence in his behalf.
(Emphasis supplied)
The requirement to conduct a searching inquiry applies more so in cases of re-arraignment. In

People v. Galvez, the Court noted that since accused-appellant's original plea was not guilty, the
trial court should have exerted careful effort in inquiring into why he changed his plea to guilty.[7]
According to the Court:
The stringent procedure governing the reception of a plea of guilt, especially in a case involving the
death penalty, is imposed upon the trial judge in order to leave no room for doubt on the possibility
that the accused might have misunderstood the nature of the charge and the consequences of the
plea.[8]
Likewise, the requirement to conduct a searching inquiry should not be deemed satisfied in cases in
which it was the defense counsel who explained the consequences of a guilty plea to the accused, as
it appears in this case. In People v. Alborida, this Court found that there was still an improvident
plea of guilty, even if the accused had already signified in open court that his counsel had explained
the consequences of the guilty plea; that he understood the explanation of his counsel; that the
accused understood that the penalty of death would still be meted out to him; and that he had not
been intimidated, bribed, or threatened.[9]
We have reiterated in a long line of cases that the conduct of a searching inquiry remains the duty
of judges, as they are mandated by the rules to satisfy themselves that the accused had not been
under coercion or duress; mistaken impressions; or a misunderstanding of the significance, effects,
and consequences of their guilty plea.[10] This requirement is stringent and mandatory.[11]
Nevertheless, we are not unmindful of the context under which the re-arraignment was conducted
or of the factual milieu surrounding the finding of guilt against the accused. The Court observes that
accused Baharan and Trinidad previously pled guilty to another charge multiple murder based on
the same act relied upon in the multiple frustrated murder charge. The Court further notes that
prior to the change of plea to one of guilt, accused Baharan and Trinidad made two other
confessions of guilt one through an extrajudicial confession (exclusive television interviews, as
stipulated by both accused during pretrial), and the other via judicial admission (pretrial
stipulation). Considering the foregoing circumstances, we deem it unnecessary to rule on the
sufficiency of the searching inquiry in this instance. Remanding the case for re-arraignment is not
warranted, as the accuseds plea of guilt was not the sole basis of the condemnatory judgment under
consideration.[12]
Second Assignment of Error

In People v. Oden, the Court declared that even if the requirement of conducting a searching inquiry
was not complied with, [t]he manner by which the plea of guilt is made loses much of great
significance where the conviction can be based on independent evidence proving the commission
by the person accused of the offense charged.[13] Thus, in People v. Nadera, the Court stated:
Convictions based on an improvident plea of guilt are set aside only if such plea is the sole basis of
the judgment. If the trial court relied on sufficient and credible evidence to convict the accused, the
conviction must be sustained, because then it is predicated not merely on the guilty plea of the
accused but on evidence proving his commission of the offense charged.[14] (Emphasis supplied.)
In their second assignment of error, accused-appellants assert that guilt was not proven beyond
reasonable doubt. They pointed out that the testimony of the conductor was merely circumstantial,
while that of Asali as to the conspiracy was insufficient.
Insofar as accused-appellants Baharan and Trinidad are concerned, the evidence for the
prosecution, in addition to that which can be drawn from the stipulation of facts, primarily
consisted of the testimonies of the bus conductor, Elmer Andales, and of the accused-turned-state-
witness, Asali. Andales positively identified accused Baharan and Trinidad as the two men who had
acted suspiciously while inside the bus; who had insisted on getting off the bus in violation of a
Makati ordinance; and who had scampered away from the bus moments before the bomb exploded.
On the other hand, Asali testified that he had given accused Baharan and Trinidad the TNT used in
the bombing incident in Makati City. The guilt of the accused Baharan and Trinidad was sufficiently
established by these corroborating testimonies, coupled with their respective judicial admissions
(pretrial stipulations) and extrajudicial confessions (exclusive television interviews, as they both
stipulated during pretrial) that they were indeed the perpetrators of the Valentines Day
bombing.[15] Accordingly, the Court upholds the findings of guilt made by the trial court as
affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
Anent accused Rohmat, the evidence for the prosecution consisted of the testimony of accused-
turned-state-witness Asali. Below is a reproduction of the transcript of stenographic notes on the
state prosecutors direct examination of state-witness Asali during the 26 May 2005 trial:
Q : You stated that Zaky trained you and Trinidad. Under what circumstances did he train you, Mr.
Witness, to assemble those explosives, you and Trinidad?
A : Abu Zaky, Abu Solaiman, Khadaffy Janjalani, the three of them, that Angelo Trinidad and myself
be the one to be trained to make an explosive, sir.
Q : Mr. witness, how long that training, or how long did it take that training?
A : If I am not mistaken, we were thought to make bomb about one month and two weeks.
Q : Now, speaking of that mission, Mr. witness, while you were still in training at Mr. Cararao, is
there any mission that you undertook, if any, with respect to that mission?
A : Our first mission was to plant a bomb in the malls, LRT, and other parts of Metro Manila, sir.[16]
The witness then testified that he kept eight kilos of TNT for accused Baharan and Trinidad.
Q : Now, going back to the bomb. Mr. witness, did you know what happened to the 2 kilos of bomb
that Trinidad and Tapay took from you sometime in November 2004?
A : That was the explosive that he planted in the G-liner, which did not explode.
Q : How did you know, Mr. witness?
A : He was the one who told me, Mr. Angelo Trinidad, sir.
Q : What happened next, Mr. witness, when the bomb did not explode, as told to you by Trinidad?
A : On December 29, Angelo Trinidad got 2 more kilos of TNT bombs.
Q : Did Trinidad tell you why he needed another amount of explosive on that date, December 29,
2004? Will you kindly tell us the reason why?
A : He told me that Abu Solaiman instructed me to get the TNT so that he could detonate a bomb
Q : Were there any other person, besides Abu Solaiman, who called you up, with respect to the
taking of the explosives from you?
A : There is, sir Abu Zaky, sir, called up also.
Q : What did Abu Zaky tell you when he called you up?
A : He told me that this is your first mission.
Q : Please enlighten the Honorable Court. What is that mission you are referring to?
A : That is the first mission where we can show our anger towards the Christians.
Q : The second time that he got a bomb from you, Mr. witness, do you know if the bomb explode?
A : I did not know what happened to the next 2 kilos taken by Angelo Trinidad from me until after I
was caught, because I was told by the policeman that interviewed me after I was arrested that the 2
kilos were planted in a bus, which also did not explode.
Q : So besides these two incidents, were there any other incidents that Angelo Trinidad and Tapay
get an explosive for you, Mr. witness?
A : If I am not mistaken, sir, on February 13, 2005 at 6:30 p.m.
Q : Who got from you the explosive Mr. witness?
A : Its Angelo Trinidad and Tapay, sir.
Q : How many explosives did they get from you, Mr. witness, at that time?
A : They got 2 kilos TNT bomb, sir.
Q : Did they tell you, Mr. witness, where are they going to use that explosive?
A : No, sir.
Q : Do you know, Mr. witness, what happened to the third batch of explosives, which were taken
from you by Trinidad and Tapay?
A : That is the bomb that exploded in Makati, sir.
Q : Why did you know, Mr. witness?
A : Because I was called in the evening of February 14 by Abu Solaiman. He told me not to leave the
house because the explosive that were taken by Tapay and Angelo Trinidad exploded.
Q : Was there any other call during that time, Mr. Witness?
A : I was told by Angelo Trinidad not to leave the house because the explosive that he took exploded
already, sir.
Q : How sure were you, Mr. witness, at that time, that indeed, the bomb exploded at Makati, beside
the call of Abu Solaiman and Trinidad?
A : It was told by Abu Solaiman that the bombing in Makati should coincide with the bombing in
General Santos.
A : He told it to me, sir I cannot remember the date anymore, but I know it was sometime in
February 2005.
Q : Any other call, Mr. witness, from Abu Solaiman and Trinidad after the bombing exploded in
Makati, any other call?
A : There is, sir The call came from Abu Zaky.
Q : What did Abu Zaky tell you, Mr. witness?
A : He just greeted us congratulations, because we have a successful mission.
A : He told me that sa wakas, nag success din yung tinuro ko sayo.
Q : By the way, Mr. witness, I would just like to clarify this. You stated that Abu Zaky called you up
the following day, that was February 15, and congratulating you for the success of the mission. My
question to you, Mr. witness, if you know what is the relation of that mission, wherein you were
congratulated by Abu Zaky, to the mission, which have been indoctrinated to you, while you were in
Mt. Cararao, Mr. witness?
A : They are connected, sir.
Q : Connected in what sense, Mr. witness?
A : Because when we were undergoing training, we were told that the Abu Sayyaf should not wage
war to the forest, but also wage our battles in the city.
Q : Wage the battle against who, Mr. witness?
A : The government, sir.[17]

What can be culled from the testimony of Asali is that the Abu Sayyaf Group was determined to sow
terror in Metro Manila, so that they could show their anger towards the Christians.[18] It can also
be seen that Rohmat, together with Janjalani and Abu Solaiman, had carefully planned the
Valentines Day bombing incident, months before it happened. Rohmat had trained Asali and
Trinidad to make bombs and explosives. While in training, Asali and others were told that their
mission was to plant bombs in malls, the LRT, and other parts of Metro Manila. According to Asali,
Rohmat called him on 29 December 2004 to confirm that Trinidad would get two kilos of TNT from
Asali, as they were about to commence their first mission.[19] They made two separate attempts to
bomb a bus in Metro Manila, but to no avail. The day before the Valentines Day bombing, Trinidad
got another two kilos of TNT from Asali. On Valentines Day, the Abu Sayyaf Group announced that
they had a gift for the former President, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. On their third try, their plan
finally succeeded. Right after the bomb exploded, the Abu Sayyaf Group declared that there would
be more bombings in the future. Asali then received a call from Rohmat, praising the former: Sa
wakas nag success din yung tinuro ko sayo.[20]
In the light of the foregoing evidence, the Court upholds the finding of guilt against Rohmat. Article
17 of the Revised Penal Code reads:
Art. 17. Principals. The following are considered principals:
1. Those who take a direct part in the execution of the act

2. Those who directly force or induce others to commit it
3. Those who cooperate in the commission of the offense by another act without which it would
not have been accomplished
Accused Rohmat is criminally responsible under the second paragraph, or the provision on
principal by inducement. The instructions and training he had given Asali on how to make bombs
coupled with their careful planning and persistent attempts to bomb different areas in Metro
Manila and Rohmats confirmation that Trinidad would be getting TNT from Asali as part of their
mission prove the finding that Rohmats co-inducement was the determining cause of the
commission of the crime.[21] Such command or advice [was] of such nature that, without it, the
crime would not have materialized.[22]
Further, the inducement was so influential in producing the criminal act that without it, the act
would not have been performed.[23] In People v. Sanchez, et al., the Court ruled that,
notwithstanding the fact that Mayor Sanchez was not at the crime scene, evidence proved that he
was the mastermind of the criminal act or the principal by inducement. Thus, because Mayor
Sanchez was a co-principal and co-conspirator, and because the act of one conspirator is the act of
all, the mayor was rendered liable for all the resulting crimes.[24] The same finding must be
applied to the case at bar.
The Court also affirms the finding of the existence of conspiracy involving accused Baharan,
Trinidad, and Rohmat. Conspiracy was clearly established from the collective acts of the accused-
appellants before, during and after the commission of the crime. As correctly declared by the trial
court in its Omnibus Decision:
Asalis clear and categorical testimony, which remains unrebutted on its major points, coupled with
the judicial admissions freely and voluntarily given by the two other accused, are sufficient to prove
the existence of a conspiracy hatched between and among the four accused, all members of the
terrorist group Abu Sayyaf, to wreak chaos and mayhem in the metropolis by indiscriminately
killing and injuring civilian victims by utilizing bombs and other similar destructive explosive
devices.
While said conspiracy involving the four malefactors has not been expressly admitted by accused
Baharan, Angelo Trinidad, and Rohmat, more specifically with respect to the latters participation in
the commission of the crimes, nonetheless it has been established by virtue of the aforementioned
evidence, which established the existence of the conspiracy itself and the indispensable
participation of accused Rohmat in seeing to it that the conspirators criminal design would be
realized.
It is well-established that conspiracy may be inferred from the acts of the accused, which clearly
manifests a concurrence of wills, a common intent or design to commit a crime (People v. Lenantud,
352 SCRA 544). Hence, where acts of the accused collectively and individually demonstrate the
existence of a common design towards the accomplishment of the same unlawful purpose,
conspiracy is evident and all the perpetrators will be held liable as principals (People v. Ellado, 353
SCRA 643).[25]
In People v. Geronimo, the Court pronounced that it would be justified in concluding that the
defendants therein were engaged in a conspiracy when the defendants by their acts aimed at the
same object, one performing one part and the other performing another part so as to complete it,
with a view to the attainment of the same object; and their acts, though apparently independent,
were in fact concerted and cooperative, indicating closeness of personal association, concerted
action and concurrence of sentiments.[26]
Accused contend that the testimony of Asali is inadmissible pursuant to Sec. 30, Rule 130 of the
Rules of Court. It is true that under the rule, statements made by a conspirator against a co-
conspirator are admissible only when made during the existence of the conspiracy. However, as the
Court ruled in People v. Buntag, if the declarant repeats the statement in court, his extrajudicial
confession becomes a judicial admission, making the testimony admissible as to both
conspirators.[27] Thus, in People v. Palijon, the Court held the following:
[W]e must make a distinction between extrajudicial and judicial confessions. An extrajudicial
confession may be given in evidence against the confessant but not against his co-accused as they
are deprived of the opportunity to cross-examine him. A judicial confession is admissible against
the declarants co-accused since the latter are afforded opportunity to cross-examine the former.
Section 30, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court applies only to extrajudicial acts or admissions and not to
testimony at trial where the party adversely affected has the opportunity to cross-examine the
declarant. Mercenes admission implicating his co-accused was given on the witness stand. It is
admissible in evidence against appellant Palijon. Moreover, where several accused are tried
together for the same offense, the testimony of a co-accused implicating his co-accused is
competent evidence against the latter.[28]
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, as
affirmed with modification by the Court of Appeals, is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 213455, August 11, 2015
JUAN PONCE ENRILE, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, HON. AMPARO M.

CABOTAJE-TANG, HON. SAMUEL R. MARTIRES, AND HON. ALEX L. QUIROZ OF THE THIRD
DIVISION OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN, Respondents.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
We resolve the petition for certiorari with prayers (a) for the Court En Banc to act on the petition;
(b) to expedite the proceedings and to set the case for oral arguments; and (c) to issue a temporary
restraining order to the respondents from holding a pre-trial and further proceedings in Criminal
Case No. SB-14-CRM-02381 filed by petitioner Juan Ponce Enrile (Enrile) challenging the July 11,
2014 resolutions2 of the Sandiganbayan.
I.
THE ANTECEDENTS
On June 5, 2014, the Office of the Ombudsman filed an Information3 for plunder against Enrile,
Jessica Lucila Reyes, Janet Lim Napoles, Ronald John Lim, and John Raymund de Asis before the
Sandiganbayan.
The Information reads:LawlibraryofCRAlaw

xxxx
In 2004 to 2010 or thereabout, in the Philippines, and within this Honorable Courts jurisdiction,
above-named accused JUAN PONCE ENRILE, then a Philippine Senator, JESSICA LUCILA G. REYES,
then Chief of Staff of Senator Enriles Office, both public officers, committing the offense in relation
to their respective offices, conspiring with one another and with JANET LIM NAPOLES, RONALD
JOHN LIM, and JOHN RAYMUND DE ASIS, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and criminally
amass, accumulate, and/or acquire ill-gotten wealth amounting to at least ONE HUNDRED
SEVENTY TWO MILLION EIGHT HUNDRED THIRTY FOUR THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED PESOS
(Php172,834,500.00) through a combination or series of overt criminal acts, as
follows:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
(a)
by repeatedly receiving from NAPOLES and/or her representatives LIM, DE ASIS, and others,
kickbacks or commissions under the following circumstances: before, during and/or after the
project identification, NAPOLES gave, and ENRILE and/or REYES received, a percentage of the cost
of a project to be funded from ENRILES Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF), in
consideration of ENRILES endorsement, directly or through REYES, to the appropriate government

agencies, of NAPOLES non-government organizations which became the recipients and/or target
implementors of ENRILES PDAF projects, which duly-funded projects turned out to be ghosts or
fictitious, thus enabling NAPOLES to misappropriate the PDAF proceeds for her personal gain;
(b)
by taking undue advantage, on several occasions, of their official positions, authority, relationships,
connections, and influence to unjustly enrich themselves at the expense and to the damage and
prejudice, of the Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Enrile responded by filing before the Sandiganbayan (1) an urgent omnibus motion (motion to
dismiss for lack of evidence on record to establish probable cause and ad cautelam motion for
bail),4 and (2) a supplemental opposition to issuance of warrant of arrest and for dismissal of
Information,5 on June 10, 2014, and June 16, 2014, respectively. The Sandiganbayan heard both
motions on June 20, 2014.
On June 24, 2014, the prosecution filed a consolidated opposition to both motions.
On July 3, 2014, the Sandiganbayan denied Enriles motions and ordered the issuance of warrants of
arrest on the plunder case against the accused.6redarclaw
On July 8, 2014, Enrile received a notice of hearing7 informing him that his arraignment would be
held before the Sandiganbayans Third Division on July 11, 2014.
On July 10, 2014, Enrile filed a motion for bill of particulars8 before the Sandiganbayan. On the
same date, he filed a motion for deferment of arraignment9 since he was to undergo medical
examination at the Philippine General Hospital (PGH).
On July 11, 2014, Enrile was brought to the Sandiganbayan pursuant to the Sandiganbayans order
and his motion for bill of particulars was called for hearing. Atty. Estelito Mendoza (Atty. Mendoza),
Enriles counsel, argued the motion orally. Thereafter, Sandiganbayan Presiding Justice (PJ) Amparo
Cabotaje-Tang (Cabotaje-Tang), declared a 10-minute recess to deliberate on the motion.
When the court session resumed, PJ Cabotaje-Tang announced the Courts denial of Enriles motion
for bill of particulars essentially on the following grounds:
(1)
the details that Enrile desires are substantial reiterations of the arguments he raised in his
supplemental opposition to the issuance of warrant of arrest and for dismissal of information; and
(2)
the details sought are evidentiary in nature and are best ventilated during trial.
Atty. Mendoza asked for time to file a motion for reconsideration, stating that he would orally move
to reconsider the Sandiganbayans denial if he would not be given time to seek a reconsideration.
The Sandiganbayan then directed Atty. Mendoza to immediately proceed with his motion for
reconsideration.
Atty. Mendoza thus orally presented his arguments for the reconsideration of the denial of Enriles
motion for bill of particulars. The Sandiganbayan again declared a recess to deliberate on the
motion. After five (5) minutes, PJ Cabotaje-Tang announced the Sandiganbayans denial of the
motion for reconsideration.10redarclaw
The Sandiganbayan reduced its rulings into writing on Enriles written and oral motions. The
pertinent portion of this ruling reads:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
xxxx
In todays consideration of accused Juan Ponce Enriles Motion for Bill of Particulars, the Court
heard the parties on oral arguments in relation thereto. Thereafter, it declared a ten-minute recess
to deliberate thereon. After deliberating on the said motion as well as the arguments of the parties,
the Court resolves to DENY as it hereby DENIES the same motion for bill of particulars for the
following reasons: (1) the details desired in paragraphs 2 to 5 of the said motion are substantially
reiterations of the arguments raised by accused Enrile in his Supplemental Opposition to Issuance
of Warrant of Arrest and for Dismissal of Information dated June 16, 2014 x x x.
The Court already upheld the sufficiency of the allegations in the Information charging accused
Enrile, among other persons, with the crime of plunder in its Resolution dated July 3, 2014. It finds
no cogent reasons to reconsider the said ruling.
Moreover, the desired details that accused Enrile would like the prosecution to provide are
evidentiary in nature, which need not be alleged in the Information. They are best ventilated during
the trial of the case.
Counsel for accused Juan Ponce Enrile orally sought a reconsideration of the denial of his motion for
bill of particulars which was opposed by the prosecution. The Court then declared another ten-
minute recess to deliberate on the said motion for reconsideration. After deliberation thereon, the
Court likewise resolved to DENY as it hereby DENIES accused Juan Ponce Enriles motion for
reconsideration there being no new or substantial grounds raised to warrant the grant thereof.
ACCORDINGLY, the scheduled arraignment of accused Juan Ponce Enrile shall now proceed as
previously scheduled.
SO ORDERED.11
Atty. Mendoza subsequently moved for the deferment of Enriles arraignment. The Sandiganbayan
responded by directing the doctors present to determine whether he was physically fit to be
arraigned. After he was declared fit, the Sandiganbayan proceeded with Enriles arraignment. Enrile
entered a no plea, prompting the Sandiganbayan to enter a not guilty plea on his behalf.
II.
THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI
Enrile claims in this petition that the Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it denied his motion for bill of particulars despite
the ambiguity and insufficiency of the Information filed against him. Enrile maintains that the
denial was a serious violation of his constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of
the accusation against him.
Enrile further alleges that he was left to speculate on what his specific participation in the crime of
plunder had been. He posits that the Information should have stated the details of the particular
acts that allegedly constituted the imputed series or combination of overt acts that led to the charge
of plunder. Enrile essentially reiterates the details desired that he sought in his motion for bill of
particulars, as follows:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
Allegations of Information
Details Desired
x x x accused JUAN PONCE ENRILE, then a Philippine Senator, JESSICA LUCILA G. REYES, then Chief
of Staff of Senator Enriles Office, both public officers, committing the offense in relation to their
respective offices, conspiring with one another and with JANET LIM NAPOLES, RONALD JOHN LIM,
and JOHN RAYMUND DE ASIS, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and criminally amass,
accumulate, and/or acquire ill-gotten wealth amounting to at least ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY TWO
MILLION EIGHT HUNDRED THIRTY FOUR THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED PESOS
(Php172,834,500.00) through a combination or series of overt acts, x x x.
a. Who among the accused acquired the alleged ill-gotten wealth amounting to at least ONE
HUNDRED SEVENTY TWO MILLION EIGHT HUNDRED THIRTY FOUR THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED
PESOS (Php172,834,500.00)? One of them, two of them or all of them? Kindly specify.
b. The allegation through a combination or series of overt criminal acts is a conclusion of fact or of
law. What are the particular overt acts which constitute the combination? What are the particular
overt acts which constitute the series? Who committed those acts?
x x x by repeatedly receiving from NAPOLES and/or her representatives LIM, DE ASIS, and others,
implementers of ENRILES PDAF projects, which duly-funded projects turned out to be ghosts or
fictitious, thus enabling NAPOLES to misappropriate the PDAF proceeds for her personal gain;
a. What was repeatedly received? If sums of money, the particular amount. If on several occasions
and in different amounts, specify the amount on each occasion and the corresponding date of
receipt.
b. Name the specific person(s) who delivered the amount of Php172,834,500.00 and the specific
person(s) who received the amount; or if not in lump sum, the various amounts totaling
Php172,834,500.00. x x x Specify particularly the person who delivered the amount, Napoles or Lim
or De Asis, and who particularly are the others.
c. To whom was the money given? To Enrile or Reyes? State the amount given on each occasion, the
date when and the place where the amount was given.
d. x x x Describe each project allegedly identified, how, and by whom was the project identified, the
nature of each project, where it is located and the cost of each project.
e. For each of the years 2004-2010, under what law or official document is a portion of the Priority
Development Assistance Fund identified as that of a member of Congress, in this instance, as
ENRILEs, to be found? In what amount for each year is ENRILEs Priority Development Assistance
Fund? When, and to whom, did Enrile endorse the projects in favor of Napoles non-government
organizations which became the recipients and/or target implementers of ENRILEs PDAF
projects? Name Napoles non-government organizations which became the recipients and/or target
implementers of ENRILEs PDAF projects. Who paid Napoles, from whom did Napoles collect the
fund for the projects which turned out to be ghosts or fictitious? Who authorized the payments for
each project?
f. x x x what COA audits or field investigations were conducted which validated the findings that
each of Enriles PDAF projects in the years 2004-2010 were ghosts or spurious projects?
x x x by taking undue advantage, on several occasions of their official positions, authority,
relationships, connections, and influence to unjustly enrich themselves at the expense and to the
damage and prejudice, of the Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines.
a. Provide the details of how Enrile took undue advantage, on several occasions, of his official
positions, authority, relationships, connections, and influence to unjustly enrich himself at the
expense and to the damage and prejudice, of the Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines.
Was this because he received any money from the government? From whom and for what reason
did he receive any money or property from the government through which he unjustly enriched
himself? State the details from whom each amount was received, the place and the time.
Enrile posits that his desired details are not evidentiary in nature; they are material facts that
should be clearly alleged in the Information so that he may be fully informed of the charges against
him and be prepared to meet the issues at the trial.
Enrile adds that the grounds raised in his motion for bill of particulars are cited in a context
different from his opposition to the issuance of a warrant of arrest. He maintains that the resolution
of the probable cause issue was interlocutory and did not bar the submission of the same issue in
subsequent proceedings especially in the context of a different proceeding.
Enrile thus prays that: (a) the Court en banc act on the present petition; (b) by way of an interim
measure, the Court issue a TRO or writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the Sandiganbayan from
holding the pre-trial and subsequent proceedings against him in Criminal Case No. SB-14-CRM-
0238 during the pendency of the present petition; (c) the Court expedite the proceedings and set
the case for oral arguments; and (d) at the conclusion of the proceedings, the Court annul and set
aside the Sandiganbayans July 11, 2014 resolution and his arraignment.
A. The Peoples Comment
In its Comment,12 the People of the Philippines13 counters that the Sandiganbayan did not
exercise its discretionary power in an arbitrary or despotic manner. Even assuming that the
Sandiganbayans denial of Enriles motion for bill of particulars was erroneous, the error did not
amount to lack or excess or jurisdiction. It further maintains that the assailed Sandiganbayan
rulings were arrived at based on the procedures prescribed under Section 2, Rule VII of the Revised
Internal Rules of the Sandiganbayan.
The People also argues that the Information already contained the ultimate facts; matters of
evidence do not need to be averred.
B. Enriles Reply
In his Reply, Enrile essentially claims that the right to move for a bill of particulars is ancillary to
and in implementation of an accuseds rights to due process, to be heard, and to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him. He maintains that the Sandiganbayans denial of his
motion for bill of particulars is not a mere denial of a procedural right under the Rules of Court, but
of rights vested in an accused under the Constitution to ensure fairness in the trial of the offense
charged. Enrile also adds that there could only be a fair trial if he could properly plead to the
Information and prepare for trial.
Enrile further argues that the Peoples Comment did not dispute the relevance of the details sought
in the motion for bill of particulars. He likewise claims that the desired details could not be found
in the bundle of documents marked by the prosecution during the preliminary conference. Finally,
Enrile maintains that his motion for bill of particulars was not dilatory.
III.
THE COURTS RULING
After due consideration, we resolve to partially GRANT the petition under the terms outlined below.
A. The constitutional right of the accused to be informed
Under the Constitution, a person who stands charged of a criminal offense has the right to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.14 This right has long been
established in English law, and is the same right expressly guaranteed in our 1987 Constitution.
This right requires that the offense charged be stated with clarity and with certainty to inform the
accused of the crime he is facing in sufficient detail to enable him to prepare his
defense.15redarclaw
In the 1904 case of United States v. Karelsen,16 the Court explained the purpose of informing an
accused in writing of the charges against him from the perspective of his right to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
The object of this written accusation was First. To furnish the accused with such a description of
the charge against him as will enable him to make his defense; and second, to avail himself of his
conviction or acquittal for protection against a further prosecution for the same cause; and third, to
inform the court of the facts alleged, so that it may decide whether they are sufficient in law to
support a conviction, if one should be had. (United States vs. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542.) In order that
this requirement may be satisfied, facts must be stated, not conclusions of law. Every crime is made
up of certain acts and intent; these must be set forth in the complaint with reasonable particularity
of time, place, names (plaintiff and defendant), and circumstances. In short, the complaint must
contain a specific allegation of every fact and circumstances necessary to constitute the crime
charged. x x x.17 [Emphasis supplied.]
The objective, in short, is to describe the act with sufficient certainty to fully appraise the accused of
the nature of the charge against him and to avoid possible surprises that may lead to injustice.
Otherwise, the accused would be left speculating on why he has been charged at all.18redarclaw
In People v. Hon. Mencias, et al.,19 the Court further explained that a persons constitutional right to
be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him signifies that an accused should
be given the necessary data on why he is the subject of a criminal proceeding. The Court added that
the act or conduct imputed to a person must be described with sufficient particularity to enable the
accused to defend himself properly.
The general grant and recognition of a protected right emanates from Section 1, Article III of the
1987 Constitution which states that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without
due process of law. The purpose of the guaranty is to prevent governmental encroachment against
the life, liberty, and property of individuals; to secure the individual from the arbitrary exercise of
the powers of the government, unrestrained by the established principles of private rights and
distributive justice x x x; and to secure to all persons equal and impartial justice and the benefit of
the general law.20redarclaw
Separately from Section 1, Article III is the specific and direct underlying root of the right to
information in criminal proceedings Section 14(1), Article III which provides that No person
shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law. Thus, no doubt exists
that the right to be informed of the cause of the accusation in a criminal case has deep
constitutional roots that, rather than being cavalierly disregarded, should be carefully protected.
In Republic of the Philippines v. Sandiganbayan (2nd Division),21 the Court, in sustaining the
Sandiganbayans grant of the motion for bill of particulars of Ferdinand Marcos, Jr., held that the
facile verbosity with which the legal counsel for the government flaunted the accusation of excesses
against the Marcoses in general terms must be soonest refurbished by a bill of particulars, so that
respondent can properly prepare an intelligent responsive pleading and so that trial in this case
will proceed as expeditiously as possible.22 The Court additionally stated
that:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
This Court has been liberal in giving the lower courts the widest latitude of discretion in setting
aside default orders justified under the right to due process principle. Plain justice demands and the
law requires no less that defendants must know what the complaint against them is all about.
x x x In the interest of justice, we need to dispel the impression in the individual respondents'
minds that they are being railroaded out of their rights and properties without due process of
law.23
B. Procedural Sufficiency of the Information
An Information is an accusation in writing charging a person with an offense, signed by the

prosecutor and filed with the court.24 The Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, in implementing
the constitutional right of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him, specifically require certain matters to be stated in the Information for its sufficiency.
The requirement aims to enable the accused to properly prepare for his defense since he is
presumed to have no independent knowledge of the facts constituting the offense
charged.25redarclaw
To be considered as sufficient and valid, an information must state the name of the accused; the
designation of the offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions constituting the offense; the
name of the offended party; the approximate date of the commission of the offense; and the place
where the offense was committed.26redarclaw
If there is no designation of the offense, reference shall be made to the section or subsection of the
statute penalizing it. The acts or omissions constituting the offense and the qualifying and
aggravating circumstances alleged must be stated in ordinary and concise language; they do not
necessarily need to be in the language of the statute, and should be in terms sufficient to enable a
person of common understanding to know what offense is charged and what qualifying and
aggravating circumstances are alleged, so that the court can pronounce judgment.27 The Rules do
not require the Information to exactly allege the date and place of the commission of the offense,
unless the date and the place are material ingredients or essential elements of the offense, or are
necessary for its identification.
B.1. Ultimate facts versus Evidentiary facts
An Information only needs to state the ultimate facts constituting the offense; the evidentiary and
other details (i.e., the facts supporting the ultimate facts) can be provided during the
trial.28redarclaw
Ultimate facts is defined as those facts which the expected evidence will support. The term does
not refer to the details of probative matter or particulars of evidence by which these material
elements are to be established. It refers to the facts that the evidence will prove at the
trial.29redarclaw
Ultimate facts has also been defined as the principal, determinative, and constitutive facts on whose
existence the cause of action rests;30 they are also the essential and determining facts on which the
court's conclusion rests and without which the judgment would lack support in essential
particulars.31redarclaw
Evidentiary facts, on the other hand, are the facts necessary to establish the ultimate facts; they are
the premises that lead to the ultimate facts as conclusion.32They are facts supporting the existence
of some other alleged and unproven fact.33redarclaw
In Bautista v. Court of Appeals,34 the Court explained these two concepts in relation to a particular
criminal case, as follows:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
The distinction between the elements of the offense and the evidence of these elements is
analogous or akin to the difference between ultimate facts and evidentiary facts in civil cases.
Ultimate facts are the essential and substantial facts which either form the basis of the primary
right and duty or which directly make up the wrongful acts or omissions of the defendant, while
evidentiary facts are those which tend to prove or establish said ultimate facts. x x x.35 [Emphasis
supplied.]
While it is fundamental that every element of the offense must be alleged in the Information,
matters of evidence as distinguished from the facts essential to the nature of the offense do not
need to be alleged. Whatever facts and circumstances must necessarily be alleged are to be
determined based on the definition and the essential elements of the specific crimes.36redarclaw
C. Arraignment
The procedural due process mandate of the Constitution requires that the accused be arraigned so
that he may be fully informed as to why he was charged and what penal offense he has to face, to be
convicted only on showing that his guilt is shown beyond reasonable doubt with full opportunity to
disprove the evidence against him.37 During arraignment, the accused is granted the opportunity
to fully know the precise charge that confronts him and made fully aware of possible loss of
freedom, even of his life, depending on the nature of the crime imputed to him.38redarclaw
An arraignment thus ensures that an accused be fully acquainted with the nature of the crime
imputed to him in the Information and the circumstances under which it is allegedly committed.39
It is likewise at this stage of the proceedings when the accused enters his plea,40 or enters a plea of
not guilty to a lesser offense which is necessarily included in the offense charged.41redarclaw
A concomitant component of this stage of the proceedings is that the Information should provide
the accused with fair notice of the accusations made against him, so that he will be able to make an
intelligent plea and prepare a defense.42Moreover, the Information must provide some means of
ensuring that the crime for which the accused is brought to trial is in fact one for which he was
charged, rather than some alternative crime seized upon by the prosecution in light of subsequently
discovered evidence.43Likewise, it must indicate just what crime or crimes an accused is being
tried for, in order to avoid subsequent attempts to retry him for the same crime or crimes.44 In
other words, the Information must permit the accused to prepare his defense, ensure that he is
prosecuted only on the basis of facts presented, enable him to plead jeopardy against a later
prosecution, and inform the court of the facts alleged so that it can determine the sufficiency of the
charge.
Oftentimes, this is achieved when the Information alleges the material elements of the crime
charged. If the Information fails to comply with this basic standard, it would be quashed on the
ground that it fails to charge an offense.45Of course, an Information may be sufficient to withstand
a motion to quash, and yet insufficiently inform the accused of the specific details of the alleged
offenses. In such instances, the Rules of Court allow the accused to move for a bill of particulars to
enable him properly to plead and to prepare for trial.46redarclaw
C.1. Bill of Particulars
In general, a bill of particulars is the further specification of the charges or claims in an action,
which an accused may avail of by motion before arraignment, to enable him to properly plead and
prepare for trial. In civil proceedings, a bill of particulars has been defined as a complementary
procedural document consisting of an amplification or more particularized outline of a pleading,
and is in the nature of a more specific allegation of the facts recited in the pleading.47 The purpose
of a motion for bill of particulars in civil cases is to enable a party to prepare his responsive
pleading properly.
In criminal cases, a bill of particulars details items or specific conduct not recited in the Information
but nonetheless pertain to or are included in the crime charged. Its purpose is to enable an accused:
to know the theory of the governments case;48 to prepare his defense and to avoid surprise at the
trial; to plead his acquittal or conviction in bar of another prosecution for the same offense; and to
compel the prosecution to observe certain limitations in offering evidence.49redarclaw
In criminal proceedings, the motion for a bill of particulars is governed by Section 9 of Rule 116 of
the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure which provides:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
Section 9. Bill of particulars. - The accused may, before arraignment, move for a bill of particulars to
enable him properly to plead and prepare for trial. The motion shall specify the alleged defects of
the complaint or information and the details desired.
The rule requires the information to describe the offense with sufficient particularity to apprise the
accused of the crime charged with and to enable the court to pronounce judgment. The particularity
must be such that persons of ordinary intelligence may immediately know what the Information
means.50redarclaw
The general function of a bill of particulars, whether in civil or criminal proceedings, is to guard
against surprises during trial. It is not the function of the bill to furnish the accused with the
evidence of the prosecution. Thus, the prosecutor shall not be required to include in the bill of
particulars matters of evidence relating to how the people intend to prove the elements of the
offense charged or how the people intend to prove any item of factual information included in the
bill of particulars.51redarclaw
C.2. Origin of bill of particulars in criminal cases52redarclaw
Even before the promulgation of the 1964 Rules of Court, when the applicable rules for criminal
procedure was still General Order No. 58,53 the Court had already recognized the need for a bill of
particulars in criminal cases. This recognition came despite the lack of any specific provision in
General Order No. 58 setting out the rules for a bill of particulars in criminal cases.
In U.S. v. Schneer,54 the issue presented was whether a bill of particulars was available in a
criminal case for estafa after the accused had already been arraigned. The Court essentially ruled
that there was no specific provision of law expressly authorizing the filing of specifications or bills
of particulars in criminal cases, and held that:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
We know of no provision either in General Orders, No. 58, or in the laws existing prior thereto
which requires the Government to furnish such a bill of particulars, and we accordingly hold that it
was not error on the part of the court below to refuse to do so.
In U.S. v. Cernias,55 however, the Court formally recognized the existence and applicability of a bill
of particulars in criminal cases. In this case, the prosecution filed an information charging Basilio
Cernias with several counts of brigandage before the Court of First Instance of Leyte. In overruling
the accuseds objection, the Court declared that the prosecutions act of specifying certain acts done
by the conspirators in the Information did no more than to furnish the defendant with a bill of
particulars of the facts which it intended to prove at the trial x x x.56redarclaw
In sum, the Court essentially held that a detailed complaint or information is not objectionable, and
that the details it contains may be properly considered as specifications or bill of
particulars.57redarclaw
In People v. Abad Santos,58 the court first recognized a bill of particulars, as a right that the accused
may ask for from the court. In this case, the prosecution charged respondent Joseph Arcache with
the crime of treason before the Peoples Court. The Information filed against the accused contained,
in counts 2 and 3, the phrase and other similar equipment.
The counsel for the accused verbally petitioned the Peoples court to order the prosecution to
make more specific [the] phrase and other similar equipment, which request the Peoples Court
granted. The People of the Philippines filed a petition for certiorari, but the Court dismissed this
petition.
In upholding the order of the Peoples Court, the Court ruled that in the absence of specific
provisions of law prohibiting the filing of specifications or bills of particulars in criminal cases, their
submission may be permitted, as they cannot prejudice any substantial rights of the accused. On the
contrary, they will serve to apprise the accused clearly of the charges filed against them, and thus
enable them to prepare intelligently whatever defense or defenses they might have.59redarclaw
Notably, Abad Santos emphasized the importance of a bill of particulars in criminal cases, stating
that x x x inasmuch as in criminal cases not only the liberty but even the life of the accused may be
at stake, it is always wise and proper that the accused should be fully apprised of the true charges
against them, and thus avoid all and any possible surprise, which might be detrimental to their
rights and interests; and ambiguous phrases should not, therefore, be permitted in criminal
complaints or informations; and if any such phrase has been included therein, on motion of the
defense, before the commencement of the trial, the court should order either its elimination as
surplusage or the filing of the necessary specification, which is but an amendment in mere matters
of form.60redarclaw
In these cited cases, the Courts did not rely on the Rules of Court to provide for a bill of particulars
in criminal cases. A specific provision granting the accused the right to move for or demand a more
definite statement or a bill of particulars was not incorporated as a formal rule until the 1964
Rules of Court,61under its Section 6, Rule 116. This initial provision later became Section 10 of Rule
116 under the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure62and Section 9 of Rule 116 under the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended.63redarclaw
C.3. The Distinctive Role of a Bill of Particulars
When allegations in an Information are vague or indefinite, the remedy of the accused is not a
motion to quash, but a motion for a bill of particulars.
The purpose of a bill of particulars is to supply vague facts or allegations in the complaint or
information to enable the accused to properly plead and prepare for trial. It presupposes a valid
Information, one that presents all the elements of the crime charged, albeit under vague terms.
Notably, the specifications that a bill of particulars may supply are only formal amendments to the
complaint or Information.
In Virata v. Sandiganbayan,64 the Court expounded on the purpose of a bill of particulars as

follows:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
It is the office or function, as well as the object or purpose, of a bill of particulars to amplify or limit
a pleading, specify more minutely and particularly a claim or defense set up and pleaded in general
terms, give information, not contained in the pleading, to the opposite party and the court as to the
precise nature, character, scope, and extent of the cause of action or defense relied on by the
pleader, and apprise the opposite party of the case which he has to meet, to the end that the proof
at the trial may be limited to the matters specified, and in order that surprise at, and needless
preparation for, the trial may be avoided, and that the opposite party may be aided in framing his
answering pleading and preparing for trial. It has also been stated that it is the function or purpose
of a bill of particulars to define, clarify, particularize, and limit or circumscribe the issues in the
case, to expedite the trial, and assist the court. A general function or purpose of a bill of particulars
is to prevent injustice or do justice in the case when that cannot be accomplished without the aid of
such a bill.65redarclaw
x x x x [Emphasis ours.]
Notably, the failure of the accused to move for the specification of the details desired deprives him
of the right to object to evidence that could be introduced and admitted under an Information of
more or less general terms but which sufficiently charges the accused with a definite
crime.66redarclaw
Although the application for the bill of particulars is one addressed to the sound discretion of the
court67 it should nonetheless exercise its discretion within the context of the facts and the nature
of the crime charged in each case and the right of the accused to be informed of the nature and
cause of accusation against him. As articulated in the case of People v. Iannone:68
It is beyond cavil that a defendant has a basic and fundamental right to be informed of the charges
against him so that he will be able to prepare a defense. Hence the courts must exercise careful
surveillance to ensure that a defendant is not deprived of this right by an overzealous prosecutor
attempting to protect his case or his witnesses. Any effort to leave a defendant in ignorance of the
substance of the accusation until the time of trial must be firmly rebuffed. This is especially so
where the indictment itself provides a paucity of information. In such cases, the court must be
vigilant in safeguarding the defendant's rights to a bill of particulars and to effective discovery.
Should the prosecutor decide to use an indictment which, although technically sufficient, does not
adequately allow a defendant to properly prepare for trial, he may well run afoul of the defendant's
right to be informed of the accusations against him.
Thus, if the Information is lacking, a court should take a liberal attitude towards its granting69 and
order the government to file a bill of particulars elaborating on the charges. Doubts should be
resolved in favor of granting the bill70 to give full meaning to the accuseds Constitutionally
guaranteed rights.
Notably, the government cannot put the accused in the position of disclosing certain overt acts
through the Information and withholding others subsequently discovered, all of which it intends to
prove at the trial. This is the type of surprise a bill of particulars is designed to avoid.71The accused
is entitled to the observance of all the rules designated to bring about a fair verdict.
This becomes more relevant in the present case where the crime charged carries with it the severe
penalty of capital punishment and entails the commission of several predicate criminal acts
involving a great number of transactions spread over a considerable period of time.
C.4. Motion to Quash vs. Motion for Bill of Particulars

A bill of particulars presupposes a valid Information while a motion to quash is a jurisdictional

defect on account that the facts charged in the Information does not constitute an
offense.72redarclaw
Justice Antonio T. Carpio, in his dissent, avers that the allegations in the information are not vague
because the Information needs only allege the ultimate facts constituting the offense for which the
accused stands charged, not the finer details of why and how the illegal acts alleged were
committed. In support of his position, Justice Carpio cited the cases of Miguel v.
Sandiganbayan,73Go v. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas,74 and People v. Romualdez,75 among others,
to support the superfluity of the details requested by Enrile.
Justice Carpios reliance on these cases is misplaced for they involve the issue of quashal of an
information on the ground that the facts charge do not constitute an offense, rather than a request
for bill of particulars. That is, these cited cases involve the critical issue of the validity of an
information, and not a request for specificity with request to an offense charged in an information.
On the other hand, the cases of People v. Sanico,76People v. Banzuela,77Pielago v. People,78People

v. Rayon, Sr.,79People v. Subesa,80People v. Anguac,81 and Los Baos v. Pedro,82 which were
likewise cited by Justice Carpio, involve the issue that an Information only need to allege the
ultimate facts, and not the specificity of the allegations contained in the information as to allow the
accused to prepare for trial and make an intelligent plea.83redarclaw
Notably, in Miguel,84 to which Justice Carpio concurred, this Court mentioned that the proper
remedy, if at all, to a supposed ambiguity in an otherwise valid Information, is merely to move for a
bill of particulars and not for the quashal of an information which sufficiently alleges the elements
of the offense charged.85redarclaw
Clearly then, a bill of particulars does not presuppose an invalid information for it merely fills in the
details on an otherwise valid information to enable an accused to make an intelligent plea and
prepare for his defense.
I stress, however, that the issue in the present case involves abuse of discretion for denying Enriles
request for a bill of particulars, and not a motion to quash.
If the information does not charge an offense, then a motion to quash is in order.86redarclaw
But if the information charges an offense and the averments are so vague that the accused cannot
prepare to plead or prepare for trial, then a motion for a bill of particulars is the proper
remedy.87redarclaw
Thus viewed, a motion to quash and a motion for a bill of particulars are distinct and separate
remedies, the latter presupposing an information sufficient in law to charge an offense.88redarclaw
D. The Grave Abuse of Discretion Issue
The grant or denial of a motion for bill of particulars is discretionary on the court where the
Information is filed. As usual in matters of discretion, the ruling of the trial court will not be
reversed unless grave abuse of discretion or a manifestly erroneous order amounting to grave
abuse of discretion is shown.89redarclaw
Grave abuse of discretion refers to the capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment that amounts
or is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to
amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to
act at all in contemplation of law such as when the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic
manner by reason of passion and hostility.90 For the extraordinary writ of certiorari to lie, there
must be capricious, arbitrary, or whimsical exercise of power.
It will be recalled that the Sandiganbayan denied Enriles motion for bill of particulars on two
grounds, namely:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
(1) the details sought were evidentiary in nature and are best ventilated during trial; and
(2) his desired details were reiterations of the details he sought in his supplemental opposition
to the issuance of a warrant of arrest.
We shall separately examine these grounds in determining whether the Sandiganbayan committed
grave abuse of discretion when it denied Enriles motion for a bill of particulars and his subsequent
motion for reconsideration.
Sandiganbayan Ground #1:LawlibraryofCRAlaw

The details sought were evidentiary in nature
D.1. The Law of Plunder
A determination of whether the details that Enrile sought were evidentiary requires an examination
of the elements of the offense he is charged with, i.e., plunder under Republic Act No. 7080.
Section 2 of R.A. No. 7080, as amended, reads:LawlibraryofCRAlaw

Section 2. Definition of the Crime of Plunder; Penalties. Any public officer who, by himself or in
connivance with members of his family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business associates,
subordinates or other persons, amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth through a
combination or series of overt criminal acts as described in Section 1 (d) hereof in the aggregate
amount or total value of at least Fifty million pesos (P50,000,000.00) shall be guilty of the crime of
plunder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua to death. Any person who participated with
the said public officer in the commission of an offense contributing to the crime of plunder shall
likewise be punished for such offense. In the imposition of penalties, the degree of participation and
the attendance of mitigating and extenuating circumstances, as provided by the Revised Penal Code,
shall be considered by the court. The court shall declare any and all ill-gotten wealth and their
interests and other incomes and assets including the properties and shares of stocks derived from
the deposit or investment thereof forfeited in favor of the State. [Emphasis supplied.]
Based on this definition, the elements of plunder are:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
(1)
That the offender is a public officer who acts by himself or in connivance with members of his
family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business associates, subordinates, or other persons;
(2)
That he amassed, accumulated or acquired ill-gotten wealth through a combination or series of the
following overt or criminal acts:
(a)
through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or malversation of public funds or raids on the
public treasury;
(b)
by receiving, directly or indirectly, any commission, gift, share, percentage, kickback or any other
form of pecuniary benefits from any person and/or entity in connection with any government
contract or project or by reason of the office or position of the public officer concerned;
(c)
by the illegal or fraudulent conveyance or disposition of assets belonging to the National
Government or any of its subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities of government-owned or -
controlled corporations or their subsidiaries;
(d)
by obtaining, receiving or accepting directly or indirectly any shares of stock, equity or any other
form of interest or participation including the promise of future employment in any business
enterprise or undertaking;
(e)
by establishing agricultural, industrial or commercial monopolies or other combinations and/or
implementation of decrees and orders intended to benefit particular persons or special interests; or
(f)
by taking undue advantage of official position, authority, relationship, connection or influence to
unjustly enrich himself or themselves at the expense and to the damage and prejudice of the
Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines; and,
(3)
That the aggregate amount or total value of the ill-gotten wealth amassed, accumulated or acquired
is at least P50,000,000.00. [Emphasis supplied.]
D.1.a. The Conspiracy Element and its Requested Details
Taking these elements into account, we hold that Enriles requested details on Who among the
accused acquired the alleged ill-gotten wealth are not proper subjects for a bill of particulars.
The allegation of the Information that the accused and Jessica Lucila G. Reyes, conspiring with one
another and with Janet Lim Napoles, Ronald John Lim, and John Raymund de Asis x x x expressly
charges conspiracy.
The law on plunder provides that it is committed by a public officer who acts by himself or in
connivance with x x x. The term connivance suggests an agreement or consent to commit an
unlawful act or deed with another; to connive is to cooperate or take part secretly with another.91
It implies both knowledge and assent that may either be active or passive.92redarclaw
Since the crime of plunder may be done in connivance or in conspiracy with other persons, and the
Information filed clearly alleged that Enrile and Jessica Lucila Reyes conspired with one another
and with Janet Lim Napoles, Ronald John Lim and John Raymund De Asis, then it is unnecessary to
specify, as an essential element of the offense, whether the ill-gotten wealth amounting to at least
P172,834,500.00 had been acquired by one, by two or by all of the accused. In the crime of plunder,
the amount of ill-gotten wealth acquired by each accused in a conspiracy is immaterial for as long
as the total amount amassed, acquired or accumulated is at least P50 million.
We point out that conspiracy in the present case is not charged as a crime by itself but only as the
mode of committing the crime. Thus, there is no absolute necessity of reciting its particulars in the
Information because conspiracy is not the gravamen of the offense charged.
It is enough to allege conspiracy as a mode in the commission of an offense in either of the following
manner: (1) by use of the word conspire, or its derivatives or synonyms, such as confederate,
connive, collude; or (2) by allegations of basic facts constituting the conspiracy in a manner that a
person of common understanding would know what is intended, and with such precision as the
nature of the crime charged will admit, to enable the accused to competently enter a plea to a
subsequent indictment based on the same facts.93redarclaw
Our ruling on this point in People v. Quitlong94 is particularly instructive:LawlibraryofCRAlaw

A conspiracy indictment need not, of course, aver all the components of conspiracy or allege all the
details thereof, like the part that each of the parties therein have performed, the evidence proving
the common design or the facts connecting all the accused with one another in the web of the
conspiracy. Neither is it necessary to describe conspiracy with the same degree of particularity
required in describing a substantive offense. It is enough that the indictment contains a statement
of the facts relied upon to be constitutive of the offense in ordinary and concise language, with as
much certainty as the nature of the case will admit, in a manner that can enable a person of
common understanding to know what is intended, and with such precision that the accused may
plead his acquittal or conviction to a subsequent indictment based on the same facts. x x x95
D.1.b. The Requested Details of Enriles PDAF
We similarly rule that the petitioner is not entitled to a bill of particulars for specifics sought under
the questions
For each of the years 2004-2010, under what law or official document is a portion of the Priority
Development Assistance Fund identified as that of a member of Congress, in this instance, as
ENRILEs, to be found? In what amount for each year is ENRILEs Priority Development Assistance
Fund?
and
x x x what COA audits or field investigations were conducted which validated the findings that each
of Enriles PDAF projects in the years 2004-2010 were ghosts or spurious projects?
These matters will simply establish and support the ultimate fact that Enriles PDAF was used to
fund fictitious or nonexistent projects. Whether a discretionary fund (in the form of PDAF) had
indeed been made available to Enrile as a member of the Philippine Congress and in what amounts
are evidentiary matters that do not need to be reflected with particularity in the Information, and
may be passed upon at the full-blown trial on the merits of the case.
D.1.b(i) The yearly PDAF Allocations
Specifically, we believe that the exact amounts of Enriles yearly PDAF allocations, if any, from 2004
to 2010 need not be pleaded with specific particularity to enable him to properly plead and prepare
for his defense. In fact, Enrile may be in a better position to know these details than the prosecution
and thus cannot claim that he would be taken by surprise during trial by the omission in the
Information of his annual PDAF allocations.
Thus, whether the amounts of Enriles PDAF allocations have been specified or not, Enrile has been
sufficiently informed that he stands charged of endorsing Napoles non-government organizations
to implement spurious or fictitious projects, in exchange for a percentage of his PDAF.
D.1.b(ii) The details of the COA Audits
The details of the COA audits or field investigations only support the ultimate fact that the
projects implemented by Napoles NGOs, and funded by Enriles PDAF, were nonexisting or
fictitious. Thus, they are evidentiary in nature and do not need to be spelled out with particularity
in the Information.
To require more details on these matters from the prosecution would amount to asking for
evidentiary information that the latter intends to present at the trial; it would be a compulsion on
the prosecution to disclose in advance of the trial the evidence it will use in proving the charges
alleged in the indictment.
D.1.c. Other Sources of Kickbacks and Commissions
We also deny Enriles plea for details on who the others were (aside from Napoles, Lim and De
Asis) from whom he allegedly received kickbacks and commissions. These other persons do not
stand charged of conspiring with Enrile and need not therefore be stated with particularly, either as
specific individuals or as John Does. The Court cannot second-guess the prosecutions reason for
not divulging the identity of these others who may potentially be witnesses for the prosecution.
What the Constitution guarantees the accused is simply the right to meet and examine the
prosecution witnesses. The prosecution has the prerogative to call witnesses other than those
named in the complaint or information, subject to the defenses right to cross-examine them.96
Making these others known would in fact be equivalent to the prosecutions premature disclosure
of its evidence. We stress, to the point of repetition, that a bill of particulars is not meant to compel
the prosecution to prematurely disclose evidentiary matters supporting its case.
D.2. The Overt Acts constituting the Combination or Series under the Plunder Law
We hold that Enrile is entitled to a bill of particulars for specifics sought under the following
questions
What are the particular overt acts which constitute the combination? What are the particular
overt acts which constitute the series? Who committed those acts? [Emphasis ours.]
D.2.a. Reason for Requirement for Particulars of Overt Acts
Plunder is the crime committed by public officers when they amass wealth involving at least P50
million by means of a combination or series of overt acts.97 Under these terms, it is not sufficient to
simply allege that the amount of ill-gotten wealth amassed amounted to at least P50 million; the
manner of amassing the ill-gotten wealth whether through a combination or series of overt acts
under Section 1(d) of R.A. No. 7080 is an important element that must be alleged.
When the Plunder Law speaks of combination, it refers to at least two (2) acts falling under
different categories listed in Section 1, paragraph (d) of R.A. No. 7080 [for example, raids on the
public treasury under Section 1, paragraph (d), subparagraph (1), and fraudulent conveyance of
assets belonging to the National Government under Section 1, paragraph (d), subparagraph (3)].
On the other hand, to constitute a series there must be two (2) or more overt or criminal acts
falling under the same category of enumeration found in Section 1, paragraph (d) [for example,
misappropriation, malversation and raids on the public treasury, all of which fall under Section 1,
paragraph (d), subparagraph (1)].98redarclaw
With respect to paragraph (a) of the Information

[(i.e., by repeatedly receiving from NAPOLES and/or her representatives LIM, DE ASIS, and others,
implementers of ENRILES PDAF projects, which duly funded projects turned out to be ghosts or
fictitious, thus enabling NAPOLES to misappropriate the PDAF proceeds for her personal gain x x
x)]
we hold that the prosecution employed a generalized or shotgun approach in alleging the criminal
overt acts allegedly committed by Enrile. This approach rendered the allegations of the paragraph
uncertain to the point of ambiguity for purposes of enabling Enrile to respond and prepare for his
defense. These points are explained in greater detail below.
The heart of the Plunder Law lies in the phrase combination or series of overt or criminal acts.
Hence, even if the accumulated ill-gotten wealth amounts to at least P50 million, a person cannot be
prosecuted for the crime of plunder if this resulted from a single criminal act. This interpretation of
the Plunder Law is very clear from the congressional deliberations.99redarclaw
Considering that without a number of overt or criminal acts, there can be no crime of plunder, the
various overt acts that constitute the combination and series the Information alleged, are
material facts that should not only be alleged, but must be stated with sufficient definiteness so that
the accused would know what he is specifically charged of and why he stands charged, so that he
could properly defend himself against the charge.
Thus, the several (i.e., at least 2) acts which are indicative of the overall scheme or conspiracy must
not be generally stated; they should be stated with enough particularity for Enrile (and his co-
accused) to be able to prepare the corresponding refuting evidence to meet these alleged overt acts.
It is insufficient, too, to merely allege that a set of acts had been repeatedly done (although this may
constitute a series if averred with sufficient definiteness), and aver that these acts resulted in the
accumulation or acquisition of ill-gotten wealth amounting to at least P172,834,500.00, as in this
case. The Information should reflect with particularity the predicate acts that underlie the crime of
plunder, based on the enumeration in Section 1(d) of R.A. No. 7080.
A reading of the Information filed against Enrile in the present case shows that the prosecution
made little or no effort to particularize the transactions that would constitute the required series or
combination of overt acts.
In fact, it clustered under paragraph (a) of the Information its recital of the manner Enrile and his
co-accused allegedly operated, thus describing its general view of the series or combination of overt
criminal acts that constituted the crime of plunder.
Without any specification of the basic transactions where kickbacks or commissions amounting to
at least P172,834,500.00 had been allegedly received, Enriles preparation for trial is obviously
hampered. This defect is not cured by mere reference to the prosecutions attachment, as Enrile
already stated in his Reply that the desired details could not be found in the bundle of documents
marked by the prosecution, which documents are not integral parts of the Information. Hence, the
prosecution does not discharge its burden of informing Enrile what these overt acts were by simply
pointing to these documents.
In providing the particulars of the overt acts that constitute the combination or series of
transactions constituting plunder, it stands to reason that the amounts involved, or at their ball
park figures, should be stated; these transactions are not necessarily uniform in amount, and
cannot simply collectively be described as amounting to P172,834,500.00 without hampering

Enriles right to respond after receiving the right information.
To stress, this final sum is not a general ball park figure but a very specific sum based on a number
of different acts and hence must have a breakdown. Providing this breakdown reinforces the
required specificity in describing the different overt acts.
Negatively stated, unless Enrile is given the particulars and is later given the chance to object to
unalleged details, he stands to be surprised at the trial at the same time that the prosecution is
given the opportunity to play fast and loose with its evidence to satisfy the more than P50 Million
requirement of law.
D.2.b. Approximate Dates of Commissions or Kickbacks
Enrile should likewise know the approximate dates, at least, of the receipt of the kickbacks and
commissions, so that he could prepare the necessary pieces of evidence, documentary or otherwise,
to disprove the allegations against him. We point out that the period covered by the indictment
extends from 2004 to 2010 or thereabout, of which, we again stress that different overt acts
constituting of the elements of Plunder took place during this period.
Undoubtedly, the length of time involved six years will pose difficulties to Enrile in the
preparation of his defense and will render him susceptible to surprises. Enrile should not be left
guessing and speculating which one/s from among the numerous transactions involving his
discretionary PDAF funds from 2004 to 2010, are covered by the indictment.
D.2.c. The Projects Funded and NGOs Involved
Enrile is also entitled to particulars specifying the project that Enrile allegedly funded coupled with
the name of Napoles NGO (e.g., Pangkabuhayan Foundation, Inc.), to sufficiently inform Enrile of
the particular transactions referred to.100redarclaw
Be it remembered that the core of the indictment is:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
(1) the funding of nonexisting projects using Enriles PDAF;
(2) Enriles endorsement of Napoles NGOs to the government agencies to implement these
projects; and
(3) Enriles receipt of kickbacks or commissions in exchange for his endorsement.
Under the elaborate scheme alleged to have been committed by Enrile and his co-accused, the
project identification was what started the totality of acts constituting plunder: only after a project
has been identified could Enrile have endorsed Napoles NGO to the appropriate government
agency that, in turn, would implement the supposed project using Enriles PDAF. Note that without
the project identification, no justification existed to release Enriles PDAF to Napoles allegedly
bogus NGO.
In these lights, the identified project and Napoles NGO are material facts that should be clearly
and definitely stated in the Information to allow Enrile to adequately prepare his defense evidence
on the specific transaction pointed to. The omission of these details will necessarily leave Enrile
guessing on what transaction/s he will have to defend against, since he may have funded other
projects with his PDAF. Specification will also allow him to object to evidence not referred to or
covered by the Informations ultimate facts.
D.2.d. The Government Agencies Serving as Conduits
The government agencies to whom Enrile endorsed Napoles NGOs are also material facts that must
be specified, since they served a necessary role in the crime charged the alleged conduits between
Enrile and Napoles NGOs. They were indispensable participants in the elaborate scheme alleged to
have been committed.
The particular person/s in each government agency who facilitated the transactions, need not
anymore be named in the Information, as these are already evidentiary matters. The identification
of the particular agency vis--vis Napoles NGO and the identified project, will already inform Enrile
of the transaction referred to.
In Tantuico v. Republic,101 the Republic filed a case for reconveyance, reversion, accounting,
restitution, and damages before the Sandiganbayan against former President Ferdinand Marcos,
Imelda Marcos, Benjamin Romualdez, and Francisco Tantuico, Jr. Tantuico filed a motion for bill of
particulars essentially alleging that the complaint was couched in general terms and did not have
the parti-culars that would inform him of the alleged factual and legal bases. The Sandiganbayan
denied his motion on the ground that the particulars sought are evidentiary in nature. Tantuico
moved to reconsider this decision, but the Sandiganbayan again denied his motion.
The Court overturned the Sandiganbayans ruling and directed the prosecution to prepare and file a
bill of particulars. Significantly, the Court held that the particulars prayed for, such as: names of
persons, names of corporations, dates, amounts involved, a specification of property for
identification purposes, the particular transactions involving withdrawals and disbursements, and
a statement of other material facts as would support the conclusions and inferences in the
complaint, are not evidentiary in nature. The Court explained that those particulars are material
facts that should be clearly and definitely averred in the complaint so that the defendant may be
fairly informed of the claims made against him and be prepared to meet the issues at the trial.
To be sure, the differences between ultimate and evidentiary matters are not easy to distinguish.
While Tantuico was a civil case and did not involve the crime of plunder, the Courts ruling
nonetheless serves as a useful guide in the determination of what matters are indispensable and
what matters may be omitted in the Information, in relation with the constitutional right of an
accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.
In the present case, the particulars on the:LawlibraryofCRAlaw

(1) projects involved;
(2) Napoles participating NGOs; and
(3) the government agency involved in each transaction

will undoubtedly provide Enrile with sufficient data to know the specific transactions involved, and
thus enable him to prepare adequately and intelligently whatever defense or defenses he may have.
We reiterate that the purpose of a bill of particular is to clarify allegations in the Information that
are indefinite, vague, or are conclusions of law to enable the accused to properly plead and prepare
for trial, not simply to inform him of the crime of which he stands accused. Verily, an accused
cannot intelligently respond to the charge laid if the allegations are incomplete or are unclear to
him.
We are aware that in a prosecution for plunder, what is sought to be established is the commission
of the criminal acts in furtherance of the acquisition of ill-gotten wealth. In the language of Section 4
of R.A. No. 7080, for purposes of establishing the crime of plunder, it is sufficient to establish
beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful
scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate, or acquire ill-gotten wealth.102redarclaw
The term overall unlawful scheme indicates a general plan of action or method that the principal
accused and public officer and others conniving with him follow to achieve their common criminal
goal. In the alternative, if no overall scheme can be found or where the schemes or methods used by
the multiple accused vary, the overt or criminal acts must form part of a conspiracy to attain a
common criminal goal.103redarclaw
Lest Section 4 be misunderstood as allowing the prosecution to allege that a set of acts has been
repeatedly done (thereby showing a pattern of overt criminal acts), as has been done in the
present case, we point out that this section does not dispense with the requirement of stating the
essential or material facts of each component or predicate act of plunder; it merely prescribes a rule
of procedure for the prosecution of plunder.
In Estrada v. Sandiganbayan,104 we construed this procedural rule to mean that [w]hat the
prosecution needed to prove beyond reasonable doubt was only the number of acts sufficient to
form a combination or series that would constitute a pattern involving an amount of at least
P50,000,000.00. There was no need to prove each and every other act alleged in the Information to
have been committed by the accused in furtherance of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy to
amass, accumulate, or acquire ill-gotten wealth.105redarclaw
If, for example, the accused is charged in the Information of malversing public funds on twenty
different (20) occasions, the prosecution does not need to prove all 20 transactions; it suffices if a
number of these acts of malversation can be proven with moral certainty, provided only that the
series or combination of transaction would amount to at least P50,000,000.00. Nonetheless, each of
the twenty transactions should be averred with particularity, more so if the circumstances
surrounding each transaction are not the same. This is the only way that the accused can properly
prepare for his defense during trial.
D.3. Paragraph (b) of the Information
As his last requested point, Enrile wants the prosecution to provide the details of the allegation
under paragraph (b) of the Information (i.e., x x x by taking undue advantage, on several occasions,
of their official position, authority, relationships, connections, and influence to unjustly enrich
themselves at the expense and to the damage and prejudice, of the Filipino people and the Republic
of the Philippines) in the following manner:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
Provide the details of how Enrile took undue advantage, on several occasions, of his official
positions, authority, relationships, connections, and influence to unjustly enrich himself at the
expense and to the damage and prejudice, of the Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines.
Was this because he received any money from the government? From whom and for what reason
did he receive any money or property from the government through which he unjustly enriched
himself? State the details from whom each amount was received, the place and the time.
Our ruling on Enriles desired details specifically, the particular overt act/s alleged to constitute
the combination and series charged in the Information; a breakdown of the amounts of the
kickbacks and commissions allegedly received, stating how the amount of P172,834,500.00 was
arrived at; a brief description of the identified projects where kickbacks and commissions were
received; the approximate dates of receipt of the alleged kickbacks and commissions from the
identified projects; the name of Napoles non-government organizations (NGOs) which were the
alleged recipients and/or target implementors of Enriles PDAF projects; and the government
agencies to whom Enrile allegedly endorsed Napoles NGOs renders it unnecessary to require the
prosecution to submit further particulars on the allegations contained under paragraph (b) of the
Information.
Simply put, the particular overt acts alleged to constitute the combination or series required by the
crime of plunder, coupled with a specification of the other non-evidentiary details stated above,
already answer the question of how Enrile took undue advantage of his position, authority,
relationships, connections and influence as Senator to unjustly enrich himself.
We also point out that the PDAF is a discretionary fund intended solely for public purposes. Since
the Information stated that Enrile, as Philippine Senator, committed the offense in relation to his
office, by repeatedly receiving kickbacks or commissions from Napoles and/or her
representatives through projects funded by his (Enriles) PDAF, then it already alleged how undue
advantage had been taken and how the Filipino people and the Republic had been prejudiced.
These points are fairly deducible from the allegations in the Information as supplemented by the
required particulars.
E. The Grave Abuse of Discretion
In the light of all these considerations, we hold that the Sandiganbayans denial of the petitioners
motion for a bill of particulars, on the ground that the details sought to be itemized or specified are
all evidentiary without any explanation supporting this conclusion constitutes grave abuse of
discretion.
As discussed above, some of the desired details are material facts that must be alleged to enable the
petitioner to properly plead and prepare his defense. The Sandiganbayan should have diligently
sifted through each detail sought to be specified, and made the necessary determination of whether
each detail was an ultimate or evidentiary fact, particularly after Enrile stated in his Reply that the
desired details could not be found in the bundle of documents marked by the prosecution. We
cannot insist or speculate that he is feigning ignorance of the presence of these desired details;
neither can we put on him the burden of unearthing from these voluminous documents what the
desired details are. The remedy of a bill of particulars is precisely made available by the Rules to
enable an accused to positively respond and make an intelligent defense.
Justice Carpios reference to the voluminous 144-page Ombudsmans resolution (which found
probable cause to indict the petitioner and his co-accused not only of the crime of plunder, but also
for violations of several counts of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practice Act) to justify his argument
that Enrile was already aware of the details he seeks in his motion for a bill of particulars, all the
more strengthens our conclusive position that the Information for plunder filed against Enrile was
ambiguous and glaringly insufficient to enable him to make a proper plea and to prepare for trial.
We reiterate, to the point of being repetitive, that the purpose of the bill of particulars in criminal
cases is to supply vague facts or allegations in the complaint or information to enable the accused to
properly plead and prepare for trial.
Moreover, a resolution arising from a preliminary investigation does not amount to nor does it
serve the purpose of a bill of particulars.
A bill of particulars guards against the taking of an accused by surprise by restricting the scope of
the proof;106it limits the evidence to be presented by the parties to the matters alleged in the
Information as supplemented by the bill. It is for this reason that the failure of an accused to move
for a bill of particulars deprives him of the right to object to evidence which could be lawfully
introduced and admitted under an information of more or less general terms which sufficiently
charges the defendants with a definite crime.
The record on preliminary investigation, in comparison, serves as the written account of the
inquisitorial process when the fiscal determined the existence of prima facie evidence to indict a
person for a particular crime. The record of the preliminary investigation, as a general rule, does
not even form part of the records of the case.107 These features of the record of investigation are
significantly different from the bill of particulars that serves as basis, together with the Information,
in specifying the overt acts constituting the offense that the accused pleaded to during arraignment.
Notably, plunder is a crime composed of several predicate criminal acts. To prove plunder, the
prosecution must weave a web out of the six ways of illegally amassing wealth and show how the
various acts reveal a combination or series of means or schemes that reveal a pattern of criminality.
The interrelationship of the separate acts must be shown and be established as a scheme to
accumulate ill-gotten wealth amounting to at least P50 million.
Plunder thus involves intricate predicate criminal acts and numerous transactions and schemes
that span a period of time. Naturally, in its prosecution, the State possesses an effective flexibility
of proving a predicate criminal act or transaction, not originally contemplated in the Information,
but is otherwise included in the broad statutory definition, in light of subsequently discovered
evidence. The unwarranted use of the flexibility is what the bill of particulars guards against.
Justice Carpio further argues that the ponencia transformed the nature of an action from an
accusation in writing charging a person with an offense to an initiatory pleading alleging a cause of
action.
We see nothing wrong with such treatment, for a motion for a bill of particulars in criminal cases is
designed to achieve the same purpose as the motion for a bill of particulars in civil cases. In fact,
certainty, to a reasonable extent, is an essential attribute of all pleadings, both civil and criminal,
and is more especially needed in the latter where conviction is followed by penal
consequences.108redarclaw
Thus, even if the Information employs the statutory words does not mean that it is unnecessary to
allege such facts in connection with the commission of the offense as will certainly put the accused
on full notice of what he is called upon to defend, and establish such a record as will effectually bar
a subsequent prosecution for that identical offense.109redarclaw
Notably, conviction for plunder carries with it the penalty of capital punishment; for this reason,
more process is due, not less. When a persons life interest protected by the life, liberty, and
property language recognized in the due process clause is at stake in the proceeding, all measures
must be taken to ensure the protection of those fundamental rights.
As we emphasized in Republic v. Sandiganbayan,110 the administration of justice is not a matter of

guesswork. The name of the game is fair play, not foul play. We cannot allow a legal skirmish where,
from the start, one of the protagonists enters the arena with one arm tied to his back.
Finally, we find no significance in Justice Carpios argument that Atty. Estelito Mendoza did not
previously find vague the Information for plunder filed against President Joseph Estrada in 2001.
Under the amended Information111 against Estrada, et al., each overt act that constituted the series
or combination and corresponding to the predicate acts under Section 1(d) had been averred with
sufficient particularity so that there was no doubt what particular transaction was referred to.
We point out that unlike in the Information against Enrile, the following matters had been averred
with sufficient definiteness, viz: the predicate acts that constitute the crime of plunder; the
breakdown of how the alleged amount of P4,097,804,173.17, more or less, had been arrived at; the
participants involved in each transaction; and the specific sources of the illegal wealth amassed.
At any rate, that Atty. Mendoza did not previously question the indictment of President Estrada via
a motion for bill of particulars does not ipso facto mean that the present Information for plunder
filed against Enrile is not vague and ambiguous.
Sandiganbayan Ground #2:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
That Enriles cited grounds are reiterations of the grounds previously raised
Enrile does not deny that the arguments he raised in his supplemental opposition to issuance of a
warrant of arrest and for dismissal of information and in his motion for bill of particulars were
identical. He argues, however, that the mere reiteration of these grounds should not be a ground for
the denial of his motion for bill of particulars, since the context in which those questions were
raised was entirely different.
While both the motion to dismiss the Information and the motion for bill of particulars involved the
right of an accused to due process, the enumeration of the details desired in Enriles supplemental
opposition to issuance of a warrant of arrest and for dismissal of information and in his motion for
bill of particulars are different viewed particularly from the prism of their respective objectives.
In the former, Enrile took the position that the Information did not state a crime for which he can be
convicted; thus, the Information is void; he alleged a defect of substance. In the latter, he already
impliedly admits that the Information sufficiently alleged a crime but is unclear and lacking in
details that would allow him to properly plead and prepare his defense; he essentially alleged here
a defect of form.
Note that in the former, the purpose is to dismiss the Information for its failure to state the nature
and cause of the accusation against Enrile; while the details desired in the latter (the motion for bill
of particulars) are required to be specified in sufficient detail because the allegations in the
Information are vague, indefinite, or in the form of conclusions and will not allow Enrile to
adequately prepare his defense unless specifications are made.
That every element constituting the offense had been alleged in the Information does not preclude
the accused from requesting for more specific details of the various acts or omissions he is alleged
to have committed. The request for details is precisely the function of a bill of particulars.
Hence, while the information may be sufficient for purposes of stating the cause and the crime an
accused is charged, the allegations may still be inadequate for purposes of enabling him to properly
plead and prepare for trial.
We likewise find no complete congruence between the grounds invoked and the details sought by
Enrile in his motion for bill of particulars, and the grounds invoked in opposing the warrant for his
arrest issued, so that the Sandiganbayans action in one would bar Enrile from essentially invoking
the same grounds.
The judicial determination of probable cause is one made by the judge to ascertain whether a
warrant of arrest should be issued against the accused. The judge must satisfy himself that based on
the evidence submitted, there is necessity for placing the accused under custody in order not to
frustrate the ends of justice.112 Simply put, the judge determines whether the necessity exists to
place the accused under immediate custody to avoid frustrating the ends of justice.
On the other hand, the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure grants the accused the remedy of a bill
of particulars to better inform himself of the specifics or particulars concerning facts or matters
that had not been averred in the Information with the necessary clarity for purposes of his defense.
Its purpose is to better acquaint the accused of the specific acts and/or omissions in relation with
the crime charged, to limit the matters and the evidence that the prosecution may otherwise be
allowed to use against him under a more or less general averment, and to meet the charges head on
and timely object to evidence whose inadmissibility may otherwise be deemed waived.
Based on these considerations, the question of whether there is probable cause to issue a warrant
of arrest against an accused, is separate and distinct from the issue of whether the allegations in the
Information have been worded with sufficient definiteness to enable the accused to properly plead
and prepare his defense. While the grounds cited for each may seemingly be the same, they are
submitted for different purposes and should be appreciated from different perspectives, so that the
insufficiency of these grounds for one does not necessarily translate to insufficiency for the other.
Thus, the resolution of the issue of probable cause should not bar Enrile from seeking a more
detailed averment of the allegations in the Information.
The Sandiganbayan grossly missed these legal points and thus gravely abused its discretion: it used
wrong and completely inapplicable considerations to support its conclusion.
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
a. We PARTIALLY GRANT the present petition for certiorari, and SET ASIDE the Sandiganbayans
resolutions dated July 11, 2014, which denied Enriles motion for bill of particulars and his motion
for reconsideration of this denial.
b. We DIRECT the People of the Philippines to SUBMIT, within a non-extendible period of fifteen
(15) days from finality of this Decision, with copy furnished to Enrile, a bill of particulars containing
the facts sought that we herein rule to be material and necessary. The bill of particulars shall
specifically contain the following:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
1. The particular overt act/s alleged to constitute the combination or series of overt criminal acts
charged in the Information.
2. A breakdown of the amounts of the kickbacks or commissions allegedly received, stating how
the amount of P172,834,500.00 was arrived at.
3. A brief description of the identified projects where kickbacks or commissions were received.
4. The approximate dates of receipt, in 2004 to 2010 or thereabout, of the alleged kickbacks and
commissions from the identified projects. At the very least, the prosecution should state the year
when the kickbacks and transactions from the identified projects were received.
5. The name of Napoles non-government organizations (NGOs) which were the alleged recipients
and/or target implementors of Enriles PDAF projects.
6. The government agencies to whom Enrile allegedly endorsed Napoles NGOs. The particular
person/s in each government agency who facilitated the transactions need not be named as a
particular.
All particulars prayed for that are not included in the above are hereby denied.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 140208 March 12, 2002
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ELPIDIO PASTOR, accused-appellant.
PUNO, J.:
For automatic review is the decision of the Regional Trial Court of the City of Tagbilaran, Branch 2,
in Criminal Case No. 10283, dated August 30, 1999, finding accused-appellant Elpidio Pastor guilty
of incestuous rape and sentencing him to suffer the supreme penalty of death with its accessory
penalties, to indemnify the complainant Maria Nia R. Pastor the sum of P75,000.00, and to pay the
costs.1
In an Information2 dated March 12, 1999, accused-appellant was charged with the crime of
Incestuous Rape, committed as follows:
"That on or about the 7th day of May, 1998, in the Municipality of Loon, Province of Bohol,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused with lewd
designs, entered the room of his own daughter, Maria Nia R. Pastor (accused being the biological
father of the victim), a 13-year-old girl, and once inside did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, by means of force and intimidation, lie on top of her, insert his penis in the vagina of the
said offended victim, Maria Nia R. Pastor, and succeeded in having carnal knowledge of her against
her will and without her consent resulting in the pregnancy of the victim, to the damage and
prejudice of the latter.1wphi1.nt
Acts committed in violation of Sec. 2, Art. 266-B, par. 1, of RA 8353, amending [Article] 335 of the
Revised Penal Code."
On April 8, 1999, accused-appellant was arraigned and, with the assistance of PAO lawyer Atty.
Perpetuo Magallano, entered a plea of not guilty.
During the hearing on June 23, 1999, Atty. Adriano Damalerio of PAO manifested that after a
conference with accused-appellant, the latter had decided to change his plea from Not Guilty to
Guilty. The trial court ordered that the previous plea of not guilty be set aside and that accused-
appellant be arraigned anew. Upon re-arraignment, accused-appellant entered a plea of guilty to
the Information which was read and translated to him in the Visayan dialect. Thereafter, the trial
court propounded clarificatory questions to accused-appellant to ascertain whether he understood
the consequences of his plea.
Accused-appellant then testified on the mitigating circumstances of plea of guilty, voluntary

surrender and drunkenness which is not habitual. The prosecution admitted the plea of guilty and
voluntary surrender. Accused-appellant offered evidence to prove drunkenness. He testified that on
May 7, 1998, he drank tuba and in his drunkenness, he was led to think bad about his daughter,
herein complainant, because his wife left him. He claims that it was never his intention to rape his
daughter.3
Subsequently, the prosecution was ordered to prove the culpability of accused-appellant.

Complainant Maria Nia testified that on May 7, 1998, at about 3 o'clock in the morning, she was
raped by her father, herein accused-appellant, in their house at Catagbacan Sur, Loon, Bohol. Her
parents were already separated at that time and her mother was living in Manila. Complainant was
impregnated4 and gave birth on December 12, 1998.5 On cross examination, complainant testified
that she was 13 years old at the time of the incident;6 that she had a premature delivery and her
baby died five days after birth; that nobody forced her to file the complaint against accused-
appellant; and that she pursued the prosecution of the case against accused-appellant knowing that
he may be sentenced to death.7
On August 30, 1999, the court a quo rendered judgment finding accused-appellant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of incestuous rape. It nevertheless recommended the commutation
of the sentence from death to reclusion perpetua by reason of the remorseful attitude exhibited by
accused-appellant. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
"WHEREFORE, in Criminal Case No. 10283, the Court finds accused ELPIDIO PASTOR, guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Incestuous Rape, defined under Par 1 (a) of Article 266-A and
penalized under Par 5, No. (1) of Article 266-B, of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic
Act No. 8353, and hereby sentences said accused ELPIDIO PASTOR to suffer the supreme and
indivisible penalty of DEATH, in the manner provided for by law, with the accessory penalties of the
law, to indemnify the offended party, Maria Nia R. Pastor the sum of P75,000.00, and to pay the
costs.
The Court herein was saved of its precious time in conducting (a) full-dress trial because the
accused pleaded guilty. The prosecution even conformed to accused' (sic) claim of the mitigating
circumstances of voluntary surrender and spontaneous plea of guilt.
When the accused took the witness stand to prove the circumstance of drunkenness, which is not
habitual, which was not conceded by the prosecution, we found him to be meditative and
remorseful, a behaviour which is quite different from other death-row convicts, who despite the
onus of the evidence against them, with insistence, persist in needlessly taxing the court on their
claim of innocence, all throughout the trial and even after the affirmance of their conviction by our
Highest Court. We believe that accused herein should not be equated to the likes of these calloused
and non-repentant offenders.
It is therefore on the basis of the foregoing circumstances, and in the highest interest of humane
and compassionate justice, that we are minded of the provisions of Article 5, paragraph 2 of the
Revised Penal Code, and hereby, without suspending the execution of the sentence herein,
recommends unto the President of the Republic of the Philippines, thru the Secretary of Justice, the
commutation of accused' (sic) sentence from death to reclusion perpetua.
Accordingly, let copy of this decision be furnished the Secretary of Justice, Padre Faura, Manila, for
whatever recommendation he may deem proper to His Excellency, the President of the Republic of
the Philippines.
SO ORDERED."
In his appellant's brief, accused-appellant avers that the trial court gravely erred in not applying the
guidelines for a plea of guilty to a capital offense provided in Section 3, Rule 116 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure. Specifically, it is contended that the trial court failed to conduct a
searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences of the
accused-appellant's plea, pursuant to the ruling laid down in the cases of People vs. Bello8 and
People vs. Dayot.9 Allegedly, the questions propounded to the accused-appellant were limited to his
family background and personal circumstances. Accused-appellant thus prays that the case be
remanded to the court a quo for a full-blown trial.
Section 3, Rule 116 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure provides, viz:
"SEC. 3. Plea of guilty to capital offense; reception of evidence. - When the accused pleads guilty to a
and the precise degree of his culpability. The accused may present evidence in his behalf."
When a plea of guilty to a capital offense is entered, the trial court is duty bound to: (1) conduct a
searching inquiry into the voluntariness of the plea and the accused's full comprehension of the
consequences thereof; (2) require the prosecution to present evidence to prove the guilt of the
accused and the precise degree of his culpability; and (3) inquire from the accused if he desires to
present evidence on his behalf and allow him to do so if he desires.10 The rationale behind the rule
is that the courts must proceed with more care where the possible punishment is in its severest
form, namely death, for the reason that the execution of such a sentence is irrevocable and
experience has shown that innocent persons have at times pleaded guilty.11 Moreover, the
requirement of taking further evidence would aid this Court on appellate review in determining the
propriety or impropriety of the plea.12
I.
Anent the first requirement, the searching inquiry must determine whether the plea of guilt was
based on a free and informed judgment. Hence, it must focus on (1) the voluntariness of the plea,
and (2) the full comprehension of the consequences of the plea.13 Although there is no definite and
concrete rule as to how a trial judge must conduct a "searching inquiry," we have held that the
following guidelines should be observed:
1. Ascertain from the accused himself (a) how he was brought into the custody of the law; (b)
whether he had the assistance of a competent counsel during the custodial and preliminary
investigations; and (c) under what conditions he was detained and interrogated during the
investigations. This is intended to rule out the possibility that the accused has been coerced or
placed under a state of duress either by actual threats of physical harm coming from malevolent
quarters or simply because of the judge's intimidating robes.
2. Ask the defense counsel a series of questions as to whether he had conferred with, and
completely explained to, the accused the meaning and consequences of a plea of guilty.
3. Elicit information about the personality profile of the accused, such as his age, socio-economic
status, and educational background, which may serve as a trustworthy index of his capacity to give
a free and informed plea of guilty.
4. Inform the accused the exact length of imprisonment or nature of the penalty under the law and
the certainty that he will serve such sentence. For not infrequently, an accused pleads guilty in the
hope of a lenient treatment or upon bad advice or because of promises of the authorities or parties
of a lighter penalty should he admit guilt or express remorse. It is the duty of the judge to ensure
that the accused does not labor under these mistaken impressions because a plea of guilty carries
with it not only the admission of authorship of the crime proper but also of the aggravating
circumstances attending it, that increase punishment.14
5. Inquire if the accused knows the crime with which he is charged and fully explain to him the
elements of the crime which is the basis of his indictment. Failure of the court to do so would
constitute a violation of his fundamental right to be informed of the precise nature of the accusation
against him and a denial of his right to due process.15
6. All questions posed to the accused should be in a language known and understood by the
latter.16
7. The trial judge must satisfy himself that the accused, in pleading guilty, is truly guilty. The
accused must be required to narrate the tragedy or reenact the crime or furnish its missing
details.17
In the case at bar, the records will show that the trial court miserably failed to discharge its duty to
conduct a "searching inquiry," to wit:
"ATTY. ADRIANO DAMALERIO:
Yes, your Honor, and the accused is now ready to enter a plea of Guilty, and I would like to manifest,
Your Honor, that the accused was already arraigned and he entered the plea of Not Guilty and he
would like to change his plea of Not Guilty to Guilty, Your Honor, and we move that the earlier plea
of Not Guilty be vacated and the accused be re-arraigned.
COURT:
Let the previous plea of Not Guilty by the accused Elpidio Pastor be set aside and re-arraign the
accused now.
COURT:
Call the accused, Elpidio Pastor, and arraign the accused.
RECORD:
COURT INTERPRETER: reads the Information of Incestuous Rape and translated the same to the
accused in Visayan vernacular.
COURT TO ACCUSED ELPIDIO PASTOR:
Let's ask the accused Elpidio Pastor, whether he understood the Information read and translated to
him in the Visayan vernacular.
COURT INTERPRETER TO THE ACCUSED:
Q Do you understand the Information read to you?
ACCUSED ELPIDIO PASTOR:
A Yes, Your Honor.
COURT:
Q Now, having understood the Information, Mr. Elpidio Pastor, what is your plea, guilty or not
guilty?
ACCUSED ELPIDIO PASTOR:
A I admit, Your Honor, that I have committed a sin.
COURT:
Enter a plea of Guilty as expressed by accused Elpidio Pastor through his very own mouth, upon his
re-arraignment today.
COURT TO ELPIDIO PASTOR:
Q You are Elpidio Pastor?

A Yes, Your Honor.
Q How old are you?

A 35 years old, Your Honor.
Q You are married?

A Yes, Your Honor.
Q What is the name of your wife?

A Josefina Requello.
Q You and your wife were married in church?

A Yes, Your Honor.
Q Do you have children?

A Yes, Your Honor, five (5) children.
Q Tell the Court the names of your children?

A Goldelyn the eldest.
Q How old is Goldelyn now?

A 16 years old.
Q Where is Goldelyn now?

A She is in Mindanao, Don Carlos, Mindanao.
Q Your second child, what is the name?

A Maria Nia, Your Honor.
Q Maria Nia is the private complainant in this case?

A Yes, Your Honor.
Q How old is Maria Nia?

Q Maria Nia was living with you during the incident?

A Yes, Your Honor.
Q The third child, what is the name?

A Joel.
Q How old is Joel?

Q How about the 4th child?

A Rodel.
Q How old is Rodel?

Q And the 5th child?

A Jenelyn.
Q How old is Jenelyn?

A 8 years old.
Q Your wife Josefina is living with you?

A We got separated, Your Honor, she left for Manila and she did not return because she had a
boyfriend.
Q Of the five (5) children, how many children were living with you at that time of the incident?
A Four (4), Your Honor.
Q Who supported your four (4) children, Maria Nia, Joel, Rodel and Jenelyn?
A Me and my mother.
Q Why, what is your work?

A Fisherman, Your Honor.
Q You have changed your plea from Not Guilty to Guilty, is this correct?
A Yes, Your Honor, that is true that I have committed a sin.
Q Nobody has forced you to plead guilty to this Information?

A None, Your Honor.
Q In other words, your pleading guilty is your free and voluntary act?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q Do you know that by pleading guilty you may be sentenced to a death penalty?
A I do not know what will be the outcome of my pleading guilty, Your Honor.
Q The Court is now telling you, that by pleading guilty you may be sentenced to a death penalty.
A Yes, Your Honor, I understand.
Q Despite of your knowledge, you still insist on your plea of guilt?

A Yes, Your Honor.
COURT:
No further questions.
ATTY. ADRIANO DAMALERIO:
Your Honor, we would like to present the accused himself to the witness stand to prove three (3)
mitigating circumstances: First, the plea of guilt; Second, voluntary surrender; and Third,
drunkenness which is not habitual and at that time of the incident, Your Honor, he was drunk.
COURT TO COUNSELS:
I have to inform counsels that in cases of Incestuous Rape, neither mitigating nor aggravating
circumstances cannot (sic) be availed of.
Only to save him, Your Honor, for (sic) the penalty of death.
COURT:
Okay, let's hear the accused.

Call the accused to the witness stand.
xxx xxx xxx
The purpose of the testimony of Elpidio Pastor, Your Honor, is to prove the three (3) mitigating
circumstances: 1. Plea of guilt; 2. Voluntary surrender; and 3. Drunkenness which is not habitual,
Your Honor.
FISCAL HELEN T. CABATOS:
We admit the plea of guilt, Your Honor, and the voluntary surrender, Your Honor.
xxx xxx xxx

DIRECT EXAMINATION ON ELPIDIO PASTOR

BY: ATTY. ADRIANO DAMALERIO
Q You have just admitted and in fact pleaded guilty to the crime which accordingly committed
(sic) on May 7, 1998, now please tell the Court why did you do this kind of crime and what led you
to do this crime?
A I have drunk tuba.
Q And what did you feel after you drunk tuba?

A A little bit tipsy.
Q You mean you are drunk?

A Yes, sir.
Q And because of that drunkenness, what did you do?

A I was led to think bad about my daughter because my wife left me.
xxx xxx xxx
CROSS EXAMINATION:
xxx xxx xxx
Q I said, this is not the first time that you were drunk?
A There are times that I got drunk but that was the only time that I committed that kind of
incident.
xxx xxx xxx
COURT:
xxx xxx xxx
Q Now, did you purposely take tuba in order to commit crime (sic) against your child?
A When I drunk (sic), Your Honor, that was not my intention to do it."18
The questions propounded by the trial court failed to show the voluntariness of the plea of guilt of
accused-appellant nor did the questions demonstrate that he fully understood the consequences of
his plea.
First, all the questions propounded by the court were couched in English but there is nothing in the
records to show that accused-appellant had a good comprehension, or at least, a nodding
acquaintance with the English language. The records also do not show whether the judge translated
and explained his questions to accused-appellant in a language or dialect known and understood by
the latter.19 Accused-appellant is a simple fisherman and his educational background is unknown.
Second, the trial court failed to explain to accused-appellant the elements of the crime of rape.
Moreover, when the trial court asked accused-appellant if he knew that by pleading guilty he may
be sentenced to a death penalty, the latter answered "I do not know what will be the outcome of my
pleading guilty, Your Honor." Given the vagueness of accused-appellant's answer, the trial court
went no further to find out whether or not he fully comprehended the consequences of his plea. In
addition, accused-appellant was not categorically advised that his plea of guilt would not under any
circumstance affect or reduce his sentence. The records reveal that it was the defense counsel, not
accused-appellant, who was informed and warned by the court that in cases of incestuous rape,
mitigating and aggravating circumstances do not matter.20 When accused-appellant attempted to
prove the mitigating circumstances of plea of guilty, voluntary surrender and drunkenness, he was
under the mistaken assumption that his liability would be reduced.21 He was not warned that the
penalty of death is indivisible and is not affected by either aggravating or mitigating
circumstances.22 The trial court's statement that by pleading guilty he "may" be sentenced to a
death penalty is inadequate. It should have warned him, in a language that cannot be
misinterpreted, that should the court find that the qualifying circumstances alleged in the
information were proved during the trial, along with the elements of the crime of rape, he would be
meted the death penalty.23
Third, when accused-appellant was questioned by the court as to the act he committed, he
answered that he "was led to think bad about my daughter because my wife left me." Again, the
answer is hardly comprehensible yet, the court failed to probe deeper into the material details of
the crime.
We hold that in the absence of a "searching inquiry" into the voluntariness of the plea of guilt of
accused-appellant and his full comprehension of the consequences thereof, the re-arraignment of
accused-appellant is fatally flawed.
II.
The second requirement prescribes that the trial court must order the prosecution to prove the
guilt of the accused-appellant and the precise degree of his culpability beyond reasonable doubt. It
must be stressed that under the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, a conviction in capital offenses
cannot rest alone on a plea of guilt. The prosecution evidence must be sufficient to sustain a
judgment of conviction independently of the plea of guilty.24
In the case at bar, complainant Maria Nia testified as follows:
"Q Ma. Nia, the accused in this case is Elpidio Pastor, how are you related to him?
A My father.
Q If your father is inside this court room today please point (sic) him?
A That one, ma'am.
xxx xxx xxx
Q Were you present during the arraignment of your father, the accused in this case?
A Yes, maam.
Q And you heard him pleaded (sic) guilty to the crime charge (sic)?
A Yes maam, I heard.
Q Having heard your father admitted (sic) the crime charged against him, do you still insist to
pursue in prosecuting this case?
A Yes, Your Honor.
COURT:
Record that the witness is crying.
xxx xxx xxx
Q Now, if you can recall, when was that that your father raped you?
A May 7, 1998.
Q Where did it happen?

A In our house.
Q Where is your house located?

A Catagbacan Sur, Loon, Bohol.
Q Can you recall what time was that, that your father sexually abused you?
A That was 3:00 o'clock dawn.
Q By the way, where was your mother at that time when your father sexually abused you?
A My mother is not there.
xxx xxx xxx
Q What was the result of that sexual abused (sic) committed by your father on May 7, 1998?
A I got ill and always vomit.
Q What was the caused (sic) of vomiting?

A I was pregnant.
Q Were you examined by a doctor, to prove that you were pregnant of that rape incident?
A Yes, maam.
xxx xxx xxx
Q Now, you said that you were pregnant, eventually did you give birth of (sic) a child?
A Yes, maam.
Q When did you give birth?

A December 12, 1998.
Q And where is your baby now?

A She died.
xxx xxx xxx
Q What did you feel about the sexual assault committed by your father against you?
A I'm mad.
Q What else did you feel?

A Angry.
Q Is that all your feelings because of this incident?

A I'm also sad.
xxx xxx xxx
FISCAL HELEN T. CABATOS:
No further questions, Your Honor.
COURT:
Cross.
No cross, Your Honor, accused had already pleaded guilty."25
The prosecution formally offered its documentary evidence which consist of the birth certificate of
complainant to prove that she was 13 years old at the time of the incident and that accused-
appellant is her father,26 and two medical certificates, one showing that complainant has been
pregnant for 23-3/7 weeks,27 and the other that she gave birth to a baby girl who died five days
thereafter.28
As heretofore discussed, the plea of guilty of accused-appellant was made improvidently.

Convictions based on an improvident plea of guilt are set aside if such plea is the sole basis of the
judgment. If, however, the trial court relied on sufficient and credible evidence to convict the
accused, the conviction must be sustained, because then it is predicated not merely on the guilty
plea of the accused but on evidence proving his commission of the offense charged.29
A perusal of the decision of the trial court will reveal that the judge failed to state the factual and
legal reasons on which he based accused-appellant's conviction. The judge merely stated that the
complainant "positively declared that on May 7, 1998, her father (the accused in this case), without
her consent, forcibly obtained carnal knowledge with her, which resulted in her being pregnant."
He then concluded that the lone testimony of the victim, if credible, is enough to sustain a
conviction, and made a bare recital of Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A.
8353. There is no discussion of the facts of the case and the qualifying circumstances alleged in the
information, in utter disregard of the constitutional injunction that "no decision shall be rendered
by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is
based."30
Also, there is no evaluation of the evidence and no reason given why the court found that the
testimony of the complainant is credible. We note that the first question asked of the complainant in
her direct examination was if she could recall when she was raped by the accused-appellant. It did
not elicit the specific details as to how the rape was committed against complainant. The
prosecution simply presumed that the complainant was indeed raped on the basis of the plea of
guilty of accused-appellant.
Moreover, there was practically no evidence presented to prove force and intimidation as well as
the relationship of accused-appellant with complainant. It is true that our jurisprudence is replete
with cases where the moral ascendancy of a parent over his child has been allowed to justify a
finding that there was intimidation sufficient to convict the accused of incestuous rape. However, in
the case of People vs. Alberto Chua,31 we held that the mere fact that accused-appellant is her
father and therefore exercises moral ascendancy over his daughter cannot ipso facto justify this
Court to conclude that the victim was intimidated. Thus, we held:
"There must be some evidence of intimidation employed on the victim as to indubitably show how
vitiated the victim's consent was to the violation of her womanhood. After all, rape is committed
against or without the consent of the victim. x x x The court cannot rely on presumptions of moral
ascendancy x x x [which] cannot and should not prevail over the constitutional presumption of
innocence. Force or intimidation is an element of the crime of rape. There must, therefore, be proof
beyond reasonable doubt that the victim did not resist her defloration due to the moral ascendancy
of the accused."
We have ruled that it is the concurrence of the minority of the victim and her relationship with the
offender that would qualify the rape as heinous and thus justify the imposition of the supreme
penalty.32 Both qualifying circumstances of age and relationship must be alleged in the information
and proved during the trial. In the case at bar, the qualifying circumstance of relationship was not
established beyond moral certainty. The rule is that relationship, as a qualifying circumstance of
rape, must be proved beyond reasonable doubt, just as the crime itself. It has been held that the
bare testimony of the complainant and the admission of accused-appellant as to their relationship
is not sufficient.33 The birth certificate of herein complainant which was not duly certified cannot
be given probative value insofar as the relationship of complainant with accused-appellant is
concerned.34 Since the relationship of complainant to accused-appellant has not been sufficiently
established, it was error for the trial court to impose the penalty of death.
In addition, the trial court, in convicting accused-appellant, considered pieces of evidence presented
by the prosecution that are inadmissible for being hearsay. The prosecution merely asked
complainant to identify the two medical certificates relating to her pregnancy without presenting
the doctors who issued the certifications to testify thereon. The defense counsel failed to object to
the documentary evidence of the prosecution and worse, even expressed his conformity to its
admission. Such lapses should not have been allowed by the trial court considering that it was
trying a case where a life was at stake. Life cannot be lost due to the ignorance of counsel.
III.
Under the third requirement, the court must ask the accused if he desires to present evidence on his
behalf and allow him to do so if he desires. In the present case, there is nothing in the records to
show that accused-appellant was informed, either by his counsel or by the court, of his right to
present evidence, if he so desires.
Very glaring is the manifest lack of enthusiasm of the defense counsel, Atty. Damalerio, for his
client's cause when he refused to cross examine the complainant, on the pretext that accused-
appellant has pleaded guilty. We reiterate that it is the bounden duty of lawyers to protect the
constitutional right of an accused even when he has pleaded guilty to the crime charged, viz.:
"It may be so that defense counsel personally found Oleby's testimony to be believable.
Nonetheless, he had the bounden duty to scrutinize private complainant's testimony to ensure that
the accused's constitutional right to confront and examine the witnesses against him was not
rendered for naught.
It bears pointing out that in rape cases, it is often the word of the complainant against that of the
accused, the two being the only persons present during the commission of the offense. While the
lone testimony of the victim is sufficient to convict the accused, such testimony must be clear,
positive, convincing and consistent with human nature and the normal course of things.
Complainant's testimony cannot be accepted with precipitate credulity without denying the
accused's constitutional right to be presumed innocent. This is where cross examination becomes
essential to test the credibility of the witnesses, expose falsehoods or half-truths, uncover the truth
which rehearsed direct examination testimonies may successfully suppress, and demonstrate
inconsistencies in substantial matters which create reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused
and thus to give substance to the constitutional right of the accused to confront the witnesses
against him. For unless proven otherwise to be guilty beyond all reasonable doubt, the accused is
presumed to be innocent. 1wphi1.nt
xxx xxx xxx
Atty. Brotonel, as counsel de oficio, had the duty to defend his client and protect his rights, no
matter how guilty or evil he perceives accused-appellant to be. The performance of this duty was all
the more imperative because the life of accused-appellant hangs in the balance. His duty was no less
because he was counsel de oficio."35
This utter lack of concern is further aggravated by Atty. Damalerio's lackadaisical and perfunctory
discharge of his obligation to present evidence in behalf of accused-appellant. After the prosecution
rested its case, Atty. Damalerio manifested that since the accused-appellant had already pleaded
guilty, he is not presenting any defense, and merely prayed that his client be credited with the
mitigating circumstances earlier claimed by him.36 To say the least, Atty. Damalerio's attitude falls
short of the noble duty of a lawyer to defend an accused however guilty he may appear to be if only
to assure that his prosecution is in accord with the procedure laid down by our law. In cannot be
over emphasized that even the guilty cannot be prosecuted by means revolting to the civilized
demands of due process.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the judgment appealed from is SET ASIDE. The case is REMANDED to the trial
court for further proceedings in accord with the guidelines set forth in this Decision.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 128289 April 23, 2002
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
GREGORIO LIMA y SILPA, accused-appellant.
PER CURIAM:
Among the heinous crimes, none stirs up so much public outrage, repulsion and hatred than
incestuous rape. It is so odious and disgusting that the perpetrator rightfully must feel the anger
and spurn of society. Indeed, a father who stains the purity and dignity of his own flesh and blood
has reduced himself to the lowliest of lowly beasts.
Gregorio S. Lima was charged by her own daughter, Sherilyn Lima, before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 17, Davao City, with two counts of rape under the following informations:
Criminal Case No. 36,517-961
"The undersigned accuses the above-named accused of the crime of rape under Art. 335 of the
Revised Penal Code, upon the instance of the complainant, Sherilyn B. Lima, who is a minor, and her
mother, Erlinda B. Lima, and witness SPO2 Ricardo M. Arcilla, whose affidavits are hereto attached
to form part of this information. The crime is committed as follows:
"That sometime in 1992, in the City of Davao, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-mentioned accused, by means of force and intimidation and abuse of
superior strength, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge
with her daughter, Sherilyn B. Lima, a minor who is below fourteen (14) years of age, against her
will.
"Contrary to law."
Criminal case No. 36,380-962
"The undersigned, SHERILYN LIMA Y BARLIZO, after having been duly sworn according to law,
accuses her father, GREGORIO LIMA Y SILPA of the crime of rape, under Art. 335, par. 1 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act 7659, committed as follows:
"That on or about January 20, 1996, in the City of Davao, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-mentioned accused by means of force and intimidation, did, then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with the undersigned
complainant, who is 14 years of age against her will.
"Contrary to law."
The two cases were originally raffled to the two branches of the said RTC. When arraigned
separately on the two Informations, accused pleaded "Not guilty." Thereafter, the two cases were
consolidated in Branch 17.
On November 20, 1996, counsel for the accused manifested that the latter would change his plea of
not guilty to both charges.3 Upon rearraignment, he entered a plea of "Guilty." Thereafter, upon
order of the trial court, the prosecution presented its evidence and rested its case.
The prosecutions evidence consisted of the testimonies of the victim, Sherilyn Lima, her mother,
Erlinda Lima, SP02 Ricardo Arcilla, and Dr. Danilo P. Ledesma.
Sherilyn was 15 years old when she testified in court on November 20, 1996 about her harrowing
experience in the hands of her very own father. She identified her Certificate of Live Birth4 which
indicates that she was born on August 14, 1981 in Davao City, and that her father is Gregorio Silpa
Lima, the accused. She narrated that sometime in 1992, when she was only 10 years old, her father,
whom she identified in court, raped her in their house located in Sitio Concepcion, Indangan,
Buhangin, Davao City. He warned her not to inform anyone about that incident lest he would kill all
of their family members. Because of fear that he would harm them, she did not tell her mother what
he did to her. Since that incident in 1992, she had been repeatedly ravished by the accused on
occasions when her mother was out of the house. In all those instances, she repeatedly pleaded to
him to stop abusing her, but her pleas only fell on deaf ears.5
Sherilyn further testified that in the evening of January 20, 1996, when she was 14 years old, she
was sleeping in the sala of their house together with her brothers. At that time, her mother was
attending a birthday party in her sisters place about 16 kilometers away. Sherilyn was roused from
her sleep by the accused, telling her to transfer to the masters bedroom. When she asked why, he
replied that he would do something to her. Inside the room, he instructed her to undress and lie
down. He then placed himself on top of her, kissed her private parts, and inserted his organ into her
vagina. Sherilyn felt extreme pain in her vagina while he was raping her. But she could not resist for
fear he would kill her.6
According to Erlinda Lima, Sherilyns mother, at around 10:00 in the evening of the same date, she
arrived home and noticed that the gate of the house was locked from inside. She then entered the
gate of her brother-in-law, which was beside their house, and proceeded to her house. When she
entered the masters bedroom, she was surprised to find Sherilyn sleeping on the bed. She
approached her daughter, removed the blanket and saw her totally naked. Erlinda told her to dress
up because they were attending her nephews birthday party. At that moment, the accused went out
to open the gate. When he returned, Erlinda did not let him notice her suspicion. On their way to the
house of Erlindas sister, Sherilyn cried as she confided to her mother that the accused raped her.
She also told her mother that when she was ten, or four years earlier, she was already ravished by
her father. Thereupon, Erlinda brought Sherilyn to the police station and reported the rape
incidents.
In the course of her testimony, Erlinda also identified and confirmed the Certificate of Live Birth
(Exhibit "B") of her daughter and further testified that she is legally married to accused Gregorio
Lima.7
Meanwhile, at midnight of that same day, January 20, 1996, SPO2 Ricardo Arcilla and several
policemen, together with Sherilyn and her mother, proceeded to the house of accused. SP02 Arcilla
invited him to go with them to the police station, but the latter resisted. Forthwith, Arcilla asked a
fellow policeman to handcuff the accused and brought him to the police station.8
Thereafter, Dr. Danilo P. Ledesma, Medico-legal Officer of the Davao City Health Office, physically
examined Sherilyn and found "old healed deep lacerations at 3 and 8 oclock positions" in her
hymen. He also observed that her "hymenal orifice...admits a tube 3.0 in diameter." He estimated
that the lacerations could be more than four (4) months old, or possibly more than three (3) years
old. He also found spermatozoa in her vaginal canal. These findings are reflected in the Medical
Certificate he issued on January 22, 1996.9
The accused pleaded guilty to the charges. He testified that on January 21, 1996, the police went to
his house and invited him to the police station for investigation regarding the rape incident. He then
extended his two arms to be handcuffed showing that he voluntarily surrendered.10 He already
knew that his wife Erlinda and daughter Sherilyn would go to the police station to have him
arrested. He declared that her daughter "agreed" to what he had done to her "because she used to
get money from my wallet, (so) she cannot refuse anymore." When asked why he raped his
daughter, he answered, "Because at times that I am drunk, I lost my composure and Sherilyn used
to lay down inside my room." He also admitted having raped her when she was 10 years old.11
The defense rested its case with the prayer that the "voluntary plea of guilty and voluntary
surrender" be appreciated as mitigating circumstances so as to reduce the penalty to be imposed
upon the accused.12
On November 29, 1996, the trial court rendered a Joint Judgment,13 the dispositive portion of
which reads:
"Accordingly, finding the evidence of the prosecution more than sufficient to prove the guilt of the
accused Gregorio Lima Y Silpa beyond reasonable doubt of the offense charged for rape under
Criminal Case No. 36, 517-96, said accused is sentenced to suffer an indivisible penalty of reclusion
perpetua pursuant to Art. 335, par. 3 of the Revised Penal Code, together with all the accessory
penalty attached therewith in accordance with law.
"In Criminal Case No. 36,380-96, finding the evidence of the prosecution, notwithstanding the plea
of guilty of the accused voluntarily entered, more than sufficient to prove beyond reasonable doubt
the guilt of accused, pursuant to Republic Act 7659, Sec. 11 thereof, sub-paragraph 7, accused
Gregorio Lima y Silpa is sentenced to suffer the supreme penalty of death by electrocution pursuant
to sec. 24 of R.A. 7659 in the manner therein provided, subject to such other method of carrying out
his sentence as may be provided for by law, under existing procedure or maybe regulated through
other means such as lethal injection to be executed in the manner and procedure therein provided.
"Moreover, pursuant to Art. 100, in relation to Art. 104 of the Revised Penal Code, governing civil
indemnity, accused is furthermore ordered to indemnify complainant Sherilyn Lima... the amount of
P30,000.00 by way of moral damages of all the ignominy and sufferings she incurred out of accused
demonic act of sexually abusing his own daughter.1wphi1.nt
"x x x." (Emphasis supplied)
In this appeal, appellant asserts, as his lone assignment of error, that "the trial court gravely erred
in convicting (him) on an improvident plea of guilty and sentencing him to suffer reclusion
perpetua (in Criminal Case No. 36,517-96) and the supreme penalty of death (in Criminal Case No.
36,380-96)."14
Appellant argues, in essence, that his plea in both cases was "improvident, fatally defective and
void" because the trial court failed to observe the mandatory provisions of Sec. 3, Rule 116 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which provides
"Sec. 3. Plea of guilty to capital offense; reception of evidence - When the accused pleads guilty to a
comprehension of the consequences of his plea and require the prosecution to prove his guilt and
the precise degree of culpability. The accused may also present evidence in his behalf."
Appellant claims that nothing on record shows that: a) he understood the two (2) separate charges
against him; and b) he was made to understand and was specifically warned that in Crim. Case No.
36,380-96, he shall be sentenced to death and that his plea of guilty shall not in any way affect or
reduce the penalty.
The records of the proceedings during the rearraignment of appellant show how he entered his
plea of guilty, thus:
"ATTY ARIQUEZ: For the accused. We would like to inform the Honorable Court that the accused
intend to withdraw his plea of not guilty to both charges and instead enters a plea of guilty to both
charges.
COURT: Does he understand the consequences of this?
ATTY. ARIQUEZ: Yes, your Honor.
COURT: Alright, re-arraign the accused.

COURT INTERPRETER:
Reading both informations to accused:
ACCUSED: GUILTY.
COURT: In these two informations against you, you understand the extent and implication of your
plea of guilty?
ACCUSED: I know, your Honor because I committed a mistake.
COURT: Were these matters explained and fully understood by you upon assistance by your
counsel?
ACCUSED: Yes, I was advised by my lawyer and I understand what he explained to me, very clearly.
COURT: I would like to explain to you and understand, that upon your plea of guilty on the two
offenses, very serious offenses, in fact, capital offenses, you may be sentenced to life or death
penalty, you understand that?
ACCUSED: Whatever will be the judgment I will gladly accept it Your Honor.
COURT: The court is explaining to you the consequences now, did you understand the explanation
given to you by the court?
ACCUSED: I understand your Honor.
COURT: Do you still insist that you plead guilty in these two offenses just read to you?
ACCUSED: Yes, I will accept it.
COURT: Were you forced or intimidated or unduly influenced by anybody in your plea of guilty in
these two offenses?
ACCUSED: No one has forced me to admit the two charges, it is voluntary on my part.
COURT: In other words, despite the explanation of the court and your lawyer, it is voluntary on
your part that you will plead guilty to the two offenses?
ACCUSED: It is my voluntary plea of guilty in these two cases.
COURT: The court is convinced on the voluntariness of plea of guilty of accused in both cases, but
considering the matter of these charges against the accused, capital offenses, and pursuant to the
ruling of the Supreme Court, despite his plea of guilty, the prosecution will still present its evidence
against the accused, and the accused, if the defense decides to present, the court will receive his
evidence, despite his plea of guilty."15
Appellants theory does not convince us.
There is no definite and concrete rule as to how a trial judge may go about the matter of a proper
"searching inquiry" as required by the aforecited rule.16 It is incumbent upon a trial judge to
ascertain and be totally convinced that the plea of guilty was voluntarily made and its consequences
fully comprehended by the accused.
In the present case, to fully determine whether such voluntariness and comprehension attended
appellants plea of guilty, his whole testimony must be taken into account and be read together with
his statements made during the rearraignment proceedings. As narrated earlier, after the
prosecution rested its case, appellant admitted that he sexually abused her daughter Sherilyn
because of the influence of wine which made him lost his composure; and that at the time he slept
with Sherilyn in 1992, she was 10 years old.17 This admission is significant since appellant
furnished and explained to the trial court the missing details of why he committed the offenses
charged. Certainly, his explanation is an earmark of voluntariness of his plea of guilty and a clear
comprehension of the consequences thereof.
Moreover, as noted earlier, the defense, after presenting the testimony of the accused, earnestly
prayed before the trial court that his "voluntary plea of guilty" be taken into account as a mitigating
circumstance in reducing his penalty. By invoking such plea of guilty, the appellant has completely
demolished his argument that his plea was improvidently made.
In any case, contrary to appellants assertion, he was convicted by the trial court, not on the basis of
his plea of guilty, but on the strength of the evidence adduced by the prosecution. As held by this
Court in People vs. Lakindanum,18 People vs. Nismal,19 People vs. Petalcorin,20 and People vs.
Tahop,21 convictions based on pleas of guilty to capital offenses have been set aside because of
improvidence of the plea, but only when such plea is the sole basis of the judgment. Where, as here,
the trial court relied solely on the prosecutions sufficient and convincing evidence to convict the
appellant beyond reasonable doubt, not on his guilty plea, the same must be sustained.22 As the
trial court aptly stated in its appealed decision of November 29, 1996:
"Notwithstanding, the plea of guilty of accused and his open confession of his understanding as to
its legal import and consequences, the court, aware of his rights and prevailing jurisprudence
decided by the Supreme Court en banc in the case of People of the Philippines vs. Alberto Diaz (G.R.
No. 119073, March 13, 1996) and the case of People vs. Rolly Albert y Oliver (G.R. No. 114001,
promulgated on December 11, 1995), required the prosecution to present its evidence against the
accused . . . ."
It bears stressing that four credible witnesses were presented by the prosecution who were
extensively cross-examined by appellants counsel. The victim, Sherilyn, herself gave a clear,
positive and straightforward account of how she was sexually assaulted by appellant. The three
other witnesses strongly corroborated her testimony which established beyond reasonable doubt
appellants guilt. But to be sure, the victims testimony is sufficient to establish the crimes
charged,23 thus:
"Q: How old are you now Sherilyn Lima?
A: 15 years old.
Q: Do you have a birth certificate to prove your age?
A: Yes, I have.
Q: I am showing to you a birth certificate, marked Exh. "A", is this the same birth certificate?
A: Yes.
Q: And you were born on October 4, 1981, you can confirm that?
A: Yes.
Q: Your father is Gregorio Lima?
A: Yes.
Q: Is this the Gregorio lima accused in this case?
A: Yes.
Q: Now, on January 20, 1996, where were you Sherilyn?
A: In our house.
Q: Who were your companion in your house?
A: My brother.
Q: And aside from your brother, who else?
A: My father.
Q: And where was your mother at that time?
A: She was in the house of my auntie attending a party.
Q: At that time on January 20, 1996, at that night while your mother was not in your house
attending party, where did you sleep?
A: In the sala.
Q: Of your house?
A: Yes.
Q: Who were your supposed companion in sleeping in your sala?
A: My brother.
Q: How about your father, where was he slept that night?
A: In his room.
Q: Is that the room of your father and mother?
A: Yes.
Q: While you were sleeping in the sala on Jan. 20, 1996, tell the court Sherilyn what did your
father do, if any?
A: He woke me up.
Q: Why did your father wake you up?
A: He wanted me to go to his room.
Q: What was your reaction to that, when your father asked you to go to his room?
A: I was surprised why he wanted me to go inside his room.
Q: What did you tell your father when he told you to go to his room?
A: I asked him why he was going to bring me to his room.
Q: What was the answer of your father?

A: According to him, he wanted me to sleep in his room. He wanted to do something to me.
Q: Did you go with your father to the room?
A: Yes.
Q: And while in the room, what did your father tell you, if any?
A: He told me to undress.
Q: What was your reaction when you were told by your father to undress?
A: I was surprised.
Q: Precisely. Aside from being surprised, what did your father tell you?
A: Just to undress myself.
Q: When you were told to undress, what happened next?
A: He had me lie down.
Q: Did you comply with his instruction?
A: Yes.
Q: When you lied down, what happened?
A: He molested me.
Q: Sherilyn, how did your father molest you?
A: He raped me.
Q: Please describe to the Hon. Court, how did your father rape you?
A: He placed himself on top of me.
Q: What happened when he was on top of you?
A: He kissed my private parts.

Q: Aside from kissing your private parts, what happened next?
A: He did something to my private parts.
Q: Please specify that something he did on your private part?
A: He inserted his organ to my private part.
FISCAL EVANGELIO:
Please make it on record, that the witness is crying.
Q: How did you know that the private part of your father was inserted in your vagina?
A: Because I was awake when he did that to me.
Q: Aside from awake, what did you feel when his organ was inserted in your vagina?
A: I feel great pain.
Q: More or less, how long this so-called sexual molestation made by your father on the evening
of January 20, 1996?
A: I cannot estimate, how long was that.
Q: Sherilyn, while your father was doing the act on January 20, 1996, why did you not resist?
A: Because he will kill me.
Q: Why, did he hold you?
A: He held my hands.
Q: Prior to January 20, 1996, do you recall what your father has been doing to you long before
January 20, 1996?
A: He molested me.
Q: That was sometime in 1992?
A: Yes.
Q: Why did you not report the matter to your mother?

A: Because if I reveal the matter, he will kill all of us.
Q: How often did your father do this to you in 1992?
A: Many times.
Q: Where?
A: In the house.
Q: At that time, how old are you in 1992, when he started molesting you?
A: 10 years old.
Q: Why is it that it was only in 1996 that you have the courage to tell your mother about it?
A: I was afraid because my mother might be harmed.
Q: In that evening of January 20, 1996, do you recall if your mother woke you up when she
returned from your Auntie from Lanang?
A: Yes.
Q: What was your physical appearance at that time when your mother woke you up?
A: I was sleeping.
Q: Aside from sleeping, were you dressed?
A: I was naked.
Q: Where did your mother bring you?
A: To the birthday party of my cousin.
Q: What transportation did you take in going there?
A: The car of my auntie.
Q: On the same evening, you reported the incident to the Buhangin Police Station?
A: Yes.
Q: On January 22, 1996, do you recall if you submitted yourself for examination?
A: Yes.
Q: I have here a medical certificate. Is this the same medical certificate issued to you by Dr.
Ledesma?
A: Yes."24
It is worthy to note that Sherilyn cried while testifying. Such actuation, undoubtedly, demonstrates
her sincerity, spontaneity and truthfulness of what she was narrating.25
In a plethora of cases, we have held that the crime of rape is difficult to prove because it is generally
unwitnessed and very often, only the victim is left to testify for herself. Fortunately for the victim
here, her testimony is reinforced by the testimonies of two other witnesses who were extensively
cross-examined.
Sherilyns mother, Erlinda Lima, testified as follows:26
"Q: You said you went home at 10:00 p.m. Please tell us why you went home at 10:00 p.m.?
A: Because it was the birthday of my nephew and this nephew of mine wanted that my children
will also attend the birthday, so that I went home to get my children.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: Where did you proceed when you entered the house?
A: When I reached the house, I knock and the one who opened the door was my son?
Q: Where did you proceed?
A: When I entered the house, I cannot find my daughter. So I proceeded to the room of my
husband to look for my daughter.
Q: What did you notice, if any?
A: I was surprised because I saw my daughter already sleeping beside the bed where my
husband sleep, because at that time, my husband went out to open the gate. I was surprised, I
approached her and took off the blanket and she was already naked.
Q: Totally naked?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: To that situation, what did you tell your daughter?
A: She was sleeping, so I have to wake her up because we were invited by my sister for the
birthday.
Q: While at that moment, where was your husband?
A: In the house.
Q: When you instructed your daughter to dress up, where was your husband?
A: He was still opening the gate.
Q: Were you able to leave the house?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What was the reaction of your husband, if any?
A: Nothing. There was no reaction because I told him that we were attending the party of my
nephew. We did not let him notice that we have suspicion.
Q: In going to the place of your sister, what transportation did you take?
A: The vehicle of my sister.
Q: And while in the vehicle of your sister going to your sisters house in Lanang, do you have a
conversation with your daughter?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And what did your daughter tell the court, that your daughter confided also that prior to
January 20, 1996, she was also abused?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Upon learning of the incident on that evening, where did you bring your daughter?
A: We proceeded to the Buhangin Police Station.

Q: What did you do in the Buhangin Police Station?
A: We reported what her father had done to her.
Q: Was your report recorded in the log book?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: And do you know what action was taken by the police based on your report?
A: They immediately arrested my husband.
Q: Do you know if your daughter was subjected to medical examination by the City Health
Office?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Why do you know that?
A: Because I was the one who brought her to Dr. Ledesma."
Also, Dr. Danilo P. Ledesma of the Davao City Health Office testified, thus:27
"Q: As medico-legal officer of the Davao City Health Office, do you recall having attended to the
patient named Sherilyn Lima?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Sometime in 1996?
A: Yes, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q; Now, it appears in your findings, that I call your attention to the genital examination you
conducted wherein you said among others that there was healed, deep laceration on the private
parts of patient, what was your basis in that finding of yours?
A: When I examined the genital of the patient, particularly the hymen, I saw old healed deep
laceration at 3:00 and 8:00 oclock position, if it is compared to a clock, wherein the lacerations
were found at 3:00 and 8:00 oclock positions.
Q: And what does that imply or indicate, Doctor?

A: Meaning to say that these lacerations when I saw and examined the victim more than four
months.
Q: And in your examination of the patient, have you found out what would have caused such
lacerations?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And finally you said, the patient was positive for spermatozoa, what do you mean by that,
Doctor?
A: With vaginal discharges were taken smear, there was the presence of sperm cells.
Q: And when you said sperm cells, from male organ?
A: Yes, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: Finally, in your opinion, this old healed laceration, you found on the private parts of patient,
how long more or less were these lacerations exist, old healed lacerations?
A: More than 4 months, when I saw patient, it could be more than one year, more than 3 years."
The foregoing testimonies effectively corroborated Sherilyns account.
Furthermore, the trial court found that the prosecutions witnesses were telling the truth. We have
consistently held that the findings of fact of the trial judge who tried the case and heard the
witnesses should not be disturbed on appeal and should be given considerable weight and respect,
especially on the credibility of the witnesses, since he was in a better position to decide the
question, having heard and observed the demeanor, attitude, conduct and deportment of
witnesses.28
Based on the prosecutions evidence, and as correctly found by the trial court, the crimes charged
have been sufficiently established beyond reasonable doubt. Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code,
as amended by Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7659, provides:
"Art. 335. When and how rape is committed. -Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a
woman under any of the following circumstances:
1. By using force or intimidation;

2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and
3. When the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented.
"The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.
xxx xxx xxx
"The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the following
circumstances:
"1. when the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant,
step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the
common law spouse of the parent of the victim. (Emphasis supplied)
xxx xxx xxx"
The prosecution has sufficiently established that in Criminal Case No. 36,517-96, the victim was
only ten years old when she was raped by her father. However, the death penalty cannot be
imposed upon the appellant because the crime was committed in 1992 when R.A. 7659 was not yet
in effect.29 As regards Criminal Case No. 36,380-96, it was proven that the victim was only 14 years
old when she was raped by her father in 1996. Thus, the penalty of death was correctly meted out
by the trial court.
The mitigating circumstance of plea of guilty cannot be appreciated in his favor because reclusion
perpetua and death are indivisible penalties imposed in their entirety regardless of any mitigating
circumstance that attended the commission of the crime.30
Finally, we rectify the error committed by the trial court with respect to the award of damages to
the victim. The award of 30,000.00 as moral damages is not in line with the prevailing
jurisprudence,31 fixing the amount at 50,000.00 for each count of rape. In addition, the amount of
50,000.00 should be awarded to her as indemnity ex delicto in Criminal Case No. 36,517-96 since
the penalty is only reclusion perpetua; while in Criminal Case No. 36,380-96 where the penalty
imposed is death, the indemnity ex delicto for the victim should be in the amount of 75,000.00.32
Since the fact of relationship between the offender and the victim is an aggravating circumstance,
she is entitled to the award of exemplary damages of 25,000.00 for each count of rape.33 In People
vs. Catubig,34 this Court clarified that an aggravating circumstance, whether ordinary or qualifying,
should entitle the offended party to an award of exemplary damages within the meaning of Article
2230 of the Civil Code.1wphi1.nt
WHEREFORE, the appealed Joint Decision in Criminal Case Nos. 36,517-96 and 36,380-96 is
AFFIRMED, with MODIFICATION in the sense that appellant Gregorio S. Lima is ordered to PAY the
victim, Sherilyn Lima, 50,000.00 as indemnity ex delicto in Criminal Case No. 36,517-96, and
75,000.00 in Criminal Case No. 36,380-96; and, in each case, 50,000.00 as moral damages; and
25,000.00 as exemplary damages. Costs against the appellant.
Relative to Criminal Case No. 36,380-96 wherein we affirm the imposition of death penalty upon
the appellant, three (3) members of the Court, although maintaining their adherence to the separate
opinions expressed in People vs. Echegaray that R.A. 7659, insofar as it prescribes the penalty of
death, is unconstitutional, nevertheless submit to the ruling of the majority that the law is
constitutional and that the death penalty should be accordingly imposed.
In consonance with Sec. 25 of R.A. 7659, amending Art. 83 of the Revised Penal Code, upon finality
of this Decision, let the record of this case be forthwith forwarded to the Office of the President for
the possible exercise of his pardoning power.
SO ORDERED.
[ G.R. No. 164258, August 22, 2012 ]
ESTRELLA TAGLAY, PETITIONER, VS. JUDGE MARIVIC TRABAJO DARAY AND LOVERIE
PALACAY, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before the Court is a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeking to
reverse and set aside the Orders[1] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Digos City, Branch 18, dated
March 9, 2004 and June 7, 2004, in Criminal Case No. FC-71-02. The March 9, 2004 Order denied
herein petitioner's Motion to Dismiss, while the June 7, 2004 Order denied her Motion for
Reconsideration.
The instant petition arose from a Criminal Complaint[2] for Qualified Trespass to Dwelling filed by
private respondent against herein petitioner with the 5th Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of
Sta. Maria-Malita-Don Marcelino, Davao del Sur on June 19, 2001.
Finding probable cause to indict petitioner, the Public Prosecutor assigned to handle the case filed
an Information[3] against her on November 19, 2001. The Information reads as follows:
The undersigned Prosecutor accuses ESTRELLA TAGLAY of the crime of Qualified Trespass to
Dwelling as defined and penalized under Article 280 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended,
committed as follows:
That on June 2, 2001 at about 2:30 o'clock in the afternoon at Tibangao, Malita, Davao del Sur,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the aforesaid accused, a private
person and without any justifiable reason and by means of violence, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously enter into the dwelling of Loverie Palacay without her consent and
against her will and once inside maltreated, boxed and choked her, to her damage and prejudice.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[4]
Upon arraignment on June 7, 2002, petitioner pleaded not guilty.[5] Pre-trial conference was set on
August 13, 2002.
However, on August 15, 2002, the MCTC issued an Order,[6] to wit:
It appearing that private complainant Loverie Palacay was a minor on June 2, 2001, the date of the
incident, since she was born on August 7, 1983, per Certification dated August 15, 2002 issued by
Municipal Registrar Josephine A. Marquez, this case, upon manifestation of Prosecutor Perfecto P.
Ordaneza and pursuant to Republic Act. No. 8369 and Circular 11-99, is hereby transferred to
Branch 20, Regional Trial Court, Digos City, for proper disposition.
SO ORDERED.
Subsequently, the case was transferred to the RTC of Digos City where petitioner was brought to
trial.
Witnesses were then presented by the prosecution. Prior to the presentation of the final witness for
the prosecution, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. Petitioner
contended that the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the case, because the MCTC erroneously
transferred the case to the RTC instead of dismissing it. Petitioner also argued that the RTC's lack of
jurisdiction was further aggravated when she was not arraigned before the RTC.
On March 9, 2004, the RTC issued its assailed Order[7] ruling that it acquired jurisdiction over the
case when it received the records of the case as a consequence of the transfer effected by the MCTC;
that the transfer of the case from the MCTC is authorized under Administrative Matter No. 99-1-13-
SC and Circular No. 11-99; that there is no doubt that the offended party is a minor and, thus, the
case falls within the original jurisdiction of Family Courts pursuant to Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8369.
The RTC also held that even granting that there was defect or irregularity in the procedure because
petitioner was not arraigned before the RTC, such defect was fully cured when petitioner's counsel
entered into trial without objecting that his client had not yet been arraigned. Furthermore, the RTC
noted that petitioner's counsel has cross-examined the witnesses for the prosecution.
Consequently, the RTC denied petitioner's Motion to Dismiss.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but the same was denied by the RTC via its Order[8]
dated June 7, 2004.
Hence, the instant petition for certiorari.
Petitioner raises two main grounds.
First, petitioner contends that the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the case because Circular
No. 11-99, which authorizes the transfer of Family Courts cases filed with first-level courts to the
RTCs, is applicable only to cases which were filed prior to the effectivity of the said Circular on
March 1, 1999. Petitioner argues that all Family Courts cases filed with first-level courts after the
effectivity of the said Circular can no longer be transferred to the RTC; instead they should be
dismissed. Considering that the Information in the instant case was filed with the MCTC on
November 19, 2001, petitioner avers that the MCTC should have dismissed the case instead of
ordering its transfer to the RTC.
Second, petitioner insists that she should have been arraigned anew before the RTC and that her
arraignment before the MCTC does not count because the proceedings conducted therein were
void.
The petition is meritorious.
At the outset, it is necessary to stress that, generally, a direct recourse to this Court in a petition for
certiorari is highly improper for it violates the established policy of strict observance of the judicial
hierarchy of courts.[9] While this Court has concurrent jurisdiction with the RTCs and the CA to
issue writs of certiorari, this concurrence is not to be taken as an unrestrained freedom of choice as
to which court the application for the writ will be directed.[10] There is after all a hierarchy of
courts. That hierarchy is determinative of the venue of appeals and should also serve as a general
determinant of the appropriate forum for petitions for the extraordinary writs.[11] This Court is a
court of last resort and must so remain if it is to satisfactorily perform the functions assigned to it
by the Constitution and immemorial tradition.[12] A direct invocation of the Supreme Court's
original jurisdiction to issue these extraordinary writs is allowed only when there are special and
important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the petition.[13]
However, it is also settled that this Court has full discretionary power to take cognizance of a
petition filed directly with it if compelling reasons, or the nature and importance of the issues
raised, so warrant.[14] Under the present circumstances, the Court will take cognizance of this case
as an exception to the principle of hierarchy of courts, considering that the Information against
petitioner was filed way back in November 2001.[15] Any further delay in the resolution of the
instant petition will be prejudicial to petitioner. Moreover, the principle may be relaxed when pure
questions of law are raised as in this case.[16]
Now, on the merits of the petition.
It is significant to point out, at this juncture, the well-entrenched doctrine that the jurisdiction of a
tribunal over the subject matter of an action is conferred by law.[17] Jurisdiction over the subject
matter is determined by the statute in force at the time of the commencement of the action.[18]
The Family Courts Act of 1997, which took effect on November 23, 1997.[19] Section 5 (a) of R.A.
8369 clearly provides that Family Courts have exclusive original jurisdiction over criminal cases
where one or more of the accused is below eighteen (18) years of age but not less than nine (9)
years of age, or where one or more of the victims is a minor at the time of the commission of the
offense. In the present case, there is no dispute that at the time of the commission of the alleged
offense on June 2, 2001, private respondent, who is also the private complainant, was a minor.
Hence, the case falls under the original and exclusive jurisdiction of Family Courts.
Anent the first issue raised, the Court agrees that the Resolution of this Court in Administrative
Matter No. 99-1-13-SC and Circular No. 11-99, issued pursuant thereto, is applicable only to Family
Courts cases which were filed with first-level courts prior to the effectivity of the said Resolution on
March 1, 1999.[20] This is evident in the language used by the Court in the third "Whereas" clause
of the subject Resolution wherein it was stated that "pending the constitution and organization of
the Family Courts and the designation of branches of the Regional Trial Courts as Family Courts in
accordance with Section 17 (Transitory Provisions) of R.A. 8369, there is a need to provide
guidelines in the hearing and determination of criminal cases falling within the jurisdiction of
Family Courts which have heretofore been filed with first-level courts." The operative word, as
correctly cited by petitioner, is "heretofore" which means "before this" or "up to this time."[21]
Moreover, Section 1 of the same Resolution directs all first-level courts, within ten (10) days from
receipt of a copy of the subject Resolution, to take an inventory of all criminal cases falling within
the jurisdiction of the Family Courts which were filed with them (first-level courts), to prepare an
appropriate inventory and to submit the same to the Court Management Office of the Office of the
Court Administrator. Logic dictates that only those cases which were filed prior to the issuance of
the Resolution shall be included in the inventory and, therefore, shall be subject to transfer by first-
level courts to the appropriate RTCs. The necessary implication then is that all cases filed with first-
level courts after the effectivity of the Resolution on March 1, 1999 should be dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction. In the present case, the Information was filed against petitioner on November 19,
2001. Thus, the MCTC is already bereft of any authority to transfer the case to the RTC as the same
no longer falls under the coverage of Circular No. 11-99. What the MCTC should have done was to
dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction.
More importantly, what justifies the dismissal of the case is that the Information filed with the
MCTC cannot be used as a basis for the valid indictment of petitioner before the RTC acting as a
Family Court, because there was no allegation therein of private complainant's minority. To
proceed to trial before the RTC on the basis of the Information filed with the MCTC would be an
exercise in futility as there is an infirmity in the Information constituting a jurisdictional defect
which cannot be cured. There is no point in proceeding under a defective Information that could
never be the basis of a valid conviction.[22] The Information filed with the MCTC must thus first be
amended and thereafter filed with the RTC. Pending the filing of such Information, the RTC has not
yet acquired jurisdiction because while a court may have jurisdiction over the subject matter, it
does not acquire jurisdiction over the case itself until its jurisdiction is invoked with the filing of a
valid Information.[23]
The Court also agrees with petitioner in her contention in the second issue raised that she should
have been arraigned by the RTC.
It is true that petitioner was arraigned by the MCTC. However, the MCTC has no jurisdiction over
the subject matter of the present case. It is settled that the proceedings before a court or tribunal
without jurisdiction, including its decision, are null and void.[24] Considering that the MCTC has no
jurisdiction, all the proceedings conducted therein, including petitioner's arraignment, are null and
void. Thus, the need for petitioner's arraignment on the basis of a valid Information filed with the
RTC.
It is also true that petitioner's counsel participated in the proceedings held before the RTC without
objecting that his client had not yet been arraigned. However, it is wrong for the RTC to rely on the
case of People v. Cabale,[25] because the accused therein was in fact arraigned, although the same
was made only after the case was submitted for decision. In the similar cases of People v. Atienza
and Closa[26] and People v. Pangilinan,[27] the accused in the said cases were also belatedly
arraigned. The Court, in these three cases, held that the active participation of the counsels of the
accused, as well as their opportunity to cross-examine the prosecution witnesses during trial
without objecting on the ground that their clients had not yet been arraigned, had the effect of
curing the defect in the belated arraignment. Moreover, the accused in these cases did not object
when they were belatedly arraigned. The same, however, cannot be said in the instant case. There is
no arraignment at all before the RTC. On the other hand, the arraignment conducted by the MCTC is
null and void. Thus, there is nothing to be cured. Petitioner's counsel also timely raised before the
RTC the fact that her client, herein petitioner, was not arraigned.
Arraignment is the formal mode and manner of implementing the constitutional right of an accused
to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.[28] The purpose of
arraignment is, thus, to apprise the accused of the possible loss of freedom, even of his life,
depending on the nature of the crime imputed to him, or at the very least to inform him of why the
prosecuting arm of the State is mobilized against him.[29] As an indispensable requirement of due
process, an arraignment cannot be regarded lightly or brushed aside peremptorily.[30]
Otherwise, absence of arraignment results in the nullity of the proceedings before the trial
court.[31]
As a final note, it may not be amiss to stress that at all stages of the proceedings leading to his trial
and conviction, the accused must be charged and tried according to the procedure prescribed by
law and marked by observance of the rights given to him by the Constitution.[32] In the same way
that the reading of the Information to the accused during arraignment is not a useless formality, so
is the validity of the information being read not an idle ceremony.[33]
Criminal due process requires that the accused must be proceeded against under the orderly
processes of law.[34] In all criminal cases, the judge should follow the step-by-step procedure
required by the Rules.[35] The reason for this is to assure that the State makes no mistake in taking
the life or liberty except that of the guilty.[36]
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Orders of the Regional Trial Court of Digos
City, Branch 18, dated March 9, 2004 and June 7, 2004, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new
one rendered dismissing the Information in Criminal Case No. FC-71-02, without prejudice to
refiling the same in the proper court.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 172707 October 1, 2013
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,

vs.
HALIL GAMBAO Y ESMAIL, EDDIE KARIM Y USO, EDWIN DUKILMAN Y SUBOH, TONY ABAO Y
SULA, RAUL UDAL Y KAGUI, THENG DILANGALEN Y NANDING, JAMAN MACALINBOL Y KATOL,
MONETTE RONAS Y AMPIL, NORA EVAD Y MULOK, THIAN PERPENIAN Y RAFON A.K.A LARINA
PERPENIAN AND JOHN DOES, ACCUSED-APPELLANTS.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
Before this Court for Automatic Review is the Decision1 dated 28 June 2005 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00863, which affirmed with modification the Decision2 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Pasay City, Branch 109 dated 16 October 1998, finding accused-appellants Halil
Gambao y Esmail, Eddie Karim y Uso, Edwin Dukilman y Suboh, Tony Abao y Sula, Raul Udal y
Kagui, Teng Mandao y Haron, Theng Dilangalen y Nanding, Jaman Macalinbol y Katol, Monette
Ronas y Ampil, Nora Evad y Mulok and Thian Perpenian y Rafon guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
kidnapping for ransom as defined and penalized under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7659.
The accused-appellants, along with an unidentified person, were charged under the criminal
information3 which reads:
Criminal Case No. 98-0928
For Kidnapping for Ransom as amended by RA 7659
That on August 12, 1998 at around 7:30 oclock in the evening at No. 118 FB Harrison Pasay City
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above named-accused conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping one another and grouping themselves together, did then and
there by force and intimidation, and the use of high powered firearms, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously take, carry away and deprive Lucia Chan y Lee of her liberty against her will for the
purpose of extorting ransom as in fact a demand for ransom was made as a condition for her
release amounting to FOUR HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (400,000.00) to the damage and
prejudice of Lucia L. Chan in the said amount and such other amounts as may be awarded to her
under the provisions of the Civil Code.
The antecedent facts were culled from the records of the case:4
Lucia Chan (Chan) was a fish dealer based in Manila. She usually expected fish deliveries, which
were shipped by her suppliers from the provinces. Sometime in the afternoon of 11 August 1998,
two persons, one of whom was identified as Theng Dilangalen (Dilangalen), went to Chans
residence at FB Harrison St., Pasay City to inquire about a certain passport alleged to have been
mistakenly placed inside a box of fish to be delivered to her. Unable to locate said passport, the two
left. The next morning, Dilangalen, together with another companion identified as Tony Abao
(Abao), returned looking for Chan but were told that she was out. When the two returned in the
afternoon, Chan informed them that the fish delivery had yet to arrive. Chan offered instead to
accompany them to the airport to retrieve the box of fish allegedly containing the passport.
Dilangalen and Abao declined and told Chan that they would be back later that evening.5
Dilangalen, accompanied by an unidentified person who remains at large, returned to Chans

residence that evening. Chans houseboy ushered them in and Chan met them by the stairs.6
Thereat, the unidentified companion of Dilangalen pointed his gun at Chans son, Levy Chan (Levy),
and the house companions.7 As the unidentified man forcibly dragged Chan, her son Levy tried to
stop the man by grabbing his mothers feet. Seeing this, Dilangalen pointed his gun at Levys head
forcing the latter to release his grip on Chans feet.8 Levy thereafter proceeded to the Pasay Police
Headquarters to report the incident.9
Chan was forced to board a "Tamaraw FX" van.10 After travelling for about two hours, the group
stopped at a certain house. Accused-appellant Edwin Dukilman (Dukilman) warned Chan not to
shout as he had his gun pointed at her mouth. Chan was ordered to go with two women,11 later
identified in court by Chan as appellants Monette Ronas (Ronas) and Nora Evad (Evad).12 Chan
was brought inside a house and was made to lie down on a bed, guarded by Ronas, Evad, Dukilman
and Jaman Macalinbol (Macalinbol).13 Ronas and Evad threatened Chan that she would be killed
unless she paid 20 Million Pesos.14
On 13 August 1998, Chan was awakened by Evad and was asked to board the "Tamaraw FX" van.
After travelling for about ten minutes, the van stopped and the group alighted. Chan was brought to
a room on the second floor of the house. Inside the room were three persons whom Chan identified
in court as Macalinbol, Raul Udal (Udal) and Halil Gambao (Gambao).15 Another woman, later
identified as Thian Perpenian (Perpenian), arrived.16 At about 9:00 oclock in the evening, a man
who was later identified as Teng Mandao (Mandao), entered the room with a handgun and asked
Chan "Bakit kayo nagsumbong sa pulis?"17 Another man, whom Chan identified in court as Eddie
Karim (Karim), ordered Mandao out of the room. Karim informed Chan that he was sent by their
boss to ask her how much money she has.18 Chan was instructed to talk to her son through a cell
phone and she gave instructions to her son to get the 75, 000.00 she kept in her cabinet.19 The
group then talked to Chans son and negotiated the ransom amount in exchange for his mothers
release. It was agreed upon that Levy was to deliver 400,000.00 at the "Chowking" Restaurant at
Buendia Avenue.20
Inspectors Narciso Ouano, Jr. (Inspector Ouano) and Cesar Mancao (Inspector Mancao), who were
assigned at the Pasay City area to conduct the investigation regarding the kidnapping, were
informed that the abductors called and demanded for ransom in exchange for Chans release.21
During their surveillance the following day, Inspectors Ouano and Mancao observed a Red
Transport taxicab entering the route which led to the victims residence. The inspectors observed
that the occupants of the taxicab kept on looking at the second floor of the house. The inspectors
and their team tailed the taxicab until Pansol, Calamba, Laguna, where it entered the Elizabeth
Resort and stopped in front of Cottage 1. Convinced that the woman the team saw in the cottage
was the victim, they sought clearance from Philippine Anti Organized Crime Task Force (PAOCTF)
to conduct a rescue operation.22
On 14 August 1998, P/Insp. Vicente Arnado (Inspector Arnado) received information that the
abductors acceded to a 400,000.00 ransom money to be delivered at "Chowking" Restaurant at
Buendia Avenue at around 2:00 am. Upon learning of the information, the team immediately and
strategically positioned themselves around the vicinity of the restaurant. At about 2:00 am, a light
blue "Tamaraw FX" van with 4 people on board arrived. The four took the ransom money and
headed towards the South Luzon Expressway. The surveillance team successfully intercepted the
van and arrested the 4 men, later identified in court as Karim, Abao, Gambao and Dukilman. The
team was also able to recover the 400,000.00 ransom.23
At about 5:00 oclock in the morning of the same day, the police team assaulted Cottage No. 1,
resulting in the safe rescue of Chan and the apprehension of seven of her abductors, later identified
in court as Dilangalen, Udal, Macalinbol, Mandao, Perpenian, Evad and Ronas.24
During the 7 October 1998 hearing, after the victim and her son testified, Karim manifested his
desire to change his earlier plea of "not guilty" to "guilty." The presiding judge then explained the
consequences of a change of plea, stating: "It would mean the moment you withdraw your previous
pleas of not guilty and enter a plea of guilty, the court of course, after receiving evidence, as in fact it
has received the testimonies of [the] two witnesses, will [outrightly] sentence you to the penalty
provided by law after the prosecution shall have finished the presentation of its evidence. Now that
I have explained to you the consequences of your entering a plea of guilty, are you still desirous of
entering a plea of guilty?" Eddie Karim answered, "Yes."25 On hearing this clarification, the other
appellants likewise manifested, through their counsel who had earlier conferred with them and
explained to each of them the consequences of a change of plea, their desire to change the pleas
they entered. The trial court separately asked each of the appellants namely: Gambao, Abao, Udal,
Mandao, Dilangalen, Macalinbol, Ronas and Evad if they understood the consequence of changing
their pleas. All of them answered in the affirmative.26 Similarly, Dukilman manifested his desire to
change his plea and assured the trial court that he understood the consequences of such change of
plea.27 Thereupon, the trial court ordered their re-arraignment. After they pleaded guilty,28 the
trial court directed the prosecution to present evidence, which it did.
On 16 October 1998, the RTC rendered a decision convicting Gambao, Karim, Dukilman, Abao, Udal,
Mandao, Dilangalen, Macalinbol, Ronas, Evad and Perpenian of Kidnapping for Ransom. Hence, they
appealed to the CA.
In a Decision dated 28 June 2005, the appellate court affirmed with modifications the decision of
the trial court. The dispositive portion of the CA decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the decision of the court a quo finding accused-appellants HALIL GAMBAO y ESMAIL,
EDDIE KARIM y USO, EDWIN DUKILMAN y SUBOH, TONY ABAO y SULA, RAUL UDAL y KAGUI,
TENG MANDAO y HARON, THENG DILANGALEN y NANDING, JAMAN MACALINBOL y KATOL,
MONETTE RONAS y AMPIL and NORA EVAD y MULOK guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
kidnapping for ransom defined and penalized under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by RA 7659 and imposing upon each of them the supreme penalty of death is AFFIRMED
WITH MODIFICATION that each of them is ordered to pay jointly and severally the victim in the
amount of 50,000.00 by way of moral damages.
It appearing that accused-appellant THIAN PERPENIAN y RAFON was only 17 years old at the time
of the commission of the crime, she is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua.29
Pursuant to Section 13, Rule 124 as amended by Administrative Matter No. 00-5-03-SC, the
appellate court certified the case to this Court and accordingly ordered the elevation of the records.
In a Resolution30 dated 20 June 2006, we required the parties to file their respective supplemental
briefs. The issues raised by the accused-appellants in their respective briefs, supplemental briefs
and manifestations will be discussed collectively.
Insufficiency of Evidence
Accused-appellants Dukilman, Ronas, Evad would have this Court believe that the witness, Chan,
was not able to positively identify them because of her failing eyesight due to old age.
This argument is bereft of merit. We note that both the trial court and the CA found Chans
testimony credible and straightforward. During her testimony, she positively identified the
accused-appellants. If she had not met them before, she could not have positively identified them in
open court. In fact, the participation of these accused-appellants was further established through
the testimonies of the other prosecution witnesses.
Time and again, this Court has maintained that the question of credibility of witnesses is primarily
for the trial court to determine. For this reason, its observations and conclusions are accorded great
respect on appeal. They are conclusive and binding unless shown to be tainted with arbitrariness or
unless, through oversight, some fact or circumstance of weight and influence has not been
considered.31 In People v. Taedo,32 this Court had occasion to reiterate the ruling that findings of
fact of the trial court pertaining to the credibility of witnesses command great respect since it had
the opportunity to observe their demeanor while they testified in court.33 It can be observed that
the briefs submitted by the accused-appellants are replete with generalities and wanting in relevant
particulars. It is for this reason that we are giving full credence to the findings of the trial court
regarding the credibility of witness Chan.
Perpenian likewise argued that the evidence for her conviction is insufficient. We also find her
argument bereft of merit.
The testimony of Inspector Ouano, establishing Perpenian as one of the seven people apprehended
when they conducted the rescue operation at around 5:00 oclock in the morning of 14 August
1998,34 and the positive identification of Perpenian by Chan constituted adequate evidence
working against her defense of denial.
Further, it should be noted that the only defense the accused-appellants proffered was denial. It is
established jurisprudence that denial cannot prevail over the witnesses positive identification of
the accused-appellants, more so where the defense did not present convincing evidence that it was
physically impossible for them to have been present at the crime scene at the time of the
commission of the crime.35
The foregoing considered, the positive identification by Chan, the relevant testimonies of witnesses
and the absence of evidence other than mere denial proffered by the defense lead this Court to give
due weight to the findings of the lower courts.
Improvident Plea
As provided for by Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by RA 7659, the penalty for
kidnapping for ransom is death. A review of the records36 shows that on 7 October 1998, the
accused-appellants withdrew their plea of "not guilty" and were re-arraigned. They subsequently
entered pleas of "guilty" to the crime of kidnapping for ransom, a capital offense. This Court, in
People v. Oden,37 laid down the duties of the trial court when the accused pleads guilty to a capital
offense. The trial court is mandated:
(1)
to conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences
of the plea of guilt,
(2)
to require the prosecution to still prove the guilt of the accused and the precise degree of his
culpability, and
(3)
to inquire whether or not the accused wishes to present evidence in his behalf and allow him to do
so if he desires.38
The rationale behind the rule is that the courts must proceed with more care where the possible
punishment is in its severest form, namely death, for the reason that the execution of such a
sentence is irreversible. The primordial purpose is to avoid improvident pleas of guilt on the part of
an accused where grave crimes are involved since he might be admitting his guilt before the court
and thus forfeiting his life and liberty without having fully understood the meaning, significance
and consequence of his plea.39 Moreover, the requirement of taking further evidence would aid
this Court on appellate review in determining the propriety or impropriety of the plea.40
Anent the first requisite, the searching inquiry determines whether the plea of guilt was based on a
free and informed judgement. The inquiry must focus on the voluntariness of the plea and the full
comprehension of the consequences of the plea. This Court finds no cogent reason for deviating
from the guidelines provided by jurisprudence41 and thus, adopts the same:
Although there is no definite and concrete rule as to how a trial judge must conduct a "searching
inquiry," we have held that the following guidelines should be observed:
Ascertain from the accused himself
(a) how he was brought into the custody of the law;
(b) whether he had the assistance of a competent counsel during the custodial and preliminary
investigations; and
(c) under what conditions he was detained and interrogated during the investigations. This is
intended to rule out the possibility that the accused has been coerced or placed under a state of
duress either by actual threats of physical harm coming from malevolent quarters or simply
because of the judges intimidating robes.
Ask the defense counsel a series of questions as to whether he had conferred with, and completely
explained to, the accused the meaning and consequences of a plea of guilty.
Elicit information about the personality profile of the accused, such as his age, socio-economic
Inform the accused the exact length of imprisonment or nature of the penalty under the law and the
certainty that he will serve such sentence. For not infrequently, an accused pleads guilty in the hope
of a lenient treatment or upon bad advice or because of promises of the authorities or parties of a
lighter penalty should he admit guilt or express remorse. It is the duty of the judge to ensure that
the accused does not labor under these mistaken impressions because a plea of guilty carries with it
not only the admission of authorship of the crime proper but also of the aggravating circumstances
attending it, that increase punishment.
Inquire if the accused knows the crime with which he is charged and fully explain to him the
against him and a denial of his right to due process.
All questions posed to the accused should be in a language known and understood by the latter.
The trial judge must satisfy himself that the accused, in pleading guilty, is truly guilty. The accused
must be required to narrate the tragedy or reenact the crime or furnish its missing details.
It is evident from the records42 that the aforesaid rules have not been fully complied with. The
questions propounded by the trial court judge failed to ensure that accused-appellants fully
understood the consequences of their plea. In fact, it is readily apparent from the records43 that
Karim had the mistaken assumption that his plea of guilt would mitigate the imposable penalty and
that both the judge and his counsel failed to explain to him that such plea of guilt will not mitigate
the penalty pursuant to Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code. Karim was not warned by the trial
court judge that in cases where the penalty is single and indivisible, like death, the penalty is not
affected by either aggravating or mitigating circumstances. The trial court judges seemingly
annoyed statement that a conditional plea is not allowed, as provided below, is inadequate:
Atty. Ferrer:
Your Honor please, may we be allowed to say something before the trial. For accused Eddie Karim
we manifest and petition this court that he be allowed to be re-arraigned Your Honor please,
considering that he will plead guilty as charged but the imposable penalty is lowered, Your Honor.
Court:
You cannot make a conditional plea of guilty, that is what the law says. You plead guilty, no
condition attached. Conditional plea is not allowed.
Atty. Ferrer:
Considering, Your Honor, accused Eddie Karim is already repenting
Court:
Nevertheless. Read the law. If you entered a plea of guilty there should be no condition attached.
We cannot make that condition and dictate to the court the penalty. 44
Although the pleas rendered, save for Perpenians, were improvidently made, this Court will still
not set aside the condemnatory judgment. Despite the trial court judges shortcomings, we still
agree with his ruling on accused-appellants culpability.
As a general rule, convictions based on an improvident plea of guilt are set aside and the cases are
remanded for further proceedings if such plea is the sole basis of judgement. If the trial court,
however, relied on sufficient and credible evidence to convict the accused, as it did in this case, the
conviction must be sustained, because then it is predicated not merely on the guilty plea but on
evidence proving the commission of the offense charged.45 The manner by which the plea of guilty
is made, whether improvidently or not, loses legal significance where the conviction can be based
on independent evidence proving the commission of the crime by the accused.46
Contrary to accused-appellants assertions, they were convicted by the trial court, not on the basis
of their plea of guilty, but on the strength of the evidence adduced by the prosecution, which was
properly appreciated by the trial court.47 The prosecution was able to prove the guilt of the
accused-appellants and their degrees of culpability beyond reasonable doubt.
Degree of Culpability
Accused-appellants Dukilman, Ronas and Evad argue in their respective briefs that conspiracy,
insofar as they were concerned, was not convincingly established. Dukilman hinges his argument
on the fact that he was not one of those arrested during the rescue operation based on the
testimony of Inspector Ouano.48 On the other hand, Ronas and Evad base their argument on the
fact that they had no participation whatsoever in the negotiation for the ransom money.
We hold otherwise. Although Dukilman was not one of those apprehended at the cottage during the
rescue operation, the testimony of Police Inspector Arnado sufficiently established that he was one
of the four people apprehended when the police intercepted the "Tamaraw FX" at the Nichols
Tollgate.49 Likewise, the testimony of Police Inspector Ouano sufficiently established that Ronas
and Evad were two of those who were arrested during the rescue operation.50 This Court has held
before that to be a conspirator, one need not participate in every detail of the execution; he need
not even take part in every act or need not even know the exact part to be performed by the others
in the execution of the conspiracy.51 Once conspiracy is shown, the act of one is the act of all the
conspirators. The precise extent or modality of participation of each of them becomes secondary,
since all the conspirators are principals.52 Moreover, Chan positively identified the accused-
appellants and placed all of them at the crime scenes.
Under Article 8 of the Revised Penal Code, there is conspiracy when two or more persons come to
an agreement concerning a felony and decide to commit it. It has been a long standing opinion of
this Court that proof of the conspiracy need not rest on direct evidence, as the same may be inferred
from the collective conduct of the parties before, during or after the commission of the crime
indicating a common understanding among them with respect to the commission of the offense.53
The testimonies, when taken together, reveal the common purpose of the accused-appellants and
how they were all united in its execution from beginning to end. There were testimonies proving
that (1) before the incident, two of the accused-appellants kept coming back to the victims house;
(2) during the kidnapping, accused-appellants changed shifts in guarding the victim; and (3) the
accused appellants were those present when the ransom money was recovered and when the
rescue operation was conducted.
Seeing that conspiracy among Gambao, Karim, Dukilman, Abao, Udal, Mandao, Dilangalen,
Macalinbol, Ronas and Evad was established beyond reasonable doubt based on the proffered
evidence of the prosecution, the act of one is the act of all the conspirators.
In Perpenians Supplemental Brief,54 she directs this Courts attention to the manifestation made
by the prosecution regarding their disinterest in prosecuting, insofar as she was concerned.55
However, pursuant to the ruling of this Court in Crespo v. Judge Mogul,56 once the information is
filed, any disposition of the case or dismissal or acquittal or conviction of the accused rests within
the exclusive jurisdiction, competence and discretion of the courts; more so in this case, where no
Motion to Dismiss was filed by the prosecution.
The trial court took note of the fact that Perpenian gave inconsistent answers and lied several times
under oath during the trial.57 Perpenian lied about substantial details such as her real name, age,
address and the fact that she saw Chan at the Elizabeth Resort. When asked why she lied several
times, Perpenian claimed she was scared to be included or identified with the other accused-
appellants. The lying and the fear of being identified with people whom she knew had done wrong
are indicative of discernment. She knew, therefore, that there was an ongoing crime being
committed at the resort while she was there. It is apparent that she was fully aware of the
consequences of the unlawful act.
As reflected in the records,58 the prosecution was not able to proffer sufficient evidence to hold her
responsible as a principal. Seeing that the only evidence the prosecution had was the testimony59
of Chan to the effect that on 13 August 1998 Perpenian entered the room where the victim was
detained and conversed with Evad and Ronas regarding stories unrelated to the kidnapping, this
Court opines that Perpenian should not be held liable as a co-principal, but rather only as an
accomplice to the crime.
Jurisprudence60 is instructive of the elements required, in accordance with Article 18 of the

Revised Penal Code, in order that a person may be considered an accomplice, namely, (1) that there
be community of design; that is knowing the criminal design of the principal by direct participation,
he concurs with the latter in his purpose; (2) that he cooperates in the execution by previous or
simultaneous act, with the intention of supplying material or moral aid in the execution of the crime
in an efficacious way; and (3) that there be a relation between the acts done by the principal and
those attributed to the person charged as accomplice.
The defenses raised by Perpenian are not sufficient to exonerate her criminal liability.1wphi1
Assuming arguendo that she just came to the resort thinking it was a swimming party, it was
inevitable that she acquired knowledge of the criminal design of the principals when she saw Chan
being guarded in the room. A rational person would have suspected something was wrong and
would have reported such incident to the police. Perpenian, however, chose to keep quiet; and to
add to that, she even spent the night at the cottage. It has been held before that being present and
giving moral support when a crime is being committed will make a person responsible as an
accomplice in the crime committed.61 It should be noted that the accused-appellants presence and
company were not indispensable and essential to the perpetration of the kidnapping for ransom;
hence, she is only liable as an accomplice.62 Moreover, this Court is guided by the ruling in People
v. Clemente, et al.,63 where it was stressed that in case of doubt, the participation of the offender
will be considered as that of an accomplice rather than that of a principal.
Having admitted their involvement in the crime of kidnapping for ransom and considering the
evidence presented by the prosecution, linking accused-appellants participation in the crime, no
doubt can be entertained as to their guilt. The CA convicted the accused-appellants of kidnapping
for ransom and imposed upon them the supreme penalty of death, applying the provisions of
Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code. Likewise, this Court finds accused-appellants guilty beyond
reasonable doubt as principals to the crime of kidnapping for ransom. However, pursuant to R.A.
No. 9346,64 we modify the penalty imposed by the trial court and reduce the penalty to Reclusion
Perpetua, without eligibility for parole.
Modification should also be made as to the criminal liability of Perpenian. Pursuant to the passing
of R.A. No. 9344,65 a determination of whether she acted with or without discernment is necessary.
Considering that Perpenian acted with discernment when she was 17 years old at the time of the
commission of the offense, her minority should be appreciated not as an exempting circumstance,
but as a privileged mitigating circumstance pursuant to Article 68 of the Revised Penal Code.
Under Section 38 of R.A. No. 9344,66 the suspension of sentence of a child in conflict with the law
shall still be applied even if he/she is already eighteen (18) years of age or more at the time of the
pronouncement of his/her guilt.
Unfortunately, at the present age of 31, Perpenian can no longer benefit from the aforesaid
provision, because under Article 40 of R.A. No. 9344,67 the suspension of sentence can be availed of
only until the child in conflict with the law reaches the maximum age of twenty-one (21) years. This
leaves the Court with no choice but to pronounce judgement. Perpenian is found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt as an accomplice in the crime of kidnapping for ransom. Since this Court has ruled
that death as utilized in Article 71 of the Revised Penal Code shall no longer form part of the
equation in the graduation of penalties pursuant to R.A. No. 9346,68 the penalty imposed by law on
accomplices in the commission of consummated kidnapping for ransom is Reclusion Temporal, the
penalty one degree lower than what the principals would bear (Reclusion Perpetua).69 Applying
Article 68 of the Revised Penal Code, the imposable penalty should then be adjusted to the penalty
next lower than that prescribed by law for accomplices. This Court, therefore, holds that as to
Perpenian, the penalty of Prision Mayor, the penalty lower than that prescribed by law (Reclusion
Temporal), should be imposed. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum penalty,
which is one degree lower than the maximum imposable penalty, shall be within the range of
Prision Correccional; and the maximum penalty shall be within the minimum period of Prision
Mayor, absent any aggravating circumstance and there being one mitigating circumstance. Hence,
the Court imposes the indeterminate sentence of six (6) months and one (1) day of Prision
Correccional, as minimum, to six (6) years and one (1) day of Prision Mayor, as maximum.
As regards Perpenians possible confinement in an agricultural camp or other training facility in

accordance with Section 51 of R.A. 9344, this Court held in People v. Jacinto70 that the age of the
child in conflict with the law at the time of the promulgation of the judgment is not material. What
matters is that the offender committed the offense when he/she was still of tender age. This Court,
however, finds such arrangement no longer necessary in view of the fact that Perpenians actual
served term has already exceeded the imposable penalty for her offense. For such reason, she may
be immediately released from detention.
We note that in the Order71 dated 9 October 1998, the trial court admitted the documentary
evidence offered by the counsel for the defense proving that the real name of Thian Perpenian is
Larina Perpenian.
In view of the death of Mandao during the pendency of this case, he is relieved of all personal and
pecuniary penalties attendant to the crime, his death72 having occurred before rendition of final
judgement.73
There is prevailing jurisprudence,74 on civil liabilities arising from the commission of kidnapping
for the purpose of extorting ransom from the victim or any other person under Article 267 of the
Revised Penal Code. The persons convicted were held liable for 75,000.00 as civil indemnity;
75,000.00 as moral damages; and 30,000.00 as exemplary damages.
We take this opportunity to increase the amounts of indemnity and damages, where, as in this case,
the penalty for the crime committed is death which, however, cannot be imposed because of the
provisions of R.A. No. 9346:75
1. 100,000.00 as civil indemnity;
2. 100,000.00 as moral damages which the victim is assumed to have suffered and thus needs no
proof; and
3. 100,000.00 as exemplary damages to set an example for the public good.
These amounts shall be the minimum indemnity and damages where death is the penalty
warranted by the facts but is not imposable under present law.
The ruling of this Court in People v. Montesclaros76 is instructive on the apportionment of civil
liabilities among all the accused-appellants. The entire amount of the civil liabilities should be
apportioned among all those who cooperated in the commission of the crime according to the
degrees of their liability, respective responsibilities and actual participation. Hence, each principal
accused-appellant should shoulder a greater share in the total amount of indemnity and damages
than Perpenian who was adjudged as only an accomplice.
Taking into account the difference in the degrees of their participation, all of them shall be liable for
the total amount of 300,000.00 divided among the principals who shall be liable for 288,000.00
(or 32,000.00 each) and Perpenian who shall be liable for 12,000.00. This is broken down into
10,666.67 civil indemnity, 10,666.67 moral damages and 10,666.67 exemplary damages for
each principal; and 4,000.00 civil indemnity, 4,000.00 moral damages and 4,000.00 exemplary
damages for the lone accomplice.
WHEREFORE, the 28 June 2005 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CRH.C. No. 00863 is
hereby AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATIONS. Accused-appellants HALIL GAMBAO y ESMAIL, EDDIE
KARIM y USO, EDWIN DUKILMAN y SUBOH, TONY ABAO y SULA, RAUL UDAL y KAGUI, THENG
DILANGALEN y NANDING, JAMAN MACALINBOL y KATOL, MONETTE RONAS y AMPIL and NORA
EVAD y MULOK are found guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principals in the crime of kidnapping
for ransom and sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua, without eligibility of parole.
Accused-appellant THIAN PERPENIAN y RAFON A.K.A. LARINA PERPENIAN is found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt as accomplice in the crime of kidnapping for ransom and sentenced to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of six (6) months and one (1) day of Prision Correccional, as minimum, to six
(6) years and one (1) day of Prision Mayor, as maximum. Accused-appellants are ordered to
indemnify the victim in the amounts of 100,000.00 as civil indemnity, 100,000.00 as moral
damages and 100,000.00 as exemplary damages apportioned in the following manner: the
principals to the crime shall jointly and severally pay the victim the total amount of 288,000.00
while the accomplice shall pay the victim 12,000.00, subject to Article 110 of the Revised Penal
Code on several and subsidiary liability.
The Court orders the Correctional Institute for Women to immediately release THIAN PERPENIAN
A.K.A. LARINA PERPENIAN due to her having fully served the penalty imposed on her, unless her
further detention is warranted for any other lawful causes.
Let a copy of this decision be furnished for immediate implementation to the Director of the
Correctional Institute for Women by personal service. The Director of the Correctional Institute for
Women shall submit to this Court, within five (5) days from receipt of a copy of the decision, the
action he has taken thereon.
SO ORDERED.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 174056

Appellee, [Formerly G.R. No. 138257]
- versus -
ROGELIO GUMIMBA y CORONA,
MORADANTE alias ROWING and CARPIO-MORALES,*
RONTE ABABO (acquitted), CALLEJO, SR.,*
Appellants,
Promulgated:
February 27, 2007
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
For review before the Court is the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated 26 April 2006,
affirming with modification the Decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Ozamiz City, Branch
15,[3] dated 10 March 1999, finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape
with homicide.
In an Information[4] dated 17 April 1997, appellant Rogelio Gumimba y Morandante alias Rowing
and co-accused Ronie Abapo (Abapo) were charged before the RTC, with the crime of rape with
homicide of an eight (8)-year old child, thus:
That on or about April 8, 1997, in Barangay Pantaon, Ozamiz City, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating with
each other, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously and by means of force, violence
and intimidation, to wit: by then and there pinning down one [AAA],[5] a minor, 8 years of age, and
succeeded in having carnal knowledge with her and as a result thereof she suffered 6-12 oclock
lacerated wounds of [sic] the vagina as well as fatal stab wounds on the different parts of her body
and which were the direct cause of her death thereafter.
CONTRARY to Article 335 in relation with Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code.
On 16 May 1997, appellant and Abapo both entered a plea of not guilty on arraignment.[6]
Thereafter, the case proceeded to trial with the prosecution first presenting two witnesses: (1)
Emelio Magallano, President of Purok I, Barangay Pantaon, Ozamiz City; and (2) Sofronio Araas, a
Civilian Volunteer Officer (CVO) of the same barangay.
Magallano and Araas testified that at around 9 oclock in the evening of 10 April 1997, appellant
went to Magallanos home and confessed to him that he alone and by himself raped and killed his
(appellants) niece, AAA, in Purok Pantaon, Ozamiz City. Subsequently, Magallano accompanied
appellant to the residence of Araas where he reiterated his confession. That same night, Magallano,
Araas, appellant and family members of the witnesses proceeded to the home of Barangay Captain
Santiago Acapulco, Jr. who conducted an investigation. Appellant repeated his narration and
confessed to the barangay captain that he had raped and killed the victim, and that he was alone
when he committed the crime. As a result thereof, Acapulco, Jr., in the company of the others,
brought appellant to the Ozamiz City Hall and turned him over to the police authorities.[7]
However, appellant manifested though counsel (before the court) at the following hearing on 22
May 1997 that he would like to change his earlier plea of not guilty to a plea of guilty.[8] The RTC
ordered appellants re-arraignment and the latter accordingly entered a plea of guilty.[9] The court
conducted an inquiry to ascertain the voluntariness of appellants plea and his full comprehension
of the consequences thereof. Prosecution was likewise charged to establish the guilt and degree of
culpability of appellant.[10]
In accordance with the courts directive, the prosecution continued with the presentation of its
evidence in chief. It presented Dr. Pedrita Rosauro, the physician who conducted the autopsy on the
body of the victim, and who testified that the victim was raped before she was killed. The
examination by Dr. Rosauro revealed that AAA sustained four (4) stab wounds in front, two (2) stab
wounds in her back and one (1) lacerated wound each on her neck and on her middle upper
extremity. Furthermore, she found 6 and 12 oclock laceration wounds on the external genital organ
of the victim.[11]
Before resting its case, the prosecution presented appellant as witness against his co-accused
Abapo. Appellant testified that he and Abapo raped and killed the victim. He likewise explained that
he had previously confessed to Magallano, Araas and Acapulco that he alone committed the crime in
the hope that the parents of the victim, who were relatives of his, might take pity on him.[12]
In his defense, Abapo testified that at the time the crime was allegedly committed, he was with his
mother and three (3) siblings at the Labo River, about two (2) kilometers away from Barangay
Pantaon, washing their clothes.[13] In support thereof, Abapo presented his mother Virgencita
Abapo, Elisa Carreon and Raymundo Orot, all of whom corroborated his alibi.[14] The defense also
presented witness Araas who reiterated his earlier testimony that appellant confessed to him that
he alone was responsible for the raping and killing of the victim.[15] Finally, Eugenio Bucog, a
teacher at Capucao Elementary School, was presented to demonstrate Abapos good character when
he was his student.[16]
On 10 March 1999, the RTC promulgated its Decision. On the basis of appellants plea of guilty, the
RTC found him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime as charged. Appellant was sentenced to
suffer the death penalty and ordered to indemnify the heirs of the victim in the amounts of
P50,000.00 as indemnity for the life of the victim, P30,000.00 as moral damages, and costs.[17] On
the other hand, the trial court acquitted Abapo on the ground that his guilt was not established
beyond reasonable doubt. Except for the lone testimony of appellant, the RTC held that no other
evidence was adduced to prove the participation of Abapo. Moreover, the court a quo found that
appellants testimony implicating Abapo was not worthy of credence coming as it did from a
polluted source.[18]
With the death penalty imposed on appellant, the case was elevated to this Court on automatic
review. Pursuant to this Courts decision in People v. Mateo,[19] the case was transferred to the
Court of Appeals.
On 26 April 2006, the appellate court rendered its Decision[20] affirming the appellants conviction,
but with modification as to damages awarded to the heirs of the victim. The dispositive portion of
the said Decision states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Appeal is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The Decision
dated March 10, 1999 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 15, of Ozami[s] City, is hereby AFFIRMED
with the MODIFICATION that the amount of civil indemnity ex delicto is hereby increased from
P50,000.00 to P100,000.00, including the award of moral damages from P30,000.00 to P50,000.00.
Conformably with the ruling of the Supreme Court in People of the Philippines v. Efren Mateo, We
refrain from entering judgment, and the Division Clerk of Court is hereby directed to elevate the
entire records of the case to the Honorable Supreme Court for its final disposition.
SO ORDERED.[21]
On 3 October 2006, the Court issued an order requiring the parties to simultaneously submit
supplemental briefs within thirty (30) days from notice should they so desire.[22] On 21 November
and 24 November 2006, appellant and appellee filed similar manifestations that they are adopting
the briefs they filed before the Court of Appeals.[23]
Thus, appellant raises the following errors in this petition for review:
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT ON THE BASIS OF HIS
IMPROVIDENT PLEA OF GUILTY AND HIS ALLEGED SEPARATE CONFESSIONS TO ONE EM[I]LIO
MAGALLANO, AND ONE SOFRONIO ARAAS, THE LATTER BEING HEARSAY AND WITHOUT
PROBATIVE VALUE WHATSOEVER.
II
THE COURT A QUO LIKEWISE ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF RAPE WITH
HOMICIDE DESPITE THE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO ESTABLISH THE LATTERS GUILT
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT, AND THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT OWNING UP ONLY TO THE
CRIME OF SIMPLE RAPE.[24]
The ultimate issue is whether appellants guilt was established by evidence beyond reasonable
doubt.
It must be conceded at the outset that the trial court failed in its duty to conduct the prescribed
searching inquiry into the voluntariness of appellants plea of guilty and full comprehension thereof.
Consequently, appellants plea of guilty was made improvidently and it is rendered
inefficacious.[25] Nevertheless, the Court must rule against appellant as the evidence on record is
ample to sustain the judgment of conviction independent from his plea of guilty.
The crime of rape with homicide is punishable with death under Article 335 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7659, which provides:
Article 335. When and how rape is committed. Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a
woman under any of the following circumstances:
1. By using force or intimidation;

2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and
3. When the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented.
The crime of rape is punishable by reclusion perpetua.
xxxx
When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, a homicide is committed, the penalty shall be death.
xxxx
The Information, to which appellant pleaded guilty, alleged that homicide was committed by reason
or on the occasion of the rape of AAA. This, if proven, would warrant the penalty of death at that
time.[26] Accordingly, a plea of guilty to such charges calls into play the provisions of Section 3,
Rule 116 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, thus
Sec. 3. Plea of guilty to capital offense; reception of evidence. When the accused pleads guilty to a
and the precise degree of culpability. The accused may present evidence in his behalf.
Based on this rule, when a plea of guilty to a capital offense is entered, there are three (3)
conditions that the trial court must observe to obviate an improvident plea of guilty by the accused:
(1) it must conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension by the
accused of the consequences of his plea; (2) it must require the prosecution to present evidence to
prove the guilt of the accused and the precise degree of his culpability; and (3) it must ask the
accused whether he desires to present evidence on his behalf, and allow him to do so if he so
desires. [27]
There is no hard and fast rule as to how a judge may conduct a searching inquiry, or as to the
number and character of questions he may ask the accused, or as to the earnestness with which he
may conduct it, since each case must be measured according to its individual merit.[28] However,
the logic behind the rule is that courts must proceed with caution where the imposable penalty is
death for the reason that the execution of such a sentence is irrevocable and experience has shown
that innocent persons have at times pleaded guilty.[29] An improvident plea of guilty on the part of
the accused when capital crimes are involved should be avoided since he might be admitting his
guilt before the court and thus forfeit his life and liberty without having fully comprehended the
meaning and import and consequences of his plea.[30] Moreover, the requirement of taking further
evidence would aid this Court on appellate review in determining the propriety or impropriety of
the plea.[31]
In the instant case, when the accused entered a plea of guilty at his re-arraignment, it is evident that
the RTC did not strictly observe the requirements under Section 3, Rule 116 above. A mere warning
that the accused faces the supreme penalty of death is insufficient.[32] Such procedure falls short of
the exacting guidelines in the conduct of a searching inquiry, as follows:
(1) Ascertain from the accused himself (a) how he was brought into the custody of the law; (b)
whether he had the assistance of a competent counsel during the custodial and preliminary
investigations; and (c) under what conditions he was detained and interrogated during the
investigations. This is intended to rule out the possibility that the accused has been coerced or
placed under a state of duress either by actual threats of physical harm coming from malevolent
quarters or simply because of the judges intimidating robes.
(2) Ask the defense counsel a series of questions as to whether he had conferred with, and
completely explained to, the accused the meaning and consequences of a plea of guilty.
(3) Elicit information about the personality profile of the accused, such as his age, socio-economic
(4) Inform the accused of the exact length of imprisonment or nature of the penalty under the law
and the certainty that he will serve such sentence. For not infrequently, an accused pleads guilty in
the hope of a lenient treatment or upon bad advice or because of promises of the authorities or
parties of a lighter penalty should he admit guilt or express remorse. It is the duty of the judge to
ensure that the accused does not labor under these mistaken impressions because a plea of guilty
carries with it not only the admission of authorship of the crime proper but also of the aggravating
circumstances attending it, that increase punishment.
(5) Inquire if the accused knows the crime with which he is charged and to fully explain to him the
against him and a denial of his right to due process.
(6) All questions posed to the accused should be in a language known and understood by the latter.
(7) The trial judge must satisfy himself that the accused, in pleading guilty, is truly guilty. The
accused must be required to narrate the tragedy or reenact the crime or furnish its missing
details.[33]
An examination of the records of the proceedings will illustrate the courts treatment of appellants
change of plea, viz:
Atty. Cagaanan:
Considering the voluntary plea of guilty of the accused[,] we pray that the mitigating circumstance
to prove his plea of guilty be appreciated in favor of the accused. We likewise pray that another
mitigating [circumstance] of voluntary surrender be appreciated in his favor.
Pros. Edmilao:
Considering the gravity of the crime, may we ask your Honor that we will present evidence inorder
[sic] that it will give also justice to the victim.
Court:
Present evidence to prove gravity of the crime.
Pros. Edmilao:
Our first witness is the ABC president.

Court:
What matter will Santiago Acapulco testify?
Court:
Was there cruelty done by the accused in picking [sic] the life of the minor girl?
xxxx
Pros. Edmilao:
May we ask that we will present her [sic] in the next hearing.
Court:
The court will call the accused to the witness stand.
xxxx
(The witness after having administered an oath, took the witness stand and declared that he is:
ROGELIO GUMIMBA
20 years old
Single
Occupation- duck raising
Resident of Capucao, Ozamiz City)
xxxx
Court:
The court will allow the prosecutor or the defense to profound [sic] question [sic] on the matter and
the accused understand [sic] and fully comprehend [sic] the consequence of his plea of guilty.
xxxx
Pros. Edmilao:
Q Mr. Rogelio Gumimba[,] are you the same accused in this case in Crim. Case No. RTC 2074?
A Yes, sir.
Q Now the victim in this case is [AAA], a minor, 8 years of age[.] Since you have admitted this in
what particular place wherein [sic] you raped and slew [AAA]?
A Purok Pantaon, Ozamiz City.
Q How far is that place wherein you slew and raped [AAA] from her house?
A Very near, sir.
Q Can you estimate how many meters?

A One meter, sir.
Q Was it committed inside or outside the house?

A Outside.
Q In what particular place of the house[:] in front, at the side or at the back?
A At the back of the house of the victim.
Q Will you please tell the court, how did you do it, will you please narrate.
A I raped her by tying her hand, then I killed her.
Q Before you raped and killed [AAA], where did you get her?
A I saw her roaming around.
Q In committing the crime, were you alone?
Atty. Anonat:
Objection
Court:
Sustained.
Pros. Edmilao:
You stated that you pushed her and even tied her hand and raped her and stabbed her, were you
the one alone [sic]?
Atty. Anonat:
Objection
Court:
Sustained.
Court:
Q When you said you raped her, you mean you inserted your penis inside the vagina of [AAA]?
A No, Your Honor.
Q When you said you raped her, what do you mean?

A I was drank [sic] at that time.
Q And you said you tied [AAA], what did you use in tying her?
A Banana skin.
Q How did you tie [AAA]?

A I tied both her hands.
Q The hands of [AAA], you placed at the back?

A In front of her.
Q After tying her [,] what did you do to her?

A After that I went home.
Q You did not stab [AAA]?

A I stabbed her, Your Honor.
Q What weapon did you use in stabbing her?

A A long bolo.
Q You mean you were bringing [a] long bolo at that time?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q After stabbing her, what did you do to her?

A No more, Your Honor.
Q How many times did you stab [AAA]?

A I could not count how many stab wounds I inflicted to [sic] her.
Q But you will agree that you have stabbed her many times?
A I could no longer count how many stab wounds, Your Honor.
Q When you were arraigned, you pleaded guilty, do you understand the consequence of your
pleading guilty?
A I do not know Your Honor [,] the consequence.
Q You pleaded guilty to the offense of rape with homicide, did you understand?
A Yes, Your Honor, I understand.
Q That by your pleading guilty to the offense you will be sentenced to die?
A Yes, I am aware.
Q Your act of pleading guilty to the offense charged is your voluntary will?
A Yes, I admitted that crime, but we were two.
Q You mean to say there were two of you who raped [AAA]?
A Yes, your Honor.
Q Before raping her, was [AAA] wearing clothes?

A Yes, Your Honor.
Q Was [AAA] wearing [a] panty before you raped her?

A Yes, Your Honor.
Q Did you remove her panty before raping her?

A No, You Honor, I did not.
Q How did you rape [AAA]?

A I have sexed [sic] with her.
Q What do you mean by I remedio her, you mean you have inserted your penis into the vagina of
[AAA]?
A No, Your Honor, my penis did not penetrate into the vagina of [AAA].
Q Why your penis did [sic] not able to penetrate into the vagina of [AAA]?
A The vagina of [AAA] is very small.
Q Can you tell this Court how tall was [AAA]?

A (The witness demonstrated that from the floor about 3 feet high was the height of [AAA])
Q If you are standing and [AAA] is also standing side by side with you, up to what part of your body
is the height of [AAA]?
A Up to my waist line.
Atty. Cagaanan:
Q When you pleaded guilty [,] was it in your own free will?
A Yes, sir.
Q Were you not forced or coerced by anybody with this crime?

A No, sir.[34]
The inefficacious plea of guilty notwithstanding, the totality of the evidence for the prosecution
undeniably establishes appellants guilt beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape with
homicide. Apart from his testimony upon changing his plea to a plea of guilty, appellant gave a
subsequent testimony when he was presented by the prosecution as a witness against his co-
accused. This second testimony which constitutes another judicial confession, replete with details
and made consciously as it was, cured the deficiencies which made his earlier plea of guilty
improvident. The latter testimony left no room for doubt as to the voluntariness and
comprehension on appellants part of his change of plea, as well as completed his narration of how
he raped and killed the victim. The pertinent portions of the second testimony follow, thus:
Pros. Jose A. Edmilao:
Q While you were gathering firewoods [sic] and Ronie Abapo was pasturing carabao, do you recall
of any untoward incident that happened?
A We raped and killed.
Q Whom did you rape and kill?

A [AAA].
Q And when you said [AAA], who was then your companion, because you said we?
A Ronie Abapo.
xxxx
Q While she [AAA] was there gathering oranges, you mean to say you were close to the place [AAA]
was?
A I, together with Ronie Abapo go [sic] near to the place [AAA] was.
Q When you were already near at [sic] the place where [AAA] was climbing, was she still up there at
the orange tree?
A She already came down.
Q When she came down, what followed next then?

A We held her hands.
Q Who held her hands?

A The two of us.
Q You mean one hand was held by you and the other hand was held by Ronie Abapo?
Atty. Anonat:
Objection, leading.
Pros. Edmilao:
Q You said that you were holding the hands of [AAA], how did you do it?
A We held her hands and tied it [sic] with banana skin.
Q Who tied the hands of [AAA]?

A Both of us.
Q After tying the hands of [AAA][,] with banana stalk where did you place her?
A We brought her to the [sic] grassy place.
Q What happened then after [AAA] was brought to the [sic] grassy place?
A We killed her.
Q Before you killed her, what did you do to her?

A We raped her.
Q Who raped her first?

A It was Ronie Abapo, then followed by me.
Q How did you rape her?

A We undress[sed] her.
Q What was she wearing at that time?

A She wore a dress.
Q What about Ronie Abapo?

A He did not undress.
Q How did you let your penis out?

A I removed my t-shirt.
Q How about your pants?

A I also removed my pants.
Q What was then the reaction of [AAA], when you first tied her hand?
A She did not cry, because we covered her mouth.
Q Who covered her mouth? You or Ronie?

A Ronie.
Q What [sic] you said that it was Ronie Abapo, what did you do then when he was on [sic] the act of
raping her?
A I was just near to [sic] them.
Q The after Ronie Abapo, what did you do then?

A He told me that you will be the next [sic].
Q So when he told you that you will be the next [sic], what did you do next?
A I also raped her.
Q Again, when you said you raped her, you inserted your penis into the vagina of [AAA]?
A It did not enter [sic].
Q Why?
A It did not penetrate, because I was afraid.
Q But your penis erected [sic]?

A No, Your Honor.
Q You said that Ronie was the first to have sexual intercourse, was he able to insert his penis into
the vagina of [AAA]?
A No, sir, because he was watching, if there was person [sic] around.
Q Were you able to see the penis of Ronie inserted into the vagina of [AAA]?
A I have [sic] not seen.
xxxx
Q You said that you and Ronie Abapo raped [AAA], what do you mean or what do you understand
by the word rape?
A We undressed her.
Q Why did you undress her?

A We undressed her, because we want [sic] to do something to her.
Q What is that something that you want [sic] top do to [AAA]?

A We raped her.
Q When you said we raped her, you mean, you inserted your penis inside the vagina of [AAA]?
A No, sir.
Q But you tried to insert your penis inside the vagina?

A Yes, sir.
Q And your penis touched the vagina of [AAA]?

A Yes, sir.
Q Only your penis was not able to enter the vagina because [AAA] is [sic] still a small girl?
A Yes, sir.
Q After trying to insert your penis after Ronie Abapo, what did you do to [AAA]?
A I walked away, but he called me.
Q Who called you?

A Ronie Abapo.
Q Why did he call you?

A He asked me, what to do with [AAA]. It might be that she will tell us to somebody [sic], we will kill
her.
Q What did you do?

A I did not answer.
Q And what was your answer?

A Because he keep [sic] on persuading me.
Q How did he persuade you?

A He persuaded me because we might be caught.
Q And what did he tell you to do?

A That we will kill [AAA].
Q How did he tell you that?

A Rowing[,] we will kill her.
Q And what was your reply?

A I refused.
Q When you refused, what did he do then?

A He keep [sic] on persuading me.
Q And what did eventually came [sic] to your mind?

A Evil came to my mind, so we killed her.
Q How did you kill her?

A We stabbed her.
Q What weapon you used [sic] when you killed her?

A A long bolo.
Q Whose [sic] the owner of that long bolo?

A Mine, but Ronie Abapo used it.
Q Who was the first one to use it?

A Ronie Abapo.
Q But the bolo was in your hands, how did [sic] he be able to use it?
A I put it on the ground and he got it.
Q You said that he made the first struck [sic]. Where was [AAA] first hit?
A In the stomach.
Q How many times did Ronie Abapo strike her with the use of that bolo?
A I cannot remember anymore.
Q Aside from the stomach, where were the other pants [sic] of [AAA] also hit?
A At the left side.
Q How about you, did you made [sic] the following stab to [AAA]?
A I was hesitant to stab, but eventually I stabbed her.
Q How many times?

A Only one.
Q What part of her body was she hit?

A At the stomach.
Q Do you mean to say that you also got the bolo from the hands of Ronie Abapo and also stabbed
[AAA]?
A Yes, sir.
Q Why was [AAA] not killed, when Ronie Abapo made stabbed [sic] on her?
A He [sic] was already dead.
Q Why did you stab her, when she was already dead?
A I just stabbed her, because I thought that she was still alive.
xxxx
Q Do you know where is [sic] the bolo used in stabbing [AAA]?

A No, sir.
Q After killing [AAA], where did you place the bolo?

A In our place.
Q It [sic] it there in your home?

A Already taken.
Q Who got?
A The barangay captain.
Q Now, did you tell to [sic] anybody regarding the raping and killing of [AAA] aside from here in
Court?
A I have already told.
Q Who was the person whom you talked about [sic]?

A My neighbor.
Q Whose [sic] the name of that neighbor?

A Emilio Magallano.
Q After Emilio Magallano[,] to whom did you report?

A Sofronio Aranas.
Q Who else?
A Rico Magallano.
Q Who else?
A The wife of Panyong.
Q In the reporting [sic] this matter[,] were you together with Ronie Abapo telling these persons that
you raped [AAA]?
A I was alone.
Q And did you tell her that you were two in killing and raping with Ronie Abapo?
A No, sir.
Q Why not?
A According to Emilio that the mother of the victim might be [sic] pity enough to me, because I am
related to them.
Q When you reported to these persons you have mentioned, did you also tell them that you were
together with Ronie Abapo in killing and raping?
A No, sir.[35]
While the trial court found appellants second testimony insofar as it implicated his co-accused to be
unworthy of credence, there is absolutely nothing on record which militates against its use as basis
for establishing appellants guilt. In fact, in his Brief, appellant submits that he must be convicted of
simple rape alone and not rape with homicide. Thus, he admits in writing, albeit implicitly, that he
raped the victim.
Convictions based on an improvident plea of guilt are set aside only if such plea is the sole basis of
the judgment. If the trial court relied on sufficient and credible evidence to convict the accused, the
conviction must be sustained, because then it is predicated not merely on the guilty plea of the
accused but on evidence proving his commission of the offense charged.[36] Thus, as we have ruled
in People v. Derilo:[37]
While it may be argued that appellant entered an improvident plea of guilty when re-arraigned, we
find no need, however, to remand the case to the lower court for further reception of evidence. As a
rule, this Court has set aside convictions based on pleas of guilty in capital offenses because of
improvidence thereof and when such plea is the sole basis of the condemnatory judgment.
However, where the trial court receives evidence to determine precisely whether or not the
accused has erred in admitting his guilt, the manner in which the plea of guilty is made
(improvidently or not) loses legal significance, for the simple reason that the conviction is based on
evidence proving the commission by the accused of the offense charged.
Thus, even without considering the plea of guilty of appellant, he may still be convicted if there is
adequate evidence on record on which to predicate his conviction. x x x x
Here, the prosecution was able to establish, through the separate testimonies of appellant, that at
around 1:00 oclock in the afternoon of 8 April 1997, appellant was gathering firewood not far from
the house of the victim AAA in Barangay Pantaon, Ozamiz City. He met co-accused Ronie Abapo who
was then pasturing his carabao also within the vicinity of the victims home. They spotted the victim
picking oranges with her three (3)-year old brother at the back of their house and together
approached her from behind, tied her hands with banana skin and dragged her to a grassy
place.[38] Abapo raped the victim first.[39] Thereafter, appellant followed suit.[40] Once they had
finished with their dastardly acts, they stabbed and killed the victim with a long bolo which
belonged to appellant.[41]
Through the testimony of the physician who conducted the autopsy on AAAs body, it was
established that the victim had 6 and 12 oclock lacerations on her external genital organ. Thus, it is
clear that the rape was consummated.
Appellant challenges the testimonies of the witnesses Magallano and Araas on what appellant had
confessed to or told them for being hearsay. The challenge fails. The testimonies, it should be
conceded, cannot serve as a proof of extrajudicial confession for an extrajudicial confession has to
be in writing, among others, to be admissible in evidence.[42] That is why the testimonies are of use
in the case as corroborative evidence only. Such utility, however, cannot be defeated by the hearsay
rule. The testimonies covered are independently relevant statements which are not barred by the
hearsay rule.
Under the doctrine of independently relevant statements, only the fact that such statements were
made is relevant, and the truth or falsity thereof is immaterial. The hearsay rule does not apply. The
statements are admissible as evidence. Evidence as to the making of such statement is not
secondary but primary, for the statement itself may constitute a fact in issue or be circumstantially
relevant as to the existence of such a fact.[43]
Moreover, where, as in the case at bar, there is no evidence to show any dubious reason or
improper motive for a prosecution witness to bear false testimony against the accused or falsely
implicate him in a crime, his or her testimony should be given full faith and credit.[44]
Next, we address appellants contention that he can only be convicted of simple rape, as this is the
only crime to which he has owned up. Arguing that the victim may have already been dead after his
co-accused had allegedly hacked her first, appellant theorizes that he, at most, would be guilty of an
impossible crime.
Appellant is clutching at straws. It is extremely doubtful that appellant could have known positively
that the victim was already dead when he struck her. The proposition not only completely
contradicts his judicial confession, it is also speculative as to cause of death. In light of the particular
circumstances of the event, appellants mere conjecture that AAA had already expired by the time he
hacked her cannot be sufficient to support his assertion of an impossible crime. An examination of
the testimony is again called for, thus:
Pros. Edmilao:
Q You said that he (Abapo) made the first strike, where was [AAA] first hit?
A In the stomach.
Q How many times did Ronie Abapo strike her with the use of that bolo?
A I cannot remember anymore.
Q Aside from the stomach, where were the other pants [sic] of [AAA] also hit?
A At the left side.
Q How about you, did you made [sic] the following stab to [AAA]?
A I was hesitant to stab, but eventually I stabbed her.
Q How many times?

A Only one.
Q What part of her body was she hit?

A At the stomach.
Q Do you mean to say that you also got the bolo from the hands of Ronie Abapo and also stabbed
AAA?
A Yes, sir.
Q Why was [AAA] not killed, when Ronie Abapo made stabbed [sic] on her?
A He [sic] was already dead.
Q Why did you stab her, when she was already dead?
A I just stabbed her, because I thought that she was still alive.[45]
Thus, the finding of guilt as pronounced by the RTC and the Court of Appeals should be sustained.
However, with the passage of R.A. No. 9346, entitled An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death
Penalty in the Philippines, the penalty of death can no longer be imposed. Accordingly, the penalty
imposed upon appellant is reduced from death to reclusion perpetua without eligibility for
parole.[46]
With respect to the civil liability of appellant, we modify the award in light of prevailing
jurisprudence. Accordingly, appellant is ordered to indemnify the heirs of AAA in the amount of
P100,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages, P25,000.00 as temperate damages
and P100,000.00 as exemplary damages.[47]
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. CR-HC No. 00193 is AFFIRMED WITH
MODIFICATION. Appellant is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua without
eligibility for parole and to pay the heirs of the victim, AAA, in the amounts of P100,000.00 as civil
indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages, P25,000.00 as temperate damages, and P100,000.00 as
exemplary damages, plus costs.

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C ases on Ar ra ig nment / Pl e a |1

A.M. No. RTJ-14-2399 November 19, 2014

GASPAR BANDOY, Complainant,

Thus, the OCA recommended that:

The Court's Ruling

The Court agrees with the recommendation of the OCA.

G.R. Nos. 163972-77

March 28, 2008

The petition is meritorious.

(a) plea bargaining;

(b) stipulation of facts;

(c) marking for identification of evidence of the parties;

(d) waiver of objections to admissibility of evidence;

G.R. No. 164953

JOHN JOSEPH LUMANLAW y BULINAO,

On the latter date, respondent judge issued the following Order:[15]

Hence, the present Petition.[30]

Petitioner raises the following issues for our consideration:

The Courts Ruling

The Petition is meritorious.

Speedy Trial Construed

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

G.R. No. 188314

January 10, 2011

The pertinent facts, as determined by the trial court, are as follows:

1.) The jurisdiction of this court over the offenses charged.

Accused-appellants raise the following assignment of errors:

First Assignment of Error

ATTY. PEA : Yes, your Honor.

COURT : With matters that they stipulated upon?

The requirement to conduct a searching inquiry applies more so in cases of re-arraignment. In

Second Assignment of Error

Q : How did you know, Mr. witness?

A : On December 29, Angelo Trinidad got 2 more kilos of TNT bombs.

A : There is, sir Abu Zaky, sir, called up also.

A : He told me that this is your first mission.

A : If I am not mistaken, sir, on February 13, 2005 at 6:30 p.m.

Q : Who got from you the explosive Mr. witness?

A : Its Angelo Trinidad and Tapay, sir.

A : They got 2 kilos TNT bomb, sir.

A : That is the bomb that exploded in Makati, sir.

Q : Why did you know, Mr. witness?

A : There is, sir The call came from Abu Zaky.

Q : What did Abu Zaky tell you, Mr. witness?

A : He just greeted us congratulations, because we have a successful mission.

A : He told me that sa wakas, nag success din yung tinuro ko sayo.

A : They are connected, sir.

Q : Connected in what sense, Mr. witness?

Q : Wage the battle against who, Mr. witness?

A : The government, sir.[17]

Art. 17. Principals. The following are considered principals:

1. Those who take a direct part in the execution of the act

G.R. No. 213455, August 11, 2015

JUAN PONCE ENRILE, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, HON. AMPARO M.

The Information reads:LawlibraryofCRAlaw

consideration of ENRILES endorsement, directly or through REYES, to the appropriate government

THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI

A. The Peoples Comment

THE COURTS RULING

A. The constitutional right of the accused to be informed

An Information is an accusation in writing charging a person with an offense, signed by the

B.1. Ultimate facts versus Evidentiary facts