Legmed 1st Set

G.R. No.
L-204 May 16, 1947
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
GERARDO CORNEL, defendant-appellant.
Pablo Anzures for appellant.

Office of the Assistant Solicitor General Gianzon and Solicitor Jimenez for appellee.
PARAS, J.:
This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Albay sentencing the defendant,
for the crime of homicide, to an indeterminate prison term ranging from 8 years and 1 day of prision
mayor to 14 years, 8 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal, with corresponding accessory
penalties, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased, Fabian Burac, in the sum of P2,000, and to pay the
costs.
The first feature of appellant's case as presented by his counsel de oficio, refers to the alleged
inadequacy of the evidence for the prosecution establishing appellant's identity. Trinidad Coral,
however, personally saw (1) the appellant suddenly assault her deceased husband (Fabian Burac)
with a bolo as the latter was descending the stairs of his house in the Barrio of San Miguel,
Municipality of Tabaco, Province of Albay, at about 6 o'clock in the afternoon of June 8, 1945; (2)
after Fabian Burac (then wounded in the forehead) fell, the appellant threw a stone which hit Fabian's
right clavicle, and (3) the appellant thereafter fled in the direction of his house. The positive testimony
of Trinidad was given full credit by the trial court, and the latter's advantage of observing and hearing
the witness should not be disregarded particularly where, as in this case, Trinidad knew the appellant
well and the latter merely relies on the conjecture that Trinidad might have made a mistake in
identifying her husband's assailant, considering the time of the attack. Apart, therefore, from the
testimony of another witness for the government (Caspara Bendicio) to the effect that when she
asked Fabian not long after the incident in question as to what had happened, Fabian replied that he
had been boloed by the appellant, which testimony (alleged by the appellant to be inadmissible) was
accepted by the trial court under the rule of the res gestae, there is sufficient proof regarding
appellant's identity. Moreover, it should be remembered that the appellant was prosecuted, though
only for physical injuries, even before Fabian's death which occured several day after June 8, 1945.
Under the third assignment of error, counsel for the appellant adopts the view that the wound on
Fabian's forehead, described by Dr. Mariano Cruel, a government witness, as "an incised vertIcal
wound extending from a little above the middle of the eyebrows down to the lower root of the nose,"
and cutting "the frontal and the nasal bones also," was produced not by a bolo or any long, sharp-
cutting weapon but by an irregular and hard object with a sharp edge such as a heavy piece of stone
with one or more sharp edges which, when thrown forcibly from a distance, will necessarily produce,
a small apparently "incised" wound and render the victim unconscious. This contention may be
tenable in forensic medicine, but it is still conjectural and cannot be accepted where a criminal assault
is proved through an eyewitness.
Contrary to appellant's pretension, the death of Fabian Burac is established by the testimony of his
wife and mother-in-law. The certificate of the civil registrar of Tabaco dated August 3, 1945, to the
effect that the matter had not been registered in his office, merely shows that no report was made up
to the date mentioned, but it cannot conclusively negate the fact of Fabian's death.
We have no doubt that Fabian Burac died, as certified by Dr. Mariano Cruel, "of tetanus secondary to
the infected wound." When Fabian last reported for treatment on June 15, 1945, Dr, Cruel already
noticed Fabian's rigid muscles and slight lock-jaw, and this is the very reason why he prescribed anti-
tetanic serum, which, not being then available in the place, was never actually administered on the
patient. Appellant's surmise that Fabian might not have died of tetanus, because there are other
diseases sometimes exhibiting symptoms of tetanus, cannot prevail against the conclusion of Dr.
Cruel who in fact treated Fabian's wound and saw the manifestations of tetanus. The appellant must
of course be held responsible for the natural consequences of his unlawful act. (People vs. Borbano,
76 Phil., 702.)
Appellant's defense of alibi that between 5 p.m. of June 8, 1945 and the morning of June 9, 1945,
he was in Tabaco, Albay, may be worth inquiring into, if Trinidad Coral (already found to the
truthful) was not an eyewitness to appellant's criminal attack. The motive for the offense is
undoubtedly supplied by the circumstance that Fabian once arrested and threatened the appellant
during the Japanese occupation.
The appealed judgment is hereby affirmed, with costs against the appellant. So ordered.
Pablo, Perfecto, Bengzon, Hontiveros, and Tuason, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 116528-31 July 14, 1997
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
MARIETO ADORA, accused-appellant.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
In prosecutions for rape resulting in pregnancy, it is not essential to establish the exact date of the
fertilization of the egg; forensic experts agree that such exact date is still medically unascertainable.
In any event, pregnancy is a non-issue in a criminal prosecution for rape, the essential element of
which is the absence of the victim's consent to the sexual congress.
This appeal seeks the reversal of the July 11, 1994 Joint Decision 1 of the Regional Trial Court of
Legaspi City, Branch 5, convicting appellant of four (4) counts of rape and sentencing him to four (4)
terms of reclusion perpetua.
On December 30, 1992, Complainant Cecilia Cotorno lodged before the National Bureau of
Investigation in Legaspi City a complaint for rape against Appellant Marieto Adora.
After preliminary investigation, four separate Informations docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 6128 to
6131 were filed charging appellant with rape. The Information 2 in Criminal Case No. 6128 reads:
That on or about the 24th day September, 1992, at more or less 11:00-12:00 midnight,
at Brgy. Vega, Municipality of Rapu-Rapu, Province of Albay, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with lewd design and
deliberate intent to violate the law, by means of force and intimidation, without the
consent and against the will of Cecilla E. Cotorno, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously have sexual intercourse and succeeded in having carnal knowledge with
the latter, to her damage and prejudice.
In Criminal Case No. 6129:3
That on or about the 1st day of August, 1992, at more or less 2:00 o'clock in the
afternoon, at Barangay Vega, Municipality of Rapu-Rapu, Province of Albay,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, with lewd design and deliberate intent to violate the law, by means of force
and intimidation, without the consent and against the will of Cecilla E. Cotorno, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse and succeeded in
having carnal knowledge with the latter, to her damage and prejudice.
In Criminal Case No. 6130:4
That on or about the 27th day of June, 1992, at more or less 1:00 o'clock in the
afternoon, at Barangay Vega, Municipality of Rapu-Rapu, Province of Albay,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, with lewd design and deliberate intent to violate the law, by means of force
and intimidation, without the consent and against the will of Cecilla E. Cotorno, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse and succeeded in
having carnal knowledge with the latter, to her damage and prejudice.
In Criminal Case No. 6131: 5
That on or about the 25th day of June, 1992, at more or less 8:00 o'clock in the evening,
at Barangay Vega, Municipality of Rapu-Rapu, Province of Albay, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with lewd
design and deliberate intent to violate the law, by means of force and intimidation,
without the consent ad against the will of Cecilla E. Cotorno, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse and succeeded in having carnal
knowledge with the latter, to her damage and prejudice.
Upon arraignment,6 appellant with the assistance of counsel pleaded "not guilty." The trial court
consolidated the four cases and joint trial ensued. On July 11, 1994, the trial court promulgated its
assailed Joint Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, decision is hereby rendered:
1) In Crim. Case No. 6128 finding the accused Marieto Adora GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of RAPE as defined and penalized under Art. 335 RPC
and hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of Reclusion Perpetua,
to pay complainant Cecilla Cotorno P50,000.00 as moral damages, P20,000.00 as
exemplary damages and to pay the costs.
to pay complainant Cecilia Cotorno P50,000.00 as moral damages, P20.000.00 as
to pay complainant Cecilla Cotorno P50,000.00 as moral damages, P20,000.00 as
to pay complainant Cecilia Cotorno P50,000.00 as moral damages, P20,000.00 as
The period of time during which the accused had been in detention shall be deducted in
full from his sentences.7
Hence, this appeal.
The Facts
Version of the Prosecution
Quoted hereunder are the facts as narrated in the Joint Decision of the trial court:
The complainant Cecilia Cotorno was born on August 16, 1976 as the youngest among
the four children of the spouses Ricardo Cotorno and Fe Echague, the older three
others are Cynthia, Ruben and Cherry. The family was modestly living at Bago Bantay,
Quezon City where the breadwinner, Ricardo was working . . . Fe, the mother died
untimely sometime in 1979, leaving Ricardo alone to take care of the children. At that
time, . . . both Cherry and Cecilia were not yet of school age. The death of the children's
mother greatly affected and prejudiced Ricardo's working schedule and efficiency. He
could not work everyday because the two young daughters (Cherry and Cecilia) had to
be attended to such that sometimes he could work, sometimes he could not.
The accused Marieto Adora is a brother-in-law of Ricardo Cotorno (Complainant

Cecilia's father) because accused Marieto Adora is married to Ricardo Cotorno's sister,
Apolonia.
That year after the death of Ricardo's wife, . . . accused offered to take Cecilia with him
to Rapu-Rapu and care for her, for after all, accused and his wife were alone in their
house, their only child, having resided already in Iloilo where the latter works. . . .
Considering his predicament and because it would be to his sister Apolonia and the
accused Adora to whom he would be entrusting the children, Ricardo agreed that his
two youngest daughters Cherry and Cecilia stay with spouses accused Marieto Adora
and Apolonia at Rapu-Rapu, Albay.
Much later, Ricardo Cotorno re-married, this time to a certain Ester Cesar. He has seen
Cecilia twice in Rapu-Rapu. This was before the incident herein complained of.
The sisters Cherry and Cecilia then grew up in the custody and care of accused Adora
and his wife. Sometime in 1992, accused Adora was able to find work for Cherry at the
Muoz Market at Quezon City. Cecilia was then left alone in the care of accused and his
wife.
Cecilia finished grade 6 in the elementary only. She was no longer sent to high school
by accused and his wife. Cecilia grew up to be a small and frail girl barely five feet tall.
She grew up believing all the while that accused Marieto Adora was her real father and
that the wife Apolonia was her real mother. Cecilia calls the accused Papa and his wife
Apolonia as Mama. Having grown up with the accused since Cecilia was about three
years old, accused became a real father to her, loving him, respecting him and giving
him what is due from a daughter, although when Cecilia was in grade 6, she was
already informed about her status, that her father was Ricardo Cotorno and not the
accused and that Apolonia was not her mother. This did not change her love and
respect to them.
. . . At the tender and innocent age of sixteen years, Cecilia underwent a painful . . .
experience . . . She was raped not once but four times, by the very man she grew up
with and whom [s]he had revered as a father. All the rapes were committed in the very
home where she grew up with the accused at [Biga-a], Rapu-Rapu, Albay. On all the
four occasions, she had no choice but yield her body and honor because the accused
had threatened to behead her and her aunt, Apolonia, wife of the accused. It was only
after she was noticed to be pregnant the she revealed the bestial deeds of accused.
How all the rapes were committed shall be narrated below.
On June 25, 1992, only the accused and Cecilia were left at home in (Biga-a), Rapu-
Rapu, Albay. Her aunt Apolonia, the wife of the accused had gone to Poblacion, Rapu-
Rapu for a seminar. Her sister Cherry had long gone to work at Muoz market, Quezon
City. At about 8:00 o'clock in the evening of that June 25, 1992, while Cecilia was
asleep in her room, the accused sneaked into her room with a bolo locally know as
(')loknit(')8 in his hand. Once inside the room, accused covered the mouth of Cecilia,
undressed her and raped her. Her resistance was of no use as her strength was no
match to the weight and persistence of the accused. While she was being raped,
accused warned her of telling anyone about what accused was doing to her otherwise
accused will behead her and so with her aunt Apolonia. After the accused has satisfied
his lust, he went out of the room. Cecilia sat in a corner of the room crying, feeling
betrayed and forsaken, repeatedly asking herself why she was raped by the very person
she looked upon as her father.
In the morning of June 26, 1992, when her aunt Apolonia came home from the seminar,
she kept silent on the matter afraid that the accused might carry on the threat of
beheading her and her aunt Apolonia.
At about 1:00 o'clock in the afternoon of June 2, 1992, Cecilia was asleep in her room.
Her aunt Apolonia was in a gambling session at the house of a certain Merle, 200
meters away from her house. Emboldened by the silence of Cecilia on the rape he
committed on June 25, 1992, accused again sneaked into Cecilia's room armed with the
same bolo (')Loknit(') and once inside the room raped Cecilia the second time, under
the same threats.
When Cecilia's aunt Apolonia came home from the gambling session at about 5:00
o'clock that afternoon she did not tell her that she was raped because of the threat of
accused.
At about 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon of August 1, 1992, while Cecilia was asleep in the
same room of their house, accused sneaked into the room and for the third time raped
her, under the same threats and bringing along with him the same bolo. When her aunt
Apolonia came home that afternoon at about 6:00 o'clock she did not tell her about the
rape committed upon her person because of the threat.
On September 24, 1992, her aunt Apolonia was at the Poblacion of Rapu-Rapu, Albay
for a seminar. Cecilia was left alone with accused. At about 11:00 o'clock that evening
of September 24, 1992, accused carrying the same bolo sneaked into the room where
Cecilia was sleeping and once inside raped Cecilia for the fourth time. Again, when her
aunt Apolonia came home the following morning, she did not tell her about the rape
committed upon her person by the accused for fear of the threat. But that day of
September 25, 1992, Cecilia was brought to Legazpi (sic) by the accused to find work
for her. That night of September 25, 1992, they slept at Charing's house at Victory
Village. She slept with Charing although accused asked her to sleep beside him
because she was afraid the accused might rape her again. The following morning,
September 26, 1992, she was brought to Nene's Kitchenette at Lapu-Lapu St., where
she was hired to work as a dishwasher thereat by the owner Rosario Relucio, also
nicknamed Charing, for a salary of P200.00 a month.
At Nene's Kitchenette, she was visited once by the accused when the latter got P200.00
from her salary.
Although far from the accused, she told no one of her being raped by the accused, not
even her employer Rosario Relucio for fear of the threat made by the accused upon her
and to her aunt Apolonia.
As a result of the first two rapes committed upon the person of Cecilia on June 25 and
27, 1992, she got pregnant. All the while, Cecilia had been silent on the rapes
committed upon her person but in December 1992, her enlarging abdomen was noticed
by her employer Rosario Relucio and asked about the man responsible for her
pregnancy, she felt pressed to the wall and found no excuses. She then broke her
silence and told her employer that it was her father (accused) the very same person
who brought her to Nene's Kitchenette to work, as the one who impregnated her.
Apprehensive of getting involved in Cecilia's situation, Rosario Relucio entrusted Cecilia
to a latter's cousin. Subsequently, Cecilia was brought to the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) Legaspi Office, and after an investigation, she was brought to the
DSWD Regional Office, Region 5, Legaspi City for custody and the DSWD brought her
to the Albay Provincial Hospital for medical examination where she was found to be
pregnant. (Exh. "A", rollo, p. 57). Then a complaint for the rapes committed was filed
against the accused Marieto Adora. (Exh "B", rollo, p. 58).9
Version of the Defense
The defense relied on the sole testimony of Appellant Marieto Adora. The following may be gleaned
from his testimony. He stated that he took the victim in his custody when she was between two and
six years old. She was not yet walking then. He raised her as his own daughter, fed her and sent her
to school on his income as a fisherman.
He denied raping the victim on June 25, 1992, claiming that he was then in Binosawan, Rapu-Rapu,
Albay with his wife attending a fiesta. They left Biga-a in the afternoon of June 23, 1992 and returned
only on June 26, 1992. As his wife was against bringing Cecilia with them, they told her to sleep with
her uncle, Cristino Cotorno, whose house was only about seven meters from theirs. 10
On June 27, 1992 he went fishing. He left their house at three in the morning and did not return until
four in the afternoon of the same day. 11
On August 1, 1992 he was also out fishing, as their town fiesta was approaching (August 13). He
went out alone using a sibid-sibid (a small boat or banca). 12
On September 24, 1992 he and the victim went to Legaspi City. He got the victim employed as a
dishwasher at Nene's Kitchenette where she worked for four months. 13 Thereafter, he got an
unsigned letter from the victim, dated January 10, 1993, telling him that she could no longer endure
working in the eatery and requesting him to fetch her. Although the letter was unsigned, he knew that
it was from the victim because he recognized her handwriting. 14
He also admitted that he had no misunderstanding with Cristino Cotorno, the victim's father, nor did
he have any dealing with her other relatives in
Albay. 15
Issues
Appellant interposes the following as errors of the trial court:
. . . (I)n allying itself with the prosecution and depriving accused of a fair trial.
II
. . . (I)n not doubting the testimony of complainant. 16
On a similar note, he further argues that:
The complainant blatantly lied on material points which renders her testimony of
doubtful veracity.
(I) Contrary to complainant's testimony that accused fathered her child, the
medical evidence on record is indubitable that complainant was already
pregnant long before she was allegedly abused by accused.
Complainant's unexpected silence for a period of six months after she was allegedly
abused renders her testimony of doubtful veracity.
Complainant's behavior after the alleged incident is inconsistent with the prosecution's
theory and the findings of the trial court. 17
Appellant seeks his equittal based on the fact that the medical evidence showed that she was already
pregnant prior to the alleged first rape; that on the dates of the alleged rapes, he was not even at
home; that the complainant's letter to him proved that she still relied on him for love and support-
inconsistent with the usual behavior of a rape victim towards her aggressor; and that the complaint
was filed upon the proddings of the complainant's relatives.
The Court's Ruling
The appeal is not meritorious.
First Issue: The Trial Court's Alleged Bias
Appellant claims that the interventions of the trial court showed that the judge had sided with the
prosecution; thus, he was denied his constitutional right to a fair trial.
As first salvo, the defense quotes this excerpt from the stenographic notes to show that the trial judge
directed the prosecutor as to who should be called in as witnesses, thus:
COURT:
Fiscal, you will present that Tiya Charing?
Alright, when do you want this case reset?

Choose your next available dates. 18
The reason for said question, as can easily be gleaned from its context, was not to suggest to the
prosecutor who the next witness should be, but to confirm the resetting of the hearing. This Court
cannot read any bias, much less prejudgment, from this simple and very common question.
Second, appellant also ascribes bias to the trial judge because he disallowed as misleading a
question propounded by the defense counsel, without waiting for an objection from the
prosecution. 19 Thus:
Q You also claimed that you did not shout to ask for assistance?
COURT:
Misleading. She could not shout because Adora covered her mouth, not
that she did not shout. Misleading.
On the other hand, the judge also made this remark in favor of the defense, viz.:
(Asst. Prov'l Pros. De Mesa)
Q Mr. Witness, I would like to remind you that on August 1, 1992 you were
at sea at 2:00 o'clock because you were about to celebrate the fiesta now
you are saying that you were at sea before dawn. Which is correct? (sic)
now?
COURT:
He did not say 2:00 o'clock he only said I was at sea because I
was . . . 20
These examples clearly signify the trial court's zealous regard for the propriety of questions
propounded to witnesses during trial. These instances cannot be equated with bias for the
prosecution or, for that matter, even for the defense.
Finally, appellant claims that the following statement made by the presiding judge shows his partiality
towards the prosecution, thus:
Q Now, since you treated them as your own parents, how did you feel
after this Marieto Adora, for several times, raped you? 21
Then the trial judge asked the victim-witness several questions in this wise:
COURT: (Propounding questions)
Q Alright, questions from the Court. Do you know your height?
A No, your Honor.
Q Do you know your weight?

A I do not know, your Honor.
Q When were you born?
A I was born on August 16, 1976.
COURT:
At any rate, make it of record that the witness, complainant Cecilia

Cotorno appears to be with frail body and relatively a small girl.22
Afterwards in its decision, the trial court concluded:
The accused is Cecilia's uncle but who was a father to her because she lived with him,
she was under his custody since she was three years old and she grew up with him until
age sixteen when she was raped. Because of this situation, no doubt the accused had
exercised strong moral and physical influence and control over her. Naturally, Cecilia's
regard for the accused as her father intervened in those moments she was raped. The
court therefore, views this outrage upon Cecilia by the accused as rapes committed by
a father upon his own daughter, such that, with or without force or intimidation, any
sexual intercourse with Cecilia by accused by reason of her age would be like a rape
committed by a father to her daughter, because if there is no force or intimidation
applied, the father's moral ascendancy and influence over her daughter substitute for
violence or intimidation. (People vs. Erardo, 127 SCRA 250) 23
Appellant argues that these questions ceased to be clarificatory in nature and became direct
examination instead.
Again, we are not persuaded. Trial judges must be accorded a reasonable leeway in directing
questions to witnesses as may be essential to elicit relevant facts and to make the record speak the
truth. In such an effort, a judge may examine or cross-examine a witness. 24 He may seek to draw out
relevant and material testimony though that testimony may tend to support or rebut the position taken
by one or the other party. 25 This is not only the right but also the duty of a trial judge. Under our
system of legal procedure where he is judge of both the law and the facts, it is often expedient or
even necessary in the due and faithful administration of justice for the presiding judge, in the exercise
of sound discretion, to question a witness in order that his judgment may rest upon a full and clear
understanding of the facts. 26
In this case, we do not believe that the trial judge transgressed the permissible limits of what
questions he could propound to a witness. In the above instances, the trial judge sought to elicit
information on whether appellant used sufficient "intimidation" on the victim. For the record, he
wanted only to elucidate how the witness appeared to the court as she was testifying on the stand.
That the answers of the witness formed part of the decision is not a proof of prejudgment or bias
towards the prosecution.
The accused's reliance on the ruling in People vs. Opida 27 is misplaced. What was objectionable
therein was the trial judge's tenor in questioning some defense witnesses. In the said case, the trial
court was adversarial, cruel and/or irrelevant. The trial judge there accorded hostile and even sadistic
treatment to said witnesses. Further, he went to the extent of saying, "You want me to dictate the
decision now?" This is not so in this case where the trial magistrate was not proven to have similarly
prejudged appellant. We believe he merely performed his function to ferret out the truth so his
decision would be cogent and based on facts. Thus, we hold that the scales of justice had remained
equal throughout the trial and appellant had been given a fair hearing characterized by the cold
neutrality of an impartial judge.
Inexactitude in the Date of Fertilization
Appellant also anchors his defense on the medical evidence on record allegedly proving that he did
not father the complainant's child.
We disagree. First, relying on the testimony of the prosecution expert witness, Dr. Evelyn L. Cua,
appellant argues that the victim became pregnant even before the supposed first rape. Appellant
clearly takes the doctor's testimony out of context. What the doctor testified to was that she advised
the victim to take an ultrasound reading because the fetus appeared to be too small to be eight
months old. Said the doctor:
A I saw the patient last January 4, that was the initial time I saw the
patient. She told me that her last menstruation was April 23, and counting
the date from April 24, she would be around eight months pregnant. When
I examined her, the baby or fetus was very small for that stage that is why
I requested for ultra sound reading to (determine) or guide my supposition
that the baby was small, very small or that there was an error in the age or
term of the pregnancy. Two days later, when the ultrasound reading was
done, this is the official reading: (')PU which means pregnancy uterine, 29-
30 weeks, AOG, which is supposed to read (')AOP('), meaning age of
pregnancy, Cephalic, Not in Labor. (') 28
Second, authorities in forensic medicine agree that the determination of the exact date of fertilization
is problematic. The exact date thereof is unknown; thus, the difficulty, the determining the actual
normal duration of pregnancy. 29 A Filipino authority writes:
The average duration of pregnancy is 270 to 280 days from the onset of the last
menstruation. There is however no means of determining it with certainty. Evidence
derived from pregnancy following a single coitus is trustworthy, but inasmuch as some
authorities consider more than two weeks as the life span of the spermatozoa in the
vaginal canal, it is hard to ascertain the exact date of fertilization. There is no synchrony
between coitus and fertilization. 30
Computation of the whole period of gestation, thus, becomes a purely academic endeavor. In this
light, while most authorities would agree on an average duration, there are still cases of long and
short gestations.
Thus, the stage of development of the fetus cannot be determined with any exactitude,
and an error of at least two weeks, if not more, should be allowed for. This, together
with the recognized variation in the duration of normal pregnancies, makes it very
unsafe to dogmatise in a medico-legal case . . . 31
More importantly, it should be pointed out that these consolidated cases are criminal cases for rape,
not civil actions for paternity or filiation. The identity of the father of the victim's child is a non-issue.
Even her pregnancy is beside the point. 32 What matters is the occurrence of the sexual assault
committed by appellant on the person of the victim on four separate occasions. At any rate, that the
victim was already pregnant before the first rape does not disprove her testimony that appellant raped
her.
Second Issue: Testimony and Conduct of Complainant
Well-settled is the rule that delay in the reporting of rape is not an indicium of fabrication. Neither
does the victim's failure to cry out for help or to immediately denounce appellant's acts mean consent
thereto. That the victim did not make known the four instances of rape committed against her until
they could no longer be concealed does not diminish her credibility as a witness.
The reason was sufficiently explained by the victim. She testified that her uncle threatened to
decapitate her and her aunt. Such a threat from her adoptive father was sufficient to instill fear in the
frail, sixteen-year-old girl and to keep her from denouncing her aggressor.
A victim's disclosure that she has been raped must not be taken lightly. It is not uncommon for a
young girl to conceal for some time the assault on her virtue because of the rapist's threats on her
life, 33 fear of public humiliation, 34 and/or lack of courage and composure to immediately complain
that she has been sexually assaulted. 35
In the case at bar, the four incidents of rape were all attended by appellant's threat to behead her and
her aunt with a luknit. Further, her aggressor was none other than the man she regarded as her father
and with whom she lived. Thus, not much explanation is needed to understand the prolonged silence
of the victim.
Evidentiary Weight of Letter
Appellant also contends that the victim's letter asking him to fetch her from her workplace
demonstrated conduct inconsistent with that of an abused woman towards her abuser. We cannot
sustain this view.
Hardly any probative value can be given to the unsigned letter. It was not shown how appellant
recognized the handwriting of the victim. It was not compared with other handwriting samples of the
victim. Neither was it demonstrated that she had specimen handwriting which the accused was
familiar with.
More telling is the fact that the letter asking appellant to fetch the victim from the kitchenette was
dated January 10, 1993, but it has been established that the latter had already been taken into
custody by the NBI and DSWD as early as January 1, 1993. The reluctance of the trial court judge to
accord evidentiary weight to the letter is thus justified.
Crime and Punishment
The commission of rape with force and intimidation under Article 335 (par. 2) of the Revised Penal
Code is clearly established by the testimony of the victim herself, thus: 36
PROS. DE MESA: (On direct examination)
Q Cecilia on June 25, 1992 at about 8:00 in the evening, do you

remember where you were?
A Yes, Madam.
Q Can you tell the Court where you were on that date and time?
A I was at our house.
Q Where is that house you are referring to?
A At Biga-a, Rapu-rapu.
Q While thereat on said time and date, do you recall any unusual incident
that happened on that date and time?
A Yes, Madam.
Q Will you tell the court what that incident is all about?
A While I was sleeping, my uncle entered my room.
PROS. DE MESA:
May we make it of record your Honor that the witness is crying.
Q What happened after you(r) uncle entered your room?
A When he entered my room he was carrying a (')luknit(') which is a kind

of knife usually used for stripping abaca.
Q What happened next after he entered your room carrying a (')luknit(')?
A He covered my mouth with his hand and undressed me. I wanted to

shout but I could not because my mouth was covered by his hand.
Q After he covered your mouth and undressed you what happened next?
A He placed his (')ano(') into my (') anon (').
Q What do you mean by (') ano (')?
A (The witness is crying) He placed his sex organ inside my vagina.
Q After that what happened next?
A While he continued to rape me, to abuse me, he told me that if will (sic)
reveal to anybody what he did to me, I will be beheaded including my aunt
Apolonia (witness is sobbing uncontrollably).
Q After the accused, Marieto Adora, had sexually abused you, what did
you do?
A (Witness crying uncontrolably (sic)) After he abused me, I sat in the

corner of the room and cried and cried and asked myself why my uncle did
it to me considering that I regarded him with respect like my own father.
COURT:
Let us have a recess for 5 minutes
PROS. DE MESA:
May we make it of record your Honor that the witness is gasping for breath
and crying uncontrollably, testifying under labor of pain, looking very pale
as if she is sick for which reason the Court called for a 5-minute recess.
xxx xxx xxx
Q What did you do when he was raping you?
A I pushed him away from me and I wanted to shout but he covered my

mouth with his hand.
Q Now on that date June 25, 1992 when Marieto Adora raped you, who
were with you in the house aside from Marieto?
A I was the only person there because his wife attended a seminar. Only
the two of us were left in the house.
xxx xxx xxx
PROS. DE MESA:
Q Now when did ah you said (sic) that your auntie was attending a
seminar at that time June 25 when you were raped by your uncle Marieto
Adora, what time did she return to your house?
A The following morning.
Q In the morning when your auntie returned did you tell her what
happened to you?
A No Madam.
Q Why not?
A I was afraid because Marieto Adora told me that my head will be cut off
and that of my auntie if ever I will tell her. I was engulfed with fear.
Q Now on June 27, 1992 in the afternoon where were you, if you recall?
A I was in our house.
Q Can you tell us what you were doing about 1.00 on said date? June 27,
1992?
A I was sleeping.
Q Do you recall of any unusual incident again that happened on June 27,
1992 in the afternoon while you were sleeping?
A Yes, Madam[.]
Q Tell the court what was that unusual incident that happened on June 27,
1992 in the afternoon?
A Every time he entered my room, he was carrying a (')luknit(') which is a

kind of bolo with teeth used for stripping abaca.
Q Are you saying that Marieto Adora entered your room again on June 27,
1992 at around 1:00 o'clock in the afternoon?
A Yes, Madam.
Q What did Marieto do in your room?
A He raped me again.
Q Was Marieto again with the ahcarrying the Luknit that you
described?
A Yes, Madam.
Q Can you describe to the Honorable Court how Marieto raped you on
that particular date and time?
A Whenever he entered my room because my room has no lock, he was

carrying the (')luknit('). He covered my mouth with his hand so that I could
not shout.
Q Did Marieto succeed in raping you again on that date and time?
ATTY. DOTE:
Leading.
COURT:
Already answered. She said she was raped again.
PROS. DE MESA: (CONTINUING)
Q Where was your auntie on June 27, 1992 at 1:00 o'clock in the
afternoon when you said you were again raped by the accused?
A My auntie was gambling.
COURT:
Q How far was that gambling place?
A It is far, in the place of Mamay Merle.
PROS. DE MESA:
Q Can you make an estimate of the distance, if you know?
A From my seat to that place (witness indicating a distance which the

parties agreed to be about 200 meters).
Q What time did your auntie return to your house?
A About 5:00 in the afternoon.
Q Did you tell her what happened to you on that date, June 27, 1992?
A No, Madam.
Q Why, for what reason?
A No Madam because that Marieto was always standing by the doorway.
Q And what about if Marieto was not standing by the doorway, so what?
A Marieto keeps on warning me not to tell my aunt what happened to me

because I will be beheaded if I will reveal the matter to my aunt.
Q On August 1, 1992, can you tell the Court where you were at that time
2:00 o'clock in the afternoon?
A I was in the house.
Q Do you recall of any incident that happened again to you on August 1,

1992 at about 2:00 in the afternoon?
A While I was sleeping Marieto entered my room.
Q What did Marieto Adora do to you?
A He was again carrying a luknit.
Q And after you saw him carrying the luknit when he wnetered (sic) your
room, what happened to you?
A He removed my panty and placed himself on top of me.
Q While he was on top of you what was Marieto doing?
A He inserted his penis inside my vagina.

Q Did you not shout?
A No Madam because he was always with that luknit and he covers my

mouth with his hand and threatend (sic) me not to tell anybody because
he will behead me.
Q What was Marieto telling you while he was raping you?
A While he was raping me he continued to remind me not to reveal what

he was doing to me because if ever I tell anybody, I will be beheaded,
including my aunt.
Q On August 1, 1992 when according to you you were again raped in your
room by your uncle, the accused in this case where was your auntie?
A She was in the gambling session.
Q And did she return that day to your house?
A No Madam. She went home at 6:00 in the evening.
Q When your auntie returned did you tell her what Marieto ah that the
accused raped you?
A No Madam because if I tell my aunt while I am still there I would be

killed. I am afraid that I will be beheaded by Marieto.
Q On September 24, 1992 in the evening where were you Cecilia?
A I was at our house. His wife attended again a seminar.
Q Do you remember who was with you in the house?
A That Marieto.
Q Do you recall of a similar incident that happened on that day?
ATTY. DOTE:
Objection, very leading.
PROS. DE MESA: (rephrasing her question)
Q Do you recall of an unusual indicent (sic) that happened to you on Sept.

24, 1992 at about 11:00 in the evening?
A Yes, Madam.
Q Will you tell the court what was that incident that you recall?
A While I was sleeping he entered my room again.

Q And what time ah what did he do when he entered your room?
A He was again carrying a luknit and then he undressed me and placed

himself on top of me, covered my mouth with his hand and then raped me.
Q Did you not shout or resist?
A I could not because he was covering my mouth.
Q Were you able to do anything to get yourself free from the accused?
A I could not free myself from Marieto because he is very heavy and then
he was threatening to kill me with the luknit if I shout.
Q Now you tell the court again where your aunt was at the time when
Marieto raped you on Sept. 24, 1992 at about 11:00 in the evening?
A My aunt was in Rapu-Rapu attending a seminar.
Q Where in particular in Rapu-rapu?
A In Sta. Florentina.
Q You said that your auntie is attending a seminar. Do you know what is
the seminar about?
A She is a catechist.
Q What time did you (sic) aunt return to Bigaa to your house?
A The following morning.
Q When your aunt returned homse (sic) the following morning did you tell
her about what happened to you on that evening of September 24, 1992?
A No Madam.
Q Why not?
A I was afraid to tell my aunt because she is also very cruel, unkind and
mean (maisog).
Q After September 24, 1992 when according to you you were again raped
by the accused, what happened the following morning?
A His wife arrived the following morning and they talked to each other that
I should work.
Q After they talked about you getting you to work, what happened next?
Q (sic) Marieto brought me to Legazpi (sic) City.

Thus, authorship of the crime has been attributed to appellant by no less than the victim herself. The
victim's testimony, standing alone, can be made the basis of appellant's prosecution and conviction if
such testimony meets the test of credibility. 37 From the nature of the offense, oftentimes the only
evidence that can be offered to prove the guilt of the perpetrator is the complainant's testimony. This
Court has even gone to the extent of pronouncing that:
. . . when a woman says that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is
necessary to show that the rape has been committed, and that if her testimony meets
the test of credibility the accused may be convicted on the basis thereof. 38
Courts usually give credence to the testimony of a girl who is a victim of sexual assault because,
ordinarily, no person would be willing to undergo the humiliation of a public trial and to testify on the
details of her ordeal were it not to condemn an injustice. 39 Even during her cross-examination, no
malice, ill motive, or proof of lying has been shown. Her testimony remained positive, categorical and
credible. Furthermore, there is no evidence that the filing of the complaint for rape was motivated by a
grudge between appellant and the Cotornos. Appellant's admission that they had no
misunderstanding and that they had few dealings with each other bolsters this conclusion.
We also agree with the trial court that force and intimidation had been employed by appellant on the
victim, thus: 40
During all the rapes committed by the accused upon Cecilia, he was always with a bolo
and while committing the rape she was being told to keep the matter a secret and to tell
no one of what the accused was doing, otherwise, she will be beheaded and so with her
aunt Apolonia. This threat was more than sufficient to break Cecilia's resistance
considering their relationship . . . The test of sufficiency of force or intimidation in the
crime of rape under Art. 335 of the Revised Penal Code, is whether it produces a
reasonable fear in the victim that if she resists or does not yield to the bestial demands
of the accused, that which the latter threatened to do would happen to her or to those
dear to her. Where such degree of intimidation exists and the victim is cowed into
submission as a result thereof, thereby rendering resistance futile, it would be extremely
unreasonable to expect the victim to resist with all her might and strength. And even if
some degree of resistance would nevertheless be futile, offering none at all cannot
amount to consent to the sexual assault. For rape to exist, it is not necessary that the
force or intimidation employed in accomplishing it be so great or of such character as
could not be resisted, it is only necessary that the force or intimidation be sufficient to
consummate the purpose which the accused had in mind. (People vs. Savellano, 57
SCRA 320) This is especially true in the case of a young, innocent, immature girl like
Cecilia, who could not be expected to act with equanimity of disposition and with nerves
of steel. (People vs. Viray, 164 SCRA 135) or to act like an adult or mature and
experienced woman who would know what to do under the circumstances or to have
the courage and intelligence to disregard the threat. (People vs. Jimenez, 200 SCRA
539)
The accused is Cecilia's uncle but who was a father to her because she lived with him,
she was under his custody since she was three years old and she grew up with him until
age sixteen when she was raped. Because of this situation, no doubt the accused had
exercised strong moral and physical influence and control over her. Naturally, Cecilia's
regard for the accused as her father intervened in those moments she was raped. The
court therefore, views this outrage upon Cecilia by the accused as rapes committed by
a father upon his own daughter, intercourse with Cecilia by accused by reason of her
age would be like a rape committed by a father to her daughter, because if there is no
force or intimidation applied, the father's moral ascendancy and influence over her
daughter substitute for violence or intimidation. (People vs. Erardo, 127 SCRA 250)
That ascendancy or influence necessarily flows from the father's parental authority . . .
as well as from the children's duty to obey and observe reverence and respect towards
their parents. Such reverence and respect are deeply ingrained in the minds of Filipino
children . . . Abuse by a father can subjugate his daughter's will, thereby forcing her to
do whatever he wants.
Appellant's defense of alibi is fundamentally and inherently a weak defense, much more so when
uncorroborated by other witnesses. Appellant failed to prove that he was not present at the scene of
the crime at the time of its commission. Juxtaposed against the clear, straightforward, positive and
credible testimony of the victim, his alibi cannot stand. 41
The well-settled rule is that appellate courts will generally not disturb the findings of the trial court on
the credibility of witnesses. 42 Such findings are conclusive upon the Supreme Court in the absence of
any showing that the trial court has overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some fact or
circumstance of weight and substance that would have affected the result of the case. 43
Damages
The Court reiterates the rule that a claim for damages must be supported by proof. 44 During the trial,
the claimant must satisfactorily prove the existence of the factual basis of the damages and its causal
connection to defendant's acts. In particular, although proof of pecuniary loss is not required, moral
damages must be anchored on a showing that the claimant experienced physical suffering, mental
anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social
humiliation or similar injury. Regrettably, we find no basis for its award in this case, as the
complainant herself did not ask for it or present evidence that she experienced moral suffering. Thus,
the order of the court a quo granting moral damages of fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) and
exemplary damages in the amount of twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) for each count of rape
must be deleted. 45
Acknowledgment and support of the victim's offspring may form part of the civil liability of persons
guilty of crimes against chastity. 46 The trial court, however, did not order the accused to acknowledge
or support complainant's child. We support the trial court, for the issue of the paternity of the
complainant's child remains unresolved. We refrain, therefore, from proceeding further on this matter.
Instead, in line with current jurisprudence, the Court awards to the complainant civil indemnity of fifty
thousand pesos (P50,000.00) for each count of rape. Civil indemnity is automatically granted to the
offended party without need of further evidence other than the fact of the commission of the crime
and the accused's responsibility therefor. 47
WHEREFORE, the assailed Joint Decision of the trial court is hereby AFFIRMED with the following
MODIFICATIONS:
1 The award of moral and exemplary damages is hereby DELETED;
2 Appellant is ordered to pay civil indemnity to Cecilia Cotorno in the amount of fifty thousand pesos
(P50,000.00) for each count of rape, or a total of two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00).
SO ORDERED
G.R. No. 70836 October 18, 1988

vs.
TIMOTEO TOLENTINO y MAPUA alias "TEM" defendant-appellant.
CORTES, J.:
In the instant appeal from a conviction for murder, the Court is once more tasked with the resolution
of the pivotal issue of whether the prosecution has successfully discharged the onus
probandi imposed upon it in criminal cases. The case stemmed from an information charging the
accused Timoteo Tolentino y Mapua and one John Doe with the crime of murder committed as
follows:
That on or about the 26th day of July, 1982, in Quezon City, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring together,
confederating with and aiding one another, did, then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously with intent to kill, qualified by evident premeditation and treachery, attack,
assault and employ personal violence upon the person of Alfredo Quitoriano y Bayot, by
then and there throwing at him stones hitting him on the head and stabbing the said
victim thereby inflicting upon him serious and mortal wounds which were the direct and
immediate cause of his untimely death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of the
said Alfredo Quitoriano y Bayot. [Information, Rollo, p. 3.]
In order to determine the Identity of the other accused, the fiscal conducted a reinvestigation and
thereafter submitted his resolution to the trial court wherein he noted the failure of the complainant
during the investigation to present any witness to establish the Identity of said John Doe. Hence the
reinvestigation was terminated with the Identity of said John Doe still undetermined [Original Records,
p. 55.1 Accordingly, only the herein accused Tolentino was arraigned and tried. A plea of not guilty
was entered by the accused. His application for bail dated August 2, 1982 was denied and so he
remained in jail during the trial.
After the presentation of the evidence for the prosecution, accused Tolentino filed a demurrer to the
evidence, captioned "Motion to Dismiss," alleging:
1. That there is no evidence adduced by the prosecution to show that herein accused
stabbed the deceased or conspired with somebody who might have inflicted the stab
wound sustained by the deceased;
2. That the evidence adduced by the prosecution shows that the injuries sustained by
the deceased, particularly on the head, were caused by some other means and not by
stoning;
3. That the testimony of the prosecution witness, Bienvenido Ferrer, does not indicate
that the deceased was hit by a stone allegedly thrown by accused towards the
deceased;
4. That the deceased died because of the fatal wounds caused by a sharp instrument,
according to the testimony of the medicolegal officer;
5. That the prosecution failed to prove the crime charged and therefore the case against
the herein accused should be dismissed. [Original Records, p. 95.]
However, the trial court resolved to defer its resolution thereon, stating in its Order dated May 27,
1983 that "the resolution of this motion to dismiss ... is held in abeyance until the defense shall have
presented its evidence and the complete records of the proceedings from the beginning shall be
available." [Original Records, p. 123.]
Relying strongly on the merits of his demurrer to the evidence, accused waived his right to present
any evidence and moved that the case be submitted for decision on the basis of the evidence
presented by the prosecution and his demurrer to the evidence. He likewise filed a second motion to
be released on bail. After a consideration of the evidence presented by the prosecution, the trial court
resolved to grant the application for bail on July 18, 1983. Thereafter, the trial court rendered its
judgment, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the guilt of the accused having been proved beyond reasonable doubt is
(sic) hereby convicted of the crime of Murder and is hereby sentenced to life
imprisonment and to indemnify the heirs of Alfredo Quitoriano the amount of
P15,000.00. [Rollo. p. 22.]
From said decision, Tolentino interposed an appeal to this Court.
In his brief, the accused made the following assignments of errors:
I. That the trial court erred in finding that the victim was hit at the back of his head by a
stone thrown by the accused.
II. The trial court erred in not finding that the victim's wounds at the back of his head
was caused by a sharp instrument as borne by the findings and testimony of the
medicolegal expert who performed the autopsy of the body of the victim.
III. The trial court erred in not finding that accused had nothing to do with the infliction of
the mortal wounds sustained by the victim, nor he conspired or acted in concert with the
person who inflicted such injuries, much less he acted as an accomplice (sic.)
IV. The trial court erred in not rendering a judgment of acquittal. [Brief for Defendant-
Appellant, p. 2.1
To support the first and second assigned errors, the appellant relies heavily upon the testimony of the
medicolegal officer, Dr. Gregorio Blanco, who performed the autopsy on the body of the victim.
According to the appellant, the finding of the trial court to the effect that the wound located at the back
of the victim's head was caused by a stone is erroneous as the same is not supported or confirmed
by the finding of the medicolegal officer and his expert testimony before the lower court.
The necropsy report filed by Dr. Gregorio Blanco, the Chief of the Medico- Legal Division of the PC
Crime Laboratory shows the following injuries found on the body of the deceased, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
HEAD, TRUNK AND EXTREMITIES:
(1) Abrasion, right supra-orbital region, measuring 0.7 by 0.2 cm. 8 cm. from the anterior
midline.
(2) Lacerated wound, right post-auricular region, measuring 2.5 by 0.3 cm. 10 cm. from
the posterior midline.
(3) Contusion, right pre-auricular region, measuring 6 by 5 cm. 13 cm. from the anterior
midline.
(4) Contusion, right supra-scapular region, measuring 6 by 6 cm. 13 cm. from the
posterior midline, with a superimposed abrasion, measuring 3 by 3 cm.
(5) Abrasion, right infrascapular region, measuring 5 by 0.3 cm. 10 cm. from the
posterior midline.
(6) Stab wound, left axillary region, measuring 1.8 by 0.4 cm. 18 cm. from the anterior
midline, 11 cm. deep, directed downwards, posterior wards and to the right, fracturing
the 5th left thoracic rib, along the mid-axillary line, lacerating both lobes of the left lung.
(7) Abrasion, dorsum of the left hand, measuring O.6 by O.5 cm. 2 cm. lateral to its
posterior midline.
(8) Abrasion, left knee, measuring 0.7 by 0.5 cm. 1.5. cm. lateral to its posterior midline.
xxx xxx xxx
REMARKS:
Cause of death is cardio-respiratory arrest due to shock and hemorrhage secondary to

injuries of the head and stab wound of the trunk. [Original Records, p. 74.]
It must be noted that the injuries denominated as Nos. 1, 2, and 3 in the necropsy report were all
located in the victim's head while the rest of the injuries denominated as Nos. 4, 5, and 6 were
located on the trunk and Nos. 7 and 8 on the extremeties of the victim. The two fatal injuries though
are the lacerated wound at the back of the victim's head (wound No. 2) and the stab wound at his left
chest (wound No. 6). The prosecution deposits that since the accused hurled stones at the back of
the victim's head, the infliction of wound No. 2 can be ascribed to him and accordingly, he can be held
liable for the victim's death.
However, inasmuch as the medicolegal officer testified that the fatal injury sustained by the deceased
at the back of the head was caused by a sharp instrument [TSN, November 5, 1982, p. 81, appellant
maintains that the allegation of another prosecution witness, Bienvenido Ferrer in his sworn
statement to the effect that the accused came from behind the victim and threw a stone hitting the
back of the latter's head and causing him to fall on the cemented ground, cannot be given any
credence at all. He asserts that in view of Dr. Blanco's unquestioned qualifications, experience and
expertise and his opportunity to examine the nature and extent of the injury inflicted upon the victim,
his testimony should prevail over that of Ferrer.
The apparent conflict in the evidence introduced by the prosecution brings to the fore the main issue
of whether the guilt of the accused has been proved beyond reasonable doubt. In resolving the
question, the Court has to determine how much weight should be given to the opinion of the medical
expert vis-a-vis that of the other witness.
The prosecution's case is anchored principally upon the sworn statement and testimony ** before the
court a quo of the lone eyewitness, Bienvenido Ferrer. While his testimony dwelt on the fact that he
saw the appellant throwing stones at the victim, nowhere from said testimony can it be gleaned that
the stones allegedly thrown actually hit the victim and caused such injury as will constitute a penal
offense. In the light of the absence of any other corroborating testimonies, the sparseness in details
of Ferrer's testimony has certainly weakened the prosecution's case.
Neither is the sworn statement executed by Ferrer on July 22, 1 982 and formally presented in
evidence before the court of any help to the prosecution. While said statement serves to amplify
Ferrer's narration of the stoning incident, it has not sufficiently established Tolentino's liability for the
death of the victim. This conclusion is supported by a close scrutiny of said statement:
T - Ano ba ang nakita ninyong pagkapatay nitong si Fred Quitoriano

Victoriano?
S - Ng humigit kumulang sa 8:30 ng gabi kagabi July 26,1982, ng ako'y

dumating sa aming bahay ay nakita ko si FRED QUITORIANO na
nakaupo sa may tabi ng isang lamesa sa harapan ng aming tindahan sa
No. 822 T. Sora Avenue, Old Balara, Quezon City, at siya ay kumakain ng
dinuguan at ako'y niyaya na umupo sa tabi at doon ay nakita ko rin si
TRANCING na si Mrs. TOLENTINO na kausap ng asawa ko, at hindi
nagtagal ay dumating ho si Mr. SATURNINO MOGADO na kapitbahay rin
namin kaya niyaya rin namin al FRED na kumain si SATURNINO at pati si
TRANCING ay niyaya na rin namin na kumain kaya naman nga ginawa ni
TRANCING ay naupo sa aming lamesa, subalit hindi nagtagal ay
dumating si Mr. SIXTO TOLENTINO kaya siya ay inanyayahan namin na
kumain din ngunit hindi siya kumibo at siya ay umorder na lang ng isang
boteng beer sa tindahan namin at iniinom niya iyon habang siya ay
nakatayo sa tabi ng counter pagkatapos na maubos niya ang laman ng
bote ng beer ay umalis na si Mr. SIXTO TOLENTINO, tapos ho hindi pa
nagtatagal ay umuwi na rin si TRANCING at ako naman ay pumasok na
sa loob ng aming bahay at ako'y humiga sa supa namin sa sala at ako'y
naidlip ng sandali at ako nagising na lang ng ako makarinig ng sigawan ng
mga tao na nanggaling sa harapan ng tindahan namin kaya ang ginawa
ko ay agad akong tumayo at nagtungo sa pintuan ng bahay namin at
nakita ho si FRED QUITORIANO na kasalukuyang naglalakad patungo sa
looban namin at pagkatapos ho ay bigla kong nakita si TIMOTEO
TOLENTINO na sumulpot sa may likuran ni FRED at nakita ko na binato
niya ng isang pirasong bato si FRED at tinamaan sa ulo haya ho
napatumba si FRED sa semento at pagkatapos ay binato na uli ni TEM si
FRED habang ito'y nakahiga sa semento at tinamaan na muli si FRED,
pagkatapos ho ay tumakbo na si TEM palabas ng aming bakuran at noon
naman ay kinarga na nina Mr. MOGADO at ni CAMILO LOPEZ si FRED
sa kotse ni CAMILO at sinamahan ko sila na dalhin itong is FRED sa
Labor Hospital subalit siya ay namatay doon makalipas ang 20 minutos.
[Original Record, p. 85, Emphasis supplied.)
From the said statement it can be gathered that the stabbing of Quitoriano occurred while Ferrer was
taking his nap, causing a commotion and eliciting shouts from the people outside which awakened
him. Ferrer categorically admitted before the trial court having seen only the stoning and not the
stabbing [TSN, August 25, 1982, pp. 7 and 1 0.1 There was therefore no evidence linking the
appellant to the stabbing as witness Ferrer never saw the stabbing. This fact was conceded by the
Assistant City Fiscal in his resolution dated July 28, 1982, ordering the filing of the information against
Tolentino [Original Records, p. 8.1 The indictment for murder was accordingly premised on the
appellant's act of throwing stones at the victim.
But the evidence on record is bereft of any affirmative and positive showing that such act of the
appellant produced any fatal wound or any injury for that matter. The testimony of Ferrer, it bears
reiteration, merely established the fact that appellant threw stones at the victim. While in his sworn
statement, Ferrer alleged that the stones hit the victim's head and caused him to fall, such allegation
is belied by the clear and categorical findings of the medicolegal officer who conducted the autopsy
on the victim, that such injuries were caused by means other than stoning. Thus:
xxx xxx xxx
Q Now, doctor, in layman's language, will you please explain your findings
relative to the finding No. 1, where is this located?
A Abrasion. The collision of the surface of the body affected by falling

down or it could be inflicted by instrument which is rough which will cause
abrasion and it is located in orbitrary region, I have here in my possession
the diagrammatic representation of different injuries incurred by the victim.
xxx xxx xxx
Q How about item No. 2 (lacerated wound), what had caused this
injury? ***
A I would say, sharp instrument which could have been inflicted to the
body of the victim thus producing lacerated wound.
Q What could have caused the wound, doctor?
A Possible may be a "balisong.
Q How about item No. 3?
A This injury is contusion...
Q Where is this located?
A It is here. (Witness indicating diagram 1, 2, 3... wait a minute... this No.

3, right aurecular region...
COURT:
Witness is marking in chronological order corresponding to the necropsy

report the injuries sustained by the victim.
Q What could have caused injury No. 3?
A Maybe it was caused by a fistic blow. (TSN, November 5, 1982, pp. 8-9;
Emphasis supplied.]
Ferrer's testimony thus finds no corroboration even from the opinion given by the medicolegal officer
who was presented by the prosecution itself to testify on the cause of the victim's injuries. In this
jurisdiction, expert opinion constitutes one of the few exceptions to the general rule that a mere
opinion of a witness regarding a particular matter is not admissible. In this connection, Rule 130,
Section 43 provides: "The opinion of a witness regarding a question of science, art or trade, when he
is skilled therein, may be received in evidence."
In the field of medicine, opinions of doctors qualified by training and experience as to causation are
competent and in many cases controlling and binding upon the court [People v. Castro, G.R. No. L-
38989, October 29, 1982, 117 SCRA 101 4; See also Murray v. Industrial Commission, 349 P. 2d
627, 87 Ariz 190 (1960).] In this case, Dr. Blanco's opinion as to the cause of the victim's injuries
should be accorded great respect, it being peculiarly within the expertise of medical practitioners.
A careful examination of the findings of the medicolegal officer in his necropsy report, particularly on
the wounds found on the victim's head, bolsters the appellant's claim that his guilt has not been
proved beyond reasonable doubt. Wound No. 1, an abrasion, was located above the victims right
eyebrow and therefore, could not have been inflicted by the appellant as Ferrer plainly testified that
the appellant was behind the victim when he threw the stones. The same can be said of Wound no. 3,
a contusion located near the right cheek of the victim. The infliction of the fatal wound, Wound No. 2,
a lacerated wound measuring only 2.5 by 3 cm., located at the back of the victims head cannot
likewise be attributed to appellant as, according to the expert opinion of the doctor who examined the
wound, it was caused by a sharp instrument like a "balisong." While the doctor's testimony on! record
does not preclude the possibility that the wound could have also been caused by a stone, it was
incumbent upon the prosecution, for its case against the accused to succeed, to elicit a positive
statement to that effect from the doctor. But the prosecution absolutely failed in this task.
That the prosecution's evidence falls short of the standard degree of proof that will sustain a judgment
of conviction is manifest from its belated attempt to cure the deficiency by a motion for correction of
transcript of stenographic notes [See Original Records, p. 111, et. seq..] The motion adverted to an
alleged omission in the transcript of stenographic notes of a question propounded to Dr. Blanco which
allegedly elicited a response to the effect that the hitting of the head with a stone could have caused
the injury. The motion however was filed only after the accused-appellant had already filed his
demurrer to the evidence, pointing out to the absence of evidence to show that the injuries sustained
by the deceased, particularly on the head, were caused by stoning [Original Records, p. 95.] It was
denied by the trial court as "there (was) no showing that the stenographer concerned who took (sic)
the proceeding and transcribed the notes failed in her duty' [Original Records, p. 115.]
Further, the prosecution during the trial manifested that it has in its possession the stones allegedly
used in the commission of the crime [TSN, March 15, 19831 and yet, the prosecution rested its case
without formally offering in evidence the said stones. The ineptness of the prosecution in handling this
case, while certainly prejudicial to the State and the private offended party, cannot be treated by this
Court with indulgence as it will result in a complete disregard of the constitutional right of the accused
to be presumed innocent until his guilt has been proven beyond reasonable doubt.
In fine, the failure of the prosecution to prove that the act of the appellant produced such injury as will
constitute a penal offense is fatal to their case. In criminal cases, the burden of proof as to the offense
charged lies on the prosecution [Rule 131, Section 2 of the Revised Rules of Court.] As the accused
has in his favor the constitutional presumption of innocence, the quantum of proof that will warrant a
verdict of guilt must be strong enough to erase any reasonable doubt as to his culpability. True, the
trial court found the prosecution evidence sufficient for purposes of conviction. As a rule, this Court
usually desists from disturbing the conclusions of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses, in
deference to the basic precept that the lower court, having seen and heard the witnesses and
observed their demeanor and manner of testifying, is in a better position to appreciate the evidence.
But this doctrine must bow to the superior and immutable rule that the guilt of the accused must be
proved beyond a reasonable doubt, because the law presumes that a defendant is innocent and this
presumption must prevail unless overturned by competent and credible proof (People v. Galvez, G.R.
Nos. L-26944-45, December 5, 1980, 101 SCRA 544.] As authoritatively set forth by this Court in a
fairly recent decision:
Appellants have in their favor the presumption of innocence as guaranteed by the

Constitution. Proof against them must survive the test of reason. Every circumstance
against guilt and in favor of innocence must be considered. Suspicion no matter how
strong should not sway judgment, for well-established is the rule that the prosecution
must rely on the strength of its evidence and not on the weakness of the defense; that
appellants need not prove their innocence because that is presumed; that the
presumption of innocence is a conclusion of law in favor of the accused, whereby his
innocence is not only established but continues until sufficient evidence is introduced to
overcome the proof which the law has created-that is, his innocence; "that conscience
must be satisfied that defendant has been proven guilty of the offense charged. Only by
proof beyond reasonable doubt which requires moral certainty, 'a certainty that
convinces and satisfies the reason and conscience of those who are to act upon it' may
the presumption of innocence be overcome. [People v. Clores, G.R. No. 61408, October
12, 1983, 125 SCRA 67, 75 citing People v. Inguito, G.R. No. 53497, October
18,1982,117 SCRA 641, 649.]
Here, the evidence of the prosecution, far from proving the culpability of the appellant for the crime
charged, discloses several probabilities, some of which point to his innocence. For one thing, Ferrer's
testimony that the appellant had just alighted in front of the carinderia at the time he threw stones at
the victim negates any possibility that he was the one who assaulted the victim with a sharp
instrument [TSN, August 25, 1982, p. 10.1 Moreover, while the established facts do not entirely rule
out the possibility that the accused could himself have inflicted the fatal wounds, the Court cannot
base its conviction upon mere possibilities. It should be stressed anew that 'possibilities and suspicion
are not evidence" [Sacay v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 66497-98, July 10, 1986,142 SCRA 593,
6121 and therefore should not be taken against the accused. Here, what the prosecution managed to
establish were mere circumstances which were not sufficient to overcome the constitutional
presumption of innocence. While circumstantial evidence may suffice to support a conviction, it is
imperative, though, that the following requisites should concur:
(a) There is more than one circumstance;
(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
(c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond
a reasonable doubt [Rule 133, Section 5 of the Revised Rules of Court.]
For the well-entrenched rule in evidence is that "before conviction can be had upon circumstantial
evidence, the circumstances proved should constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one fair and
reasonable conclusion pointing to the defendant, to the exclusion of all others, as the author of the
crime' [People v. Subano, 73 Phil. 692 (1942); Emphasis supplied.] In this case the circumstantial
evidence presented by the prosecution does not conclusively point to the liability of the accused for
the crime charged.
Bearing in mind that circumstantial evidence in order to warrant conviction "must fairly exclude every
reasonable hypothesis of innocence' [Doronado v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 57744, August 31,
1987, 153 SCRA 420, 433], the Court concludes that the prosecution has miserably failed to adduce
such circumstantial evidence as would produce a moral certainty that the accused committed the
crime charged. The accused is not duty-bound to dispel the doubts regarding his innocence.
Accordingly, the constitutional presumption of innocence prevails.
The third assignment of error-that the trial court erred in not finding that the accused had nothing to
do with the infliction of the mortal wounds sustained by the victim nor did he conspire or act in concert
with the person who inflicted such injuries, much less act as an accomplice-is thus impressed with
considerable merit.
Since it does not appear that any of the mortal wounds were inflicted by the accused, it behooves the
prosecution to establish the existence of conspiracy in order to hold the accused liable as a principal
in the crime of murder. But in this task, the prosecution failed utterly as admitted by the Solicitor
General himself in the appellee's brief [Reno, p. 47.] " the came as an
Neither was the a 's participation m accomplice sufficiently proved. For the doctrine -steadfastly
adhered to by this Tribunal is that '. . . (i)t is an essential condition to the existence of complicity, not
only that there should be a relation between the acts done by the principal and those attributed to the
person charged as accomplice, but it is furthermore necessary that the latter, with knowledge of the
criminal intent, should cooperate with the intention of supplying material or moral aid in the execution
of the crime in an efficacious way." [People v. Tamayo, 44 Phil. 38, 49 (1922); Emphasis supplied.]
None of these essential rudiments of complicity were shown to exist in the instant case.
From the foregoing, it is clear that the fourth assignment of error-that the trial court erred in not
rendering a judgment of acquittal-is meritorious.
The fundamental precept that the prosecution has the burden of establishing the guilt of the accused
beyond reasonable doubt commands strict compliance with the requisite degree of proof for
discharging that burden. A painstakingly thorough appraisal of the evidence presented by the
prosecution yields no legal basis for a verdict of conviction for it failed to meet the test of moral
certainty.
WHEREFORE, for failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the accused
Timoteo Tolentino is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime charged.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-49778 January 27, 1981
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ALEJANDRO BAUTISTA Y APARICE alias ANDOT, defendant-appellant.
DE CASTRO,* J.:
Charged with rape committed according to the information, as follows:
That on or about July 13, 1976, in the City of Davao, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovementioned accused, while herein
undersigned complainant was unconscious and/or deprived of her reason or will, did
then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with the
undersigned complainant against her will. (p. 6, Rollo).
Alejandro Bautista y Aparice alias Andot was found guilty and sentenced to reclusion perpetua and to
pay the complainant the sum of P20,000.00 as moral damages, and costs. Accused Bautista has
appealed to this Court.
Quoting from appellee's brief, the crime was committed as follows:

The complainant Remedios Abalayan was according to the description of the court a
quo, an attractive woman, 33 years old, married, with two children. (Decision, p. 2). In
the afternoon of July 11, 1976, suspicious of the behavior of her husband, she and her
mother-in-law went to the residence of appellant Alejandro Bautista at Mangahan, Toril
Davao City. Appellant was a well- known fortune teller and faith healer. (t. s. n 66-68).
Abalayan consulted appellant regarding her husband. Acting as though he knew

whereof he speak, appellant told Abalayan that her husband was at that moment
somewhere at Bajada with his girlfriend. Appellant offered to use his powers to protect
Abalayan against the possibility of losing her husband to the other guitar (Id, 7071)
Appellant produced a bottle of potion which he made Abalayan drink. She momentarily
felt weak. Appellant then performed a ritual whereby he tied strips of red cloth around
his head and neck, rang a small bell and recited some incantations while a daughter
played the guitar. (Id, 69-70)
Before Ablayan left, appellant told her to bring the following day a picture and some
unwashed clothings of her husband which appellant would cleanse of evil spirits. (Id,
71-72) Appellant asked for P230.00 as payment for his services, although Abalayan
was able to pay only P200.00. (Id, 72-73)
The following day, July 12, 1976, Abalayan returned with her mother to the residence of
appellant. Abalayan performed the same ceremony he did the day before and gave
Abalayan another dose of potion (Id, 74-75) He pretended to treat with smoke the
unwashed clothings and picture of Abalayan's husband. After these, appellant told
Abalayan to return the following day for a trip to a remote cave where the ritual would be
repeated for better effects. (Id, 76-77)
Early in the morning of July 13, 1976 Abalayan returned to appellant's residence in the
company of her mother. After some waiting, appellant's passenger jeep, driven by his
son Fernando, arrived. It was this that used in going somewhere near Mt. Apo. Id 78-79)
When they reached a place planted to sugar cane, they alighted. (Id, 79-80) Appellant
told Abalayan that only she should come with him to the cave which was located down
the hill behind some trees. This was necessary, according to appellant, in order that the
ceremony could produce better results. (Id, 80-81)
Appellant and Abalayan followed a descending trail that led to a cave which was
isolated and concealed from any possible spectator. (Id, 81-82) Here appellant brought
out the clothings and picture of Abalayan's husband and gave them to Abalayan to hold.
Appellant then made smoke with his paraphernalia. After this, he produced a plastic
sheet secreted in the cave and spread it on the ground. (Id, 8284) He then brought out
linen from the bag he carried with him and spread it on the plastic sheet. He told
Abalayan to lie down on this so he could blow some medication on her stomach. She
obeyed him. (Id, 84.)
Appellant told Abalayan to unzip her pants in order that his medicine could reach her
navel. After she did, however, appellant began to touch her breast and her genitalia.
This surprised Abalayan who immediately stood up and zipped her pants. She told
appellant that she could not agree to his kind of treatment. (Id, 84-85) Appellant
explained that Abalayan should understand his acts as part of the ritual that had to be
done to save her husband from another woman. Appellant suggested that the treatment
would be all the more effective if he could have sexual intercourse with her.
Because Abalayan rejected the suggestion of sexual intercourse, appellant proposed to
instead give her a potion which, according to him, achieve the same ends although in a
somewhat slower manner. Abalayan took the potion proffered to her. (Id., 85-87) Soon
after, she felt dizzy and weak. While she remained conscious, she experienced a
sudden loss of control over her person. She was in this state when appellant ordered
her to take off her pants. And she obeyed him. He then abused her. (Id., 87-89).
Bothered and unable to sleep the evening following the incident, she reported the matter the following
day, July 14, 1976, to her older brother and to her mother who later filed a complaint against
appellant with the PC, CIS. Complainant had herself examined on two occasions by Dr. Leonardo
Bascara, a neuropsychiatry, and specialist in psychonalytic and psychosometric neurology as well as
in medical hypnosis. 1 In the first session Dr. Bascara subjected her to a pre-association or orthodox
mode of psychoanalysis, while in the second, he placed her under hynopsis. 2 According to the doctor
specialist, complainant was telling the truth regarding the rape by a faith-healer who administered to
her a psychedelic drug that deprived her of her will and who placed her under his hypnotic power. In
her state of mind, Dr. Bascara further testified, complainant was deprived of reason, unable to resist
the sexual advances of appellant. 3
Relying on the laboratory finding made at the Davao General Hospital that after a pap smear made in
the evening of July 14, 1976, complainant was found negative for spermatozoa, appellant would deny
the commission of rape on complainant in the morning of the previous day, as charged. Appellant's
contention of the alleged impossibility of the rape having been committed with no sign of spermatozoa
on complainant, as found by a laboratory examination, is unavailing in the light of repeated rulings
that the absence of spermatozoa does not necessarily mean that the alleged victim has not in fact
been raped. 4 In the present case, the period of almost one and one-half day, or 36 hours, is long
enough for the spermatozoa to have already died when the pap smear was made, medical opinion
being that the organism may not last more than 24 hours. 5
Other circumstances that might explain the negative finding of spermatozoa is the possibility of an
unsuccessful emission on the part of appellant, being already in the rather advanced age of 58 at the
time, and conscious of the presence of persons close to the scene, including the victim's mother. The
possibility of complainant having washed or flushed herself to prevent conception cannot also be
ruled out, such a cause for the absence of spermatozoa despite the actuality of the rape, having been
suggested in one case by this Court. 6
In any case, slight penetration even without emission, is sufficient to convict for rape. 7 By the positive
testimony of complainant, such penetration did take place. She said she felt there was penetration.
This is very likely, indeed with her having already bome two children, thus making entry or penetration
relatively easy.
Appellant, however, next suggests consent on the part of the complainant to the sexual act, pointing
to the complain- appellant's reaction to his sexual advances as not constituting any serious resistance
thereto, such as allowing him to fondle her private parts and not immediately stopping the ritual even
after he had asked for sexual intercourse, but instead showed cooperation when she drank the potion
offered to her as an alternative of the sex act.
The above pretensions of appellant are not true. Complainant did not for a moment tolerate the
indecent acts of appellant. She drew herself away from him instantly and protestingly when appellant
started to touch her private parts, and angrily rejected the proposal for sexual intercourse by standing
up and zipping close her pants. If she agreed to take the potion proferred as a substitute for the
sexual intercourse, it was only because she has not lost her belief in appellant's sincerity in trying to
help her with what was increasingly his widening reputation to have been endowed with mystic power
of faith-healing and fortune-telling. Certainly, the victims taking the potion as she had done on two
previous occasions was not by any means to show her agreement to appellant's indecent proposal.
She evidently thought that the potiondrinking ritual accompanied by incantations and prayers, would
not be followed by a sexual assault as the two similar rituals referred to had in appellant residence
were not. But in the privacy of the well-hidden cave, appellant revealed his true lewd designs as had
evidently possessed him even before, during the first two sessions, which he now could give full vent
to, within the confines of the cave, with no one to stop or reproach his sinister proceedings, once the
potion he made complainant drink would show its effect, which was to deprive complainant of reason
and the will to resist appellant's sexual assault. The effect is thus similar to that of violence in
overcoming resistance with which she could very well have successfully thwarted the lustful attack.
Appellant, undoubtedly had clearly committed the crime charged by depriving complainant of reason
to be able to have carnal knowledge of her 8 without the latter having in the least shown any sign of
consent. If she did, she would not have angrily rejected appellant's proposition to have sexual
intercourse with her, and instead of reporting the assault on her to her mother and brother, with
certain knowledge of proper complaint being filed which would be followed by medical examination of
her body, and the ordeal of a public trial in which she would expose her honor and reputation, she
could just have kept the sexual indulgence a tightly guarded secret, as she would have done if she
had submitted herself willingly thereto. Characteristic of the modesty in Filipino womanhood, she
would have preferred to preserve an unsullied reputation for marital fidelity by keeping silent, if she
felt she had, to any degree, shared in the moral culpability inherent in the act of sexual intercourse
with a man other than her husband.
The absence of any motive to place in jeopardy her priced possession of womanly virtue, as none
whatsoever has been shown, gives solid credibility to complainant's testimony. The slight discrepancy
between her affidavit taken just after the incident (Exhibit 1) and her testimony as pointed out by
appellant is, therefore, utterly insufficient to impeach her credibility, which is that of having failed to
mention in her affidavit about her taking of the potion and merely stating therein that appellant put oil
on the tips of his finger and with it touched her lips. She explained this discrepancy by stating that she
had not yet fully recovered her senses when she gave her statement. 9 She could very well have
added in explanation that she feared being branded as stupidly credulous for willingly taking that
potion in her desire to seek help from appellant in the solution of her problem as this Court perceives,
from the facts duly proven, that she did not want being credited with so such naivete Further
explanation may be found in the fact already of judicial notice, that affidavits generally suffer from
incompleteness and inaccuracy. 10 Thus explained, the discrepancy pointed out with so much stress
by appellant, cannot discredit complainant's testimony specially considering that the taking of the
potion was a fact admitted by appellant himself when he claimed the act as allegedly indicative of
complainant's cooperative reaction to his proposal of sexual intercourse.
The award of moral damages which is the subject of appellant's last assignment of error, based on
alleged lack of evidence supportive thereof is legally justifiable. As a victim of rape, complainant
undeniably felt mental anguish and distress. And having to face public trial that would expose the lurid
details of her unhappy experience, that too had the effect of besmirching her reputation to warrant the
award of moral damages, an inseparable liability to the punitive portion of the sentence imposed on
all convicted rapists.
In view of the penalty of the crime charged, which is indivisible, there need be no discussion of the
attendant circumstances which would not vary the properly imposable penalty reclusion perpetua.
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from, being in accordance with law and the evidence, same is
affirmed in toto, with costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 86230 September 18, 1990

vs.
EDGAR JEREZA, accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Liberato R. Ibadlit for accused-appellant.
SARMIENTO, J.:
The Court affirms the judgment herein appealed from.
The accused-appellant was charged with murder under an information filed on November 24, 1986,
stating thus:
The undersigned Second Assistant Provincial Fiscal of Aklan hereby accuses EDGAR
JEREZA of the crime of MURDER, committed as follows:
That on or about the 8th day of July, 1986, in the afternoon, at the Poblacion,
Municipality of Kalibo, Province of Aklan, Republic of the Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with treachery and
evident premeditation, without just motive, while armed with Caliber .22 Revolver,
marked Rohm' with Serial No. 44600, and with intent to kill one NOEL RIMON did then
and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, shoot and wound the said
NOEL RIMON thereby inflicting upon the latter mortal wounds, to wit:
# 1 Lacerated Wound, 1.5 x 1.5 cm., Forehead, right;
# 1 Gunshot wound, 1 x 1 cm. with Contusion, collar, maxillary area, left;
# 3 Abrasion, 1 x 4 cms. zygomatic area, right.
as per Medico-Legal Report on Physical Injuries signed Dr. Esteban B. Villaruel,

Resident Physician, Dr. Rafael S. Tumbokon Memorial Hospital, Kalibo, Aklan, hereto
attached and forming integral part hereof, as Annex "A" which wounds directly caused
the death of the said NOEL RIMON as per Autopsy Report of Dr. Roberto V. Garcia,
Medico-Legal Officer, National Bureau of Investigation, Medico-Legal Division, Manila,
likewise attached hereto and made integral part hereof as Annex "B".
That as a result of the criminal acts of the herein accused, the heirs of the deceased
NOEL RIMON suffered the following damages:
1. P30,000.00 as actual and compensatory damages;
2 P30,000.00 as moral damages; and
3. P20,000.00 as exemplary damages.1
The accused pleaded "not guilty", and although he admitted having taken the life of the victim, Noel
("Boy") Rimon, he allegedly did so in defense of his own person.
In his order of July 14, 1987, the trial judge 2 set the case for reception of evidence for the defense, to
establish self-defense.
The defense first presented Arthur Castor, a driver, and a resident of Libacao, Aklan. He alleged that
on July 8, 1986, he was aboard a bus, a passenger truck operated by the Seraspi company returning
from Iloilo City to Kalibo, Aklan, driven by the victim, when, at or about five o'clock in the afternoon,
and after the vehicle had parked near the Castillo monument in Kalibo, Aklan, he was distracted by
an argument going on between the victim and the accused, about a certain "clutchbag which Edgar
would like to bring to the municipal hall. 3 The accused allegedly then alighted. The victim, however,
tailed him. He allegedly then saw the victim hacking the accused with a bolo he had kept under his
seat, which the latter parried, but which decked him. Thereafter, the accused reached inside the
clutchbag in question, from which a twenty-two caliber automatic pistol emerged, which the accused
aimed at the victim and which he fired. The first shot allegedly hit the victim in the face. He fired two
more shots both of which also found their mark.
He also declared that he was at the rear portion of the bus at that time as the two protagonists
struggled outside. He claimed that he was the only passenger by then.
The defense likewise presented Teresita Loresco, a medical records librarian at the Dr. Rafael
Tumbokon Memorial Hospital in Kalibo, and a resident of Andagao, Kalibo, Aklan. She averred that
on July 8, 1986, the accused was admitted to the hospital for treatment of hacking wounds. The
accused allegedly suffered four "multiple incised wounds." 4 The attending physician's, Dr. Esteban
Villaruel's, medico-legal report stated that he sustained cuts on the left arm, and right hand. 5 It also
appeared that he was discharged on the same day.
In his testimony, the accused claimed that he was in the bus in question as inspector for Seraspi bus
company, while the victim drove it. He contended that as the bus unloaded passengers and cargo
near the Castillo monument, in Kalibo, he and the victim tangled in an argument concerning a
clutchbag which he allegedly found in one of the bus seats, and which contained a firearm. He
allegedly sought to surrender it to the Kalibo police, but the victim allegedly insisted that they keep it.
He allegedly alighted, anyway, on his way to the police station, the clutchbag tied around his arm,
when allegedly, "somebody shouted and when I looked back, I saw that it was Boy Rimon and he was
already hacking me and I was hit here on my left arm." 6 He allegedly retreated, but the victim
allegedly boloed away, hitting him on the left breast and later, the left arm. He allegedly rolled over to
a canal, opened the clutchbag, and reached for the gun, with which he shot the victim. He shot him
three times until he, the victim, fell and died. He also said that when he fired at him, he was lying on
the ground while the victim stood about a meter away.
He later surrendered to the municipal authorities and turned over the firearm to the police. He was
also brought to the Dr. Tumbokon Memorial Hospital when Dr. Villaruel treated him for bolo wounds.
On cross-examination, he testified that he and the victim were alone in the bus when they began
exchanging words. He also admitted knowing how to operate a motorcycle, being a motocross racer,
and that he had joined racing competitions.
The defense then rested, and the prosecution presented rebuttal evidence.
The prosecution put Bobby Masangya, of Batan, Aklan, on the stand.
He testified that on July 8, 1986 he boarded a Seraspi bus headed for Kalibo. It was driven by the
victim, and in which the accused was the inspector. He also said that accused actually alighted at the
new Washington-Banga-Kalibo intersection, and jumped off it while the bus was in motion. The bus
later stopped at D. Maagma Street near the Castillo monument and in front of the Seventh-Day
Adventist Church.
He subsequently saw the accused on a motorcycle proceeding toward the bus. He stated that he was
then a seat behind the driver, by the window. There were allegedly about twenty-five other
passengers on board the bus. The accused then supposedly parked his motorcycle, dismounted, and
"he had with him a clutch bag and he went round the portion of the bus where the driver was situated
then opened his clutch bag, took a gun and [shot] the driver." 7He allegedly shot him outside the bus,
from the driver's window. Mr. Masangya said he rose and dashed toward the back of the bus and
jumped out of the window. He heard two more gunshots thereafter.
He also asserted that he did not hear any conversation preceding the shooting between the accused
and the victim, and that the accused did not carry anything when he first got off the bus. At the first
shot, the other passengers likewise allegedly scurried in all directions and scampered for safety.
Felipe Reprado, of Banga, Aklan, corroborated Masangya's testimony, and alleged that "[s]omebody
arrived riding a motorcycle and parked it in front of the Seraspi Mini Bus and then he drew a gun from
his waist and shot the driver on his seat." 8
He said that he was at the "Youth Hostel" along Maagna Street at that time, about twelve meters from
the bus. After the first shot, he said that the driver, his face bleeding, stood up brandishing a bolo,
after which he heard two shots more.
Dr. Esteban Villaruel, of the Dr. Tumbokon Memorial Hospital, testified that it was he who prepared
the medico-legal report of the injuries of the victim. His report revealed:
#1 Lacerated Wound, 1.5 x 1.5 cm., Forehead, right;
#1 Gunshot Wound, 1 x 1 cm. with Contusion, collar, maxillary area, left;
#3 Abrasion, 1 x 4 cms., zygomatic area, right.9
Police lieutenant Vicente Seraspi, of Kalibo, then officer-in-charge of the Kalibo Integrated National
Police, claimed that the accused, on July 8, 1986, went to the station to surrender a firearm. The
accused was allegedly on a motorcycle when he arrived at the station. He also appeared bloodied, for
which reason, he was advised to check into a hospital, the Dr. Tumbokon Memorial, about 200
meters away.
He Identified the firearm to be a "Rohm", with serial No. 44600, with three live ammunition and three
empty shells in the cylinder.
The trial judge found the evidence for the prosecution more convincing and compatible with claims
that the accused had been guilty of murder, qualified by treachery. He sentenced the accused
to reclusion perpetua, taking into consideration the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender,
offset, however, by the generic aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation. The accused was
also adjudged to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the amount of P30,000.00, and to pay the
costs.
As we said, we affirm, save for certain modifications, the judgment under appeal.
There is no question that the accused shot the victim, three times, which caused his death. The only
question is whether or not he shot him in self-defense. The evidence before the trial court, as found
by the judge, indicated that it was plain murder and that it was the victim, in hacking away at the
accused, which also caused some injuries to the latter, who was in fact defending himself from the
former's assault. The errors raised by the defense have to do with the assessment of the believability
of the witnesses' testimonies, and we have held time and again that credibility of witnesses is a
matter we leave, as a general rule, to the trial judge to determine. 10 This is so because first, the
Supreme Court does not try facts. Its office is preeminently, to review errors of law. No valid reason
has been advanced why we should depart from the rule.
The evidence indeed discloses that the accused, contrary to his story, had earlier alighted from the
bus, followed it via a motorcycle, parked it as the bus parked, slinked around it, and shot the
deceased from the window. Two reasons persuade the Court. First, the witness', Bobby Masangya's
testimony, wherein he categorically declared that the accused acted in the manner above- described.
As the court a quo did, we find his testimony to be forthright, candid, and persuasive. The accused
has not successfully shown any improper motive why Mr. Masangya should perjure his testimony.
Second, it jibes with the accused's very evidence that he knew how to operate a motorcycle, and the
fact that he was seen riding one and arrived at the crime scene on one. Third, police lieutenant
Vicente Seraspi, testified that the accused arrived at the station aboard a motorcycle. The accused's
bare denials that he had been all along on board the bus can not overcome these positive
testimonies.
The fact that Masangya maintained that the accused drew his pistol from a clutchbag, while Felipe
Reprado said that he reached for it from his waist, does not contradict meaningfuly the finding that he
did draw a firearm and that he shot the deceased with it. At best, the conflicting testimonies involve
an inconsistency on an insignificant footnote explained, first, by the swift turn of events that had
unfolded, and second, by the frailty of human memory. At any rate, the accused admits having shot
the victim, and whether he shot him with a gun he kept in a clutchbag or tucked under his waist, the
fact remains that he had a gun, and that he shot the victim with it.
We can not accept the accused's claim of self-defense, first, because he has not convincingly shown
it amid the ample proofs that he was not defending himself, but rather, was committing cold-blooded
murder. The testimony of defense witness Arthur Castor, to the effect that he was the lone passenger
who witnessed the event, is belied by the fact that Masangya, for one, and Reprado, for another, had
come forward to testify that there were other passengers aboard, and that they numbered around
twenty-five.
The accused can not point to his injuries to illustrate self-defense. What the evidence shows is that
after he fired his first shot, the victim did not die immediately, although normally it would have been
fatal, but managed to alight from the bus and swing away with his bolo for which the accused fired at
him again-twice. Dr. Villaruel himself, in reply to the questioning:" . . .could the victim inflict those
wounds to the accused after he was shot ... 11 stated that: "It is possible." 12 Indeed, the records show
that the accused sustained but minor wounds, which did not require confinement, and which give rise
to valid inferences that the victim had been weakened and had swung at the accused
indiscriminately. This was in fact confirmed by Masangya and Reprado that after the first shot, the
deceased rose wielding a bolo.
The records indeed suggest that the victim had managed to get off his seat, exit from the bus, and
follow his assailant outside (notwithstanding his facial wound) since he, the victim, was found lying on
the ground.
It is not therefore farfetched to say that the deceased could still have attacked the accused with his
bolo although he had already been injured. Two things convince us: (1) Reprado, prosecution
witness, testified that he saw the victim stand up after the first shot was fired; and (2) while he did not
see what transpired later, the evidence on record shows that the victim fell on the ground, outside the
bus, which means that he was able to leave the vehicle and that judging from the accused's admitted
bodily cuts, he managed to bolo, without fatal success, the accused.
As the Solicitor General further observes, the shots came at intervals, in Mr. Reprado's language,
"[p]erhaps two (2) minutes, 13 meaning, that, there was activity after the first shot.
That the offense was attended by treachery is adequately buttressed by the records. Under the law,
treachery involves a mode of attack adopted by the culprit to insure consummation with no risk to
himself. 14 The circumstances herein show that the accused had alighted from the bus, rode on a
motorcycle, pursued the bus, and once it had parked, snaked around it and shot its driver. Although
the victim did not die immediately, the attack made on him was sudden, without warning, and which
caught him with his guards down. We can not say that the victim had insinuations that the accused
would commit a dastardly act because of their earlier altercation, assuming that there was such an
altercation, because a brief interval had passed between that and the actual act of shooting. Albeit in
one case, 15 the Court held that where the victim was able to retreat, although the attack was
sudden, alevosia can not be appreciated, the Court can not apply that case here. In that case, the
victim, upon retreating was able to defend himself, and he can not be said to have been defenseless.
Here, however, the accused had wounded the victim-as a consequence of his surprise attack and if
he, the victim, happened to "defend' himself, it was no defense at all, although he was able to inflict
superficial wounds on the accused.
We rule out, however, evident premeditation (which the trial court appreciated as a generic
aggravating circumstance) because in evident premeditation, the time the accused had mustered the
determination to commit the crime must be well-established. It was not shown here.
The Court is put to task in appreciating voluntary surrender as a mitigating circumstance because all
that the records reveal is that the accused trooped to the Kalibo police headquarters to surrender the
firearm. It is not clear whether or not he also sought to submit his very person to the authorities. We
leave him, however, the benefit of the doubt, and consider his arrival at the police station as an act of
surrender.
There being one mitigating circumstance, the accused is hereby sentenced to the minimum period
prescribed by law for the crime of murder, reclusion temporal maximum, and pursuant to the
indeterminate sentence law, he is sentenced to ten years and one day of prision mayor, to eighteen
years and one day of reclusion temporal, and, in the light of the new policy of the Court, to pay an
increased indemnity of P50,000.00 from the amount of P30,000.00 fixed by the trial court.
WHEREFORE, this appeal is DISMISSED. The accused-appellant is SENTENCED to undergo

imprisonment of ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, to eighteen (18) years and one (1)
day of reclusion temporal; to pay indemnity in the sum of FIFTY THOUSAND (P50,000.00) PESOS to
the heirs of Noel Rimon.
SO ORDERED
G.R. No. L-24055 December 28, 1925
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
CATALINO OSCAR, defendant-appellant.
Alejandro M. Panis for appellant.

Attorney-General Jaranilla for appellee.
OSTRAND, J.:
The defendant was charged in the Court of First Instance of Abra of the crime of rape under the
following information:
That on or about the 28th day of October , 1923, in the municipality of Lagangilang, Province
of Abra, Philippine Islands, the said accused by means of force did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously lie and had carnal knowledge with Marta Trondillo, a girl eight years
of age, against her will and in spite of her resistance, while she was asleep in the house of her
uncle Tomas Cada.
The trial court found the defendant guilty of the crime of frustrated rape without any qualifying
circumstance and sentenced hi to either years and one day of presidio mayor with the accessory
penalties and to pay the costs. From the sentence the defendant appeals.
The evidence leaves no doubt whatever as to the defendant's guilt His testimony that he merely
introduced his finger into vagina of the offended party, in a fit of anger, because her uncle, Tomas
Cada, failed to furnish him a girl with whom he could have sexual intercourse, is under the
circumstances absurd and deserves no credence.
The court below found that he crime was frustrated, and not consummated, on the ground that the
evidence did not clearly show that the defendant's genital organ was introduced to its full length into
that of the offended party, and that there were no signs of emission of semen. This conclusion is
erroneous.lawphi1.net
Perfect penetration is not essential . Any penetration of female body by the male organ is
sufficient.
Entry of the labia or lips of the female organ, merely without rapture of the hymen or laceration
of the vagina, is sufficient to warrant conviction.
Stewart, in his work on Legal Medicine, citing Taylor vs. State and People vs. Crawley, says at page
137: "And it is undoubtedly the law that penetration even to the least extent will be sufficient to
established the crime, and this may even be inferred from the circumstances of the case."lawphi1.net
In the present case, the physician, who examined the offended party shortly after the commission of
the crime, testifies that he hymen was lacerated and that there was coagulated blood, though he
found no semen. This shows sufficiently that the crime was consummated, and the sentence of the
court below must be modified accordingly.
We therefore find the defendant-appellant guilty of the consummated crime of rape and sentence him
to suffer fourteen years, eight months and one day of reclusion temporal, with the accessory penalties
prescribed by law, to endow the offended party in the sum of P500, and to pay the costs. So ordered.
G.R. No. L-12988 January 24, 1918
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
SARIKALA, defendant-appellant.
Charles D. DeSelms for appellant.

Acting Attorney-General Paredes for appellee.
MALCOLM, J.:
C. H. Cotton, a farmer of the American colony of Mumungan, Lanao, and his adopted daughter
Francisca, a girl of 11 or 12 years of age, were foully murdered on or about January 14, 1917, while
sleeping in their home. Sarikala, a Moro laborer, was charged with the crime, was found guilty in the
lower court, and was given the death penalty. On review, as the proof is entirely circumstantial in
nature, we must describe antecedent events and closely analyze the evidence.
And first, the motive. Sarikala had been employed as a laborer by Cotton. His services had been
found to be unsatisfactory. On Saturday, January 13, 1917, Sarikala was discharged by Cotton who
used violent and profane language. We shall not repeat these words but they were such as naturally
arouse enmity. A further point indicating ill-feeling on the part of Sarikala toward the little girl is
revealed by evidence to the effect that some time previous Francisca had outraged the Moro's
religious belief by putting pork in his rice. The finger of guilt thus points at Sarikala. But mere
suspicion is not sufficient to convict.
So next, the circumstantial evidence, deduced point by point
First. Sarikala was familiar with the house of Cotton and his belongings. He knew that the wire of
window which found open after the murder could be broken with pliers and he knew that Cotton had
weapons which could be used to commit the crime.
Second. Sarikala admitted having spent the night of January 14, 1917, in the little house near
Cotton's residence.
Third. Sarikala left the scene of the murder immediately thereafter. Flight, when unexplained, is a
circumstance from which an interference of guilty may be drawn. "The winked flee, even when no
man pursueth; but the righteous are as bold as a lion."
Fourth. On a white coat and khaki trousers belonging to Sarikala were found blood stains. The
medical expert testified from the microscopical examination that this was blood but that he could not
tell whether it was the blood of a human being or of an animal. On this point, Stewart on Legal
Medicine (p.322), says:
Under ordinary circumstances there is no difficulty in determining whether a given stain is, or is
not, a blood stain; and, in case the blood corpuscels are intact the blood of reptiles or birds is
readily distinguished from that of mammals. But even under the most favorable conditions the
determination of the particular mammal from which a sample of blood has been obtained, is a
matter of great difficulty, calling for expert skill and very careful microscopical examination.
Even the most expert would hesitate to testify to the presence of human blood, in distinction
from dog's blood, for example, when such testimony would mean the conviction of one
accused of murder.
Fifth. The ghastly wounds were made either by the machete (knife or bolo) of Cotton, or a weapon
identical therewith. Sarikala knew of this weapon, and after the murder, while in jail, told another
person that Cotton's weapons could be found in the well. The weapons were discovered in the well.
Sixth. After arrest, Sarikala told a story implicating another Moro named Mudag. But no motive for
Mudag to commit the murder, unless it was robbery, can be imagined and no other evidence against
Mudag was presented.
Seventh. Sarikala made denials as to his ownership of breeches, as to having asked permission of
another Moro Tayaba to sleep in his house, and of having met Esperanza Andrews who lived nearby.
The statements of Sarilaka on these points were found to be false.
Eighth. Sarilaka testified that the coat with the blood stains was one which he had exchanged with his
cousin. But the cousin was not introduced as a witness. American courts have been generally much
more liberal to the accused for failure to produce a evidence than English courts. The true rule is we
believe as stated by Dean Wigmore in his work on Evidence [4, p. 3148]:
The failure to produce evidence, in general, other than his own testimony, is open to inference
against a party accused, with the same limitations applicable to civil parties. Here the effect of
the burden of proof has sometimes tended to confuse. It is true that the burden is on the
prosecution, and that the accused is not required by any rule of law to produce evidence; but
nevertheless he runs the risk of an inference from nonproduction. This seeming paradox,
which has been already sufficiently noticed in treating of the general principle, has misled a
few courts to deny that any inference may be drawn. (People vs. Cline [1890], 83 Caal., 374,
378; 23 Pac., 391 [larceny of horse; defendant's failure to call the alleged vendor, held to be
open to inference]; State vs. Griswold [1900], 73 Conn., 95; 46 Atl., 829; Price vs. U. S. [1899],
14 D. C. App., 391, 400 [failure to attempt to prove an alibi]; Frazier vs. State [1893], 135 Ind.,
38, 39; 34 N. E., 817 [failure to produce any evidence]; State vs. Hinkle [1858], 6 Iowa, 385
[failure to explain where arsenic was bought]; State vs. Hasty [1903], -id.-; 96 N. W., 1115 [the
absence of contradiction for certain facts may be noticed, even though the accused is the only
one who could contradict them]; Com. vs. Webster [1850], 5 Cush., 295, 316; (quoted supra.)
Com. vs. Harlow [1872], 110 Mass., 411; Com. Brownell [1887], 145 id., 319; 14 N. E., 108;
People vs. Mills [1893], 94 Mich., 630, 638; 54 N. W., 488; State vs. Costner [1900], 127 N. C.,
566; 37 S. E., 326 [failure to call witnesses to explain accused's whereabouts]; Jackson vs.
State [1892], 31 Tex. Cr., 342, 344; 20 S. W., 921 [failure to account for possession of stolen
goods].)
The inference (supposing the failure of evidence not to be explained away) is of course that
the tenor of the specific unproduced evidence would be contrary to the party's case, or at least
would not support it. (1 Wigmore on Evidence, p. 377; see also Ann. Cas. [1914 A], pp. 907 et
seq., especially p. 932.)
Counsel de officio has presented the case for his client in a most convincing manner. Cupidity, not
revenge, he argues, was the motive. Not one of the articles missing from the house was found in the
possession of the accused. Naturally, counsel dwells on the thin veneer of circumstantial evidence,
suspicion, conclusion and conjecture. The brief concludes:
It is not known who committed either the murder or the robbery. It might have been Mudag, or
it might have been Andrews, or it might have been someone else. We may never know the
author of the deed; certainly we do not know him at this time. And, however much ill-founded
suspicion there may be, certain it is that Sarikala has not been proven to be the perpetrator of
the crime.
To a considerable degree we are inclined to concur with counsel. We must convict, if at all, on
circumstantial evidence. Yet when we weigh the argument for the defense against this circumstantial
evidence, we find the balance inclined towards guilt. We believe that for revenge Sarikala secured
the machete, broke the window of Cotton's house, entered, treacherously, murdered Cotton and the
little girl, threw all the weapons in the well, left his bloody trousers in the hut, escaped, and then when
arrested endeavored to put the guilt on Mudag.
The crime charged was double murder with robbery. Robbery was not proved. The trial judge took
into consideration as to the death of Cotton the qualifying circumstance of premeditation and the
extenuating circumstance of passion and obfuscation, and as to the death of the little girl the
qualifying circumstance of premeditation with the aggravating circumstance of nocturnity and no
mitigating circumstance. On close study we cannot agree that premeditation or nocturnity are proved.
As to the mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation we likewise cannot agree that it can be
taken into consideration because more than twenty-four hours elapsed after the insults of Cotton to
the accused and the criminal act.
The mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation cannot be considered when a long
period of time has inverted between the impulse which produces it and the criminal act.
(Decision of the supreme court of Spain of March 29, 1882.)
On the contrary, we find present, alevosia, raising the crime to murder, and the aggravating
circumstance of commission in the dwelling of Cotton and his daughter, but balanced by the
mitigating circumstance of ignorance and lack of education. Wherefore, we sentence the defendant
and appellant to life imprisonment (cadena perpetua), the accessory penalties provided by law, to pay
an indemnity of P500 to the heirs of C. H. Cotton and an indemnity of P500 to the heirs of the girl
Francisca, and to pay the costs of both instances. So ordered.
DR. MILAGROS L. CANTRE, G.R. No. 160889

Petitioner,
Present:
QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson,

CARPIO,
- versus - CARPIO MORALES,
TINGA, and
VELASCO, JR., JJ.
SPS. JOHN DAVID Z. GO and NORA S. Promulgated:

GO,
Respondents. April 27, 2007
x------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
For review on certiorari are the Decision[1] dated October 3, 2002 and Resolution[2] dated November 19,
2003 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 58184, which affirmed with modification the
Decision[3] dated March 3, 1997 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 98, in Civil Case No. Q-
93-16562.
The facts, culled from the records, are as follows:
Petitioner Dr. Milagros L. Cantre is a specialist in Obstetrics and Gynecology at the Dr. Jesus Delgado
Memorial Hospital. She was the attending physician of respondent Nora S. Go, who was admitted at the said
hospital on April 19, 1992.
At 1:30 a.m. of April 20, 1992, Nora gave birth to her fourth child, a baby boy. However, at around 3:30
a.m., Nora suffered profuse bleeding inside her womb due to some parts of the placenta which were not
completely expelled from her womb after delivery. Consequently, Nora suffered hypovolemic shock, resulting
in a drop in her blood pressure to 40 over 0. Petitioner and the assisting resident physician performed various
medical procedures to stop the bleeding and to restore Noras blood pressure.Her blood pressure was frequently
monitored with the use of a sphygmomanometer. While petitioner was massaging Noras uterus for it to contract
and stop bleeding, she ordered a droplight to warm Nora and her baby.[4] Nora remained unconscious until she
recovered.
While in the recovery room, her husband, respondent John David Z. Go noticed a fresh gaping wound
two and a half (2 ) by three and a half (3 ) inches in the inner portion of her left arm, close to the armpit. [5] He
asked the nurses what caused the injury. He was informed it was a burn. Forthwith, on April 22, 1992, John
David filed a request for investigation.[6] In response, Dr. Rainerio S. Abad, the medical director of the hospital,
called petitioner and the assisting resident physician to explain what happened. Petitioner said the blood
pressure cuff caused the injury.
On May 7, 1992, John David brought Nora to the National Bureau of Investigation for a physical
examination, which was conducted by medico-legal officer Dr. Floresto Arizala, Jr.[7] The medico-legal officer
later testified that Noras injury appeared to be a burn and that a droplight when placed near the skin for about 10
minutes could cause such burn.[8] He dismissed the likelihood that the wound was caused by a blood pressure
cuff as the scar was not around the arm, but just on one side of the arm.[9]
On May 22, 1992, Noras injury was referred to a plastic surgeon at the Dr. Jesus Delgado Memorial
Hospital for skin grafting.[10] Her wound was covered with skin sourced from her abdomen, which consequently
bore a scar as well. About a year after, on April 30, 1993, scar revision had to be performed at the same
hospital.[11] The surgical operation left a healed linear scar in Noras left arm about three inches in length, the
thickest portion rising about one-fourth (1/4) of an inch from the surface of the skin. The costs of the skin
grafting and the scar revision were shouldered by the hospital.[12]
Unfortunately, Noras arm would never be the same. Aside from the unsightly mark, the pain in her left
arm remains. When sleeping, she has to cradle her wounded arm. Her movements now are also restricted. Her
children cannot play with the left side of her body as they might accidentally bump the injured arm, which aches
at the slightest touch.
Thus, on June 21, 1993, respondent spouses filed a complaint[13] for damages against petitioner,
Dr. Abad, and the hospital. Finding in favor of respondent spouses, the trial court decreed:
In view of the foregoing consideration, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the

plaintiffs and against the defendants, directing the latters, (sic) jointly and severally
(a) to pay the sum of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00) in moral
damages;
(b) to pay the sum of One Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos (P150,000.00) exemplary
damages;
(c) to pay the sum of Eighty Thousand Pesos (P80,000.00) nominal damages;
(d) to pay Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) for and as attorneys fees; and
(e) to pay Six Thousand Pesos (P6,000.00) litigation expenses.
SO ORDERED.[14]
Petitioner, Dr. Abad, and the hospital all appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed with
modification the trial court decision, thus:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, and finding no reversible error in the
appealed Decision dated March 3, 1997 of Branch 98 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City
in Civil Case No. Q-93-16562, the same is hereby AFFIRMED, with the following
MODIFICATIONS:
1. Ordering defendant-appellant Dra. Milagros [L.] Cantre only to pay plaintiffs-

appellees John David Go and Nora S. Go the sum of P200,000.00 as moral
damages;
2. Deleting the award [of] exemplary damages, attorneys fees and expenses of
litigation;
3. Dismissing the complaint with respect to defendants-appellants

Dr. Rainerio S. Abad and Delgado Clinic, Inc.;
4. Dismissing the counterclaims of defendants-appellants for lack of merit; and
5. Ordering defendant-appellant Dra. Milagros [L.] Cantre only to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.[15]
Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied by the Court of Appeals. Hence, the instant petition
assigning the following as errors and issues:
I.
WHETHER OR NOT, THE LOWER COURT, AND THE COURT OF APPEALS

COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF THEIR DISCRETION WHEN, NOTWITHSTANDING
THAT BOTH PARTIES HAVE RESTED THEIR RESPECTIVE CASES, THE LOWER
COURT ADMITTED THE ADDITIONAL EXHIBITS FURTHER OFFERED BY
RESPONDENTS NOT TESTIFIED TO BY ANY WITNESS AND THIS DECISION OF THE
LOWER COURT WAS UPHELD BY THE COURT OF APPEALS LIKEWISE
COMMITTING GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION;
II.
WHETHER OR NOT THE LOWER COURT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF ITS

DISCRETION WHEN, CONTRARY TO PREPONDERANCE OF EVIDENCE PRESENTED
BY THE PETITIONER, IT RULED THAT THE PETITIONER HAS NOT AMPLY SHOWED
THAT THE DROPLIGHT DID NOT TOUCH THE BODY OF MRS. NORA GO, AND THIS
DECISION OF THE LOWER COURT WAS UPHELD BY THE COURT OF APPEALS
LIKEWISE COMMITTING GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION;
III.
WHETHER OR NOT THE LOWER COURT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF ITS

DISCRETION WHEN, CONTRARY TO PREPONDERANCE OF EVIDENCE PRESENTED
BY THE PETITIONER, IT RULED THAT PETITIONER DRA. CANTRE WAS NOT ABLE
TO AMPLY EXPLAIN HOW THE INJURY (BLISTERS) IN THE LEFT INNER ARM OF
RESPONDENT MRS. GO CAME ABOUT;
IV.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF ITS

DISCRETION WHEN IT MADE A RULING ON THE RESPONDENTS INJURY QUOTING
THE TESTIMONY OF SOMEONE WHO WAS NOT PRESENT AND HAS NOT SEEN THE
ORIGINAL, FRESH INJURY OF RESPONDENT MRS. NORA GO;
V.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ABUSING ITS DISCRETION

RULED THAT PETITIONER DRA. CANTRE SHOULD HAVE INTENDED TO INFLICT
THE INJURY TO SAVE THE LIFE OF RESPONDENT MRS. GO;
VI.
WHETHER OR NOT THE LOWER COURT AND THE COURT [OF] APPEALS
COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN, CONTRARY TO THE
DETAILED PROCEDURES DONE BY PETITIONER, BOTH RULED THAT THE
RESPONDENT WAS LEFT TO THE CARE OF THE NURSING STAFF;
VII.
WHETHER OR NOT THE LOWER COURT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF

DISCRETION WHEN, CONTRARY TO THE MEDICAL PURPOSES OF COSMETIC
SURGERY, IT RULED THAT THE COSMETIC SURGERY MADE THE SCARS EVEN
MORE UGLY AND DECLARED THE COSMETIC SURGERY A FAILURE;
VIII.
WHETHER OR NOT THE LOWER COURT GRAVELY ABUSE OF (SIC) DISCRETION

WHEN, CONTRARY TO RESPONDENTS CONTRARY TESTIMONIES AND THE
ABSENCE OF ANY TESTIMONY, IT RULED THAT THEY ARE ENTITLED TO
DAMAGES AND WHICH WAS UPHELD, ALTHOUGH MODIFIED, BY THE COURT OF
APPEALS LIKEWISE ABUSING ITS DISCRETION.[16]
Petitioner contends that additional documentary exhibits not testified to by any witness are inadmissible
in evidence because they deprived her of her constitutional right to confront the witnesses against her. Petitioner
insists the droplight could not have touched Noras body. She maintains the injury was due to the constant taking
of Noras blood pressure. Petitioner also insinuates the Court of Appeals was misled by the testimony of the
medico-legal officer who never saw the original injury before plastic surgery was performed. Finally, petitioner
stresses that plastic surgery was not intended to restore respondents injury to its original state but rather to
prevent further complication.
Respondents, however, counter that the genuineness and due execution of the additional documentary
exhibits were duly admitted by petitioners counsel. Respondents point out that petitioners blood pressure cuff
theory is highly improbable, being unprecedented in medical history and that the injury was definitely caused
by the droplight. At any rate, they argue, even if the injury was brought about by the blood pressure cuff,
petitioner was still negligent in her duties as Noras attending physician.
Simply put, the threshold issues for resolution are: (1) Are the questioned additional exhibits admissible
in evidence? (2) Is petitioner liable for the injury suffered by respondent Nora Go? Thereafter, the inquiry is
whether the appellate court committed grave abuse of discretion in its assailed issuances.
As to the first issue, we agree with the Court of Appeals that said exhibits are admissible in evidence.
We note that the questioned exhibits consist mostly of Noras medical records, which were produced by the
hospital during trial pursuant to a subpoena duces tecum. Petitioners counsel admitted the existence of the same
when they were formally offered for admission by the trial court. In any case, given the particular circumstances
of this case, a ruling on the negligence of petitioner may be made based on the res ipsa loquitur doctrine even in
the absence of such additional exhibits.
Petitioners contention that the medico-legal officer who conducted Noras physical examination never
saw her original injury before plastic surgery was performed is without basis and contradicted by the records.
Records show that the medico-legal officer conducted the physical examination on May 7, 1992, while the skin
grafting and the scar revision were performed on Nora on May 22, 1992 and April 30, 1993, respectively.
Coming now to the substantive matter, is petitioner liable for the injury suffered by respondent Nora
Go?
The Hippocratic Oath mandates physicians to give primordial consideration to the well-being of their
patients. If a doctor fails to live up to this precept, he is accountable for his acts. This notwithstanding, courts
face a unique restraint in adjudicating medical negligence cases because physicians are not guarantors of care
and, they never set out to intentionally cause injury to their patients. However, intent is immaterial in negligence
cases because where negligence exists and is proven, it automatically gives the injured a right to reparation for
the damage caused.[17]
In cases involving medical negligence, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur allows the mere existence of an
injury to justify a presumption of negligence on the part of the person who controls the instrument causing the
injury, provided that the following requisites concur:
1. The accident is of a kind which ordinarily does not occur in the absence of someones negligence;
2. It is caused by an instrumentality within the exclusive control of the defendant or defendants; and
3. The possibility of contributing conduct which would make the plaintiff responsible is
eliminated.[18]
As to the first requirement, the gaping wound on Noras arm is certainly not an ordinary occurrence in
the act of delivering a baby, far removed as the arm is from the organs involved in the process of giving birth.
Such injury could not have happened unless negligence had set in somewhere.
Second, whether the injury was caused by the droplight or by the blood pressure cuff is of no moment.
Both instruments are deemed within the exclusive control of the physician in charge under the captain of the
ship doctrine. This doctrine holds the surgeon in charge of an operation liable for the negligence of his
assistants during the time when those assistants are under the surgeons control.[19] In this particular case, it can
be logically inferred that petitioner, the senior consultant in charge during the delivery of Noras baby, exercised
control over the assistants assigned to both the use of the droplight and the taking of Noras blood pressure.
Hence, the use of the droplight and the blood pressure cuff is also within petitioners exclusive control.
Third, the gaping wound on Noras left arm, by its very nature and considering her condition, could only
be caused by something external to her and outside her control as she was unconscious while
in hypovolemic shock. Hence, Nora could not, by any stretch of the imagination, have contributed to her own
injury.
Petitioners defense that Noras wound was caused not by the droplight but by the constant taking of her
blood pressure, even if the latter was necessary given her condition, does not absolve her from liability. As
testified to by the medico-legal officer, Dr. Arizala, Jr., the medical practice is to deflate the blood pressure cuff
immediately after each use. Otherwise, the inflated band can cause injury to the patient similar to what could
have happened in this case. Thus, if Noras wound was caused by the blood pressure cuff, then the taking of
Noras blood pressure must have been done so negligently as to have inflicted a gaping wound on her arm,[20] for
which petitioner cannot escape liability under the captain of the ship doctrine.
Further, petitioners argument that the failed plastic surgery was not intended as a cosmetic procedure,
but rather as a measure to prevent complication does not help her case. It does not negate negligence on her
part.
Based on the foregoing, the presumption that petitioner was negligent in the exercise of her profession
stands unrebutted. In this connection, the Civil Code provides:
ART. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done.
ART. 2217. Moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious
anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar
injury. Though incapable of pecuniary computation, moral damages may be recovered if they are
the proximate result of the defendants wrongful act or omission.
Clearly, under the law, petitioner is obliged to pay Nora for moral damages suffered by the latter as a
proximate result of petitioners negligence.
We note, however, that petitioner has served well as Noras obstetrician for her past three successful
deliveries. This is the first time petitioner is being held liable for damages due to negligence in the practice of
her profession. The fact that petitioner promptly took care of Noras wound before infection and other
complications set in is also indicative of petitioners good intentions. We also take note of the fact that Nora was
suffering from a critical condition when the injury happened, such that saving her life became petitioners
elemental concern. Nonetheless, it should be stressed that all these could not justify negligence on the part of
petitioner.
Hence, considering the specific circumstances in the instant case, we find no grave abuse of discretion in
the assailed decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals.Further, we rule that the Court of Appeals award of
Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200,000) as moral damages in favor of respondents and against petitioner is
just and equitable.[21]
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated October 3, 2002 and Resolution
dated November 19, 2003 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 58184 are AFFIRMED.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 142625 December 19, 2006
ROGELIO P. NOGALES, for himself and on behalf of the minors, ROGER ANTHONY,
ANGELICA, NANCY, and MICHAEL CHRISTOPHER, all surnamed NOGALES, petitioners,
vs.
CAPITOL MEDICAL CENTER, DR. OSCAR ESTRADA, DR. ELY VILLAFLOR, DR. ROSA UY, DR.
JOEL ENRIQUEZ, DR. PERPETUA LACSON, DR. NOE ESPINOLA, and NURSE J.
DUMLAO, respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This petition for review1 assails the 6 February 1998 Decision2 and 21 March 2000 Resolution3 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 45641. The Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the 22 November
1993 Decision4 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 33, finding Dr. Oscar Estrada solely
liable for damages for the death of his patient, Corazon Nogales, while absolving the remaining
respondents of any liability. The Court of Appeals denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration.
The Facts
Pregnant with her fourth child, Corazon Nogales ("Corazon"), who was then 37 years old, was under
the exclusive prenatal care of Dr. Oscar Estrada ("Dr. Estrada") beginning on her fourth month of
pregnancy or as early as December 1975. While Corazon was on her last trimester of pregnancy, Dr.
Estrada noted an increase in her blood pressure and development of leg edema 5 indicating
preeclampsia,6 which is a dangerous complication of pregnancy.7
Around midnight of 25 May 1976, Corazon started to experience mild labor pains prompting Corazon
and Rogelio Nogales ("Spouses Nogales") to see Dr. Estrada at his home. After examining Corazon,
Dr. Estrada advised her immediate admission to the Capitol Medical Center ("CMC").
On 26 May 1976, Corazon was admitted at 2:30 a.m. at the CMC after the staff nurse noted the
written admission request8 of Dr. Estrada. Upon Corazon's admission at the CMC, Rogelio Nogales
("Rogelio") executed and signed the "Consent on Admission and Agreement"9 and "Admission
Agreement."10 Corazon was then brought to the labor room of the CMC.
Dr. Rosa Uy ("Dr. Uy"), who was then a resident physician of CMC, conducted an internal
examination of Corazon. Dr. Uy then called up Dr. Estrada to notify him of her findings.
Based on the Doctor's Order Sheet,11 around 3:00 a.m., Dr. Estrada ordered for 10 mg. of valium to
be administered immediately by intramuscular injection. Dr. Estrada later ordered the start of
intravenous administration of syntocinon admixed with dextrose, 5%, in lactated Ringers' solution, at
the rate of eight to ten micro-drops per minute.
According to the Nurse's Observation Notes,12 Dr. Joel Enriquez ("Dr. Enriquez"), an anesthesiologist
at CMC, was notified at 4:15 a.m. of Corazon's admission. Subsequently, when asked if he needed
the services of an anesthesiologist, Dr. Estrada refused. Despite Dr. Estrada's refusal, Dr. Enriquez
stayed to observe Corazon's condition.
At 6:00 a.m., Corazon was transferred to Delivery Room No. 1 of the CMC. At 6:10 a.m., Corazon's
bag of water ruptured spontaneously. At 6:12 a.m., Corazon's cervix was fully dilated. At 6:13 a.m.,
Corazon started to experience convulsions.
At 6:15 a.m., Dr. Estrada ordered the injection of ten grams of magnesium sulfate. However, Dr. Ely
Villaflor ("Dr. Villaflor"), who was assisting Dr. Estrada, administered only 2.5 grams of magnesium
sulfate.
At 6:22 a.m., Dr. Estrada, assisted by Dr. Villaflor, applied low forceps to extract Corazon's baby. In
the process, a 1.0 x 2.5 cm. piece of cervical tissue was allegedly torn. The baby came out in an
apnic, cyanotic, weak and injured condition. Consequently, the baby had to be intubated and
resuscitated by Dr. Enriquez and Dr. Payumo.
At 6:27 a.m., Corazon began to manifest moderate vaginal bleeding which rapidly became profuse.
Corazon's blood pressure dropped from 130/80 to 60/40 within five minutes. There was continuous
profuse vaginal bleeding. The assisting nurse administered hemacel through a gauge 19 needle as a
side drip to the ongoing intravenous injection of dextrose.
At 7:45 a.m., Dr. Estrada ordered blood typing and cross matching with bottled blood. It took
approximately 30 minutes for the CMC laboratory, headed by Dr. Perpetua Lacson ("Dr. Lacson"), to
comply with Dr. Estrada's order and deliver the blood.
At 8:00 a.m., Dr. Noe Espinola ("Dr. Espinola"), head of the Obstetrics-Gynecology Department of the
CMC, was apprised of Corazon's condition by telephone. Upon being informed that Corazon was
bleeding profusely, Dr. Espinola ordered immediate hysterectomy. Rogelio was made to sign a
"Consent to Operation."13
Due to the inclement weather then, Dr. Espinola, who was fetched from his residence by an
ambulance, arrived at the CMC about an hour later or at 9:00 a.m. He examined the patient and
ordered some resuscitative measures to be administered. Despite Dr. Espinola's efforts, Corazon
died at 9:15 a.m. The cause of death was "hemorrhage, post partum." 14
On 14 May 1980, petitioners filed a complaint for damages15 with the Regional Trial Court16 of Manila
against CMC, Dr. Estrada, Dr. Villaflor, Dr. Uy, Dr. Enriquez, Dr. Lacson, Dr. Espinola, and a certain
Nurse J. Dumlao for the death of Corazon. Petitioners mainly contended that defendant physicians
and CMC personnel were negligent in the treatment and management of Corazon's condition.
Petitioners charged CMC with negligence in the selection and supervision of defendant physicians
and hospital staff.
For failing to file their answer to the complaint despite service of summons, the trial court declared Dr.
Estrada, Dr. Enriquez, and Nurse Dumlao in default.17 CMC, Dr. Villaflor, Dr. Uy, Dr. Espinola, and
Dr. Lacson filed their respective answers denying and opposing the allegations in the complaint.
Subsequently, trial ensued.
After more than 11 years of trial, the trial court rendered judgment on 22 November 1993 finding Dr.
Estrada solely liable for damages. The trial court ruled as follows:
The victim was under his pre-natal care, apparently, his fault began from his incorrect and
inadequate management and lack of treatment of the pre-eclamptic condition of his patient. It
is not disputed that he misapplied the forceps in causing the delivery because it resulted in a
large cervical tear which had caused the profuse bleeding which he also failed to control with
the application of inadequate injection of magnesium sulfate by his assistant Dra. Ely Villaflor.
Dr. Estrada even failed to notice the erroneous administration by nurse Dumlao of hemacel by
way of side drip, instead of direct intravenous injection, and his failure to consult a senior
obstetrician at an early stage of the problem.
On the part however of Dra. Ely Villaflor, Dra. Rosa Uy, Dr. Joel Enriquez, Dr. Lacson, Dr.
Espinola, nurse J. Dumlao and CMC, the Court finds no legal justification to find them civilly
liable.
On the part of Dra. Ely Villaflor, she was only taking orders from Dr. Estrada, the principal
physician of Corazon Nogales. She can only make suggestions in the manner the patient
maybe treated but she cannot impose her will as to do so would be to substitute her good
judgment to that of Dr. Estrada. If she failed to correctly diagnose the true cause of the
bleeding which in this case appears to be a cervical laceration, it cannot be safely concluded
by the Court that Dra. Villaflor had the correct diagnosis and she failed to inform Dr. Estrada.
No evidence was introduced to show that indeed Dra. Villaflor had discovered that there was
laceration at the cervical area of the patient's internal organ.
On the part of nurse Dumlao, there is no showing that when she administered the hemacel as
a side drip, she did it on her own. If the correct procedure was directly thru the veins, it could
only be because this was what was probably the orders of Dr. Estrada.
While the evidence of the plaintiffs shows that Dr. Noe Espinola, who was the Chief of the
Department of Obstetrics and Gynecology who attended to the patient Mrs. Nogales, it was
only at 9:00 a.m. That he was able to reach the hospital because of typhoon Didang (Exhibit
2). While he was able to give prescription in the manner Corazon Nogales may be treated, the
prescription was based on the information given to him by phone and he acted on the basis of
facts as presented to him, believing in good faith that such is the correct remedy. He was not
with Dr. Estrada when the patient was brought to the hospital at 2:30 o'clock a.m. So, whatever
errors that Dr. Estrada committed on the patient before 9:00 o'clock a.m. are certainly the
errors of Dr. Estrada and cannot be the mistake of Dr. Noe Espinola. His failure to come to the
hospital on time was due to fortuitous event.
On the part of Dr. Joel Enriquez, while he was present in the delivery room, it is not incumbent
upon him to call the attention of Dr. Estrada, Dra. Villaflor and also of Nurse Dumlao on the
alleged errors committed by them. Besides, as anesthesiologist, he has no authority to control
the actuations of Dr. Estrada and Dra. Villaflor. For the Court to assume that there were errors
being committed in the presence of Dr. Enriquez would be to dwell on conjectures and
speculations.
On the civil liability of Dr. Perpetua Lacson, [s]he is a hematologist and in-charge of the blood
bank of the CMC. The Court cannot accept the theory of the plaintiffs that there was delay in
delivering the blood needed by the patient. It was testified, that in order that this blood will be
made available, a laboratory test has to be conducted to determine the type of blood, cross
matching and other matters consistent with medical science so, the lapse of 30 minutes maybe
considered a reasonable time to do all of these things, and not a delay as the plaintiffs would
want the Court to believe.
Admittedly, Dra. Rosa Uy is a resident physician of the Capitol Medical Center. She was sued
because of her alleged failure to notice the incompetence and negligence of Dr. Estrada.
However, there is no evidence to support such theory. No evidence was adduced to show that
Dra. Rosa Uy as a resident physician of Capitol Medical Center, had knowledge of the
mismanagement of the patient Corazon Nogales, and that notwithstanding such knowledge,
she tolerated the same to happen.
In the pre-trial order, plaintiffs and CMC agreed that defendant CMC did not have any hand or
participation in the selection or hiring of Dr. Estrada or his assistant Dra. Ely Villaflor as
attending physician[s] of the deceased. In other words, the two (2) doctors were not employees
of the hospital and therefore the hospital did not have control over their professional conduct.
When Mrs. Nogales was brought to the hospital, it was an emergency case and defendant
CMC had no choice but to admit her. Such being the case, there is therefore no legal ground
to apply the provisions of Article 2176 and 2180 of the New Civil Code referring to the vicarious
liability of an employer for the negligence of its employees. If ever in this case there is fault or
negligence in the treatment of the deceased on the part of the attending physicians who were
employed by the family of the deceased, such civil liability should be borne by the attending
physicians under the principle of "respondeat superior".
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered finding defendant Dr.

Estrada of Number 13 Pitimini St. San Francisco del Monte, Quezon City civilly liable to pay
plaintiffs: 1) By way of actual damages in the amount of P105,000.00; 2) By way of moral
damages in the amount of P700,000.00; 3) Attorney's fees in the amount of P100,000.00 and
to pay the costs of suit.
For failure of the plaintiffs to adduce evidence to support its [sic] allegations against the other
defendants, the complaint is hereby ordered dismissed. While the Court looks with disfavor the
filing of the present complaint against the other defendants by the herein plaintiffs, as in a way
it has caused them personal inconvenience and slight damage on their name and reputation,
the Court cannot accepts [sic] however, the theory of the remaining defendants that plaintiffs
were motivated in bad faith in the filing of this complaint. For this reason defendants'
counterclaims are hereby ordered dismissed.
SO ORDERED.18
Petitioners appealed the trial court's decision. Petitioners claimed that aside from Dr. Estrada, the
remaining respondents should be held equally liable for negligence. Petitioners pointed out the extent
of each respondent's alleged liability.
On 6 February 1998, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court. 19 Petitioners filed a
motion for reconsideration which the Court of Appeals denied in its Resolution of 21 March 2000. 20
Hence, this petition.
Meanwhile, petitioners filed a Manifestation dated 12 April 2002 21 stating that respondents Dr.
Estrada, Dr. Enriquez, Dr. Villaflor, and Nurse Dumlao "need no longer be notified of the petition
because they are absolutely not involved in the issue raised before the [Court], regarding the liability
of [CMC]."22 Petitioners stressed that the subject matter of this petition is the liability of CMC for the
negligence of Dr. Estrada.23
The Court issued a Resolution dated 9 September 200224 dispensing with the requirement to submit
the correct and present addresses of respondents Dr. Estrada, Dr. Enriquez, Dr. Villaflor, and Nurse
Dumlao. The Court stated that with the filing of petitioners' Manifestation, it should be understood that
they are claiming only against respondents CMC, Dr. Espinola, Dr. Lacson, and Dr. Uy who have filed
their respective comments. Petitioners are foregoing further claims against respondents Dr. Estrada,
Dr. Enriquez, Dr. Villaflor, and Nurse Dumlao.
The Court noted that Dr. Estrada did not appeal the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the
decision of the Regional Trial Court. Accordingly, the decision of the Court of Appeals, affirming the
trial court's judgment, is already final as against Dr. Oscar Estrada.
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration25 of the Court's 9 September 2002 Resolution claiming
that Dr. Enriquez, Dr. Villaflor and Nurse Dumlao were notified of the petition at their counsels' last
known addresses. Petitioners reiterated their imputation of negligence on these respondents. The
Court denied petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration in its 18 February 2004 Resolution. 26
The Court of Appeals' Ruling
In its Decision of 6 February 1998, the Court of Appeals upheld the trial court's ruling. The Court of
Appeals rejected petitioners' view that the doctrine in Darling v. Charleston Community Memorial
Hospital27 applies to this case. According to the Court of Appeals, the present case differs from
the Darling case since Dr. Estrada is an independent contractor-physician whereas the Darling case
involved a physician and a nurse who were employees of the hospital.
Citing other American cases, the Court of Appeals further held that the mere fact that a hospital
permitted a physician to practice medicine and use its facilities is not sufficient to render the hospital
liable for the physician's negligence.28 A hospital is not responsible for the negligence of a physician
who is an independent contractor.29
The Court of Appeals found the cases of Davidson v. Conole30 and Campbell v. Emma Laing Stevens
Hospital31applicable to this case. Quoting Campbell, the Court of Appeals stated that where there is
no proof that defendant physician was an employee of defendant hospital or that defendant hospital
had reason to know that any acts of malpractice would take place, defendant hospital could not be
held liable for its failure to intervene in the relationship of physician-patient between defendant
physician and plaintiff.
On the liability of the other respondents, the Court of Appeals applied the "borrowed servant" doctrine
considering that Dr. Estrada was an independent contractor who was merely exercising hospital
privileges. This doctrine provides that once the surgeon enters the operating room and takes charge
of the proceedings, the acts or omissions of operating room personnel, and any negligence
associated with such acts or omissions, are imputable to the surgeon. 32 While the assisting
physicians and nurses may be employed by the hospital, or engaged by the patient, they normally
become the temporary servants or agents of the surgeon in charge while the operation is in progress,
and liability may be imposed upon the surgeon for their negligent acts under the doctrine
of respondeat superior.33
The Court of Appeals concluded that since Rogelio engaged Dr. Estrada as the attending physician of
his wife, any liability for malpractice must be Dr. Estrada's sole responsibility.
While it found the amount of damages fair and reasonable, the Court of Appeals held that no interest
could be imposed on unliquidated claims or damages.
The Issue
Basically, the issue in this case is whether CMC is vicariously liable for the negligence of Dr. Estrada.
The resolution of this issue rests, on the other hand, on the ascertainment of the relationship between
Dr. Estrada and CMC. The Court also believes that a determination of the extent of liability of the
other respondents is inevitable to finally and completely dispose of the present controversy.
The Ruling of the Court
The petition is partly meritorious.
On the Liability of CMC
Dr. Estrada's negligence in handling the treatment and management of Corazon's condition which
ultimately resulted in Corazon's death is no longer in issue. Dr. Estrada did not appeal the decision of
the Court of Appeals which affirmed the ruling of the trial court finding Dr. Estrada solely liable for
damages. Accordingly, the finding of the trial court on Dr. Estrada's negligence is already final.
Petitioners maintain that CMC is vicariously liable for Dr. Estrada's negligence based on Article 2180
in relation to Article 2176 of the Civil Code. These provisions pertinently state:
Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or
omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.
xxxx
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers
acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any
business or industry.
xxxx
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned
prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-
existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the
provisions of this Chapter.
Similarly, in the United States, a hospital which is the employer, master, or principal of a physician
employee, servant, or agent, may be held liable for the physician's negligence under the doctrine
of respondeat superior.34
In the present case, petitioners maintain that CMC, in allowing Dr. Estrada to practice and admit
patients at CMC, should be liable for Dr. Estrada's malpractice. Rogelio claims that he knew Dr.
Estrada as an accredited physician of CMC, though he discovered later that Dr. Estrada was not a
salaried employee of the CMC.35 Rogelio further claims that he was dealing with CMC, whose primary
concern was the treatment and management of his wife's condition. Dr. Estrada just happened to be
the specific person he talked to representing CMC.36 Moreover, the fact that CMC made Rogelio sign
a Consent on Admission and Admission Agreement37 and a Consent to Operation printed on the
letterhead of CMC indicates that CMC considered Dr. Estrada as a member of its medical staff.
On the other hand, CMC disclaims liability by asserting that Dr. Estrada was a mere visiting physician
and that it admitted Corazon because her physical condition then was classified an emergency
obstetrics case.38
CMC alleges that Dr. Estrada is an independent contractor "for whose actuations CMC would be a
total stranger." CMC maintains that it had no control or supervision over Dr. Estrada in the exercise of
his medical profession.
The Court had the occasion to determine the relationship between a hospital and a consultant or
visiting physician and the liability of such hospital for that physician's negligence in Ramos v. Court of
Appeals,39 to wit:
In the first place, hospitals exercise significant control in the hiring and firing of consultants and
in the conduct of their work within the hospital premises. Doctors who apply for "consultant"
slots, visiting or attending, are required to submit proof of completion of residency, their
educational qualifications; generally, evidence of accreditation by the appropriate board
(diplomate), evidence of fellowship in most cases, and references. These requirements are
carefully scrutinized by members of the hospital administration or by a review committee set up
by the hospital who either accept or reject the application. This is particularly true with
respondent hospital.
After a physician is accepted, either as a visiting or attending consultant, he is normally

required to attend clinico-pathological conferences, conduct bedside rounds for clerks, interns
and residents, moderate grand rounds and patient audits and perform other tasks and
responsibilities, for the privilege of being able to maintain a clinic in the hospital, and/or for the
privilege of admitting patients into the hospital. In addition to these, the physician's
performance as a specialist is generally evaluated by a peer review committee on the basis of
mortality and morbidity statistics, and feedback from patients, nurses, interns and residents. A
consultant remiss in his duties, or a consultant who regularly falls short of the minimum
standards acceptable to the hospital or its peer review committee, is normally politely
terminated.
In other words, private hospitals, hire, fire and exercise real control over their attending and
visiting "consultant" staff. While "consultants" are not, technically employees, a point
which respondent hospital asserts in denying all responsibility for the patient's
condition, the control exercised, the hiring, and the right to terminate consultants all
fulfill the important hallmarks of an employer-employee relationship, with the exception
of the payment of wages. In assessing whether such a relationship in fact exists, the
control test is determining. Accordingly, on the basis of the foregoing, we rule that for
the purpose of allocating responsibility in medical negligence cases, an employer-
employee relationship in effect exists between hospitals and their attending and visiting
physicians.This being the case, the question now arises as to whether or not respondent
hospital is solidarily liable with respondent doctors for petitioner's condition.
The basis for holding an employer solidarily responsible for the negligence of its employee is
found in Article 2180 of the Civil Code which considers a person accountable not only for his
own acts but also for those of others based on the former's responsibility under a relationship
of patria potestas. x x x40 (Emphasis supplied)
While the Court in Ramos did not expound on the control test, such test essentially determines
whether an employment relationship exists between a physician and a hospital based on the exercise
of control over the physician as to details. Specifically, the employer (or the hospital) must have the
right to control both the means and the details of the process by which the employee (or the
physician) is to accomplish his task.41
After a thorough examination of the voluminous records of this case, the Court finds no single
evidence pointing to CMC's exercise of control over Dr. Estrada's treatment and management of
Corazon's condition. It is undisputed that throughout Corazon's pregnancy, she was under the
exclusive prenatal care of Dr. Estrada. At the time of Corazon's admission at CMC and during her
delivery, it was Dr. Estrada, assisted by Dr. Villaflor, who attended to Corazon. There was no showing
that CMC had a part in diagnosing Corazon's condition. While Dr. Estrada enjoyed staff privileges at
CMC, such fact alone did not make him an employee of CMC.42 CMC merely allowed Dr. Estrada to
use its facilities43 when Corazon was about to give birth, which CMC considered an emergency.
Considering these circumstances, Dr. Estrada is not an employee of CMC, but an independent
contractor.
The question now is whether CMC is automatically exempt from liability considering that Dr. Estrada
is an independent contractor-physician.
In general, a hospital is not liable for the negligence of an independent contractor-physician. There is,
however, an exception to this principle. The hospital may be liable if the physician is the "ostensible"
agent of the hospital.44 This exception is also known as the "doctrine of apparent
authority."45 In Gilbert v. Sycamore Municipal Hospital,46 the Illinois Supreme Court explained the
doctrine of apparent authority in this wise:
[U]nder the doctrine of apparent authority a hospital can be held vicariously liable for the
negligent acts of a physician providing care at the hospital, regardless of whether the physician
is an independent contractor, unless the patient knows, or should have known, that the
physician is an independent contractor. The elements of the action have been set out as
follows:
"For a hospital to be liable under the doctrine of apparent authority, a plaintiff must show that:
(1) the hospital, or its agent, acted in a manner that would lead a reasonable person to
conclude that the individual who was alleged to be negligent was an employee or agent of the
hospital; (2) where the acts of the agent create the appearance of authority, the plaintiff must
also prove that the hospital had knowledge of and acquiesced in them; and (3) the plaintiff
acted in reliance upon the conduct of the hospital or its agent, consistent with ordinary care
and prudence."
The element of "holding out" on the part of the hospital does not require an express
representation by the hospital that the person alleged to be negligent is an employee. Rather,
the element is satisfied if the hospital holds itself out as a provider of emergency room care
without informing the patient that the care is provided by independent contractors.
The element of justifiable reliance on the part of the plaintiff is satisfied if the plaintiff relies
upon the hospital to provide complete emergency room care, rather than upon a specific
physician.
The doctrine of apparent authority essentially involves two factors to determine the liability of an
independent-contractor physician.
The first factor focuses on the hospital's manifestations and is sometimes described as an inquiry
whether the hospital acted in a manner which would lead a reasonable person to conclude that the
individual who was alleged to be negligent was an employee or agent of the hospital.47 In this
regard, the hospital need not make express representations to the patient that the treating
physician is an employee of the hospital; rather a representation may be general and
implied.48
The doctrine of apparent authority is a species of the doctrine of estoppel. Article 1431 of the Civil
Code provides that "[t]hrough estoppel, an admission or representation is rendered conclusive upon
the person making it, and cannot be denied or disproved as against the person relying thereon."
Estoppel rests on this rule: "Whenever a party has, by his own declaration, act, or omission,
intentionally and deliberately led another to believe a particular thing true, and to act upon such belief,
he cannot, in any litigation arising out of such declaration, act or omission, be permitted to falsify it." 49
In the instant case, CMC impliedly held out Dr. Estrada as a member of its medical staff. Through
CMC's acts, CMC clothed Dr. Estrada with apparent authority thereby leading the Spouses Nogales
to believe that Dr. Estrada was an employee or agent of CMC. CMC cannot now repudiate such
authority.
First, CMC granted staff privileges to Dr. Estrada. CMC extended its medical staff and facilities to Dr.
Estrada. Upon Dr. Estrada's request for Corazon's admission, CMC, through its personnel, readily
accommodated Corazon and updated Dr. Estrada of her condition.
Second, CMC made Rogelio sign consent forms printed on CMC letterhead. Prior to Corazon's
admission and supposed hysterectomy, CMC asked Rogelio to sign release forms, the contents of
which reinforced Rogelio's belief that Dr. Estrada was a member of CMC's medical staff. 50 The
Consent on Admission and Agreement explicitly provides:
KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:
I, Rogelio Nogales, of legal age, a resident of 1974 M. H. Del Pilar St., Malate Mla., being the
father/mother/brother/sister/spouse/relative/ guardian/or person in custody of Ma. Corazon,
and representing his/her family, of my own volition and free will, do consent and submit said
Ma. Corazon to Dr. Oscar Estrada (hereinafter referred to as Physician) for cure, treatment,
retreatment, or emergency measures, that the Physician, personally or by and through the
Capitol Medical Center and/or its staff, may use, adapt, or employ such means, forms or
methods of cure, treatment, retreatment, or emergency measures as he may see best
and most expedient; that Ma. Corazon and I will comply with any and all rules,
regulations, directions, and instructions of the Physician, the Capitol Medical Center
and/or its staff; and, that I will not hold liable or responsible and hereby waive and forever
discharge and hold free the Physician, the Capitol Medical Center and/or its staff, from any and
all claims of whatever kind of nature, arising from directly or indirectly, or by reason of said
cure, treatment, or retreatment, or emergency measures or intervention of said physician, the
Capitol Medical Center and/or its staff.
x x x x51 (Emphasis supplied)
While the Consent to Operation pertinently reads, thus:
I, ROGELIO NOGALES, x x x, of my own volition and free will, do consent and submit said
CORAZON NOGALES to Hysterectomy, by the Surgical Staff and Anesthesiologists of
Capitol Medical Center and/or whatever succeeding operations, treatment, or emergency
measures as may be necessary and most expedient; and, that I will not hold liable or
responsible and hereby waive and forever discharge and hold free the Surgeon, his assistants,
anesthesiologists, the Capitol Medical Center and/or its staff, from any and all claims of
whatever kind of nature, arising from directly or indirectly, or by reason of said operation or
operations, treatment, or emergency measures, or intervention of the Surgeon, his assistants,
anesthesiologists, the Capitol Medical Center and/or its staff.52 (Emphasis supplied)
Without any indication in these consent forms that Dr. Estrada was an independent contractor-
physician, the Spouses Nogales could not have known that Dr. Estrada was an independent
contractor. Significantly, no one from CMC informed the Spouses Nogales that Dr. Estrada was an
independent contractor. On the contrary, Dr. Atencio, who was then a member of CMC Board of
Directors, testified that Dr. Estrada was part of CMC's surgical staff.53
Third, Dr. Estrada's referral of Corazon's profuse vaginal bleeding to Dr. Espinola, who was then the
Head of the Obstetrics and Gynecology Department of CMC, gave the impression that Dr. Estrada as
a member of CMC's medical staff was collaborating with other CMC-employed specialists in treating
Corazon.
The second factor focuses on the patient's reliance. It is sometimes characterized as an inquiry on
whether the plaintiff acted in reliance upon the conduct of the hospital or its agent, consistent with
ordinary care and prudence.54
The records show that the Spouses Nogales relied upon a perceived employment relationship with
CMC in accepting Dr. Estrada's services. Rogelio testified that he and his wife specifically chose Dr.
Estrada to handle Corazon's delivery not only because of their friend's recommendation, but more
importantly because of Dr. Estrada's "connection with a reputable hospital, the [CMC]." 55 In other
words, Dr. Estrada's relationship with CMC played a significant role in the Spouses Nogales' decision
in accepting Dr. Estrada's services as the obstetrician-gynecologist for Corazon's delivery. Moreover,
as earlier stated, there is no showing that before and during Corazon's confinement at CMC, the
Spouses Nogales knew or should have known that Dr. Estrada was not an employee of CMC.
Further, the Spouses Nogales looked to CMC to provide the best medical care and support services
for Corazon's delivery. The Court notes that prior to Corazon's fourth pregnancy, she used to give
birth inside a clinic. Considering Corazon's age then, the Spouses Nogales decided to have their
fourth child delivered at CMC, which Rogelio regarded one of the best hospitals at the time. 56 This is
precisely because the Spouses Nogales feared that Corazon might experience complications during
her delivery which would be better addressed and treated in a modern and big hospital such as CMC.
Moreover, Rogelio's consent in Corazon's hysterectomy to be performed by a different physician,
namely Dr. Espinola, is a clear indication of Rogelio's confidence in CMC's surgical staff.
CMC's defense that all it did was "to extend to [Corazon] its facilities" is untenable. The Court cannot
close its eyes to the reality that hospitals, such as CMC, are in the business of treatment. In this
regard, the Court agrees with the observation made by the Court of Appeals of North Carolina in
Diggs v. Novant Health, Inc.,57 to wit:
"The conception that the hospital does not undertake to treat the patient, does not undertake to
act through its doctors and nurses, but undertakes instead simply to procure them to act upon
their own responsibility, no longer reflects the fact. Present day hospitals, as their manner
of operation plainly demonstrates, do far more than furnish facilities for treatment. They
regularly employ on a salary basis a large staff of physicians, nurses and internes [sic],
as well as administrative and manual workers, and they charge patients for medical care
and treatment, collecting for such services, if necessary, by legal action. Certainly, the
person who avails himself of 'hospital facilities' expects that the hospital will attempt to
cure him, not that its nurses or other employees will act on their own responsibility." x x
x (Emphasis supplied)
Likewise unconvincing is CMC's argument that petitioners are estopped from claiming damages
based on the Consent on Admission and Consent to Operation. Both release forms consist of two
parts. The first part gave CMC permission to administer to Corazon any form of recognized medical
treatment which the CMC medical staff deemed advisable. The second part of the documents, which
may properly be described as the releasing part, releases CMC and its employees "from any and all
claims" arising from or by reason of the treatment and operation.
The documents do not expressly release CMC from liability for injury to Corazon due to negligence
during her treatment or operation. Neither do the consent forms expressly exempt CMC from liability
for Corazon's death due to negligence during such treatment or operation. Such release forms, being
in the nature of contracts of adhesion, are construed strictly against hospitals. Besides, a blanket
release in favor of hospitals "from any and all claims," which includes claims due to bad faith or gross
negligence, would be contrary to public policy and thus void.
Even simple negligence is not subject to blanket release in favor of establishments like hospitals but
may only mitigate liability depending on the circumstances.58 When a person needing urgent medical
attention rushes to a hospital, he cannot bargain on equal footing with the hospital on the terms of
admission and operation. Such a person is literally at the mercy of the hospital. There can be no
clearer example of a contract of adhesion than one arising from such a dire situation. Thus, the
release forms of CMC cannot relieve CMC from liability for the negligent medical treatment of
Corazon.
On the Liability of the Other Respondents
Despite this Court's pronouncement in its 9 September 200259 Resolution that the filing of petitioners'
Manifestation confined petitioners' claim only against CMC, Dr. Espinola, Dr. Lacson, and Dr. Uy, who
have filed their comments, the Court deems it proper to resolve the individual liability of the remaining
respondents to put an end finally to this more than two-decade old controversy.
a) Dr. Ely Villaflor
Petitioners blame Dr. Ely Villaflor for failing to diagnose the cause of Corazon's bleeding and to
suggest the correct remedy to Dr. Estrada.60 Petitioners assert that it was Dr. Villaflor's duty to correct
the error of Nurse Dumlao in the administration of hemacel.
The Court is not persuaded. Dr. Villaflor admitted administering a lower dosage of magnesium
sulfate. However, this was after informing Dr. Estrada that Corazon was no longer in convulsion and
that her blood pressure went down to a dangerous level.61 At that moment, Dr. Estrada instructed Dr.
Villaflor to reduce the dosage of magnesium sulfate from 10 to 2.5 grams. Since petitioners did not
dispute Dr. Villaflor's allegation, Dr. Villaflor's defense remains uncontroverted. Dr. Villaflor's act of
administering a lower dosage of magnesium sulfate was not out of her own volition or was in
contravention of Dr. Estrada's order.
b) Dr. Rosa Uy
Dr. Rosa Uy's alleged negligence consisted of her failure (1) to call the attention of Dr. Estrada on the
incorrect dosage of magnesium sulfate administered by Dr. Villaflor; (2) to take corrective measures;
and (3) to correct Nurse Dumlao's wrong method of hemacel administration.
The Court believes Dr. Uy's claim that as a second year resident physician then at CMC, she was
merely authorized to take the clinical history and physical examination of Corazon.62 However, that
routine internal examination did not ipso facto make Dr. Uy liable for the errors committed by Dr.
Estrada. Further, petitioners' imputation of negligence rests on their baseless assumption that Dr. Uy
was present at the delivery room. Nothing shows that Dr. Uy participated in delivering Corazon's
baby. Further, it is unexpected from Dr. Uy, a mere resident physician at that time, to call the attention
of a more experienced specialist, if ever she was present at the delivery room.
c) Dr. Joel Enriquez
Petitioners fault Dr. Joel Enriquez also for not calling the attention of Dr. Estrada, Dr. Villaflor, and
Nurse Dumlao about their errors.63 Petitioners insist that Dr. Enriquez should have taken, or at least
suggested, corrective measures to rectify such errors.
The Court is not convinced. Dr. Enriquez is an anesthesiologist whose field of expertise is definitely
not obstetrics and gynecology. As such, Dr. Enriquez was not expected to correct Dr. Estrada's
errors. Besides, there was no evidence of Dr. Enriquez's knowledge of any error committed by Dr.
Estrada and his failure to act upon such observation.
d) Dr. Perpetua Lacson
Petitioners fault Dr. Perpetua Lacson for her purported delay in the delivery of blood Corazon
needed.64 Petitioners claim that Dr. Lacson was remiss in her duty of supervising the blood bank staff.
As found by the trial court, there was no unreasonable delay in the delivery of blood from the time of
the request until the transfusion to Corazon. Dr. Lacson competently explained the procedure before
blood could be given to the patient.65 Taking into account the bleeding time, clotting time and cross-
matching, Dr. Lacson stated that it would take approximately 45-60 minutes before blood could be
ready for transfusion.66 Further, no evidence exists that Dr. Lacson neglected her duties as head of
the blood bank.
e) Dr. Noe Espinola
Petitioners argue that Dr. Espinola should not have ordered immediate hysterectomy without
determining the underlying cause of Corazon's bleeding. Dr. Espinola should have first considered
the possibility of cervical injury, and advised a thorough examination of the cervix, instead of believing
outright Dr. Estrada's diagnosis that the cause of bleeding was uterine atony.
Dr. Espinola's order to do hysterectomy which was based on the information he received by phone is
not negligence. The Court agrees with the trial court's observation that Dr. Espinola, upon hearing
such information about Corazon's condition, believed in good faith that hysterectomy was the correct
remedy. At any rate, the hysterectomy did not push through because upon Dr. Espinola's arrival, it
was already too late. At the time, Corazon was practically dead.
f) Nurse J. Dumlao
In Moore v. Guthrie Hospital Inc.,67 the US Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit, held that to recover, a
patient complaining of injuries allegedly resulting when the nurse negligently injected medicine to him
intravenously instead of intramuscularly had to show that (1) an intravenous injection constituted a
lack of reasonable and ordinary care; (2) the nurse injected medicine intravenously; and (3) such
injection was the proximate cause of his injury.
In the present case, there is no evidence of Nurse Dumlao's alleged failure to follow Dr. Estrada's
specific instructions. Even assuming Nurse Dumlao defied Dr. Estrada's order, there is no showing
that side-drip administration of hemacel proximately caused Corazon's death. No evidence linking
Corazon's death and the alleged wrongful hemacel administration was introduced. Therefore, there is
no basis to hold Nurse Dumlao liable for negligence.
On the Award of Interest on Damages
The award of interest on damages is proper and allowed under Article 2211 of the Civil Code, which
states that in crimes and quasi-delicts, interest as a part of the damages may, in a proper case, be
adjudicated in the discretion of the court.68
WHEREFORE, the Court PARTLY GRANTS the petition. The Court finds respondent Capitol Medical
Center vicariously liable for the negligence of Dr. Oscar Estrada. The amounts of P105,000 as actual
damages and P700,000 as moral damages should each earn legal interest at the rate of six percent
(6%) per annum computed from the date of the judgment of the trial court. The Court affirms the rest
of the Decision dated 6 February 1998 and Resolution dated 21 March 2000 of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CV No. 45641.
SO ORDERED
G.R. No. 151993 October 19, 2011
MARITIME FACTORS INC., Petitioner,

vs.
BIENVENIDO R. HINDANG, Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari are the Decision1 dated November 28, 2001 and the
Resolution2dated January 29, 2002, of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 57478.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
On June 10, 1994, petitioner Maritime Factors Inc., a domestic manning agency, for and in behalf of
its foreign principal Bahrain Marine Contracting/Panama, engaged the services of Danilo R. Hindang
(Danilo) to work as GP/Deckhand on board the M/T "Reya," a Panamanian-registered ocean-going
vessel. Danilo's contract of employment was for a period of 12 months with a basic monthly salary of
US$230.00.3
On July 27, 1994, while within the territorial jurisdiction of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and on board
the vessel, Chief Mate Marcial Lauron, Jr., AB Jaime Aguinaldo and Oiler Allan P. Sarabia forced
open Danilo's cabin door by taking out the screws on the door lock with a screw driver. They found
Danilo's body inside the locker (wardrobe) of his cabin.4 Danilo was found hanging by a strap on his
neck in a kneeling position.5 Upon arriving at West Pier, Ras Tanurah, they turned over Danilo's body
to the Saudi police authorities, who then brought the body to Dr. Ossman Abdel Hameed, the Medical
Examiner of the Eastern Region, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. It was alleged that Dr. Hameed conducted
an autopsy on Danilo's remains and concluded that Danilo committed suicide by hanging himself. 6
Danilo's remains were repatriated to the Philippines where an autopsy was requested by Danilo's
family. The autopsy was conducted by Dr. Maximo L. Reyes, a Medico-Legal Officer of the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI) and concluded that the cause of Danilo's death was Asphyxia by
Strangulation, Ligature.7 Dr. Reyes subsequently issued a Certification8 dated December 27, 1994
clarifying that Danilo died of Asphyxia by strangulation which meant that somebody caused his death
based on his autopsy findings.
On August 24, 1994, respondent Bienvenido R. Hindang, brother of the deceased seaman Danilo,
filed for death compensation benefits pursuant to the POEA Standard Employment Contract
Governing the Employment of All Filipino Seamen on Board Ocean-Going Vessels. The case was
docketed as POEA Case No. 94-08-2599.9 Since efforts to settle the case amicably proved futile, the
Labor Arbiter (LA) directed the parties to submit their respective position papers.
Petitioner filed its Position Paper claiming that based on Dr. Hameed's medical jurisprudence report,
Danilo committed suicide by hanging himself; thus, his death is not compensable. Petitioner
submitted a photocopy of the fax transmission of a purported English translation of a 4-page medical
jurisprudence report of Dr. Hameed where the latter stated that the cause of Danilo's death was
suicide by hanging himself. Petitioner also submitted the written report dated September 21, 1994 of
Danilo's fellow crew members stating that Danilo's cabin door was locked, thus, they forced open it
and found Danilo inside the locker room hanging by his neck in a kneeling position.
In his Position Paper, respondent contended that the NBI autopsy report categorically declared that
the cause of Danilo's death was Asphyxia by strangulation, ligature; that the alleged Dr. Hameed's
medical report cannot be given legal effect, since the report was a mere photocopy of a fax
transmission from petitioner's foreign principal, hence, the document was unreliable as to its due
execution and genuineness.
On November 29, 1996, the LA rendered its decision,10 the decretal portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered ordering respondent Maritime

Factors, Inc. and/or its foreign employer Bahrain Marine Contracting/PANAMA to jointly and severally
pay Danilo Hindang's death benefits through his next of kin Bienvenido R. Hindang, pursuant to the
POEA Standard Contract for Seafarers, in the amount of US$50,000.00 or at its Philippine Currency
equivalent at the exchange rate prevailing during the time of payment. 11
The LA found that Danilo did not commit suicide, thus, the claim for his death benefit must prosper. It
found, among others, that the NBI autopsy report concluding that Danilo died of Asphyxia by
strangulation should be given credence as against petitioner's evidence which consisted of a mere
photocopy of the fax transmission of the alleged medical jurisprudence report of Dr. Hameed; that the
medical report was unreliable, since its genuineness and due execution could not be verified
especially so that the report was purportedly prepared by a foreign government officer; and that under
the POEA Standard Employment Contract for Filipino Seamen, the burden of proof to prove non-
compensability of the death of the seaman is on the employer which petitioner failed to discharge.
The LA also found that there was no proof submitted that Danilo had been observed to be losing his
mind as to kill himself.
Petitioner filed its Memorandum of Appeal12 with the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC).
On August 18, 1998, the NLRC rendered a Resolution13 which affirmed in toto the LA decision.
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was also denied in a Resolution14 dated December 8, 1999.
Petitioner filed with the CA a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 assailing the NLRC resolutions for
having been issued with grave abuse of discretion. Respondent filed his Comment, while the
petitioner its Rejoinder thereto.
In a Decision dated November 28, 2001, the CA denied the petition and affirmed the NLRC
resolutions.
The CA found that respondent through the NBI autopsy report and the certification issued by the
medico-legal officer, Dr. Reyes, was able to prove that Danilo died of Asphyxia by strangulation, thus,
the burden was shifted to petitioner to prove that Danilo committed suicide. However, petitioner failed
to do so since its evidence consisted merely of a photocopy of the fax transmission of the alleged
English-translated medical report of Dr. Hameed; and such report cannot be verified as to its
genuineness and due execution in our jurisdiction. Therefore, as between the independent report of
the NBI and the mere photocopy of the alleged medical report of Dr. Hameed, the former therefore
prevailed and should be given full credence.
The CA did not also give much credence to the written report dated September 21, 1994 of Danilo's
fellow crew members since the circumstances stated in the report did not at all prove that Danilo
committed suicide.
The CA brushed aside petitioner's claim that respondent failed to prove that he is related to Danilo. It
found that petitioner had admitted in its Answer to the Complaint that respondent is a brother of
Danilo; and that the issue that respondent is not related to Danilo was only raised for the first time in
the CA.
Hence, this petition wherein petitioner raises the following assignment of errors, to wit:
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRIEVOUSLY [ERRED] WHEN IT TOTALLY

DISREGARDED THE MEDICAL JURISPRUDENCE REPORT OF THE SAUDI ARABIAN
DOCTOR WHO CONDUCTED AN ACTUAL EXAMINATION OF THE CADAVER AND
OCULAR INSPECTION OF THE PLACE WHERE THE DECEASED WAS FOUND ON THE
LAME [EXCUSE] THAT THE SAME WERE MERE PHOTOCOPIES OF THE FAX
TRANSMISSIONS FROM THE PETITIONER'S FOREIGN PRINCIPAL.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT MADE A FACTUAL

CONCLUSION THAT IS NOT BORNE OUT BY THE RECORD BUT GROUNDED ENTIRELY
ON SPECULATIONS, SURMISES OR CONJECTURE.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT RULED THAT THE

RESPONDENT IS THE BROTHER OF THE DECEASED DESPITE THE UTTER LACK OF
BASIS TO SUBSTANTIATE THE RELATIONSHIP.15
Petitioner claims that Danilo's death is not compensable, since he committed suicide; that the
photocopy of the facsimile transmission of the purported 4-page medical report of Dr. Hameed, which
supported petitioner's claim, should have been admitted notwithstanding that the same was a mere
photocopy since the original document is in a foreign country; and that administrative and quasi-
judicial bodies like the NLRC are not bound by technical rules of procedure in the adjudication of
cases. Petitioner argues that the written report dated September 21, 1994, signed by Danilo's fellow
crew members, should have also been considered in the resolution of this case.
The main issue for resolution is whether Danilo committed suicide during the term of his employment
contract which would exempt petitioner from paying Danilo's death compensation benefits to his
beneficiaries.
Elementary is the principle that this Court is not a trier of facts. Judicial review of labor cases does not
go beyond the evaluation of the sufficiency of the evidence upon which its labor officials findings
rest.16 As such, the findings of fact and conclusion of the NLRC are generally accorded not only great
weight and respect but even clothed with finality and deemed binding on this Court as long as they
are supported by substantial evidence.17 This is because it is not the function of this Court to analyze
or weigh all over again the evidence already considered in the proceedings below; or reevaluate the
credibility of witnesses; or substitute the findings of fact of an administrative tribunal which has
expertise in its special field.18 In this case, we adopt the factual findings of the LA, as affirmed by the
NLRC and the CA, as the same was duly supported by substantial evidence.
Under Part II, Section C, Nos. 1 and 6 of the POEA "Standard Employment Contract Governing the
Employment of All Filipino Seamen on Board Ocean-Going Vessels,"19 it is provided that:
1. In case of death of the seaman during the term of this Contract, the employer shall pay his
beneficiaries the Philippine Currency equivalent to the amount of U.S.$50,000.00 and an additional
amount of U.S.$7,000.00 to each child under the age of twenty-one (21) but not exceeding four
children at the exchange rate prevailing during the time of payment.20
xxxx
6. No compensation shall be payable in respect of any injury, incapacity, disability or death resulting
from a willful act on his own life by the seaman, provided, however, that the employer can prove that
such injury, incapacity, disability or death is directly attributable to him.21
In order to avail of death benefits, the death of the employee should occur during the effectivity of the
employment contract. The death of a seaman during the term of employment makes the employer
liable to his heirs for death compensation benefits. Once it is established that the seaman died during
the effectivity of his employment contract, the employer is liable.22 This rule, however, is not absolute.
The employer may be exempt from liability if he can successfully prove that the seaman's death was
caused by an injury directly attributable to his deliberate or willful act. 23 Clearly, respondent's
entitlement to any death benefit depends on whether petitioner's evidence suffices to prove that
Danilo committed suicide, and the burden of proof rests on petitioner.24
The LA, the NLRC and the CA found that Danilo died of Asphyxia by strangulation as proved by the
NBI post-mortem findings and certification issued by the medico-legal officer, Dr. Reyes. These three
tribunals did not consider the photocopy of the fax transmission of the purported English translation of
Dr. Hameed's medical report to prove that Danilo committed suicide, since the medical report's
genuineness and due execution were unverifiable.
We agree.
Notably, petitioner stated in all its pleadings filed that the medical report is the English translation of
Dr. Hameed's report. However, the existence of the original medical report, which was written in the
arabic language, was not even attached to the records and has not been proved. 25
Moreover, the identity of the person who made the translation and whether the translator has the
recognized competence in both English and the language the medical report was originally written are
not established.26 Thus, there is no clear assurance that the translated words are the accurate
translation of the original medical report of Dr. Hameed.
More importantly, the alleged translated medical report was not even signed by Dr. Hameed which
creates doubt as to its authenticity. The unsigned translated medical report is nothing but a self-
serving document which ought to be treated as a mere scrap of paper devoid of any evidentiary value
even in administrative proceedings.
Thus, based on the foregoing, the photocopy of the fax transmission of an alleged translated medical
report was correctly denied consideration, since it is required that there be some proof of authenticity
or reliability as condition for the admission of documents.27
In Uichico v. NLRC,28 we said:
x x x It is true that administrative and quasi-judicial bodies like the NLRC are not bound by the
technical rules of procedure in the adjudication of cases. However, this procedural rule should not be
construed as a license to disregard certain fundamental evidentiary rules. While the rules of evidence
prevailing in the courts of law or equity are not controlling in proceedings before the NLRC, the
evidence presented before it must at least have a modicum of admissibility for it to be given some
probative value x x x29
Petitioner argues that the CA should have given credence to its other documentary evidence which
consist of the written report of Danilo's fellow crew members which we hereby quote in full:
September 21, 1994
TO: MARITIME FACTORS, INC.
FROM: CREWS "REYA"
July 27, 1994 about the incident Chief Mate, Oiler, Jaime Aguinaldo forced to opened (sic) the door,
the key still inside the key hole, (sic) we take (sic) out the screws on the door lock with screw driver
then when the door opened found nothing, but when I opened the locker D. Hindang hanging with
kneeling position inside with a strap on his neck.
From the job site to West Pier, Ras Tanurah we are steaming for 3 hours sea condition still rough and
D. Hindang still same position inside the locker.
All personal belonging (sic) to (sic) the late Danilo Hindang were turn (sic) over to Saudi Police
Authorities in Ras Tanurah but I forgot to asked (sic) a copy.
Sgd. Sgd. Sgd.

Marcial Lauron, Jr. Jaime Aguinaldo Allan P. Sarabia
Ch. Mate AB Oiler30
That such report establishes that there could be no other person except Danilo that went inside the
cabin before, during and immediately after the incident.
We are not persuaded.
The report fails to satisfactorily show the circumstances surrounding Danilo's death nor proves that he
committed suicide. Thus, said the CA:
x x x [T]here is nothing whatsoever in Annex "L" that would show that the deceased committed
suicide, considering that the key to the room was inside the keyhole, and that the keyhole was inside
the said room. Certainly, no one can prevent a determined villain from entering the said room while
the door was open when the deceased was inside; thus, after the villain strangled the victim to death,
he slipped away, closed and locked the door.31
Petitioner next contends that a reading of the NBI post-mortem findings would show that indeed
Danilo's death was caused by Asphyxia by hanging and not by strangulation. Petitioner quotes a
portion of the NBI findings, to wit:
Interstitial hematoma and hemorrhages involving tissues of the anterior aspect of the neck and both
lateral aspects.32
and makes its own interpretation that such findings mean that clotted blood and copious discharge of
blood from the blood vessels appeared on the front and side of the neck; that it does not strain one's
mind to realize and believe that for a person to die by strangulation with a ligature, all sides of his
neck must be compressed to stop the progress of respiration; that once this is done, it necessarily
follows that the interstitial hematoma and hemorrhage involving tissues must appear not only on the
front and side of the neck but likewise at the back or nape of it; that this circumstance is not obtaining
in this case, since only the front and side of the neck, as found by both the Saudi Arabian doctor and
the NBI medico-legal examiner, had clotted blood.
We are not persuaded.
In his post-mortem findings, Medico-Legal Officer Dr. Maximo L. Reyes wrote:
POST-MORTEM FINDINGS
xxxx
Interstitial hematoma and hemorrhages involving tissues of the anterior aspect of the neck and both
lateral aspects.
Ligature marked practically all over the anterior aspect of the neck with the greatest diameter of 1.5
cm. and smallest of 1.0 cm., the opposite is the back of [the] neck or the nape probably the
convergent point but skin and tissues of this area undergoing decomposition as a result of tightening
and trauma with areas of hemorrhages still visible.
xxxx
Fracture, two tracheal ring, upper and severance of carotid blood vessels over the left side; fracture of
the cornu of the hyoid bone is also noted.
Cause of death: Asphyxia by strangulation, ligature.33
Thus, based on the NBI findings, the front and side of Danilo's neck were not the only portions with
clotted blood but his nape as well. We find that petitioner's layman interpretation of the NBI post-
mortem findings cannot substitute the medical findings and conclusion made by Dr. Reyes, which
was done in the regular performance of his duty as NBI Medico-Legal Officer. In fact, Dr. Reyes even
issued a Certification34 that, based on his autopsy findings, the cause of Danilo's death was Asphyxia
by strangulation, ligature which deserves full credence in the absence of any expert evidence shown
to the contrary. Further, there is no showing that Dr. Reyes has motive to falsify.
Considering the foregoing, we find that the records are bereft of any substantial evidence showing
that petitioner employer successfully discharged its burden of proving that Danilo committed suicide
so as to evade its liability for death benefits under POEA's Standard Employment Contract for Filipino
Seaman.35
Finally, we also find no merit in petitioner's claim that respondent failed to prove or establish his
relationship to the deceased seaman.
In Danilo's seafarer information sheet filed with the POEA, he named his mother, Elpedia R. Hindang,
as his beneficiary. Elpedia executed a Special Power of Attorney36 dated October 10, 1994,
appointing respondent, her son, as her true and lawful attorney-in-fact to perform, among others, the
filing of claims relative to the death of her son Danilo while on board the vessel; and to perform any
and all acts necessary thereto to accomplish the purpose by which the authority was delegated to
respondent. It is, therefore, established that respondent is a brother of the deceased seaman and
was appointed by Danilo's beneficiary Elpedia to be the latter's attorney-in-fact in the claim for death
compensation benefits.1avvphi1
Moreover, petitioner cannot deny respondent's relationship with Danilo after admitting in its Answer
filed with the LA that respondent is the brother of Danilo, thus:
1. That they deny the malicious allegations of Mr. Bienvenido R. Hindang, brother the late Danilo R.
Hindang.37
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated November 28, 2001 and the Resolution
dated January 29, 2002 of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

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G.R. No.

L-204 May 16, 1947

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

Pablo Anzures for appellant.

Pablo, Perfecto, Bengzon, Hontiveros, and Tuason, JJ., concur.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

In Criminal Case No. 6129:3

In Criminal Case No. 6131: 5

WHEREFORE, premises considered, decision is hereby rendered:

Version of the Prosecution

The accused Marieto Adora is a brother-in-law of Ricardo Cotorno (Complainant

Version of the Defense

Appellant interposes the following as errors of the trial court:

. . . (I)n not doubting the testimony of complainant. 16

On a similar note, he further argues that:

The Court's Ruling

The appeal is not meritorious.

First Issue: The Trial Court's Alleged Bias

Fiscal, you will present that Tiya Charing?

Alright, when do you want this case reset?

(Asst. Prov'l Pros. De Mesa)

COURT: (Propounding questions)

Q Alright, questions from the Court. Do you know your height?

A No, your Honor.

Q Do you know your weight?

Q When were you born?

A I was born on August 16, 1976.

At any rate, make it of record that the witness, complainant Cecilia

Afterwards in its decision, the trial court concluded:

Inexactitude in the Date of Fertilization

Evidentiary Weight of Letter

Crime and Punishment

PROS. DE MESA: (On direct examination)

Q Cecilia on June 25, 1992 at about 8:00 in the evening, do you

Q Where is that house you are referring to?

A While I was sleeping, my uncle entered my room.

May we make it of record your Honor that the witness is crying.

Q What happened after you(r) uncle entered your room?

A When he entered my room he was carrying a (')luknit(') which is a kind

Q What happened next after he entered your room carrying a (')luknit(')?

A He covered my mouth with his hand and undressed me. I wanted to

A He placed his (')ano(') into my (') anon (').

Q What do you mean by (') ano (')?

A (The witness is crying) He placed his sex organ inside my vagina.

Q After that what happened next?

A (Witness crying uncontrolably (sic)) After he abused me, I sat in the

xxx xxx xxx

Q What did you do when he was raping you?

A I pushed him away from me and I wanted to shout but he covered my

xxx xxx xxx

A The following morning.

A I was in our house.

A Every time he entered my room, he was carrying a (')luknit(') which is a

Q What did Marieto do in your room?

A Whenever he entered my room because my room has no lock, he was

Already answered. She said she was raped again.

PROS. DE MESA: (CONTINUING)

A My auntie was gambling.

A It is far, in the place of Mamay Merle.

Q Can you make an estimate of the distance, if you know?

A From my seat to that place (witness indicating a distance which the

Q What time did your auntie return to your house?

A About 5:00 in the afternoon.

Q Why, for what reason?