PERSISTENT QUESTIONS

From H.L.A. Harts The Concept of Law

A Summary by Rean Raphaelle Gonzales

Law seems to evade a simple definition. Professor Hart elaborates on this

difficulty by citing movements towards providing for the words meaning, and then
fluently striking them down on basis of the narrowness of their usages. Law as a common
knowledge, a convergence of behavior, an enumeration of predictable penalties, or a
morality: these definitions have been carefully dismissed by Professor Hart.

First, Professor Hart pointed out the existence of law as a form of common
knowledge a skeleton system that people learn in school and actively create through
legislation. This first attempt at a definition, he says, does not cover laws which are
controlling despite lack of legislation (i.e. international and primitive law), nor does it
address the fact that this skeleton system is not sufficient to solve problems that do not
fall squarely on clear standards.

Second, he recognized that law could be seen as a convergence of behavior but

likewise pointed out that some groups perform the same activities but are not required
to do so. In fact, deviation from these activities could only be met, at most, by hostile
reactions that lack any legal character still.

Third, much as the other attempts at definition mentioned beforehand,

predictability of punishment seems to be an important aspect of law but this alone,
thought Professor Hart, would not be enough. To debunk this, Hart used the example of
the judge, in punishing. The judge sees punishment as a justification and tool while the
future offender (or deviator from conduct or behavior) sees thaw law as a guide;
something to avoid. Two people seeing the same law differently, Professor Hart thought,
would make for an inconsistent definition.

Lastly, Professor Hart very simply dismissed that law is a set of rules. He said that
this too was weakened by inconsistency for one statute could yield varying results a
variation unhealthy for a reliable definition of law.

The above definitions have been dismissed by Professor Hart for being unable to
settle grey-area questions, for limitations in being able to answer only issues with a clear
standard, or for having inconsistent results. We must take note, however, that Professor
Hart struck down the attempts at definition only insofar as they were not wholistic he
nonetheless took them as valid perspectives or aspects on what law is. Thus, in creating
a more gestalt definition, he forwarded three questions meant to be fused as one: 1) How
does law differ from an order backed by threats? 2) How does law differ from and relate
to morals? 3) What are rules and to what extent are laws rules? Still, Professor Hart did
not yet try to answer the questions he posited. Rather, he stressed that difficulty of doing
so. He would not accept any answers unsatisfactory to the general perspective and even
dove into why we are puzzled by the questions in the first place.

All in all, we can confirm that the law does evade a simple definition. Nevertheless,
Professor Hart cautiously reminds that the purpose for finding that elusive definition is
not to merely create a dictionary reference, but to advance legal theory by shedding light
on the structure of the legal system and its connection and application to coercion,
morality, and different social phenomena an endeavor of prime importance for the
furtherance of the profession, its system, and its subjects.