CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II (ATTY.
BUTCH JAMON): TABLE OF CASES
MIDTERM WEEK, TERM 2, A.Y. 2010-2011
I. PLACE OF JUDICIAL POWER
A. In General
Case Facts
1. GARCIA VS. BOI 1. This is a petition seeking the annulment
GUTIERREZ, JR.; of the approval of the Board of
11/09/1990 Investments-DTI regarding the site
transfer of the proposed petrochemical
plant from Bataan to Batangas, and the
shift from naphta to naphta and LPG
feedstock.
2. The earlier petition for certiorari was
granted, however, the petitioner still
seeks for reconsideration asking the
following:
Ruling on the import of PD 949 and
1803
Ruling on the foreign investors
claim of right of final choice of plant
site
3. This reconsideration has been denied.
Then the petitioner filed a
reconsideration asking to resolve on the
issue of whether foreign investor has the
right of the final choice of plant site.
4. Again this reconsideration has been
denied on Jan.19,1990.
5. Thus this petition relying on the ruling on
Jan. 19, 1990
2. OPOSA VS. - The overarching theme of the case deals with
FACTORAN the prevention the misappropriation or
DAVIDE, JR.; impairment of Philippine rainforests and arrest
07/30/1993 the unabated hemorrhage of the countrys vital
life support systems and continued rape of
Mother Earth.
- In 1991 a case was filed by minors
(represented by their parents) and the
Philippine Ecological Network (PENI) against
the then Secretary of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR),
Fulgencio Factoran, Jr. who was substituted by
the new secretary, Angel Alcala. The complaint
was instituted to be a taxpayers class suit as it
alleges that all citizens of the Philippines are
entitled to benefit, use and enjoyment of the
countrys virgin tropical rainforests. The suit
also alleges that this suit represents people
who are sharing the same sentiment towards
the preservation of our natural resources (since
not all of them could go before the court).
Furthermore, this was also asserted to be
representative of the current generation and
generation that are yet to be born.
- The suit calls for two primary actions that
orders the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR), its agents,
representatives, and those acting on its behalf
to, 1. Cancel all existing timber license
agreements in the country and 2. to cease and
desist from receiving, accepting, processing,
and renewing or approving new timber license
agreements.
- The suit starts off with statement of facts
regarding the country, the countrys islands, its
natural resources, and scientific evidences
pointing to the requirement for the country to
maintain a balanced and healthful ecology
(54% should be use for forest cover and 46%
for agricultural, residential, industrial,
commercial, and other uses). They asserted
that deforestation resulted in, a. water
shortages b. salinization c. massive erosion
and loss of soil fertility d. extinction of some of
the countries flora and fauna e. disturbance and
dislocation of indigenous cultures f. siltation of
rivers and seabed g. drought h. increasing
velocity of typhoon winds i. flooding of lowlands
j. siltation and shortening of the life span of
dams k. reduction of earths capacity to process
carbon dioxide.
- Initially the petition was dismissed on the
grounds of lack of cause of action, of being
political question, and of causing the
impairment of contracts. The petitioners filed for
certiorari hence this case. They contend that
Issue/s
1. Does the petitioner hold
final choice under the
1987 Constitution and the
Omnibus Election Code?
1. Locus Standi: WON the
case is a class suit?
2. WON minors can assert
that they represent other
generations and those
succeeding theirs?
3. Merits: WON the
respondent judge committed
grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of
jurisdiction by declaring the
petitioners to have no legal
right?
4. Whether or not granting the
petition would violate the non-
impairment clause found in the
Constitution?
CALUAG, CHIONGSON, CIPRES, MARONILLA, MILLETE, QUERUBIN, RICO, SY, UY | 1
Holding
1. NO.
The site is already ideal. There is no more
need to buy expensive real estate.
The state has the duty to regulate and exercise
authority over foreign investment. The
constitution mandates for a self-reliant and
independent national economy.
The non alienation of natural resources, the
states full control of our scarce resources,
agreements with foreigners being based on
real contribution to the economic growth and
general welfare of the country and the
regulation of foreign investments in accordance
with national goals and priorities, are too
explicit not to be noticed and understood.
Petition GRANTED.
1. Yes it is a class suit because the subject matter of the
complaint is of common and general interest to all
citizens of the Philippines and that it would be
impracticable to bring them all to court. The plaintiffs in
this case are numerous and representative enough to
ensure that all interests is protected.
2. Yes they can, following the concept of
intergenerational responsibility. Every generation has a
responsibility to the next to preserve the rhythm and
harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and
healthful environment.
3. Yes respondent judge committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction because it
failed to recognize the legal right of the petitioners which
is the right to a balanced and healthful ecology that is
incorporated in the 1987 Constitution under Section 16
Article II.
- Moreover, this rights need not be written in the
Constitution for this deals with rights that are assumed
from the very inception oh humankind. The reason why it
was written was because the framers feared that without
a mandate as stated in the state policies future
generations would inherit nothing to sustain life. It is clear
then that there is a legal right for a balanced healthful
ecology and the right to health. Given that it could also
be said that this right is further supported by Executive
Order No. 192 and the Administrative Code of 1987
making the cause of action existent.
4. No it does not violate the non-impairment clause
because licenses are not contracts, properties or a
property right that is protected by the due process clause
of the Constitution. As the court held in Tan v. Director of
Forestry, a license is merely a permit or privilege to do
what otherwise would be unlawful and is not a contract. It
is not irrevocable. The Chief Executive may validly
amend, modify, replace, or rescind licenses when
national interests so require.
Given that it is not a contract, the non-impairment clause
cannot be invoked.
- Even if the licenses are contracts, the action stated in
the case still does not affect it given that no law or action
by the Chief Executive to amend, modify, replace, or
rescind licenses so it is could not as of the moment be
invoked. And furthermore, if there would be a law passed
it would not be considered as a violation of the non-
impairment clause as the very nature of the law deals
with the exercising of the police power of the state to
advance the right of the people to a balanced and
healthful ecology. The non-impairment clause yields to
the police power of the state.
Decision Petition is granted. Petitioners may amend
complaint to implead as defendants the holders or
grantees of the questioned timber license agreements.
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II (ATTY. BUTCH JAMON): TABLE OF CASES
MIDTERM WEEK, TERM 2, A.Y. 2010-2011
there is a cause of action using articles 19, 20,
and 21 of the Civil Code (the right to a sound
environment), Section 4 of Executive Order No.
192 that calls for the creation of the Department
of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR)
to safeguard the peoples right to a healthful
environment, Section 3 of Presidential Decree
No. 1151 ( Philippine Environmental Policy),
and Section 16, Article II of the 1987
Constitution that recognizes the right of the
people to a balanced and healthful ecology. As
well as the concept of generational genocide in
Criminal Law and the concept of mans
inalienable right to self-preservation and self-
perpetuation in natural law.
3. MANILA PRINCE VS. - Respondent GSIS, pursuant to the
GSIS privatization program of the Philippine
BELLOSILLO; Government under Proclamation No. 50 dated
02/03/1997 8 December 1986, decided to sell through
public bidding 30% to 51% of the issued and
outstanding shares of respondent MHC which
owns the historic Manila Hotel. In a closed
bidding held on 18 September 1995 only two
(2) bidders participated: petitioner Manila
Prince Hotel Corporation, a Filipino corporation,
which offered to buy 51 % of the MHC or
15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per share, and
Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, with ITT
Sheraton as its hotel operator, which bid for the
same number of shares at P44.00 per share, or
P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner.
- Pending the declaration of Renong Berhard as
the winning bidder and the execution of the
necessary contracts, petitioner in a letter to
respondent GSIS dated 28 September 1995
matched the bid price of P44.00 per share
tendered by Renong Berhad. In a subsequent
letter dated 10 October 1995 petitioner sent a
manager's check issued by Philtrust Bank for
Thirty-three Million Pesos (P33-000,000.00) as
Bid Security to match the bid of the Malaysian
Group, Messrs. Renong Berhad which
respondent GSIS refused to accept.
- On 17 October 1995, perhaps apprehensive
that respondent GSIS has disregarded the
tender of the matching bid and that the sale of
51% of the MHC may be hastened by
respondent GSIS and consummated with
Renong Berhad, petitioner came to this Court
on prohibition and mandamus. On 18 October
1995 the Court issued a temporary restraining
order enjoining respondents from perfecting
and consummating the sale to the Malaysian
firm. On 10 September 1996 the instant case
was accepted by the Court En Banc after it was
referred to it by the First Division.
- The petitioner argues the following:
1. Petitioner invokes Sec. 10, second Par.,
Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution and submits
that the Manila Hotel has been identified with
the Filipino nation and has practically
become a historical monument which
reflects the vibrancy of Philippines heritage
and culture. To all intents and purpose, it
has become a part of the national patrimony.
2. Petitioner also argues that since 51% of
the shares of the MHC carries with it the
ownership of the business of the hotel which
is owned by respondent GSIS, the hotel
business of respondent GSIS being a part of
the tourism industry is unquestionably a part
of the national economy. Thus, any
transaction involving 51% of the shares of
stock of the MHC is clearly covered by the
term national economy, to which Sec. 10,
second par., Art. XII, 1987 Constitution,
applies.
3. It is also the thesis of petitioner that since
Manila Hotel is part of the national patrimony
and its business also unquestionably part of
the national economy petitioner should be
preferred after it has matched the bid offer of
the Malaysian firm. For the bidding rules
mandate that if for any reason, the Highest
Bidder cannot be awarded the Block of
1. WON Sec. 10, 2nd par., Art.
XII, of the 1987 Constitution is
non-self-executing
2. WON the Manila Hotel falls
under the term national
patrimony
3. WON 51% of the equity of
MHC can be considered part
of national patrimony
4. WON petitioner should be
allowed to match the highest
bid
5. WON GSIS committed
grave abuse of discretion
CALUAG, CHIONGSON, CIPRES, MARONILLA, MILLETE, QUERUBIN, RICO, SY, UY | 2
1. NO. A provision which is complete in itself and
becomes operative without the aid of supplementary or
enabling legislation, or that which supplies sufficient rule
by means of which the right it grants may be enjoyed or
protected, is self-executing. Unless the contrary is clearly
intended, the provisions of the Constitution should be
considered self-executing, as a contrary rule would give
the legislature discretion to determine when, or whether,
they shall be effective. Sec. 10, second par., of Art. XII is
couched in such a way as not to make it appear that it is
non-self-executing but simply for purposes of style. The
argument of respondents that the non-self-executing
nature of Sec. 10, second par. of Art. XII is implied from
the tenor of the first and third paragraphs of the same
section which undoubtedly are not self-executing is
flawed. If the first and third paragraphs are not self-
executing because Congress is still to enact measures to
encourage the formation and operation of enterprises
fully owned by Filipinos, as in the first paragraph, and the
State still needs legislation to regulate and exercise
authority over foreign investments within its national
jurisdiction, as in the third paragraph, then a fortiori, by
the same logic, the second paragraph can only be self-
executing as it does not by its language require any
legislation in order to give preference to qualified
Filipinos in the grant of rights, privileges and concessions
covering the national economy and patrimony. A
constitutional provision may be self-executing in one part
and non-self-executing in another. Sec. 10, second par.,
Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory, positive
command which is complete in itself and which needs no
further guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its
enforcement. From its very words the provision does not
require any legislation to put it in operation. It is per se
judicially enforceable.
2. YES. In its plain and ordinary meaning, the term
patrimony pertains to heritage. When the Constitution
speaks of national patrimony, it refers not only to the
natural resources of the Philippines, as the Constitution
could have very well used the term natural resources, but
also to the cultural heritage of the Filipinos. Manila Hotel
has become a landmark - a living testimonial of
Philippine heritage. Its existence is impressed with public
interest; its own historicity associated with our struggle
for sovereignty, independence and nationhood. Verily,
Manila Hotel has become part of our national economy
and patrimony.
3. YES. 51% of the equity of the MHC comes within the
purview of the constitutional shelter for it comprises the
majority and controlling stock, so that anyone who
acquires or owns the 51% will have actual control and
management of the hotel. In this instance, 51% of the
MHC cannot be disassociated from the hotel and the
land on which the hotel edifice stands. Respondents
further argue that the constitutional provision is
addressed to the State, not to respondent GSIS which by
itself possesses a separate and distinct personality. In
constitutional jurisprudence, the acts of persons distinct
from the government are considered "state action"
covered by the Constitution (1) when the activity it
engages in is a "public function"; (2) when the
government is so significantly involved with the private
actor as to make the government responsible for his
action; and, (3) when the government has approved or
authorized the action. It is evident that the act of
respondent GSIS in selling 51% of its share in
respondent MHC comes under the second and third
categories of "state action." Therefore the transaction,
although entered into by respondent GSIS, is in fact a
transaction of the State and therefore subject to the
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II (ATTY. BUTCH JAMON): TABLE OF CASES
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Shares, GSIS may offer this to the other
Qualified Bidders that have validly submitted
bids provided that these Qualified Bidders
are willing to match the highest bid in terms
of price per share.
- Respondents maintain that:
1. Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987
Constitution is merely a statement of
principle and policy since it is not a self-
executing provision and requires
implementing legislation(s). Thus, for the
said provision to operate, there must be
existing laws "to lay down conditions under
which business may be done."
2. Granting that this provision is self-
executing, Manila Hotel does not fall under
the term national patrimony which only refers
to lands of the public domain, waters,
minerals, coal, petroleum and other mineral
oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries,
forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna
and all marine wealth in its territorial sea,
and exclusive marine zone as cited in the
first and second paragraphs of Sec. 2, Art.
XII, 1987 Constitution. While petitioner
speaks of the guests who have slept in the
hotel and the events that have transpired
therein which make the hotel historic, these
alone do not make the hotel fall under the
patrimony of the nation. What is more, the
mandate of the Constitution is addressed to
the State, not to respondent GSIS which
possesses a personality of its own separate
and distinct from the Philippines as a State.
3. Granting that the Manila Hotel forms part
of the national patrimony, the constitutional
provision invoked is still inapplicable since
what is being sold is only 51% of the
outstanding shares of the corporation, not
the hotel building nor the land upon which
the building stands. Certainly, 51% of the
equity of the MHC cannot be considered part
of the national patrimony. Moreover, if the
disposition of the shares of the MHC is really
contrary to the Constitution, petitioner should
have questioned it right from the beginning
and not after it had lost in the bidding.
4. The reliance by petitioner on par. V.,
subpar. J. I., of the bidding rules which
provides that if for any reason, the Highest
Bidder cannot be awarded the Block of
Shares, GSIS may offer this to the other
Qualified Bidders that have validly submitted
bids provided that these Qualified Bidders
are willing to match the highest bid in terms
of price per share, is misplaced.
Respondents postulate that the privilege of
submitting a matching bid has not yet arisen
since it only takes place if for any reason,
the Highest Bidder cannot be awarded the
Block of Shares.
5. The prayer for prohibition grounded on
grave abuse of discretion should fail since
respondent GSIS did not exercise its
discretion in a capricious, whimsical manner,
and if ever it did abuse its discretion it was
not so patent and gross as to amount to an
evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal
to perform a duty enjoined by law. Similarly,
the petition for mandamus should fail as
petitioner has no clear legal right to what it
demands and respondents do not have an
imperative duty to perform the act required
of them by petitioner.
4. KILOSBAYAN VS. Petitioners seek reconsideration of our decision
MORATO in this case
MENDOZA; Petitioners contend that the decision in the
07/17/1995 first case has already settled
(1) whether petitioner Kilosbayan, Inc. has a
standing to sue and
(2) whether under its charter (R.A. No. 1169,
as amended) the Philippine Charity
Sweepstakes Office can enter into any form
1. WON the constitutional
policies and principles (Art II
Sec 5 ,Sec 12, Sec 13, Sec
17) invoked by the petitioners
may be resorted to for striking
down laws or official actions
which are inconsistent with
them
2. WON the petitioners have
CALUAG, CHIONGSON, CIPRES, MARONILLA, MILLETE, QUERUBIN, RICO, SY, UY | 3
constitutional command.
4. YES. It should be stressed that while the Malaysian
firm offered the higher bid it is not yet the winning bidder.
The bidding rules expressly provide that the highest
bidder shall only be declared the winning bidder after it
has negotiated and executed the necessary contracts,
and secured the requisite approvals. Since the Filipino
First Policy provision of the Constitution bestows
preference on qualified Filipinos the mere tending of the
highest bid is not an assurance that the highest bidder
will be declared the winning bidder. Resultantly,
respondents are not bound to make the award yet, nor
are they under obligation to enter into one with the
highest bidder. For in choosing the awardee respondents
are mandated to abide by the dictates of the 1987
Constitution the provisions of which are presumed to be
known to all the bidders and other interested parties.
Paragraph V. J. I of the bidding rules provides that [i]f for
any reason the Highest Bidder cannot be awarded the
Block of Shares, GSIS may offer this to other Qualified
Bidders that have validly submitted bids provided that
these Qualified Bidders are willing to match the highest
bid in terms of price per share. The constitutional
mandate itself is reason enough not to award the block of
shares immediately to the foreign bidder notwithstanding
its submission of a higher, or even the highest, bid.
Where a foreign firm submits the highest bid in a public
bidding concerning the grant of rights, privileges and
concessions covering the national economy and
patrimony, thereby exceeding the bid of a Filipino, there
is no question that the Filipino will have to be allowed to
match the bid of the foreign entity. And if the Filipino
matches the bid of a foreign firm the award should go to
the Filipino. It must be so if we are to give life and
meaning to the Filipino First Policy provision of the 1987
Constitution. The argument of respondents that petitioner
is now estopped from questioning the sale to Renong
Berhad since petitioner was well aware from the
beginning that a foreigner could participate in the bidding
is meritless. Undoubtedly, Filipinos and foreigners alike
were invited to the bidding. But foreigners may be
awarded the sale only if no Filipino qualifies, or if the
qualified Filipino fails to match the highest bid tendered
by the foreign entity. In the case before us, while
petitioner was already preferred at the inception of the
bidding because of the constitutional mandate, petitioner
had not yet matched the bid offered by Renong Berhad.
Only after it had matched the bid of the foreign firm and
the apparent disregard by respondent GSIS of
petitioner's matching bid did the latter have a cause of
action.
5. YES. Since petitioner has already matched the bid
price tendered by Renong Berhad pursuant to the
bidding rules, respondent GSIS is left with no alternative
but to award to petitioner the block of shares of MHC and
to execute the necessary agreements and documents to
effect the sale in accordance not only with the bidding
guidelines and procedures but with the Constitution as
well. The refusal of respondent GSIS to execute the
corresponding documents with petitioner as provided in
the bidding rules after the latter has matched the bid of
the Malaysian firm clearly constitutes grave abuse of
discretion.
Voting Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Kapunan,
Francisco, and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ., concur with the
main opinion.
Narvasa, C.J, joins Justice Puno in his dissent.
1. NO. As already stated, however, these provisions are
not self-executing. They do not confer rights which can
be enforced in the courts but only provide guidelines for
legislative or executive action. By authorizing the holding
of lottery for charity, Congress has in effect determined
that consistently with these policies and principles of the
Constitution, the PCSO may be given this authority. That
is why we said with respect to the opening by the
PAGCOR of a casino in Cagayan de Oro, "the morality of
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II (ATTY. BUTCH JAMON): TABLE OF CASES
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of association or collaboration with any party
in operating an on-line lottery, and these
questions can no longer be reopened.
- Petitioners argue that the two justices who
changed their votes did not act according to law
and that the two new appointees regardless of
the merits of the case must of necessity align
themselves with all the Ramos appointees who
were dissenters in the first case and constitute
the new majority in the second lotto case.
- SC said the decision in the first case was a
split decision: 7-6. With the retirement of one of
the original majority (Cruz, J.) and one of the
dissenters (Bidin, J.) it was not surprising that
the first decision in the first case was later
reversed.
- SC cited the case of Feliciano v. Aquinas
(also a split decision) which was overturned in
People v. Yang.
5. TANADA VS. - Petition for Certiorari
ANGARA - DTI secretary Rizalino Navarro signed the
PANGANIBAN; Final Act Embodying the Results of the
05/02/1997 Uruguay Round of Multilateral Negotiations.
(Final Act). By signing it, he agreed on behalf of
the Philippines
o To submit the WTO
agreement to competent
authorities for their approval
o Adopt the ministerial
declarations and decisions
(Basically, the final act aims to liberalize and
expand world trade and strengthen the
interrelationship between trade and economic
policies affecting growth and development.)
- The president then sent to the senate a letter
which submits the Uruguay Round Final Act for
their concurrence
- Another letter was sent by the president. This
time, he submits the Uruguay Final Round Act,
the Agreement Establishing the WTO, the
Ministerial Declarations and Decisions and the
Understanding on Commitments in Financial
Services to the Senate for its concurrence.
- The Senate adopted Resolution number 97,
which expresses their concurrence in the
ratification of the president of the Agreement
standing to sue on gambling is not a justiciable issue. Gambling is not illegal
constitutional grounds, given per se. . . . It is left to Congress to deal with the activity
that the Constitution as it sees fit." (Magtajas v. Pryce Properties Corp., Inc.,
guarantees to peoples 234 SCRA 255, 268 [1994]).
organizations effective and 2. NO. It is noteworthy that petitioners do not question
reasonable participation at all the validity of the law allowing lotteries. It is the contract
levels of social, political and entered into by the PCSO and the PGMC which they are
economic decision making (Art assailing. This case, therefore, does not raise issues of
XIII Sec 16). constitutionality but only of contract law, which
3. WON, as settled in the first petitioners, not being privies to the agreement, cannot
case, the PCSO under its raise.
charter (R.A. No. 1169, as - Kilosbayan's status as a people's organization does not
amended) cannot enter into give it the requisite personality to question the validity of
any form of association or the contract in this case. The Constitution provides that
collaboration with any party in "the State shall respect the role of independent people's
operating an on-line lottery. organizations to enable the people to pursue and protect,
within the democratic framework, their legitimate and
collective interests and aspirations through peaceful and
lawful means," that their right to "effective and
reasonable participation at all levels of social, political,
and economic decision-making shall not be abridged."
(Art. XIII, 15-16)
- These provisions have not changed the traditional rule
that only real parties in interest or those with standing, as
the case may be, may invoke the judicial power. The
jurisdiction of this Court, even in cases involving
constitutional questions, is limited by the "case and
controversy" requirement of Art. VIII, 5. This
requirement lies at the very heart of the judicial function.
It is what differentiates decision-making in the courts
from decision-making in the political departments of the
government and bars the bringing of suits by just any
party.
- Petitioners' right to sue as taxpayers cannot be
sustained because this case does not involve illegal
disbursement of public funds. Nor as concerned citizens
can they bring this suit because no specific injury
suffered by them is alleged. As for the petitioners, who
are members of Congress, their right to sue as
legislators cannot be invoked because they do not
complain of any infringement of their rights as legislators.
3. Indeed in the first case it was held that the PCSO
under its charter (R.A. No. 1169, as amended) cannot
enter into any form of association or collaboration with
any party in operating an on-line lottery HOWEVER THE
QUESTIONS RAISED IN THIS CASE ARE LEGAL
QUESTIONS AND THE CLAIMS INVOLVED ARE
SUBSTANTIALLY DIFFERENT FROM THOSE
INVOLVED IN THE PRIOR CASE BETWEEN THE
PARTIES. AS ALREADY STATED, THE ELA IS
SUBSTANTIALLY DIFFERENT FROM THE CONTRACT
OF LEASE DECLARED VOID IN THE FIRST CASE.
Also, the Court noted in its decision that the provisions of
the first contract, which were considered to be features of
a joint venture agreement, had been removed in the new
contract.
1. WON the case is - Petition dismissed.
justiciable. 1. Yes.
2. WON the parity - The judiciary has the duty and power to strike down
provisions and national grave abuse of discretion on the part of any branch or
treatment clauses in the instrumentality of government including Congress
WTO agreement violates 2. No
Sec. 19 Article 2, Sec. - The declaration of principles are not intended to be
10 and 12 Article 12 of self-executing, rather, they are just aid and guides by
the Constitution the judiciary in judicial review, and by the legislature
(economic nationalism in enacting laws. These broad principles need
clauses). legislative enactments to implement them.
3. WON the WTO
agreement unduly limits, - The economic nationalism provisions should be read
restricts and impairs with other constitutional mandates, especially Sec 1 and
legislative power of the 13 of Article 12.
Congress. - The WTO protects the weak economies. There are
4. WON the WTO specific provisos in the agreement with respect to tariffs,
agreement intrudes on domestic subsidies and protection from unfair
the power of the competition which are intended to help developing
Supreme Court to economies.
promulgate rules - The Constitution does not rule out foreign competition.
concerning pleading, Independence refers to the freedom from undue foreign
practice and procedures. control of the national economy.
5. WON the concurring of - The Constitution has not really shown any unbalanced
the senate only in the bias in favor of any business or enterprise, nor does it
WTO agreement and not contain any specific pronouncement that Filipino
in the final act implies companies should be pampered with total prescription of
CALUAG, CHIONGSON, CIPRES, MARONILLA, MILLETE, QUERUBIN, RICO, SY, UY | 4
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II (ATTY. BUTCH JAMON): TABLE OF CASES
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Establishing the WTO.
- The President signed the Instrument of
Ratification of the Agreement Establishing the
WTO and the agreements and associated legal
instruments of that agreement.
- The final act signed by Secretary Navarro, on
the other hand, embodies not only the WTO
agreement but also the ministerial declarations
and decisions and the understanding on
commitments in financial services.
- Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the
treaty. They also claim that since the Senate
only concurred with the WTO agreement and
not on all the contents of the Final act, they
impliedly rejected the Final act.
6. SANTIAGO VS. Teodoro Santiago Hr. Was awarded
BAUTISTA 3rd honors in their grade Six
BARREDO; graduating class by the Comm on
05/30/1970 the Rating of Students for Honor.
(Hereon referred as Comm).
He, represented by his parents,
sought the invalidation of the results
thru a writ of certiorari claiming that
the teachers :
- violated the Service Manual for
Teachers of the Bureau of Public
Schools which states that the comm
should be made up of grede 5 and
grade 6 teachers not just the latter.
- Committed grave abuse of
discretion by chaning the grades of
the 1st/2nd honors recipients.
Respondents moved for dismissal
because certiorari was improper
and the issue became moot and
academic since graudation was
over
Court agreed with respondents
pointing out that
- no written or formal judgment made
by the respondent was submitted
for correction so certitori cannot
issue.
- Admin remedies not exhausted.
- There was abuse of discretion only
errors
Santiago appealed. The
respondents further raised that the
comm being impleaded is not a
tribunal board or officer exercising
judicial function agains which an
action for certiorari apply under sec.
1 rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
7. ANGARA VS. In the elections of Sept. 17, 1935, petitioner
ELECOM Jose A. Angara and the respondents Pedro
LAUREL; 07/15/1936 Ynsua, Miguel Castillo, and Dionisio Mayor
were candidates voted for the position of
members of the National Assembly for the
rejection of the final act.
The Court thought it is most
important to settle WON the
committee can be a proper
subject of certiorari
(1) Whether or not the
Supreme Court has jurisdiction
over the Electoral Commision
and the subject matter of the
controversy upon the
CALUAG, CHIONGSON, CIPRES, MARONILLA, MILLETE, QUERUBIN, RICO, SY, UY | 5
foreign competition.
- Constitutions are designed to meet not only the
vagaries of contemporary events. They should be
interpreted to cover even future and unknown
circumstances.
3. No
- Sovereignty is not absolute because it is subject to
restrictions and voluntarily agreed to by the
Philippines.
- The Constitution did not envision a hermit type isolation
of the country.
- By their inherent nature, treaties really limit or restrict
the absoluteness of sovereignty
- There are certain restrictions to the Constitution
- Limitations imposed by the very nature of
membership in the family of nations.
- Limitations imposed by treaty stipulations
- When the Philippines join the UN, it consented to
restrict its soverign rights under the concept of auto-
limitation. (Reagan vs Commission of Internal Revenue)
- The underlying concept in the partial surrender of
sovereignty is the reciprocal commitment of the other
contracting states granting the same privilege and
immunities to the Philippines, its officials and its citizens.
4. No.
- The burden of proof is not transferred in cases of patent
infringement. It is still on the patent owner to introduce
evidence of the existence of the alleged identical
product.
- The new rule should not really present any problem in
changing the rules of evidence as the present law on the
subject, RA 165 (Patent Law), provides a similar
presumption in cases of infringement of patent design.
- Conclusion in the third issue also applies.
5. No.
- The final act need not be ratified. It is not the treaty
itself. Rather, it is just a summary of the proceedings.
The final act only required that the senate concur with
the WTO agreement, which they did.
- The Senate was well-aware of what it was concurring to
as shown by the members deliberations.
Certiorari cannot apply
To answer this case, the court had to first
define judicial power .
Generally, is the authority to determine what
the law is and what legal rights of parties are,
with respect to a matter in controversy. In
short, it implies the construction of laws and
the adjudication of rights . It is not the office
that matters but the nature of the action taken
to determine WON there was a discharge of
judicial or quasi-judicial functions.
Following such definition, the court said that
for judicial or quasi-judicial acts to be
exercised, there must be :
a. a law that gives rise to some specific rights of
persons or property,
b. adverse claims are made resulting in a
controversy
c. same controversy is brought before a body of
officer clothed with authority to make a
determination of law and adjudication of
rights.
* Based on that definition, the Court ruled that the comm
is neither a judicial or quasi-judicial body. Notable, the
petitioner cannot claim a right that has been violated.
There is no right to a prize until it is awarded. There is
only a privilege to compete that did not ripen into a
demandable right unless and until they were proclaimed
winners (citing a decision regarding an oratorical
contest).
On the issue of jurisdiction of the Supreme Court
The separation of powers is a fundamental principle of a
system of government. It obtains not through a single
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II (ATTY. BUTCH JAMON): TABLE OF CASES
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first district of Tayabas. On Oct. 7, 1935, the
provincial board of canvassers proclaimed
Angara as member-elect of
the NationalAssembly and on Nov. 15, 1935,
he took his oath of office.
On Dec. 3, 1935, the National Assembly
passed Resolution No. 8, which in effect,
fixed the last date to file election protests. On
Dec. 8, 1935, Ynsua filed before the
Electoral Commission a "Motion of Protest"
against Angara and praying, among other
things, that Ynsua be named/declared
elected Member of the National Assembly or
that the election of said position be nullified.
On Dec. 9, 1935, the
Electoral Commission adopted a resolution
(No. 6) stating that last day for filing of
protests is on Dec. 9.
Angara contended that
the Constitution confers exclusive jurisdiction
upon the Electoral Commission solely as
regards the merits of contested elections to
the National Assembly and the Supreme
Court therefore has no jurisdiction to hear the
case.
foregoing related facts, and in
the affirmative,
(2) Whether or not the said
Electoral Commission acted
without or in excess of its
jurisdiction in assuming to take
cognizance of the protest filed
against the election of the
herein petitioner
notwithstanding the previous
confirmation of such election
by resolution of
the National Assembly
CALUAG, CHIONGSON, CIPRES, MARONILLA, MILLETE, QUERUBIN, RICO, SY, UY | 6
provision but by actual division in our Constitution that
each department of the government has exclusive
cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction, and is
supreme within its own sphere. But it does not follow
from that fact that the three powers are to be kept
separate and that the Constitution intended them to be
absolutely restrained and independent of each other.
The Constitution has provided for an elaborate system of
checks and balances to secure coordination in the
workings of the various departments of the government.
In case of conflict, the judicial department is the only
constitutional organ which can be called upon to
determine the proper allocation of powers between the
several departments and among the integral and
constituent units thereof.
As any human production, our Constitution is of course
lacking perfection and perfectability, but as much as it
was within the power of our people, acting through their
delegates to so provide, that instrument which is the
expression of their sovereignty however limited, has
established a republican government intended to operate
and function as a harmonious whole, under a system of
checks and balances and subject to the specific
limitations and restrictions provided in the said
instrument.
The Constitution itself has provided for the
instrumentality of the judiciary as the rational way. When
the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional
boundaries, it does not assert any superiority over the
other departments; it does not in reality nullify or
invalidate an act of the legislature, but only asserts the
solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by
the Constitution to determine conflicting claims of
authority under the Constitution and to establish for the
parties in an actual controversy the rights which that
instrument secures and guarantees to them. This is in
truth all that is involved in what is termed "judicial
supremacy" which properly is the power of judicial review
under the Constitution.
Even then, this power of judicial review is limited to
actual cases and controversies to be exercised after full
opportunity of argument by the parties and limited further
to the constitutional question raised or the very lis
mota presented. Courts accord the presumption of
constitutionality to legislative enactments, not only
because the legislature is presumed to abide by
the Constitution, but also because the judiciary in the
determination of actual cases and controversies must
respect the wisdom and justice of the people as
expressed through their representatives in
the executive and legislative departments of government.
In the case at bar, here is then presented an actual
controversy involving as it does a conflict of a grave
constitutional nature between the National Assembly on
the one hand, and the Electoral Commission on the
other. Although the Electoral Commission may not be
interfered with, when and while acting wihtin the limits of
its authority, it does not follow that it is beyond the reach
of the constitutional mechanism adopted by the people
and that it is not subject to constitutional restrictions. The
Electoral Commission is not a separate department of
the government, and even if it were, conflicting claims of
authority under the fundamental law between
departmental powers and agencies of the government
are necessarily determined by the judiciary in justiciable
and appropriate cases.
The court has jurisdiction over the
Electoral Commission and the subject matter of the
present controversy for the purpose of determining the
character, scope, and extent of the constitutional grant to
the Electoral Commission as "the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of the members of the National Assembly."
On the issue of jurisdiction of the Electoral Commission
The creation of the Electoral Commission was designed
to remedy certain errors of which the framers of
our Constitutionwere cognizant. The purpose was
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B. Case or Controversy Requirements: Elements
Standing
Case Facts
8. PACU VS. PACU assails the constitutionality of
SECRETARY Act 2706 An act making the
BENGZON; inspection obligatory for the Sec. of
10/31/1955 Public Instructions.
a. The power of the Sec. of Education
to require prior permit before they
operate deprive them of liberty and
property without due process.
b. The act involved undue delegation
of leg. powers when it allowed the
Sec. of Educ. Unlimited powers and
discretion to prescribe rules and
standards. The act does not provide
guidelines for this. This. There has
to transfer in its totality all the powers previously
exercised by the legislature in matters pertaining to
contested elections of its members, to an independent
and impartial tribunal.
The Electoral Commission is a constitutional creation,
invested with the necessary authority in the performance
and exercise of the limited and specific function assigned
to it by the Constitution. Although it is not a power in our
tripartite scheme of government, it is, to all intents and
purposes, when acting within the limits of its authority, an
independent organ.
The grant of power to the Electoral Commission to judge
all contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of members of the National Assembly, is
intended to be as complete and unimpaired as if it had
remained originally in the legislature. The express
lodging of that power in the Electoral Commission is an
implied denial in the exercise of that power by
the National Assembly. And thus, it is as effective a
restriction upon the legislative power as an express
prohibition in the Constitution.
The creation of the Electoral Commission carried with it
ex necessitate rei the power regulative in character to
limit the time within which protests instructed to its
cognizance should be filed. Therefore, the incidental
power to promulgate such rules necessary for the proper
exercise of its exclusive power to judge all contests
relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of
members of the National Assembly, must be deemed by
necessary implication to have been lodged also in the
Electoral Commission.
It appears that on Dec. 9, 1935, the
Electoral Commission met for the first time and approved
a resolution fixing said date as the last day for the filing
of election protests. When, therefore,
the National Assembly passed its resolution of Dec. 3,
1935, confirming the election of the petitioner to
the National Assembly, the Electoral Commission had
not yet met; neither does it appear that said body had
actually been organized.
While there might have been good reason for the
legislative practice of confirmation of the election of
members of the legislature at the time the power to
decide election contests was still lodged in the
legislature, confirmation alone by the legislature cannot
be construed as depriving the Electoral Commission of
the authority incidental to its constitutional power to be
"the sole judge of all contests...", to fix the time for the
filing of said election protests.
HELD:
The Electoral Commission is acting within the legitimate
exercise of its constitutional prerogative in assuming to
take cognizance of the protest filed by the respondent,
Pedro Ynsua against he election of the herein petitioner,
Jose A. Angara, and that the resolution of the National
Assembly on Dec. 3, 1935, cannot in any manner toll the
time for filing protest against the election, returns, and
qualifications of the members of the National Assembly,
nor prevent the filing of protests within such time as the
rules of the Electoral Commission might prescribe.
Issue/s Holding
WON there is a justiciable NO, No there is none.
controversy with regard to
permits. Ratio:
In the 1st place, there is no justiciable controversy bec
none of them have been closed down in fact. It was not
shown either that the Sec. of Education has threatened
to revoke their permits.
Courts do not sit to adjudicate mere academic questions.
Nevertheless, in view of decisions of US SC quoted
apparently outlawing censorship, the Court decided to
look into the merits, otherwise it might be alleged that the
Court failed to act in the face of a clear violation of
CALUAG, CHIONGSON, CIPRES, MARONILLA, MILLETE, QUERUBIN, RICO, SY, UY | 7
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been abuse on the part of the
school inspectors bullying.
c. The act imposes a tax on a right
(i.e. to operate schools)
d. Regulation of books of instruction
amounts to censorship.
Govt asserts that the petitioners
have not brought a justiciable
controversy and should be
dismissed. Nevertheless, the govt
can state that the act is not
unconstitutional.
9. GONZALES VS. - Respondent Exec. Sec. authorized
HECHANOVA importation of foreign rice and created rice
CONCEPCION; procurement committee. Gonzales, a rice
10/22/1963 planter and President of Iloilo Palay and Corn
Planters Association, filed petition.
Procedure Case is an original action for
prohibition with preliminary injunction to restrain
implementation of decision of Exec. Sec. to
import rice. Respondents were required to file
answer and hearing was set.
- on WON respondents are acting without
jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction
Petitioners stand:
- Yes, bec. RA 3452 explicitly prohibits
importation of rice and corn by Rice and Corn
Administration and any other govt agency.
Respondents stand:
- Petitioner has no sufficient interest to file
petition.
- Petitioner has not exhausted all
administrative remedies available before
coming to court.
- Petitioners action is not sufficient and not
governed by RA 3452 because importation was
authorized by President as Commander in
Chief for military stock pile purposes. As such,
Pres must prepare for threats without waiting
for any special authority.
- Also, they say its not under RA 3452 bec. the
RAs prohibit importation of rice and corn by
government agency and not the government
itself.
- Even if the proposed importation violated the
RAs, it can still be permitted because it is for
the benefit of the people.
- The Phils is already under executive
agreements with contracts for purchase of rice
with Vietnam and Burma. In case of conflict
between the RAs and the contracts, the
contracts should prevail because it came later.
These contracts have been consummated bec.
the Phils. has already paid.
10. GONZALES VS. - Gonzales assailed the validity of EO 30 as an
MARCOS impermissible encroachment by the President
FERNANDO; on the legislative prerogative
07/31/1975 - EO 30 has the creation of a trust for the
benefit of the Filipino people under the name
and style of the Cultural Center of the
Philippines to awaken our peoples
consciousness in the nations cultural heritage
and encourage its preservation, promotion and
development
- In the Court of First Instance, stress was laid
on the funds administered by the Center as
coming from donations and contributions and
not a single centavo raised by taxation
- Respondents argue EO 30 as: 1) legitimate
exercise of executive power and that 2) this is
supplementary to rather than a disregard of RA
4165 creating the National Commission on
Culture and that 3) petitioner Gonzales did not
have the requisite personality to contest as a
taxpayer the validity of EO 30 as the funds held
by the Cultural Center came from donations
and contributions and not one centavo came
from taxation
- Later, PD 15 was issued creating the Cultural
Center of the Philippines
WON respondents are acting
without jurisdiction or in
excess of jurisdiction
prayed for is DENIED.
1. WON petitioner has
standing
2. WON EO 30 encroached
on the legislative prerogative
3. WON the issue on the
validity of EO 30 became moot
and academic
CALUAG, CHIONGSON, CIPRES, MARONILLA, MILLETE, QUERUBIN, RICO, SY, UY | 8
fundamental personal rights of liberty and property.
- RA 3452 says that the govt policy is to purchase basic
foods directly from farmers in Phils. Petitioner has
sufficient interest.
- Case at bar involves question which is a purely legal
one. It falls under the exemption from the doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies.
- The proposed importation is governed by RA 2207 and
RA 3452 bec it covers all importations of rice and corn
into the Phils.
- RA 2207 and 3452 also applies to importations of the
government itself bec. RA 2207 talks about imports
authorized by the President, by and on behalf of
government. RA 3452 also indicates that only private
parties may import rice under its provisions. These RAs
are only in addition to Commonwealth Act No. 138 which
says that in all purchases by govt, incl. those for armed
forces, preference is given to materials produced in the
Phils.
- The benefit of the people argument cant be accepted
because there is no local rice shortage. And the
importation is said to be for stockpile of Army, not for the
civilian population.
- The contracts w/ Vietnam and Burma are not executive
agreements. Even if they were, they are unlawful, being
against the RAs. The alleged consummation does not
render this case academic. The contracts may have
already been entered into and the payment may have
been made but the actual importation has not yet taken
place.
Disposition- For lack of requisite majority, injunction
- It is declared that Exec. Sec. has no power to authorize
importation in question and he exceeded jurisdiction in
granting authority. The importation is not sanctioned by
law and is contrary to its provisions.
1. The court shall rule that taxpayer has no legal
standing to question executive acts that do not involve
the use of public funds
2.The court shall rule that the President had the power to
administer a trust created by an agreement with a foreign
country
3.EO 30 was superseded by PD 15, hence the suit has
assumed a moot and academic character
Obiter
(1)-The funds administered by the President of the
Philippines came from donations and contributions and
not by taxation
-There was that absence of the requisite pecuniary or
monetary interest
(2) As head of State, as Chief Executive, as spokesman
in domestic and foreign affairs, in behalf of the estate
as parens patriae, the President has authority to
implement for the benefit of the Filipino people by
creating the Cultural Center consisting of private citizens
to administer the private contributions and donations
given not only by the US government but also by private
persons
-Creation of rules governing the administration of a trust
may be concurrently exercised by the President and
Congress
Decision DISMISSED, No standing and even if there
was, still no encroachment and that it is already moot
and academic
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11. PEOPLE VS. VERA Cu Unjieng was found guilty and
LAUREL; 11/16/1937 sentenced to imprisonment
C.U. applied for probation under Act
4221 in Manila CFI (Tuason
presiding), which referred it ti the
probation which in turn denied it.
However, another branch, held by
herein respondent Vera granted a
hearing, denied the application.
However, the judge failed to rule on
the execution of the sentence of
C.U. bec the latter asked for a
recon and a group of lawyers asked
to intervene in his favor.
But before Judge Vera could rule on
this, HSBC, later joined by Sol.
Gen. filed an action for certiorari
and prohibition before the SC
asking it to put a stop on the
hearing and execute the sentence
of CU.
They argued that the judge lack
jurisdiction in as much as his basis,
the Probation Law is
unconstitutional on 3 grounds:
a. infringed on the executive
prerogative to grant pardon and
reprieves
b. undue delegation of leg power
c. violates equal protection clause
Respondents argue:
a. case is premature since the same
issues being raised by petitioners
are still pending before the trial
court. They have also a pending
appeal before the said court. The
SC should not impair the latters
jurisdiction.
b. The private petitioner may not
intervene in a probation case. While
the Sol Gen is estopped from
questioning a law which govt
promulgated.
c. Act. 4221, is constitutional but even
it is not, the assailed parts can be
excluded while the others can be
maintained (separability).
A. Justiciability 1. The petitioners raised an issue of
B. Constitutional constitutionality in a proper case
Issues Raised
C. Separability Courts willonly make a determination with
regard to constitutionality if raised in the
appropriate cases (i.e. requisites for judicial
review are present) and the issue of
constitutionality is the very lis mota of the
case which is the case here.
Ratio:
Right remedy sought. Although question of
unconstitutionality are usually raised in
ordinary action in the lower courts. However,
if the very basis for the jurisdiction of the
lower court, is accused of constitutional
infirmities, a writ of prohibition is issued.
Public Party have standing.
a. Private party- gen. rule: only parties to the
suit can question the validity of a law (in this
case only the govt is the party bec its a
probation proceeding).
b. Public party-the people, rep by Sol. Gen., is a
proper party. Indeed the proper party-to bring
the action. If act 4221 indeed violates the
constitution, then the state has a substantial
interest to set it aside. Not only does its
implementation result in the illegal
expenditure of public funds, it also inflicts a
mortal wound upon the fundamental law.
c. The people is not estopped from impinging
the law just because it is already
implemented. It is not a valid ground because
fiscals etc will naturally implement Act 4221
as long as it is not declared void by the
Court.
Mootness: not moot
As a general rule, question of constitutionality must
be raised at the earliest opportunity so that if it is
not raised in the pleading, ordinarily it may not be
raised at the trial, and if not in the trial courts, in will
not be considered on appeal.
However, courts can grant exception through the
exercise of its sound discretion such as in:
a. crim cases, it may be raised at any stage of
the proceedings
b. when the constitutionality of the jurisdiction of
the lower court is assailed, the issue can be
considered any time by an appellate court.
Lis Mota: There is no doubt that the
constitutionality is the issue here bec Cu
Unjien draws his purported privilege from the
assailed law.
Liberality Doctrine (of Judicial Review):
However the Court said that despite the foregoing
discussion on justiciability, the court can still overrule the
defense of want of jurisdiction bec there is an
extraordinary situation which calls for the relaxation of
the general rule on justiciability.
Considering the
importance of the case, to prevent the multiplicity of
suits, strong reasons of public policy and that the issue
be resolved.
Constitutionality: Act 4221 is unconstitutional
- WON it a usurpation of pardon powers. NO
a. Probation is not pardon. A pardon removes
both guild and punishment. It releases
punishment and blots out of existence the
guilt so that in the eye of the law, the offender
is as innocent as if he had never committed
an offense. It removes the penalties and
disabilities, and restores him to all his civil
rights.
b. A probation, unlike pardon, does not relieve
penalty. It is in fact a penalty of lesser
degree. During the probation period, the
convict is still under legal custody, under the
control of the probation of the officer and the
Court; he may be rearrested if he violates the
conditions of his probation and it rearrested,
may be committed to prison to serve out his
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12. FLAST VS. COHEN In 1964, the Elementary and Secondary
WARREN; Education Act was passed. Title I was aimed to
06/10/1968 give financial assistance to local educational
agencies in their programs in the form of
grants. Meanwhile, Title II was for giving federal
grants to help acquire school instructional
materials. The application process involves that
submission of a plan which will be subject to
the approval of the U.S. Commissioner of
Education.
The petitioners filed this case, suing
in their capacity as federal taxpayers, to
challenge the constitutionality of Elementary
and Secondary Education Act of 1964. They
stated that the federal funds appropriated under
the law were being used to finance the
purchase of instructional materials for religious
schools as well. They believe that their taxes
were being used for religious purposes, which
is contrary to what the Establishment and Free
Exercise Clause mandates.
They filed this case with the US District Court of
New York, which dismissed the case because
they lacked standing to sue. Hence, this
petition.
Do petitioners have standing
to sue?
CALUAG, CHIONGSON, CIPRES, MARONILLA, MILLETE, QUERUBIN, RICO, SY, UY | 10
original sentence.
c. Congress is the branch where in the power to
define crimes and their penalties is reposed.
Since probation is a new mode of penalty, in
substitution of imprisonment and tire,
therefore, the leg did not overstep its bounds
when it passed Act 4221.
BUT
It is an undue delegation of leg powers.
General Rule: A delegated power cannot be
redelegated.
Exceptions:
a. delegation of leg power to the LGUs to
prescribe local ordinances
b. delegation of leg power directly to the people
(eg. Referendum)
c. delegation of leg power by the Consti itself
(eg. Emergency powers of the pres to leg.)
The case at hand does not fall within the
exception. It must be subjected to a test: was
the statute complete in itself when it left the
hands of the legislative so that nothing was
left to judgment of any other delegate of the
leg. Quoting Judge Ranney, it is quite
different to give discretion, it is quite different
to give discretion as to what it (the law) shall
be and conferring an authority or discretion
as to its execution, to be exercised under and
in pursuance of the law. Hence, it is valid for
Congress, to let the delegate make a
determination of facts, upon presence of
which a law becomes executable.
But Sec. 11 of the Act 4221, allows discretion
to the provinces to implement or not
implement the law. Said sec. 11 gives the
provincial board arbitrary discretion. The Act
becomes applicable only if provincial boards
appropriate. The salary for the probation
officer of the province.
Act violates equality clause.
- person X in province A may benefit from the
Act bec province A provided for the salary of
the probation officer whereas person Y may
not in province B that did not do the same. It
permits the denial of equal protection which
is not different from a direct denial of equal
protection.
Separability. Sec. 11 is invalid, the whole law
is invalid. How can the law be implemented
without probation officers (which is the
subject matter of said sec. 11). Enough must
remain (in the impugned statute) to make a
complete, intelligible, and valid statute which
carries out the leg interest. This is not the
case here.
YES.
*Standing depends on the personal stake of the
complainant in the outcome of the controversy.
1. Standing basically depends on establishing a logical
connection between the status asserted and the claim
sought to be adjudicated. This will help determine if the
petitioner is an appropriate party to invoke federal judicial
power.
There are 2 aspects to consider in
establishing personal stake and interest in
the case:
1.) Establishing a logical link between status and
type of legislative enactment attacked.
~ A taxpayer will be considered as a proper party if
he is able to allege that there is unconstitutionality
on the part of the congress in exercising its power,
following the taxing and spending clause of the
Constitution.
2.) Establishing a link between status and
precise nature of alleged constitutional
infringement.
~ The challenged law must exceed specific
constitutional limitations imposed upon the
congressional taxing and spending power.
Application to the case: The petitioners were able to fully
satisfy the 2 important aspects in establishing legal
standing.
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13. KILOSBAYAN VS. Nature: Special civil action for prohibition and
GUINGONA injunction, praying for a TRO and preliminary
DAVIDE, JR.; injunction, to prohibit and restrain
05/05/1994 implementation of "Contract of Lease" between
PCSO and PGMC in connection with on-line
lottery system a.k.a. "lotto".
1. Pursuant to Section 1 of its charter (RA
1169), PCSO decided to establish an
online lottery system for the purpose of
increasing its revenue base and
diversifying its sources of funds.
Sometime before March 1993, after
learning that PCSO was interested in
operating an on-line lottery system,
Berjaya Group Berhad, a multinational
company in Malaysia, became interested
to offer its services and resources to
PCSO and organized with some Filipino
investors in March 1993 a corporation
known as the Philippine Gaming
Management Corporation (PGMC).
2. Before August 1993, PCSO finally
formally issued a Request for Proposal
(RFP) for the Lease of Contract of an on-
line lottery system for PCSO. Considering
the citizenship requirement in the RFP
("Lessor shall be a domestic corporation,
with at least 60% of its shares owned by
Filipino shareholders"), PGMC claims
that Berjaya Group undertook to reduce
its equity stakes in PGMC to 40%, by
selling 35% out of the original 75%
foreign stockholdings to local investors.
3. Aug. 15, 1993, PGMC submitted its bid to
PCSO. The bids were evaluated by the
Special Pre-Qualification Bids and
Awards committee (SPBAC) for the on-
line lottery and its Bid Report was
thereafter submitted to the Office of the
President. (This was preceded by
complaints from the Committe's
Chairperson, Dr. Mita Pardo de Tavera.)
4. Oct. 21, 1993, the Office of the President
announced that it had given PGMC the
go-signal to operate the countr's on-line
lottery system. Announcement was
published in Manila Times, PDI, and
Manila Standard on Oct. 29.
5. Nov. 4, 1993, KILOSBAYAN sent an
open letter to President Ramos strongly
opposing the setting up of an on-line
lotttery system on the basis of serious
moral and ethical considerations.
KILOSBAYAN reiterated its vigorous
opposition to lotto at the meeting of the
Committee on Games and Amusements
of the Senate on Nov. 12, 1993
6. Nov. 19, 1993, the media announced that
despite the opposition, Malacanang will
push through with operation of lotto, that
it is actually PCSO which will operate the
lottery while winning corporate bidders
merely lessors.
7. Dec. 1, 1993, KILOSBAYAN requested
copies of all documents pertaining to the
lottery award from Executive Secretary
Teofisto Guingona, Jr., who informed
KILOSBAYAN that the documents will be
transmitted before the end of the month.
However on the same date, an
agreement denominated as Contract of
Lease was finally executed by PCSO
and PGMC.
8. Considering the denial by the Office of
Procedural: WON the
petitioners have locus standi.
Substantive: WON the
Contract of Lease is legal and
valid in light of RA 1169 as
amended by BP Blg. 42,
which prohibits PCSO from
holding and conducting
lotteries "in collaboration,
association, or joint venture
with any person, association,
company, or entity, whether
domestic or foreign."
acts of the PCSO and PGMC indubitably disclose that
lottery system, and that although it wished to have the
system, it would have it "at no expense or risks to the
CALUAG, CHIONGSON, CIPRES, MARONILLA, MILLETE, QUERUBIN, RICO, SY, UY | 11
-As taxpayers, they challenged the congressional power
to spend for general welfare.
- They were able to clearly identify that the congress
violated a specific provision in the Constitution, which is
the Establishment and Free Exercise Clause.
2. The decision in Frothingham does not apply to this
case. In this case, Mrs. Frothingham was able to attack a
federal spending program as a taxpayer. However, she
was not able to clearly identify what is the Constitutional
violation made under that program.
DECISION: Reversed
HELD
1. The preliminary issue on the locus standi of the
petitioners should, indeed, be resolved in their favor. A
party's standing before this Court is a procedural
technicality which it may, in the exercise of its discretion,
set aside in view of the importance of the issues raised.
In the landmark Emergency Powers Cases, this Court
brushed aside this technicality because "the
transcendental importance to the public of these cases
demands that they be settled promptly and definitely,
brushing aside, if we must, technicalities of procedure.'
- The Court found the instant petition to be of
transcendental importance to the public. The
ramifications of such issues immeasurably affect the
social, economic, and moral well-being of the people
even in the remotest barangays of the country and the
counter-productive and retrogressive effects of the
envisioned on-line lottery system are as staggering as
the billions in pesos it is expected to raise. The legal
standing then of the petitioners deserves recognition
and, in the exercise of its sound discretion, this Court
hereby brushes aside the procedural barrier which the
respondents tried to take advantage of
2. Contract of Lease is void for being contrary to law.
PGMC is not only a Lessor, PCSO in the least will be
conducting lotteries in collaboration or association and
in the most in joint vernture with PGMC. The
manegerial and technical expertise of PGMC are
indespensible to the operation of the on-line lottery
system, whereas PCSO only has its franchise to offer.
- By the exception explicitly made in paragraph B,
Section 1 of its charter, the PCSO cannot share its
franchise with another by way of collaboration,
association or joint venture. Neither can it assign,
transfer, or lease such franchise.
- It is a settled rule that "in all grants by the government
to individuals or corporations of rights, privileges and
franchises, the words are to be taken most strongly
against the grantee .... [o]ne who claims a franchise or
privilege in derogation of the common rights of the public
must prove his title thereto by a grant which is clearly
and definitely expressed, and he cannot enlarge it by
equivocal or doubtful provisions or by probable
inferences. Whatever is not unequivocally granted is
withheld. Nothing passes by mere implication."
- Whether the contract in question is one of lease or
whether the PGMC is merely an independent contractor
should not be decided on the basis of the title or
designation of the contract but by the intent of the
parties, which may be gathered from the provisions of
the contract itself. Animus hominis est anima scripti. The
intention of the party is the soul of the instrument.
- A careful analysis and evaluation of the provisions of
the contract and a consideration of the contemporaneous
the contract is not in reality a contract of lease under
which the PGMC is merely an independent contractor for
a piece of work, but one where the statutorily proscribed
collaboration or association, in the least, or joint venture,
at the most, exists between the contracting parties.
(Collaboration is defined as the acts of working together
in a joint project. Association means the act of a
number of persons in uniting together for some special
purpose or business. Joint venture is defined as an
association of persons or companies jointly undertaking
some commercial enterprise; generally all contribute
assets and share risks. )
- The contemporaneous acts of the PCSO and the
PGMC reveal that the PCSO had neither funds of its own
nor the expertise to operate and manage an on-line
government." Because of these serious constraints and
unwillingness to bear expenses and assume risks, the
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the President of its protest and the PCSO was candid enough to state in its RFP that it is
statement of Assistant Executive seeking for "a suitable contractor which shall build, at its
Secretary Renato Corona that "only a own expense, all the facilities needed to operate and
court injunction can stop Malacaang," maintain" the system; exclusively bear "all capital,
and the imminent implementation of the operating expenses and expansion expenses and risks."
Contract of Lease in February 1994,
KILOSBAYAN, with its co-petitioners,
filed on 28 January 1994 this petition.
PETITIONERS' CLAIM
- Petitioners claim that PCSO cannot validly
enter into the assailed Contract of Lease with
the PGMC because it is an arrangement
wherein the PCSO would hold and conduct the
on-line lottery system in "collaboration" or
"association" with the PGMC, in violation of
Section 1(B) of R.A. No. 1169, as amended by
B.P. Blg. 42, which prohibits the PCSO from
holding and conducting charity sweepstakes
races, lotteries, and other similar activities "in
collaboration, association or joint venture with
any person, association, company or entity,
foreign or domestic." And that there are terms
and conditions of the Contract "showing that
respondent PGMC is the actual lotto operator
and not respondent PCSO."
- The petitioners also point out that the Contract
of Lease requires or authorizes PGMC to
establish a telecommunications network that
will connect all the municipalities and cities in
the territory. However, PGMC cannot do that
because it has no franchise from Congress to
construct, install, establish, or operate the
network pursuant to Section 1 of Act No. 3846,
as amended.
- Moreover, PGMC is a 75% foreign-owned or
controlled corporation and cannot, therefore, be
granted a franchise for that purpose because of
Section 11, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.
Furthermore, since "the subscribed foreign
capital" of the PGMC "comes to about 75%, as
shown by paragraph EIGHT of its Articles of
Incorporation," it cannot lawfully enter into the
contract in question because all forms of
gambling and lottery is one of them are
included in the so-called foreign investments
negative list under the Foreign Investments Act
(R.A. No. 7042) where only up to 40% foreign
capital is allowed.
- Finally, the petitioners insist that the Articles of
Incorporation of PGMC do not authorize it to
establish and operate an on-line lottery and
telecommunications systems.
RESPONDENTS' COMMENTS
- Private respondent PGMC asserts that "(1) [it]
is merely an independent contractor for a piece
of work and (2) as such independent contractor,
PGMC is not a co-operator of the lottery
franchise with PCSO, nor is PCSO sharing its
franchise, 'in collaboration, association or joint
venture' with PGM.
- Finally, it states that the execution and
implementation of the contract does not violate
the Constitution and the laws; that the issue on
the "morality" of the lottery franchise granted to
the PCSO is political and not judicial or legal,
which should be ventilated in another forum;
and that the "petitioners do not appear to have
the legal standing or real interest in the subject
contract and in obtaining the reliefs sought."
- Executive Secretary Teofisto Guingona, Jr.,
Assistant Executive Secretary Renato Corona,
and the PCSO maintain that the contract of
lease in question does not violate Section 1 of
R.A. No. 1169, as amended by B.P. Blg. 42,
and that the petitioner's interpretation of the
phrase "in collaboration, association or joint
venture" in Section 1 is "much too narrow,
strained and utterly devoid of logic" for it
"ignores the reality that PCSO, as a corporate
entity, is vested with the basic and essential
prerogative to enter into all kinds of
transactions or contracts as may be necessary
for the attainment of its purposes and
objectives." What the PCSO charter "seeks to
prohibit is that arrangement akin to a "joint

CALUAG, CHIONGSON, CIPRES, MARONILLA, MILLETE, QUERUBIN, RICO, SY, UY | 12

 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II (ATTY. BUTCH JAMON): TABLE OF CASES
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venture" or partnership where there is
"community of interest in the business, sharing
of profits and losses, and a mutual right of
control," a characteristic which does not obtain
in a contract of lease." They further claim that
the establishment of the telecommunications
system stipulated in the Contract of Lease does
not require a congressional franchise because
PGMC will not operate a public utility
- They also argue that the contract does not
violate the Foreign Investment Act of 1991; that
the Articles of Incorporation of PGMC authorize
it to enter into the Contract of Lease; and that
the issues of "wisdom, morality and propriety of
acts of the executive department are beyond
the ambit of judicial review."
Finally, they allege that the petitioners
have no standing to maintain the instant
suit.
14. FRANCISCO VS. - Art 11, Sec 8 Constitution Congress shall
HOUSE promulgate its rules on impeachment to
CARPIO-MORALES; effectively carry out the purpose of this Section.
11/10/2003 - November 2001 - 12th Congress of the House
of Representatives adopted and approved the
Rules of Procedure in Impeachment
Proceedings (House Impeachment Rules)
superseding the Rules approved by 11th
Congress
> Section 16. Impeachment Proceedings
Deemed Initiated. In cases where a
Member of the House files a verified
complaint of impeachment or a citizen files
a verified complaint that is endorsed by a
Member of the House through a resolution
of endorsement against an impeachable
officer, impeachment proceedings against
such official are deemed initiated on the
day the Committee on Justice finds that
the verified complaint and/or resolution
against such official, as the case may be,
is sufficient in substance, or on the date
the House votes to overturn or affirm the
finding of the said Committee that the
verified complaint and/or resolution, as the
case may be, is not sufficient in substance.
In cases where a verified complaint or a
resolution of impeachment is filed or
endorsed, as the case may be, by at least
one-third (1/3) of the Members of the
House, impeachment proceedings are
deemed initiated at the time of the filing of
such verified complaint or resolution of
impeachment with the Secretary General.
> Section 17. Bar Against Initiation Of
Impeachment Proceedings. Within a
period of one (1) year from the date
impeachment proceedings are deemed
initiated as provided in Section 16 hereof,
no impeachment proceedings, as such,
can be initiated against the same official.
- July 2002 House of representatives
adopted a Resolution directing Committee on
Justice to conduct an investigation in aid of
legislation on the manner of disbursements
and expenditures by the Chief Justice of the
Judiciary Development Fund
- June 2003 Pres. Estrada filed the first
impeachment complaint against Davide and 7
associate justices for culpable violation of the
Constitution, betrayal of public trust, and other
high crimes; endorsed by Rep. Suplico,
Zamora, and Dilangalen House Committee
on Justice dismissed the complain because
insufficient in substance
- October 2003 Rep. Teodoro and
Fuentebella filed second impeachment
complaint founded on the alleged results of the
legislative inquiry; resolution of
endorsement/impeachment was signed by at
least 1/3 of all the members of the House of
Representatives
15. SANLAKAS VS. 1. Three hundred junior officers and
1. WON issue is justiciable
2. WON Rules of Procedure
for Impeachment Proceedings
adopted by 12th Congress is
constitutional and second
impeachment complaint is
valid
1. Whether or not petitions
CALUAG, CHIONGSON, CIPRES, MARONILLA, MILLETE, QUERUBIN, RICO, SY, UY | 13
1. Justiciable. The Constitution did not intend to leave
the matter of impeachment to the sole discretion of
Congress. Instead, it provided for judicially discoverable
standards for determining the validity of the exercise of
such discretion through power of judicial review.
o Locus standi - Case is of transcendental pubic
importance.
o Ripe for adjudication - the second complaint had
been filed and the 2001 rules had been
promulgated and enforced.
o Lis mota - (1) whether Sections 15 and 16 of
Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules
adopted by the 12th Congress are
unconstitutional for violating the provisions of
Section 3, Article XI of the Constitution; and (2)
whether, as a result thereof, the second
impeachment complaint is barred under Section
3(5) of Article XI of the Constitution.
o Judicial Restraint not an option because the
Court is not legally disqualified; no other tribunal
to which the controversy may be referred.
2. Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the Rules of
Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings which were
approved by the House of Representatives on November
28, 2001 are unconstitutional. Consequently, the second
impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G.
Davide, Jr. which was filed by Representatives Gilberto
C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William B. Fuentebella with the
Office of the Secretary General of the House of
Representatives on October 23, 2003 is barred under
paragraph 5, section 3 of Article XI of the Constitution.
o Interpretation of the term initiate takes place
by the act of filing and referral or endorsement
of the impeachment complaint to the House
Committee on Justice or, by filing by at least 1/3
of the members of the HR with the Secretary
General of the House, the meaning of Sec 3 (5)
of Art XI becomes clear.
o Sec 3 (5) of Article XI once an impeachment
complains has been initiated, another complaint
may not be filed against the same official within
a period of one year.
o Under Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the
House Impeachment Rules, impeachment
proceedings are deemed initiated (1) if there is a
finding by the House Committee on Justice that
the verified complaint and/or resolution is
sufficient in substance, or (2) once the House
itself affirms or overturns the finding of the
Committee on Justice that the verified complaint
and/or resolution is not sufficient in substance or
(3) by the filing or endorsement before the
Secretary-General of the House of
Representatives of a verified complaint or a
resolution of impeachment by at least 1/3 of the
members of the House. These rules clearly
contravene Section 3 (5) of Article XI since the
rules give the term initiate a meaning different
meaning from filing and referral.
1. Petitions are moot and academic, although the
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II (ATTY. BUTCH JAMON): TABLE OF CASES
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EXEC. SEC. enlisted men from the Armed Forces of
TINGA; 02/03/2004 the Philippines (AFP) staged a mutiny
by storming the Oakwood Premiere
apartments in Makati City on July 27,
2003
2. The mutineers cried of corruption in the
Armed Forces of the Philippines;
demanded for the resignation of the
President, the Secretary of Defense,
and the Chief of the Philippine National
Police (PNP)
3. In lieu of the said mutiny, the President
issued Proclamation No. 427 and
General Order No. 4, both declaring a
state of rebellion and called on the AFP
to suppress the rebellion
4. The mutiny ended on the evening of
July 27, 2003
5. After negotiations with the soldiers to
return to their barracks, the President
lifted the state of rebellion five days
later on August 1, 2003, through
Proclamation No. 435
6. Petitioners Sanlakas, Partido
Manggagawa (PM), and Social Justice
Society (SJS), in relation to Section 18,
Art. VII of the Constitution, contend
that:
The declaration of a state of
rebellion is not required to call out
the armed forces
Due to the cessation of the
rebellion, there exists no factual
basis for the imposition of a state
of rebellion in an indefinite period
(the mutiny ended on the evening
of July 27, 2003; the state of
rebellion ensued for five days until
August 1, 2003)
The report circumvents the report
requirement, which requires the
President to make a report 48
hours after the proclamation of
martial law
7. Petitioner Suplico, et al., contends that
the declaration of a state of rebellion by
the President is an indirect exercise of
emergency powers
a. Said petitioner contends that under
Section 23 (2), Art. VII of the
Constitution, such exercise of
emergency powers is exclusive to
Congress, and that the declaration
made by the President thus results to
the latters usurpation of their said
exclusive power
8. Petitioner Senator Pimentel contends
that the presidential issuances
constitute an unwarranted exercise of
martial law power, which is baseless
under the Constitution
Said petitioner fears that the said
declaration of the President may
pave way for the unconstitutional
imposition of warrantless arrests
are moot and academic
2. Whether or not
petitioners have legal
standing
3. Whether or not a
declaration of a state of
rebellion is required to
call out the armed forces
4. Whether or not there is
factual basis for the
imposition of a state of
rebellion
5. Whether or not said
declaration constitutes
exercise of emergency
powers
6. Whether or not the
issuances are
tantamount to exercising 2.
martial law powers
3.
CALUAG, CHIONGSON, CIPRES, MARONILLA, MILLETE, QUERUBIN, RICO, SY, UY | 14
Supreme Court recognizes jurisdiction over cases
that are capable of repetition yet evading review
The petitions are deemed moot and
academic, because the state of rebellion has
been lifted already on August 1, 2003
The Lacson vs. Perez precedent proved that
this case is capable of repetition; in the said
case, an angry mob that stormed
Malacanang on May 1, 2001 has compelled
the President to call upon the AFP and PNP
to suppress the rebellion through
Proclamation No. 38 and General Order No.
1
In this case, the Supreme Court went on to
assess the validity of the Presidents
declaration
Petitioners Sanlakas, PM, and SJS, have no legal
standing to sue; Petitioners Suplico et al. and
Pimentel (Members of Congress) have standing to
sue
Whereas petitioners Sanlakas et al. are
considered peoples organizations that
represents the interest of the people, the
Supreme Court is still observant of the rule
that only real parties in interest or those who
would suffer a direct injury from the
controversy, are the ones who may invoke
the judicial power
Petitioners Members of Congress have made
clear the validity of their legal standing, since
their contention involving the alleged
usurpation of the President of their
constitutional power speaks of their
incurrence of direct damage
For purposes of exercising the calling out power,
the President is not required to declare a state of
rebellion
Section 18, Art. VII of the Constitution:
whenever it becomes necessary, he may
call out such armed forces to prevent or
suppress lawless violence, invasion or
rebellion.
Section 18, Art. VII of the Constitution grants
the President, in her capacity as
Commander-in-Chief, the following powers:
o Calling out power
o Power to suspend the writ of
habeas corpus
o Power to declare martial law
In order for the President to exercise the
latter two powers, these two conditions must
exist:
o Actual invasion or rebellion
o Exercise of said power required
for ensuring public safety
The aforementioned conditions are not
required in the exercise of the calling out
power
The Constitution of the United States of
America (USA) serves as the foundation of
the overall concept of the Presidents power
as Chief Executive and Commander-In-Chief
Residual executive powers of the President,
as suggested by Justice Cortes, rests upon
the President
o Such is due to the highly unitary
and centralized nature of the
Philippines government
o Exemplified in Marcos vs.
Manglapus, wherein residual
executive power is practiced by
the President by barring the
return of former President Marcos
due to perceived threats of
destabilization against the
government and other forms of
socio-political disturbances
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II (ATTY. BUTCH JAMON): TABLE OF CASES
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16. LACSON VS. PEREZ 1. On May 1, 2001, President Macapagal-
MELO; 05/10/2001 Arroyo, faced by an angry and violent mob
armed with explosives, firearms, bladed
weapons, clubs, stones and other deadly
weapons assaulting and attempting to
break into Malacaang, issued
Proclamation No. 38 declaring that there
was a state of rebellion in the National
Capital Region.
2. She likewise issued General Order No. 1
directing the Armed Forces of the
Philippines and the Philippine National
Police to suppress the rebellion in the
National Capital Region.
3. Warrantless arrests of several alleged
leaders and promoters of the rebellion
were thereafter effected.
4. Aggrieved by the warrantless arrests, and
the declaration of a state of rebellion,
which allegedly gave a semblance of
legality to the arrests, the following four
related petitions were filed before the
Court.
5. Prior to resolution, the state of rebellion
was lifted in Metro Manila.
1. Whether or not the
declaration of a state of
rebellion is constitutional
warrantless arrests, the Secretary of Justice denies that
it has issued a particular order to arrest specific persons
warrant. The warrantless arrest feared by petitioners is,
declaration of a state of rebellion is violative of the
CALUAG, CHIONGSON, CIPRES, MARONILLA, MILLETE, QUERUBIN, RICO, SY, UY | 15
4. There is factual basis for the implementation of a
state of rebellion
Section 18 (3), Art. VII of the Constitution:
The Supreme Court may review, in an
appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen,
the sufficiency of the factual basis for the
proclamation of martial law or the suspension
of the writ of habeas corpus or the extension
thereof, ad must promulgate its decision
thereon within three days from its filing.
No proof was shown by the petitioners that
the President has acted without factual basis
5. Power exercised by the President in declaring a
state of rebellion and in calling out the armed
forces is in consonance with her powers as Chief
Executive and Commander-in-Chief
There was no instance wherein the President
has acted beyond her powers as both Chief
Executive and Commander-in-Chief
6. No. Said declarations are not tantamount to the
declaration of martial law
No indication that military tribunals have
taken over jurisdiction over civil courts
No indication of curtailment of civil and
political rights
No indication of Presidents encroachment of
other branches of government
No indication of attempt, at all, that President
attempted to exercise martial law
Petitions DISMISSED.
As to warrantless arrests
As to petitioners claim that the proclamation of a state
of rebellion is being used by the authorities to justify
in connection with the rebellion. xxx
With this declaration, petitioners apprehensions as to
warrantless arrests should be laid to rest.
In quelling or suppressing the rebellion, the authorities
may only resort to warrantless arrests of persons
suspected of rebellion, as provided under Section 5, Rule
113 of the Rules of Court, if the circumstances so
thus, not based on the declaration of a state of
rebellion.
Was there violation of doctrine of separation of powers?
Petitioner Lumbao, leader of the Peoples Movement
against Poverty (PMAP), for his part, argues that the
doctrine of separation of powers, being an encroachment
on the domain of the judiciary which has the
constitutional prerogative to determine or interpret what
took place on May 1, 2001, and that the declaration of a
state of rebellion cannot be an exception to the general
rule on the allocation of the governmental powers.
We disagree. To be sure, section 18, Article VII of
the Constitution expressly provides that [t]he President
shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of
the Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he
may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress
lawless violence, invasion or rebellion thus, we held in
Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Hon. Zamora, (G.R.
No. 141284, August 15, 2000):
xxx The factual necessity of calling out the armed forces
is not easily quantifiable and cannot be objectively
established since matters considered for satisfying the
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II (ATTY. BUTCH JAMON): TABLE OF CASES
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17. JOYA VS. PCGG 1. The Republic of the Philippines through the
GUTIERREZ, JR.; PCGG entered into
11/09/1990 a Consignment Agreement with Christies
of New York, selling 82 Old Masters
Paintings and antique silverware seized
from Malacanang and the Metropolitan
Museum of Manila alleged to be part of the
ill-gotten wealth of the late Pres. Marcos,
his relatives and cronies.
2. Prior to the auction sale, COA questioned
the Consignment Agreement, there was
already opposition to the auction sale.
3. Nevertheless, it proceeded as scheduled
and the proceeds of $13,302,604.86 were
turned over to the Bureau of Treasury.
same is a combination of several factors which are not
always accessible to the courts. Besides the absence of
testual standards that the court may use to judge
necessity, information necessary to arrive at such
judgment might also prove unmanageable for the courts.
Certain pertinent information necessary to arrive at such
judgment might also prove unmanageable for the courts.
Certain pertinent information might be difficult to verify, or
wholly unavailable to the courts. In many instances, the
evidence upon which the President might decide that
there is a need to call out the armed forces may be of a
nature not constituting technical proof.
On the other hand, the President as Commander-in-
Chief has a vast intelligence network to gather
information, some of which may be classified as highly
confidential or affecting the security of the state. In the
exercise of the power to call, on-the-spot decisions may
be imperatively necessary in emergency situations to
avert great loss of human lives and mass destruction of
property. xxx
The Court, in a proper case, may look into the sufficiency
of the factual basis of the exercise of this power.
However, this is no longer feasible at this time,
Proclamation No. 38 having been lifted.
1. Whether or not PCGG has On jurisdiction of the Court to exercise judicial review
jurisdiction and authority
to enter into an agreement The rule is settled that no question involving the
with Christies of New constitutionality or validity of a law or governmental act
York for the sale of may be heard and decided by the court unless there is
the artworks? compliance with the legal requisites for judicial inquiry,
namely: that the question must be raised by the proper
party; that there must be an actual case or controversy;
that the question must be raised at the earliest possible
opportunity; and, that the decision on the constitutional
or legal question must be necessary to the determination
of the case itself. But the most important are the first two
(2) requisites.
Standing of Petitioners
On the first requisite, we have held that one having no
right or interest to protect cannot invoke the jurisdiction of
the court as party-plaintiff in an action. This is premised
on Sec. 2, Rule 3, of the Rules of Court which provides
that every action must be prosecuted and defended in
the name of the real party-in-interest, and that all
persons having interest in the subject of the action and in
obtaining the relief demanded shall be joined as
plaintiffs. The Court will exercise its power of judicial
review only if the case is brought before it by a party who
has the legal standing to raise the constitutional or legal
question. "Legal standing" means a personal and
substantial interest in the case such that the partyhas
sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the
governmental act that is being challenged. The term
"interest" is material interest, an interest in issue and to
be affected by the decree, as distinguished from mere
interest in the question involved, or a mere incidental
interest. Moreover, the interest of the party plaintiff must
be personal and not one based on a desire to vindicate
the constitutional right of some third and related party.
EXCEPTIONS TO LEGAL STANDING: Mandamus and
Taxpayers Suit:
There are certain instances however when this Court has
allowed exceptions to the rule on legal standing, as when
a citizen brings a case for mandamus to procure the
enforcement of a public duty for the fulfillment of a public
right recognized by the Constitution, and when a
taxpayer questions the validity of a governmental act
authorizing the disbursement of public funds.
Petitioners claim that as Filipino citizens, taxpayers and
artists deeply concerned with the preservation and
protection of the country's artistic wealth, they have the
legal personality to restrain respondents Executive
Secretary and PCGG from acting contrary to their public
duty to conserve the artistic creations as mandated by
the 1987 Constitution, particularly Art. XIV, Secs. 14 to
18, on Arts and Culture, and R.A. 4846 known as "The
Cultural Properties Preservation and Protection Act,"
governing the preservation and disposition of national
CALUAG, CHIONGSON, CIPRES, MARONILLA, MILLETE, QUERUBIN, RICO, SY, UY | 16
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II (ATTY. BUTCH JAMON): TABLE OF CASES
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and important cultural properties. Petitioners also anchor

their case on the premise that the paintings
and silverware are public properties collectively owned
by them and by the people in general to view and enjoy
as great works of art. They allege that with the
unauthorized act of PCGG in selling the art pieces,
petitioners have been deprived of their right to public
property without due process of law in violation of the
Constitution.

Petitioners' arguments are devoid of merit. They lack

basis in fact and in law. They themselves allege that the
paintings were donated by private persons from different
parts of the world to the Metropolitan Museum of Manila
Foundation, which is a non-profit and non-stock
corporations established to promote non-Philippine arts.
The foundation's chairman was former First Lady Imelda
R. Marcos, while its president was Bienvenido R.
Tantoco. On this basis, the ownership of these paintings
legally belongs to the foundation or corporation or the
members thereof, although the public has been given the
opportunity to view and appreciate these paintings when
they were placed on exhibit.

Similarly, as alleged in the petition, the pieces of

antique silverware were given to the Marcos couple as
gifts from friends and dignitaries from foreign countries
on their silver wedding and anniversary, an occasion
personal to them. When the Marcos administration was
toppled by the revolutionary government, these paintings
and silverware were taken from Malacaang and the
Metropolitan Museum of Manila and transferred to the
Central Bank Museum. The confiscation of these
properties by the Aquino administration however should
not be understood to mean that the ownership of these
paintings has automatically passed on the government
without complying with constitutional and statutory
requirements of due process and just compensation. If
these properties were already acquired by the
government, any constitutional or statutory defect in their
acquisition and their subsequent disposition must be
raised only by the proper parties the true owners
thereof whose authority to recover emanates from
their proprietary rights which are protected by statutes
and the Constitution. Having failed to show that they are
the legal owners of theartworks or that the valued pieces
have become publicly owned, petitioners do not possess
any clear legal rightwhatsoever to question their alleged
unauthorized disposition.

Requisites for a Mandamus Suit

Further, although this action is also one of mandamus

filed by concerned citizens, it does not fulfill the criteria
for a mandamus suit. In Legaspi v. Civil Service
Commission, this Court laid down the rule that a writ of
mandamus may be issued to a citizen only when the
public right to be enforced and the concomitant duty of
the state are unequivocably set forth in the Constitution.
In the case at bar, petitioners are not after the fulfillment
of a positive duty required of respondent officials under
the 1987 Constitution. What they seek is the enjoining of
an official act because it is constitutionally infirmed.
Moreover, petitioners' claim for the continued enjoyment
and appreciation by the public of theartworks is at most a
privilege and is unenforceable as a constitutional right in
this action for mandamus.

When a Taxpayer's Suit may prosper

Neither can this petition be allowed as a taxpayer's suit.

Not every action filed by a taxpayer can qualify to
challenge the legality of official acts done by the
government. A taxpayer's suit can prosper only if the
governmental acts being questioned involve
disbursement of public funds upon the theory that the
expenditure of public funds by an officer of the state for
the purpose of administering an unconstitutional act
constitutes a misapplication of such funds, which may be
enjoined at the request of a taxpayer. Obviously,
petitioners are not challenging any expenditure involving
public funds but the disposition of what they allege to be
public properties. It is worthy to note that petitioners
admit that the paintings and antique silverware were
acquired from private sources and not with public money.

CALUAG, CHIONGSON, CIPRES, MARONILLA, MILLETE, QUERUBIN, RICO, SY, UY | 17

 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II (ATTY. BUTCH JAMON): TABLE OF CASES
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18. TANADA VS. 1. On 24 April 1985, the Court affirmed the
TUVERA necessity for the publication to the
CRUZ; 12/29/1986 Official Gazette all unpublished
presidential issuances which are of
general application, and unless so
published, they shall have no binding
force and effect.
2. Decision was concurred only by 3
judges. Petitioners move for
reconsideration / clarification of the
decision on various questions. Solicitor
General avers that the motion is a
request for advisory opinion. February
Revolution took place, which
subsequently required the new Solicitor
General to file a rejoinder on the issue
(under Rule 3, Section 18 of the Rules of
Court).
19. UMALI VS. 1. Osmundo Umali the petitioner was
GUINGONA appointed Regional Director of the Bureau
GUTIERREZ, JR.; of Internal Revenue by Pres Fidel V.
11/09/1990 Ramos. He assigned him in Manila,
November 29, 1993 to March 15, 1994
and Makati, March 16, 1994 to August 4,
1994.
2. On August 1, 1994, President Ramos
received a confidential memorandum
against the petitioner for alleged violations
of internal revenue laws, rules and
regulations during his incumbency as
Regional Director, more particularly the
following malfeasance, misfeasance and
nonfeasance. upon receipt of the said
confidential memorandum,
former President authorized the issuance
of an Order for the preventive suspension
of the petitioner and immediately referred
the Complaint against the latter to the
Presidential Commission on Anti-Graft
1. Whether publication is still
required in light of the
clause unless otherwise
provided.
1. Whether or Not AO No.
152 violated petitioner's
Right to Security of
Tenure.
2. Whether or Not Petitioner
was denied due process of
law
3. Whether or Not the
PCAGC is a validly
Constituted government
agency and whether the
petitioner can raise the
issue of constitutionality
belatedly in its motion for
reconsideration of the trial
courts decision.
4. Whether or Not the
ombudsman's resolution
dismissing the charges
against the petitioner is
still basis for the
CALUAG, CHIONGSON, CIPRES, MARONILLA, MILLETE, QUERUBIN, RICO, SY, UY | 18
Actual Controversy
For a court to exercise its power of adjudication, there
must be an actual case of controversy one which
involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite
legal claims susceptible of judicial resolution; the case
must not be moot or academic or based on extra-legal or
other similar considerations not cognizable by a court of
justice. A case becomes moot and academic when its
purpose has become stale, such as the case before us.
Since the purpose of this petition for prohibition is to
enjoin respondent public officials from holding the
auction sale of the artworks on a particular date 11
January 1991 which is long past, the issues raised in
the petition have become moot and academic.
At this point, however, we need to emphasize that this
Court has the discretion to take cognizance of a suit
which does not satisfy the requirements of an actual
case or legal standing when paramount public interest is
involved. We find however that there is no such
justification in the petition at bar to warrant the relaxation
of the rule.
Petition DISMISSED.
1. YES. The clause unless it is otherwise provided, in
Article 2 of the Civil Code, refers to the date of effectivity
and not to the requirement of publication itself, which
cannot in any event be omitted.
This clause does not mean that the legislature may
make the law effective immediately upon approval, or
on any other date, without its previous publication.
The legislature may in its discretion provide that the
usual fifteen-day period shall be shortened or
extended. Publication requirements applies to (1) all
statutes, including those of local application and
private laws; (2) presidential decrees and executive
orders promulgated by the President in the exercise of
legislative powers whenever the same are validly
delegated by the legislature or directly conferred by
the Constitution; (3) Administrative rules and
regulations for the purpose of enforcing or
implementing existing law pursuant also to a valid
delegation; (4) Charter of a city notwithstanding that it
applies to only a portion of the national territory and
directly affects only the inhabitants of that place; (5)
Monetary Board circulars to fill in the details of the
Central Bank Act which that body is supposed to
enforce.
Further, publication must be in full or it is no
publication at all since its purpose is to inform the
public of the contents of the laws.
The Supreme Court declared that all laws as above
defined shall immediately upon their approval, or as
soon thereafter as possible, be published in full in the
Official Gazette, to become effective only after 15
days from their publication, or on another date
specified by the legislature, in accordance with Article
2 of the Civil Code.
Laws ordered to be PUBLISHED in the Official Gazette
for effectivity
1. NO, it cant be said that there was a violation of what
petitioner asserts as his security of tenure. According
to petitioner, as a Regional Director of Bureau of
Internal Revenue, he is CESO eligible entitled to
security of tenure. However, petitioner's claim of
CESO eligibility is anemic of evidentiary support. It
was incumbent upon him to prove that he is a CESO
eligible but unfortunately, he failed to adduce
sufficient evidence on the matter. His failure to do so
is fatal.
2. NO. To be sure, petitioner was not denied the right to
due process before the PCAGC. Records show that
the petitioner filed his answer and other pleadings
with respect to his alleged violation of internal
revenue laws and regulations, and he attended the
hearings before the investigatory body. It is thus
decisively clear that his protestation of non-
observance of due process is devoid of any factual
or legal basis.
3. As regards the issue of constitutionality of the
PCAGC, it was only posed by petitioner in his motion
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II (ATTY. BUTCH JAMON): TABLE OF CASES
MIDTERM WEEK, TERM 2, A.Y. 2010-2011
and Corruption (PCAGC), for
investigation.
3. Petitioner was duly informed of the
charges against him. And was directed
him to send in his answer, copies of his
Statement of Assets, and Liabilities for the
past three years (3), andPersonal
Data Sheet. Initial hearing was set on
August 25, 1994, at 2:00 p.m., at the
PCAGC Office.
4. On August 23, the petitioner filed his
required answer. After evaluating the
evidence on record, the PCAGC issued its
Resolution of September 23, 1994, finding
a prima facie evidence to support six (6)
of the twelve (12) charges against
petitioner. On October 6, 1994, acting
upon the recommendation of the PCAGC,
then President Ramos
issued Administrative Order No. 152
dismissing petitioner from the service,
with forfeiture of retirement and
all benefits under the law.
20. ARCETA VS. 1. The City Prosecutor of Navotas, Metro
MANGROBANG Manila charged Ofelia V. Arceta with
QUISUMBING; violating Batas Pambansa 22 in an
06/15/2004 Information (Criminal Case 1599-CR),
alleging in an Information that on or about
16 September 1998, Arceta issued a
Regional Bank check worth P740,000
(postdated 21 December 1998) to Oscar
R. Castro payable in CASH, well-knowing
that at the time of issue she did have
sufficient funds or credit with the drawee
bank for the payment, and despite receipt
of notice of such dishonor,
2. Arceta failed to pay said payee with the
face amount of said check or to make
arrangement for full payment thereof
within 5 banking days after receiving
notice.
3. Arceta did not move to have the charge
against her dismissed or the Information
quashed on the ground that BP 22 was
unconstitutional. She reasoned out that
with the Lozano doctrine still in place,
such a move would be an exercise in
futility for it was highly unlikely that the
trial court would grant her motion and thus
go against prevailing jurisprudence.
4. On 21 October 2002, Arceta was
arraigned and pleaded not guilty to the
charge. However, she manifested that her
arraignment should be without prejudice
to the present petition or to any other
actions she would take to suspend
proceedings in the trial court.
5. Arceta [GR 152895] then filed the petition
for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus,
with prayers for a temporary restraining
order, assailing the constitutionality of the
Bouncing Checks Law (BP 22).
6. On the other hand, the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Caloocan filed a charge
sheet against Gloria S. Dy for violation of
the Bouncing Checks Law (MeTC of
Caloocan City, Criminal Case 212183),
alleging in the Information that on or about
the month of January 2000, Dy issued
Prudential Bank Check 0000329230 in the
amount of P2,500,000.00 dated 19
January 2000 in favor of Anita Chua well
knowing at the time of issue that she has
no sufficient funds in or credit with the
drawee bank for the payment of such
check in full upon its presentment which
check was subsequently dishonored for
petitioner's dismissal with
forfeiture of benefits as
ruled in AO No. 152
4. As to last issue, It is worthy to note that in the case
Petition DISMISSED.
1. Should the Court render
BP22 unconstitutional due
to the present economic
and financial crisis, else
due to the undue burden
made upon the MeTC by
bouncing checks cases?
Petition DENIED.
CALUAG, CHIONGSON, CIPRES, MARONILLA, MILLETE, QUERUBIN, RICO, SY, UY | 19
for reconsideration before the Regional Trial Court of
Makati. It was certainly too late to raise for the first
time at such late stage of the proceedings.
under consideration, the administrative action
against the petitioner was taken prior to the
institution of the criminal case. The charges included
in Administrative Order No. 152 were based on the
results of investigation conducted by the PCAGC
and not on the criminal charges before the
Ombudsman.
In sum, the petition is dismissable on the ground that
the Issue posited by the petitioner do not constitute a
valid legal basis for overturning the finding and
conclusion arrived at by the Court of Appeals.
However, taking into account the antecedent facts
and circumstances aforementioned, the Court, in the
exercise of its equity powers, has decided to
consider the dismissal of the charges against
petitioner before the Ombudsman, the succinct and
unmistakable manifestation by the Commissioner of
the Bureau of Internal Revenue that his office is no
longer interested in pursuing the case, and the
position taken by the Solicitor General, that there is
no more basis for Administrative Order No. 152, as
effective and substantive supervening events that
cannot be overlooked.
1. NO.
When the issue of unconstitutionality of a
legislative act is raised, it is the established
doctrine that the Court may exercise its power of
judicial review only if the following requisites are
present: (1) an actual and appropriate case and
controversy exists; (2) a personal and substantial
interest of the party raising the constitutional
question; (3) the exercise of judicial review is
pleaded at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the
constitutional question raised is the very lis mota
of the case. Only when these requisites are
satisfied may the Court assume jurisdiction over a
question of unconstitutionality or invalidity of an
act of Congress.
With due regard to counsels spirited advocacy in
both cases, the Court was unable to agree that
the said requisites have been adequately met.
Nor does the Court find the constitutional question
raised to be the very lis mota presented in the
controversy below.
Every law has in its favor the presumption of
constitutionality, and to justify its nullification,
there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of
the Constitution, and not one that is doubtful,
speculative or argumentative.
The Court examined the contentions of Arceta
and Dy carefully; but they still have to persuade
us that BP 22 by itself or in its implementation
transgressed a provision of the Constitution. Even
the thesis of Dy that the present economic and
financial crisis should be a basis to declare the
Bouncing Checks Law constitutionally infirm
deserves but scant consideration. As stressed in
Lozano, it is precisely during trying times that
there exists a most compelling reason to
strengthen faith and confidence in the financial
system and any practice tending to destroy
confidence in checks as currency substitutes
should be deterred, to prevent havoc in the
trading and financial communities.
Further, while indeed the metropolitan trial courts
may be burdened immensely by bouncing checks
cases now, that fact is immaterial to the alleged
invalidity of the law being assailed. The solution to
the clogging of dockets in lower courts lies
elsewhere.
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II (ATTY. BUTCH JAMON): TABLE OF CASES
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the reason ACCOUNT CLOSED and
with intent to defraud failed and still fails
to pay the said complainant the amount of
P2,500,000.00 despite receipt of notice
from the drawee bank that said check has
been dishonored and had not been paid.
Like Arceta,
7. Dy made no move to dismiss the charges
against her on the ground that BP 22 was
unconstitutional. Dy likewise believed that
any move on her part to quash the
indictment or to dismiss the charges on
said ground would fail in view of the
Lozano ruling. Instead, she filed a petition
with the Supreme Court invoking its power
of judicial review to have the said law
voided for Constitutional infirmity.
21. CHAVEZ VS. PEA- 1. The petition seeks to compel the Public
AMARI Estates Authority ("PEA" for brevity) to
CARPIO; 07/09/2002 disclose all facts on PEA's then on-going
renegotiations with Amari Coastal Bay
and Development Corporation ("AMARI"
for brevity) to reclaim portions of Manila
Bay.
2. The petition further seeks to enjoin PEA
from signing a new agreement with
AMARI involving such reclamation.
3. PEA asserts that in cases of on-going
negotiations the right to information is
limited to "definite propositions of the
government."
4. PEA maintains the right does not include
access to "intra-agency or inter-agency
recommendations or communications
during the stage when common
assertions are still in the process of being
formulated or are in the 'exploratory
stage'."
Ripeness
Case Facts
22. TAN VS. 1. The petitioners seeks for the court to
MACAPAGAL declare that the deliberating Constitutional
FERNANDO; Convention was "without power, under
02/29/1972 Section 1, Article XV of the Constitution
and Republic Act 6132, to consider,
discuss and adopt proposals which seek
to revise the present Constitution through
the adoption of a form of a government
other than the form now outlined in the
present Constitution [the Convention
being] merely empowered to propose
improvements to the present Constitution
without altering the general plan laid down
therein."
23. POE VS. ULLMAN 1. Mr. and Mrs. Pauline Poe had three
1. Are negotiations leading to
a settlement with PIATCO
within the scope of the
constitutional guarantee of
access to information?
Issue/s
1. Does petitioner have locus
standi?
2. Does the court have
jurisdiction over the case?
1. Do the petitioner have
CALUAG, CHIONGSON, CIPRES, MARONILLA, MILLETE, QUERUBIN, RICO, SY, UY | 20
1. YES. Section 7, Article III of the Constitution explains
the people's right to information on matters of public
concern: Access to official records, and to
documents, and papers pertaining to official acts,
transactions, or decisions, as well as to government
research data used as basis for policy development,
shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such
limitations as may be provided by law." Further, the
state policy (Sec 28, Art II) of full transparency in all
transactions involving public interest reinforces the
people's right to information on matters of public
concern.
These twin provisions of the Constitution seek to
promote transparency in policy-making and in the
operations of the government, as well as provide
the people sufficient information to exercise
effectively other constitutional rights.
Information on on-going evaluation or review of
bids or proposals being undertaken by the bidding
or review committee is not immediately accessible
under the right to information. While the
evaluation or review is still on-going, there are no
"official acts, transactions, or decisions" on the
bids or proposals. However, once the committee
makes its official recommendation, there arises a
"definite proposition" on the part of the
government.
Petition GRANTED.
Holding
1. NO.
Justice Laurel: "The unchallenged rule is that the
person who impugns the validity of a statute must
have a personal and substantial interest in the
case such that he has sustained, or will sustain,
direct injury as a result of its enforcement."
Pascual v. The Secretary of Public Works: validity
of a statute may be contested only by one who
will sustain a direct injury, in consequence of its
enforcement.
Taxpayers only have standing on laws providing
for the disbursement of public funds.
Expenditure of public funds, by an officer of the
State for the purpose of administering an
unconstitutional act constitutes a misapplication of
such funds,' which may be enjoined at the request
of a taxpayer."
2. NO.
At the time the case was filed the Con-Con has
not yet finalized any resolution that would radically
alter the 1935 constitution therefore not yet ripe
for judicial review. The case becomes ripe when
the Con-Con has actually does something
already. Then the court may actually inquire into
the jurisdiction of the body.
Separation of power departments should be left
alone to do duties as they see fit. The Executive
and the Legislature are not bound to ask for
advice in carrying out their duties, judiciary may
not interfere so that it may fulfil its duties well. The
court may not interfere until the proper time
comes ripeness
Petitin DENIED.
1. NONE. The records of the cases do not present
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II (ATTY. BUTCH JAMON): TABLE OF CASES
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FRANKFURTER; congenital abnormalities of pregnancy.
06/19/1961 While Mrs. Doe underwent pregnancy
which induced in her a critical physical
illness.
2. Both consulted Dr. Buxton which
recommended that the best and safest
medical treatment which could be
prescribed for their situation is advice in
methods of preventing conception.
3. Plaintiffs have been unable to obtain this
information of contraceptive devices for
the reason that its delivery of information
and use may or will be claimed for suit by
the defendant- States Attorney because it
is prohibited by Connecticut law.
4. Dr. Buxton claimed that he would violate
the law in giving information, since there
was a case which was brought regarding
the dissemination of contraceptive
information against 2 doctors and a nurse
but the case was dismissed.
5. Petitioners file a petition because the
Connecticut statutes violate the 14th
Amendment by depriving them of life and
property without due process of law. They
want to declare it as unconstitutional.
24. US VS. 1. Respondents attempts to gain information
RICHARDSON regarding detailed expenditures of the CIA
BURGER; 10/10/1973 2. Requested that he be provided with the
documents published by the government
in compliance with Article I, section 9,
clause (7) of the U.S. Constitution:
3. No Money shall be drawn from the
Treasury, but in Consequence of
Appropriations made by Law; and a
regular Statement and Account of the
Receipts and Expenditures of all public
Money shall be published from time to
time.
4. The fiscal Service of the Bureau of
Accounts of the Department of Treasury
contends that it published the document
known as the combined Statement of
Receipts, Expenditures, and Balances of
the United States Government,
5. Respondent contends that CIA Act was in
violation to the Constitution for it permits
the Agency to account for its expenditures
solely on the certificate of the Director.
6. He further contends that without the
detailed document, he cannot intelligently
follow the actions of the Congress or the
Executive, nor fulfill his obligations
properly as a member of the electorate.
7. The District court dismissed the case for
lack of standing while the Court of
Appeals reversed the decision.
Mootness
Case Facts
25. DE FUNIS VS. 1. De Funis was not admitted to the
ODEGAARD University of Washington Law School
PER CURIAM; (State operated)
04/23/1974 2. There were only 150 slots available and
1600+ applied
3. De Funis sued the school, in behalf of
HIMSELF contending that its criteria and
justiciable basis to declare
law against contraception
unconstitutional?
1. Does respondent have
legal standing?
Issue/s
1. Is the case moot and
academic?
2. Assuming that it is, should
the court still decide on the
case?
CALUAG, CHIONGSON, CIPRES, MARONILLA, MILLETE, QUERUBIN, RICO, SY, UY | 21
controversies justifying the adjudication of a
constitutional issue.
Since the party does not show that the statute is
not only invalid but he has sustained or is
immediately in danger of sustaining some direct
injury as the result of its enforcement.
It is the solemn duty of the court to determine
whether or not the act be constitutional or not and
to determine if there is real, earnest, and vital
controversy between individuals.
The case must retain essentials of adversary
proceeding involving a real, not a hypothetical
controversy, which is finally determined by the
judgment of lower court.
The court cannot be an umpire to debates
concerning harmless, empty shadows.
The deterrent effect which is prosecution feared
by Dr. Buxton is realistic. However, the personal
sensitiveness and standing as a physician of Dr.
Buxton is not a basis for constitutional
adjudication.
Relation to Constitution:
The various doctrines of "standing," "ripeness," and
"mootness," which this Court has evolved with particular,
though not exclusive, reference to such cases are but
several manifestations -- each having its own "varied
application" -- of the primary conception that federal
judicial power is to be exercised to strike down
legislation, whether state or federal, only at the instance
of one who is himself immediately harmed, or
immediately threatened with harm, by the challenged
action.
Justiciability is not a legal concept with a fixed content or
susceptible of scientific verification. Its operation is the
result of many subtle pressures:
a. appropriateness of the issues for decision by
the court and
b. The actual hardship to the litigants of denying
them the relief sought.
Petition DISMISSED.
1. NO.
Petitioner failed to meet the two-tier test as a tax
payer provided by Flast v Cohen:
o logic link between the status as a taxpayer
and the challenged legislative enactment.
o nexus between the plaintiffs status and a
specific constitutional limitation imposed on
the taxing and spending power.
He makes no claim that theres a misappropriation
of funds that is in violation of any specific
constitutional limitations upon the taxing and
spending power.
An individual must prove that he sustained or will
sustain direct injury. It is not enough that he/she
proves that a statute is invalid.
Even though respondent contends that he is filing
this suit as a taxpayer, he has not alleged that he
is in danger of suffering any injury as a result of
the continued operation of the statute in question.
Petition DISMISSED.
Holding
1. YES, the case is moot and academic because even
if the decision was to come out nothing would
happen because De Funis was already in his last
term, and would be allowed to finish anyway. Judicial
review may only be done if there is an actual
controversy. The controversy here is gone.
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II (ATTY. BUTCH JAMON): TABLE OF CASES
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procedure for picking students for
admission violated the equal protection of
law, because it had racial discrimination.
4. He asked the trial court for a mandatory
injunction for his admittance.
5. The trial court granted it and ordered the
school to admit him as a freshman during
fall.
6. An appeal was filed when he was already
nd
in his 2 year
7. And the call for certiorari was only given
attention by the supreme court when he
rd
was in his 3 year already (Final year).
8. Trial began when he was already enrolled
in his final term (graduating term).
9. Despite this the parties wanted to
continue the case and said that whatever
the out come of the decision is De Funis
will still be allowed to finish his enrolled
term.
II. DUE PROCESS CLAUSE
Procedural Due Process
Case Facts
26. B. ESPANOL VS. 1. This action was instituted by "El Banco
PALANCA Espanol-Filipino" to foreclose a mortgage
STREET; 03/26/1918 upon property situated in the cityof
Manila. The mortgage was executed by
the original defendant herein, Engracio
Palanca Tanquinyeng, as security for a
debt owing by him to the bank.
2. After the execution of this instrument by
Tanquinyeng, here turned to China and
he there died.
3. As Tanquinyeng was a nonresident at the
time, it was necessary for the bank in the
foreclosure proceeding to give notice to
Tanquinyeng by publication pursuant to
sec399 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
Publication was made in a newspaper of
Manila. The court also directed the clerk
of court to deposit in the post office a copy
of the summons and complaint directed to
Tanquinyeng at his last place of
residence, the city of Amoy, China
pursuant to the same provision:
4. Sec 399 of the code,In case of
publication, where the residence of a
nonresident or absent defendant is
known, the judge must direct a copy of the
summons and complaint to be forthwith
deposited by the clerk in the post-office,
postage prepaid, directed to the person to
be served, at his place of residence.
5. Whether the clerk complied with this order
does not affirmatively appear.
6. The case proceeded in the CFI, and the
defendant not having appeared, judgment
was taken against him by default.
7. July 3, 1908, decision was rendered in
favor of the bank.It was ordered that the
Tnaquinyeng should deliver amount owed
to the clerk of the court, and it was
declared that in case of failure to satisfy
the judgment, the mortgage property
should be exposed to public sale.
8. The payment contemplated in said order
was never made.Court ordered the sale of
the property which was bought in by the
bank
9. 7 years after confirmation of sale, motion
was made by Vicente Palanca, as
administrator of Tanquinyeng, requesting
the court to set aside the order of default
and the judgment rendered upon July 3,
1908, and to vacate all the proceedings
subsequent thereto.
10. Basis of motion: that the order of default
and the judgment rendered thereon were
void because the court had never
acquired jurisdiction over the defendant or
over the subject of the action
11. The motion was denied
Issue/s
Assume that the clerk of court
failed to mail the papers which
he was directed to send to the
defendant in Amoy.
1. Has the court acquired the
necessary jurisdiction to
enable it to proceed with the
foreclosure of the
mortgage?
2. Were the proceedings
conducted in such manner
as to constitute due process
of law?
CALUAG, CHIONGSON, CIPRES, MARONILLA, MILLETE, QUERUBIN, RICO, SY, UY | 22
2. NO, because De Funis when he filed the case
represented himself as an individual to the court not
representing others/ public interest. De Funis will
not be taking the admissions exam again because
he is already graduating so no need to settle for the
future.
Petition GRANTED.
Holding
1. YES.
Jurisdiction over the person is acquired by the
voluntary appearance of a party in court and his
submission to its authority, or it is acquired by the
coercive power of legal process exerted over the
person.
Jurisdiction over the property which is the subject
of the litigation may result either from a seizure of
the property under legal process, whereby it is
brought into the actual custody of the law, or it
may result from the institution of legal
proceedings wherein the power of the court over
the property is recognized and made effective.
Tanquinyeng is a nonresident and, remaining
beyond the range of the personal process of the
court, refuses to come in voluntarily, the court
never acquires jurisdiction over the person at all.
This, however, is not essential. The property itself
is the sole thing which is impleaded and is the
responsible object which is the subject of the
exercise of judicial power. It follows that the
jurisdiction of the court is based exclusively on the
power which it possesses over the property.
The jurisdiction over the property based upon the
following:
o that the property is located within the district;
o that the purpose of the litigation is to subject
the property by sale to an obligation fixed upon
it by the mortgage; and
o that the court at a proper stage of the
proceeding stakes the property into custody, if
necessary, and expose it to sale for the
purpose of satisfying the mortgage debt.
Given that jurisdiction is exclusively over property,
the relief granted by the court must be limited to
such as can been forced against the property
itself.
2. YES. Requirement of due process is satisfied if;
There must be a court or tribunal clothed with
judicial power to hear and determine the matter
before it;
jurisdiction must be lawfully acquired over the
person of the defendant or over the property
which his the subject of the proceeding;
the defendant must be given an opportunity to be
heard; and
judgment must be rendered upon lawful hearing.
Opportunity to be heard:
In a foreclosure case some notification of the
proceedings to the nonresident owner, prescribing
the time within which appearance must be made
is essential. To answer this necessity the statutes
generally provide for:
o Publication
o Personal notice thru mail, if his residence is
known
o
In the light of all these facts, it is evident that actual
notice to the defendant in cases of this kind is not,
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27. ANG TIBAY VS. CIR 1. This case deals with a dispute between
LAUREL; 02/27/1940 Ang Tibay (Shoe manufacturer) and the
National Labor Union (NLU). And Tibay
decided to temporarily lay off 89 workers
(all of which are NLU members) because
of an alleged shortage of leather soles
coming in from U.S.
2. This case has already been decided by
CIR and was elevated to the Supreme
Court. Here, NLU filed a motion for new
trial. They believe that it was the
membership in their union which
influenced the said decision. They would
like to check the records in Bureau of
Customs and Book of Accounts of native
dealers in leather in order to determine
whether there was really a shortage. They
also want to prove that Toribio
Teodoro(owner) established an illegal
union, The National Workers Brotherhood
of Ang Tibay.
3. However, Ang Tibay opposed the said
motion.
28. ATENEO VS. CA 1. On 12 December 1967, Juan Ramon
GUTIERREZ; Guanzon (from Bacolod, son of Romeo
10/18/1986 Guanzon and Teresita Regalado), first
year student of AdMU Loyola Heights,
and boarder at the Cervini Hall) struck at
the left temple of Carmelita Mateo, a
waitress in the Cervini Hall cafeteria.
2. Other boarders held him from striking
again, but the boarders hid the incident
from Fr. Campbell. The university
conducted an investigation of the slapping
incident. On the basis of the investigation
results, Juan Ramon was dismissed from
1. Should the motion for new
trial be granted?
1. Would the absence of
notice to the dismissed
students parents negate
the compliance of the
requirements of
administrative due process?
CALUAG, CHIONGSON, CIPRES, MARONILLA, MILLETE, QUERUBIN, RICO, SY, UY | 23
under the law, to be considered absolutely
necessary.
Assumption in recognizing the effectiveness of a
means of notification which may fall short of actual
notice is:
Property is always assumed to be in the
possession of its owner, in person or by agent; and
he may be safely held,under certain conditions, to
be affected with knowledge that proceedings have
been instituted for its condemnation and sale.
Right to due process has not been infringed.
Petition DENIED.
1. YES.
The Court of Industrial Relations. It is a special
court created by virtue of Commonwealth Act #
103, which primarily exercises judicial or quasi-
judicial functions in determining employer-
employee disputes. However, its not just limited
to that. It exercises jurisdiction over the entire
Philippines to deal with controversies affecting
employee-employer, landlord-tenant and regulate
their relations. It also deals with the settlement of
such disputes, and even appeal to voluntary
arbitration in order to settle industrial disputes. In
short, its a government instrumentality which
enjoys both executive and judicial powers.
It is not strictly bound by technical rules of
procedure [Goseco v CIR]. It is mandated by CA#
103 to act according to justice and equity and
substantial merits of the case. However, it still has
to adhere to the fundamental and essential
requirements of due process in administrative
trials and investigations. The primary
considerations are as follows:
o the right to a hearing, which includes the right
to present one's cause and submit evidence
in support thereof;
o The tribunal must consider the evidence
presented;
o The decision must have something to support
itself;
o The evidence must be substantial;
o The decision must be based on the evidence
presented at the hearing; or at least
contained in the record and disclosed to the
parties affected;
o The tribunal or body or any of its judges must
act on its own independent consideration of
the law and facts of the controversy, and not
simply accept the views of a subordinate;
o The Board or body should, in all controversial
questions, render its decision in such manner
that the parties to the proceeding can know
the various Issue involved, and the reason for
the decision rendered.
Application to the Case. The court believes that it
is in the best interest of justice to let Ang Tibay
present the necessary evidences in order to
resolve the issues at hand.
Motion for new trial GRANTED.
Relevance to Topic:
This case shows the important elements involved in
administrative due process. Agencies like the CIR,
which are relatively new at that time, are those which
do not exercise strict adherence to procedural rules
but instead follow a more liberal approach which is
primarily all about rendering a decision in
consonance with the principles of equality and
justice.
1. NO.
Besides the administrative body undertaking a fair
and objective investigation of the incident, due
process in administrative proceedings also requires
consideration of the evidence presented and the
existence of evidence to support the decision.
Here, the original Court of Appeals decision
(penned by Justice Gancayco) showed that the
procedures in the expulsion case were fair, open,
exhaustive, and adequate. There was nothing in
the records to reverse the findings in the
reconsideration. Clearly, there was absolutely no
indication of malice, fraud, and improper or wilful
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II (ATTY. BUTCH JAMON): TABLE OF CASES
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the university.
3. The dismissal of Juan Ramon triggered
off the filing of a complaint for damages
by his parents against the university in the
then Court of First Instance (CFI) of
Negros Occidental at Bacolod City.
4. The complaint states that Juan Ramon
was expelled from school without giving
him a fair trial in violation of his right to
due process and that they are prominent
and well known residents of Bacolod City,
with the unceremonious expulsion of their
son causing them actual, moral, and
exemplary damages as well as attorneys
fees.
5. In its answer, the university denied the
material allegations of the complaint and
justified the dismissal of Juan Ramon on
the ground that his unbecoming behaviour
is contrary to good morals, proper
decorum, and civility, that such behaviour
subjected him as a student to the
universitys disciplinary regulations action
and sanction and that the university has
the sole prerogative and authority at any
time to drop from the school a student
found to be undesirable in order to
preserve and maintain its integrity and
discipline so indispensable for its
existence as an institution of learning.
6. After due trial, the lower court found for
the Guanzons and ordered the university
to pay them P92.00 as actual damages;
P50,000.00 as moral damages; P5,000.00
as attorneys fees and to pay the costs of
the suit.
7. Upon appeal to the Court of Appeals by
the university, the trial courts decision
was initially reversed and set aside.
However, upon motion for reconsideration
filed by the Guanzons, the appellate court
reversed its decision and set it aside
through a special division of five.
8. The motion for reconsideration had to be
referred to a special division of five in view
of the failure to reach unanimity on the
resolution of the motion, the vote of the
regular division having become 2 to 1.
Hence, the University filed a petition for
review before the Supreme Court.
29. NON VS. DAMES 1. Petitioners were students in Mabini
CORTES; 05/20/1990 College, Inc,.
2. They were not allowed to re-enroll for the
academic year 1988-1989 for leading or
participating in student mass action
against the school in the prior semester.
3. The subject of the protest was not made
clear in the pleadings.
4. Petitioners filed a petition for them to me
readmitted to the school, but the trial court
dismissed the petition.
5. The decision was based on the ruling on
Alcuaz vs PSBA1
6. The court said that petitioners waived
their privilege to be admitted for re-
enrollment with respondent college when
they adopted, signed, and used its
enrollment form for the first semester of
school year 1988-89, which states that:
The Mabini College reserves the right to
deny admission of students whose
scholarship and attendance are
unsatisfactory and to require withdrawal of
students whose conduct discredits the
institution and/or whose activities unduly
disrupts or interfere with the efficient
operation of the college. Students,
therefore, are required to behave in
accord with the Mabini College code of
conduct and discipline.
7. The court also contends that the
termination of their contract at the end of
a specific semester gave the school the
right to admit/not to admit students on the
Petition GRANTED.
1. Was there a violation of
the students right to
freedom of speech and
assembly infringed?
2. Was the action of the
respondent school
justifiable because of the
termination of contract
theory?
3. Were the students given
due process?
CALUAG, CHIONGSON, CIPRES, MARONILLA, MILLETE, QUERUBIN, RICO, SY, UY | 24
motives or conduct on the part of the Ateneo de
Manila University. Juan Ramon was given notice of
the proceedings.
He actually appeared to present his side. The
investigating board acted fairly and objectively. All
requisites of administrative due process were met.
It cannot be negated by the fact that the parents of
Juan Ramon were not given any notice of the
proceedings. Juan Ramon, who at the time was 18
years of age, was already a college student,
intelligent and mature enough to know his
responsibilities. He was fully cognizant of the
gravity of the offense he committed as he asked if
he could be expelled for what he did.
When informed about the 19 December 1967
meeting of the Board of Discipline, he was asked to
seek advice and assistance from his guardian and
or parents. The fact that he chose to remain silent
and did not inform them about his case, not even
when he went home to Bacolod City for his
Christmas vacation, was not the fault of the
University.
1. YES.
The protection to the cognate rights of speech
and assembly guaranteed by the Constitution is
similarly available to students is well-settled in our
jurisdiction.
However there are limitations. The permissible
limitation on Student Exercise of Constitutional
Rights within the school presupposes that conduct
by the student, in class or out of it, which for any
reason whether it stems from time, place, or type
of behavior should not materially disrupt class
work or must not involve substantial disorder or
invasion of the rights of others
2. NO
The contract between the school and the student
is not an ordinary contract. It is imbued with public
interest, considering the high priority given by the
Constitution to education and the grant to the
State of supervisory and regulatory powers over
all educational institutions
The student is presumed to be qualified for
enrolment for the entire period he is expected to
complete his course without prejudice to his right
to transfer
3. NO
The decision not to accept students for
reenrollment was just a mere afterthought.
Excluding students because of failing grades
when the cause for the action taken against them
undeniably related to possible breaches of
discipline not only is a denial of due process but
also constitutes a violation of the basic tenets of
fair play
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II (ATTY. BUTCH JAMON): TABLE OF CASES
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next semester.
8. Respondents also contend that they also
refused to re-admit the students because
of failing grades.
30. GOLDBERG VS. 1. The question for decision is whether a
KELLY State that terminates public assistance
BRENNAN; payments to a particular recipient without
03/23/1970 affording him the opportunity for an
evidentiary hearing prior to termination
denies the recipient procedural due
process in violation of the Due Process
th
Clause of the 14 Ammendment
2. Complainants (appellees): NY residents
receiving financial aid under the program
Aid to Families with Dependent Children
(AFDC) under NYs Home Relief
Program. Their complaint: NYC officials
terminated aid without prior notice and
hearing thereby denying them due
process of law.
3. Prior to the filing of complaints, no prior
notice or hearing of any kind was required
before termination. The state however
adopted procedures for notice and
hearing after suits were brought and the
plaintiffs challenged the constitutional
adequacy of said procedures
4. Procedure No. 68-18: a caseworker sees
the recipient and then reports to the unit
supervisor to make an official review abt
ineligibility and whether or not aid should
be stopped.
5. Appellees challenge to this procedure
emphasizes the absence of any
provisions for the personal appearance of
the recipient before the reviewing official,
for oral presentation of evidence, and for
confrontation and cross-examination of
adverse witnesses. However, they are
afforded post-termination fair hearing for
redress when the can appear personally,
offer oral presentation of evidence, and
for confrontation and cross-examination of
adverse witnesses. If they win, they get
what was withheld from them and if not,
they can avail of judicial review.
6. District Court found for the complainants
and only the Commissioner of Social
Services appealed
31. UP VS. LIGOT- 1. Ramon Nadal, a student from the UP
TELAN College of Law, applied for a scholarship
ROMERO; under the Socialized Tuition Fee and
10/12/1993 Assistance Program (STFAP) a.k.a.
Iskolar ng Bayan program. (It was
granted)
2. The applicants were asked to answer a
questionnaire asking then to state the ff:
Amount and source of their annual
income
Real and personal properties
Petition GRANTED.
1. Does the due process
clause require that the
recipient be afforded an
evidentiary hearing before
the termination of
benefits?
Trial Court Decision AFFIRMED.
1. Was Nadal denied due
process in the administrative
disciplinary proceedings
against him?
CALUAG, CHIONGSON, CIPRES, MARONILLA, MILLETE, QUERUBIN, RICO, SY, UY | 25
Insufficient information was provided by the
respondent school regarding the failure grades of
the petitioners thats why the courts cannot take
into consideration their contention.
However, disciplinary action can be taken against
petitioners for breach of discipline if the facts had
so warranted.
1. YES
Suffice it to say that to cut off a welfare recipient
in the face of a brutal need without prior hearing
of some sort is unconscionable, unless
overwhelming consideration justify it.
The need to protect tax revenues is not
overwhelming consideration. It does not justify
denying a hearing meeting the ordinary standards
of due process.
Due process requires an adequate hearing before
termination of welfare benefits
Such benefits are a matter of statutory
entitlement. The constitutional challenge cannot
be answered by an argument that public
assistance benefits are a privilege and not a right.
Due process is influenced by the extent to which
one may be condemned to suffer grievous loss
and depends upon whether the recipients interest
in avoiding that loss outweighs the governmental
interest in summary adjudication
Consideration of what procedures due process
may require under any given set of circumstances
must begin with a determination of the precise
nature of government function involved as well as
of the private interest that has been affected by
governmental action.
What will serve due process in this case is pre-
termination evidentiary hearing
Crucial factor: is that the termination of aid
pending resolution may deprive an eligible
recipient of the very means by which to live while
he waits (immediately desperate)
Appellants argument: these are outweighed by
countervailing governmental interests in
conserving fiscal and administrative resources
SC: these governmental interests are not
overriding in the welfare context
Pre-termination hearing need not take the form of
a judicial or quasi-judicial trial, just a full
administrative review
The fundamental requisite of due process of law
is the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time
in a meaningful manner
The seven-day notice, the letter, and the personal
conference with a caseworker (of above
mentioned procedure) are not constitutionally
sufficient per se. insufficiency is in not permitting
welfare recipients to appear personally before the
official who determines eligibility
Informal procedures will suffice. In this context,
due process does not require a particular order of
proof or mode of offering evidence
Jurisprudence says: where governmental action
seriously injures an individual, and
reasonableness of the action depends on fact
findings, evidence used to prove govts case must
be disclosed to the individual so that he has an
opportunity to show that it is untrue. This is true
not only in criminal proceedings but also for admin
actions
1. NO.
Admission to the UP falls under the ambit of the
schools academic freedom.
Due process is not to be equated with the notice,
the due process in this case is the process that is
due which is governed under the UPs rules.
UPs rules do not require the attendance in BOR
meetings of individuals whose cases are included
as items on the agenda of the Board.
Besides, the March 29 meeting was only for the
reconsideration of the previous decision. Nadals
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Special circumstances that will help UP presence was unnecessary. Thus, he was not
evaluate their financial status and any denied due process.
basis that will help the university to
categorize them. Petition DENIED.
3. The falsification or suppression of any
material information is prohibited by the
university and is a punishable act under
Sec. 2 (a) of the Rules and Regulations
on Student Council Discipline of the
University.
4. The University also had a random
sampling system where the residence of
the applicant will be visited to check the
applicants alleged/ sworn informations.
5. When the team went to Ramons house
they found out that he lied about certain
things like owning a 1977 Toyota Corolla
and that his mom was an OFW supporting
the studies of his two other siblings.
6. The UP charged Nadal before the Student
Disciplinary Tribunal (SDT), which found
him not guilty of withholding information.
Car Disregarded (not proven ata)
Moms income Guilty
7. This charge was tantamount to acts of
dishonesty, which had the penalty of
expulsion.
8. March 29: A special meeting was held,
without Nadal.
9. The BOR found Nadal guilty, with a
penalty of a 1-year suspension, non-
issuance of certificate of good moral
character, and reimbursement of STFAP
benefits.
10. April 22: Nadal filed with the RTC of QC a
petition for mandamus with preliminary
injunction and prayer for TRO against the
BOR and other UP officers, stating that he
was denied due process since he was not
present during the March 29 meeting. The
preliminary injunction was granted.
32. DBP VS. NLRC 1. Two cases are consolidated 1. Did the NLRC gravely 1. NO
MELENCIO- 2. The complainants in the two cases were abuse its discretion in DBP in this case cannot rightfully contend that he
HERRERA; former employees of LIRAG ( mortgage affirming the order of the was deprived of due process because he was
03/19/1990 debtor of DBP) Labor Arbiter granting the given the opportunity to be heard and to present
3. The private respondent LAND was a writ of garnishment out of evidence , in fact he even filed an opposition to
bargaining representative of the more or the proceeds of LIRAGs the Motion for Execution and Garnishment filed by
less 800 former rank and file employees properties? LAND
of LIRAG Article 110 of the Labor Code must be viewed
4. Around Sept 1981 LIRAG started with isolation. It must be read in relation to the
terminating employees o the ground or civil code scheme on classification and preference
retrenchment that by December there of credits. It must also be read in harmony with
were already 180 regular employees Insolvency Law
separated from the service Amendments made of article 110 by RA 6715
5. Joselito Abaya and LAND filed charges expand workers preference to cover not only
against LIRAG for illegal dismissal and unpaid wages but also other monetary claims
they are seeking for separation pay, 13th RA 6175 Sec. 10. Payment of wages and other
mo pay, gratuity pay, sick leave and monetary claims in case of bankruptcy. In case
vacation leave pay and emergency. of bankruptcy or liquidation of the employer's
6. The Labor Arbiter rule in favor in the business, the unpaid wages and other monetary
petitioners and issued a writ of execution. claims of the employees shall be given first
However DBP extrajudicially foreclosed preference and shall be paid in full before the
the mortgaged properties fro failure of claims of government and other creditors may be
LIRAG to pay its mortgage obligation and paid.
DBP was able to acquire it being the only In the event of insolvency, a principal objective
bidder without any payment. should be to effect an equitable distribution of the
7. Again LAND filed a motion for writ of insolvents property among his creditors. To
execution and garnishment of the accomplish this there must be some proceeding
proceeds of the foreclosure sale and upon where notice to all of the insolvents creditors may
that motion the labor arbiter requested the be given
intervention of DBP A distinction should be made between a
8. However by proclamation of nos. 50 and preference of credit and a lien. A preference
50-A ,the asset privatizations trust ( APT) applies only to claims which do not attach to
became the transferee of the DBP specific properties. A lien creates a charge on a
foreclosed assets of LIRAG particular property. In relation to art 110, it does
9. They were able to enter in agreement but not constitute a lien on the property of the
the president of LAND filed its opposition insolvent debtor in favor of workers.
to the compromise agreement for being Even if Article 110 and its Implementing Rule, as
contrary to law, morals and public policy amended, should be interpreted to mean
10. The NLRC affirmed the appeal and "absolute preference," the same should be given
dismissed the appeal of DBP, hence this only prospective effect in line with the cardinal
petition rule that laws shall have no retroactive effect,
unless the contrary is provided (Article 4, Civil
Code). To give Article 110 retroactive effect would

CALUAG, CHIONGSON, CIPRES, MARONILLA, MILLETE, QUERUBIN, RICO, SY, UY | 26

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33. ESTRADA VS. 1. Estrada was charged of the violation of
SANDIGANBAYAN the Anti-Plunder Law (RA 7080, amended
BELLOSILLO; by RA 7659).
11/19/2001 2. On April 4, 2001, petitioner filed Omnibus
Motion initially alleging the lack of a
preliminary investigation,
reconsideration/reinvestigation of offense,
and opportunity to prove lack of probable
cause, all of which were quashed.
3. On June 14, petitioner moved to quash
the Informations filed against him.
Sandiganbayan denied motion, hence this
appeal to SC.
4. Petitioner:
Anti-plunder Act is unconstitutional
under the void for vagueness doctrine
which states that a statute establishing
a criminal offense must define the
offense with sufficient definiteness that
persons of ordinary intelligence can
understand what conduct is prohibited
by the statute.
Anti-Plunder act in unconstitutional for
being overbroad, which states that a
government purpose may not be
achieved with means which sweep
unnecessarily broadly and thereby
invade the area of constitutionally
protected freedoms
Anti-Plunder act is unconstitutional for
it dispenses with due process since the
terms in Sec1, par. D and Sec 2
(combination,series, pattern) are
precisely vague &overbroad, which
denies the petitioner of the right to be
informed of the nature & cause of the
accusation against him.
Anti-Plunder Act is unconstitutional for
it dispenses with due process since the
Sec 4 thereof sets a lower standard for
evidence required to convict a person
to the crime.
Old Substantive Due Process
Case Facts
34. LOCHNER VS. NEW 1. Defendant (no name specified) was
YORK convicted of violating a New York statute
PECKHAM; (Sec. 110, Art. 8, Ch. 415 of the Laws of
1. Is the Anti-Plunder law
unconstitutional for being
vague and overboard?
2. Does the law deny due
process?
3. Is the law mala prohibitum?
Issue/s
1. Is the said law a reasonable
practice of police power?
CALUAG, CHIONGSON, CIPRES, MARONILLA, MILLETE, QUERUBIN, RICO, SY, UY | 27
be to wipe out the mortgage in DBP's favor and
expose it to a risk which it sought to protect itself
against by requiring collateral in the form of real
property.
In fine, the right to preference given to workers
under Article 110 of the Labor Code cannot exist
in any effective way prior to the time of its
presentation in distribution proceedings. It will find
application when, in proceedings such as
insolvency, such unpaid wages shall be paid in
full before the "claims of the Government and
other creditors" may be paid. But, for an orderly
settlement of a debtor's assets, all creditors must
be convened, their claims ascertained and
inventoried, and after that the preferences
determined in the course of judicial proceedings
which have for their object the subjection of the
property of the debtor to the payment of his debts
or other lawful obligations.
Petition DENIED.
1. NO.
There is a basic principle that a legislative
enactment is presumed to be in harmony with the
Constitution. Every intendment of the law must be
adjudged by the courts in favor of its
constitutionality, invalidity being a measure of last
resort.
Combination-at least two acts falling under different
categories of enumeration provided in sec 1 par (d)
Ex. raids on public treasury and fraudulent
conveyance of asset while series- two or more
criminal acts falling under the same category. Ex.
misappropriation and malversation.
As it is written, the Plunder Law contains as certain
standards and well-defined parameters which
would enable the accused to determine the nature
of his violation. Section 2 is sufficient in its
description of the acts, conduct and conditions
required or forbidden, and prescribes the elements
of the crime with reasonable certainty and
particularity.
It is a well settled principle of legal hermeneutics
that words of a statute will be interpreted in the
natural, plain & ordinary meaning except in cases
where it is clear that the legislature intended a
technical & special legal meaning
A statute is not rendered uncertain & void merely
because general terms are used, or because it
employed terms that were not defined. There is no
statutory or constitutional command that the
Congress needs to define every word it uses.
Inability to so define the words employed in a
statute will not necessarily result in the vagueness
or ambiguity of the law so long as the legislative will
is clear, or at least, can be gathered from the whole
act, which is distinctly expressed in the Plunder
Law.
Vagueness doctrine only applies when the face of
the law itself is vague.
It does not violate the due process since it defines
the acts which the law punishes and gives the
accused a fair warning of the charge against him.
2. NO
Like all criminal cases, the accused is always
presumed innocent till proven guilty which is
guaranteed by our constitution. The prosecution still
has to prove beyond reasonable doubt that at least
two acts constituting plunder occurred, and these
predicate acts form a pattern. This gives life to the
Due process clause which protects the accused
against conviction except it is proven beyond
reasonable doubt.
3. NO
It is mala in se. Criminal intent is needed to convict
the person of this crime. It also must prove all
elements of the crime occurred.
Petition DISMISSED.
Holding
1. NO, the Supreme Court held that this is just a mere
labor law that sets the hours of work of bakers; this
law contains no valid connection to the protection of
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II (ATTY. BUTCH JAMON): TABLE OF CASES
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04/17/1905 1897), which limits the hours a baker
could work for each week
2. The previous decisions of the lower courts
held that the law is necessary to protect
the health of bakers; this is pursuant to
the practice of police powers by the state
3. However, there is a contention that the
said law violates the peoples liberty to
practice the right of free contract; that it
constrains the options that would best fit
the signatories in a contract; such is
implicit in the due process clause under
the Fourteenth Amendment
35. NDC & AGRIX VS. 1. This case involves the constitutionality of
PVB Presidential Decree No. 1717 (PD 1717)
CRUZ; 12/10/1990 and its application under the 1987
Constitution as compared to the
authoritarian period of Marcos; such
orders the rehabilitation of the Agrix
companies which is to be administered by
the National Development Company,
notably Sec. 4 (1) thereof
The said law outlines the procedure for
filing claims against the Agrix
companies, creating in effect a Claims
Committee to process such claims
Sec. 4 (1) of the said decree states: all
mortgages and other liens presently
attaching to any of the assets of the
dissolved corporations are hereby
extinguished
2. 7 July 1978 Agrix Marketing, Inc.
(AGRIX), a company under Agrix
companies, executed a real estate
mortgage to Philippine Veterans Bank
(PVB; respondent herein) over three
parcels of land in Los Banos, Laguna
3. While the mortgage was still existing,
AGRIX and its fellow companies went
bankrupt; such bankruptcy became the
reason why Marcos wanted to have all
Agrix companies salvaged, hence the
purpose of PD 1717
4. Because of such bankruptcy, the PVB
files a claim with the AGRIX Claims
Committee for the payment of its loan
credit; both the National Development
Company (NDC) and the New Agrix, Inc.
(petitioners herein) filed a petition before
the Regional Trial Court of Laguna,
praying for the cancellation of the
mortgage lien, which AGRIX executed to
PVB
5. PVB took extra steps in extrajudicially
foreclosing the mortgage, thus another
petition stopping such foreclosure was
filed by the petitioners
6. The trial court ruled in favor of
respondent, annulling in effect not only
Sec. 4 (1) of PD 1717 but also the whole
law itself
Presidents exercise of legislative
powers a contravention of the doctrine
of separation of powers
PD 1717 impairs obligation of contracts
PD 1717 violates the equal protection
clause
7. Petitioners, after denial of their motion for
reconsideration, elevated this case to the
Supreme Court, reaching the en banc
because of its constitutional issues
Decisions of the lower courts REVERSED.
1. Is respondent PVB is
estopped from contesting
the validity of the decree?
2. Does the decree justify the
use of police power to
protect public interests?
3. Are due process and equal
protection is denied?
4. Is there is a violation of the
obligation of contracts?
8. NO. There is not enough showing that public interest
9. YES. Due process and equal protection is denied by
10. YES. There is a violation of the obligation of
Petition DISMISSED. PD 1717 declared
CALUAG, CHIONGSON, CIPRES, MARONILLA, MILLETE, QUERUBIN, RICO, SY, UY | 28
the health of bakers
The Supreme Court recognizes that the state
reserves the right to exercise its police powers, if
it is for the protection of the publics health and
welfare
However, the Supreme Court held that the act
must have a more direct relation to the valid
exercise of the police powers of the state
The statute does not validly establish that public
health, or the health of bakers, will be
compromised in necessitating the limit of work
hours for bakers
The statute in question is, therefore, violative of
the due process clause under the Fourteenth
Amendment, due to the fact that it constrains the
peoples right of free contract
It is thus held that the said statute does limit the
options best suited for various contracts, in this
case, for employment of bakers; such may affect
the families of bakers in that extra hours may be
needed by some bakers for more profit
7. NO. The Supreme Court held that estoppel is not
applicable in this case
The regime of Marcos characterized the nature of
estoppel in such cases
During the said regime, not a decree by him was
declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court
The case of Mendoza vs. Agrix, decided under
the Marcos regime and cited by petitioners,
cannot be applied as precedent in this case,
because the said case did not resolve PD 1717
due to estoppel being applied
This case, however, does not fall under the
Marcos regime anymore; rights are duly regarded
under the present Constitution
is taken into account to justify the exercise of police
power as provided for by PD 1717
It appears that the decree only favors a special
group of investors
Public interest aspect of PD 1717 is not duly
explained
PD 1717 does not state the number of investors,
and the kinds thereof, that would be allegedly
benefiting from the exercise of police power under
the decree
PD 1717
Sections 1 and 10, Article III, 1987 Constitution
Due process is denied because the right of
property of the creditors of AGRIX is arbitrarily
destroyed because of Sec. 4 (1) of PD 1717,
which extinguishes all of their mortgages and
other liens granted to them by the Agrix
companies
Secured creditors are placed on the same plane
with the unsecured creditors, making all of them
unsecured creditors
o Only difference is that the loans of secured
creditors are still allowed to earn interest, but
o The decree in question altogether extinguishes
said interests, whether due to the secured or
unsecured creditors
In effect, persons that are differently situated are
similarly treated, disregarding the principle that
there should be equality over equals
contracts in PD 1717
Sec. 4 (1) effectively impairs the contract between
AGRIX and PVB without justification
Impairment of said contracts may be reasonable if
it is in favor of public interest, yet in this case,
such is not justified
Contracts of loan and mortgage executed by
AGRIX are purely private transactions and does
not show that they affect public interest
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36. BALACUIT VS. CFI 1. Movie tickets for children
GANCAYCO; 2. An ordinance was passed by the
06/30/1988 municipal board of Butuan ordering that
the price of the admission of children in
movie houses and other places of
amusements should be half that of adults.
3. Owners of 4 theaters (petitioners)
maintain that Ordinance 640 violates the
due process clause for it is unfair, unjust,
confiscatory, and amounts to a restraint of
trade and violative of the right of persons
to enter into contracts.
4. Municipality: a valid exercise of policy
under the general welfare clause in their
charter.
New Substantive Due Process: Protection for Liberty, Interest in Privacy
Case Facts
37. SKINNER VS. 1. Skinner was convicted of stealing
OKLAHOMA chickens and sentenced to the
DOUGLAS; reformatory.
06/01/1942 2. He was convicted of the crime of robbery
with firearm and sentenced again to the
reformatory.
3. He was convicted of the rime of robbery
with firearms and sentenced to the
penitentiary.
4. Subsequently, the Oklahoma Habitual
Criminal Sterilization Act was passed.
Act provides that if someone is found
by the court or jury as a habitual
criminal and that he may be rendered
sexually sterile w/o detriment to his/her
general health, then the court shall
order that he/she shall be rendered
sexually sterile. Vasectomy in case of
male; salpingectomy in case of a
female.
Habitual criminal is defined as : a
person who, having been convicted 2
or more times for crimes involving
moral turpitude, either in Oklahoma
court or in a court of any other state, is
thereafter convicted of such a felony in
Oklahoma and is sentenced to a term
of imprisonment in an Oklahoma penal
institute.
However, section 195 of the Act states
that offenses arising out of the violation
of the prohibitory laws, revenue acts,
embezzlement, or political offenses
shall not be considered within the
terms of the Act.
The Attorney General has to institute a
proceeding against such a person in
Oklahoma courts. Notice and the right
to a jury trial are provided.
5. Attorney General instituted proceedings
against Skinner. Petitioner challenged the
Act as unconstitutional by reason of the
1. Is Ordinance 460 a valid
exercise of police power?
Issue/s
1. Does the legislation violate
the equal protection clause
of the 14th Amendment?
CALUAG, CHIONGSON, CIPRES, MARONILLA, MILLETE, QUERUBIN, RICO, SY, UY | 29
UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
1. NO. Because it is not lawful subject/ no lawful
purpose
The ordinance is not justified by any necessity of
public interest. The evidence purpose of it is to
reduce the loss in savings of parents, in turn
passing the buck to the theater owners. The
contention of the city that they are preventing the
movie houses from exploiting children is not
tenable (they are given the same quality of
entertainment). Besides, the city said that movies
are attractive nuisance, so why are they
encouraging it.
The means are clearly unreasonable. How can
the theater operators distinguish bet a 13-year old
an 11-year old child? The city said that the movie
operators can ask the children to bring their birth
certificates but that is impractical, said the court.
A theater ticket is an evidence of a contract bet
the movie house and its patrons. It may also be
considered a license, allowing the purchases to
enjoy the entertainment being provided. In either
case, the ticket is a species of property. The
operators, as the owners thereof, have the right to
dispose of it at a price it wants and to whom he
pleases.
The courts have declared valid laws regulating the
prices of food and drugs during emergency;
limiting the act profit of utilities. But the theater is
not of the same natureit is not a public utility or
a public good.
Note 3 instances when the exercise of police
power by local govt are invalid:
o violates the Constitution
o violates the act of Congress of the leg
o Against public policy or is unreasonable,
oppressive, discriminating or in derogation of
common rights.
Trial court Decision REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Holding
1. YES. When the law lays an unequal hand on those
who have committed intrinsically the same quality of
offense and sterilizes one and not the other, it has
made as invidious (offensive) discrimination as if it
had selected a particular race or nationality for
oppressive treatment.
Oklahoma makes no attempt to say that one
who commits larceny by trespass or trick or
fraud has biologically inheritable traits which one
who commits embezzlement lacks.
Line between larceny by fraud and larceny by
embezzlement is determined with reference to
the time when fraudulent intent to convert the
property to the takers own use arises.
No basis for inferring that the line has any
significance in eugenics, nor that inheritability of
criminal traits follows the legal distinctions which
the law has marked between these two
offenses.
o Example: A clerk who embezzles over $20
from his employer and a stranger who steals
the same amount are both guilty of felonies. If
the stranger repeats his act and is convicted
three times, he may be sterilized. But the
clerk is not subject to the penalties of the Act
no matter how large his embezzlements nor
how frequent his convictions because of the
exception in section 195 of the Act.
The Act involves one of the basic civil rights of
man.
o Marriage and procreation are fundamental to
the very existence and survival of the race.
o The power to sterilize may have subtle, far-
reaching and devastating effects. There is no
redemption for the individual whom the law
touches. Any experiment w/c the state
conducts is to the individuals irreparable
injury. He is forever deprived of a basic
liberty.
Other Criticisms of the Act which the Court
mentioned but did not elaborate:
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th
14 Amendment in the US Constitution.
After a jury trial, it was decided that
vasectomy be performed on Skinner. This
decision was affirmed by the Oklahoma
Supreme Court.
38. GRISWOLD VS. 1. Griswold is Exec. Director of the Planned
CONNECTICUT League of Connecticut, and its medical
DOUGLAS; director- Buxton, a licensed physician, were
06/07/1965 convicted as accessories for giving married
persons information and medical advice on
how to prevent conception and, following
examination, prescribing a contraceptive
device or material for the wife's use.
2. A Connecticut Statute 53- 32 and 54- 196
makes it a crime for any person to use any
drug or article to prevent conception.
The Act cannot be sustained as an exercise of the
police power in view of the state of scientific
authorities respecting inheritability of criminal traits.
Due process is lacking because the defendant is given
no opportunity to be heard on the issue as to whether
he is the probable potential parent of socially
undesirable offspring.
The Act is penal in character and that the sterilization
provided for is cruel and unusual punishment.
Oklahoma Supreme Court decision REVERSED. The Act
violates the equal protection clause in the 14th
Amendment.
1. Do petitioners have 1. YES. The Connecticut statute conflicts with the
standing? exercise of this right and is therefore null and void.
2. Does the statute against The petitioners have standing to raise the
the use of contraceptives constitutional rights of the married people with
th
violate the 14 whom they had a professional relationship.
amendment or the right to Since they were charged for being an accessory or
privacy? violating the statute by helping couples regarding
the use of contraceptives, they have the standing
to question the constitutionality of the statute
because if it is against the Constitution if follows
that they cannot be convicted of a crime.
2. YES.
Though the Constitution does not explicitly protect
a general right to privacy, the various guarantees
within the Bill of Rights create penumbras, or
zones, that establish a right to privacy. Together
with the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth and Ninth
Amendments, create a new constitutional right: the
right to privacy in marital relations. Under the 1st,
3rd, 4th and 9th Amendments, the right to family
was created and thus protects the right of marital
privacy:
o 1st amendment: Freedom of religion, speech,
the press, assembly, petition.
o 3rd Amendment: stops soldiers (read: police
power or executive branch) from quartering
soldiers in one's home
o 4th amendment states that: the right of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures.
o 5th amendment states that: self- incrimination
clause- which enables the citizen to create a
zone of privacy which government may not force
him to surrender to his detriment.
o 9th amendment: All unenumerated rights. It
states that "The enumeration in the Constitution,
of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny
or disparage others retained by the people."
(read: the explicit and heretofore decided
implicit guarantees in the Bill of Rights cannot
be used against people)
The right to privacy is the paramount importance
than any other rights and it a right carefully and
particularly reserved to the people. And it is
protected from government intrusion. The statute in
question intrudes on an intimate relation of
husband and wife and their physicians role in one
aspect of their relation.
The Connecticut statute seeks to achieve a goal of
forbidding the use of contraceptives by having a
maximum destructive impact to the relation of
married people. Hence, it invades the area of
privacy protected by the Constitution. The
government may not allow the police to search the
sacred precincts of marital bedrooms to look for
signs of the use of contraceptives.
The right of privacy is older than the Bill of Rights
and older than any political parties or school
system because it is rooted in marriage, for
marriage is coming together for better or for worse,
and intimate to the degree of being sacred. It is an
association that promotes a way of life, a harmony
in living a bilateral loyalty and not for political faiths
or commercial and social projects.
The offense against right to privacy is the invasion
of indefeasible right of personal security, personal
liberty and private property, and the right can never
be forfeited by any conviction of some public
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39. ROE VS. WADE 1. Arts. 1191-1194 and 1196 of the State's
BLACKMUN; Penal Code make it a crime to "procure an
01/22/1973 abortion," to attempt one, except when "an
abortion procured or attempted by medical
advice for the purpose of saving the life of
the mother."
2. Three petitions were filed to declare the law
unconstitutional:
Jane Roe, an unmarried woman and
pregnant but she wished to terminate her
pregnancy by an abortion "performed by a
competent, licensed physician. But she
was unable to get a "legal" abortion in
Texas because her life did not appear to
be threatened by the continuation of her
pregnancy. She claimed that the Texas
statutes were unconstitutionally vague
and that they abridged her right of
personal privacy, protected by the First,
Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth
Amendments. By an amendment to her
complaint Roe purported to sue "on behalf
of herself and all other women" similarly
situated.
James Hubert Hallford, a licensed
physician described conditions of patients
who came to him seeking abortions, and
he claimed that for many cases he, as a
physician, was unable to determine
whether they fell within or outside the
exception recognized by Article 1196. He
alleged that the statutes were vague and
uncertain for it violates the Fourteenth
Amendment, and they violated his own
and his patients' rights to privacy in the
doctor-patient relationship.
John and Mary Doe, a married and
childless couple, that Mrs. Doe was
suffering from a "neural-chemical"
offence.
Law INVALIDATED on the ground that it intrudes on
marital relationship.
GOLDBERG, Concurring:
Feels this is a due process violation of the 14th
Amendment. This is the state acting to limit a right to
family, and there is no justification by Connecticut's
argument it reinforces a ban on illicit sexual
relationships.
Connecticut's birth-control law unconstitutionally
intrudes upon the right of marital privacy
The concept of liberty is not so restricted and that it
embraces the right of marital privacy though that
right is not mentioned explicitly in the Constitution
th
but it is included in the 9 amendment or
(unemunerated rights)
The Court stated many years ago that the Due
Process Clause protects those liberties that are "so
rooted in the traditions and conscience of our
people as to be ranked as fundamental."
Although the Constitution does not speak in so many
words of the right of privacy in marriage, the fact that
no particular provision of the Constitution explicitly
forbids the State from disrupting the traditional relation
of the family - a relation as old and as fundamental as
our entire civilization -surely does not show that the
Government was meant to have the power to do so.
Rather, as the Ninth Amendment expressly
recognizes, there are fundamental personal rights
such as this one, which are protected from
abridgment by the Government though not specifically
mentioned in the Constitution.
BLACK, Dissent:
There is no constitutional right to privacy, as the
majority says there is. There are some constitutional
guarantees, like the 4th Amendment, but not the 14th,
which Black generally calls a stretch. As for the 9th
Amendment, there is no need for this analysis, as the
Framers created this Amendment to "assure the
people that the Constitution in all its provisions was
intended to limit Federal Government to the powers
granted expressly or by necessary implication.
3. Do Roe, Hallford, and 1. Only Roe has legal standing.
Roes have legal Roe, as a pregnant woman, had standing to
standing? challenge those statutes because the "logical
4. May a woman terminate nexus between the status asserted and the claim
her pregnancy in this sought to be adjudicated," and the necessary
case? degree of contentiousness, are both present.
Although Roe is no longer pregnant doesnt render
the case moot and academic because the usual
rule in federal cases is that an actual controversy
must exist at stages of appellate or certiorari
review, and not simply at the date the action is
initiated. And because pregnancy is natural in man,
the issue presented is capable of repetition yet
evading review.
Dr. Hallford has no standing, although he has been
arrested before for violation of the abortion laws,
still he makes no allegation in this case there is a
substantial threat that his protected right as a
citizen cannot be asserted as a defense against the
state prosecutions. In short, he is future defendant
only. And his petition in this case is dismissed and
he is remitted to criminal charges he is facing in
violation of abortion laws.
The Does also have no standing bec. their claim is
that sometime in the future Mrs. Doe might become
pregnant because of possible failure of
contraceptive measures, and at that time in the
future she might want an abortion that might then
be illegal under the Texas statutes. However, these
allegations are only future possibilities and not
actual threats or imminent injuries.
2. YES but such right is not absolute:
According to the court, the right of privacy under
the 14th Amendment is broad enough to
encompass a womans decision whether or not to
terminate her pregnancy because of certain
circumstances such as possible distressful life and
future, or psychological and physical harm to the
mother. The court further ruled that the right of the
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disorder. Pursuant to medical advice, she
had discontinued use of birth control pills
and that if she should become pregnant,
she would want to terminate the
pregnancy by an abortion.
40. BOWERS VS. 1. Respondent herein has been charged of the
HARDWICK crime of Sodomy which is a violation of a
WHITE; 06/30/1986 state staute in Georgia.
2. The respondent then brought the suit to the
Federal district court assailing the
constitutionality of the Georgia statute.
3. In his assertion, he argues that such statute
places him to imminent danger of arrest and
violates several provisions in the Federal
Constitution. Likewise, he avers that it was
done in their home, hence the decision
should favor of him.
4. The district court granted the motion to
dismiss the case filed by Hardwick.
5. However, the Court of appeals reversed it on
the ground that Georgias statute violated a
fundamental right since the act was private
and beyond the states regulation. This is in
accordance with the 9th amendment and due
process clause of the 14th amendment.
6. Thus this petition by the Attorney General.
41. LAWRENCE VS. 1. Authorities responded to a complaint of
TEXAS weapon disturbance in a private residence.
KENNEDY; 2. When the Houston police barged in the
06/23/2003 residence of petitioner, Lawrence, they saw
him having sexual act with another man.
3. He was arrested and was convicted of
deviant sexual acts in violation of Texas laws
which forbids two persons of the same sex to
engage in intimate sexual conduct.
4. Thus the petitioner assailed the
constitutionality of the statute.
5. State CA held that the statue was not
unconstitutional under the Due process
Clause of the 14th amendment. The court
made consideration of Bowers case as a
controlling doctrine.
woman is not absolute because it is subjected to
certain limitations. The state can regulate the
womans actions in cases where the law serves a
compelling state interest: protection of health,
medical standards, and prenatal life.
The court rejected Texas argument that at
conception, the unborn should be considered a
person under the Constitution. According to the
court, the word person as used in the Constitution
does not refer to the unborn. Hence the court ruled
that:
o In the initial stages of the pregnancy (before the
end of the first trimester/1- 3 months) the woman
and her physician are free to make their choice
about abortion without the interference from the
state.
o For the subsequent stage of pregnancy (4- 6
months), the state can regulate the womans
choice but only to serve the compelling interest
of promoting the health of the mother.
o For the stage after viability (7- 9months), the
state in promoting its interest in the potentiality
of human life may, if it chooses, regulate and
even proscribe, abortion except where it is
necessary to preserve the life of the mother.
Abortion statute declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL
5. Does the US constitution 1. NO
confer the rights of There is a difference between family, marriage or
homosexuals in engaging procreation and homosexual activity. The former
in sodomy and hence is what contemplated in 14th amendment.
invalidating laws against Due process clause does extend not just to life,
such? liberty and property but also to substantive
content. Privacy may fall under this category but
not the present case.
In order to declare a right not conferred by the
Constitutions text it should be as follows:
o Rights where implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty
o Where if they were sacrificed, neither justice
nor liberty can exist
o Those deeply rooted in nations traditions.
The pleaded right on engaging to homosexual
consensual sodomy does not come from these
categories.
Doing such in privacy of home does not warrant
any consideration. If so, then those using illegal
drugs, committing adultery, incest, have stolen
goods etc. could have been protected where such
are done inside their homes. That is absurdity.
It is pointless to always invoke Due process
clause. If all laws essentially grounded on morality
will be stricken by this clause, there would be
numerous of the same cases.
The court is not persuaded that due to
inadequacy of rational basis, the laws by 25
states on sodomy should be invalidated.
Judgment of the Court of Appeals REVERSED.
1. Was the judgment of the 2. NO
State Court of Appeals BOWERS CASE REVERSED
correct? The Georgia law in Bowers case seeks to control
even the human and personal relationship which
is whether or not entitled to formal recognition of
the law is within the liberty of the person to
choose without being punished as criminals.
The Constitution gives homosexuals the right to
choose their relationships in the confines of their
homes and remain with dignity as free persons.
Bowers court erred in overstating historical facts
as they claim that there are ancient roots of
proscriptions against sodomy where there has no
recorded history which directs to homosexual
conduct as distinct matter.
Bowers doctrines non-applicability and
deficiencies reveals in the present time since,
more liberty is now accorded to adult person in
choosing how to conduct their lives when it comes
to sex.
Caseys case overturned Bowers as it confirms
that Due process clause protects personal
decisions to family, life, relationships etc.
The case of Bowers, in the dissent of Justice
Stevens, does not involve minors nor persons
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who might be injured or coerced, those who might

not easily refuse consent nor even public conduct
or prostitution. It involves two adults who with full
and mutual consent engage to a private conduct
which is not in need of government intervention.

Texas statute declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

42. BOARD OF EDUC. 1. The Tecumseh Public Schools adopted the
VS. EARLS Students Activities Drug Testing Policy,
THOMAS; 06/27/2002 which requires all middles and high school
students to consent to drug testing before
they can participate in competitive extra-
curricular activities.
2. Under this program, students must submit to
random drug testing while participating in
their respective activities and must agree to
be tested at any time upon reasonable
suspicion.
3. However, this policy was not accepted by
everyone.
4. Two students involved in the covered extra-
curricular activities, as represented by their
parents, filed a case questioning the
constitutionality of the said policy.
5. They contended that it violates their right to
privacy, which is protected under the 4th
Amendment (guards against
unreasonable searches and seizures). The
District Court dismissed the petition while the
Court of Appeals concluded that it is
unconstitutional.
1. Is the said policy 1. NO. It is still constitutional.
unconstitutional?
Unlike in other establishments, there is no need to
apply the reasonable test when it comes to public
schools. This is because it would duly interfere
with the maintenance of swift and informal
disciplinary measures that are needed.
In public schools, a search unsupported by a
probable cause may be considered reasonable
when there are special needs which are beyond
the normal need for special enforcement.
Moreover, the reasonableness inquiry cannot
just disregard the public schools custodial
responsibility for children. The court also applied
the Verona ruling which states that what was
conducted was a fact-specific balancing of the
th
intrusion on the childrens 4 Amendment rights
against the promotion of legitimate government
interest.
As for privacy interests, the court ruled that the
students covered by the policy are already used
to voluntarily subjecting themselves to many
similar intrusions to privacy since its quite normal
in the nature of the activities they participate in.
Meanwhile, theres only minimal intrusion on the
implementation of the policy.
o First, the faculty monitor will have to wait
outside the closed restroom stall for the sample
and will listen to normal sound of urination in
order to guard against tampering with the
sample, which affects the accurateness of the
result.
o The results will then be kept in confidential file
separate from the students educational
records. It may only be released to school
personnel on a need-to-know basis.
These will not be turned over to law enforcement
authorities. Instead, it can only affect the students
privilege of participating in extra-curricular
activities.
On the other hand, preventing drug use by
children is a very important government concern.
There is really no need to first have a pervasive
drug problem before the government can conduct
drug testing. In this case, however, there was
even a substantial amount of evidence which
became the basis for implementing the drug
testing policy.

Court of Appeals decision REVERSED.

43. OPLE VS. TORRES 1. On December 12, 1996, President Ramos
PUNO; 07/23/1998 issued A.O. No. 308 which aims to establish
a National Computerized Identification
Reference System (NCIR).
2. Its purpose is to help local citizens and
foreign residents to conveniently transact
business with the basic service and social
security providers and other government
instrumentalities.
3. A few days after its publication, Senator Ople
filed an instant petition to stop its
implementation because it (1) involves
unconstitutional usurpation of legislative
power and (2) violates peoples right to
privacy.
1. Does Sen. Ople have 1. YES. Sen. Ople has legal standing to sue because
legal standing? as a senator, he represents the legislative, whose
2. Was there a usurpation of powers are being used by the wrong branch of
power? government. Second, he can also question the use
3. Did it violate right to of public funds as a taxpayer and GSIS member.
privacy?
2. YES. This is because A.O. # 308 is not merely an
administrative order but a law in itself, which only the
legislature can enact.
Legislative Power refers to the authority under the
Constitution to make laws and to alter and repeal
them. It embraces all subjects and extends to
matters of general concern or common interest.
Meanwhile, Administrative Power deals with
applying policies and enforcing orders as
determined by proper government organs. They
should be in harmony with the law, for
implementing it and carrying out legislative policy.
In this case, AO 308 establishes a completely
new system which requires a delicate adjustment
of various contending state policies. Moreover, it
will also provide difficulty for people to exercise
their rights and enjoy their privileges.
3. YES. It violates the right to privacy, or the right to be
left alone, which is protected by the Constitution.
The court made mention of the adaptation of
Griswold in Morfe v Mutuc wherein the court
stated that we have a system of limited

CALUAG, CHIONGSON, CIPRES, MARONILLA, MILLETE, QUERUBIN, RICO, SY, UY | 33

 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II (ATTY. BUTCH JAMON): TABLE OF CASES
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44. DUNCAN ASSOC. 1. Tecson was hired by Glaxo Wellcome Phil,
VS. GLAXO Inc. as a medical representative wherein he
TINGA; 09/17/2004 had training and orientation.
2. He signed a contract which provides that he
agrees to study and abide by existing
company rules; to disclose to management
any existing or future relationship by
consanguinity or affinity with co-employees
or employees of competing drug
companies and should management find
that such relationship poses a possible
conflict of interest, to resign from the
company.
3. Under the Employee Code of Conduct, an
employee needs to inform the management
of any existing or future relationship by
consanguinity or affinity with co-employees
or employees of competing drug companies.
If theres conflict of interest, the management
and the employee will explore the possibility
of a transfer to another department in a non-
counterchecking position or preparation for
employment outside the company after six
months.
4. Subsequently after his employment, Tecson
entered into a romantic relationship with
Bettsy, a Branch Coordinator of Astra
Pharmaceutical, a competitor of Glaxo.
5. Before Tecson and Bettsy got married, he
already received reminders from his
manager regarding the conflict of interest
that his relationship might create. Despite
this, they still got married.
6. Tecson was informed by hus supervisors
that his marriage gave rise to a conflict of
interest and he should decide whether he or
Bettsy would resign. The management,
though, told him their preference of him
staying with the company.
7. Tecson said that he still need more time
because Bettsy was planning to avail of the
redundancy package to be offered by Astra.
With Bettsys separation from her company,
the potential conflict of interest would be
eliminated
8. Tecson applied for a transfer in Glaxos milk
division to avoid the conflict of interest
because Astra doesnt have a Milk Division.
However, the application was denied.
9. Instead, the company transferred Tecson to
AO308 declared NULL AND VOID.
1. Is the companys policy 1. NO. The companys policy is not violative of the
violative of the equal
protection clause?
2. Was Tecson constructively
dismissed?
2. NO. Tecson was not constructively dismissed
Petition DENIED.
CALUAG, CHIONGSON, CIPRES, MARONILLA, MILLETE, QUERUBIN, RICO, SY, UY | 34
government which safeguards a private sector,
which belongs to the individual; firmly
distinguishing it from the public sector, which the
state can control.
The so-called Zones of Privacy are not only
recognized and protected under the Bill of Rights,
Civil Code, Revised Penal Code and other
Special laws. This is why before the government
can regulate this right, there must be provide a
narrowly-drawn, compelling state interest.
In AO 308, we can see that the use of Population
Reference Number (PRN) through the use of
Biometrics technology and computer application
designs is indeed a futuristic undertaking. But, the
law itself does not provide sufficient protection to
ensure the right to peoples right to privacy.
o First, it is fairly vague as to what information
will be collected and how it will be specifically
used.
o Second, theres a lack of information as to who
will have control and access over the data
collected.
o Third, it can contain vast information about an
individuals every transaction with the
government; which may be used against him
by people with wrong intentions.
Sure, the court is open to the idea of adopting
modern technology to make things easier for both
the government and its citizens. However, such
futuristic system should provide every safeguard
possible so as to ensure that the peoples right to
privacy will be protected.
equal protection clause
Glaxo has the right to protect its economic
interest. The Constitution itself recognizes the
right of enterprises to adopt such a policy to
protect its right to reasonable returns on
investments and to expansion and growth.
What the company seeks to avoid is a conflict of
interest between the employee and the company
that may arise out of such relationship because
the company has the right to guard its trade
secrets and other confidential programs and
information from its competitors.
The law also recognizes that management has
rights which are also entitled to respect and
enforcement in the interest of fair play.
Tecson was informed of the Companys Policies
and he knowingly and voluntarily entered into
the contract, the stipulations therein have the
force of law between them and, thus, should be
complied with in good faith
Constructive dismissal is defined as a quitting,
an involuntary resignation resorted to when
continued employment becomes impossible,
unreasonable, or unlikely; when there is a
demotion in rank or diminution in pay; or when a
clear discrimination, insensibility or disdain by an
employer becomes unbearable to the employee.
Tecson was not demoted or unduly
discriminated upon by reason of such transfer.
In facts, the company gave Tecson time to settle
the matter.
It is even evident that the management wanted
him to stay in the company.
They didnt dismiss Tecson, instead they
reassigned him and therefore, they were
considerate of the welfare of his family.
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the Butuan City-Surigao City-Agusan del
Sur sales area.
10. Tecson sought for reconsideration but was
denied thats why he filed a grievance case.
While the grievance case was pending, he
was paid his salary but was not issued
samples of products which were competing
with similar products manufactured by Astra.
Tecson was also not included in the product
conferences.
Protected Interests in Property
Case Facts
45. CHURCHILL VS. 1. There was a billboard that was put up by the
RAFFERTY plaintiffs on a private land in Rizal Province
TRENT; 12/31/1915 that is quite a distance from the road and is
strongly built.
2. Some German and British Consuls find the
said billboard offensive to the sight, and is
otherwise a nuisance.
3. In pursuant to the complaint, the defendant,
Collector of Internal Revenue investigated
the said billboard. This is in accordance with
Act No. 2339 which allows the Collector of
Internal revenue to collect taxes from such
property and to remove it when it is offensive
to sight.
4. The defendant, after due investigation,
decided to remove the billboard.
5. Plaintiff however, contends that the billboard
in question is not offensive to the sight,
strongly built, not dangerous to the safety of
the people and contained no advertising
matter which is filthy, indecent or in contrast
to the morals of the community.
6. The Court of First Instance prohibited the
Collector of Internal Revenue to collect or
remove the Billboard.
46. US VS. TORIBIO 1. Act 1147, Sec. 30. No large cattle shall be
CARSON; 01/06/1910 slaughtered or killed for food at the
municipal slaughterhouse except upon
permit secured from the municipal
treasurer
2. Act 1147, Sec. 31. No permit to slaughter
carabaos shall be granted by the municipal
treasurer unless such animals are unfit for
agricultural work or for draft purposes
3. Toribo applied for a permit to slaughter his
Carabao for consumption but his application
was denied, because his carabao was not
found to be unfit for agricultural work or draft
processes.
4. Despite the denial, Toribio still slaughtered
for human consumption a carabao without a
permit from the municipal treasurer.
5. Toribio contends that the statute is
unconstitutional since it penalizes the
slaughter of carabaos without a permit
amounting to a taking by the government of
the right of the person over his property
amounting to an exercise of eminent domain
without just compensation or an undue
exercise of police power by the State.
47. KMU VS. NEDA 1. In April 13, 2005, President Gloria
SECRETARY Macapagal Arroyo issued Executive Order
CARPIO; 04/19/2006 420 requiring all government agencies and
government-owned corporations to
streamline and harmonize their Identification
Systems.
2. The purposes of the uniform ID data
collection and ID format are to reduce costs,
achieve efficiency and reliability and ensure
compatibility and provide convenience to the
people served by government entities.
3. Petitioners allege that EO420 is
unconstitutional because it constitutes
Issue/s
1. Can the CFI restrain by
injunction the collection of
taxes?
2. Is act 2339
unconstitutional for
depriving property without
due process?
1. Is the statue
unconstitutional?
1. In issuing EO 420, did the
president make, alter or
repeal any laws?
CALUAG, CHIONGSON, CIPRES, MARONILLA, MILLETE, QUERUBIN, RICO, SY, UY | 35
Holding
1. NO. An injunction is an extraordinary remedy. It
should not be used if there is an adequate remedy
that the law provides, therefore the CFI may not
restrain the collection of taxes by injunction.
2. NO, Act 2339 is a valid exercise of the police power
of the state.
The regulation of billboards and their restriction
is not as much a regulation of private property
as it is a regulation of the use of the streets and
other public thoroughfares.
Unsightly advertisements which are offensive to
the sight are not dissociated from the general
welfare of the public, therefore can be regulated
by police power, and act is constitutional.
Judgment of CFI REVERSED.
1. NO, the statute is a valid exercise of police power
because it is just restraint of injurious private use of
property not taking of the property for public use.
Rights of property, like all other social and
conventional rights, are subject to such
reasonable limitations in their enjoyment as shall
prevent them from being injurious (to the equal
enjoyment of others having an equal right to the
enjoyment of their property or to the rights of the
community), and to such reasonable restraints
and regulations established by law, as the
legislature, under the governing and controlling
power vested in them by the constitution, may
thing necessary and expedient.
For this case to be considered as eminent domain
it has to be for public use, the restriction being
done by taking certain enjoyment (being able to
do anything he wants with his property) of the
owner, was for the general welfare of the people.
General Welfare in this case was rooted from
the distress the Philippines experienced a few
years before the enactment of the statute where a
disease threatened the total extinction of
carabaos in the Philippines resulting in famine
from the insufficiency of work animals to cultivate
the fields.
To justify the exercise of police power of the state:
first, that the interests of those of a particular
class require such interference; and second, that
the means are reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly
oppressive upon individuals.
Trial court Decision AFFIRMED.
1. NO. In issuing EO 420, the President did not make,
alter or repeal any law but merely implemented and
executed existing laws.
Legislative power is the authority to make laws
and to alter or repeal them. EO 420 reduces
costs, as well as insures efficiency, reliability,
compatibility and user-friendliness in the
implementation of current ID systems of
government entities under existing laws.
Thus, EO 420 is simply an executive issuance
and not an act of legislation.
Petition DISMISSED.
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II (ATTY. BUTCH JAMON): TABLE OF CASES
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usurpation of legislative functions by the
executive branch of the government.
Furthermore, they allege that EO420
infringes on the citizens rights to privacy.
48. PEOPLE VS. 1. 15 August 1950 Mayor Juan Fajardo of
FAJARDO Baao, Camarines Sur issued Ordinance No.
REYES, J.B.L.; 7, Series of 1950
08/29/1958 2. Ordinance a person must secure a permit
before repairing or constructing a building;
3. Penalties Fine of PhP25-PhP50 or
Imprisonment of 12 -24 days. If building
constructed destroys the view of the public
plaza or occupies any public property, it will
be removed at the expense of the owner of
the building or house.
4. After Fajardos term, he and his son-in-law,
Pedro Babilonia, applied for a permit to
construct a building on his land adjacent to
their gas station. Land also along national
highway and separated from public plaza by
a creek.
5. 16 January 1954 - the request was denied,
becausethe proposed building would destroy
the view or beauty of the public plaza.
6. Fajardo and Babilonia reapplied for a permit
but were denied again.
7. They constructed the building anyway
because their house was destroyed by a
typhoon and they were living presently on
leased property.
8. 26 February 1954 - They were charged and
convicted of violation of the ordinance. Their
penalties were: fines of PhP35 each and
demolition of the building.
9. They appealed their conviction.
49. YNOT VS. CA 1. Pres. Marcos made an amendment to
CRUZ; 03/20/1987 Executive Order (E.O.) No. 626 which
became E.O. 626-A. It now provides that no
carabao or carabeef shall be transported
from one place to another.
2. Carabao and carabeef transported in
violation of E.O. 626-A will be confiscated.
3. Confiscated Carabaos will distributed by
Director of Animal Industry to farmers as he
may see fit and confiscated carabeef will
distributed by the Chairman of the National
Meat Inspection Commission to charities as
he may see fit.
4. 13 January 1984 Restituto Ynot got caught
transporting 6 carabaos from Masbate to
Iloilo by pumpboat. The carabaos were
confiscated per E.O. 626.
5. Ynot filed a petition assailing the
constitutionality of E.O. 626-A on the ground
that it imposes outright confiscation of his
property without giving him an opportunity to
be heard before a court of law. He was
deprived of due process.
50. US VS. CAUSBY 1. Causby spouses own a 2.8 acre lot in
DOUGLAS; Grensboro, North Carolina. Its near a
05/27/1946 government-leased municipal airport;
frequently used by aircrafts such as
1. Is the conviction of Fajardo
and Babilonia correct?
1. Is E.O. 626-A
unconstitutional?
1. Was there really a taking of
property under the 5th
Amendment?
2. Can they recover for
CALUAG, CHIONGSON, CIPRES, MARONILLA, MILLETE, QUERUBIN, RICO, SY, UY | 36
1. NO, the conviction of Fajardo and Babilonia is not
correct because the ordinance is null and void.
The ordinance gives the mayor absolute
discretion to issue permits. There are no
standards, purpose, conditions for the issuance of
the permit.
Even if there is a standard of not destroying the
view of public plaza, following it is unreasonable.
It is because it will be taking Fajardos property
without just compensation. They cannot use their
land because every structure they will build there
would destroy the view of the public plaza.
An ordinance which permanently so restricts the
use of property that it cannot be used for any
reasonable purpose goes, it is plain, beyond
regulation and must be recognized as a taking of
the property (Arverne Bay Constr. Co. vs.
Thatcher (N.Y.) 117 ALR. 1110, 1116).
A regulation which substantially deprives an
owner of all beneficial use of his property is
confiscation and is a deprivation within the
meaning of the 14th Amendment. (Sundlum vs.
Zoning Bd., 145 Atl. 451; also Eaton vs. Sweeny,
177 NE 412; Taylor vs. Jacksonville, 133 So. 114)
Municipality must give them just compensation
and an opportunity to be heard. The ordinance
overstepped the States police power.
Case DISMISSED.
Note: Focus is on Art. 3 Sec 9 of Constitution: Private
property shall not be taken for public use without just
compensation
1. YES, E.O. 626-A is unconstitutional.
The original intent of E.O. 626 before it was
amended was to prohibit the slaughter of
carabaos except under certain conditions for their
conservation. Small farmers depended on
carabaos for their energy needs because there
was an energy crisis at the time.
There is no relation as to how prohibition of
transport of carabaos can prevent their
indiscriminate slaughter.
Two tests in exercise of police power: a.) that the
interests of the public generally, as distinguished
from those of a particular class, require such
interference and b.) that the means are
reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of
the purpose, and not unduly oppressive upon
individuals
The carabaos were seized immediately without a
trial.
The E.O. gave administrative authorities to judge
the guilt of an offender which is an encroachment
on the function of the judiciary.
There is an undue delegation of legislative powers
because the Director of Animal Industry and
Chairman of the National Meat Inspection
Commission are given unlimited discretion in
distribution of confiscated carabaos and carabeef.
Petition GRANTED.
Note:
Focus is on Art. 3 Sec 9 of Constitution: Private property
shall not be taken for public use without just
compensation which is the taking of the carabaos and
carabeef without due process and trial. Thus, Justice
Felix Frankfurter of the U.S. Supreme Court, for
example, would go no farther than to define due process
and in so doing sums it all up as nothing more and
nothing less than "the embodiment of the sporting Idea of
fair play.
1. YES. There can be taking of property, even without
physical intrusion, IF it can be proven that it resulted
to near total loss of property.
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bombers, transports and fighters.
2. The problem is that the path of glide passes
directly over the property. As a result, the
owners have to deal with the startling noise
and glare from the airplanes which are taking
off and landing. It even caused them to give
up their chicken business because the noise
frightened the chickens to death.
3. The Causbys filed a case with the Court of
Claims. The said Court found that the there
th
was indeed a taking of property under the 5
amendment based on the facts presented. It
even rewarded the spouses with $2,000 for
the easement.
*(Easement: a right which one landowner has
with respect to the lands of another)
*Fifth Amendment: ...nor shall private property
be taken for public use, without just
compensation.
51. REPUBLIC VS. 1. The Bureau of Telecommunications is a
PLDT government instrumentality created under
REYES, J.B.L.; EO No. 94, tasked to supervise in the
01/27/1969 operation and maintenance of existing
telecoms services throughout the Philippines
2. The Philippine Long Distance Telephone Co.
is a corporation under the jurisdiction of the
Public Service Commission holding a
legislative franchise (Act 3426, amended by
CA 407)
Franchise allows PLDT to operate
telephone lines throughout the country;
authorizes the PLDT to maintain long-
distance communications with other
countries
The legislative franchise granted to the
PLDT is not exclusive (Art. 14, PLDT
Charter), hence the PLDT is also allowed
to grant franchises to other companies
who wish to operate telephone lines as
well
Among the grantees cited is the RCA
Communications, Inc., an American
telecoms company; said company forged
an agreement with PLDT to enable the
latters subscribers to make overseas
calls to the US; the contract lasted from
1933 to February 2, 1958
3. Immediately after its establishment in 1947,
the Bureau established its own Government
Telephone System (GTS), which enables
government offices to call private parties; the
said system used trunk lines rented from
PLDT
4. Starting from 1948, the GTS expanded its
service to the general public, enabling its
users to call PLDT subscribers and vice-
versa
5. On January 8, 1958 the Bureau proposed to
the PLDT an interconnecting agreement,
providing that:
Bureau would pay for all incoming calls
passing through the lines from the GTS to
the PLDT
The PLDT said that it would only agree to
the Bureaus proposal if the latter agrees
to place itself under the Public Service
damages?
1. Can the lower court, in the
absence of an agreement
between the parties, compel
PLDT to allow Bureau to
use its trunk lines?
2. Is there unfair and
parasitic competition
between PLDT and GTS?
3. Is the PLDT entitled to
compensation over the
Bureaus use of its
telephone poles?
CALUAG, CHIONGSON, CIPRES, MARONILLA, MILLETE, QUERUBIN, RICO, SY, UY | 37
There is taking of property when the use of
airspace immediately above the land would limit
the utility of the land and diminution of its value.
If the character of invasion resulted to substantial
damages, there is taking.
The US Congress defined the navigable
airspace as that above the minimum safe
altitudes of flight prescribed by the Civil
Aeronautics Authority.
o The CAA approved the path of glide of the said
airplanes. However, the standards to be
followed in such operation should be the Civil
Air Regulations which provide a lower
minimum altitude. This is to protect the
landowners from flights that are so close to the
land to render it uninhabitable.
The definition of property under North Carolina
Laws: ownership of the space above the lands
and waters of this State is declared to be vested
in the several owners of the surface beneath.
2. NOT YET. This is because there is a need to know
first if the easement taken by the US government
from the spouses is either permanent or temporary.
The Court of Claims opinion that the easement is
permanent is not supported by conclusive proof.
There is a need to know the nature of easement
to determine the extent of liability of US.
Judgment REVERSED. REMANDED to Court of Claims
for
evidentiary hearing.
BLACK, Dissent:
There is no taking in this case. What should have
been proper for this case is the action for tort and not
an action bases on Constitutional grounds.
2. NO, the lower court cannot compel PLDT to do so
due to the absence of an agreement
However, the Bureau (representing the Republic),
may exercise its power of eminent domain to
compel the use of PLDTs trunk lines for the
benefit of the public
Art. XIII, Sec. 6 of the 1935 Constitution states
that in the interest of national welfare, the state
may transfer utilities to public ownership after just
compensation has been paid; isolation of the
Philippines from the rest of the world is compelling
enough to use power of eminent domain
The lower court should have treated the case in
such perspective, where an absence of an
agreement would not matter
PLDT cannot compel the Bureau to submit itself
within the jurisdiction of the Public Service
Commission, since it is under the National
Government
3. NO, there is no such competition between PLDT and
GTS
Competition deemed hypothetical
Notoriety of PLDTs inability to meet the demands
is considered
Sec. 14 of PLDTs charter reminds that the
legislative franchise granted to the PLDT is not
exclusive, and may be granted to other
companies interested in operating telephone
services
PLDT cannot say that the Bureau has misused
the trunk lines it has rented, since PLDT is
presumed to be aware that the Bureaus usage is
for a public purpose
EO 94 does not specify that the Bureau is only
limited to non-commercial activities, or that it is
prevented from serving the general public
The Bureau may have stated that the GTS would
only be limited to government offices, yet the
Supreme Court held that such statement may not
block any future expansion of the GTS into other
uses
The GTS rapid expansion is not a valid excuse
for PLDT to discontinue its services for the
Bureau
4. NO, because there is no showing that the PLDT is
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Commissions jurisdiction burdened by the Bureaus usage of its facilities

6. Both parties did not approve of the proposals The Bureaus usage of PLDTs facilities does not
7. On March 5, 1958 the GTS forged an burden the latter, because no further upgrades on
agreement with RCA to enable GTS the part of PLDT are needed to accommodate the
subscribers to make overseas calls to the US Bureaus need to use their facilities
(reminder: RCA had a same agreement with
PLDT which lasted from 1933 to 1958) Decision of the lower court AFFIRMED WITH
8. On April 7, 1958, soon after the contract MODIFICATION. Records REMANDED to the lower
between GTS and RCA was forged, the court for further proceedings.
PLDT complained on the following grounds:
GTS is not supposed to expand its
services from a purely public (for
government offices only) nature to a
commercial one
GTS expansion to commercial telecoms
services made it look like a competitor of
PLDT as the former uses the latters trunk
lines for its services; the competition was
therefore deemed parasitic in nature
9. PLDTs further said that if the Bureau
continues to provide commercial
telecommunications services via the GTS, it
will disconnect its trunk lines that are being
rented by the GTS
10. The Bureau did not reply to the PLDTs
complaint; on April 12, 1958 PLDT
disconnected its trunk lines being used by
the Bureau for its GTS, isolating the
Philippines from the rest of the world from
overseas calls, except the US
11. In response, the Bureau filed an action
before the trial court, praying:
That the PLDT may be compelled to allow
the Bureau to use its trunk lines
That the PLDT may be restrained from
severing its services to the Bureau
12. Initially, the trial court ordered the PLDT to
restore service to the GTS trunk lines
severed by the PLDT in order to prevent the
further isolation of the Philippines from other
countries
13. The trial court later reversed itself, on the
ground that there wasnt any agreement
existing between the two parties
14. The trial court also said that PLDT knew of
the commercial expansion of GTS
15. Both parties appealed
52. REPUBLIC VS. DE 1. Philippine Air Force occupied Castellvis 1. When did the taking of 1. Taking of property began upon filing of complaint
CASTELLVI lands by virtue of lease contracts property begin? for eminent domain, not from the start of lease.
ZALDIVAR; 2. Castellvi refused to renew contract 2. Is the pricing (P10/sqm) Taking of property for the purpose of eminent
08/15/1974 3. Contract terminated. Air Force, however, appropriate? domain:
refuses to vacate property 1. Exproprietor entered a private property
4. Castellvi writes to Chief of Staff, informing 2. Entry to said property for indefinite period
that the heirs to the property are not 3. Entry under legal authority
interested in leasing the property anymore 4. Property devoted to public use
and instead they want to turn it into a 5. Property utilized in a way that deprives the
subdivision owner of all his beneficial enjoyment of
5. However, Lt. Gen. Arellano said that they property
cannot leave, due to the permanent Lease does not suggest intention to permanently
installations they have established; they possess the land
would have to lease the land instead It is a deceptive scheme for the government to
6. Castellvi filed ejectment case against the first lease out a certain property for a couple of
Air Force years to ensure that they would be able to buy it
7. While ejectment case is pending, Republic at a lower price after contract terminates
instituted expropriation proceedings to gain o Owner will be deprived of true market value
possession of the land because of this, at the tie expropriation
Castellvi agrees to three-year lease of proceedings would begin
land In the present case, all the requirements were met
Court fixed provisional value of land at except number 5
P259,669.10 (P2000 per hectare) Castellvi still benefited from the property by
8. Republic gained possession of the land receiving payment from the lease
after depositing provisional value with the Castellvi was still in control of the land since the
court contract was renewed on a yearly basis
9. Castellvi filed a Motion to Dismiss Price of the land will be determined at the time the
Expropriation because the pricing was Republic took possession of the land, not on the
wrong (should be 15/sqm) and the Air price of property during their first lease of the land
Force illegally occupied the land 2. NO. It is not appropriate because it is quite high.
10. A commission determined proper and P5/sqm is deemed more proper
value, coming up with P10/sqm Price of property at the time of expropriation was
11. Trial court accepted it and thus ordered Air P3-4/sqm
Force to pay such property on said amount P5/sqm considered as happy medium,
within three years (1956-1959) and 6% considering that Republic wants to buy it as
annual interest for illegal occupation P0.20/sqm
12. Republic rfiled for new trial. Dismissed.

CALUAG, CHIONGSON, CIPRES, MARONILLA, MILLETE, QUERUBIN, RICO, SY, UY | 38

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53. BEL-AIR VS. IAC 1. The gates of Jupiter and Orbit Streets of Bel-
SARMIENTO; Air Village were ordered demolished by the
08/25/1989 Mayor of Makati, pursuant to the opening of
both streets to vehicular traffic for traffic
decongestion and public convenience.
2. Jose D. Sangalang and the Bel-Air Village
Association (BAVA) opposed the demolition
of the gates for opening of the streets. They
claimed that it amounted to deprivation of
their property without due process and
compensation.
3. The Mayor stated as his justification
Municipal Ordinance No.17 as amended by
Resolution No. 139, dated 21 November
1948 requires a Mayors permit to erect
construction anywhere in Makati. It also
empowers the Mayor to remove and
demolish any such illegal construction.
54. EPZA VS. DULAY 1. PD 1811 was issued. Under PD 1811, a
GUTIERREZ, JR.; certain parcel of land in Mactan, Cebu was
04/29/1987 reserved in order to establish an export
processing zone by EPZA (Export
Processing Zone Authority).
2. Not all of the reserved lands under the
decree were public land. EPZA offered the
respondent to purchase their parcel of land
in accordance with the valuation that is
provided in Section 92 of PD 464. However,
there was no agreement regarding the sale
of the properties involved.
3. EPZA filed a complaint for expropriation with
a prayer for the issuance of a writ of
possession, pursuant to PD 66, which
empower it to acquire by condemnation
proceeding any property for the
establishment of export processing zones.
4. Petitioner filed with the CFI of Cebu a
complaint for expropriation with a prayer for
the issuance of a writ of possession,
pursuant to PD 66, empowering the
petitioner to acquire by condemnation
proceedings any property for the
establishment of export processing zones.
5. Respondent judge ruled in favor of EPZA
and he issued a second order appointing
certain persons as commissioners in order to
ascertain and report the just compensation
for the properties in question.
6. The appointed commissioners recommended
that 15/ sq.m. was the fair and reasonable
value of the said property in order to satisfy
just compensation.
7. EPZA filed a motion for reconsideration. It
contends that PD 1533 has repealed Secs.
5-8 of Riles 67 of the Rules of Court. EPZA
contends that under P.D. 1533, the basis of
just compensation shall be the fair and
current market value declared by the owner
of the property or such market value as
determined by the assessor whichever is
lower.
8. The motion for reconsideration was denied.
3. Was the demolition of the
gates and opening of the
streets by the Mayor of
Makati valid?
1. Did PDs 76,464,794 and
1533 repealed Sec 5 to 8 of
the Rule 67 of the Revised
Rules of Court when it
comes to determining just
compensation of property in
an expropriation case?
CALUAG, CHIONGSON, CIPRES, MARONILLA, MILLETE, QUERUBIN, RICO, SY, UY | 39
Decision MODIFIED.
1. YES, the demolition of the gates and opening of the
streets by the Mayor of Makati was valid.
The opening of Jupiter and Orbit streets were
warranted by the demands of common good in
terms of traffic decongestion and public
convenience.
The Mayors act was not an exercise of eminent
domain but an exercise of police power; hence no
just compensation is required.
The fact that sometime elapsed before the Mayor
acted cannot render the ordinance unenforceable
or void.
The gate is a public nuisance because it hinders
or impairs the use of property.
Per Art. 699 of the Civil Code, abatement without
judicial proceedings is a remedy against public
nuisance.
Per Art. 698 of the Civil Code, the lapse of time
cannot legalize any nuisance, whether public or
private.
7. The Mayor notified BAVA that both Jupiter and
Orbit Streets were going to be opened and this
constituted compliance of due process.
Petitions DENIED.
1. NO, the determination of just compensation in
eminent domain cases is a judicial function.
The methods of ascertaining just compensation
provided by the decrees constitute impermissible
encroachment on judicial prerogatives. It tends to
render the court inutile in a matter which under
the Constitution is reserved to it for final
determination.
If the courts adhere to the provisions of the said
decree, then the appointment of the
commissioners under Rule 67 of the Rules of
Court would be useless.
The reason why the courts appoint
commissioners to determine just compensation
because the owner of the property expropriated is
entitled to recover from the expropriating authority
the fair and full value of the lot, as of the time
when possession thereof was actually taken by
the province, plus consequential damages.
Concept of Just compensation
This means a fair and full equivalent for the loss
sustained.
All the facts as to the condition of the property and
its surroundings, its improvements and
capabilities should be considered.
The tax declarations presented by the petitioners
as basis for just compensations was not only
much cheaper but when assessed values of
properties were stated in figures constituting only
a fraction of their true market value. To peg the
value of the lots on the basis of outdated
documents and at prices below the acquisition
cost of present owners would make it arbitrary
and confiscatory.
The value given to the land in question was very
general, individual differences were never taken
into consideration.
All the facts as to the condition of the property and
its surroundings, its improvements and
capabilities, should be considered.
The ruling is that, the owner of property
expropriated is entitled to recover from
expropriating authority the fair and full value of the
lot, as of the time when possession thereof was
actually taken, plus consequential damages.
If the Courts authority to determine just
compensation is limited, it may result in the
deprivation of the landowners right of due
process to enable it to prove its claim to just
compensation, as mandated by the Constitution
The valuation in the decree may only serve as a
guiding principle or one of the factors in
determining just compensation but it may not
substitute the courts own judgment as to what
amount should be awarded and how to arrive at
such amount.
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55. NAPOCOR VS. CA 1. National Power Corporation (NPC),
MELENCIO- negotiated with spouses Esteban Sadang
HERRERA; and Maria Lachica
06/22/1984 2. Parcel of land in Barrio San Mateo,
Norzagaray, Bulacan
3. For the purpose of constructing an access
road to its Angat River Hydroelectric Project.
4. Although the negotiations were not yet
concluded
5. NPC asked the permission from the to begin
construction of the access road.
6. November 1961 Permission was granted.
7. December 7, 1962 - B.E. San Diego, Inc. a
realty firm and private respondent (SAN
DIEGO), bought the parcel at a public
auction sale and was issued a title.
8. February 14, 1963 - NPC instituted
proceedings for eminent domain against the
spouses Sadang.
9. June 20, 1963 - impleaded SAN DIEGO
10. March 19, 1969 - the Trial Court appointed
two Commissioners, to determine the just
compensation to be paid for.
11. Trial Court: P3.75 per square meter, with
interest at 12% per annum from March 11,
1963 until fully paid
12. Court of Appeals - P7.00 per square meter
56. REPUBLIC VS. DE 1. Philippines filed in the CFI an expropriation
KNECHT proceeding against the owners (Cristina De
GANCAYCO; Knecht w/ 15 others) of the houses standing
02/12/1990 along Fernando Rein-Del Pan streets.
2. Some motions which led to the victory of De
Knecht and other land owners in saving their
property from expropriation. (De Knecht v.
Baustista) Just to elaborate, here is what
happened:
De Knecht filed a motion to dismiss
alleging lack of jurisdiction, pendency of
appeal with the President of the
Philippines, prematureness of complaint
and arbitrary and erroneous valuation of
the properties.
De Knecht filed for the issuance of a
restraining order.
Republic filed a motion for the issuance of
a writ of possession of the property to be
expropriated on the ground that it had
made the required deposit with the PNB
of 10% of the amount of compensation.
Lower court issued a writ of possession
authorizing the Republic to enter into and
take possession of the properties sought
to be condemned, and created a
Committee of 3 to determine the just
compensation.
De Knecht filed with this Court a petition
for certiorari and prohibition directed
against the order of the lower. SC granted
the petition. (De Knecht vs. Baustista)
defendants-Maria Del Carmen Roxas
Vda. de Elizalde, Francisco Elizalde and
Antonio Roxas moved to dismiss the
expropriation action in compliance with
the dispositive portion of the previous
decision of the SC. The Republic filed a
manifestation stating that it had no
objection to the motion to dismiss.
3. After a few years, the Republic filed a motion
to dismiss said case due to the enactment of
the Batas Pambansa Blg. 340 expropriating
the same properties for the same purpose.
The lower court granted dismissal due to the
enactment of the law.
4. De Knecht appealed to the CA. CA granted
appeal because the choice of Fernando
Rein-Del Pan Streets for the EDSA
extension is arbitrary and should not receive
judicial approval.
Petition DISMISSED. The abovementioned PDs were
declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
1. Did respondent Court of
Appeals err in fixing the
amount of P7.00 per square
meter as just compensation
based on its planned
convertibility into a
residential subdivision?
CA Decision REVERSED.
1. May an expropriation
proceeding that was
determined by a final
judgment of the SC be the
subject of a subsequent
legislation for expropriation?
CALUAG, CHIONGSON, CIPRES, MARONILLA, MILLETE, QUERUBIN, RICO, SY, UY | 40
1. YES. P3.75 per square meter is reinstated; the price
of just compensation should be the value lost at the
actual taking, not the value it may serve in the future
it is the time of taking and not as "potential
building" site that is the determining factor,
the nature of the land at the time of taking by the
govt is the principal criterion for awarding
compensation to the land owner
The taking commences when San Diego bought
the land
As early as 1977 the govt, through the DPWH
began work on the westward extension of EDSA
out fall of the Manila and suburbs flood control and
drainage project and the Estero Tripa de Gallina.
These projects were aimed at:
o easing traffic congestion in the Baclaran and
outlying areas;
o controlling flood by the construction of the
outlet for the Estero Tripa de Gallina; and
o Completing the Manila Flood and Control and
Drainage Project.
Republic acquired about 80 to 85 percent of the the
needed properties involved in the project through
negotiated purchase. The owners did not raise any
objection as to arbitrariness on the choice of the
project and of the route.
It is only with the remaining 10 to 15 percent that
the petitioner cannot negotiate. Thus, Republic
filed the expropriation proceedings in the CFI.
The decision in De Knecht vs. Bautista, SC held
that the "choice of the Fernando Rain-Del Pan
streets as the line through which the EDSA should
be extended to Roxas Boulevard is arbitrary and
should not receive judicial approval." It is based on
the recommendation of the Human Settlements
Commission that the choice of Cuneta street as the
line of the extension will minimize the social impact
factor as the buildings and improvement therein
are mostly motels. In view of the said finding, SC
set aside the order of the trial court.
Subsequently B.P. Blg. 340 was enacted. CA held
that the decision of the Supreme Court having
become final, Republics right as determined
therein should no longer be disturbed and that the
same has become the law of the case between the
parties involved.
The right of the Republic to take private properties
for public use upon the payment of the just
compensation is so provided in the Constitution.
Such expropriation proceedings may be
undertaken by the petitioner not only by voluntary
negotiation with the land owners but also by taking
appropriate court action or by legislations. When
the Batasang Pambansa passed B.P. Blg. 340, it
appears that it was based on supervening events
that occurred after the decision of this Court was
rendered in De Knecht in 1980 justifying the
expropriation.
The social impact factor which persuaded the
Court to consider this extension to be arbitrary had
disappeared. All residents in the area have been
relocated and duly compensated. Eighty percent of
the EDSA outfall and 30% of the EDSA extension
had been completed. Only private respondent
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remains as the solitary obstacle to this project.

The single piece of property 'occupied' by De
Knecht is the only parcel of land where
Government engineers could not enter due to the
'armed' resistance offered by De Knecht.
B.P. Blg. 340 effectively superseded the final and
executory decision of the SC, and the trial court
committed no grave abuse of discretion in
dismissing the case pending before it on the
ground of the enactment of B.P. Blg. 340.
o The decision is no obstacle to the legislative arm
of the Govt in making its own assessment of the
circumstances then prevailing as to the propriety
of the expropriation and thereafter by enacting
the corresponding legislation.

Petition GRANTED.

57. DE KNECHT VS. 1. There was a plan extending EDSA to Roxas
BAUTISTA Blvd that would pass thru Cuneta Ave.
FERNANDEZ; 2. However, the plan was changed from that
10/30/1980 proposed route to Fernando Rein & Del Pan
Sts, which are lined with old houses,
petitioner's property being amongst those
that will be affected by the change in the
plan.
3. The owners of the properties along
Fernando-Del Pan filed on April 1977 a
formal petition with Pres. Marcos asking him
to order the Ministry of Public Works to
proceed with the original plan.
4. Marcos then ordered the head of the MPH
Baltazar Aquino to explain, & tasked the
Human Settlements Commission to
investigate the matter.
5. After formal hearings the HSC recommended
that the planned extension be reverted to its
original route.
6. Despite this the MPH insisted on
implementing the route which passed
through Fernando Rein & Del Pan Sts.
7. In Feb 1979, gov't filed expropriation
proceedings in the CFI, Branch 3 of Pasay
City. Petitioner filed motion to dismiss.
8. In June 1979 the Republic filed a motion for
the issuance of a writ of possesion, on the
ground that the payment for the expropriated
properties had already been made with the
PNB.
9. Respondent Judge Bautista granted writ. It is
this that is being assailed in the present
petition.
CRUZ, Concurring:
1. Did respondent judge acted
with grave abuse of
discretion in issuing the writ
of possession?
In the instant case, the Court reasoned that taking all
the factors:
Petition GRANTED.
B.P. Blg. 340 is not a legislative reversal of the finding
in De Knecht v. Bautista, that the expropriation of the
petitioner's property was arbitrary.
Supervening events have changed the factual basis of
that decision to justify the subsequent enactment of
the statute.
The SC is sustaining the legislation, not because it
concedes that the lawmakers can nullify the findings of
the Court in the exercise of its discretion.
It is simply because the Court has found that under
the changed situation, the present expropriation is no
longer
arbitrary.
1. YES. The power of eminent domain is unquestioned
as it is constitutionally granted. (Section 2, Article IV,
1973 Constitution; Section 9, Article III 1987
Constitution).
But there are exacting standards that need to be
met. Government may not capriciously or
arbitrarily choose what private land to be taken.
The Court held in JM Tuason v LTA that a
landowner is covered by the mantle of protection
that due process affords...it frowns on
arbitrariness
1. That is seemed odd why there was a sudden
change in plan where the route went north rather
than south;
2. That it is doubtful whether the extension of EDSA
along Cuneta Ave can be objected to on the
ground of social impact as those to be affected
are mostly motels as opposed to residential
areas;
3. That the HSC report has recommended the
original route;
The choice of Fernando Rein-Del Pan was
arbitrary and hence should not receive judicial
approval.

Petitioner:
10. Respondent court lacked or exceeded
jurisdiction in issuing the writ of possession
because petitioner raised a constitutional
question that the court must first resolve
before it can issue an order to take
possession
11. the choice of Fernando Rein-Del Pan Sts
arbitrary and capricious for :
12. The original consideration for the extension
is that it would travel in a straight line, but the
new route detours to the north first before
heading south.
13. Equal protection of the law was not accorded
to the petitioner who is one of the "owners of
solid & substantial homes & quality
residential lands occupied for generations"

CALUAG, CHIONGSON, CIPRES, MARONILLA, MILLETE, QUERUBIN, RICO, SY, UY | 41

 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II (ATTY. BUTCH JAMON): TABLE OF CASES
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and not only to the motel owners of Cuneta
Ave.
Respondents:
14. Court did not exceed jurisdiction since the
Republic complied with all the statutory
requirements for it to have immediate
possession of the property.
15. The change from the original plan of Cuneta
Ave to the Del Pan route was not sudden.
Those who would be adversely affected by
the change were notified. In changing the
proposed route, government did not intend to
protect the motels but to minimize the social
impact factor; more people would be affected
if the original plan had pushed thru as
opposed to a smaller number of
homeowners in the second route
58. MANOTOK VS. NHA 1. President Marcos issued Letter of Instruction
GUTIERREZ, JR.; (LOI) No. 555, instituted a nationwide slum
05/21/1987 improvement & resettlement program. He
also issued LOI No. 558 which adopted slum
improvement as a national housing policy.
2. Governor of Metro Manila issued Executive
Order (E.O.) No. 6-77 adopting the
Metropolitan Manila Zonal Improvement
Program.
3. Tambunting and Sunog Apog Estate were
included in the Metro Manila Zoning
Improvement program, after being classified
by the National Housing Authority (NHA) as
blighted communities
4. National government acquired Tambunting
estate for the residents there after a fire
razed it
5. Proclamation No. 1810 was issued,
declaring all sites Identified by the Metro
Manila local governments and approved by
the Ministry of Human Settlements to be
included in the ZIP, including the
Tambunting estate and the Sunog-Apog
area
6. 28 January 1980 - President issued
Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1669 which:
expropriates Tambunting Estate;
designates the NHA to do the
expropriation
PhP17,000,000.00 will be paid to the
owners within a period of five (5) years in
five (5) equal installments.
7. 28 January 1980 President also issued PD
No. 1670 which:
expropriates the Sunog-Apog Area;
designates the NHA to do the
expropriation
PhP8,000,000.00 will be paid to the
owners within a period of five (5) years in
five (5) equal installments.
8. Eliza Manotok (petitioner) assails PD No.
1669 and PD No. 1670 as unconstitutional.
The laws violated their constitutional right to
due process because it expropriated their
properties automatically without the chance
to oppose the expropriation and to contest
the just compensation to which they are
entitled.
59. E.M. HOTEL VS. 1. Ordinance No. 476- was enacted by the
CITY OF MANILA Municipal City of manila on June 13, 1963
FERNANDO; and was approved by Vice Mayor Astorga
07/31/1967 on June 14.
2. According to the petitioners, the said
ordinance is unconstitutional for being
unreasonable and is in violation of due
process:
Imposes 150-200% increase in the
license fee
Requires owner, manager, keeper of a
hotel or motel to ask guests to fill up a
prescribed form that will be open to
public at all times (whole name, birthday,
address, occupation, nationality, sex
length of stay, number of companions
with name, age, sex, relationship)
hotels will be open for inspection by the
1. Are PD No. 1669 and PD
No. 1670 unconstitutional?
1. Is Ordinance No. 4760
unconstitutional?
CALUAG, CHIONGSON, CIPRES, MARONILLA, MILLETE, QUERUBIN, RICO, SY, UY | 42
1. YES, PD No. 1669 and PD No. 1670 are
unconstitutional.
Limitations on Eminent Domain:
o the taking must be for public use
o the payment of just compensation must be made
o due process must be observed in the taking
Tambunting Estate and Sunog-Apog were
expropriated automatically when the decrees were
signed. They were summarily proclaimed a blighted
area and directly expropriated by decree without
any hearing or any proceeding.
Although due process does not always necessarily
demand that a proceeding be had before a court of
law, it still mandates some form of proceeding
wherein notice and reasonable opportunity to be
heard are given to the owner to protect his property
rights. This was not done in this case.
There is no reason presented as to why the
properties involved were singled out for
expropriation through decrees or what necessity
impelled the particular choices or selections.
Tambunting Estate is a valuable commercial
property while Sunog-Apog is well-developed.
The provision in PD 1669 which allows NHA to put
portions of the expropriated area to commercial use
in order to defray the development costs of its
housing projects is not for public use. The
legislature may not take the property of one citizen
and transfer it to another even for full compensation
(Guido vs. Rural Progress Administration).
The Government argues that the values used for
compensation were assessments made in 1978
when they decided to expropriate the properties.
The determination of just compensation, however,
should be at the time of the actual taking or at the
time of the judgment by the court, whichever came
first.
Market value stated by the city assessor cannot
substitute for the court's judgment in expropriation
proceedings. It is violative of the due process and
the eminent domain provisions of the Constitution
to deny to a property owner the opportunity to
prove that the valuation made by a local assessor
is wrong or prejudiced.
1. NO. There are standards of constitutional adjudication
in procedural and substantive aspects. There must be
evidence to offset the presumption of validity that
attaches to a challenged statute or ordinance.
Evidence to rebut is unavoidable unless the
ordinance is void on its face
No such factual foundation being laid in the present
case. Presumption must prevail.
Protection associated with the due process
guaranty does not cover petitioners
Purpose of the state (the purpose of police power):
promote public health, public morals, public safety,
and the general welfare
Purpose specifically in this case is to minimize
practices hurtful to public morals
Astorga annexed a stipulation of facts that there is
an alarming increase in the rate of prostitution,
adultery, and fornication in Manila traceable in
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mayor, chief of police or any authorized
person (invasion of the right to privacy
and the guaranty against self
incrimination)
classifies motels into two classes and
requiring maintenance of certain
minimum facilities
prohibits admission of persons below 18
unless accompanied by parents or lawful
guardian and prohibits establishments
from leasing a room (or part of it) twice
every 24 hours
provides a penalty which is the
cancellation of license causing the
destruction of the business
3. Respondent Contends:
the ordinance bears a relation to a
purpose which is to curb morality
Its a valid exercise of police power
4. The lower court declared the ordinance
unconstitutional.
60. ASSOC. S. L. O. VS. 1. In line with the implementation of the
DAR SEC. following statute:
CRUZ; 07/14/1989 R.A. No. 3844the Agricultural Land
Reform Code enacted before the 1973
Constitution
P.D. No. 27 providing compulsory
acquisition of private lands for
distribution among tenant-farmers and
landowners retention limit.
E.O. No. 228 declaring full land
ownership in favor of the beneficiaries of
P.D. No. 27 and providing for the
What then is the procedural or substantive requisite?
Judgment REVERSED.
1. Were the petitioners correct
in raising the issue on
compensable taking?
2. Was there a proper or
necessary use of the power
of eminent domain?
3. Does the fixation of just
compensation rendered by
the statutes violate judicial
prerogatives?
4. Is the argument of the
petitioners that just
CALUAG, CHIONGSON, CIPRES, MARONILLA, MILLETE, QUERUBIN, RICO, SY, UY | 43
great part to the existence of motels which provide
a necessary atmosphere for clandestine entry,
presence and exit and thus become the ideal
heaven for prostitutes and thrill seekers
The purpose of the ordinance is to check the
clandestine harboring of transients and guests to fill
up a registration form, prepared for the purpose, in
a lobby open to public view at all times, and by
introducing several amendatory provisions
calculated to shatter the privacy that characterizes
the registration of transients and guests.
Another purpose is to increase in license fees to
discourage illegal establishments
This court has invariably stamped with the seal of
approval ordinances intended to protect public
morals
In view of the requirements of due process, equal
protection and other applicable constitutional
guaranties, the exercise of police power insofar as
it may affect the life, liberty, property of any person
is subject to judicial inquiry
When exercise of police power may be considered
as wither capricious, whimsical, unjust or
unreasonable, a denial of due process, or a
violation of any other applicable constitutional
guaranty may call for correction by the courts
There is no controlling and precise definition of due
process. It merely requires that any taking should
be valid.
1. responsiveness to the supremacy of reason,
obedience to the dictates of justice
2. arbitrariness is ruled out and unfairness avoided
3. must not outrun the bounds of reason and result in
sheer oppression
4. should be reflective of democratic traditions of legal
and political thought
5. not unrelated to time, place, and circumstances
6. due process cannot be a slave to form or phrases
The increase in license fees is incidental to the
police power (power to regulate)
There is municipal discretion which the courts
decline to interfere with
Cities and municipalities have plenary power to tax
(1) for public purpose, (2)just, (3) uniform
The mere fact that some individuals in the
community may be deprived of their present
business or a particular mode of earning cannot
prevent the exercise of police power--- neither is
the restriction on freedom
Purpose was not unreasonable in this case
There is a correspondence between the undeniable
existence of an undesirable situation and the
legislative attempt at correction
Liberty is not absolute. Liberty is regulated for the
greater good. It is subject to reasonable restraint by
general law for the common good
Fundamental aim of the state (to which individual
rights are SUBORDINATED): to secure the general
comfort, health and prosperity of the state
There is a required balance bet authority and liberty
to ensure peace, order, and happiness for all.
People vs Pomar is no longer a living principle
Government has the right to intervene even in
contractual relations affected with public interest
Ordinance also not vague (common sense can
understand it)
1. NO. The case presents no complication as to the
issue on compensable taking.
Measures being challenged in this case presents
retention limits for landowners where police power
is exercised over landowners in accordance with
the Constitutions regulation on private property.
However, to carry out the regulation, eminent
domain is also used to have the taking to be with
just compensation.
Recent trends indicate not the polarization but
rather the mingling of the police power and the
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valuation of still unvalued lands covered
by the decree as well as the manner of
their payment.
Followed EO 228 is Pres. Proc. No. 131,
instituting a comprehensive agrarian
reform program (CARP), with E.O. No.
229 as its IRR.
Later Congress R.A. No. 6657the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of
1988
2. Four consolidated petitions are laid for
decision.
3. Basically, the petitioners contend that no
property should be taken without just
compensation, on grounds of separation of
powers, due process, equal protection and
constitutional limitation.
4. In addition, they that the taking of lands
must be simultaneous with the taking of
such.
5. Barcelona, one of the petitioners, added
that there is a lack of evidence to justify the
necessity of the use of eminent domain.
6. Petitions seek to declare statutes
unconstitutional
compensation should only power of eminent domain. What accounts to this
come in the form of money is the concept that whatever may be beneficially
hence, making the assailed employed for the general welfare satisfies the
statute unconstitutional for requirement of public use.
having it in less than Case laws have long accepted the employment of
money? taxing power to achieve police purpose.
2. YES. The requirement of public use can be found in
the Constitution itself. PD 27, Proc.137 and RA 6657
merely elaborate the Constitution; the state adopts
for necessary measures to undertake the just
distribution of agricultural lands for farmers to own
directly the land they till.
Eminent domain is an inherent power of the state
to forcibly acquire private lands intended for public
use upon payment of just compensation. This only
works to owners unwilling to surrender their
property to the state, where the latter takes over
their property for the purpose of general welfare.
Requirements for proper exercise of the power
are
o Public use.
o Just compensation
Both were satisfied by the statutes.
3. NO. R.A. 6657 (Sec. 16(d)) will show that although
the proceedings are described as summary, the
landowner and other interested parties are
nevertheless allowed an opportunity to submit
evidence on the real value of the property.
Although this is judicial in nature, other agencies
concerned are not barred from having to take
account of this compensation.
Likewise, the determination of the just
compensation by the DAR is not by any means
final and conclusive upon the landowner or any
other interested party. It is merely preliminary
unless accepted by all parties concerned.
Hence, Judiciary still hold the final say. They may
review DARs pronouncements.

4. NO. This is no ordinary/traditional expropriation. It

affects the entire Philippine population.
It is not traditional or ordinary expropriation where
only a specific and limited area is sought to be
taken by the State for a local purpose.
This is a revolutionary kind of expropriation which
affects all private agricultural land as long as they
are in excess of the maximum retention limits
allowed their owners. It benefits the entire Filipino
nation, from all levels of society.
The Framers of the constitution could have
foreseen the difficulty of these agrarian reform
actions.

All petitions DISMISSED. RA6657, PD27, Proc.131 and

EO 228 and 229 are SUSTAINED of the constitutional
objections of the petitioners.

Note: Police Power v. Eminent Domain

61. SUMULONG VS. 1. December 5, 1977 National Housing
GUERRERO Authority (NIIA) filed a complaint for
CRUZ; 09/30/1987 expropriation of parcels of land covering
approximately twenty five (25) hectares, (in
Antipolo, Rizal) including the lots of
petitioners Sumulong, et.al.
2. Expropriate lands were valued by the NHA at
one peso (P1.00) per square meter, adopting
the market value fixed by the provincial
assessor. NHA deposited the amount of
P158,980.00 with the Philippine National
Bank, pursuant to PD 1224 which defines
"the policy on the expropriation of private
property for socialized housing upon
payment of just compensation."
3. Petitioners filed petition contending that
Pres. Decree No. 1224:
1. Is the socialized housing 1. YES. In the present case, the use to which it is
as defined in PD 1224
intended for public use?
2. Is PD 1224 allows taking of
any private land?
3. Do the petitioners been
deprived of due process of
law because of unjust
compensation?
Property condemned under police power in intended
for harmful purpose such as obscene materials,
building about to collapse etc. Eminent domain
involves wholesome properties and those intended
for public use.
The confiscation is not compensable for police power
in comparison to the eminent domain power.
proposed to put the subject parcels of land meets the
requisites of "public use". The lands are being
expropriated by the NHA for the expansion of Bagong
Nayon Housing Project to provide housing to low-
salaried government employees.
Socialized housing - " construction of dwelling units
for the middle and lower class members of our
society, including the construction of the supporting
infrastructure and other facilities" (Pres. Decree No.
1224, par. 1).
"Public use" requirement for exercise of the power
of eminent domain is flexible and evolving, as
influenced by changing conditions. Urban
redevelopment and construction of low-cost
housing is recognized as a public purpose, not only
because of the expanded concept of public use but

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Will benefit only "a handful of people,
bereft of public character," since
socialized housing" which is the purpose
of condemnation proceedings, is not
really for "public use"
Would allow taking of "any private land"
regardless of size.
Would allow the taking of private property
upon payment of unjust and unfair
valuations arbitrarily fixed by government
assessors. PD 1224 would also deprive
courts of their discretion to determine "just
compensation".
Violates procedural due process as it
allows immediate taking of possession,
control and disposition of property without
the owners due process in court
62. CITY GOVT VS. 1. A Quezon City ordinance requires all
ERICTA cemeteries to a lot 6% of their lands to the
GUTIERREZ, JR.; paupers, free of charge
06/24/1983 City government says that this was a valid
exercise of their police power
Authorized by city charter
2. The respondents contend that
Eminent domain is exercised, not police
power; hence there should be just
compensation
Confiscation of property is obvious
because the ordinance permanently
restricts the use of the property in that it
cannot be used for any reasonable
purpose
Deprives the owner of all beneficial use of
his property.
General welfare clause is not valid as a
reason for taking the property in this case
since it refers to the power of promoting
the public welfare by restraining and
regulating the use of liberty and property."
also because the Constitution says that the state
shall by law, and for the common good, undertake,
in cooperation with the private sector, a continuing
program of urban land reform and housing which
will make available at affordable cost decent
housing and basic services to underprivileged and
homeless citizens in urban centers and
resettlement areas. (Art. XIII, sec. 9).
2. NO. The test to be applied for a valid expropriation of
private lands was the area of the land and not the
number of people who stood to be benefited.
The State via the NHA is vested with broad
discretion to designate the particular
property/properties to be taken for socialized
housing purposes and how much thereof may be
expropriated.
Without a showing of fraud, bad faith, or gross
abuse of discretion on petitioners part, the Court
will give due weight to the NHA's choice and size of
the site for the project.
3. YES. The provisions on just compensation found in
Presidential Decree Nos. 1224, 1259 and 1313 are the
same provisions found in Presidential Decree Nos. 76,
464, 794 and 1533 which were declared
unconstitutional in EPZA vs. Dulay.
The court should not be deprived of its judicial
powers to determine just compensation. Just
compensation means the value of the property at
the time of the taking.
Just compensation means a fair and full equivalent
for the loss sustained. All the facts as to the
condition of the property and its surroundings, its
improvements and capabilities, should be
considered. Taking of property without notice is in
violation of due process.
Requisites that must be met before a
writ of possession is issued by the
Court in expropriation proceedings:
1. There must be a complaint for expropriation sufficient
in form and in substance;
2. A provisional determination of just compensation for
the properties sought to be expropriated must be
made by the trial court on the basis of judicial (not
legislative or executive) discretion; and
3. The deposit requirement under Section 2, Rule 67
must be complied with.
Writ of possession on the basis of the market value
ANNULLED. The case is REMANDED to the court of
origin for further proceedings to determine the
compensation the petitioners are entitled to be paid.
1. Is Section 9 of Ordinance 1. YES, it is unconstitutional, because they are not
No. 61 18, S-64 exercising police power
unconstitutional? Property taken for public use without just
compensation is a violation of the principles of
eminent domain
The power to regulate does not include the power
to prohibit.
The power to regulate does not include the power
to confiscate.
Police power the power of promoting the public
welfare by restraining and regulating the use of
liberty and property (Freund)
Property taken in police power is to be destroyed
o Destroy in order to promote the general
welfare.
o Does not recover from the government for
injury sustained in consequence.
Property taken in eminent domain is utilized for
public use
Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, Series of 1964
of Quezon City is an outright confiscation, not just
a police regulation; deprives a person of his
private property without due process and just
compensation.
Allotment of 6% of private cemetery lands has no
relation to the promotion of' health, morals, good
order, safety, or the general welfare of the people.
The ordinance does not provide for just
compensation for the taking of a certain area from
a private cemetery to benefit paupers
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63. LUZ FARMS VS. 1. Luz Farms is a corporation involved in the
DAR SEC. poultry and livestock business
PARAS; 12/04/1990 2. June 1988: The President approved
R.A.6657 (Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Law of 1988), which explicitly covered the
raising of livestock, poultry and swine.
The law requires the implementation of
production-sharing plans where those
covered by the law will have to distribute
3% of gross sales and 10% of net profit to
their workers as additional compensation
3. Jan 1989: Sec of Agrarian Reform
promulgated IRRs for RA 6657
4. Luz Farms filed petitions to declare the said
Law and IRR as unconstitutional and to
restrain their enforcement.
5. The court initially denied the petitions but
later on gave them due course.
64. CARIDAY 1. CARIDAY owner of residential building
INVESTMENT VS. inside Forbes Park
CA 2. Building does not pass Forbes Park
GRINO-AQUINO; Association (FPA; corporation promoting
08/02/1989 interests of Forbes Park residents)
3. Deed of Restrictions of FPA indicate that
only one family is allowed to live in a
residential building
4. Said Deed also states that one lot can only
hold one residential building
5. Violation of the Deed would result to water
supply cutoff by FPA
6. CARIDAY said that the building looks that of
a single family residence, only that it is
designed to accommodate two families
7. In spite of FBAs demands, CARIDAY still
leased portion of the house to an
Englishman and to Procter & Gamble
8. Clearance approving CARIDAYs lease
denied by FPA
9. FPA threatened water supply cutoff to
CARIDAY
10. CARIDAY instituted action; won at RTC but
reversed at CA
1. Is Luz Farms contention
that the laws are
unconstitutional for including
livestock, poultry and swine
under its coverage, being
not primarily reliant on land
valid?
1. Should the regulation of
FPA regarding building
structures be considered
valid?
CALUAG, CHIONGSON, CIPRES, MARONILLA, MILLETE, QUERUBIN, RICO, SY, UY | 46
The charter allows the city to build cemeteries and
not to take lands thereof; in effect, the city is
passing on the burden to the owners of the
cemetery.
Petition DENIED
1. YES. Framers never intended to include livestock and
poultry industry in the Governments agrarian reform
program in the Constitution
Framers agreed that agricultural lands are
limited to arable and suitable agricultural lands
and do not include commercial, industrial lands
and residential properties
Those involved in the livestock business do not
primarily rely on land as their resource. In fact the
use of land is merely incidental in this business.
Livestock and poultry farm-workers are covered
by the minimum wage law and not by tenancy
law. They are also entitled to additional benefits
unlike the tenants.
Petition GRANTED. The portion covering the inclusion of
livestock, poultry and swine declared NULL AND VOID.
1. YES. Restriction contemplates of avoiding
overcrowding in the houses and subdivision; such will
only result to pressure common facilities and creates
problems for the subdivision in terms of sanitation and
security.
Deed restrictions provided for number of families
allowed, which is one. Law should have not
included the number of families if it only intended
to restrict structure.
Filipino custom of family ties is recognized.
However, in this case, CARIDAY allowed two
unrelated tenants to live in a supposedly single
family shelter.
Petitioners contention on exterior and interior
differences - not warranted. Such reason would
circumvent the law. If allowed, a house with the
external appearance of a single family shelter but
with the interior space for a large number of
occupants may be built.
Petition DENIED.
GUTIERREZ, JR., Dissent:
No proof that two families living in one big residence
in Forbes Park would lead to unpleasant
consequences (overcrowding, deterioration of roads,
unsanitary conditions etc.)
Millions-worth property for just one family waste of
money
Social justice and human rights in our Constitution
Congress should highly prioritize measures promoting
right to human dignity, reduction of inequalities via
equitable diffusion of political power and wealth
Difficulty in pinpointing the line where restrictions of
property ownership go beyond the constitutional
bounds of reasonableness