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G.R. No.

134504 March 17, 2000 3) Failing before DOJ, the accused on February 6, 1992, filed in Criminal Case
No. Q-91-24179 an "Omnibus Motion for Reinvestigation and to Lift the
Warrant of Arrest". The Motion was granted and the case was set for
JOSELITO V. NARCISO, petitioner,
reinvestigation by another prosecutor.
vs.
FLOR MARIE STA. ROMANA-CRUZ, respondent.
4) Assistant Prosecutor Lydia A. Navarro, to whom the case was assigned for
reinvestigation, found no reason to disturb the findings of the previous
PANGANIBAN, J.:
prosecutor and recommended the remand of the case to the court for
arraignment and trial.
When the penalty prescribed by law is death, reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, a hearing must be conducted by the trial judge before bail can
5) On August 3, 1992, accused filed an "Urgent Ex-Parte (Ex Abundanti
be granted to the accused. Absent such hearing, the order granting bail is
Cautela) to Allow Accused Joselito Narciso to Post Bail". The Public
void for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion. In parricide, the
Prosecutor registered no objection and said motion was granted on the same
accused cannot be considered an offended party just because he was
day, allowing accused to post bail at P150,000.00.
married to the deceased. In the interest of justice and in view of the peculiar
circumstances of this case, the sister of the victim may be deemed to be an
"offended party"; hence, she has the legal personality to challenge the void xxx xxx xxx
order of the trial court.
6) On August 14, 1992, the private prosecutor representing private
The Case complainant Flor Marie Sta. Romana-Cruz, a sister of accused's deceased
wife, filed an "Urgent Motion to Lift Order Allowing Accused To Post Bail".
We invoke the foregoing principles in rejecting the Petition for Review on
Certiorari before us, assailing the February 26, 1998 Decision 1 and the June 7) Accused objected to the aforesaid urgent motion by filing a "Motion to
29, 1998 Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA), 2 which reversed and set Expunge 1) Notice of Appearance of the Private Prosecutor and the 2) Urgent
aside the Order of Executive Judge Pedro T. Santiago of the Regional Trial Motion to Lift Order Allowing Accused to Post Bail".
Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 101, in Criminal Case No. Q-91-24179
entitled "People of the Philippines v. Joselito V. Narciso."
8) Arraignment was conducted on September 14, 1992 and the case was set
for hearing on November 9, 16, 23, December 2, 9, 1992, January 6, 13, 20,
The dispositive portion of the challenged CA Decision reads: 27, 1993, February 3, 7, 10 and 24 1993.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is hereby GRANTED and the order 9) On October 15, 1992, private complainant through counsel filed her
granting bail is annulled and set aside. 3 opposition to the motion to expunge [filed by] accused.

The assailed Resolution, on the other hand, denied petitioner's Motion for 10). On November 3, 1992 private complainant moved for the postponement
Reconsideration. of the trials set on November 9, 16 and 23 and the subsequent hearings
thereon pending the resolution of their "Urgent Motion to Lift Order
Allowing Accused To Post Bail".
The full text of the August 3, 1992 RTC Order, which the Court of Appeals
annulled and set aside, reads as follows:
11) On November 9, 1992, the court issued the first assailed order stating
therein to wit:
Accused who is present filed thru counsel a Motion to Allow Accused Joselito
V. Narciso to Post Bail.
ORDER
Considering that the Presiding Judge of Branch 83 who is hearing this case is
on leave and the Pairing Judge Honorable Salvador Ceguerra is no longer Counsel for the accused, upon being informed of the motion for
within the premises, there being no objection by the City Prosecutor Candido postponement dated November 3, 1992 filed by the private complainant,
Rivera to the accused posting a cashbond of P150,000.00, the undersigned in through counsel, offered no objection to the cancellation of today's trial but
his capacity as Executive Judge hereby approves the same. 4 not the trial set on November 16, 23 and December 2 and 9, 1992 for the
reason that the trial can proceed independently of the pending "Urgent
Motion to Lift Order Allowing the Accused to Post Bail".
The Facts of the Case

WHEREFORE, the trial set for today is hereby cancelled and re-set on
The undisputed antecedents of the case were summarized by the Court of
November 16, 1992 at 10:30 o'clock in the morning, as previously scheduled.
Appeals as follows:

SO ORDERED.
1) After conducting a preliminary investigation on the death of Corazon Sta.
Romana-Narciso, wife of Joselito Narciso, Asst. City Prosecutor Myrna
Dimaranan Vidal of Quezon City recommended and thereafter filed, the 12) On November 16, 1992, the court cancelled the hearing upon motion of
information for parricide against Joselito Narciso on November 13, 1991, the public prosecutor because no prosecution witness was available.
with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, docketed therein as Criminal
Case No. Q-91-24179.
13) [I]n the hearing of November 23, 1992, the private prosecutor again
moved for postponement because of the pendency of his "Motion to Lift
2) Joselito Narciso thereafter asked for a review of the prosecutor's Order Allowing Accused to Post Bail". On the same date, the court issued the
resolution [before] the Department of Justice (DOJ) which was however second assailed order which reads:
denied. Joselito Narciso moved for reconsideration, which was still denied by
the DOJ.
ORDER

1|RULE 114 CASES - BAIL


On motion of the Asst. City Prosecutor, for the reason that there is no Sec. 13, Article III of the Constitution, provides: "All persons, except those
showing in the record that the private complainant was duly notified, hence, charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of
there is no available witness this morning, the trial set for today is hereby guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or
cancelled and reset on December 2 and 9, 1992 both at 10:30 o'clock in the be released on recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail
morning, as previously scheduled. shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is
suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required." Furthermore, Section 7,
Article 114 of the Rules of Court, as amended, also provides: "No person
Let a subpoena be issued to complainant Corazon [sic] Sta. Romana-Narciso,
charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion
the same to be served personally by the Deputy Sheriff/Process server of this
perpetua or life imprisonment, when evidence of guilt is strong, shall be
Court.
admitted to bail regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution."

The accused is notified of this Order in open court.


Although petitioner was charged with parricide which is punishable with
reclusion perpetua, he argued before the CA that he was entitled to bail
SO ORDERED. because the evidence of his guilt was not strong. He contended that the
prosecutor's conformity to his Motion for Bail was tantamount to a finding
Not obtaining any resolution on her "Motion To Lift Order Allowing Accused that the prosecution evidence against him was not strong.
to Post Bail", private complainant filed this petition [before the CA].
The Court of Appeals ruled, however, that there was no basis for such
As earlier mentioned, the Court of Appeals granted private respondent's finding, since no hearing had been conducted on the application for bail
Petition for Certiorari. Hence, this recourse to us via Rule 45 of the Rules of summary or otherwise. The appellate court found that only ten minutes had
Court. 5 elapsed between the filing of the Motion by the accused and the Order
granting bail, a lapse of time that could not be deemed sufficient for the trial
court to receive and evaluate any evidence. We agree with the CA.
The Issues

Stressing in Basco v. Rapatalo 8 that the judge had the duty to determine
Petitioner imputes to the Court of Appeals this alleged error: whether the evidence of guilt was strong, the Court held:

The Respondent Court of Appeals has erroneously decided questions of When the grant of bail is discretionary, the prosecution has the burden of
substance, in a manner not in accord with law, the Rules of Court and showing that the evidence of guilt against the accused is strong. However,
applicable jurisprudence, as exemplified in the decisions of this Honorable the determination of whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong, being a
Court, when it reversed and set aside the order of the Regional Trial Court of matter of judicial discretion, remains with the judge. "This discretion by the
Quezon City which granted the petitioner his constitutional right to bail, very nature of things, may rightly be exercised only after the evidence is
considering the absence of strong evidence or proof of his guilt, and more submitted to the court at the hearing. Since the discretion is directed to the
especially when the public prosecutors, who have direct control of the weight of the evidence and since evidence cannot properly be weighed if not
proceedings and after assessment of the evidence, have themselves duly exhibited or produced before the court, it is obvious that a proper
recommended the grant of bail. 6 exercise of judicial discretion requires that the evidence of guilt be submitted
to the court, the petitioner having the right of cross examination and to
Respondent, on the other hand, poses the following issues: 7 introduce his own evidence in rebuttal."

A xxx xxx xxx

Whether or not the Respondent Court of Appeals correctly ruled that the Consequently, in the application for bail of a person charged with a capital
Order of the Regional Trial Court which granted bail to the petitioner is offense punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, a
substantially and procedurally infirm notwithstanding the absence of any hearing, whether summary or otherwise in the discretion of the court, must
opposition from the public prosecutor. actually be conducted to determine whether or not the evidence of guilt
against the accused is strong. "A summary hearing means such brief and
speedy method of receiving and considering the evidence of guilt as is
B practicable and consistent with the purpose of hearing which is merely to
determine the weight of evidence for the purposes of bail. On such hearing,
Whether or not the private respondent has the legal personality to intervene the court does not sit to try the merits or to enter into any nice inquiry as to
in the present criminal case. the weight that ought to be allowed to the evidence for or against the
accused, nor will it speculate on the outcome of the trial or on what further
evidence may be therein offered and admitted. The course of inquiry may be
To resolve this case, the Court believes that two issues must be taken up;
left to the discretion of the court which may confine itself to receiving such
namely, (1) the validity of the grant of bail and (2) private respondent's
evidence as has reference to substantial matters, avoiding unnecessary
standing to file the Petition before the CA.
thoroughness in the examination and cross examination." If a party is denied
the opportunity to be heard, there would be a violation of procedural due
The Court's Ruling process. (Emphasis supplied.)

The Petition is devoid of merit. Jurisprudence is replete with decisions compelling judges to conduct the
required hearings in bail applications, in which the accused stands charged
First Issue: with a capital offense. The absence of objection from the prosecution is
never a basis for the grant of bail in such cases, for the judge has no right to
presume that the prosecutor knows what he is doing on account of
Validity of the Grant of Bail familiarity with the case. "Said reasoning is tantamount to ceding to the
prosecutor the duty of exercising judicial discretion to determine whether
the guilt of the accused is strong. Judicial discretion is the domain of the

2|RULE 114 CASES - BAIL


judge before whom the petition for provisional liberty will be decided. The its absence will invalidate the grant or the denial of the application for bail.
mandated duty to exercise discretion has never been reposed upon the 15
prosecutor. 9
Clearly, the grant of bail by Executive Judge Santiago was laced with grave
Imposed in Baylon v. Sison 10 was this mandatory duty to conduct a hearing abuse of discretion and the Court of Appeals was correct in reversing him.
despite the prosecution's refusal to adduce evidence in opposition to the
application to grant and fix bail. We quote below the pertinent portion of the
Second Issue:
Decision therein:

Respondent's Standing to File the Petition


The importance of a hearing has been emphasized in not a few cases wherein
the Court ruled that even if the prosecution refuses to adduce evidence or
fails to interpose an objection to the motion for bail, it is still mandatory for Petitioner attacks respondent's legal standing to file the Petition for
the court to conduct a hearing or ask searching questions from which it may Certiorari before the appellate court, maintaining that only the public
infer the strength of the evidence of guilt, or the lack of it, against the prosecutor or the solicitor general may challenge the assailed Order. He
accused. invokes People v. Dacudao 16 which ruled:

In Gimeno v. Arcueno Sr., 11 the Court also held: . . . A private prosecutor in a criminal case has no authority to act for the
People of the Philippines before this Court. It is the Government's counsel,
the Solicitor General who appears in criminal cases or incidents before the
The grant of bail is a matter of right except in cases involving capital offenses
Supreme Court. At the very least, the Provincial Fiscal himself, with the
when the matter is left to the sound discretion of the court. That discretion
conformity of the Solicitor General, should have raised the issue (of whether
lies, not in the determination whether or not a hearing should be held but in
or not the prosecution was deprived of procedural due process on account of
the appreciation and evaluation of the prosecution's evidence of guilt against
the grant of bail to the accused without any hearing on the motion for bail)
the accused. . . . A hearing is plainly indispensable before a judge can aptly be
before us, instead of the private prosecutor with the conformity of the
said to be in a position to determine whether the evidence for the
Assistant Provincial Fiscal of Cebu.
prosecution is weak or strong.

He also cites Republic v. Partisala 17 which held as follows:


And in Concerned Citizens v. Elma, 12 the Court ruled:

We make it known that only the Solicitor General can bring or defend actions
It is true that the weight of the evidence adduced is addressed to the sound
on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines. Henceforth actions filed in the
discretion of the court. However, such discretion may only be exercised after
name of the Republic of the Philippines if not initiated by the Solicitor
the hearing called to ascertain the degree of guilt of the accused for the
General will be summarily dismissed.
purpose of determining whether or not he should be granted liberty.

Citing the "ends of substantial justice," People v. Calo, 18 however, provided


Basco v. Rapatalo 13 summarized several cases 14 that emphasized the
an exception to the above doctrines in this manner:
mandatory character of a hearing in a petition for bail in a capital case. It
enunciated the following duties of the trial judge in such petition.
While the rule is, as held by the Court of Appeals, only the Solicitor General
may bring or defend actions on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines, or
(1) Notify the prosecutor of the hearing of the application for bail or require
represent the People or the State in criminal proceedings pending in this
him to submit his recommendation (Section 18, Rule 114 of the Rules of
Court and the Court of Appeals (Republic vs. Partisala, 118 SCRA 320 [1982]),
Court as amended;
the ends of substantial justice would be better served, and the issues in this
action could be determined in a more just, speedy and inexpensive manner,
(2) Conduct a hearing of the application for bail regardless of whether or not by entertaining the petition at bar. As an offended party in a criminal case,
the prosecution refuses to present evidence to show that the guilt of the private petitioner has sufficient personality and a valid grievance against
accused is strong for the purpose of enabling the court to exercise its sound Judge Adao's order granting bail to the alleged murderers of his (private
discretion (Sections 7 and 8, supra); petitioner's) father.

(3) Decide whether the evidence of guilt of the accused is strong based on In Paredes vs. Gopengco, 29 SCRA 688 (1969), this Court ruled that the
the summary of evidence of the prosecution (Baylon v. Sison, supra); offended parties in criminal cases have sufficient interest and personality as
"person(s) aggrieved" to file the special civil action of prohibition and
certiorari under Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 65 in line with the underlying spirit
(4) If the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge the accused upon the
of the liberal construction of the Rules of Court in order to promote their
approval of the bailbond. (Section 19, supra). Otherwise, petition should be
object, thus:
denied.

Furthermore, as offended parties in the pending criminal case before


The Court added: "The above-enumerated procedure should now leave no
petitioner judge, it cannot be gainsaid that respondents have sufficient
room for doubt as to the duties of the trial judge in cases of bail applications.
interest and personality as "person(s) aggrieved" by petitioner judge's ruling
So basic and fundamental is it to conduct a hearing in connection with the
on his non-disqualification to file the special civil action under sections 1 and
grant of bail in the proper cases that it would amount to judicial apostasy for
2 of Rule 65. Recently, in line with the underlying spirit of a liberal
any member of the judiciary to disclaim knowledge or awareness thereof."
construction of the Rules of Court in order to promote their object, as against
the literal interpretation of Rule 110, section 2, we held, overruling the
Additionally, the court's grant or refuse of bail must contain a summary of implication of an earlier case, that a widow possesses the right as an
the evidence for the prosecution, on the basis of which should be formulated offended party to file a criminal complaint for the murder of her deceased
the judge's own conclusion on whether such evidence is strong enough to husband. (Id., p. 699)
indicate the guilt of the accused. The summary thereof is considered an
aspect of procedural due process for both the prosecution and the defense;

3|RULE 114 CASES - BAIL


The ends of substantial justice indeed require the affirmation of the appellate accused filed a "Motion To Reinstate Former Bail and Reduction of the
court's ruling on this point. Clearly, the assailed Order of Judge Santiago was Amount of New Bail Bond."
issued in grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. A void
order is no order at all. 19 It cannot confer any right or be the source of any
In an order dated May 4, 1994, respondent judge granted said motion, fixing
relief. This Court is not merely a court of law; it is likewise a court of justice.
the bail bond in Criminal Case No, 1433-M-94 at P40,000.00 and reducing the
recommended P200,000.00 bail in Criminal Case No. 1434-M-94 to
To rule otherwise would leave the private respondent without any recourse P40,000.00. 3
to rectify the public injustice brought about by the trial court's Order, leaving
her with only the standing to file administrative charges for ignorance of the
Subsequently, the present administrative complaint, was filed, assailing the
law against the judge and the prosecutor. A party cannot be left without
said order of respondent judge on the contention that the grant of said
recourse to address a substantive issue in law.
motion without hearing or notice to the provincial prosecutor constitutes a
clear violation of the Rules of Court. Complainant further alleged that
Moreover, we agree with the Office of the Solicitor General that "it is too late respondent judge manifested unusual interest, in the case by rudely and
in the day for the petitioner to challenge the legal personality of private arrogantly ordering the deletion of the names of the prosecution's witnesses
respondent considering that it was never disputed by [him] during the when there was no appearance for the prosecution during the arraignment
preliminary investigation of the case, in his appeal to the Department of of the accused, which is a clear indication of his unfairness and that the
Justice and during the reinvestigation of the case." 20 "Motion for Reconsideration and Disqualification" of respondent judge filed
by the provincial prosecutor was denied by the former by merely writing on
the face thereof the notation "denied" without the corresponding written
Corollary to the question of standing, petitioner submits that even if the
order.4
exception were made to apply, private respondent is not an "offended party"
who is granted the right to challenge the assailed RTC Order. He maintains
that only the compulsory heirs of the deceased, who are the accused himself In our resolution of August 22, 1994, respondent judge was required to
and his minor child, may file the instant action. We disagree. comment on the aforesaid administrative complaint.5

It should be remembered that the crime charged against the private On September 12 1994, complainant, through counsel, filed an "Urgent
respondent is parricide; hence, the accused cannot be regarded as an Motion to Order Re-raffle of Cases," praying that Criminal Cases Nos. 1433-
offended party. That would be a contradiction in terms and an absurdity in M-94 and 1434-M-94 be re-raffled to another branch of the Regional Trial
fact. Nor can one expect the minor child to think and to act for himself. Court of Malolos in the interest of justice, considering that respondent judge
Hence, we rule that in view of the peculiar circumstances of this case, the refused to voluntarily inhibit himself from trying said cases.6 In the resolution
sister of the deceased is a proper party-litigant who is akin to the "offended of this Court dated September 8, 1994, said motion was merely noted,
party," she being a closer relative of the deceased. There is no closer kin who pending filing of the comment of respondent judge on the administrative
may be expected to take up the cudgels of justice for the deceased. complaint. 7

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision AFFIRMED. In his comment which was thereafter received, Judge Ofilada vehemently
Costs against petitioner. denied the allegations in the complaint. According to him, the amount of bail
recommended by prosecutors is almost always not followed. He claims that
one who believes that the court should follow the recommendation
SO ORDERED.1wphi1.nt
regarding the amount of bail like a strait-jacket is misinformed. He further
averred that the matter of hearing before the grant or reduction of bail was
A.M. No. RTJ-94-1217 June 16, 1995 handled by the Municipal Trial Court of San Miguel, Bulacan, which made a
predetermination of the amount of the bail.
RODRIGO SANTOS, complainant,
vs. With respect to the information for illegal possession of firearm, he asserted
JUDGE CARLOS C. OFILADA, respondent. that the revelation of the investigator that the gun was not recovered
weakened the prosecution's case, hence reduction of bail was justified.
Respondent judge further argued that the reduction of the amount of bail is
REGALADO, J.: all right as long as the accused would diligently attend the trial of the cases
until the promulgation of the judgments therein. The law, he added, even
allows the posting of recognizance in favor of the accused in certain cases
The present administrative matter was commenced by a sworn complaint and under certain conditions. 8
dated June 22, 1994 filed by Rodrigo Santos, through counsel, before the
Office of the Court Administrator charging Judge Carlos C. Ofilada with
incompetence, gross ignorance of the law, oppression and grave misconduct On November l6, 1994, the Court resolved to refer this administrative matter
relative to Criminal Cases Nos. 1433-M-94 for murder and 1434-M-94 for to the Office of the Court Administrator for evaluation, report and
illegal possession of firearm. recommendation. 9 On February 12, 1992, Deputy Court Administrator
Reynaldo C. Suarez, submitted to the Court, his memorandum duly approved
by the Court Administrator. 10
The record reveal that for the killing of complainant's son, Ronnie Santos,
two separate informations for murder and for illegal possession of firearm,
docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 1433-M-94 and 1434-M-94 respectively, 1 The general rule is that all persons in custody shall, before final conviction, be
were filed against accused Rolando Lopez before Branch 15, Regional Trial entitled to bail as a matter of right. The exception thereto is when the
Court of Malolos, Bulacan, presided over by respondent Judge. accused is charged with a capital offense or an offense which, under the law
at the time of its commission and at the time of the application for bail, is
punishable by reclusion perpetua, when the evidence of guilt is strong,11
Subsequently, the corresponding warrants of arrest were issued by which has since been ramified to include the penalties of life imprisonment
respondent judge in Criminal Case No. 1433-M-94 where no bail was and death.
recommended by the public prosecutor, and in Criminal Case No. 1434-M-94
where bail of P200,000.00 was recommended. 2 Thereafter, counsel for the

4|RULE 114 CASES - BAIL


Thus, the grant of bail becomes a matter of discretion if the accused is The bail was granted by said judge of the lower court on the bases of the
charged with a capital offense. Where admission to bail is a matter of evidence then at hand at that stage. It could very well happen that thereafter
discretion, a hearing is mandatory before an accused can be granted bail. 12 the prosecution may have secured further evidence, in addition to or in
At the hearing, both the prosecution and the defense must be given connection with that which it already possessed, which evidence taken all
reasonable opportunity to prove, in the case of the prosecution, that together are sufficiently strong to prove the guilt of the accused of a capital
evidence of guilt of the applicant is strong; and, in the case of the defense, offense. Thus, it is still necessary for the judge of the regional trial court, in
that such evidence of guilt is not strong. 13 whose sala the information is filed, to set the petition for bail for hearing in
order that the parties can feasibly introduce whatever additional evidence
they may be minded to adduce therein as an aid in determining the guilt of
In the case involved herein, the accused was charged with murder, a capital
the accused and the proper amount of the bail.
offense, in Criminal Case No. 1433-M-94. Hence, it, is specifically required
that the prosecution must be accorded ample opportunity to prove that the
evidence of his guilt is strong. It appears from the records that respondent Even the alleged failure of the prosecution to interpose an objection to the
judge granted bail to the accused without any hearing, thereby denying the granting of bail to the accused will not justify such grant without hearing.
prosecution a chance to prevent said grant of bail by adducing evidence This Court has uniformly ruled that even if the prosecution refuses to adduce
showing the strength of the evidence of his guilt. evidence or fails to interpose any objection to the motion for bail, it is still
mandatory for the court to conduct a hearing or ask searching and
clarificatory questions from which it may infer the strength of the evidence of
We have held that admission to bail as a matter of discretion presupposes
guilt, or the lack of it, against the accused. Where the prosecutor refuses to
the exercise thereof in accordance with law and guided by the applicable
adduce evidence in opposition to the application to grant and fix bail, the
legal principles. The prosecution must first be accorded an opportunity to
court may ask the prosecution such questions as would ascertain the
present evidence because by the very nature of deciding applications for bail,
strength of the State's evidence or judge the adequacy of the amount of
it is on the basis of such evidence that judicial discretion is weighed in
bail.17 Irrespective of respondent judge's opinion that the evidence of guilt
determining whether the guilt of the accused is strong. In other words,
against the accused is not strong, the law and settled jurisprudence demand
discretion must be exercised regularly, legally and within the confines of
that a hearing be conducted before bail may be fixed for the temporary
procedural due process, that is, after evaluation of the evidence submitted
release of the accused. If bail is at all justified. 18
by the prosecution. Any order issued in the absence thereof is not a product
of sound judicial discretion but of whim, caprice and outright arbitrariness.
14 Thus, although the provincial prosecutor had interposed no objection to the
grant of bail to the accused, the respondent judge therein should
nevertheless have set the petition for bail for hearing and diligently
Accordingly, while the determination of whether or not the evidence of guilt
ascertained from the prosecution whether the latter was not in fact
is strong is a matter of judicial discretion, this discretion, by the nature of
contesting the bail application. In addition, a hearing, was also necessary for
things, may rightly be exercised only after the evidence is submitted to the
the court to take into consideration the guidelines set forth in the then
court at such hearing. Whether the motion for bail of an accused who is in
Section 6, Rule 114 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure for fixing the
custody for a capital offense be resolved in a summary proceeding or in the
amount of bail. Only after respondent judge had satisfied himself that these
course of a regular trial, the prosecution must always be given an
requirements have been met could he then proceed to rule on whether or
opportunity to present, within a reasonable time, all the evidence that it may
not to grant bail. 19
desire to introduce before the court may resolve the motion for bail. If the
prosecution should be denied such an opportunity, there would be a
violation of procedural due process, and the order of the court granting bail Clearly, therefore, respondent's act in granting bail to the accused under the
should be considered void on that ground.15 aforementioned circumstances obtaining in this administrative matter
amounts to such a whimsical and arbitrary exercise of jurisdiction which calls
for the exercise of the disciplinary power of this Court. It is indeed
Moreover, it is apparent from a reading of the impugned order granting bail
lamentable that despite the series of its pronouncements on the same
that it lacked the requisite summary or resum of the evidence presented by
administrative offense, this Court still has to contend with the same problem
the parties and necessary to support the grant of bail. There is no recital
all over again and to impose once more the same sanction.
therein of any evidence presented by the prosecution, much less a
conclusion or a pronouncement therefrom that the guilt of the accused is not
evident. The Office of the Court Administrator recommends that a fine of P20,000.00
be imposed on respondent judge and that he be warned against a repetition
of the same administrative misconduct. We approve the recommendation
We have repeatedly stressed that the order granting or refusing the bail must
since it is but in accordance with the penalty imposed by the Court in
contain a summary of the evidence presented by the prosecution. The reason
previous cases involving the same issues. 20
therefor is obvious. On the basis thereof, the judge should formulate his own
conclusion as to whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong, in order to
determine whether bail should be granted or withheld.16 ON THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, respondent Judge Carlos C. Ofilada of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 15 Malolos, Bulacan is hereby ORDERED to
pay a FINE of P20,000.00 with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the
Respondent judge tried to justify the grant of bail without a hearing by
same or similar acts in the future will definitely warrant a more severe
stating that the matter of the need for such a hearing before the reduction or
sanction. Let a copy of this decision be attached to the personal record of
grant of bail was determined by the judge of the municipal trial court who
respondent judge.
predetermined the bail issue and granted the same prior to the filing of the
information in the regional trial court. The said justification is effete and
unacceptable. Additionally, in the best interest of a fair trial and a just disposition of the
criminal actions involved, it is hereby ORDERED that Criminal Cases Nos.
1433-M-94 and 1434-M-94, be re-raffled among the other branches of the
The fact that the judge of the municipal trial court granted bail to the
Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan. The judge or judges whom the cases
accused during the preliminary investigation cannot be the basis for the grant
shall thereafter be assigned shall forthwith cancel the present bail bonds of
of bail by the regional trial court after an information was already filed and
the accused Rolando Lopez in the aforesaid cases, promptly issue the
where the investigating public prosecutor recommends no bail for the
corresponding warrants of arrest therein, and thereafter conduct the proper
indictee.
hearings with due notice to all parties concerned of such bail petitions as
may be filed by said accused.

5|RULE 114 CASES - BAIL


SO ORDERED. warning that a repetition of the same or similar offense will be dealt with
more severely.
A.M. OCA No. 03-1800-RTJ November 26, 2004
In our Resolution9 dated August 25, 2003, we directed that the complaint be
re-docketed as a regular administrative matter and required the parties to
CHIEF STATE PROSECUTOR JOVENCITO R. ZUO, complainant,
manifest whether they are submitting the case for resolution on the basis of
vs.
the pleadings filed. Both parties submitted the required manifestations that
JUDGE ALEJADRINO C. CABEBE, Regional Trial Court, Branch 18, Batac,
they are submitting the case for decision on the basis of the records.
Ilocos Norte, respondent.

In Docena-Caspe vs. Judge Arnulfo O. Bugtas,10 we held that jurisprudence is


replete with decisions on the procedural necessity of a hearing, whether
DECISION
summary or otherwise, relative to the grant of bail, especially in cases
involving offenses punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life
imprisonment, where bail is a matter of discretion. Under the present Rules,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.: a hearing is mandatory in granting bail whether it is a matter of right or
discretion.11 It must be stressed that the grant or the denial of bail in cases
The instant administrative case stemmed from the sworn complaint1 dated where bail is a matter of discretion, hinges on the issue of whether or not the
January 15, 2003 of Chief State Prosecutor Jovencito R. Zuo of the evidence of guilt of the accused is strong, and the determination of whether
Department of Justice, against Judge Alejandrino C. Cabebe,2 then Presiding or not the evidence is strong is a matter of judicial discretion which remains
Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 18, Batac, Ilocos Norte. The charges are with the judge. In order for the latter to properly exercise his discretion, he
knowingly rendering an unjust judgment, gross ignorance of the law and must first conduct a hearing to determine whether the evidence of guilt is
partiality. strong.12 In fact, even in cases where there is no petition for bail, a hearing
should still be held.13

In his complaint, Chief State Prosecutor Zuo alleged that Criminal Case No.
3950-18 for illegal possession of prohibited or regulated drugs was filed with There is no question that respondent judge granted bail to the accused
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 18, Batac, Ilocos Norte against Rey Daquep without conducting a hearing, in violation of Sections 8 and 18, Rule 114 of
Arcangel, Victorino Gamet Malabed, William Roxas Villanueva, all police the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, quoted as follows:
officers, Jocelyn Malabed Manuel and Pelagio Valencia Manuel. Upon
arraignment, all the accused, assisted by their counsel de parte, pleaded not "Sec. 8. Burden of proof in bail application. At the hearing of an application
guilty to the crime charged. On March 14, 2001, the prosecution filed with for bail filed by a person who is in custody for the commission of an offense
this Court a petition for change of venue but was denied in a Resolution punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, the
dated August 13, 2001.3 On October 8, 2001, the accused filed a motion for prosecution has the burden of showing that evidence of guilt is strong. The
reconsideration.4 In the meantime, the proceedings before respondent's evidence presented during the bail hearing shall be considered automatically
court were suspended. reproduced at the trial but, upon motion of either party, the court may recall
any witness for additional examination unless the latter is dead, outside the
On May 6, 2002, the accused filed a motion to dismiss invoking as ground the Philippines, or otherwise unable to testify."
right of the accused to a speedy trial. On November 5, 2002, respondent
judge motu propio issued an Order5 granting bail to the accused, fixing the "Sec. 18. Notice of application to prosecutor. In the application for bail
bail for each at P70,000.00 in cash or property bond at P120,000.00, except under section 8 of this Rule, the court must give reasonable notice of the
for accused Evelyn Manuel whose bail was fixed at P20,000.00 in cash. hearing to the prosecutor or require him to submit his recommendation.
Respondent judge issued the Order without the accused's application or (18a)"
motion for bail.
In Cortes vs. Catral,14 we laid down the following rules outlining the duties of
The prosecution then filed a motion for reconsideration.6 Instead of acting the judge in case an application for bail is filed:
thereon, respondent judge issued an order inhibiting himself from further
proceeding with the case, realizing that what he did was patently irregular.
1. In all cases whether bail is a matter of right or discretion, notify the
Complainant thus prays that respondent judge be dismissed from the service
prosecutor of the hearing of the application for bail or require him to submit
with forfeiture of all benefits and be disbarred from the practice of law.
his recommendation (Section 18, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure);
In his comment,7 respondent denied the charges. While admitting that he
issued the Order dated November 5, 2002 granting bail to the accused
2. Where bail is a matter of discretion, conduct a hearing of the application
without any hearing, "the same was premised on the constitutional right of
for bail regardless of whether or not the prosecution refuses to present
the accused to a speedy trial." There was delay in the proceedings due to
evidence to show that the guilt of the accused is strong for the purpose of
complainant's frequent absences and failure of the witnesses for the
enabling the court to exercise its sound discretion (Section 7 and 8, id.);
prosecution to appear in court, resulting in the cancellation of the hearings.
The prosecution did not object to the grant of bail to the accused.8 He added
that the administrative complaint filed against him is purely harassment. It is 3. Decide whether the guilt of the accused is strong based on the summary of
not the appropriate remedy to question his alleged erroneous Order. evidence of the prosecution;
Accordingly, and considering his forty (40) years of government service, he
prays that the administrative complaint be dismissed.
4. If the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge the accused upon the
approval of the bail bond (Section 19, id.); otherwise the petition should be
On March 26, 2003, respondent judge compulsorily retired. denied.

In his Report dated July 7, 2003, Deputy Court Administrator Jose P. Perez Based on the above-cited procedure, after the hearing, the court's order
found respondent judge liable for gross ignorance of the law and granting or refusing bail must contain a summary of the evidence of the
recommended that a fine of P20,000.00 be imposed upon him, with a stern prosecution and based thereon, the judge should formulate his own

6|RULE 114 CASES - BAIL


conclusion as to whether the evidence so presented is strong enough to the very nature of his office, should be circumspect in the performance of his
indicate the guilt of the accused.15 duties. He must render justice without resorting to shortcuts clearly uncalled
for. Obviously, respondent failed to live up to these standards.
Respondent judge did not follow the above Rules and procedure enumerated
in Cortes.16 He did not conduct a hearing before he granted bail to the It bears reiterating that respondent is being charged with knowingly
accused, thus depriving the prosecution of an opportunity to interpose rendering unjust judgment, gross ignorance of the law and partiality. We
objections to the grant of bail. Irrespective of his opinion on the strength or ruled that in order to be held liable for knowingly rendering an unjust
weakness of evidence to prove the guilt of the accused, he should have judgment or order, respondent judge must have acted in bad faith, with
conducted a hearing and thereafter made a summary of the evidence of the malice or in willful disregard of the right of a litigant.19 A perusal of the
prosecution. The importance of a bail hearing and a summary of evidence records, specifically the assailed Order, hardly shows that any of these
cannot be downplayed, these are considered aspects of procedural due incidents has been proven.
process for both the prosecution and the defense; its absence will invalidate
the grant or denial of bail.17
On the charge of gross ignorance of the law, suffice it to say that to
constitute such infraction, it is not enough that the subject decision, order or
Neither did respondent require the prosecution to submit its actuation of the judge in the performance of his official duties is contrary to
recommendation on whether or not bail should be granted. existing law and jurisprudence but, most importantly, he must be moved by
bad faith, fraud, dishonesty or corruption. 20 In Guillermo vs. Judge Reyes,
Jr.21 we categorically held that "good faith and absence of malice, corrupt
He maintains that the prosecution did not object to the grant of bail to the
motives or improper considerations are sufficient defenses in which a judge
accused, hence, he cannot be held administratively liable for not conducting
charged with ignorance of the law can find refuge." In Villanueva-Fabella vs.
a hearing.
Lee,22 we ruled that "a judge may not be held administratively accountable
for every erroneous order he renders. For liability to attach for ignorance of
In Santos vs. Ofilada,18 we held that the failure to raise or the absence of an the law, the assailed order of a judge must not only be erroneous; more
objection on the part of the prosecution in an application for bail does not important, it must be motivated by bad faith, dishonesty, hatred or some
dispense with the requirement of a bail hearing. Thus other similar motive." Complainant, having failed to present positive
evidence to show that respondent judge was so motivated in granting bail
"Even the alleged failure of the prosecution to interpose an objection to the without hearing, can not be held guilty of gross ignorance of the law.
granting of bail to the accused will not justify such grant without hearing.
This Court has uniformly ruled that even if the prosecution refuses to adduce As to the charge of partiality, we find no evidence to sustain the same. It is
evidence or fails to interpose any objection to the motion for bail, it is still merely based on complainant's speculation. Mere suspicion that a judge is
mandatory for the court to conduct a hearing or ask searching and partial is not enough. There should be clear and convincing evidence to prove
clarificatory questions from which it may infer the strength of the evidence of this charge. The only exception to the rule is when the error is so gross and
guilt, or lack of it, against the accused. Where the prosecutor refuses to patent as to produce an ineluctable inference of bad faith and malice,23
adduce evidence in opposition to the application to grant and fix bail, the which are not present here.
court may ask the prosecution such questions as would ascertain the
strength of the State's evidence or judge the adequacy of the amount of bail.
We thus find respondent judge guilty of violation of Supreme Court Rules,
Irrespective of respondent judge's opinion that the evidence of guilt against
specifically Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure on the grant
the accused is not strong, the law and settled jurisprudence demand that a
of bail. This administrative offense is considered a less serious charge,
hearing be conducted before bail may be fixed for the temporary release of
punishable under Section 9(4) and Section 11(B-2), Rule 140 of the same
the accused, if bail is at all justified.
Rules, thus:

Thus, although the provincial prosecutor had interposed no objection to the


"Sec. 9. Less Serious Charges. Less serious charges include:
grant of bail to the accused, the respondent judge therein should
nevertheless have set the petition for bail for hearing and diligently ascertain
from the prosecution whether the latter was not in fact contesting the bail x x x
application. In addition, a hearing was also necessary for the court to take
into consideration the guidelines set forth in the then Section, 6, Rule 114 of
"4. Violation of Supreme Court Rules, directives, and circulars;
the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure for the fixing of the amount of the bail,
Only after respondent judge had satisfied himself that these requirements
have been met could he then proceed to rule on whether or not to grant x x x
bail."
"Sec. 11. Sanctions. x x x
Clearly, therefore, respondent judge cannot seek refuge on the alleged
absence of objection on the part of the prosecution to the grant of bail to the "B. If the respondent is guilty of a less serious charge, any of the following
accused. sanctions shall be imposed:

Respondent judge contends that the accused were entitled to their right to a 1. Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for not less than
speedy trial, hence, he granted bail without a hearing. He blames the one (1) nor more than three (3) months; or
prosecution for the delay.

2. A fine of more than P10,000.00 but not exceeding P20,000.00."


Respondent's contention is bereft of merit. There is no indication in the
records of the criminal case that the prosecution has intentionally delayed
the trial of the case. Even assuming there was delay, this does not justify the WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Alejandrino C. Cabebe, now retired, is found
grant of bail without a hearing. This is utter disregard of the Rules. The guilty of violation of Supreme Court Rules and is hereby fined in the sum of
requirement of a bail hearing has been incessantly stressed by this Court. In Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00), the same to be deducted from his
the same vein, the Code of Judicial Conduct enjoins judges to be conversant retirement benefits.
with the law and the Rules and maintain professional competence; and by

7|RULE 114 CASES - BAIL


SO ORDERED. Check No. 308202 for P5,750,1 BPI Check No. 308223 for
P14,210.00, 2 BPI check No. 308226 for P66,330.00,3 and Criminal Cases Nos.
86-51209 and 86-51210, both for estafa involving the same checks.
G.R. Nos. 101127-31 November 18, 1993

After the prosecution had rested its case, Reyes manifested through her
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
counsel that she would file a demurrer to evidence. She did not do so during
vs.
the 10-day period allowed her, whereupon the trial court, on motion of the
CRESENCIA C. REYES, accused-appellant.
prosecution, declared the cases submitted for decision. Instead of filing a
motion for reconsideration, Reyes, assisted by her counsel, submitted a
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee. waiver of appearance.4 Judge Angelina S. Gutierrez thereafter rendered the
challenged decision in which she disposed as follows:
Timoteo A. David for Oriental Assurance Corporation.
ACCORDINGLY, finding the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, she
Rosendo C. Ramos for accused-appellant. is hereby sentenced as follows:

In Criminal Case No. 51206, to suffer imprisonment of six (6) months and to
CRUZ, J.: pay the fine of P15,750.00;

The appellant has instituted this proceeding for the reversal of the decision In Criminal Case No. 51207, to suffer imprisonment of six (6) months and to
of the Regional Trial Court of Manila dated March 12, 1991, convicting her of pay the fine of P14,210.00;
estafa and violation of BP 22 under five separate informations which had
been consolidated and tried jointly on her own motion. In Criminal Case No. 51208, to suffer one year imprisonment and to pay the
fine of P66,330.00;
From the unrebutted evidence of the prosecution, the trial court that
complainant Lorie Garcia came to know Cresencia Reyes through Manny In Criminal Case No. 51209, to suffer 22 years of reclusion perpetua together
Carbrera, a friend and business acquaintance of Garcia, who requested her to with the accessory penalties and to indemnify the complaining witness by
deliver rice to Reyes because he had no more stock to sell. Garcia initially way of actual damages in the sum of P80,540.00 and to pay the costs; and
refused but eventually agreed to sell to Reyes but only on the condition that
Reyes first make a purchase order and, upon delivery, pay 50% of the cost of
In Criminal Case No. 51210, there being no modifying circumstances that
the rice, the balance to be paid with a postdated check.
attended the commission of the offense, to suffer an indeterminate penalty
of six (6) years and 1 day of prision mayor as minimum to 14 years, 8 months
The first purchase order was for 200 sacks. On April 4, 1986, Garcia delivered and 1 day of reclusion temporal as maximum together with the accessory
to Reyes 100 sacks of rice worth P 31,500.00, for which two checks were penalties and to indemnify the complaining witness by way of actual
issued, each in the amount of P15,750.00. One was dated April 4, 1986 and damages in the sum of P15,750.00 and to pay the costs.
the other April 10, 1986. On April 9, 1986, Garcia delivered 98 more sacks of
rice to Reyes, and Reyes again issued two checks, each in the amount of
On May 13, 1992, the First Division referred en consulta to the Court en banc
P14,210.00, the first dated April 10, 1986, and the other April 15, 1986.
the question of whether the appellant, having been sentenced to serve 22
years of reclusion perpetua, should be allowed to remain on bail during the
On April 9, 1986, Reyes placed another order for 200 sacks of rice, which pendency of her appeal.5 On August 7, 1992, the Court en banc ordered the
Garcia delivered to her on the same day. While the 200 sacks were being surrender of Reyes by her bondsman to the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
unloaded, Reyes asked to buy an additional 200 sacks, and since there were Branch 37, for her confinement by the Bureau of Corrections.6
400 sacks of rice loaded on the truck, Garcia agreed to sell the whole stock to
her.
In the appellant's brief, it is alleged that the trial court committed grave
errors:
For the 400 sacks (plus 2 more sacks to complete the first purchase order for
200 sacks), Reyes again issued two checks, each for P66,330.00, one dated
(1) In convicting Reyes of estafa and violation of BP 22 when on the face of
April 9, 1986 and the other April 15, 1986.
the evidence itself it is clear that the issuance of the checks in question was
involved in a credit transaction and that the said checks were issued by the
All the checks were drawn against the Bank of the Philippine Islands at its latter as guarantee for the payment of her civil obligation to the complainant;
Espaa Branch.
(2) In holding her guilty of estafa under Art. 315, par. 2(d) of the Revised
Of the six checks issued by Reyes, only three were made good, to wit, the Penal Code when there was no deceit employed by her in the issuance of the
check dated April 4, 1986 for P15,750.00, which was encashed by Garcia; the checks in question;
check dated April 10, 1986 for P14,210.00, which was redeemed by Reyes;
and the check dated April 9, 1986 for P66,330, which was paid by Reyes by
(3) In holding that there was sufficient evidence her to justify her conviction
installments.
for estafa under Art. 315, par. 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code and for
violation of BP 22; and
The other three checks were, either upon encashment or deposit, returned
by the drawee bank to Garcia due to "insufficient funds." Garcia notified
(4) In convicting her for the crime of estafa under Art. 315, par. 2(d) of the
Reyes of their dishonor and the latter promised to pay their total value.
Revised Penal Code for having issued a bad check, even if the check had been
Despite repeated demands on Reyes, however, she failed to make good the
issued in payment of a pre-existing obligation.
checks or to replace them with cash

The Court, after deliberating on the above assignment of errors and the
The five criminal cases filed against Reyes were Criminal Cases Nos. 86-51206
briefs submitted by the parties, finds for the People.
to 86-51208, for violation of BP 22 in connection with the issuance of BPI

8|RULE 114 CASES - BAIL


We re-affirm at the outset the established doctrine that: Even on the assumption, then, that the subject checks were given by the
appellant as a mere guaranty and not as payment, this circumstance will not
absolve Reyes from her violation of BP 22.
While the filing of the two sets of Information under the provisions of Batas
Pambansa Bilang 22 and under the provisions of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, on estafa, may refer to identical acts committed by the petitioner, The appellant has also been convicted under Art. 315 (2) (d) of the Revised
the prosecution thereof cannot be limited to one offense, because a single Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 4885, which penalizes any person who
criminal act may give rise to a multiplicity of offenses and where there is shall defraud another "by postdating a check, or issuing a check in payment
variance or differences between the elements of an offense in one law and of an obligation when the offender had no funds in the bank, or his funds
another law as in the case at bar there will be no double jeopardy because deposited therein were not sufficient to cover the amount of the check."
what the rule on double jeopardy prohibits refers to identity of elements in
the two (2) offenses. Otherwise stated, prosecution for the same act is not
To constitute estafa under this provision, the act of postdating or issuing a
prohibited. What is forbidden is prosecution for the same offense. Hence, the
check in payment of an obligation must be the efficient cause of the
mere filing of the two (2) sets of information does not itself give rise to
defraudation; as such, it should be either prior to or simultaneous with the
double jeopardy (People v. Miraflores, 115 SCRA 570).7
act of fraud. 12 The offender must be able to obtain money or property from
the offended party because of the issuance of the check, whether postdated
The gravamen of the offense punished by BP 22 is the act of making and or
issuing a worthless check or a check that is dishonored upon its presentment not. 13 It must be shown that the person to whom the check was delivered
for payment. The law has made the mere act of issuing a bad check a malum would not have parted with his money or property were it not for the
prohibitum, an act proscribed by the legislature for being deemed pernicious issuance of the check by the other party. Stated otherwise, the check should
and inimical to public welfare.9 have been issued as an inducement for the surrender by the party deceived
of his money or property and not in payment of a pre-existing obligation.
According to Chief Justice Pedro L. Yap in the landmark case of Lozano v.
Martinez: 10 It is recalled that Garcia was unwilling at first to deal with Reyes but was
finally persuaded when she issued the two checks in payment for the first
100 sacks of rice. One of these checks was encashed before the second could
The effects of the issuance of a worthless check transcends the private
mature and be subsequently dishonored. Believing the Reyes' credit was
interests of the parties directly involved in the transaction and touches the
good, Garcia accepted two more checks from her in payment for another 100
interest of the community at large. The mischief it creates is not only a wrong
sacks, and Reyes redeemed one of them before the other could mature and
to the payee or holder, but also an injury to the public. The harmful practice
be subsequently dishonored. Garcia was still unaware of Reyes's deception
of putting valueless commercial papers in circulation, multiplied a thousand
when she entered into their last sale of 400 sacks, for which Reyes issued
fold, can very well pollute the channels of trade and commerce, injure the
another two checks in payment, one of which was also to be dishonored
banking system and eventually hurt the welfare of society and the public
later. In all this series of transactions, Garcia was induced to sell because of
interest.
the checks issued by the appellant which the complainant believed to be
funded.
The appellant argues that the questioned checks were not intended for
deposit or encashment but merely to guarantee payment of her obligations
The deceit practiced by Reyes on Garcia is all too palpable. Reyes was able to
to Garcia, who, she stresses, admitted that for every delivery of rice the
maintain Garcia's confidence by making good three of the checks she had
corresponding checks were given in return. She contends that in credit
issued and thus giving Garcia the impression that the other checks, which she
transactions, a check may serve merely as a guaranty for the payment of the
could not yet present for payment, would be honored. Reyes' timing was
amount indicated therein, to be redeemed later by the drawer "on the
clever. She saw to it that one of her checks for the first delivery was valid
maturity date of the check or on a much later date, depending on the
(and was subsequently encashed) before she made her second purchase, for
availability of funds of the latter."
which she issued two more checks. She redeemed one of these checks
before she bought the final 400 sacks, for which she issued another two
It is now settled that BP 22 applies even in cases where the dishonored checks. All this time, Garcia believed that the remaining postdated checks she
checks were issued merely in the form of a deposit or a guaranty and not as had yet to encash were all good when they were in fact all worthless.
actual payment. The law does not make any distinction. Criminal liability
attaches to the drawer of the check whether it was issued in payment of an
The three postdated checks that were subsequently dishonored were issued
obligation or merely to guarantee the said obligation. As we held in Que v.
at a time when the funds in her account were insufficient and even nil. Two
People: 11
of these checks were dated April 10, 1986, and the third April 15, 1986. The
records of the drawee bank showed that Reyes had a zero balance at the
. . . Inasmuch as the law does not make any distinction in this regard, no such time the checks were issued and also when they were presented for
distinction can be made by means of interpretation of application. payment.14 The dishonored checks she had issued to Garcia had a total value
Furthermore, the history of the enactment of subject statutes evinces the of P96,290.00, and this represented the damage sustained by Garcia because
definitive legislative intent to make the prohibition all embracing, without of the appellant's deceit. Reyes had issued these check upon her fraudulent
making any exception from the operation thereof in favor of a guarantee. assurance to Garcia that they were fully funded.
This intent may be gathered from the statement of the sponsor of the bills . .
. which was enacted later into BP 22, when it was introduced before the
Her situation worsened when she failed to make good the checks within
Batasang Pambansa that the bill was introduced to discourage the issuance
three days from receipt of notice of their dishonor and the demand from the
of bouncig checks, to prevent checks from becoming "useless scrap of paper"
complainant for their value. Her failure to take advantage of this grace period
and to restore respectability to checks, all without distinction as to the
offered by the law raised the prima facie inference of deceit consisting of
purpose of the issuance of the checks. . . .
"false pretense or a fraudulent act."15

Consequently, what are important are the facts that the accused had
The appellant's final contention is the, prior to the delivery of the rice, she
deliberately issued the checks in question to cover accounts and that the
had agreed that only 50% of the purchase price would be paid upon delivery
checks were dishonored upon presentment regardless of whether or not the
and that the remaining 50% would be covered by a postdated check. Hence,
accused merely issued the checks as a guarantee. (Emphasis added)
as the subject checks covered the balance of the purchase price of the 600

9|RULE 114 CASES - BAIL


sacks of rice, they were issued in payment of a pre-existing obligation and so even if convicted, he could not be sentenced to death because of his
did not violate Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code or BP 22. minority. Again, attached to the motion for reconsideration was a duly
certified copy of petitioner's birth certificate. The Fiscal opposed the motion
on the ground that the evidence of guilt is strong, but did not contest the
The facts established by the prosecution belie this assertion. The evidence to
minority of petitioner.
the contrary is overwhelming. There is no doubt that the subject checks were
issued by Reyes (and accepted by Garcia) in exchange for the three deliveries
of rice as each delivery was made. We are satisfied that the postdated checks In his order of September 21, 1983, respondent Judge denied the motion for
were issued by the appellant not as payment for a pre-existing obligation but reconsideration.
as the consideration for each shipment of rice she received from the
complainant.
Failing in his bid for bail, petitioner then filed a motion with the lower court
praying that he be placed in the care and custody of the Ministry of Social
The argument that the postdated checks were promissory notes and not for Services and Development (MSSD) pursuant to Article 191 of Presidential
negotiation is so unsubstantial as to deserve no serious attention. Decree No. 603 (Child and Youth Welfare Code) which provides:

The Court notes the following observations of the trial court on the Care of Youthful Offender Held for Examination or Trial. A youthful
personality of the appellant: offender held for physical and mental examination or trial or pending appeal,
if unable to furnish bail, shall from time to time (sic) of his arrest be
committed to the care of the Department of Social Welfare or the local
Accused, past 50, is a physically handicapped lady whose height is barely two
rehabilitation center or a detention home in the province or city which shall
(2) feet. In fact, whenever she came to court, she was always assisted by one
be responsible for his appearance in court whenever required: Provided, That
or two companions. But she is well educated and speaks English fluently. The
in the absence of any such center or agency within a reasonable distance
Court discerns that it is this unique combination of bizarre physical make-up
from the venue of the trial, the provincial, city and municipal jail shall provide
and seeming trustworthiness which led others, like herein complainant, to
quarters for youthful offenders separate from other detainees. The court
repose their confidence in her. Her counsel manifested that she is also facing
may, in its discretion upon recommendation of the Department of Social
similar charges in other branches of this Court.
Welfare or other agency or agencies authorized by the Court, release a
youthful offender on recognizance. to the custody of his parents or other
It is indeed pathetic that the appellant should suffer the physical handicap suitable person who shall be responsible for his appearance whenever
above described, but what is especially tragic is she has chosen to use this required.
handicap for the deception of Garcia, who trusted her partly out of sympathy
for her abnormal appearance. By her deceitfulness, Reyes has forfeited all
On September 22, 1983, respondent judge denied the motion for lack of
feelings of charity or kindness toward her and earned instead the
merit. Explaining the denial later, he said that the quoted Article 191 is not
punishment of the laws she has scorned.
applicable since it could be invoked only where the minor is charged with a
bailable offense, as could be gleaned from the phrase "if unable to furnish
WHEREFORE, the challenged decision is AFFIRMED and the appeal is DENIED, bail."
with costs against the appellant. It is so ordered.
On September 22, 1983, the NBI Regional Office at Naga City submitted its
G.R. No. L-65228 February 18, 1985 report, copy of which was sent to the City Fiscal of Naga. It found that it was
the prosecution witness, Ferdinand del Rosario, and not the petitioner, who
JOJO PASTOR BRAVO, JR., ETC., petitioner, killed the deceased Ramon Abiog. When the murder case was next called for
vs. hearing on October 19, 1983, the defense unilaterally moved orally that the
HON. MELECIO B. BORJA, ET AL., respondents. trial of petitioner be reset in order to give the City Fiscal more time to study
the NBI report, but the motion was denied as dilatory. Again, on November 2,
1983, petitioner unilaterally filed with the trial court a formal Motion for
Reinvestigation praying "that the proceedings be suspended and that the City
PLANA, J.: Fiscal of Naga be ordered to reinvestigate this case." It does not appear what
action, if any, the court has taken on this motion. Neither does it appear that
In the Regional Trial Court of Naga City, petitioner Jojo Pastor Bravo, Jr., is the City Fiscal of Naga has taken any move to reinvestigate the case.
charged with murder for the killing of one Ramon Abiog (Criminal Case No.
83-184). Against this factual backdrop, petitioner has filed the instant petition for
certiorari and mandamus, with two supplementary petitions, seeking the
Detained in the city jail of Naga after his arrest, petitioner filed a motion for release of petitioner on bail or his transfer to the custody of the MSSD
bail based on two reasons: (a) that the evidence against him is not strong in pending trial pursuant to Article 191 of PD No. 603. In view of the aforesaid
view of the retraction by Ferdinand del Rosario, one of the prosecution NBI report, the petition also seeks the issuance of a writ of mandamus
witnesses, of his previous statement naming petitioner as the assailant; and commanding respondent Judge to remand the case to the City Fiscal of Naga
(b) that he is a minor of 16 years, entitled as such to a privileged mitigating for reinvestigation.
circumstance under Article 68 of the Revised Penal Code which would make
the murder charge against him non-capital. The first question to be resolved is whether petitioner is entitled to bail as a
matter of right.
After a hearing during which the retracting witness (del Rosario) presented
by petitioner made another turn-about and declared against the latter, Under the Constitution, "all persons, except those charged with capital
respondent Judge Melecio B. Borja denied the motion for bail on the finding offenses when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable
that the evidence of petitioner's guilt is strong and his minority was not by sufficient sureties." (Article IV, Section 18.) Generally, therefore, bail is a
proved. Petitioner then filed a motion for reconsideration stating that his matter of right before conviction, unless the accused is charged with a capital
minority had been proved by his birth certificate which was attached to the offense and the evidence of guilt is strong.
memorandum in support of his motion for bail, showing that he was born on
February 26, 1967, that his minority had never been challenged by the fiscal,
and that the offense charged, as regards petitioner, is not capital because

10 | R U L E 1 1 4 C A S E S - B A I L
The charge against petitioner is murder qualified by treachery and attended pending trial in the care and custody of the MSSD pursuant to Article 191 of
by two aggravating circumstances: evident premeditation and nocturnity. P.D. No. 603.
Punishable by reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death, the crime
is therefore a capital offense.
Turning to the reinvestigation aspect of the petition, the plea therefor must
be addressed to the City Fiscal of Naga, who has direction and control of the
The petitioner however submits that even assuming that the evidence of criminal prosecution and who is the primary official called upon to evaluate
guilt against him is strong, the charge of murder, as to him who is only 16 the evidence, ascertain the existence of a prima facie case and determine
years old, cannot be capital because the death penalty cannot be imposed on who should be criminally indicted. In case of unjustified refusal by the City
account of his minority which entitles him to a penalty reduction of one Fiscal to conduct a reinvestigation, the proper recourse is to appeal to the
degree. In effect, under petitioner's submission, the test to determine Minister of Justice who exercises control and supervision over fiscals.
whether the offense charged is capital, is the penalty to be actually imposed
on him in view of the attendant circumstances.
WHEREFORE, the orders of respondent Judge denying bail to petitioner are
set aside. In the interest of dispatch, bail for petitioner is fixed at P15,000.00
Petitioner's posture hardly finds support in the law. Under Section 5 of Rule and his release is ordered upon the posting thereof and its approval by the
114 of the Rules of Court, a capital offense is "an offense which, under the trial judge, unless petitioner is held for some other cause. The petition for
law existing at the time of its commission, and at the time of the application mandamus to compel reinvestigation of the case is denied. This decision is
to be admitted to bail, may be punished by death." It is clear from this immediately executory.
provision that the capital nature of an offense is determined by the penalty
prescribed by law, with reference to which it is relatively easy to ascertain
SO ORDERED.
whether the evidence of guilt against the accused is strong. Moreover, when
the Constitution or the law speaks of evidence of guilt, it evidently refers to a
finding of innocence or culpability, regardless of the modifying G.R. No. 125310 April 21, 1999
circumstances.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee
To allow bail on the basis of the penalty to be actually imposed would vs.
require a consideration not only of the evidence of the commission of the EDGAR LAGMAY y ALARCON, accused-appellant.
crime but also evidence of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances.
There would then be a need for a complete trial, after which the judge would
be just about ready to render a decision in the case. As perceptively observed
by the Solicitor General, such procedure would defeat the purpose of bail,
which is to entitle the accused to provisional liberty pending trial. PARDO, J

Nevertheless, where it has been established without objection that the In our criminal justice system, the overriding consideration is not whether
accused is only 16 years old, it follows that, if convicted, he would be given the court doubts the innocence of the accused but whether it entertains a
"the penalty next lower than that prescribed by law," which effectively rules reasonable doubt as to his guilt. This determinant, with the constitutional
out the death penalty. presumption of innocence which can be overthrown only by the strength of
the prosecution's own evidence proving guilt beyond reasonable doubt,
irresistibly dictate an exoneration in this case. 1
The Constitution withholds the guaranty of bail from one who is accused of a
capital offense where the evidence of guilt is strong. The obvious reason is
that one who faces a probable death sentence has a particularly strong The constitutional presumption of innocence is not an empty platitude
temptation to flee. This reason does not hold where the accused has been meant only to embellish the Bill of Rights. Its purpose is to balance the scales
established without objection to be a minor who by law cannot be sentenced in what would otherwise be an uneven contest between the lone individual
to death. pitted against the People of the Philippines and all the resources at their
command. Its inexorable mandate is that, for all the authority and influence
of the prosecution, the accused must be acquitted and set free if his guilt
But respondent judge claims that petitioner has not proved his minority. This cannot be proved beyond the whisper of a doubt. That mandate shall be
is inaccurate. In his motion for bail, petitioner alleged that he was a minor of enforced.2
16 and this averment was never challenged by the prosecution.
Subsequently, in his memorandum in support of the motion for bail,
petitioner attached a copy of his birth certificate. And finally, after The presumption of innocence is not a mere procedural tool of the law. It is
respondent Judge had denied the motion for bail, petitioner filed a motion not overcome by the presumption of regularity; indeed, it can be rebutted
for reconsideration, attaching thereto a certified true copy of his birth only by proof beyond reasonable doubt.
certificate. Respondents Judge however refused to take cognizance of
petitioner's unchallenged minority allegedly because the certificate of birth . . . the prosecution must overthrow the presumption of innocence with
was not offered in evidence. This was error because evidence of petitioner's proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The proof against him must survive
minority was already a part of the record of the case. It was properly filed in the test of reason; the strongest suspicion must not be permitted to sway
support of a motion. It would be a needless formality to offer it in evidence. judgment.
Respondent Judge therefore acted with grave abuse of discretion in
disregarding it.
In order to convict an accused the circumstances of the case must exclude all
and each and every hypothesis consistent with his innocence. 4
Evidence on motion. When a motion is based on facts not appearing of
record the court may hear the matter on affidavits or depositions presented
by the respective parties, but the court may direct that the matter be heard In offenses involving the capital punishment, the presumption of innocence
wholly or partly on oral testimony or depositions. (Rules of Court, Rule 133, takes an even more paramount significance. "It is safely entrenched in our
Section 7.) jurisprudence that unless the prosecution discharges its burden to prove the
guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, the latter need not even offer
evidence in his behalf. 5
It results that petitioner is entitled to bail as a matter of right, which makes it
unnecessary to decide whether he, being a minor, is entitled to be placed

11 | R U L E 1 1 4 C A S E S - B A I L
The prosecution must rely on the strength of its own evidence and must not Ramon Magsaysay Avenue, Reyes, Bolton, San Pedro Streets and finally
simply depend on the weakness of the defense. The slightest possibility of an stopped in front of the Datu Complex at Bankerohan, Davao City.
innocent man being convicted for an offense he has never committed, let
alone when no less than a capital punishment is imposed, would be far more
Along the way, the jeep picked up passengers and some alighted at several
dreadful than letting a guilty person go unpunished for a crime he may have
stops. At Bankerohan, three or four more passengers boarded the jeep and
perpetrated."6 The presumption of innocence provides the fulcrum from
they proceeded towards their destination at Toril. The accused fell asleep
where the scales of justice can be balanced and allowed to take its
during this segment of the trip. When the jeep stopped at a police checkpoint
course.1wphi1.nt
in Ulas, a tap on the shoulder awakened him. Someone asked him if he
owned the bag beside his seat. The accused answered that the bag was not
The case before us is an automatic review of the decision of the Regional his. SPO3 Laput, one of the policemen in the checkpoint, kept asking him if
Trial Court, Davao City, Branch 17, in Criminal Case No. 34,149-94, for the bag belonged to him. Again, he said no. The policeman then asked the
violation of Section 8, Republic Act 6425, as amended by Batas Pambansa accused to alight from the jeep and carry the bag. He alighted from the jeep
Blg. 179, finding accused Edgar Lagmay y Alarcon guilty as charged. The but did not carry the bag. The policeman immediately frisked him at the
dispositive portion of the decision reads: waist and asked if he was a military man, to which he answered that he was
not.
WHEREFORE, finding the evidence of the prosecution more than sufficient, to
prove the guilt of accused of the offense charged, pursuant to Sec. 20 of At that time, there were many passengers inside the jeep, both men and
Republic Act 7659 paragraph 5 thereof, accused EDGAR LAGMAY y ALARCON, women, but the police officer did not bother to question them. Instead, he
is sentenced to suffer a maximum penalty of death by electrocution, in insisted that the accused carry the bag. Accused reiterated that the bag did
accordance with Sec. 24 of Republic Act 7659. not belong to him and refused to carry it. At this instance, the policeman
cocked his armalite rifle and pointed it at the accused, and told him that he
would shoot the accused, which caused the latter to scamper and hide.
Notwithstanding the imposition of the above-death penalty against accused,
Edgar Lagmay y Alarcon, this court finding the above-penalty, harsh and
clearly excessive, considering the personal circumstances of accused, as first From his hiding place, the accused overheard the policeman say that he
offender, without prior derogatory record against him, pursuant to Art. 5, would not be shot but arrested instead. Only then did he come out of his
par. 3 of the Revised Penal Code, it is recommended to His Excellency hiding place. Whereupon, he was immediately accosted by the policeman
President Fidel V. Ramos, President of the Republic of the Philippines, and ordered to lie face flat on the ground while they tied his hands. They
through the Secretary of Justice, Manila, to extend Executive Clemency to again asked him if he owned the bag. Again, he denied owning the bag.
accused, on account of the strict enforcement of the provision of Republic
Act 7659 can be considered harsh or clearly excessive penalty deserving
Accused was brought to the Ulas Police Sub-Station, and again questioned
exercise of Presidential Pardon and/or commutation of sentence, along with
about the bag which was found to contain 3,051.3 grams of dried marijuana
appropriate legislative remedial measures, as may be recommended with
leaves.12 He again denied ownership of the bag. A certain Captain Yu arrived
Congress of the Philippines, to correct the disparity in the imposition of
at the sub-station and asked if the accused already admitted ownership of
penalty as above-pointed out.7
the bag. He was told that the accused refused to admit ownership of the bag,
Capt. Yu then threatened the accused that he would be delivered to the
The antecedent facts of the case are as follows: NARCOM. When accused asked where he would he taken, he was hit with
the butt of the rifle at the right side of his stomach, and was told that he
would be brought to the "smokey mountain", a known salvage area in Davao.
In an Information dated June 13, 1994, City Prosecutor of Davao City Jose
Emmanuel M. Castillo charged the accused Edgar Lagmay y Alarcon with
violation of Section 8, Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, as follows: While on their way to "smokey mountain", they stopped at a dimly lit place
somewhere in Ma-a, Davao City, a well known salvage area, where Capt. Yu
ordered the accused to run. He refused and was asked again whether he
That on or about June 7, 1994, in the city of Davao, Philippines, and within
owned the bag. Again, he denied ownership of the bag.
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-mentioned accused, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously had in his possession 3.2
kilograms of dried marijuana leaves and one stick marijuana cigarette roch, a At around 10:00 in the evening of June 7, 1994, Capt. Yu fired his gun in the
prohibited drug. 8 air and declared that the next shot would be for the accused, after which
Capt. Yu pointed his gun at the back of the accused's neck. Accused pleaded
for his life and told the Captain that the bag was not his, Capt. Yu, however,
On June 21, 1994, the court issued a warrant for the arrest of the accused.9
did not heed his pleas and informed him that he would count up to ten. After
On July 14, 1994, the court arraigned the accused and he entered a plea of
which, if he still would not admit ownership of the bag, he would be killed.
not guilty.10 The court issued an order 11 setting the case for continuous
trial beginning with the presentation of the prosecution's evidence on August
4 and 5, 1994, at 8:30 in the morning, and for the accused on August 30 and When Capt. Yu was at the count of seven, by some stroke of luck, two cars
31, 1994, at 8:30 in the morning. passed by and their lights caused Capt. Yu to stop. The accused was brought
back inside the jeep and they proceeded to the Catitipan station. Upon
arrival, somebody pointed a gun at him and he was again asked if he owned
The lower court in its decision narrated a succinct account of the events that
the bag.
transpired on that fateful day of June 7, 1994.

During the entire interrogation accused was never asked whether he needed
In the afternoon of June 7, 1994, accused-appellant, a Marine Engineering
a lawyer. In Catitipan, a certain Major Laza, promised to help him if he would
student graduate, was at MATS College in Agdao, Davao City, to get his
admit ownership of the bag. According to accused, he was hit repeatedly by
SOLAS Certificate for his application as a seaman. He was at the school
the policemen until he could no longer move, and until the policemen got
premises at about 2:30 in the afternoon and left at about 6:30 in the evening.
tired of hitting him. He was detained for four (4) days and was made to lie
He took a pedicab bound for the Agdao public market to check if his father
down on a table, with handcuffs on and then transferred to a place they
was still at the market selling pork. After talking with his father, he left for
called a stockade at Catitipan, Diversion Highway, Davao City.
home at Toril, Davao City. At around 7:30 in the evening, he boarded a jeep
at the corner of Anda and San Pedro streets. Including him, the jeep he was
riding in had five other passengers. They passed through Uyanguren or

12 | R U L E 1 1 4 C A S E S - B A I L
Accused strongly denied the accusation against him. The trial court, however, Q. Where is the route of that Lawin jeep were you are a conductor?
after hearing the evidence presented by both the prosecution and the
defense ruled in favor of the prosecution and sentenced the accused to
A. Toril-Agdao and vice versa. 14
death.

xxx xxx xxx


The accused through counsel filed a motion for new trial, to introduce newly
discovered evidence.
A. Will, you please tell the court if you remember on June 7, 1994 if you were
a conductor in that jeep?
At the hearing of the motion for new trial, the testimony of six (6) witnesses
were presented, namely: the conductor of the jeep, Hesorenan13 de la
Cerna; passengers of the jeep, Victor Degamo, Teresita Pecson; sisters of the A. Yes.
accused, Crispina Lagmay and Marichu Lagmay-Garcia; and the wife of the
accused. Q. At about 7:00 in the evening of the said date June 7, 1994 do you
remember where were you.
Victor Degamo, and Teresita Pecson, both passengers of the jeep, declared
that the reason they came out in the open and testified for the accused was A. Yes.
that they could not, in conscience, allow an innocent man to die, when they
knew that it was not the accused who owned the bag. They testified that
they, were hesitant to talk at the checkpoint when asked by the police Q. Where were you?
because they were afraid of the true owner of the bag, who was still inside
the jeep at that time. A. I was at that time at the Assumption School.

The conductor of the jeep, Hesorenan de la Cerna, testified in the following Q. Where is this Assumption School located?
manner:
A. Cabaguio Avenue, Agdao Davao City.
Q. What was your work before becoming a fisherman?
Q. Why were you at Assumption School?
A. I was a conductor.
A. It is where we execute a U-turn.
Q. What is the work of a conductor?
Q. Will you tell the court at Assumption School if you have a passenger?
A. The work of a conductor is to attend to the passengers, to see to it that
they are properly seated and to collect their fare.
A One passenger boarded the vehicle.

Q. You mean to say that you are a conductor of a passenger vehicle?


Q. From Assumption School where did your jeep proceed?

A. Yes.
A. We are on our way to Toril.

Q. What kind of passenger vehicle?


Q. Going to Toril from Assumption School what route did you pass?

A. A PUJ.
A. The road infront of the Agdao public market.

Q. What kind of a PUJ, if you know?


Q. On your way to Agdao public market what do you noticed if any?

A. Lawin.
A. A passenger in front of the SSS boarded the vehicle. 15

Q. Who is the owner of that PUJ Lawin where you were a conductor?
xxx xxx xxx

A. Fernando Calvo.
Q. You said you passed in front of the Agdao public market, while you were
passing in front of the Agdao public market, what did you observe if any?
Q. Where is he staying?
A. Two passengers boarded the jeep.
A. At Toril infront of the Color Plaza.
Q. What kind of passengers if you know?
Q. Who is the driver of that jeep where you area conductor?
A. A woman and a man.
A. Efren Sustiger.
Q. These two passengers can you tell us whether they were companion (sic)?
Q. Since when did you become the conductor of said jeep?
A. No.
A. January 1994.

13 | R U L E 1 1 4 C A S E S - B A I L
Q. Why do you say that they are not companion (sic)? Q. While travelling from Lombisco towards Toril what happened if any?

A. Because they were standing (sitting) quite a distance apart. A. Somebody flagged our jeep at Ulas.

Q. Who boarded ahead of the two. Q. Who stopped you at Ulas?

A. The woman boarded ahead. A. Policemen.

Q. Please tell the court if the woman who boarded ahead brought anything Q. Why do you know that they are policemen?
with her in riding the vehicle?
A. Because they were in uniform and they were armed.
A. She was not carrying anything.
Q. Did you stop?
Q. How about the male passenger, please tell the court if he brought
anything with him when he boarded that jeep?
A. Yes.

A. None.
Q. What happened when you stopped your jeep?

Q. Can you tell us what particular place in front of Agdao public market
A. A policeman checked the inside portion of the jeep and he went towards
where did your jeep proceed?
the driver's seat.

A. Towards Uyanguren. 16
Q. What happened when the policeman inspected the inside of the jeep?

Q. Will you please tell the court from Assumption School up to Bankerohan, if
A. He saw a bag inside the jeep.
your jeep has any baggage or bag inside the jeep?

Q. Where is that bag located?


A. None.

A. Inside the jeep.


Q. How long you waited (sic) at Bankerohan for some more passengers?

Q. Inside the jeep at the ceiling or at the flooring?


A. More than half an hour.

A. At the Flooring.
Q. After waiting more than half an hour where did you proceed?

Q. Please tell us how far from the driver?


A. We proceeded towards the direction of Toril.

A. Half a pathom.
Q. How many passengers can you recall from Bankerohan? Were you full?

Q. When the policeman saw that bag what did he do if any?


A. About 24 passenger.

A. He told me to get the bag.


Q. What is the seating capacity of your jeep?

Q. And what did you do?


A. 22.

A. I got it and handed (sic) to the policeman.


Q. How about the excess of two (2), where are they seated?

Q. What did the policeman do with the bag?


A. They were clinging to the jeep.

A. He opened the bag.


Q. From Bankerohan where did you proceed?

Q. After he opened the bag where were you?


A. Going towards Toril.

A. Just near him.


Q. While you were on your way, to Toril tell us what happened if any?

Q. Do you know what is the contents of the bag?


A. A passenger disembarked at Bangkal and Lombisco.

A. Yes.
Q. From Lombisco where did you proceed.

Q. What is the content when the policeman opened the bag?


A. Proceeding towards Toril.
14 | R U L E 1 1 4 C A S E S - B A I L
A. A (sic) dried leaves that were already grounded. A. The man asked by the policeman to go down and bring along with him the
bag?
Q. What happened when the policeman saw the contents of the bag?
Q. And what did the man do if any?
A. He closed it back.
A. He went down the jeep but he did not bring along the bag.
Q. When he closed, what did he do?
Q. When the man already went down from the jeep what did the policeman
do if any to that man?
A. He placed it back inside the jeep.

A. The man was asked by the policeman whether he was a police or a military
Q. After he place the bag inside the jeep, what did the policeman do?
man.

A. He tried to awaken that (sic) was sleeping at that time.


Q. What was the answer?

Q. That man is one of the passengers or not?


A. I am a civilian, was the answer.

A. Passenger.
Q. After the answer I am a civilian, what happened?

Q. What happened to that man awaken by the policeman?


A. He was frisked by the policeman.

A. The man woke up.


Q. After the man was frisked what happened next?

Q. Do you know that man that was sleeping and awaken by the policeman?
A. He was asked his name.

A. Only by his face.


Q. What was the answer?

Q. Why do you know him by face?


A. He said "I am Edgar Lagmay".

A. Because he already rode our jeep so many times.


Q. Where were you when he answered I am Lagmay?

Q. When this man was awaken by the policeman what happened after that?
A. I was just near them.

A. The man was asked by the policeman if he was the owner of the bag.
Q. By the way that bag that the policeman ordered the man to bring down,
what is the color of that bag?
Q. What was the answer if any?
A. A fatigue bag.17
A. The answer was "that is not my bag".
The sisters and the wife of the accused testified that they went to see the
Q. After he answered, what did the policeman do? accused at the detention center at Camp Catitipan and judging from his
physical appearance, it was clear that he was physically abused. They went to
A. He again asked the question. the human rights office in Davao City to request for assistance and was given
a letter addressed to Major Lasa. They went to Camp Catitipan to deliver the
letter to Major Lasa. One of the guards advised them not to give the letter if
Q. What is the answer for the second question? they still wanted to see the accused alive.

A. He again said that the bag was not his. However, after consideration, on September 18, 1995, the trial court issued
an order which reads:
Q. After the second answer what did the policeman, do if any?
WHEREFORE, finding the evidence of accused, to support his petition for new
A. For the third time, he asked the same question. trial, not sufficient beyond reasonable doubt, to over-turn and or defeat the
judgment of this court, dated February 24, 1995, convicting accused of the
offense charged, accused petition for new trial, is denied.
Q. What was the answer when the policeman asked the same question for
the third time?
The judgment in this case dated February 24, 1995, is ordered reinstated and
enforced, effective immediately upon receipt of accused through counsel of
A. He again answered that the bag was not his. this order.

Q. After that man awaken by the policeman answered for the third time that The Branch Clerk of Court, is accordingly ordered to elevate the entire
the bag was not his, what did the policeman do if any? records of this case with the Hon. Supreme Court, Manila, through the Clerk

15 | R U L E 1 1 4 C A S E S - B A I L
of Court of said Court for automatic review of the original judgment of this Q. Now, while upon reaching the crossing Ulas can you recall what incident
court, dated February 24, 1995. happened if any?

Hence, this automatic review. A. When we reached the crossing of Ulas there was a checkpoint placed
there.
The lower court relied heavily on the testimony of Efren Sustiger, driver of
the jeep, that it was accused Edgar Lagmay y Alarcon who owned the bag Q. But before that you mentioned the accused was carrying a bag?
containing the dried marijuana leaves. During the direct examination of the
driver, he declared the following:
A. Yes sir.

Q. Could you tell this Honorable Court what you were driving on June 7,
Q. Can you remember the bag if shown to you again?
1994, in the evening.

A. I can still recognize it.


A. In June 7, 1994 I was driving a Lawin jeep colored orange.

Q. I would like to show you Mr. Witness, can you still recognize?
Q. Is that a passengers jeepney?

A. Similar to this.
A. Yes, sir, passengers jeepney.

Q. Please open it?


Q. Who owns the jeep?

A. (witness untying the bag). It is really similar to this.


A. Mr. Calma.

Q. You said when you reached crossing Ulas, you noticed that there was a
Q. Now, on June 7, 1994 in the evening, while passing through San Pedro and
military mobile checkpoint?
Anda Street, Davao City, can you recall of any passenger, who took your
vehicle?
A. Yes, sir.
A. A person boarded my vehicle.
Q. What happened?
Q. Can you still identify that particular person?
A. When we reached there, personnel from the military approached us.
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Can you still recall who was that military officer?
Q. Who?
A. If it (sic) will be shown to me again this person, I can recognize.
A. That one (witness pointing to Edgar Lagmay) 19
Q. What was the purpose of this military officer in going to your jeep?
xxx xxx xxx
A. He was doing an inspection round on my passengers.
Q. You said he boarded your vehicle in the corner of Anda and San Pedro
what was his physical appearance when you first saw him? Q. What happened next?

A. At the time he held my vehicle he was carrying a military backpack. A. I saw a person carrying a (sic) similar to this bag, then the military man
asked that man, why is that he is carrying that bag.
Q. What was he wearing?
Q. Who was that person who was asked that (sic) military about the bag?
A. He was wearing a polo.
A. My passenger, that one (witness pointing to the direction of the accused).
Q. Where was he bound?
Q. And what was the answer of the person?
A. He was going to Toril.
A. He answered that he was a military man.
Q. As a driver do you have a conductor?
Q. And what else did the military do?
A. Yes, sir.
A. He was requested, if possible he should (sic) go down from the vehicle,
because of (sic) this bag will be inspected by the police.
Q. Can you still remember the name of your conductor?

Q. Did the accused comply?


A. Alias Antik.

16 | R U L E 1 1 4 C A S E S - B A I L
A. Yes, he went down. A. Dried leaves.

Q. What happened? Q. If you can see him, (sic) that dried leaves, can you more or less, identify?

A. He was told by the military from the checkpoint, if it would were possible A. Yes, sir.
for him he can open his bag.
Q. We would like you to see (sic) that dried leaves, Mr. Witness, can you tell
Q. Did the accused open the bag? the Honorable Court, more or less? (witness shown the dried leaves)

A. He only acted to open this bag, but he ran away. A. Similar to this, but that one was placed inside the plastic bag. 20

Q. Where did he go? According to the trial court, the testimony of Efren Sustiger without any
impeaching evidence from the accused holds true and convincing. The court
held that the testimony of Efren Sustiger as against that of Lilia Pecson was
A. On a dark portion of that area.
more credible, decisive and free of any error.

Q. How about that (sic) bag?


The trial court was of the opinion that the witnesses provided by the accused
during the motion for new trial could not overturn the court's conclusion in
A. This was left to that military man who requested him to open this bag. the case. In an order dated September 18, 1995, the court declared "the
corresponding motivations and individual interest, allegedly coming out only
Q. Then what happened later on about you said that accused ran away? this late time, after their silence during the original trial of this case, on the
expedient alleged noble and sacred crusade of telling the truth because they
were bothered by their conscience, do not receive from this court a worthy
A. He was chased by that military man who carried that bag. appreciation with merit, rather pregnant of suspicion and apparent spectacle
of falsity and pretension." 21
Q. Can you recall the names of the military man who chased that accused?
However, a close examination of the testimony of the driver, Efren Sustiger,
A. If I can see his face again, I can recognize him. will show inconsistencies and the impossibility of some of his claims. In the
cross-examination of driver Efren Sustiger, he gave the following answers to
the questions of the defense lawyer:
Q. Do you know if the accused was recaptured?

Q. Now, in the checkpoint, you were still on the wheel, you did not alight
A. Yes, sir. from your vehicle, is that correct?

Q. Where was he brought? A. Yes, sir.

A. He was brought to the sub-station at Ulas. Q. And the passengers alighted already?

Q. How about you? A. I saw only one passenger going down my vehicle.

A. They fetch my (sic) vehicle and this is also brought to Ulas station. Q. What is the instruction of the military man in the checkpoint to you?

Q. While at the Ulas station what happened? A. He had no instruction given to us, but he only said, they will be doing an
inspection.
A. They showed to me the person asking if he was the man who was my
passenger. Q. There are no instruction to the passengers to alight from the vehicle?

Q. What happened next? A. Only that person who was carrying this pack bag, who was ask to go down.

A. The passenger was requested to open this bag. xxx xxx xxx

Q. Who requested him to open the bag? Q. You said you were at the driver's wheel, you want to tell the honorable
court, that you say the passengers in the mirror at the top of the driver's
A. The one who apprehended him. seat?

Q. Did the accused comply with the respect? A. No, I turn around looking towards many people.

A. Yes, sir. Q. Now you turn around and it is a policeman talking to you?

Q. What was found if any? A. No, I was watching him when he instructed that man the person who
carried the bag, to go down the vehicle.

17 | R U L E 1 1 4 C A S E S - B A I L
Q. How many military men manning the checkpoint? Q. Did you agree after coming out of the office, from the office of the City
Prosecutor?
A. I cannot count there were many of them.22
A. No.
It would be difficult further the driver, seated in front of the jeep by the
steering wheel to see the contents of the bag when the accused allegedly Q. Because you did not agree what did you do?
opened the bag at the other end of the jeep, considering that it was night
time and the distance from the driver's seat to the other end of the jeep was
A. I just kept silent.
more or less twenty (20) feet.

Q. What do you mean by keeping silent?


Also, between the driver and the conductor, the conductor was in a better
position to identify and describe the appearance of the passengers riding in
the jeep. The driver will, of course, be busy minding the wheel and the road A. I did not agree.
rather than observing the demeanor, appearance and luggage of the
passengers. Q. After the policemen told you two times to testify to point to Edgar Lagmay
as the one who brought the bag, did you have the intention to testify?
The conductor was the one directly interacting with the passengers, helping
them board and alight from the jeep and taking their fare. He was in a better A. No.
position to adjudge what the passengers were carrying at the time they
boarded the jeep.
Q. Did you tell anybody that you did not have any intention to testify?

It is noteworthy to mention that the distance from Agdao to Anda-San Pedro


Street is at least four (3) kilometers, and during the trip several passengers A. There was.
boarded and alighted from the vehicle. For the driver to remember the
appearances and bags carried by the passengers is very doubtful. Q. Who (sic) did you tell?

This Court in many cases has held that "evidence to be believed must not A. My parents.
only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness but it must also be
credible in itself, such that common experience and observation of mankind
lead to the inference of its probability under the circumstanccs." 23 Q. What was the (sic) reaction when you told them you have no intention to
testify?

The opinion of the lower court that the delay in the testimony of the
witnesses is questionable and leads one to doubt their true motive and A. They agreed with me.
intention is disappointing. We have expressed in a long line of decisions that
"it is not uncommon for a witness to a crime to show some reluctance about Q. Since you have no intention to testify, what did you do if any?
getting involved in a criminal case as in fact the natural reticence of most
people to get involved is of judicial notice". 24
A. I transferred residence. 26

"Delay of a witness in revealing to the authorities what he knows about a


PO3 Christopher Laput who headed the team that conducted the checkpoint
crime does not render his testimony false, for the delay may be explained by
and arrested the accused was also presented as a witness. In his testimony,
the natural reticence of most people and their abhorrence to get involved in
PO2 Laput stated.
a criminal case." 25

Q. On June 7, 1994 at around 9:35 in the evening where were you?


Another reason why this Court doubts the testimony of the driver, Efren
Sustiger, is that the driver and his conductor, Hesorenan de la Cerna, were
threatened by the police so they would testify in favor of the prosecution and A. On June 7, 1994 at 9:35 in the evening we received the directive from our
against the accused Lagmay. commanding officer to conduct a checkpoint at crossing Ulas.

In fact, the conductor de la Cerna failed to show up and testify in court, for Q. Who is your commanding officer?
fear of his life, and transferred residence to avoid being called to testify at
the initial trial. This, de La Cerna confirmed in his testimony at the new trial: A. Police Inspector Romero Tubesa.

Q. When you went out from the office of the City Prosecutor, what Q. Did you actually go to the area is directed?
happened.

A. Yes, sir.
A. We were told by the policemen to be a witness, to testify that Edgar
Lagmay was the one who brought the bag.
Q. While at crossing Ulas what happened?

Q. That was the second time you were told by the policemen to testify that
Edgar Lagmay was the one who brought the bag? A. Because there are two teams, one team will be assigned in the direction to
Toril, Davao City, and team where I was assigned in direction to Toril. 27

A. Yes.
xxx xxx xxx

18 | R U L E 1 1 4 C A S E S - B A I L
Q. With respect to the team which was assigned towards the direction of not disregard the testimonies of three witnesses on the basis of this general
Toril, what happened if any about that time June 7, 1994? rule.

A. Around 9:45 P.M. I flagged down a particular passenger's jeep bound for The trial court was of the opinion that the silence of the witnesses for almost
Toril then as I observed the jeep in the center there were three persons a year and their sudden change of heart, after hearing over the radio about
hanging on the jeep. the fate of the accused, is of no consequence. We, however, view the turn of
events differently. The three witnesses, namely, Herosenan de La Cerna,
Victor Degamo and Teresita Pecson, decided to come out in the open
Q. What did you observed if any?
because of their honest and sincere desire to serve the ends of justice. Such
act should not be spurned lest a wrong signal be given to would be
A. I observed that there was one person inside the jeep that was carrying a witnesses.
bag.
Their testimonies were clear and leave no room to doubt as to their true
Q. You said, you observed a person carrying a bag, what did you do? intention, which is to save the life of a men who was wrongly convicted
because they refused to heed the call of their conscience and retreated into
A. I approached him and ask him his name. the safe haven of being indifferent to the call of justice.

Q. What did he tell you, as to his name. In this case, the prosecution failed to establish the guilt of accused Edgar
Lagmay y Alarcon beyond reasonable doubt. We are convinced that there
was another passenger in the jeep who was the true owner of the bag
A. Because he did not answer, when I asked him about his name, so I again containing the 3,051.3 grams of dried marijuana leaves.
further said, what are you, are you a policeman or military? 28

We understand the drug menace that our country is facing, and the direct
xxx xxx xxx link of certain crimes to drug abuse. We condemn the pusher, strive to
convince users to undergo rehabilitation, and commiserate with the victims
Q. Now, did you ask other passengers, aside from him as to the ownership of and kin of drug related crimes. As herein-above stated, the law requires
the bag? proof beyond reasonable doubt of the commission of an offense before an
accused may be convicted.
A. Only he.
We have held that "if the inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of
two or more explanations, one of which is consistent with the innocence of
Q. Am I correct to say that what lead you ask him because he looks like a the accused and the other consistent with his guilt, then the evidence does
military, is that correct? not fulfill the test of moral certainty and is not sufficient to support a
conviction." 31
A. No. 29
Furthermore, "the equipoise rule provides that where the evidence in a
xxx xxx xxx criminal case evenly balanced, the constitutional presumption of innocence
should tilt the scales in favor of the accused." 32
Q. Now, will you admit that you instructed the accused to open the that army
bag? We therefore "take this opportunity to repeat this age-old observation and
experience of mankind on the penological and societal effect of capital
punishment: If it is justified, it serves as a deterrent, if injudiciously imposed,
A. Yes, sir.
it generates resentment." 33

Q. And you will admit that he denied the ownership of the bag?
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Court hereby REVERSES the appealed decision and
ACQUITS the accused, with costs de oficio. The Court orders the immediate
A. He did not deny. release of the accused, unless he is held for other causes. The Director,
Bureau of Corrections, shall report to this Court his compliance herewith
Q. But you will admit that you never made an instruction to the other within five (5) days from notice.1wphi1.nt
passengers to confirm the ownership of that bag?
SO ORDERED.
A. Yes, sir.
G.R. No. 131421 November 18, 2002
Q. You also failed to get the name of the woman passenger whom you tell
the Honorable Court that is seated beside the accused? 30 GERONIMO DADO, petitioner,
vs.
In the instant case, the Court is faced with the dilemma of whether or not to PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
give weight to the testimonies of the conductor (de La Cerna) and the
passengers of the jeep Victor Degamo and Teresita Pecson. They failed to DECISION
testify in the original trial of the case and only went into the open upon
learning that accused Lagmay was sentenced to death.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

This Court has ruled that the findings of the trial court as to the credibility of
Before us is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing
witnesses are generally not disturbed. In the instant case, however, we can
the June 26, 1997 decision of the Court of Appeals1 in CA-G.R. CR No. 16886,

19 | R U L E 1 1 4 C A S E S - B A I L
which affirmed the decision2 dated April 22, 1994, of the Regional Trial Court injuries noted [at] the urinary bladder prostate gland, urethra, part of the
of Sultan Kudarat, Branch 19, in Criminal Case No. 2056, finding petitioner ureter, the mid-pelvic bone (symphysis pubis), and the surrounding vessels
Geronimo Dado and his co-accused Francisco Eraso guilty of the crime of and tissues of the pelvis. Marked bleeding was noted along the injured pelvic
homicide. area. Three (3) pieces of irregularly shaped metallic slugs were recovered
from the body; one, silvery colored, along the iliac spine almost glued to the
bone; two, copper colored, embedded in the urinary bladder substance;
In an Information dated August 24, 1993, petitioner Geronimo Dado and
three, copper colored, embedded in blasted substance almost on the pelvic
accused Francisco Eraso were charged with murder allegedly committed as
floor. Hematoma noted along the penile area.
follows:

No other injuries noted.9


That in the evening of May 25, 1992, at Sitio Paitan, Barangay Sagasa,
Municipality of Esperanza, Province of Sultan Kudarat, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, armed with Dr. Rhodora T. Antenor testified that the fatal wound that caused the death
firearms, with intent to kill, with evident premeditation and treachery, did of the victim was the one inflicted on the mid-inner thigh. The bullet pierced
then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, attack, assault and shot through and injured the organs in the pelvic region where she found three
one SILVESTRE BALINAS with the use of the afore-mentioned weapons, irregularly shaped metallic fragments. Dr. Antenor added that the position of
thereby inflicting gunshot wounds upon the latter which caused his the victim at that time of the shooting was higher than the assailant
instantaneous death. considering that the trajectory of the bullets was upwards. She added that
the wound on the victims right outer lateral arm alone, would not bring
about death, unless not immediately treated.10
CONTRARY TO LAW, particularly Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code of the
Philippines, with the aggravating circumstance of taking advantage of
superior strength.3 Upon examination by NBI Ballistician Elmer Nelson D. Piedad, the three
metallic fragments recovered from the fatal wound of the victim turned out
to be fragments of a 5.56 mm jacketed bullet, thus:
Upon arraignment on September 22, 1992, petitioner and his co-accused
pleaded not guilty.4 Trial thereafter followed.
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSION:
The antecedent facts as narrated by prosecution witnesses Alfredo Balinas5
and Rufo Alga6 are as follows: On the night of May 25, 1992, the Esperanza, xxxxxxxxx
Sultan Kudarat Police Station formed three teams to intercept cattle rustlers
from Barangay Laguinding, Sultan Kudarat. The team, composed of petitioner
1. Evidence marked "SB-1" is a part of a copper jacket of a caliber 5.56mm
SPO4 Geromino Dado and CAFGU members Francisco Eraso, Alfredo Balinas,
jacketed bullet and was fired through the barrel of a caliber 5.56mm
and Rufo Alga, waited behind a large dike at Sitio Paitan, Sultan Kudarat.
firearms.
Alfredo Balinas and Rufo Alga, who were both armed with M14 armalite
rifles, positioned themselves between petitioner, who was armed with a
caliber .45 pistol, and accused Francisco Eraso, who was carrying an M16 2. Evidence marked "SB-2" and "SB-3" could be parts of the lead core of
armalite rifle. They were all facing southwards in a half-kneeling position and evidence copper jacketed marked "SB-1".
were about 2 arms length away from each other. At around 11:00 of the
same evening, the team saw somebody approaching at a distance of 50 x x x x x x x x x.11
meters. Though it was a moonless night, they noticed that he was half-naked.
When he was about 5 meters away from the team, Alfredo Balinas noticed
that Francisco Eraso, who was on his right side, was making some On cross-examination, he declared that he is not sure whether the 2 other
movements. Balinas told Eraso to wait, but before Balinas could beam his metallic fragments (marked as exhibit "SB-2" and "SB-3") recovered from the
flash light, Eraso fired his M16 armalite rifle at the approaching man. fatal wound of the victim are indeed parts of "SB-1" which is a part of a
Immediately thereafter, petitioner, who was on the left side of Rufo Alga, copper jacket of a caliber 5.56 mm. jacketed bullet.12
fired a single shot from his .45 caliber pistol. The victim shouted, "Tay Dolfo,
ako ini," ("Tay Dolfo, [this is] me")7 as he fell on the ground. The victim For his part, petitioner testified that on the night of the incident, he was
turned out to be Silvestre "Butsoy" Balinas, the nephew of Alfredo Balinas armed with a .45 caliber pistol. He claimed that while waiting for the cattle
and not the cattle rustler the team were ordered to intercept. Repentant of rustlers, he and his team positioned themselves beneath a big hole from
what he did, accused Eraso embraced Alfredo Balinas saying, "Pare, this was which a big tree had been uprooted. He was facing eastward while his
not intentionally done and this was merely an accident."8 companions, CAFGU members, Francisco Eraso, Alfredo Balinas, and Rufo
Alga, were facing southwards. When he heard rapid gun bursts, he thought
Silvestre Balinas died as a result of the gunshot wounds he sustained. The they were being fired upon by their enemies, thus, he immediately fired a
post-mortem examination conducted on his cadaver by Dr. Rhodora T. single shot eastward. It was only when accused Eraso embraced and asked
Antenor, yielded the following results: forgiveness from Alfredo Balinas, that he realized somebody was shot.13

Gunshot wounds located at: On cross-examination however, he admitted that he knew the rapid gun
burst which he thought to be from their enemies came from 2 meters behind
him. He explained that his arm was then broken making it difficult for him to
1. (Point of Entry) - at right outer lateral arm with a diameter of 0.25 cm move. Thus, when he heard the gun burst, he did not turn to face the source
coursing tangentially and exiting at the right inner arm, about 4 cm below the thereof and instead fired his .45 caliber pistol in front of him. He declared
elbow, 2.5 cm by 3cm in diameter (Point of Exit). that his purpose in firing his .45 caliber pistol opposite the source of the rapid
gun burst was to demoralize their enemy.14
No powder burns noted.
On April 22, 1994, the trial court convicted petitioner and accused Eraso of
2. (Point of Entry) 2.5 by 9.5 cm in diameter at upper mid-inner thigh, about the crime of homicide. The dispositive portion thereof reads:
5 cm from the ischial spine. Exposed were the damaged muscles, blood
vessels and the surrounding tissues along the femoral triangle. The wound
coursed upwards toward the pelvic area through the inguinal canal with blast

20 | R U L E 1 1 4 C A S E S - B A I L
WHEREFORE, upon all the foregoing considerations, the Court finds the particularity as to the name of the accused, the time and place of
accused, SPO4 Geronimo Dado and Francisco Eraso, guilty beyond commission of the offense, and the circumstances thereof.22
reasonable doubt of the crime of HOMICIDE.
Moreover, even if conspiracy was sufficiently alleged in the information, the
ACCORDINGLY, applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the Court hereby same cannot be considered against the petitioner. Conspiracy exists when
sentences the accused, SPO4 Geronimo Dado and Francisco Eraso, to suffer two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a
the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment, ranging from EIGHT (8) YEARS felony and decide to commit it. Although the agreement need not be directly
and ONE (1) DAY of prision mayor, as minimum, to FOURTEEN (14) YEARS, proven, circumstantial evidence of such agreement must nonetheless be
EIGHT (8) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of reclusion temporal, as maximum; to convincingly shown. Indeed, like the offense itself, conspiracy must be
indemnify jointly and severally the heirs of the late Silvestre Balinas, Jr.: proved beyond reasonable doubt. Thus, it has been held that neither joint
nor simultaneous action is per se sufficient proof of conspiracy.23
a) the amount of P3,000.00 as actual damages which was duly established in
relation to the expenses incurred for the complete funeral services given to In the case at bar, petitioner and accused Erasos seemingly concerted and
the deceased victim; almost simultaneous acts were more of a spontaneous reaction rather than
the result of a common plan to kill the victim. Simultaneity alone would not
be enough to demonstrate the concurrence of will or the unity of action and
b) the amount of P15,000.00, as moral damages;
purpose that could be the basis for collective responsibility of two or more
individuals particularly if, as in the case at bar, the incident occurred at the
c) the amount of P10,000.00, as exemplary damages; spur of the moment. In conspiracy, there should be a conscious design to
perpetrate the offense.24
d) the amount of P50,000.00, as indemnity for death; and to pay the costs.
Thus, petitioner can only be held responsible for the acts or omissions which
IT IS SO ORDERED.15 can be proved to have been committed by him personally. In other words, his
criminal accountability, if any, should be determined on an individual rather
than on a collective basis. Petitioner could not be made to answer for the
The aforesaid judgment of conviction was affirmed by the Court of Appeals acts done by his co-accused, Franciso Eraso, unless it be shown that he
on June 26, 1997.16 participated directly and personally in the commission of those acts. It
becomes important therefore to determine whether petitioner inflicted the
A petition for review17 was filed by accused Francisco Eraso but the same was fatal wound that directly caused the death of the victim.
denied in a Resolution dated February 11, 1998,18 which became final and
executory on March 30, 1998.19 Hence, as regards Francisco Eraso, the The trial court found that a .45 caliber bullet will create a bigger entrance
decision of the Court of Appeals finding him guilty of homicide has become wound as compared to a 5.56 mm. bullet which is of a lower caliber. It
final. concluded that the wound on the inner thigh of the victim must have been
caused by a .45 caliber bullet because said wound had a bigger entrance than
Petitioner, on the other hand, filed the instant petition contending that the the wound sustained by the victim on the right outer lateral arm.25 However,
trial court and the Court of Appeals erred: (1) in ruling that he acted in this conclusion is entirely devoid of basis because no evidence was presented
conspiracy with accused Francisco Eraso; and (2) in finding him guilty of to substantiate said conclusions. What is decisive is the result of the Ballistic
homicide on the basis of the evidence presented by the prosecution. Examination conducted by NBI Ballistician Elmer D. Piedad, on the 3 metallic
fragments recovered from the fatal wound of the victim. Piedad found that
one of said fragments, marked "SB-1," "is a part of a copper jacket of a
In convicting the petitioner, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals caliber 5.56 mm. jacketed bullet and was fired through the barrel of a caliber
found that conspiracy attended the commission of the crime. The Court of 5.56 mm. firearm,"26 and not a part of a .45 caliber bullet.27 Pertinent portion
Appeals ruled that petitioner and accused Eraso conspired in killing the of his testimony, reads:
deceased, thus, it is no longer necessary to establish who caused the fatal
wound inasmuch as conspiracy makes the act of one conspirator the act of
all. ATTY. MONTEFERIO:

A reading, however, of the information filed against petitioner will readily Q: You have presented before this Honorable Court [a] piece of paper
show that the prosecution failed to allege the circumstance of conspiracy. marked "A-1". This refer to the very same Exhibit "A-1"?
Pertinent portion of the information states: " x x x the said accused, armed
with firearms, with intent to kill, with evident premeditation and treachery, A: Yes, sir.
did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, attack, assault and
shot one SILVESTRE BALINAS with the use of the afore-mentioned weapons,
thereby inflicting gunshot wounds upon the latter which caused his xxxxxxxxx
instantaneous death. x x x" Undoubtedly, the information does not satisfy
the requirement that conspiracy must be conveyed in "appropriate Q: Please tell us, how did you arrive in your findings that SB-1 is part of a
language."20 The words "conspired," "confederated," or the phrase "acting in copper jacket of a caliber 5.56 mm. jacketed bullet; how did you arrive?
concert" or "in conspiracy," or their synonyms or derivatives do not appear in
the indictment. The language used by the prosecution in charging the
A: In a copper jacket[ed] bullet, there is always [a] copper jacket, that is
petitioner and his co-accused contains no reference to conspiracy which
upper part of the bullet, sir.
must be alleged, not merely inferred from the information. Absent particular
statements in the accusatory portion of the charge sheet concerning any
definitive act constituting conspiracy, the same cannot be considered against Q: How did you arrive at the conclusion that this is part of a copper jacket of
the petitioner who must perforce be held accountable only for his own acts 5.56 mm.?
or omissions.21 In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall first be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. To ensure
A: I carefully examined SB-1 in my report to a copper jacket[ed] bullet fired
that the due process rights of an accused are observed, every indictment
from [a] 5.56 mm., and I found out that the lands and grooves of the
must embody the essential elements of the crime charged with reasonable

21 | R U L E 1 1 4 C A S E S - B A I L
evidenced (sic) copper jacket marked SB-1 is riflings of the standard 5.56 A: The caliber 5.56 mm. there is copper jacket (sic) but something in caliber
mm., they have the same lands and grooves. .38 copper jacket, rubber putted and lead (sic).

Q: Did you utilize instruments in order to determine? Q: How about .45 firearm?

A: A bullet comparison microscope.28 A: The caliber .45, they are copper jacketed bullet or copper putted (sic) or
lead.
xxxxxxxxx
Q: The same thing with 5.56 mm.?
ATTY. PASOK:
A: Yes. All jacketed, 5.56 are all jacketed.
xxxxxxxxx
COURT:
Q: Mr. witness, being a ballistic expert, you know the composition of the
bullet of [a] .45 caliber and that of [an] armalite? Q: That is the reason why you said that your findings and conclusion that the
evidenced (sic) marked as SB-2 and SB-3 could be possibly parts of the lead
core or the evidenced (sic) copper jacket marked as SB-1?
A: Copper jacket.

A: Could be, Your Honor.


Q: The composition on the content of the lead of .45 caliber and that of
armalite?
COURT:
A: We are not in the composition but we are on a caliber (sic).
Cross for the prosecution.
Q: With that answer, it may be possible that this Exhibit "2", SB -1, SB-2 and
SB-3, could be bullet from a caliber .45, M-14 or M-16? FISCAL DE PERALTA:

A: It could not be possible. SB-1 is part of a copper jacket of 5.56 mm. and xxxxxxxxx
the lead core evidenced (sic) marked SB-2 and SB-3 could be parts of the
copper jacket evidenced (sic) marked SB-1.29
Q: A caliber .45 bullet has copper jacket, is that correct?

xxxxxxxxx
A: Some caliber .45 has copper jacket, some copper putted (sic), some lead.

Q: Look at your Certification and in Exhibit "3-A", in page 2 under the column,
Q: If a caliber .45 bullet has copper jacket, then why is it that in your findings
"Findings and Conclusions" and I quote: "Evidenced (sic) marked SB-2 and
in Exhibit "2", particularly SB-1, you made it appear that this is part of a
SB-3 could be parts of the lead core of evidenced (sic) copper jacket marked
copper jacket of 5.56 mm. and not from a .45 caliber?
[as] SB-1. My question, you said could be part of copper jacket marked SB-1,
are you telling the Court, you are sure that this Exhibits "SB-2" and "SB-3"
[are] not part of a copper . . . jacket marked as SB-1? A: It is part of a copper jacket of 5.56 mm., sir.

A: It could be parts or it could not be parts. Q: Why did you specifically state that SB-1 is part of a copper jacket of 5.56
mm?
Q: You are in doubt that this is really part of SB-1?
A: Because it is only a part of a copper jacket of 5.56 mm because it is only
a part.
A: It could be part, I am doubting.

COURT:
COURT:

Q: But you said it could be a part?


Q: If it could not be parts of the lead core of the copper jacket of 5.56 mm.
caliber ammunition, would you say that the same would be part of the lead
core of the copper jacket of a different caliber or ammunition? A: It is a part, Your Honor.

A: The copper jacket is parts (sic) of the caliber 5.56 and the lead core could FISCAL DE PERALTA:
be parts. We cannot evidently conclude. It could be parts of copper jacket
evidenced marked SB-1. Q: What is the distinction of copper jacket of 5.56 mm. and copper jacket of
.45 caliber?
There is no basis.
A: They have the same (sic), but in my findings, I compared that to a caliber
COURT: 5.56 mm. copper jacket fired from armalite under a microscope, the lands
and grooves of the copper jacket and the standard bullet fired from 5.56.,
they are the same in width.
Q: You are saying that practically, any ammunition has copper jacket?

22 | R U L E 1 1 4 C A S E S - B A I L
Q: Did you compare riflings of .45 caliber from the specimen marked SB-1? Pursuant to Article 254 of the Revised Penal Code, illegal discharge of firearm
is punishable with prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods
There being no modifying circumstances and applying the Indeterminate
A: No need to compare because the caliber .45 lands and grooves is too wide,
Sentence Law, petitioner should be sentenced to suffer the penalty of six (6)
the lands and grooves of .45 caliber is very wide.
months of arresto mayor, as minimum to two (2) years and eleven (11)
months of prision correccional, as maximum.
They are not the same.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the June 26, 1997 decision of the
Q: How about the lands and grooves of a caliber 5.56 mm. compared to a .45 Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 16886, affirming the conviction of
caliber? petitioner for the crime of homicide is SET ASIDE and petitioner is
ACQUITTED of the crime charged on the ground of reasonable doubt.
A: The caliber 5.56 mm. is smaller but on a caliber .45 are very wide.30
A new decision is entered finding petitioner Geronimo Dado guilty of the
The doubt entertained by NBI Ballistician Elmer D. Piedad, as to whether the crime of illegal discharge of firearm and sentencing him to suffer the
2 other metallic fragments (marked as exhibit "SB-2" and "SB-3") are indeed indeterminate penalty of six (6) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to
parts of the lead core of the "SB-1", which is part of a copper jacket of a two (2) years and eleven (11) months of prision correccional, as maximum.
caliber 5.56 mm. jacketed bullet, must be resolved in favor of petitioner; that
is, said metallic fragments cannot be presumed to be particles of a .45 caliber SO ORDERED.
bullet fired from the .45 caliber pistol of petitioner. Under equipoise rule,
where the evidence on an issue of fact is in equipoise or there is doubt on
G.R. No. 121212 January 20, 1999
which side the evidence preponderates, the party having the burden of proof
loses. The equipoise rule finds application if, as in the present case, the
inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two or more explanations, THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
one of which is consistent with the innocence of the accused and the other vs.
consistent with his guilt, for then the evidence does not fulfill the test of ARTEMIO CALAYCA, accused-appellant.
moral certainty, and does not suffice to produce a conviction. Briefly stated,
the needed quantum of proof to convict the accused of the crime charged is
found lacking.31
MARTINEZ, J.:

Evidently, the prosecution failed to prove that the metallic fragments found
A daughter was again allegedly raped by her own father, herein appellant
in the fatal wound of the victim are particles of a .45 caliber bullet that
Artemio Calayca, who is now facing a death sentence after having been
emanated from the .45 caliber pistol fired by petitioner. For this reason, the
found guilty of said crime in a Decision 1 dated June 13, 1995, rendered by
Court cannot in good conscience affirm his conviction for the crime of
the Regional Trial Court (Branch 24) of Cagayan de Oro City in Criminal Case
homicide.
No. 95-129.

In the same vein, petitioner cannot be held responsible for the wound
Hence, this automatic review.
inflicted on the victims right outer lateral arm for the same reason that there
is no evidence proving beyond moral certainty that said wound was caused
by the bullet fired from petitioners .45 caliber pistol. A rape charge was initiated by Neddy Calayca through a sworn complaint 2
with supporting affidavits and documents 3 filed with the Municipal Circuit
Trial Court of Balingasag, Misamis Oriental on January 9, 1995. MCTC Judge
Nevertheless, petitioner is not completely without liability. The Court
Alfredo Cain found sufficient ground to prosecute the appellant for the crime
sustains the finding of the trial court that petitioner fired his .45 caliber pistol
of rape. This was the same finding of the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor
towards the victim. From the attendant circumstances, it appears that there
of Misamis Oriental upon examination of the records of the preliminary
is no evidence tending to prove that petitioner had animus interficendi or
investigation forwarded to it. Consequently, on March 21, 1995, the
intent to kill the victim. Note that the prosecution witnesses did not see
corresponding Information 4 was filed with the Regional Trial Court reading
whether petitioner aimed to kill the victim.32 Intent to kill cannot be
as follows:
automatically drawn from the mere fact that the use of firearms is dangerous
to life.33 Animus interficendi must be established with the same degree of
certainty as is required of the other elements of the crime. The inference of INFORMATION
intent to kill should not be drawn in the absence of circumstances sufficient
to prove such intent beyond reasonable doubt.34 The undersigned Assistant Provincial Prosecutor II, upon sworn complaint of
the offended party, Neddy Calayca, accuses ARTEMIO CALAYCA of the crime
Absent an intent to kill in firing the gun towards the victim, petitioner should of RAPE, committed as follows:
be held liable for the crime of illegal discharge of firearm under Article 254 of
the Revised Penal Code.35 The elements of this crime are: (1) that the That on or about the 29th day of January, 1994 at about 1:00 o'clock in the
offender discharges a firearm against or at another person; and (2) that the morning, more or less, at Barangay Solo, Municipality of Balingasag, Province
offender has no intention to kill that person.36 Though the information of Misamis Oriental, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
charged the petitioner with murder, he could be validly convicted of illegal Court, the above-named accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
discharge of firearm, an offense which is necessarily included in the crime of feloniously and by means of force and intimidation, succeeded in having
unlawful killing of a person. Under Rule 120, Section 4, of the Revised Rules carnal knowledge (sexual intercourse) with her(sic) own daughter, Neddy
on Criminal Procedure, when there is a variance between the offense Calayca, against her will and consent.
charged in the complaint or information and that proved, and the offense as
charged is included in or necessarily includes the offense proved, the accused
shall be convicted of the offense proved which is included in the offense CONTRARY TO and in VIOLATION OF Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as
charged, or the offense charged which is included in the offense proved. amended by Republic Act No. 7659.

Cagayan de Oro City, Philippines, March 6, 1995.

23 | R U L E 1 1 4 C A S E S - B A I L
(SGD.) ROBERTO S. CASIO January 29, 1994. All that he testified to was that he was a widower in 1998
and has six (6) children by his late wife, two of whom he identified as Neddy,
the private complainant, and Betty Lani. He claimed that Neddy was only
Asst. Provincial Prosecutor II
nine (9) years old when his wife died. The private complainant stayed with
him together with his five other children, while Betty Lani stayed with his
When arraigned under the above-quoted Information, the appellant entered (appellant's) brother at San Juan, Misamis Oriental. Betty Lani and Neddy left
a plea of "Not guilty" to the crime charged. Trial on the merits ensued his house on August 19, 1993. They took his savings from the proceeds of the
thereafter. sale of his pig in the amount of P5,000.00. He then looked for his two
daughters and found them at Bocboc, Don Carlos, Bukidnon. When he asked
The evidence for the prosecution was anchored mainly on the testimony of them why they took his money, his two daughters did not say a word, forcing
16-year old Neddy Calayca who, on May 2, 1995, narrated that at about 1:00 him to slap them. 12
o'clock in the morning of January 29, 1994, she was sound asleep inside their
house at Barangay Solo, Balingasag, Misamis Oriental when she was The defense did not present any other witness nor any documentary
awakened by the weight of her father, herein appellant Artemio Calayca, evidence.
who was already on top of her, naked and armed with a bolo. He forcibly
undressed her, inserted his penis into her vagina and made a push and pull
A judgment convicting the appellant of the crime charged and imposing upon
motion. Feeling the pain in her vagina, she resisted his onslaught by kicking
him the penalty of death was rendered by the trial court in a Decision dated
and boxing him, telling him with bitter tears, "I wish you would die. You are a
June 13, 1995, the decretal portion of which states:
father without good
morals." 5 But she was helpless to resist his lustful desire as he threatened
her with a knife saying, "I will kill you if you will not agree." 6 After the sexual WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered finding
assault, she picked up her clothes, dressed up and was left weeping. She was accused ARTEMIO CALAYCA guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal of
then 15 years old when this incident happened. 7 the offense of rape defined and penalized by Article 335 of the Revised Penal
Code as amended by Section 11 of Republic Act 7659. Consequently, he is
hereby sentenced to suffer the extreme penalty of death, the private
Neddy Calayca first thought of immediately filing a case against appellant but
offended party being below 18 years of age (as she was 15 years of age at the
was prevented by his threat to kill her. She, however, reported her awful
time of the incident) and the accused being her parent, the same to be
experience with the appellant to her relatives in Mambayaan. She informed
executed by electrocution as the facilities for gas poisoning is not yet
them that even before the January 29, 1994 incident, appellant had sexually
provided by the Bureau of Prisons. In addition, accused is hereby ordered to
abused her many times. Her relatives, who were also afraid of appellant,
pay the private offended party, Neddy Calayca, the sum of P50,000.00.
merely advised her to sue him. She immediately went home in Solo because
she feared her father. When she reached home, her eldest sister Betty Lani
Calayca also arrived from Manila. Informed of the rape incident, Lani and In view of the penalty imposed, let the whole record of the case be
Neddy decided to leave the appellant. The two then traveled to Don Carlos, forwarded to the Honorable Supreme Court, Manila for automatic review. In
Bukidnon and worked as servants of the mayor, thinking their father could no addition, let the living body of the accused be committed to the New Bilibid
longer find them there. However, appellant was able to locate them. While in Prison, Muntinlupa, Metro Manila.
the house of the mayor, appellant harassed them, so Betty Lani had him
arrested by the police. 8 While appellant was in jail, Neddy reported to the
SO ORDERED.
police authorities that he raped her. The police then took her sworn
statement 9 on the rape incident. Thereafter, Neddy filed her complaint for
rape against the appellant. Appellant now assails the judgment of conviction claiming that

Betty Lani Calayca was 22 years old when she testified on May 18, 1995. She I
narrated that she was the eldest and Neddy was the second among the six
(6) children of appellant. Their mother died when she was 9 and Neddy was THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONY
7. At 11, she left Balingasag for Manila where she stayed for 10 years. While OF THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT DESPITE ITS GLARING INCONSISTENCIES.
in Manila, her aunt wrote that Neddy was sexually abused by the appellant
and that she should come home. When she arrived home in Solo, she slept in
the house of her father so she could observe him. That night, the appellant II
came to her and touched her body, but she quickly managed to get out of the
house and stayed outdoors until morning. She then convinced Neddy to run THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED OF THE
away from home so they could avoid appellant. They went to Bukidnon to CRIME OF RAPE DESPITE THE INSUFFICIENCY OF THE PROSECUTION
work, but their whereabouts was discovered by appellant, who then started EVIDENCE TO PROVE HIS GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT. 13
to harass them. Undaunted by the appellant's threat, the two sisters
reported to the authorities what Neddy suffered in the hands of appellant.
Thus, his arrest. Appellant hammers on the alleged inconsistencies in private complainant's
testimony regarding the frequency of the commission of rape by appellant
against her and the kind of weapon he used in forcing her to succumb to his
The last witness for the prosecution was Dr. Angelita A. Enopia, a physician at bestial lust. More specifically, appellant pointed out that private
the Balingasag Medicare Hospital, Misamis Oriental. She declared that on complainant, at one instance, testified that he raped her for the first time on
January 3, 1995 she conducted a pelvic examination 10 on the private January 29, 1994, 14 and yet, she later declared that she was raped by him
complainant, who informed her that she was raped by her own father even several times even before that date. Appellant further claims that private
when she was only seven (7) years old, and the last time was in January, complainant likewise testified that he threatened her with a bolo when she
1994. Dr. Enopia noted that there were healed lacerations in the hymen of tried to resist his bestial act on January 29, 1994, 15 but afterward she stated
Neddy at 3, 4, 6, 7 and 9 o'clock positions. She likewise found that there was that it was a knife which appellant used to threaten her. 16
a thickening of the hymen which was indicative of frequent sexual
intercourse. 11
These contradictory declarations by private complainant, appellant argues,
"only cast doubts on her claim that she was raped by her father on January
Appellant Artemio Calayca, on the other hand, did not deny the imputation 29, 1994. 17
of her daughter Neddy Calayca that he raped her in the early morning of

24 | R U L E 1 1 4 C A S E S - B A I L
Appellant's contention fails to persuade us. Q Not a bolo?

We have ruled in numerous cases that an errorless recollection of a A No, sir.


harrowing incident cannot be expected of a witness especially when she is
recounting details of an experience so humiliating and so painful as rape.18
FISCAL KHO
Minor errors in the testimony of a rape victim tend to buttress, rather than
weaken, her credibility since that would indicate that her testimony was not
contrived.19 Q How long is that knife?

The alleged conflicting statements of private complainant is more imagined A About this long (witness demonstrated, counsels agreed to a 6 to 8
than real. Private complainant has made it clear in her testimony that even inches in length).
before the rape incident on January 29, 1994, appellant had raped her
several times. Thus, she testified: Q With that length, does that include the handle?

Q Did you inform them (private complainant's relatives) that your father A Yes, including the handle. 21 [emphasis supplied]
will kill you if you will inform them?

The inaccuracy in private complainant's description of the weapon used is


A Yes. insignificant and understandable. To a young and naive girl, there is not much
difference between a bolo and a knife since both weapons are sharp and
Q What was their reaction? deadly. What is important to consider is that the weapon was effectively
used by appellant to intimidate private complainant into submission to his
dastardly act.
A When I told them that my father raped me several times, they feel bad.

Notwithstanding these minor flaws in the testimony of private complainant,


COURT
the latter remained consistent and firm in her denunciation of appellant, her
very own father, as the person who sexually abused her on January 29, 1994.
Before January 29, 1994 your father used to have sexual intercourse with The records bear this out as she testified as follows:
you?
Private complainant on direct examination:
A Yes, sir.
Q In what specific place at Solo, San Juan, Balingasag, Misamis Oriental
ATTY. FELICIA where you were situated on January 29, 1994?

What was the comment of your relatives when you told them that you were A Inside the house.
raped by your father several times?
Q At about 1:00 at dawn, more or less, were you still in your house?
A They commended that my father is a pig. 20 [emphasis supplied]
A I was asleep inside our house.
But whether the rape committed on January 29, 1994 was the first or just
one in the series of rapes is, to our mind, immaterial in the prosecution of
Q When you were asleep inside the house, was there any unusual
appellant for the rape he committed on said date, although this particular
incident?
telling circumstance of habitual sexual abuse convincingly shows the
appellant's perversity to commit the crime of rape.
A Yes, sir.
Also, the seeming confusion by private complainant on the kind of weapon
used by appellant to threaten her does not belie the fact of the commission Q Will you please tell the Honorable Court, what it was all about?
of rape by him against her on January 29, 1994. Moreover, when the trial
court clarified with private complainant what exactly was the weapon used A My father placed himself on top of me and made a push and pull
by appellant, she made a definite declaration that it was a knife, not a bolo, motion.
thereby removing any confusion as to this matter, to wit:

Q Was he dressed or naked?


FISCAL KHO

A He was naked.
Q After you saw the knife that your father was holding, what did you feel?

Q How about you at that time?


A I was afraid.

A He undressed me.
COURT

Q What did you do, when your father made sexual intercourse with you?
Q We will clarify, was it a bolo or a knife?

ATTY. FELICIA
A A knife.

25 | R U L E 1 1 4 C A S E S - B A I L
No basis, Your Honor. COURT

FISCAL KHO Q How old have you been at that time?

I will reform the question, Your Honor. A 15 years old.22

Q You said that your father undressed you and he placed himself on top of The victim's brief but candid and straightforward narration of how she was
you and made a push and pull motion, was there anything that happened to raped by appellant bears the earmarks of a credible witness.23
you.
Indeed, the testimony of Dr. Enopia, the examining physician, corroborated
A Yes, there was. private complainant's claim that she was sexually abused. Dr. Enopio's
declaration that she found healed lacerations on the victim's hymen at 3, 4,
6, 7 and 9 o'clock positions and that there was a thickening of her hymen,
Q And, you please tell the Court what it was all about?
simply indicated a frequent coitus.

A It was painful.
In his brief, appellant further made a vain attempt to impute ill-motive on the
part of private complainant to falsely charge him with rape. Appellant
Q Why is it that you felt a pain? suggested that private complainant had an axe to grind against him for
having allegedly slapped her and her an axe sister Betty Lani when he
A Because he made a push and pull motion. discovered that they took his savings of P5,000.00 which was the proceeds of
the sale of his pig. This alleged incidents, appellants argues, should have
deserved credence as this was not rebutted by the prosecution.
Q What particular part of your body was painful?

We do not agree.
A My vagina.

This supposed ill-motive of private complainant was not duly established by


Q Why what happened to your vagina? the defense. Hence, there was nothing for the prosecution to rebut. The
elementary in the rules of evidence is that an affirmative allegation made by
A It was inserted. a party must be duly proved to merit acceptance by the court. Besides, this
posture of appellant was correctly rejected by the trial court when it ruled
that
Q What was inserted?

. . . . Although, this allegation was not rebutted as the trial prosecutor did not
A A penis. present again Neddy Calayca as a rebuttal witness, to the mind of the court,
the fact of slapping is not enough reason on the part of private offended
Q The penis of whom that inserted your vagina? party to file such heinous case as rape against her own father. If it were true
that Neddy Calayca got his money without his permission, she would not be
slighted if slapped knowing that she got it and deserved such punishment.
A Of my father.
This is in accord with human experience.24

Q Is your father around in Court?


We believe that a teenage unmarried lass would not ordinarily file a rape
charge against anybody, much less her own father, if it were not true. 25 For,
A Yes, sir. it is unnatural for a young and innocent girl to concoct a story of defloration,
allow an examination of her private part, and thereafter subject herself to a
Q Will you please point on him? public trial if she has not, in fact, been a victim of rape and deeply motivated
by a sincere desire to have the culprit apprehended and punished.26 The
alleged slapping by apellant on private complainant over money in the
A Yes, sir, he is there. (witness pointing to a man, and upon asked of his amount of merely P5,000.00 is too frail a reason for a teenage daughter to
name responded that he is ARTEMIO CALAYCA). falsely charge her own father with the heinous crime of rape that is
punishable by death.
Q What did you do when your father inserted his penis into your vagina?
It is significant to note that, as likewise emphasized by the trial court,
A I was lying down. appellant did not deny the imputation of private complainant that he raped
her on January 29, 1994 at his house in Solo, Balingasag, Misamis Oriental.27
His silence on the evidence of rape against him is a mute but eloquent
Q Did you agree that your father will have a sexual intercourse with you? admission of the crime charged.28

A I did not agree but I just followed him because he had a bolo with him We, therefore, affirm the finding of the trial court that the charge of rape
against appellant has been proven beyond reasonable doubt.
Q What did he do with the bolo?
However, while we agree that the penalty of death should be imposed on
A He would hacked me if I will not agree. him, regrettably this is not in accord with the law and jurisprudence.

xxx xxx xxx Although the matter of the proper imposition of the penalty is not assigned
as an error by the appellant, nevertheless, it is a well-established rule in

26 | R U L E 1 1 4 C A S E S - B A I L
criminal procedure that an appeal in a criminal proceeding throws the whole The above-quoted Section 11 provides, inter alia, that where the victim of
case open for review and it becomes the duty of the appellate court to the crime of rape is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a
correct an error as may be found in the appealed judgment, whether it is parent of the victim, the death penalty shall be imposed. This is among the
made the subject if assignment of errors or not.29 seven (7) circumstances enumerated in Section 11 which, as we have held in
the recent case of People v. Garcia,32 are considered special circumstances
specifically applicable to the crime of rape. In Garcia, this Court en banc,
The trial court imposed the death penalty on appellant because of the
speaking through Justice Florenz D. Regalado,33 declared that "although the
presence of the circumstances of minority of the victim she was only 15 years
crime is still denominated as rape, such (enumerated) circumstances have
old at the time she was raped on January 29, 1994) as well as the relationship
changed the nature of simple rape by producing a qualified form thereof
of the offender (father) and the victim (daughter), pursuant to Section 11 of
punishable by the higher penalty of death.34 We reiterated this ruling in
Republic Act No. 765930 which amended Article 335 of the Revised Penal
subsequent en banc cases of People v. Ramos,35 People v. Leopoldo Ilao 36
Code.31 Section 11 of R.A. 7659 reads:
and People v. Omar Medina, 37 with further pronouncement that these
seven new attendant circumstances introduced in Section 11 of R.A. No.
Sec. 11. Article 335 of the crime Code (Revised Penal Code, as amended) is 7659 "partake of the nature of Qualifying circumstances and not merely
hereby amended to read as follows: aggravating circumstances," since the said qualifying circumstances are
punishable by the single indivisible penalty of death and not by reclusion
Art. 335. When and how rape is committed. Rape is committed by having perpetua to death. A qualifying circumstances increases it to a higher while
carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances: an aggravating circumstance affects only the period of the penalty but does
not increase it to a higher degree. 38

1. By using force or intimidation;


In the aforecited case of People v. Ramos, we explained that:

2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and


While Republic Act No. 7659 did not give a legal designation to the crime of
rape attended by any of the seven new circumstances introduced in Article
3. When the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented. 335 on December 31, 1993, this Court has referred to such crime as qualified
rape in a number of its decisions. However, with or without a name for this
The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion perpetua. kind of rape, the concurrence of the minority of the victim and her
relationship with the offender give a different character to the rape defined
in the first part of Article 335. They raise the imposable penalty upon a
Whenever the crime of rape is committed with the use of deadly weapon or person accused of rape from reclusion perpetua to the higher and supreme
by two or more persions the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death. penalty of death. Such an effect conjointly puts relationship and minority of
the offended party into the nature of a special qualifying circumstances.
When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, homicide is committed by (Emphasis supplied)
reason or on the occasion hereof, the penalty shall be death.
A reading of the Information for rape filed against appellant in the present
When the rape is attempted or frustrated and a homicide is committed by case reveals that he is merely charged with the crime of simple rape which
reason or on the occasion of thereof, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua warrants the imposition of the penalty of reclusion perpetua. This is so
to death. because the fact of the monitory of the victim, is not stated in the
Information. What was alleged therein was only the relationship of the
offender as the parent of the victim. Again, as we have emphasized in People
When by reason or on the occasion of the rape a homicide is committed, the
v. Ramos, the elements of minority of the victim and her relationship to the
penalty shall be death.
offender must concur. As such, the charge of rape in the Information is not in
its qualified form so as to fall under the special qualifying circumstances
The death penalty shall also imposed if the crime of rape is committed with stated in Section 11 of R.A. 7659. Thus, the penalty of death prescribed in
any of the following attendant circumstances: R.A. 7659 should not have been imposed against appellant. In the aforecited
case of People v. Garcia, we ruled:
1. When the victim is under eighten (18) years of age and the offender is a
parent, asendent, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity . . ., it has long been the rule that qualifying circumstances must be properly
within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the pleaded in the indictment. If the same are not pleaded but proved, they shall
victim. be considered only as aggravating circumstances (People v. Collado, 60 Phil.
[1934]; People Jovellano, et al., 56 SCRA 156 [1974]; People v. Fuertes, 229
2. When the victim is under the custody of the police or military authorities. SCRA 289 [1994]; People v. Rodico, et al., 249 SCRA 309 [1995], since the
latter admit of proof even if not pleaded (U.S. v. Campo, 23 Phil. 368 [1912];
People v. Domondon, 60 Phil. 729 [1934]; People v. de Guzman, 164 SCRA
3. When the rape is committed in full view of the husband, parent, any of the 215 [1988]). Indeed, it would be a denial of the right of the accused to be
children or other relatives within the third degree of consaguinity. informed of the charges against him and, consequently, a denial of due
process, if he is charged with simple rape and be convicted of its qualified
4. When the victim is a religious or a child below seven (7) years old. form punishable with death, although the attendant circumstances qualifying
the offense and resulting in the capital punishment was not alleged in the
indictment on which he was arraigned.
5. When the offender know that he is afflicted with Acquired Immune
Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) desease.
Recapitulating, the information filed against the appellant charged only the
felony of simple rape and no attendant qualifying circumstances, specifically
6. When committed by any member of the Armed Forces of the Philippines that of his being supposedly a guardian of the victim, was alleged. On this
or the Philippine National Police or any law enforcement agency. additional consideration, he cannot, therefore, be punished with the penalty
of death even assuming arguendo that he is such a guardian. Neither can that
7. When by reason on the occasion of the rape, the victim has suffered fact be considered to aggravate his liability as the penalty for simple rape is
permanent physical mutilation [emphasis supplied].

27 | R U L E 1 1 4 C A S E S - B A I L
the single indivisible penalty of reclusion perpetua (Article 63, Revised Penal The undersigned complainant as assisted by her mother accuses Rufino
Code). Mirandilla Bermas, of the crime of Rape, committed as follows:

. . . . He must, . . . , be further held liable for the corresponding indemnity to That on or about the 3rd day of August 1994, in the Municipality of
the victim, as well as exemplary damages for each count of rape (People v. Paraaque, Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Villanueva, 254 SCRA 202 [1996])." (emphasis supplied) Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, while armed with a knife and by
means of force and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have carnal knowledge of the undersigned complainant against
There being no allegation of the minority of the victim in the Information
her will.1wphi1.nt
under which the appellant was arraigned, he cannot be convicted of qualified
rape as he was not properly informed that he is being accused of qualified
rape. 39 Appellant's conviction of qualified rape violates his constitutional CONTRARY TO LAW
right to be properly informed of the nature and cause of accusation against
him.40 In a criminal prosecution, it is the fundamental rule that every
Paraaque, Metro Manila
element of the crime charged must be alleged in the Information. The main
purpose of this constitutional requirement is to enable the accused to
properly prepare his defense. He is presumed to have no independent August 8, 1994
knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense.41
(SGD) MANUEL P.
Adopting our pronouncement in the aforecited cases of People v. Garcia and
People v. Ramos, the failure to allege the fact of minority of the victim in the BERMAS
Information for rape is fatal and consequently bars the imposition of the
death penalty. Having been informed only of the elements of simple rape,
the appellant can be convicted only of such crime and be punished Complainant
accordingly with reclusion perpetua.42
Assisted by
As regards the P50,000.00 which the trial court ordered the appellant's to
pay the private complainant, the assailed judgment does not specify what (SGD) ROSITA BERMAS
this amount is intended for. We believe, however, that the said amount is for
payment of indemnity, which we find to be proper. In the recent case of
People v. Prades,43 it was ruled that the award of moral damages to the Mother 1
victim is proper even if there was no proof presented during the trial as basis
therefor. The circumstances of relationship between the offender and the Evidence was adduced during trial by the parties at the conclusion of which
victim as an aggravating circumstances becomes necessary in the matter of the lower court, presided over by Hon. Amelita G. Tolentino, rendered its
awarding civil damages.44 Thus, we find the appellant liable for P50,000.00 decision, dated 02 May 1995, finding the accused guilty of the offense
as moral damages and P25,000.00 as axemplary damages. charged and sentencing him to suffer the extreme penalty of death.

WHEREFORE, the judgment of the trial court convicting appellant ARTEMIO The death penalty having been imposed, the case has reached this Court by
CALAYCA of qualified rape is MODIFIED in the sense that appellant is declared way of automatic review pursuant to Article 47 of the Revised Penal Code, as
guilty of simple rape and his hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of amended by Section 22 of Republic Act No. 7659 (otherwise known as An Act
reclusion perpetua and to pay Neddy Calayca the sum of P50,000.00 by way To Impose Death Penalty on Certain Heinous Crimes, Amending For That
of indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages and P25,000 as exemplary Purpose The Revised Penal Code, as amended, Other Special Penal Laws, and
damages.1wphi1.nt For Other Purposes, which took effect on 31 December 1993).

SO ORDERED. The prosecution, through the Office of the Solicitor General, gave an account,
rather briefly, of the evidence submitted by the prosecution.
G.R. No. 120420 April 21, 1999
On August 3, 1994, complainant Manuela Bermas, 15 years old, was raped by
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, her own father, appellant Rufino Bermas, while she was lying down on a
vs. wooden bed inside their house at Creek Drive II, San Antonio Valley 8,
RUFINO MIRANDILLA BERMAS, accused-appellant. Paraaque, Metro Manila (pp. 6-7, TSN, Oct. 19, 1994). Armed with a knife,
appellant removed the victim's shorts and panty, placed himself above her,
inserted his penis in her vagina and conducted coital movements (pp. 7-8,
ibid.). After the appellant satisfied his lustful desire, he threatened the victim
with death if she reports the incident to anyone. (p. 9, ibid.)
VITUG, J.:
On August 9, 1994, complainant was medically examined at the NBI, which
In convicting an accused, it is not enough that proof beyond reasonable yielded the following findings:
doubt has been adduced, it is also essential that the accused has been duly
afforded his fundamental nights. The findings concluded: 1. No evident sign of extragenital physical injuries
noted on the body of the subject at the time of examination; 2. Hymen,
Rufino Mirandilla Bermas pleaded not guilty before the Regional Trial Court intact but distensible and its office wide (2.7 cm. In diameter) as to allow
of Paraaque, Branch 274, Metro Manila, to the crime of rape under a complete penetration by an average sized, adult, Filipino male organ in full
criminal complaint, which read: erection without producing any hymenal laceration. 2

COMPLAINT The defense proffered the testimony of the accused, who denied the charge,
and that of his married daughter, Luzviminda Mendez, who attributed the

28 | R U L E 1 1 4 C A S E S - B A I L
accusation made by her younger sister to a mere resentment by the latter. e. Negligent in not moving to inhibit the judge;
The trial court gave a summary of the testimony given by the accused and his
daughter Luzviminda; viz:
f. Negligent in her conduct at the initial trial.

The accused vehemently denied that he has ever committed the crime of
3. The Vanishing Second Counsel de Officio.
rape on her daughter, the complainant. He told the Court that he could not
do such a thing because he loves so much his daughter and his other
children. In fact, he said that he even performed the dual role of a father and a. He was not dedicated nor devoted to the accused;
a mother to his children since the time of his separation from his wife. The
accused further told the Court that in charging him of the crime of rape, the b. His work was shoddy;
complainant might have been motivated by ill-will or revenge in view of the
numerous scoldings that she has received from him on account of her
frequent coming home late at night. The accused stressed that he knew of no 4. The Reluctant Third Counsel de Officio
other reason as to why his daughter, the complainant, would ever charge
him of the crime of rape except probably in retaliation for being admonished 5. The performance of all three counsels de officio was ineffective and
by him whenever she comes home late in the night. prejudicial to the accused.

The married daughter of the accused, who testified in his behalf, denied that B. THE ACCUSED WAS DENIED HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO BE TRIED BY
the complainant was raped by the accused. She said that the complainant did AN IMPARTIAL JUDGE AND TO BE PRESUMED INNOCENT.
not come home in the night of August 3, 1994, and that, she is a liar. She told
the Court that the concoction by the complainant of the rape story is
probably due to the resentment by the latter of the frequent scoldings that C. THE ACCUSED WAS DENIED HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO BE HEARD
she has been receiving from the accused. She further added that she was told AND FOR WITNESSES TO TESTIFY IN HIS BEHALF.
by the previous household employer of the complainant that the latter is a
liar. She went on to testify further that she does not believe that the accused, D. THE ARRAIGNMENT OF THE ACCUSED WAS INVALID.
who is her father, raped the complainant, who is her younger sister. 3
E. THE ACCUSED WAS DENIED THE EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAW.
The trial court, in its decision of 02 May 1995, found the case of the
prosecution against the accused as having been duly established and so ruled
II. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT "SCRUTINIZE WITH EXTREME CAUTION" THE
out the defense theory of denial and supposed ill-will on the part of private
PROSECUTION'S EVIDENCE, MISAPPRECIATED THE FACTS AND THEREFORE
complainant that allegedly had motivated the filing of the complaint against
ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED GUILTY OF RAPE BEYOND REASONABLE
her father. The court adjudged:
DOUBT. 5

WHEREFORE, this Court finds the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
The Court, after a painstaking review of the records, finds merit in the appeal
the crime of rape and hereby sentences him to suffer the DEATH PENALTY, to
enough to warrant a remand of the case for new trial.
indemnify the complainant in the amount of P75,000.00, Philippine Currency,
and to pay the costs.
It would appear that on 08 August 1994 Manuela P. Bermas, then 15 years of
age, assisted by her mother Rosita Bermas, executed a sworn statement
SO ORDERED. 4
before SPO1 Dominador Nipas, Jr., of the Paraaque Police Station, stating, in
sum, that she had been raped by accused Rufino Mirandilla Bermas, her own
In their 61-page brief, defense counsel Fernandez & Kasilag-Villanueva (in father in 1991 and 1993, as well as on 03 August 1994, particularly the
collaboration with the Anti-Death Penalty Task Force), detailed several errors subject matter of the complaint, hereinbefore quoted, duly signed and filed
allegedly committed by the court a quo; thus: conformably with Section 7, Rule 112, of the Rules of Court. The Second
Assistant Prosecutor, issued a certification to the effect that the accused had
I. THE ACCUSED WAS DEPRIVED OF DUE PROCESS. waived his right to a preliminary investigation.

A. THE ACCUSED WAS DENIED HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO EFFECTIVE On the day scheduled for his arraignment on 03 October 1994, the accused
AND VIGILANT COUNSEL. was brought before the trial court without counsel. The court thereupon
assigned Atty. Rosa Elmira C Villamin of the Public Attorney's Office to be the
counsel de officio. Accused forthwith pleaded not guilty. The pre-trial was
1. The trial court did not observe the correct selection process in appointing waived.
the accused's counsel de officio;
The initial reception of evidence was held on 19 October 1994. The
2. The Public Attorney could not give justice to the accused; prosecution placed complainant Manuela Bermas at the witness stand. She
testified on direct examination with hardly any participation by defense
a. Negligent in not moving to quash the information on the ground of illegal counsel who, inexplicably, later waived the cross-examination and then
arrest; asked the court to be relieved of her duty as counsel de officio.

b. Negligent in not moving to quash the information on the ground of invalid ATTY. VILLARIN:
filing of the information;
And I am requesting if this Honorable Court would allow me and my paero
c. Negligent in not moving for a preliminary investigation; besides me, would accede to my request that I be relieved as counsel de
officio because I could not also give justice to the accused because as a lady
lawyer, if my paero here and if this Honorable Court will accede to my
d. Negligent in not pointing out the unexplained change in the case number; request.

29 | R U L E 1 1 4 C A S E S - B A I L
COURT: COURT:

It is your sworn duty to defend the helpless and the defenseless. That is your It is already the turn of the defense to present its evidence in this case. In
sworn duty, Mrs. Counsel de Officio. Are you retracting? view of the fact that the defense counsel is not interested anymore in
defending the accused because last time he moved for the continuance of
the hearing of this case and since this time he did not appear, he is unduly
ATTY. VILLARIN.
delaying the proceedings of this case and considering the accused here is
under detention, I think it would be better if the Court appoints another
That is why I am asking this Honorable Court. 6 lawyer. He should file his withdrawal if he is not interested anymore.

Counsel's request was granted, and Atty. Roberto Gomez was appointed the In view of the fact that the counsel de officio has repeatedly failed to appear
new counsel de officio. While Atty. Gomez was ultimately allowed to cross- in this Court to defend his client-accused, the Court is hereby constrained to
examine the complainant, it should be quite evident, however, that he barely appoint another counsel de officio to handle the defense of the accused. For
had time, to prepare therefor. On this score, defense counsel Fernandez & this purpose, Atty. Nicanor Lonzame is hereby appointed as the counsel de
Kasilag-Villanueva in the instant appeal would later point out: officio for accused Rufino Mirandilla Bermas. 8

To substitute for her, the Public Attorney recommended Atty. Roberto The hearing scheduled for that day was reset to 16 January 1995 upon the
Gomez to be appointed as defense counsel de officio. And so the trial court request of Atty. Lonzame. On even date, Atty. Lonzame himself asked to be
appointed him. relieved as counsel de officio but later, albeit reluctantly, retracted, thus:

Atty. Gomez asked for a ten minute recess before he began his cross COURT:
examination, presumably to prepare. But a ten minute preparation to cross
examine the complainant upon whose testimony largely rests the verdict on
Where is the accused? Where is the counsel de officio?
the accused who stands to be meted the death penalty if found guilty, is far
too inadequate. He could not possibly have familiarized himself with the
records and surrounding circumstances of the case, read the complaint, the ATTY. NICANOR LONZAME:
statement of the complainant, the medico-legal report, memos of the police,
transcripts and other relevant documents and confer with the accused and
As counsel de officio, Your Honor. The lawyer from the PAO is here, may I be
his witnesses, all in ten minutes. 4
allowed to give her my responsibility as counsel de officio considering that
the lawyer from the PAO.
The prosecution abruptly rested its case after the medico-legal officer had
testified.
COURT:

The reception of the defense evidence was scheduled for 12 December 1994,
What about?
it was later reset to 09 January 1995. When the case was called on 09 January
1995, the following transpired:
ATTY. LONZAME.
COURT.
I was appointed because the PAO lawyer was not around. If the Court will
allow us to be relieved from our responsibility as appointed counsel de officio
Where is the counsel for the accused?
of the accused.

COURT.
COURT.

Did he file his withdrawal in this case? It is supposed to be the turn of the
You want to be relieved of your responsibility as appointed counsel de
defense to present its evidence.
officio? As an officer of the Court you don't want to handle the defense of
the accused in this case?
PROSECUTOR GARCIA.
ATTY. LONZAME.
Yes, Your Honor. The prosecution had already rested its case.
I will be withdrawing my previous manifestation that I be relieved of my
COURT: responsibility as counsel de officio.

Last time he asked for the continuance of this case and considering that the COURT.
accused is under detention . . . it seems he cannot comply with his obligation.
So, therefore, counsel, are you now ready?
COURT:
ATTY. LONZAME.
(To the accused) Nasaan ang abogado mo?
Yes, Your Honor. 9
ACCUSED R. BERMAS.
Trial proceeded with the accused being the first to be put at the witness
Wala po. stand. He denied the accusation against him. The next witness to be

30 | R U L E 1 1 4 C A S E S - B A I L
presented was his married daughter who corroborated her father's claim of avail if it does not include the right to be heard by counsel. Even the most
innocence. intelligent or educated man may have no skill in the science of the law,
particularly in the rules of procedure, and, without counsel, he may be
convicted not because he is guilty but because he does not know how to
The defense counsel in the instant appeal took over from Atty. Lonzame who
establish his innocence. And this can happen more easily to persons who are
himself, for one reason or another, had ceased to appear for and in behalf of
ignorant or uneducated. It is for this reason that the right to be assisted by
accused-appellant.
counsel is deemed so important that it has become a constitutional right and
it so implemented that under our rules of procedure it is not enough for the
This Court finds and must hold, most regrettably, that accused-appellant has Court to apprise an accused of his right to have an attorney, it is not enough
not properly and effectively been accorded the right to counsel. So important to ask him whether he desires the aid of an attorney, but it is essential that
is the right to counsel that it has been enshrined in our fundamental law and the court should assign one de oficio for him if he so desires and he is poor or
its precursor laws. Indeed, even prior to the advent of the 1935 Constitution, grant him a reasonable time to procure an attorney of his own. 14
the right to counsel of an accused has already been recognized under
General Order No. 58, dated 23 April 1900, stating that a defendant in all
In William vs. Kaiser; 15 the United States Supreme Court, through the late
criminal prosecutions is entitled to counsel at every stage of the proceedings,
10 and that if he is unable to employ counsel, the court must assign one to Justice Douglas, has rightly observed that the accused "needs the aid of
counsel lest he be the victim of overzealous prosecutors, of the law's
defend him. 11 The 1935 Constitution has no less been expressive in
complexity or of his own ignorance or bewilderment." An accused must be
declaring, in Article III, Section 17, thereof, that
given the right to be represented by counsel for, unless so represented, there
is great danger that any defense presented in his behalf will be as inadequate
(17) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed to be considering the legal perquisites and skills needed in the court proceedings.
innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by 16
The right to counsel proceeds from the fundamental principle of due
himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the process which basically means that a person must be heard before being
accusation against him, to have a speedy and public trial, to meet the condemned. The due process requirement is a part of a person's basic rights;
witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to secure the it is not a mere formality that may be dispensed with or performed
attendance of witnesses in his behalf. perfunctorily.

Except for a proviso allowing trial in absentia, the right to counsel under the The right to counsel must be more than lust the presence of a lawyer in the
1973 Constitution, essentially, has remained unchanged. Under the 1987 courtroom or the mere propounding of standard questions and objections.
Constitution, a worthwhile innovation that has been introduced is the The right to counsel means that the accused is amply accorded legal
provision from which prevailing jurisprudence on the availability of the right assistance extended by a counsel who commits himself to the cause for the
to counsel as early as the stage of custodial interrogation can be deemed to defense and acts accordingly. The right assumes an active involvement by the
be predicated. The rule, found in Sections 12 and 14, Article III, of the 1987 lawyer in the proceedings, particularly at the trial of the case, his bearing
Constitution, states constantly in mind of the basic rights of the accused, his being well-versed on
the case, and his knowing the fundamental procedures, essential laws and
Sec 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense existing jurisprudence. The right of an accused to counsel finds substance in
shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have the performance by the lawyer of his sworn duty of fidelity to his client.
competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the Tersely put, it means an efficient and truly decisive legal assistance and not a
person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. simple perfunctory representation. 17
These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of
counsel. It is never enough that accused be simply informed of his right to counsel; he
should also be asked whether he wants to avail himself of one and should be
xxx xxx xxx told that he can hire a counsel of his own choice if he so desires or that one
can be provided to him at his request. 18 Section 7, Rule 116, of the Rules of
Criminal Procedure provides:
Sec. 14 xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 7. Appointment of counsel de oficio. The court, considering the


(2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until gravity of the offense and the difficulty of the questions that may arise, shall
the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and appoint as counsel de oficio only such members of the bar in good standing
counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against who, by reason of their experience and ability may adequately defend the
him, to have a speedy, impartial, and public trial, to meet the witnesses face accused. But in localities where such members of the bar are not available,
to face, and to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of the court may appoint any person, resident of the province and of good
witnesses and the production of evidence in his behalf. However, after repute for probity and ability, to defend the accused.
arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused
provided that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is
unjustifiable. A counsel de oficio is expected to do his utmost. 19 A mere pro-forma
appointment of de oficio counsel who fails to genuinely protect the interests
of the accused merits disapprobation. 20 The exacting demands expected of a
The constitutional mandate is reflected in the 1985 Rules of Criminal lawyer should be no less than stringent when one is a counsel de officio. He
Procedures which declares in Section 1, Rule 115, thereof, that it is a right of must take the case not as a burden but as an opportunity to assist in the
the accused at the trial to be present in person and by counsel at every stage proper dispensation of justice. No lawyer is to be excused from this
of the proceedings from the arraignment to the promulgation of the responsibility except only for the most compelling and cogent reasons. 21
judgment.

Just weeks ago, in People vs. Sevilleno, G.R. No. 129058, promulgated on 29
The presence and participation of counsel in the defense of an accused in March 1999, this Court has said:
criminal proceedings should never be taken lightly. 12 Chief Justice Moran in
People vs. Holgado, 13 explained:
We cannot right finis to this discussion without making known our
displeasure over the manner by which the PAO lawyers dispensed with their
In criminal cases there can be no fair hearing unless the accused be given an
opportunity to be heard by counsel. The right to be heard would be of little
31 | R U L E 1 1 4 C A S E S - B A I L
duties. All three (3) of them displayed manifest disinterest on the plight of wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab one MIGUEL
their client. BADENAS, hitting him on various vital parts of his body inflicting upon him
multiple injuries, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
xxx
Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility requires every lawyer to
serve his client with utmost dedication, competence and diligence. He must which were the direct and immediate cause of the instantaneous death of
not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in this regard said Miguel Badenas and thereafter the above-named accused threw the
renders him administratively liable. Obviously, in the instant case, the body of said Miguel Badenas into the river.
aforenamed defense lawyers did not protect, much less uphold, the
fundamental rights of the accused. Instead, they haphazardly performed
CONTRARY TO LAW.2
their function as counsel de oficio to the detriment and prejudice of the
accused Sevilleno, however guilty he might have been found to be after trial.
Inevitably, this Court must advise Attys. Agravante, Pabalinas and Saldavia to Of the five accused, only accused-appellant was arrested, arraigned and put
adhere closely and faithfully to the tenets espoused in the Code of to trial.
Professional Responsibility, otherwise, commission of any similar act in the
future will be severely sanctioned. The evidence for the prosecution discloses that at about 8 oclock in the
evening of May 4, 1994, the five accused converged at the house of one
The Court sees no other choice than to direct the remand of the case to the Danilo de Asis in Sitio Little Caramay, Magara, Roxas, Palawan for a drink. At
court a quo for new trial. about 9 oclock in the evening, Cesar Delima and the victim joined them.
Cesar Delima left after an hour, claiming he was sleepy, and the others
continued their drinking until midnight, when Danilo de Asis asked them to
WHEREFORE, let this case be REMANDED to the court a quo for trial on the
leave as it was already late in the evening. The group had consumed five
basis of the complaint, aforequoted, under which he was arraigned Atty.
bottles of beer.
Ricardo A Fernandez, Jr. of the Anti-Death Penalty Task Force is hereby
appointed counsel de officio for the appellant.
Honorio Cabailo testified to witnessing the attack on Miguel Badenas. Cabailo
stated that at the time in question, he was active in the campaign for the
Attys. Rosa Elmina Villamin of the Public Attorney's Office, Paraaque,
forthcoming barangay elections, and had just left the house of Ramon
Roberto Gomez and Nicanor Lonzame are hereby ADMONISHED for having
Balmonte in Sitio Caramay, for Sitio Capalad, also in Barrio Magara, to meet
fallen much too short of their responsibility as officers of the court and as
his fellow election campaigners. As he was walking towards Sitio Capalad,
members of the Bar and are warned that any similar infraction shall be dealt
and from a distance of about five meters, he recognized Edgar Crispin and his
with most severely.1wphi1.nt
cousin Felipe Crispin as well as the victim, all being his barriomates in
Magara, Roxas, Palawan. Cabailo further testified that while herein accused-
SO ORDERED. appellant Edgar Crispin and Felipe Crispin stabbed Badenas, three other men
whom he failed to identify blocked the way of the victim to prevent the latter
from escaping.3 Overcome with fear for what he saw, Cabailo proceeded to
G.R. No. 128360 March 2, 2000
Sitio Capalad and did not learn about the death of Miguel Badenas until three
days after, when a relative of Badenas told him that Badenas died of stab
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, wounds.
vs.
EDGAR CRISPIN, accused-appellant.
The body of Miguel Badenas was interred immediately and without post-
mortem examination after it was fished out of the river of Little Caramay, as
DECISION it was already in a state of decomposition. About a month later, upon the
request of Police Officer Joseph Carbonel, Chief of Police of Roxas, Palawan,
GONZAGA_REYES, J.: the body was exhumed and examined on May 28, 1994 by Dr. Leo Salvino.
The exhumation report4 bore the following findings:

Appeal from a decision of the Regional Trial Court of Palawan, Branch 52,1
finding accused-appellant Edgar Crispin guilty of the crime of murder, 1. Stab wound, 0.5 cm. penetrating the sternal area, entire anterior chest
sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua with the accessory wall hitting the cardiac ventricle through and through;
penalties provided by law, and ordering him to pay to the heirs of the victim
civil indemnity of P50,000.00, actual damages of P80,000.00, and moral 2. Stab wound, 0.5 cm. penetrating mid-clavicular area;
damages of P30,000.00.
3. Stab wound, mid-clavicular area;
The Information reads:
4. Stab wound, 0.6 cm. penetrating mid-clavicular area;
The undersigned hereby accuses FELIPE CRISPIN, EDGAR CRISPIN, EDMUND
LOSIS, HENRY LOSIS and PAQUITO GOMEZ, of the crime of "MURDER" as
5. Stab wound, penetrating mid-axillary area, 2.5 cm.;
defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, committed as follows:
6. Stab wound, 2.5 cm., penetrating mid-axillary;
That on or about the 4th day of May, 1994, at Sitio Little Caramay, Barangay
Magara, Municipality of Roxas, Province of Palawan, Philippines, and within Back stab wound, 2.5 cm., penetrating paravertebral area; and
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused
conspiring, confederating together and mutually helping one another with
Abdomen stab wound, penetrating the entire abdominal cavity, upper
evident premeditation and treachery, while armed with bladed weapons and
quadrant
with intent to kill, and taking advantage of nighttime, did then and there

32 | R U L E 1 1 4 C A S E S - B A I L
PROBABLE CAUSE OF DEATH: Cardiac Tamponade, Massive Hemo-
d. Moral Damages .. 30,000.00
pnemothorax

Testifying on the exhumation report, Dr. Salvino declared that he found at TOTAL P160,000.00
least nine stab wounds on the deceaseds body, eight of which penetrated
the body cavities. Based on the sizes of the wounds, he opined that it is likely
that more than one person, using different kinds of sharp bladed and the costs.
instruments, have caused the injuries.
xxx
Danilo de Asis, the owner of the house where the five accused and the victim
spent the night drinking, testified that the group left his house at about 12 SO ORDERED.10
oclock in the early morning of May 5, 1994. He went to sleep as soon as the
group left, and did not learn of the death of Miguel Badenas until four days
later, when the body was fished out of the river.5 On appeal, accused-appellant raises the following assignments of error:

For his part, accused-appellant interposed the defenses of denial and alibi. 1. The lower court erred in convicting accused-appellant of murder qualified
He testified that while he knew his four co-accused, he was not with them on by abuse of superior strength, when said qualifying circumstance is not
the evening in question since he was at the residence of his brother-in-law, alleged in the Information.
Rogelio Gorada, also in Sitio Little Caramay, Magara, Roxas, Palawan.
Accused-appellant stated that he and his friend, Nolito Bacaltos, arrived at 2. The lower court erred in convicting accused-appellant despite the absence
Goradas house at about 7:30 in the evening of May 4, 1994, shortly after of proof beyond reasonable doubt.
which they began drinking beer. At about 8 oclock in the evening, they
finished drinking and ate supper. Then he and Bacaltos spent the night in
Goradas house, and left for their respective homes at around 6:30 the next In support of the first assignment of error, accused-appellant cited the
morning. He claimed no knowledge of what happened to Miguel Badenas on Constitution11 and decided cases12 which held that an aggravating
the early morning of May 5, 1994, and came to learn of the latters death on circumstance not alleged in the Information but proven in trial cannot qualify
May 7, 1994 only.6 a crime but should only be treated as a generic aggravating circumstance.
Hence, assuming the correctness of the finding of abuse of superior strength,
accused-appellant should not be convicted of murder, but only homicide.
Nolito Bacaltos testified in support of accused-appellants story. Bacaltoss
elder sister, Editha, is married to Teodoro Crispin, an elder brother of
accused-appellant. He corroborated the testimony of accused-appellant that As regards the second assignment of error, accused-appellant contests the
they were together on the evening of May 4, 1994 at the house of Rogelio trial courts reliance on the testimony of eyewitness Honorio Cabailo,
Gorada, spent the night there, and went home at about 7 oclock the especially on Cabailos claim that he recognized accused-appellant on a dark
following morning.7 moonless night, by mere starlight. He pointed out that even the trial court
acknowledged that it is likely for Cabailos identification of the perpetrators
to have been inaccurate since starlight, by itself, could not have provided him
Finally, the defense presented Ramon Balmonte, the owner of the house with sufficient illumination.13
where Honorio Cabailo was said to have come from on the night that he
witnessed the killing. Balmonte, who at the time he testified was a member
of the Sangguniang Barangay of Magara,8 said that he could not remember if Accused-appellant also assails the trial courts extensive reference to the
Cabailo slept at his house sometime on the first week of May 1994, as he was sworn statement of Cesar Delima, taken by the police of Roxas, Palawan,
always out of his house.9 who also claimed to witness the five accused attack and kill Miguel
Badenas.14 While Cesar Delima was named in the Information as one of the
principal witnesses, he did not appear when subpoenaed to testify.15
The trial court rejected the denial and alibi of accused-appellant and Accused-appellant decries the fact that the trial court gave credence to the
convicted him of murder. While it held the circumstances of evident allegations of the sworn statement despite the prosecutions failure to
premeditation and treachery unsubstantiated by the evidence, it found the present Delima as a witness, thus depriving the accused of his right to cross-
killing to be qualified to murder by the attendance of abuse of superior examine him. He further contends that the sworn statement could not have
strength. It also ruled out the generic aggravating circumstance of nighttime, been validly considered by the trial court, it not having been formally offered
there being no evidence to show that the accused purposely sought in evidence by the prosecution.
nighttime to facilitate the commission of the offense.

Without the affidavit of Cesar Delima, and considering the weakness of the
Thus, the dispositive portion of the questioned Decision reads: testimony of purported eyewitness Honorio Cabailo, accused-appellant
argues that the trial court had insufficient bases to find him guilty beyond
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered finding the reasonable doubt of the murder of Miguel Badenas.
co-accused EDGAR CRISPIN guilty beyond reasonable doubt as co-principal of
the crime of murder, and there being no modifying circumstances The records and evidence before us convince us to agree with accused-
appreciated, and pursuant to Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as appellant. Before the rule that positive identification prevails over mere
amended by R.A. 7659, in relation to Article 63(2) of the same Code, and not denial and alibi may apply, it is necessary that the credibility of the
being entitled to the benefits of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, he is eyewitness be first put beyond question. This Court has always recognized
hereby sentenced to reclusion perpetua, with the accessory penalties of civil that the trial courts are the ones best-equipped to pass upon the credibility
interdiction for life and of perpetual absolute disqualification; to pay the of witnesses, having had the opportunity to observe firsthand the demeanor
heirs of Miguel Badenas for the death of the latter, and actuations of the witness while on the witness stand.16 Where the trial
a. Civil Indemnity ... P 50,000.00 court itself expresses doubts on the credibility of the eyewitness and looks to
other evidence to secure the conviction, we are inclined to find less
b. Funeral Expenses and Wake 20,000.00 believable the identification by that eyewitness. The following portions of the
RTC Decision serve to illustrate this point:
c. Lost Income for his Family . 60,000.00

33 | R U L E 1 1 4 C A S E S - B A I L
Doubt may indeed be entertained with respect to the identification of the statement or writing is attributed.22 The right to confront and cross-examine
five accused only by prosecution witness Honorio Cabailo. The slaying of the witnesses against him23 is a fundamental right of every accused which
Miguel Badenas purportedly took place at about 12 oclock midnight of May may not be summarily done away with. Another reason why the right to
4, 1994.17 It was not a moonlit night and the only source of light were the confrontation is so essential is because the trial judges duty to observe and
stars. Under the circumstances, the likelihood of a wrong identification may test the credibility of the affiant can only be met by his being brought to the
not altogether be precluded. Such being the case, the defense of alibi may witness stand.24 That the affidavit formed part of the record of the
gain some credence. preliminary investigation does not justify its being treated as evidence
because the record of the preliminary investigation does not form part of the
record of the case in the RTC.25 Such record must be introduced as evidence
But apart from the testimony of Honorio Cabailo is that of Danilo de Asis who
during trial, and the trial court is not compelled to take judicial notice of the
declared that co-accused Edgar Crispin was with Felipe Crispin, Edmundo
same.26 The prosecution having failed to present Cesar Delima as a witness,
Losis, Henry Losis and Paquito Gomez drinking Ginebra in his (Danilo de
his sworn statement was patently inadmissible and deserves no
Asiss) residence from about 8 oclock to 12 oclock midnight of May 4, 1994.
consideration at all.
At about 9 oclock that same evening Cesar Delima and Miguel Badenas also
came and joined them in drinking.
As for the testimony of Danilo de Asis, all that it proves is that the five
accused and the victim left de Asiss house together on that fateful night. In
Moreover, included and forming part of the records of the case is the records
his testimony, de Asis plainly professed that he had no knowledge of the
of the preliminary investigation, among which is a sworn statement by Cesar
incidents that took place after they left his house.27 The evidence that may
Delima, taken by the police of Roxas, Palawan, where he declared among
be adduced from de Asiss testimony is plainly circumstancial, and no
others, that: xxx 18
inference may be drawn from it as to the probable guilt of accused-appellant
for the crime charged.
In its Brief, the OSG stated that it was not impossible for Cabailo to have
properly identified the five accused despite the poor illumination since he
Settled is the rule that conviction should rest on the strength of the evidence
saw the incident from a mere five meters away, and because he knew these
of the prosecution and not on the weakness of the defense.28 The identity of
people beforehand. However, these matters have formed part of the
the offender, like the crime itself, must be proved beyond reasonable
testimony of Honorio Cabailo, and have been taken into consideration by the
doubt.29 Even though accused-appellant invokes the inherently weak
trial court when it passed upon the overall credibility of Cabailos testimony.
defense of alibi, such defense nonetheless acquires commensurate strength
The matter of assigning values to declarations at the witness stand is most
in the instant case where no positive and proper identification has been
competently carried out by the trial judge who, unlike appellate magistrates,
made by the prosecution witnesses of the offender, as the prosecution still
can weigh such testimony in light of the witnesss behavior and attitude at
has the onus probandi in establishing the guilt of the accused.30 The
the trial, and the conclusions of the trial judge command great weight and
weakness of the defense does not relieve it of this responsibility.
respect.19 When in the end, the trial court still declared that it found
Honorio Cabailos identification of the accused doubtful, we will not disturb
such finding on appeal. After having ascertained the affidavit of Cesar Delima to be inadmissible, and
going by the trial courts plain declaration that the identification by Honorio
Cabailo of the accused is doubtful, it is clear that in the instant case the
From the records of the case, we also note that the trial judge himself
prosecution has failed to present sufficient evidence to prove the guilt of
questioned Honorio Cabailo on whether there was sufficient illumination.
accused-appellant beyond reasonable doubt.
Thus:

The acquittal of accused-appellant being apropos, we therefore find it


COURT: Since it was nighttime, it was dark already, how were you able to see
unnecessary to pass upon the first assignment of error.1wphi1
them?

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated November 29, 1996 of the Regional Trial
A : Eventhough it was nighttime the night was not totally dark because of the
Court of Palawan, Branch 52, in Criminal Case No. 11926 convicting accused-
stars.
appellant Edgar Crispin of murder is REVERSED, and accused-appellant is
ACQUITTED of the crime charged on the ground of reasonable doubt. The
Q : Was there moonlight at the time? Court orders his RELEASE from commitment unless he is held for some other
legal cause or ground. Costs de oficio.
A : There was no moonlight, sir.20
SO ORDERED.
Hence, as clearly set out in the RTC Decision, above-quoted, the trial courts
conviction of accused-appellant was not based on Cabailos identification, as G.R. No. 129978 May 12, 1999
it in fact found the same to be unsatisfactory, but on the testimony of Danilo
de Asis and the affidavit of Cesar Delima.
FELICIDAD M, ROQUE and PRUDENCIO N. MABANGLO, petitioners,
vs.
The affidavit of Cesar Delima details the attack and the killing by the accused OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN; HON. OMBUDSMAN ANIANO DESIERTO; and
of Miguel Badenas in the same way as Honorio Cabailo in his testimony, but HON. MARGARITO P. GERVACIO, JR., Deputy Ombudsman for Mindanao,
with the significant distinction of having allegedly recognized the respondents.
perpetrators with the aid of a flashlight. As mentioned earlier, Cesar Delima
was named a principal witness in the Information, but he failed to testify
despite being subpoenaed twice. In considering the affidavit as evidence, the
RTC reasoned that the sworn statement formed part of the record of the
case on preliminary investigation. We cannot uphold this. PANGANIBAN, J.:

An affidavit is hearsay and has weak probative value, unless the affiant is Consistent with the rights of all persons to due process of law and to speedy
placed on the witness stand to testify on it.21 Being hearsay evidence, it is trial, the Constitution commands the Office of the Ombudsman to act
inadmissible because the party against whom it is presented is deprived of promptly on complaints filed against public officials. Thus, the failure of said
his right and opportunity to cross-examine the person to whom the office to resolve a complaint that has been pending for six years is clearly
34 | R U L E 1 1 4 C A S E S - B A I L
violative of this mandate and the public officials' rights. In such event, the 3 (e) and (g) of Republic Act 3019. The same was approved by respondent
aggrieved party is entitled to the dismissal of the complaint. Ombudsman Desierto on August 22, 1997.

The Case Two Informations similarly dated April 30, 1997, for violation of Section 3 (g)
of Republic Act 3019, as amended, and for Violation of Section 3 (e) of
Republic 3019, as amended, were filed before the Sandiganbayan, Manila.
Filed before this Court is a Petition for Mandamus praying that the
The Informations charged several respondents, among whom was petitioner
respondent public officers be directed to dismiss Ombudsman Case Nos.
Roque. The cases were docketed as Criminal Case No. 24105 and Criminal
OMB-MIN-91-0201 and OMB-MIN-91-0203 and subsequently to issue the
Case No. 24106, respectively.
necessary clearance in petitioners' favor.

On August 14, 1997, petitioners instituted the instant petition for mandamus
The Facts
premised on the allegation that "[a]fter the initial Orders finding the cases
proper for preliminary investigation were issued on June[,] 1991 and the
The undisputed facts are narrated in, respondents' Memorandum 1 as subsequent submission of their counter-affidavits, until the present[,] or,
follows: more than six (6) years, no resolution has been issued by the Public
Respondent [and no] case [has] been filed with the appropriate court against
Petitioner Felicidad M. Roque was a Schools Division Superintendent of the the herein Petitioner" (par. 3, p. 4, Petition).
Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS), assigned in Koronadal,
South Cotabato, until her compulsory retirement on, May 17, 1991 (pp. 2-3, On November 24, 1997, this Honorable Court issued a temporary restraining
Petition). order directing respondents to cease and desist from further proceeding with
the cases filed against petitioners. 2
Petitioner Prudencio N. Mabanglo was likewise a Schools Division
Superintendent of the DECS, assigned in Tagum, Davao Province, until his On August 21, 1998, petitioners asked the Court to cite respondents in
compulsory retirement on May 8, 1997 (ibid.). contempt, contending that a criminal information was filed in violation of the
Temporary Restraining Order (TRO). In compliance with this Court's
On January 14, 1991, Laura S. and Carmencita Eden T. Enriquez of the COA, Resolution dated October 21, 1998, 3 the respondents filed their Comment
by virtue of COA Regional Office Assignment Order No. 91-174 dated January to the respondents filed their Comment to the Petition for Contempt. 4
8, 1991, conducted an audit on the P9.36 million allotment released by the
DECS Regional Office No. XI to its division offices (Annexes M and N, Issues
Petition).
In their Memorandum, 5 petitioners present before this Court the following
As a result of the audit, auditors Soriano and Enriquez found some major issues:
deficiencies and violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act
(Republic Act No. 3019), violations of COA Circular Nos. 78-84 and 85-55A,
Whether or not there was undue and unjustifiable delay in resolving [the]
DECS Order No. 100 and Section 88 of Presidential Decree No. 1445 (ibid.).
complaints against petitioners (respondents therein) which violated their
constitutional right to [a] speedy disposition of cases[; and]
Consequently, affidavits of complaint were filed before the Office of the
Ombudsman-Mindanao against several persons, including petitioner
Whether or not, such undue and unjustifiable delay in resolving the
Mabanglo on May 7, 1991, and against petitioner Rogue on May 16, 1991
complaints against petitioners, would warrant dismissal of said complaints. 6
(ibid.).

In addition, we shall also discuss (1) the propriety of mandamus as a remedy


In an Order dated June 11, 1991, the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao
and (2) the respondent's liability for contempt for allegedly violating the
found the complaints proper for a preliminary investigation. The case
Temporary Restraining Order issued by this Court on November 24, 1997.
involving petitioner Mabanglo was docketed as OMB-MIN-91-0201 while that
involving petitioner Roque was docketed as OMB-MIN-91-0203 (Annex O,
Petition). THE COURT'S RULING

Thereafter, petitioners filed their respective counter-affidavits (p. 4, The Court grants the Petition for Mandamus, but denies the prayer to cite
Petition). respondents in contempt of court.

On March 18, 1997, OMB-MIN-91-0201, which involved petitioner Mabanglo, Preliminary Issue:
was resolved by the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao, finding that all the
respondents [were] probably guilty of violation of Section 3 (e) and (g) of the
Propriety of Mandamus
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (Republic Act 3019). The same was
approved by respondent Ombudsman Desierto on September 19, 1997.
Respondents argue that petitioners cannot, by this special action for
mandamus, compel the ombudsman to dismiss the criminal charges filed
An Information dated March 18, 1997, for Violation of Section 3 (g) of
against them, since such dismissal involves a discretionary, not a ministerial,
Republic Act 3019, as amended, was filed before the Sandiganbayan, Manila,
duty.
against several respondents, among them, petitioner Prudencio N.
Mabanglo. The same was docketed as Criminal Case No. 24229.
The argument is not meritorious. As a general rule, the performance of an
official act or duty, which necessarily involves the exercise of discretion or
On April 30, 1997, OMB-MIN-91-0203, which involved petitioner Roque, was
judgment, cannot be compelled by mandamus. This Court, however, has held
resolved by the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao, recommending the
that the rule does not apply "in cases where there is gross abuse of
filing [of cases] and prosecution of all the respondents for violation of Section
discretion, manifest injustice, or palpable excess of authority." 7 In First
Philippine Holdings Corporation v. Sandiganbayan, the Court explained:

35 | R U L E 1 1 4 C A S E S - B A I L
Ordinarily, mandamus will not prosper to compel a discretionary act. But substantial compliance with the time limitation prescribed by the law for the
where there is "gross abuse of discretion, manifest injustice or palpable resolution of the case by the prosecutor, is part of the procedural due
excess of authority" equivalent to denial of a settled right to which petitioner process constitutionally guaranteed by the fundamental law. Not only under
is entitled, and there is "no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy, the the broad umbrella of the due process clause, but under the constitutional
writ shall issue." 8 guarantee of "speedy disposition" of cases as embodied in Section 16 of the
Bill of Rights (both in the 1973 and the 1987 Constitutions), the inordinate
delay is violative of the petitioner's constitutional rights. A delay of close to
The Court gave a similar ruling in Kant Kwong v. Presidential Commission on
three (3) years cannot be deemed reasonable or justifiable in the light of the
Good Government. 9
circumstances obtaining in the case at bar. We are not impressed by the
attempt of the Sandiganbayan to sanitize the long delay by indulging in the
Although as averred by respondents, "the recognized rule is that, in the speculative assumption that "delay may be due to a painstaking and grueling
performance of an official duty or act involving discretion, the corresponding scrutiny by the Tanodbayan as to whether the evidence presented during the
official can only be directed by Mandamus to act but not to act one way or preliminary investigation merited prosecution of a former high-ranking
another, "yet it is not accurate to say that the writ will never issue to control government official." In the first place, such a statement suggests a double
his discretion. There is an exception to the rule if the case is otherwise standard of treatment, which must be emphatically rejected. Secondly, three
proper, as in cases of gross abuse of discretion, manifest injustice, or out of the five charges against the petitioner were for his alleged failure to
palpable excess of authority." file his sworn statement of assets and liabilities required by Republic Act
3019, which certainly did not involve complicated legal and factual issues
In Angchangco Jr. v. Ombudsman, 10 this Court likewise held: necessitating such "painstaking and grueling scrutiny" as would justify a delay
of almost three years in terminating the preliminary investigation. The other
two charges relating to alleged bribery and alleged giving [of] unwarranted
It is correct, as averred in the comment, that in the performance of an official benefits to a relative, while presenting more substantial legal and factual
duty or act involving discretion, the corresponding official can only be issues, certainly do not warrant or justify the period of three years, which it
directed by mandamus to act, but not to act one way or the other. However, took the Tanodbayan to resolve the case." (Emphasis supplied.)
this rule admits of exceptions such as in cases where there is gross abuse of
discretion, manifest injustice, or palpable excess of authority." 11
We are not persuaded by respondents' arguments that the Petition for
Mandamus became moot and academic when the Complaints were resolved
The exceptions cited apply to this case. It is undisputed that there has by the Office of the Ombudsman for Mindanao and the Informations were
already been a long and unwarranted delay in the resolution of the graft filed. The same contention was rejected in Tatad v. Sandiganbayan, wherein
charges against the two petitioners. The Complaint against Petitioner the Court declared that long and unexplained delay in the resolution of the
Mabanglo was filed with the Office of the Ombudsman in Mindanao way criminal complaints against petitioners was not corrected by the eventual
back on May 7, 1991, and that against Petitioner Roque on May 16, 1991. On filing of the Informations. The Court ruled:
June 11, 1991, the said Office found the Complaints sufficient for preliminary
investigation. Signficantly, no action was taken until after the lapse of almost
six years. For violation of Section 3 (g) of RA 3019, the same Office It has been suggested that the long delay in terminating the preliminary
recommended the filing of an Information against Petitioner Mabanglo only investigation should not be deemed fatal, for even the complete absence of a
on March 18, 1997, and against Petitioner Roque only on April 30, 1997. preliminary investigation does not warrant dismissal of the information. True
[for] the absence of a preliminary investigation can be corrected by giving
the accused such investigation. But an undue delay in the conduct of a
Main Issue: Violation of Petitioners' preliminary investigation cannot be corrected, for until now, man has not yet
invented a device for setting back time.
Constitutional Rights
. . . the inordinate delay in terminating the preliminary investigation and filing
Clearly, the delay of almost six years disregarded the ombudsman's duty, as the information in the instant case is violative of the constitutionally
mandated by the Constitution 12 and Republic Act No. 6770, 13 to act guaranteed right of the petitioner to due process and the speedy disposition
promptly on complaints before him. More important, it violated the of cases against him. Accordingly, the informations . . . should be dismissed . .
petitioners' rights to due process and to a speedy disposition of the cases .. 17
filed against them. Although respondents attempted to justify the six months
needed by Ombudsman Desierto to review the recommendation of Deputy Although petitioners prayed only for the issuance of a ruling directing the
Ombudsman Gervasio, no explanation was given why it took almost six years dismissal of Ombudsman Case Nos. OMB-MIN-91-0201 and OMB-MIN-91-
for the latter to resolve the Complaints. 14 Thus, in Angchangco, Jr. v. 0203, this Court, in the interest of the speedy disposition of cases, resolves to
Ombudsman, this Court dismissed a Complaint that had been pending before dismiss the above cases directly. This ruling is in line with Angchangco, in
the Office of the Ombudsman for more than six years, ruling as follows: which the Court dismissed the complaints outright, although petitioner
therein sought merely to compel the ombudsman to do so.
After a careful review of the facts and circumstances of the present case, the
Court finds the inordinate delay of more than six years by the Ombudsman in Additional Issue:
resolving the criminal complaints against petitioner to be violative of his
constitutionally guaranteed right to due process and a speedy disposition of
the cases against him, thus warranting the dismissal of said criminal cases... No Contempt of Court
15
Petitioner Mabanglo moves to have respondents and their agents cited in
Similarly, in Tatad v. Sandiganbayan, 16 this Court dismissed the Complaints, contempt of court for allegedly filing an Information against him in violation
which the then tanodbayan was able to resolve only after the lapse of three of the November 24, 1997 TRO issued by the Court, which ordered them to
years since the cases had been submitted for disposition, viz.: cease and desist from proceeding with the cases.

We find the long delay in the termination of the preliminary investigation by The Petition to cite respondents in contempt is patently devoid of merit. In
the Tanodbayan in the instant case to be violative of the constitutional right the first place, the Information against Petitioner Mabanglo was filed on
of the accused to due process. Substantial adherence to the requirements of September 25, 1997, before the issuance of the TRO on November 24, 1997.
the law governing the conduct of preliminary investigation, including Hence, the TRO could not have been violated. In the second place, the said

36 | R U L E 1 1 4 C A S E S - B A I L
Petition for Contempt filed in contravention of Section 4 (2), Rule 71 of the 1982 and his motion for reconsideration was also denied on October 5, 1982.
1997 Rules of Court, 18 which states that if a petition for contempt arises On October 25, 1982, all affidavits and counter-affidavits were with the
from or is related to a principal action pending in court, it "shall be docketed, Tanodbayan for final disposition. On July 5, 1985, the Tanodbayan approved
heard and decided separately," unless the court orders that both the a resolution, dated April 1, 1985, prepared by Special Prosecutor Marina
principal action and the petition for contempt be consolidated for joint Buzon, recommending that the following informations be filed against
hearing and decision. In the instant case, the Petition for Contempt, which petitioner before the Sandiganbayan, to wit:
arose from the Petition for Mandamus, was filed as an integral part of the
latter and under the same docket or case number. There is no showing that
l. Violation of Section 3, paragraph (e) of RA. 3019 for giving D' Group, a
this Court has ordered their consolidation.
private corporation controlled by his brother-in-law, unwarranted benefits,
advantage or preference in the discharge of his official functions through
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Mandamus is GRANTED and Ombudsman Case manifest partiality and evident bad faith;
Nos. OMB-91-0201 and OMB-91-O203 are accordingly DISMISSED. The
Petition to declare respondents in contempt is hereby DENIED. No
2. Violation of Section 3, paragraph (b) of RA. 3019 for receiving a check of
costs.1wphi1.nt
P125,000.00 from Roberto Vallar, President/General Manager of Amity
Trading Corporation as consideration for the release of a check of
SO ORDERED. P588,000.00 to said corporation for printing services rendered for the
Constitutional Convention Referendum in 1973;
G.R. No. 72335-39 March 21, 1988
3. Violation of Section 7 of RA. 3019 on three (3) counts for his failure to file
his Statement of Assets and Liabilities for the calendar years 1973, 1976 and
FRANCISCO S. TATAD, petitioner,
1978.
vs.
THE SANDIGANBAYAN, and THE TANODBAYAN, respondents.
Accordingly, on June 12, 1985, the following informations were flied with the
Sandiganbayan against the petitioner:
YAP, J.:
Re: Criminal Case No. 10499
In this petition for certiorari and prohibition, with preliminary injunction,
dated October 16, 1985, petitioner seeks to annul and set aside the The undersigned Tanodbayan Special Prosecutor accuses Francisco S. Tatad
resolution of the Tanodbayan of April 7, 1985, and the resolutions of the with Violation of Section 3, paragraph (b) of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise
Sandiganbayan, dated August 9, 1985, August 12,1985 and September 17, known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, committed as follows:
1985, and to enjoin the Tanodbayan and the Sandiganbayan from continuing
with the trial or any other proceedings in Criminal Cases Nos. 10499, 10500,
That on or about the 16th day of July, 1973 in the City of Manila, Philippines,
10501, 10502 and 10503, an entitled "People of the Philippines versus
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above- named
Francisco S. Tatad."
accused, being then the Secretary of the Department (now Ministry) of Public
Information, did then and there, wilfully and unlawfully demand and receive
The petition alleges, among other things, that sometime in October 1974, a check for Pl25,000.00 from Roberto Vallar, President/General Manager of
Antonio de los Reyes, former Head Executive Assistant of the then Amity Trading Corporation as consideration for the payment to said
Department of Public Information (DPI) and Assistant Officer-in-Charge of the Corporation of the sum of P588,000.00, for printing services rendered for the
Bureau of Broadcasts, filed a formal report with the Legal Panel, Presidential Constitutional Convention Referendum of January, 1973, wherein the
Security Command (PSC), charging petitioner, who was then Secretary and accused in his official capacity had to intervene under the law in the release
Head of the Department of Public Information, with alleged violations of of the funds for said project.
Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act. Apparently, no action was taken on said report.
That the complaint against the above-named accused was filed with the
Office of the Tanodbayan on May 16, 1980.
Then, in October 1979, or five years later, it became publicly known that
petitioner had submitted his resignation as Minister of Public Information,
CONTRARY TO LAW.
and two months after, or on December 12, 1979, Antonio de los Reyes filed a
complaint with the Tanodbayan (TBP Case No. 8005-16-07) against the
petitioner, accusing him of graft and corrupt practices in the conduct of his Re: Criminal Case No. 10500
office as then Secretary of Public Information. The complaint repeated the
charges embodied in the previous report filed by complainant before the The undersigned Tanodbayan Special Prosecutor accuses FRANCISCO S.
Legal Panel, Presidential Security Command (PSC). TATAD with Violation of Section 7 of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known
as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practice Act, committed as follows:
On January 26, 1980, the resignation of petitioner was accepted by President
Ferdinand E. Marcos. On April 1, 1980, the Tanodbayan referred the That on or about the 31st day of January, 1974 in the City of Manila,
complaint of Antonio de los Reyes to the Criminal Investigation Service (CIS) Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
for fact-finding investigation. On June 16, 1980, Roberto P. Dizon, CIS named accused, a public officer being then the Secretary of the Department
Investigator of the Investigation and Legal Panel, PSC, submitted his (now Ministry) of Public Information, did then and there wilfully and
Investigation Report, with the following conclusion, ". . . evidence gathered unlawfully fail to prepare and file with the Office of the President, a true
indicates that former Min. TATAD have violated Sec. 3 (e) and Sec. 7 of RA detailed and sworn statement of his assets and liabilities, as of December 31,
3019, respectively. On the other hand, Mr. ANTONIO L. CANTERO is also 1973, including a statement of the amounts and sources of his income, the
liable under Sec. 5 of RA 3019," and recommended appropriate legal action amounts of his personal and family expenses and the amount of income
on the matter. taxes paid for the next preceding calendar year (1973), as required of every
public officer.
Petitioner moved to dismiss the complaint against him, claiming immunity
from prosecution by virtue of PD 1791, but the motion was denied on July 26,

37 | R U L E 1 1 4 C A S E S - B A I L
That the complaint against the above-named accused was flied with the accused, a public officer being then the Secretary of the Department (now
Office of the Tanodbayan on June 20, 1980. Ministry) of Public Information, did then and there wilfully and unlawfully fail
to prepare and file with the Office of the President, a true, detailed and
sworn statement of his assets and liabilities, as of December 31, 1978,
CONTRARY TO LAW.
including a statement of the amounts and sources of his income, the
amounts of his personal and family expenses and the amount of income
Re: Criminal Case No. 10501 taxes paid for the next preceding calendar year (1978), as required of every
public officer.
The undersigned Tanodbayan Special Prosecutor accuses FRANCISCO S.
TATAD with Violation of Section 3, paragraph (e) of Republic Act No. 3019, That the complaint against the above-named accused was filed with the
otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, committed as Office of the Tanodbayan on June 20, 1980.
follows:
CONTRARY TO LAW.
That on or about the month of May, 1975 and for sometime prior thereto, in
the City of Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
On July 22, 1985, petitioner filed with the Sandiganbayan a consolidated
Court, the above-named accused, a public officer being then the Secretary of
motion to quash the informations on the follow grounds:
the Department (now Ministry) of Public Information, did then and there,
wilfully and unlawfully give Marketing Communication Group, Inc. (D' Group),
a private corporation of which his brother-in-law, Antonio L. Cantero, is the 1 The prosecution deprived accused-movant of due process of law and of the
President, unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of right to a speedy disposition of the cases filed against him, amounting to loss
his official functions, through manifest partiality and evident bad faith, by of jurisdiction to file the informations;
allowing the transfer of D' GROUP of the funds, assets and ownership of
South East Asia Research Corporation (SEARCH), allegedly a private
2. Prescription of the offenses charged in Crim. Case Nos. 10499, 10500 and
corporation registered with the Securities and Exchange Corporation on June
10501;
4, 1973, but whose organization and operating expenses came from the
confidential funds of the Department of Public Information as it was
organized to undertake research, projects for the government, without 3. The facts charged in Criminal Case No. 10500 (for failure to file Statement
requiring an accounting of the funds advanced by the Department of Public of Assets and Liabilities for the year 1973) do not constitute an offense;
Information and reimbursement thereof by D' GROUP, to the damage and
prejudice of the government. 4. No prima facie case against the accused-movant exists in Criminal Cases
Nos. 10500, 10502 and 10503;
That the complaint against the above-named accused was filed with the
Office of the Tanodbayan on May 16, 1980. 5. No prima facie case against the accused-movant exists in Criminal Case No.
10199 for Violation of Sec. 3, par. (b) of R.A. 3019, as amended;
CONTRARY TO LAW.
6. No prima facie case against the accused-movant exists in Criminal Case No.
Re: Criminal Case No. 10502 10501 (for Violation of Sec. 3 (e) of R.A. 3019, as amended.

The undersigned Tanodbayan Special Prosecutor accuses FRANCISCO S. On July 26, 1985, the Tanodbayan filed its opposition to petitioner's
TATAD with Violation of Section 7 of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known consolidated motion to quash, stating therein in particular that there were
as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, committed as follows: only two grounds in said motion that needed refutation, namely:

That on or about the 31st day of January, 1977 in the City of Manila, 1. The offense charged in Criminal Cases Nos. 10499,10500 and 10501, have
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above- already prescribed and criminal liability is extinguished; and
named accused, a public officer being then the Secretary of the Department
(now Ministry) of Public Information, did then and there wilfully and 2. The facts charged in the information (Criminal Case No. 10500 For
unlawfully fail to prepare and file with the Office of the President, a true and failure to file Statement of Assets and Liabilities for the year 1973) do not
sworn statement of his assets and liabilities, as of December 31, 1976, constitute an offense.
including a statement of the amounts of his personal and family expenses
and the amount of income taxes paid for the next preceding calendar year
(1976), as required of every public officer. On the issue of prescription, Tanodbayan citing the case of Francisco vs.
Court of Appeals, 122 SCRA 538, contended that the filing of the complaint or
denuncia in the fiscal's office interrupts the period of prescription. Since the
That the complaint against the above-named accused was filed with the above-numbered cases were filed with the Office of the Tanodbayan in 1980
Office of the Tanodbayan on June 20, 1988. and the alleged offenses were committed on July 16, 1973, January 31, 1974
and in May 1975, respectively, although the charges were actually filed in
CONTRARY TO LAW. Court only on July 9, 1985, the Tanodbayan has still the right to prosecute the
same, it appearing that the ten (10) year prescriptive period has not yet
lapsed. Moreover, Tanodbayan pointed out that a law such as Batas
Re: Criminal Case No. 10503
Pambansa Blg. 195, extending the period of limitation with respect to
criminal prosecution, unless the right to acquittal has been acquired, is
The undersigned Tanodbayan Special Prosecutor accuses FRANCISCO S. constitutional.
TATAD with Violation of Section 7 of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known
as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, committed as follows:
Tanodbayan likewise said that the requirement for the filing of the Statement
of Assets and Liabilities in P.D. 379 is separate and distinct from that required
That on or about the 15th day of April, 1979, in the City of Manila Philippines, pursuant to the provisions of the Anti-Graft Law, as amended. For while the
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named former requires "any natural or juridical person having gross assets of

38 | R U L E 1 1 4 C A S E S - B A I L
P50,000.00 or more..." to submit a statement of assets and liabilities "... 1. Whether the prosecution's long delay in the filing of these cases with the
regardless of the networth," the mandate in the latter law is for ALL Sandiganbayan had deprived petitioner of his constitutional light to due
government employees and officials to submit a statement of assets and process and the right to a speedy disposition of the cases against him.
liabilities. Hence, the prosecution under these two laws are separate and
distinct from each other. Tanodbayan also explained that delay in the
2. Whether the crimes charged has already prescribed.
conduct of preliminary investigation does not impair the validity of the
informations filed and that neither will it render said informations defective.
Finally, Tanodbayan added that P.D. 911, the law which governs preliminary 3. Whether there is a discriminatory prosecution of the petitioner by the
investigations is merely directory insofar as it fixes a period of ten (10) days Tanodbayan.
from its termination to resolve the preliminary investigation.
4. Whether Sandiganbayan should have ruled on the question of amnesty
On August 9, 1985, the Sandiganbayan rendered its challenged resolution raised by the petitioner.
denying petitioner's motion to quash, the dispositive portion of which reads:
5. Whether petitioner's contention of the supposed lack or non- existence of
WHEREFORE, prescinding therefrom, We find, and so hold, that the accused's prima facie evidence to sustain the filing of the cases at bar justifies the
"Consolidated Motion to Quash" should be as it is hereby, denied for lack of quashal of the questioned informations.
merit. Conformably to Rule 117, Section 4 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure, the defect in the information in Criminal Case No. 10500 being Petitioner claims that the Tanodbayan culpably violated the constitutional
one which could be cured by amendment, the Tanodbayan is hereby directed mandate of "due process" and "speedy disposition of cases" in unduly
to amend said information to change the date of the alleged commission of prolonging the termination of the preliminary investigation and in filing the
the offense therein charged from January 31, 1974 to September 30, 1974 corresponding informations only after more than a decade from the alleged
within five (5) days from receipt hereof. commission of the purported offenses, which amounted to loss of jurisdiction
and authority to file the informations. The respondent Sandiganbayan
SO ORDERED. dismissed petitioner's contention, saying that the applicability of the
authorities cited by him to the case at bar was "nebulous;" that it would be
premature for the court to grant the "radical relief" prayed for by petitioner
On August 10, 1985, in compliance with the Sandiganbayan's resolution of
at this stage of the proceeding; that the mere allegations of "undue delay" do
August 8, 1985, the Tanodbayan filed an amended information in Criminal
not suffice to justify acceptance thereof without any showing "as to the
Case No. 10500, changing the date of the commission of the offense to
supposed lack or omission of any alleged procedural right granted or allowed
September 30, 1974.
to the respondent accused by law or administrative fiat" or in the absence of
"indubitable proof of any irregularity or abuse" committed by the
On August 30, 1985, petitioners filed a consolidated motion for Tanodbayan in the conduct of the preliminary investigation; that such facts
reconsideration which was denied by the Sandiganbayan September 17, and circumstances as would establish petitioner's claim of denial of due
1985. Hence, petitioner filed this petition on October 16, 1985 assailing the process and other constitutionally guaranteed rights could be presented and
denial of his motion to quash. On October 22, 1985, the Court, without giving more fully threshed out at the trial. Said the Sandiganbayan:
due course the petition, resolved to require the respondents to comment
thereon and issued a temporary restraining order effective immediately and
That there was a hiatus in the proceedings between the alleged termination
continuing until further orders of the Court, enjoining the respondents
of the proceedings before the investigating fiscal on October 25, 1982 and its
Sandiganbayan and Tanodbayan from continuing with the trial and other
resolution on April 17, 1985 could have been due to certain factors which do
proceedings in Criminal Cases Nos. 10499, 10500, 10501, 10502 and 10503.
not appear on record and which both parties did not bother to explain or
In compliance with said resolution, the respondents, through ,Solicitor
elaborate upon in detail. It could even be logically inferred that the delay
General Estelito P. Mendoza, filed their comment on January 6, 1986.
may be due to a painstaking an gruelling scrutiny by the Tanodbayan as to
whether the evidence presented during the preliminary investigation merited
On April 10, 1986, the Court required the parties to move in the premises prosecution of a former high-ranking government official. In this respect, We
considering the supervening events, including the change of administration are the considered opinion that the provision of Pres. Decree No. 911, as
that had transpired, and the provisions of Sec. 18, Rule 3 of the Rules of amended, regarding the resolution of a complaint by the Tanodbayan within
Court, insofar far as the Public respondents were concerned, which requires ten (10) days from termination of the preliminary investigation is merely
the successor official to state whether or not he maintains the action or "directory" in nature, in view of the nature and extent of the proceedings in
position taken by his predecessor in office. On June 20, 1986, the new said office.
Tanodbayan manifested that since "the charges are not political offenses and
they have no political bearing whatsoever," he had no alternative but to
The statutory grounds for the quashal of an information are clearly set forth
pursue the cases against the petitioner, should the Court resolve to deny the
in concise language in Rule 117, Section 2, of the 1985 Rules on Criminal
petition; that in any event, petitioner is not precluded from pursuing any
Procedure and no other grounds for quashal may be entertained by the
other legal remedies under the law, such as the filing of a motion for re-
Court prior to arraignment inasmuch as it would be itself remiss in the
evaluation of his cases with the Tanodbayan. The new Solicitor General filed
performance of its official functions and subject to the charge that it has
a manifestation dated June 27, 1986 in which he concurred with the position
gravely abused its discretion. Such facts and circumstances which could
taken by the new Tanodbayan.
otherwise justify the dismissal of the case, such as failure on the part of the
prosecution to comply with due process or any other constitutionally-
Pursuant to the above manifestation of the new Tanodbayan, the petitioner guaranteed rights may presented during the trial wherein evidence for and
filed a motion for re-evaluation with the Office of the Tanodbayan, dated July against the issue involved may be fully threshed out and considered.
21, 1986, praying that the cases in question be re-evaluated and the Regrettably, the accused herein attempts to have the Court grant such a
informations be quashed. The Court is not aware of what action, if any, has radical relief during this stage of the proceedings which precludes a pre-
been taken thereon by the Tanodbayan. However, be that as it may, the filing cocious or summary evaluation of insufficient evidence in support thereof.
of the aforesaid motion for re-evaluation with the Tanodbayan has no
material bearing insofar as the duty of this Court to resolve the issues raised
This brings us to the crux of the issue at hand. Was petitioner deprived of his
in the instant petition is concerned.
constitutional right to due process and the right to "speedy disposition" of
the cases against him as guaranteed by the Constitution? May the court,
Petitioner has raised the following issues in his petition:

39 | R U L E 1 1 4 C A S E S - B A I L
ostrich like, bury its head in the sand, as it were, at the initial stage of the We find the long delay in the termination of the preliminary investigation by
proceedings and wait to resolve the issue only after the trial? the Tanodbayan in the instant case to be violative of the constitutional right
of the accused to due process. Substantial adherence to the requirements of
the law governing the conduct of preliminary investigation, including
In a number of cases, 1 this Court has not hesitated to grant the so-called
substantial compliance with the time limitation prescribed by the law for the
"radical relief" and to spare the accused from undergoing the rigors and
resolution of the case by the prosecutor, is part of the procedural due
expense of a full-blown trial where it is clear that he has been deprived of
process constitutionally guaranteed by the fundamental law. Not only under
due process of law or other constitutionally guaranteed rights. Of course, it
the broad umbrella of the due process clause, but under the constitutional
goes without saying that in the application of the doctrine enunciated in
guarantee of "speedy disposition" of cases as embodied in Section 16 of the
those cases, particular regard must be taken of the facts and circumstances
Bill of Rights (both in the 1973 and the 1987 Constitutions), the inordinate
peculiar to each case.
delay is violative of the petitioner's constitutional rights. A delay of close to
three (3) years can not be deemed reasonable or justifiable in the light of the
Coming to the case at bar, the following relevant facts appear on record and circumstance obtaining in the case at bar. We are not impressed by the
are largely undisputed. The complainant, Antonio de los Reyes, originally attempt of the Sandiganbayan to sanitize the long delay by indulging in the
filed what he termed "a report" with the Legal Panel of the Presidential speculative assumption that "the delay may be due to a painstaking and
Security Command (PSC) on October 1974, containing charges of alleged gruelling scrutiny by the Tanodbayan as to whether the evidence presented
violations of Rep. Act No. 3019 against then Secretary of Public Information during the preliminary investigation merited prosecution of a former high
Francisco S. Tatad. The "report" was made to "sleep" in the office of the PSC ranking government official." In the first place, such a statement suggests a
until the end of 1979 when it became widely known that Secretary (then double standard of treatment, which must be emphatically rejected.
Minister) Tatad had a falling out with President Marcos and had resigned Secondly, three out of the five charges against the petitioner were for his
from the Cabinet. On December 12, 1979, the 1974 complaint was alleged failure to file his sworn statement of assets and liabilities required by
resurrected in the form of a formal complaint filed with the Tanodbayan and Republic Act No. 3019, which certainly did not involve complicated legal and
docketed as TBP Case No. 8005-16-07. The Tanodbayan acted on the factual issues necessitating such "painstaking and gruelling scrutiny" as
complaint on April 1, 1980-which was around two months after petitioner would justify a delay of almost three years in terminating the preliminary
Tatad's resignation was accepted by Pres. Marcos by referring the investigation. The other two charges relating to alleged bribery and alleged
complaint to the CIS, Presidential Security Command, for investigation and giving of unwarranted benefits to a relative, while presenting more
report. On June 16, 1980, the CIS report was submitted to the Tanodbayan, substantial legal and factual issues, certainly do not warrant or justify the
recommending the filing of charges for graft and corrupt practices against period of three years, which it took the Tanodbayan to resolve the case.
former Minister Tatad and Antonio L. Cantero. By October 25, 1982, all
affidavits and counter-affidavits were in the case was already for disposition
It has been suggested that the long delay in terminating the preliminary
by the Tanodbayan. However, it was only on July 5, 1985 that a resolution
investigation should not be deemed fatal, for even the complete absence of a
was approved by the Tanodbayan, recommending the ring of the
preliminary investigation does not warrant dismissal of the information.
corresponding criminal informations against the accused Francisco Tatad.
True-but the absence of a preliminary investigation can be corrected by
Five (5) criminal informations were filed with the Sandiganbayan on June 12,
giving the accused such investigation. But an undue delay in the conduct of a
1985, all against petitioner Tatad alone.
preliminary investigation can not be corrected, for until now, man has not yet
invented a device for setting back time.
A painstaking review of the facts can not but leave the impression that
political motivations played a vital role in activating and propelling the
After a careful review of the facts and circumstances of this case, we are
prosecutorial process in this case. Firstly, the complaint came to life, as it
constrained to hold that the inordinate delay in terminating the preliminary
were, only after petitioner Tatad had a falling out with President Marcos.
investigation and filing the information in the instant case is violative of the
Secondly, departing from established procedures prescribed by law for
constitutionally guaranteed right of the petitioner to due process and to a
preliminary investigation, which require the submission of affidavits and
speedy disposition of the cases against him. Accordingly, the informations in
counter-affidavits by the complainant and the respondent and their
Criminal Cases Nos. 10499, 10500, 10501, 10502 and 10503 should be
witnesses, the Tanodbayan referred the complaint to the Presidential
dismissed. In view of the foregoing, we find it unnecessary to rule on the
Security Command for finding investigation and report.
other issues raised by petitioner.

We find such blatant departure from the established procedure as a dubious,


Accordingly, the Court Resolved to give due course to the petition and to
but revealing attempt to involve an office directly under the President in the
grant the same. The informations in Criminal Cases Nos. 10499, 10500,
prosecutorial process, lending credence to the suspicion that the prosecution
10501, 10502 and 10503, entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Francisco S.
was politically motivated. We cannot emphasize too strongly that
Tatad" are hereby DISMISSED. The temporary restraining order issued on
prosecutors should not allow, and should avoid, giving the impression that
October 22, 1985 is made permanent.
their noble office is being used or prostituted, wittingly or unwittingly, for
political ends or other purposes alien to, or subversive of, the basic and
fundamental objective of serving the interest of justice even handedly, SO ORDERED.
without fear or favor to any and all litigants alike, whether rich or poor, weak
or strong, powerless or mighty. Only by strict adherence to the established
G.R. Nos. 120681-83 October 1, 1999
procedure may the public's perception of the of the prosecutor be enhanced.

JEJOMAR C. BINAY, petitioner,


Moreover, the long delay in resolving the case under preliminary
vs.
investigation can not be justified on the basis of the facts on record. The law
HON. SANDIGANBAYAN (Third Division) and the DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR
(P.D. No. 911) prescribes a ten-day period for the prosecutor to resolve a
AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, respondents.
case under preliminary investigation by him from its termination. While we
agree with the respondent court that this period fixed by law is merely
"directory," yet, on the other hand, it can not be disregarded or ignored G.R. No. 128136 October 1, 1999
completely, with absolute impunity. It certainly can not be assumed that the
law has included a provision that is deliberately intended to become MARIO C. MAGSAYSAY, FRANCISCO B. CASTILLO, CRISTINA D. MABIOG,
meaningless and to be treated as a dead letter. REGINO E. MALAPIT, ERLINDA I. MASANGCAY and VICENTE DE LA ROSA,
petitioner,
vs.

40 | R U L E 1 1 4 C A S E S - B A I L
HON. SANDIGANBAYAN, HON. OMBUDSMAN and its PROSECUTOR pendente lite before he could file a reply to the prosecution's opposition to
WENDELL BARERRAS-SULIT and STATE PROSECUTORS ERIC HENRY JOSEPH his motion for reconsideration of the resolution denying the motion to
F. MALLONGA and GIDEON C. MENDOZA, respondents. quash. In a Resolution dated April 28, 1995, the Court directed the
Sandiganbayan to, among other things, permit petitioner to file said reply.
KAPUNAN, J.:
After allowing and considering petitioner's reply, the Sandiganbayan, on June
6, 1995, issued a Resolution reiterating the denial of his motion for
Pursuant to Section 4, Article XIII of the 1973 Constitution, Presidential
reconsideration of the denial of the motion to quash. On the same day, the
Decree No. 1486 created an Anti-Graft Court known as the Sandiganbayan.
Sandiganbayan issued another resolution reiterating the order suspending
Since then the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan has undergone various
petitioner pendente lite.
changes, 1 the most recent of which were effected through Republic Act Nos.
7975 2 and 8249. 3 Whether the Sandiganbayan, under these laws, exercises
exclusive original jurisdiction over criminal cases involving municipal mayors Meanwhile, R.A. No. 7975, redefining the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan,
accused of violations of Republic Act No. 3019 4 and Article 220 of the took effect on May 16, 1995. 10
Revised Penal Code 5 is the central issue in these consolidated petitions.
On June 13, 1995, petitioner filed before the Sandiganbayan a motion to
In G.R. Nos. 120681-83, petitioner Jejomar Binay seeks to annul, among refer his cases to the "proper court" for further proceedings, alleging that
others, the Resolution of the Sandiganbayan denying his motion to refer when the two Resolutions, both dated June 6, 1995, were issued by the Anti-
Criminal Case Nos. 21001, 21005 and 21007 to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) Graft Court, it had already lost jurisdiction over the subject cases. The
of Makati and declaring that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over said Sandiganbayan, in a Resolution dated July 4, 1995, denied petitioner's
cases despite the enactment of R.A. No. 7975. motion, holding thus:

In G.R. No. 128136, petitioner Mario C. Magsaysay, et al. assail the October There is no question that Municipal Mayors are classified as Grade "27"
22, 1996 Resolution of the Sandiganbayan, reversing its Order of June 21, under the Compensation & Position Classification Act of 1989. Since, at the
1996 which suspended the proceedings in Criminal Case No 23278 in time of the commission of the offenses charged in the above-entitled cases,
deference to whatever ruling this Court will lay down in the Binay the accused Mayor Jejomar C. Binay was a Municipal Mayor, although in an
cases.1wphi1.nt acting or interim capacity, the Sandiganbayan, has, under Section 4 (e) 5,
original jurisdiction over the cases therein filed against him. The allegation
that Mayor Binay ought to have been classified with a salary grade lower
The, facts, as gathered from the records, are as follows:
than Grade "27", because at the time of the commission of the offenses
charged he was paid a salary which merits a grade lower than Grade "27"
G.R. Nos. 120681-83 does not hold water. In 1986 when the herein offenses were committed by
the accused, the Compensation & Position Classification Act of 1989 was not
On September 7, 1994, the Office of the Ombudsman filed before the as yet in existence. From the very definition of the very Act itself, it is evident
Sandiganbayan three separate informations against petitioner Jejomar Binay, that the Act was passed and had been effective only in 1989. The Grade
one for violation of Article 220 of the Revised Penal Code, 6 and two for classification of a public officer, whether at the time of the commission of the
violation of Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019. 7 The informations, which were offense or thereafter, is determined by his classification under the
subsequently amended on September 15, 1994, all alleged that the acts Compensation & Position Classification Act of 1989. Thus since the accused
constituting these crimes were committed in 1987 during petitioner's Mayor Jejomar C. Binay was a Municipal Mayor at the time of the
incumbency as Mayor of Makati, then a municipality of Metro Manila. commission of the offenses and the Compensation & Position Classification
Act of 1989 classifies Municipal Mayors as Grade "27", it is a conclusion
beyond cavil that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the accused
Thereafter, petitioner moved to quash the informations. He contented that herein.
the six-year delay from the time the charges were filed in the Office of the
Ombudsman on July 27, 1988 to the time the informations were filed in the
Sandiganbayan on September 7, 1994 constituted a violation of his right to As of July 1, 1989, when Republic Act No. 6758 took effect, Municipal Mayor
due process. Arraignment of the accused was held in abeyance pending the Jejomar C. Binay had begun receiving a monthly salary of P15,180.00 which is
resolution of this motion. equivalent to Grade "28" under the salary scale provided for in Section 27 of
the said Act. Under the Index of Occupational Services, the position titles and
salary grades of the Compensation & Position Classification system prepared
On March 29, 1995, the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution denying by the Department of Budget and Management pursuant to Section 6 of
petitioner's motion to quash. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration, which Republic [A]ct No. 6758, the position of Municipal Mayor had been classified
was opposed by the prosecution, was likewise denied by the Sandiganbayan. as Grade "27." 11
The resolution denying the motion for reconsideration, however, was issued
before petitioner could file a reply to the prosecution's opposition to the
motion for reconsideration. On July 7, 1995, petitioner filed the present petition for certiorari, prohibition
and mandamus questioning the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over
Criminal Case Nos. 21001, 21005 and 21007. He prayed, among others, that
In the meantime, on March 31, 1995, the prosecution filed a "Motion to the Court annul and set aside: (1) the Resolution of the Sandiganbayan dated
Suspend Accused Pendente Lite." The Sandiganbayan, in a Resolution dated June 6, 1995 reiterating the denial of the motion for reconsideration of the
April 25, 1995, granted the motion and ordered the suspension of petitioner motion to quash; (2) the Resolution of the same court also dated June 6,
for ninety days from receipt of the resolution. The court ruled that the 1995 reiterating the order suspending petitioner pendente lite; and (3) the
requisites for suspension pendente lite were present as petitioner was Resolution of the Sandiganbayan dated July 4, 1995 denying the motion to
charged with one of the offenses under Section 13 of R.A. No. 3019 8 and the refer case to the RTC. Petitioner also asked that the Court issue a temporary
informations containing these charges had previously been held valid in the restraining order preventing the suspension and arraignment of petitioner.
resolution denying the motion to quash and the resolution denying the The Court on July 7, 1995, resolved, among others, to issue the temporary
motion for reconsideration. restraining order prayed for.

Petitioner thus filed before this Court a petition for certiorari, 9 to set aside On July 14, 1995, petitioner filed an "Addendum to Petition (To allow the
the resolution denying his motion for reconsideration, claiming that he was introduction of alternative reliefs)," praying that, should this Court hold that
denied due process when the Sandiganbayan ordered his suspension
41 | R U L E 1 1 4 C A S E S - B A I L
the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the cases, the criminal cases filed in the Sandiganbayan would expose petitioners to double jeopardy. The
against him be dismissed just the same on the ground that the long delay of Sandiganbayan denied the accused's motion to quash in a Resolution dated
the preliminary investigation before the Ombudsman prior to the filing of the June 21, 1996. The court, however, suspended proceedings in the case until
informations, deprived him of his right to due process; and that, moreover, the Supreme Court resolved the question of the Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction
there was no probable cause to warrant the filing of the informations. involved in the Binay petition.

G.R. No. 128136 Meanwhile, on June 7, 1996, Prosecutor Eric Mallonga filed a motion before
the RTC to refer the R.A. No. 3019 case pending therein to the
Sandiganbayan, arguing that under R.A. No. 7975 the Sandiganbayan, not the
Petitioner Mario Magsaysay is the Mayor of the Municipality of San Pascual,
RTC, had jurisdiction over the case. On July 3, 1996, the RTC issued an order
Batangas. Save for petitioner Vicente dela Rosa, all of Mayor Magsaysay's co-
holding in abeyance the resolution of the motion to refer the case since the
petitioners are officials of the same municipality.
issue of jurisdiction was pending before the Sandiganbayan.

In a complaint dated April 16, 1994, Victor Cusi, then Vice-Mayor of San
Back at the Sandiganbayan, the prosecution, on July 24, 1996, filed a motion
Pascual, Batangas, charged petitioners along with Elpidia Amada, Jovey C.
for reconsideration of the Sandiganbayan's Order dated June 21, 1996. On
Babago, and Brigido H. Buhain, also officials of San Pascual Batangas, with
August 2, 1996, filed their own motion for the reconsideration of the same
violation of R.A. No. 3019, as amended. The complaint charged the
order. On October 22, 1996, the Sandiganbayan granted the motion for
respondent municipal officials of overpaying Vicente de la Rosa of TDR
reconsideration filed by the prosecution and set the case for arraignment.
Construction for the landscaping project of the San Pascual Central School.
Petitioners moved for a reconsideration of the October 22, 1996 Resolution
This case was docketed in the Office of the Ombudsman as OMB-1-94-1232.
ordering their arraignment, which motion was denied on February 17, 1997.

In a Resolution dated June 14, 1995, Graft Investigation Officer Lourdes A.


On February 27, 1997, the accused filed the present petition.
Alarilla recommended the filing of an information for violation of Section 3(e)
and (g) of R.A. No. 3019, as amended, against petitioners with the
Sandiganbayan. Director Elvis John S. Asuncion concurred in the resolution, On October 1, 1997, the Court resolved to issue a temporary restraining
and Manuel C. Domingo, Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon, recommended order to prevent respondents from further proceeding with Crim. Case No.
approval of the same. The resolution was approved by then Acting 23278 of the Sandiganbayan.
Ombudsman Francisco A. Villa with the following marginal note:
The petition raises the following issues:
Authority is given to the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon to cause the
preparation of the information and to approve the same for filing with the
I
proper court. 12

Had the Sandiganbayan been ousted of its jurisdiction over the case of
On August 11, 1995, an Information for violation of Section 3(e) and (g) was
municipal mayor after the passage of Republic Act No. 7975, coupled with
filed against petitioners and Jovey C. Babago, not with the Sandiganbayan
the filing earlier of an information for the same offense before the Regional
per the June 14, 1995 Resolution, but with the RTC of Batangas City. The
Trial Court having territorial jurisdiction and venue of the commission of the
information was signed by Lourdes A. Alarilla, the same Graft Investigation
offense?
Officer who recommended the filing of the information with the
Sandiganbayan.
II
In the meantime, a group denominated as the Concerned Citizens of San
Pascual, Batangas filed a complaint before the Ombudsman against Are the respondents Ombudsman and the prosecutors estopped by laches or
petitioners, and Elpidia Amada and Brigido Buhain, with violations of R.A. No. waiver from filing and prosecuting the case before respondent
3019. The complaint also alleged, among others, the overpricing of the Sandiganbayan after the filing earlier of the information in the proper court,
landscaping project of San Pascual Central School. The case was docketed as thereafter repudiating it, seeking another court of the same category and
OMB-0-94-0149. finally to respondent court?

In a Resolution dated July 27, 1995, Graft Investigation Officer Ernesto M. III
Nocos recommended the filing of an information charging petitioners with
violation of Section 3(e) and (g) of R.A. No. 3019, as amended "with the Whether or not the filing of two (2) informations for the same offense
proper court." The resolution, which was recommended for approval by violated the rule on duplicity of information?
Nicanor J. Cruz, OIC-Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon, and approved by
Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto, adopted the findings and conclusions in the
resolution in OMB-1-94-1232 that the landscaping project was overpriced. IV

On February 9, 1996, another Information for violation of Section 3(e)of R.A. Whether or not the trial to be conducted by respondent court, if the case
No. 3019, as amended, was filed against petitioners for the overpricing of the shall not be dismissed, will expose the petitioners who are accused therein to
landscaping project, this time before the Sandiganbayan. The information double jeopardy?
was subsequently amended on May 17, 1996. Except for the date the alleged
crime was committed, the information charged essentially the same V
inculpatory facts as the information filed in the RTC. The case was docketed
in the Sandiganbayan as Crim. Case No. 22378.
Under the circumstances, are the respondent Ombudsman and the
prosecutors guilty of forum shopping? 13
On June 1, 1996, the accused filed with the Sandiganbayan a motion to quash
the information in Crim. Case No. 22378 on the following grounds: that the
Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over the case; that the accused were On October 6, 1997, the Court resolved to consolidate G.R. No. 128136 (the
charged with the same offense in two informations; and that the proceedings Magsaysay petition) with G.R. Nos. 120681-83 (the Binay petition).

42 | R U L E 1 1 4 C A S E S - B A I L
In resolving these consolidated petitions, the Court shall first address the (c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and
common question of the Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction. higher;

I (d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of
higher rank;
The Court rules that it is the Sandiganbayan which has jurisdiction over the
subject cases. (e) PNP chief superintendent and PNP officers of higher rank;

The informations against Mayor Binay were filed in the Sandiganbayan on (f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and
July 7, 1994 pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1606,14 as amended by prosecutors in the Office of the Ombudsman and special prosecutor;
Presidential Decree No. 1861, 15 the pertinent provisions of which state:
(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. The Sandiganbayan shall exercise: controlled corporations, state universities or educational institutions or
foundations;
(a) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving:
(2) Members of Congress and officials thereof classified as Grade "27" and up
under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989;
(1) Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II,
Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code; (3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the
Constitution;
(2) Other offenses or felonies committed by public officers and employees in
relation to their office, including those employed in government-owned or (4) Chairmen and members of Constitutional Commissions, without prejudice
controlled corporations, whether simple or complexed with other crimes, to the provisions of the Constitution; and
where the penalty prescribed by law is higher than prision correccional or
imprisonment for six (6) years, or a fine of P6,000.00; PROVIDED, HOWEVER,
(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade "27" and higher
that offenses or felonies mentioned in this paragraph where the penalty
under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.
prescribed by law does not exceed prision correccional or imprisonment for
six (6) years or a fine of P6,000.00 shall be tried by the proper Regional Trial
Court, Metropolitan Trial Court and Municipal Circuit Trial Court. b. Other offenses or felonies committed by the public officials and employees
mentioned in subsection (a) of this section in relation to their office.
xxx xxx xxx
c. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with Executive
Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A.
On May 16, 1995, R.A. No. 7975 took effect. At this time, Mayor Binay had
not yet been arraigned in the Sandiganbayan. On the other hand, R.A. No.
7975 was already in effect when the information against Mayor Magsaysay et In cases where none of the principal accused are occupying positions
al., was filed on August 11, 1995 in the RTC of Batangas City. corresponding to salary grade "27" or higher, as prescribed in the said
Republic Act No. 6758, or PNP officers occupying the rank of superintendent
or higher, or their equivalent, exclusive jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in
Sec. 2 of R.A. No. 7975 amended Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606 to read as
the proper Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial
follows:
Court, and Municipal Circuit Trial Court, as the case may be, pursuant to their
respective jurisdiction as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. The Sandiganbayan shall exercise original jurisdiction in
all cases involving:
xxx xxx xxx

a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the


While the cases against petitioners were pending in this Court, Congress
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II,
enacted R.A. No. 8249, again redefining the jurisdiction of the Anti-Graft
Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the
Court. This law took effect, per Section 10 thereof, on February 23, 1997,
principal accused are officials occupying the following positions in the
fifteen days after its complete publication on February 8, 1997 in the Journal
government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time
and Malaya, two newspapers of general circulation.
of the commission of the offense:

As further amended by Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249, Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional
now reads:
director and higher, otherwise classified as grade "27" and higher, of the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No.
6758), specifically including: Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original
jurisdiction in all cases involving:
(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang
panlalawigan, and provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the
provincial department heads; Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II,
Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of
the accused are officials occupying the following positions in the
(b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlunsod, city
government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time
treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city department heads;
of the commission of the offense:

43 | R U L E 1 1 4 C A S E S - B A I L
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the position of regional (2) Municipal mayors are not included in the enumeration in Section 4a(1) of
director and higher, otherwise classified as grade "27" and higher, of the P.D. No. 1606, as amended by R.A. No. 7975.
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No.
6758), specifically including:
(3) Congressional records reveal that the law did not intend municipal
mayors to come under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the
(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang Sandiganbayan.
panlalawigan, and provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other
provincial department heads;
A

(b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlunsod, city


In support of his contention that his position was not that of Grade 27,
treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city department heads;
Mayor Binay argues:

(c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and
. . . The new law's consistent and repeated reference to salary grades show[s]
higher;
an intention to base the separation of jurisdiction between the
Sandiganbayan and the regular courts on pay scale. Grades are determined
(d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of by compensation. The essence of grades is pay scales. Therefor, pay scales
higher rank; determine grades. 16

(e) Officers of the Philippine National Police while occupying the position of Mayor Binay, thus, presented a Certification 17 from the City Personnel
provincial director and those holding the rank of senior superintendent or Officer of Makati stating that petitioner as mayor received a monthly salary
higher; of only P10,793.00 from March 1987 to December 31, 1988. This amount was
supposedly equivalent to Grade 22 under R.A. No. 6758.
(f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and
prosecutors in the Office of the Ombudsman and special prosecutor; Mayor Magsaysay, for his part, submitted a similar Certification 18 from the
Municipal Treasurer of San Pascual, Batangas, stating:
(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or
controlled corporations, state universities or educational institutions or . . . that the basic monthly salary received by Mario C. Magsaysay Municipal
foundations. Mayor of San Pascual, Batangas with Salary Grade 27 is ELEVEN THOUSAND
EIGHT HUNDRED TWENTY EIGHT PESOS (P11,828.00) per month as of
November 3, 1993 equivalent only to Grade 25, Step 5 of RA 6758, the
(2) Members of Congress and officials thereof classified as Grade "27" and up
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.
under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989;

Sec. 444(1) (Grad[e] 27) of RA 6758 is not as yet implemented due to


(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the
budgetary constraints. This certification is issued to Mayor Mario C.
Constitution;
Magsaysay this 30th day of May 1996 at San Pascual, Batangas for whatever
legal purpose and/or purposes it may serve.
(4) Chairmen and members of Constitutional Commissions, without prejudice
to the provisions of the Constitution; and
The Court does not subscribe to the manner by which petitioners classify
Grades.
(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade "27" and higher
under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.
The Constitution 19 states that in providing for the standardization of
compensation of government officials and employees, Congress shall take
b. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes "into account the nature of the responsibilities pertaining to, and the
committed by the public officials and employees mentioned in subsection (a) qualifications required for their positions," thus:
of this section in relation to their office.
The Congress shall provide for the standardization of compensation of
d. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with Executive government officials, including those in government-owned or controlled
Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986. corporations with original charters, taking into account the nature of the
responsibilities pertaining to, and the qualifications required for their
In cases where none of the accused are occupying positions corresponding to positions.
salary grade "27" or higher, as prescribed in the said Republic Act No. 6758,
or military and PNP officers mentioned above, exclusive original jurisdiction Corollary thereto, Republic Act No. 6758 20 provides in Section 2 thereof that
thereof shall be vested in the proper regional trial court, metropolitan trial differences in pay are to be based "upon substantive differences in duties and
court, municipal trial court, and municipal circuit trial court, as the case may responsibilities, and qualification requirements of the positions." In short, the
be, pursuant to their respective jurisdictions as provided in Batas Pambansa nature of an official's position should be the determining factor in the fixing
Blg. 129, as amended. of his or her salary. This is not only mandated by law but dictated by logic as
well.
Petitioners contend that they do not come under the exclusive original
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan because: Consistent with these policies, the law employs the scheme known as the
"grade" defined in Presidential Decree No. 985 21 as including
(1) At the alleged time of the commission of the crimes charged, petitioner
municipal mayors were not classified as Grade 27. . . . all classes of positions which, although different with respect to kind or
subject matter of work, are sufficiently equivalent as to level of difficulty and
responsibilities and level of qualification requirements of the work to warrant

44 | R U L E 1 1 4 C A S E S - B A I L
the inclusion of such classes of positions within one range of basic higher, otherwise classified as grade "27" and higher, of the Compensation
compensation. 22 and Position Classification Act of 1989" necessarily conveys the very idea of
non-exclusivity of the enumeration. The principle of expressio unius est
exclusio alterius does not apply where other circumstances indicate that the
The grade, therefore, depends upon the nature of one's position the level
enumeration was not intended to be exclusive, 27 or where the enumeration
of difficulty, responsibilities, and qualification requirements thereof
is by way of example only. 28 In Conrado B. Rodrigo, et al. vs. The Honorable
relative to that of another position. It is the official's Grade that determines
Sandiganbayan (First Division), supra, the Court held that the catchall in
his or her salary, not the other way around.
Section 4a(5) was "necessary for it would be impractical, if not impossible,
for Congress to list down each position created or will be created pertaining
It is possible that a local government official's salary may be less than that to Grades 27 and above." The same rationale applies to the enumeration in
prescribed for his Grade since his salary depends also on the class and Section 4a(1). Clearly, the law did not intend said enumeration to be an
financial capability of his or her respective local government unit. 23 exhaustive list.
Nevertheless, it is the law which fixes the official's grade.
Should there be any doubt as to whether petitioner mayors are under the
Thus, Section 8 of R.A. No. 6758 fixes the salary grades of the President, Vice- category of Grade 27, Section 444(d) of the Local Government Code settles
President, Senate President, Speaker, Chief Justice, Senators, Members of the matter:
the House of Representatives, Associate Justices of the Supreme Court, as
well as the Chairmen and Members of the Constitutional Commissions.
The municipal mayor shall receive a minimum monthly compensation
Section 8 also authorizes the Department of Budget and Management (DBM)
corresponding to Salary Grade twenty-seven (27) as prescribed under R.A.
to "determine the officials who are of equivalent rank to the foregoing
No. 6758 and the implementing guidelines issued pursuant thereto.
officials, where applicable" and to assign such officials the same Salary
Grades subject to a set of guidelines found in said section.
In the Court's Resolution in Rodrigo dated July 2, 1999 denying the motion
for reconsideration, we treated the above provision as "confirmatory of the
For positions below those mentioned under Section 8, Section 9 instructs the
Salary Grade assigned by the DBM to Municipal Mayors."
DBM to prepare the "Index of Occupational Services" guided by the
Benchmark Position prescribed in Section 9 and the factors enumerated
therein. C

To determine whether an official is within the exclusive original jurisdiction Petitioner Binay cites previous bills 29 in Congress dealing with the
of the Sandiganbayan, therefore, reference should be made to R.A. No. 6758 jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. These bills supposedly sought to exclude
and the Index of Occupational Services, Position Titles and Salary Grades. municipal officials from the Sandiganbayan's exclusive original jurisdiction to
Salary level is not determinative. An official's grade is not a matter of proof, relieve these officials, especially those from the provinces, of the financial
but a matter of law, of which the Court must take judicial notice. 24 burden brought about by trials in Manila.

As both the 1989 and 1997 versions of the Index of Occupational Services, The resort to congressional records to determine the proper application of
Position Titles and Salary Grades list the Municipal Mayor under Salary Grade the law in this case is unwarranted in this case for the same reason that the
27, petitioner mayors come within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the resort to the rule of inclusio unius est expressio alterius is inappropriate.
Sandiganbayan. Petitioner mayors are "local officials classified as Grade "27"
and higher under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989,"
Verily, the interpretation of the law desired by the petitioner may be more
under the catchall provision, Section 4a(5) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by
humane but it is also an elementary rule in statutory construction that when
R.A. No. 7975. More accurately, petitioner mayors are "[o]fficials of the
the words and phrases of the statute are clear and unequivocal, their
executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher,
meaning must be determined from the language employed and the statute
otherwise classified as grade "27" and higher, of the Compensation and
must be taken to mean exactly what it says. (Baranda v. Gustilo, 165 SCRA
Position Classification Act of 1989," under Section 4a(1) of P.D. No. 1606, as
758-759 [1988]). The courts may not speculate as to the probable intent of
amended by R.A. No. 7975. 25
the legislature apart from the words (Aparri v. CA, 127 SCRA 233 [1984]).
When the law is clear, it is not susceptible to interpretation. It must be
B applied regardless of who may be affected, even if the law may be harsh or
onerous. (Nepomuceno, et al. v. FC, 110 Phil. 42). And even granting that
exceptions may be conceded, the same as a general rule, should be strictly
Petitioners, however, argue that they are not included in the enumeration in
but reasonably construed; they extend only so far as their language fairly
Section 4a(1). They invoke the rule in statutory construction expressio unius
warrants, and all doubts should be resolved in favor of the general provisions
est expressio alterius. As what is not included in those enumerated is deemed
rather than the exception. Thus, where a general rule is established by
excluded, municipal officials are excluded from the Sandiganbayan's
statute, the court will not curtail the former nor add to the latter by
exclusive original jurisdiction.
implication (Samson v. C.A., 145 SCRA 654 [1986]). 30

Resort to statutory construction, however, is not appropriate where the law


Thus, in Rodrigo, petitioners therein argued in their motion for
is clear and unambiguous. 26 The law is clear in this case. As stated earlier,
reconsideration:
Section 4a(1) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by R.A. No. 7975, speaks of
"[o]fficials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional
director and higher, otherwise classified as grade "27" and higher, of the . . . that the inclusion of Municipal Mayors within the jurisdiction of the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989." Sandiganbayan would be inconvenient since the witnesses in their case
would come from Baguio City and San Nicolas, Pangasinan. This, according to
petitioners, would defeat one of the purposes of R.A. No. 7975, that is, the
The Court fails to see how a different interpretation could arise even if the
convenience of the accused.
plain meaning rule were disregarded and the law subjected to interpretation.

The Court, in denying the motion for reconsideration, held, among others,
The premise of petitioners' argument is that the enumeration in Section
that:
4a(1) is exclusive. It is not. The phrase "specifically including" after "[o]fficials
of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and
45 | R U L E 1 1 4 C A S E S - B A I L
The legislature has nevertheless chosen the mode and standard by which to The term "proper courts" as used in Section 7, therefore, is not restricted to
implement its intent, and courts have no choice but to apply it. Congress has "regular courts," but includes as well the Sandiganbayan, a special court. If
willed that positions with Grade 27 and above shall come within the the intent of Congress were to refer all cases the trials of which have not
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan and this Court is duty-bound to obey the begun to the regular courts, it should have employed the term "proper
congressional will. regular courts" or "regular courts" instead of "proper courts." Accordingly,
the law in the third paragraph of Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by
Section 2 of R.A. No. 7975, uses the term "regular courts," not "proper
Petitioner Binay also quotes the Sponsorship Speech of Senator Roco, stating:
courts":

Since February 1979, when the Sandiganbayan was established up to the


The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction on appeals
present, the Court has been confronted with the problem of those accused
from the final judgments, resolutions or orders of regular courts where all
who are of limited means who stand trial for "petty crimes," the so-called
the accused are occupying positions lower than salary grade "27," or not
"small fry" the barangay officials, the municipal officials and employees,
otherwise covered by the preceding enumeration. [emphasis supplied.]
postal clerks and letter carriers and the like who are involved with "nickel-
and-dime" cases and money-related cases such as malversation, estafa and
theft. . . .1wphi1.nt Construed thus, the effects of Section 7 may be summarized as follows:

xxx xxx xxx 1. If trial of cases before the Sandiganbayan has already begun as of the
approval of R.A. No. 7975, R.A. No. 7975 does not apply.
Senate Bill No. 1353 modifies the present jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan
such that only those occupying high positions in the Government and the 2. If trial of cases before the Sandiganbayan has not begun as of the approval
military fall under the jurisdiction of the court. 31 of R.A. No. 7975, then R.A. No. 7975 applies.

It is not clear, however, whether Senator Roco meant that all municipal (a) If by virtue of Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by Section 2 of R.A.
officials are excluded from the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. In any case, No. 7975, the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over a case before it, then the
courts are not bound by a legislator's opinion in congressional debates cases shall be referred to the Sandiganbayan.
regarding the interpretation of a particular legislation. It is deemed a mere
personal opinion of the legislator. 32 Such opinions do not necessarily reflect
(b) If by virtue of Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by Section 2 of R.A.
the view of the entire Congress. 33
No. 7975, the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over a case before it, the
case shall be referred to the regular courts.
D
The trial of the cases involving Mayor Binay had not yet begun as of the date
From the foregoing discussion, it is clear that the cases against petitioner of the approval of R.A. No. 7975; consequently, the Anti-Graft Court retains
Binay cannot be referred to the regular courts under Section 7 of R.A. No. jurisdiction over said cases.
7975, which provides:
In any case, whatever seeming ambiguity or doubt regarding the application
Sec. 7. Upon effectivity of this Act, all criminal cases in which trial has not of Section 7 of R.A. No. 7975 should be laid to rest by Section 7 of R.A. No.
begun in the Sandiganbayan shall be referred to the proper courts. 8249, which states:

In construing the correct import of Section 7, it may be helpful to refer to the Sec. 7. Transitory Provision. This Act shall apply to all cases pending in any
guidelines in determining jurisdiction laid down in Bengzon vs. Inciong: 34 court over which trial has not begun as of the approval hereof.

The rule is that where a court has already obtained and is exercising The latter provision more accurately expresses the legislature's intent and in
jurisdiction over a controversy, its jurisdiction to proceed to the final any event should be applied in this case, R.A. No. 8249 having superseded
determination of the cause is not affected by new legislation placing R.A. No. 7975.
jurisdiction over such proceedings in another tribunal. The exception to the
rule is where the statute expressly provides, or is construed to the effect that
In Panfilo M. Lacson vs. The Executive Secretary, et al., 36 the Court explained
it is intended to operate as to actions pending before its enactment. Where a
the purpose of the foregoing provision.
statute changing the jurisdiction of a court has no retroactive effect, it cannot
be applied to a case that was pending prior to the enactment of the statute.
. . . it can be reasonably anticipated that an alteration of [the
Sandiganbayan's] jurisdiction would necessarily affect pending cases, which is
R.A. No. 7975, by virtue of Section 7, belongs to the exception rather than
why it has to provide for a remedy in the form of a transitory provision. . . . .
the rule. The provision is transitory in nature and expresses the legislature's
The transitory provision does not only cover cases which are in the
intention to apply its provisions on jurisdiction to "criminal cases in which
Sandiganbayan but also in "any court." . . . . Moreover, those cases where
trial has not begun in the Sandiganbayan." To this extent, R.A. 7975 is
trial had already begun are not affected by the transitory provision under
retroactive.
Section 7 of the new law (RA 8249). [Emphasis in the original.]

Such a transitory provision is not peculiar to R.A. No. 7975; similar provisions
The possible disruptive effect of the amendments to the Sandiganbayan's
are found in other laws reallocating the jurisdiction of the courts. 35 There is
jurisdiction on pending cases was, therefore, not lost on the legislature.
no reason why Section 7 of R.A. No. 7975 should be any different.
Congress has, furthermore, deemed the commencement of the trial as the
crucial point in determining whether a court retains a case pending before it
The term "proper courts," as used in Section 7, means "courts of competent or lose the same on the ground of lack of jurisdiction per the provisions of
jurisdiction," and such jurisdiction is defined in Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, as R.A. No. 8249. The law obviously does not want to waste the time and effort
amended by R.A. No. 7975. The former should not be read in isolation but already devoted to the presentation of evidence if trial had already begun.
construed in conjunction with the latter. On the other hand, not much disruption would be caused if the amendment
were made to apply to cases the trials of which have yet to start.

46 | R U L E 1 1 4 C A S E S - B A I L
The ramifications of Section 7 of R.A. No. 8249 may be stated as follows: cases therein. The "unexplained inaction" 46 of the prosecutors called for the
dismissal of the cases against petitioner Tatad.
1. If trial of the cases pending before whatever court has already begun as of
the approval of R.A. No. 8249, said law does not apply. In Alvizo vs. Sandiganbayan, 47 the Court also ruled that there was no
violation of the right to speedy disposition. The Court took into account the
reasons for the delay, i.e., the frequent amendments of procedural laws by
2. If trial of cases pending before whatever court has not begun as of the
presidential decrees, the structural reorganizations in existing prosecutorial
approval of R.A. No. 8249, then said law applies.
agencies and the creation of new ones by executive fiat, resulting in changes
of personnel, preliminary jurisdiction, and the functions and powers of
(a) If the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over a case pending before it, then it prosecuting agencies. The Court likewise considered the failure of the
retains jurisdiction. accused to assert such right, and the lack of prejudice caused by the delay to
the accused.
(b) If the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over a case pending before it, the
case shall be referred to the regular courts. In Santiago vs. Garchitorena, 48 the complexity of the issues and the failure
of the accused to invoke her right to speedy disposition at the appropriate
(c) If the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over a case pending before a regular time spelled defeat to her claim to the constitutional guarantee.
court, the latter loses jurisdiction and the same shall be referred to the
Sandiganbayan. In Cadalin vs. POEA's Administrator, 49 the Court, considering also the
complexity of the cases ("not run-of-the-mill variety") and the conduct of the
(d) If a regular court has jurisdiction over a case pending before it, then said parties' lawyers, held that the right to speedy disposition was not violated
court retains jurisdiction. therein.

Thus, under both R.A. Nos. 7975 and 8429, the Sandiganbayan retains In petitioner Binay's case, the Court finds that there was no undue delay in
jurisdiction over said cases. the disposition of the subject cases. The proceedings conducted before the
Office of the Tanodbayan, and later with the Office of the Ombudsman,
adequately explains the length of the delay:
II

1. That on July 27, 1988 Bobby Brillante filed with the Office of the
Petitioner Binay avers in his Addendum to Petition that his right to speedy Tanodbayan an affidavit-complaint charging, Jejomar Binay, Sergio Santos,
disposition has been violated by the inordinate delay in the resolution of the Roberto Chang, Delfin Almeda, Nelson Irasga, Nicasio Santiago, Feliciano
subject cases by the Ombudsman. Basam, Maria Chan, Romeo Barrios, Azucena Diaz, Virgilio Clarete, Godofredo
Marcelo, Armando San Miguel, Salvador Pangilinan and John Does of the
Art. III of the Constitution provides that: following offenses: (a) Massive Malversation of Public Funds; (b) Multiple
Falsification of Public Documents; (c) Usurpation of Official Functions; (d)
Violation of Election Law; and (e) Violation of Sec. 3(e) of R.A. 3019.
Sec. 16. All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases
before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies.
1.1. Brillante's complaint was based on the initial findings and observations
of the COA on the examination of the cash and accounts covering
The constitutional right to "a speedy disposition of cases" is not limited to the transactions from April 1, 1987 to January 4, 1988 and Post-Audit of Selected
accused in criminal proceedings but extends to all parties in all cases, Accounts for the last quarter of 1987 of the Municipality of Makati contained
including civil and administrative cases, and in all proceedings, including in its Report dated January 11, 1988. The COA furnished the Tanodbayan a
judicial and quasi-judicial hearings. 37 Hence, under the Constitution, any copy of this report on August 1, 1988 upon request of the latter.
party to a case may demand expeditious action on all officials who are tasked
with the administration of justice. 38
1.2. In the letter of the COA transmitting a copy of the report, the
Tanodbayan was informed that this COA audit report of January 11, 1988 is
However, the right to a speedy disposition of a case, like the right to speedy not yet released since the Mayor of Makati was given thirty days within
trial, 39 is deemed violated only when the proceedings is attended by which to explain/clarify the findings in the report and is subject to change or
vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays; or when unjustified modification depending upon the explanation/clarification to be submitted
postponements of the trial are asked for and secured, or when without cause by the Mayor of Makati. Because of this the information from the COA the
or justifiable motive a long period of time is allowed to elapse without the preliminary investigation was held in abeyance until the submission of the
party having his case tried. 40 Equally applicable is the balancing test used to final report.
determine whether a defendant has been denied his right to a speedy trial,
or a speedy disposition of a case for that matter, in which the conduct of
both the prosecution and the defendant is weighed, and such factors as the 1.3. On March 1, 1989, the first part of the Final Report on Audit of Makati
length of the delay, the reasons for such delay, the assertion or failure to was received by the Office of the Ombudsman and was transmitted for
assert such right by the accused, and the prejudice caused by the delay. 41 purposes of the ensuring preliminary investigation to the Tanodbayan which
The concept of speedy disposition is a relative term and must necessarily be received the same on March 22, 1989.
a flexible concept. 42
1.4. This first part of the Final Report contained the fifteen (15) adverse
A mere mathematical reckoning of the time involved, therefore, would not findings, above elsewhere stated as the basis of Bobby Brillante's complaint.
be sufficient. 43 In the application of the constitutional guarantee of the right
to speedy disposition of cases, particular regard must also be taken of the 1.5. Eleven (11) COA auditors participated in the documentation and analysis
facts and circumstances peculiar to each case. 44 of its findings and preparation of the final report.

In Tatad vs. Sandiganbayan, 45 the Court held that the length of delay and 1.6. The first part of the final report was followed by a Supplemental Report
the simplicity of the issues did not justify the delay in the disposition of the on Findings No. 1 and 3. This Supplemental Report is dated July 3, 1989.

47 | R U L E 1 1 4 C A S E S - B A I L
2. After securing machine copies of the voluminous documents supporting testimonial evidence were involved. In the above-entitled cases, the
the COA findings, Pros. Margarito Gervacio, Chairman of the Panel of preliminary investigation of all ten (10) cases was terminated in merely two
Prosecutors, issued the corresponding subpoena directing the respondents (2) years and four (4) months from the date Mayor Binay filed his last
to submit their respective counter-affidavits. pleading, on April 30, 1992. 51

2.1. In compliance with the subpoena, Mayor Jejomar Binay submitted his Petitioner claims that the Resolution of the Sandiganbayan ordering his
counter-affidavit on May 18, 1990, Marissa Chan, Feliciano Bascon, Nicanor suspension pendente lite is unwarranted since the informations charging him
Santiago, Jr. on June 19, 1990, Renato Manrique on June 4, 1990, Alfredo were not valid. This contention, however, must fail in view of our
Ignacio on June 6, 1990, Roberto Chang on August 27, 1990. Feliciano Bascon pronouncement that there was no delay in the resolution of the subject
submitted his Supplemental Affidavit on November 22, 1990. cases in violation of his right to speedy disposition. Accordingly, the
informations in question are valid and petitioner's suspension pendente lite
must be upheld.
2.2. Thereafter, clarificatory examinations were conducted on September 27,
1990, October 26, 1990, November 8, 9, 14, 22, 1990.
Finally, whether or not there is probable cause to warrant the filing of the
subject cases is a question best left to the discretion of the Ombudsman.
3. On January 15, 1991 Mayor Jejomar Binay submitted a copy of this Petition
Absent any grave abuse of such discretion, the Court will not interfere in the
for Certiorari in G.R. No. 92380 which he and the municipality of Makati filed
exercise thereof. 52 Petitioner in this case has failed to establish any such
with the Supreme Court against COA Chairman, Eufemio Domingo and the
abuse on the part of the Ombudsman.
Commission on Audit, with a manifestation that said petition is submitted to
support Binay's stand as regard COA Finding No. 9 aforestated.
III
4. On April 2, 1992 respondent Marissa Chan filed an affidavit containing
allegations incriminating Jejomar Binay; Having ruled that the criminal case against petitioners in G.R. No. 128136 is
within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, the Court will
now dispose of the following issues raised by them:
5. Upon being ordered to comment on the said April 2, 1992 affidavit of
Marissa Chan, Jejomar Binay submitted his comment thereto on April 30,
1992. (1) The Sandiganbayan was ousted of its jurisdiction by the filing of an
information alleging the same facts with the Regional Trial Court.
6. On August 4, 1993, the Investigation Panel submitted to the Deputy
Special Prosecutor its Resolution disposing the preliminary investigation of (2) Respondents are estopped from filing an information before the
the case. Sandiganbayan considering that they had already filed another information
alleging the same facts before the Regional Trial Court.
6.1. On August 10, 1993 the said Resolution was approved by the Special
Prosecutor, who forwarded the same and the entire records to the Office of (3) The filing of the information before the Sandiganbayan constitutes double
the Ombudsman for review and/or final action. jeopardy.

6.2. On August 16, 1994, the Review Panel of the Ombudsman submitted to The Court tackles these arguments successively then deals with the questions
the latter its review action for approval. of duplicity of information and forum shopping.

6.3. On August 19, 1994; the Ombudsman approved some of the Petitioners invoke the rule that "the jurisdiction of a court once it attaches
recommendations of the Review Panel and directed the preparation and cannot be ousted by subsequent happenings or events, although of such
filing of the informations. 50 character which would have prevented jurisdiction from attaching in the first
instance." 53 They claim that the filing of the information in the
Sandiganbayan was a "subsequent happening or event" which cannot oust
Furthermore, the prosecution is not bound by the findings of the Commission
the RTC of its jurisdiction.
on Audit (COA); it must rely on its own independent judgment in the
determination of probable cause. Accordingly, the prosecution had to
conduct its own review of the COA findings. Judging from said findings, we This rule has no application here for the simple reason that the RTC had no
find that the cases were sufficiently complex, thus justifying the length of jurisdiction over the case. Jurisdiction never attached to the RTC. When the
time for their resolution. As held by the Sandiganbayan in its Resolution information was filed before the RTC, R.A. No. 7975 was already in effect
dated March 29, 1995 denying the Motion to Quash: and, under said law, jurisdiction over the case pertained to the
Sandiganbayan.
2. Ten charges are involved in these cases and the prosecution, unable to rely
on the raw findings of the Commission on Audit in 15 reports caused the Neither can estoppel be successfully invoked. First, jurisdiction is determined
investigation and examination of thousands of vouchers, payrolls, and by law, not by the consent or agreement of the parties or by estoppel. 54 As
supporting documents considering that no less than the Chairman of the a consequence of this principle, the Court held in Zamora vs. Court of Appeals
Commission on Audit, assisted by a team supervisor and 10 team members 55 that:
had to take part in the conduct of a final audit consisting of evaluation and
analysis of the initial findings in the 15 raw reports, the cases must have
It follows that as a rule the filing of a complaint with one court which has no
involved complicated legal and factual issues which do warrant or justify a
jurisdiction over it does not prevent the plaintiff from filing the same
longer period of time for preliminary investigation.
complaint later with the competent court. The plaintiff is not estopped from
doing so simply because it made a mistake before in the choice of the proper
xxx xxx xxx forum. In such a situation, the only authority the first court can exercise is to
dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction. This has to be so as a contrary
conclusion would allow a party to divest the competent court of its
5. In the TATAD case, the preliminary investigation was resolved close to
jurisdiction, whether erroneously or even deliberately, in derogation of the
three (3) years from the time all the counter-affidavits were submitted to the
law.
Tanodbayan, notwithstanding the fact that very few documentary and

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It is true that the Court has ruled in certain cases 56 that estoppel prevents a one forum, a party seeks a favorable opinion (other than by appeal or
party from questioning the jurisdiction of the court that the party himself certiorari) in another, or when he institutes two or more actions or
invoked. Estoppel, however, remains the exception rather than the rule, the proceedings grounded on the same cause, on the gamble that one or the
rule being that jurisdiction is vested by law. 57 Even in those instances where other court would make a favorable disposition. 65 We discern no intent on
the Court applied estoppel, the party estopped consistently invoked the the part of the State, in filing two informations in two different courts, to
jurisdiction of the court and actively participated in the proceedings, "gamble that one or the other court would make a favorable disposition."
impugning such jurisdiction only when faced with an adverse decision. This is
not the case here. After discovering that a similar information had earlier
Obviously, respondents got their signals crossed. One set of officials, after
been filed in the RTC, respondents promptly asked the trial court to refer the
investigating a complaint filed by the Vice-Mayor of San Pascual, Batangas
case to the Sandiganbayan, which motion was followed by a motion to
charging petitioners of overpricing, filed the information for violation of
resolve the previous motion. There was no consistent invocation of the RTC's
Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 in the RTC. Another set of officials investigated
jurisdiction. There were no further proceedings after the filing of the
another complaint from the Concerned Citizens Group accusing petitioners
information save for the motion to refer the case precisely on the ground of
of, among others, overpricing the same project subject of the previous
lack of jurisdiction, and the motion to resolve the earlier motion. Finally, the
complaint. Finding probable cause, the second set of officials instituted the
trial court had not rendered any decision, much less one adverse to
criminal action, charging the same offense and alleging essentially the same
petitioners.
facts as the first, this time in the Sandiganbayan. Later learning of the
procedural faux pas, respondents without undue delay asked the RTC to
Second, petitioners cannot hold respondents in estoppel for the latter are refer the case to the Sandiganbayan.
not themselves party to the criminal action. In a criminal action, the State is
the plaintiff, for the commission of a crime is an offense against the State.
WHEREFORE, the consolidated petitions are hereby DISMISSED.
Thus, the complaint or information filed in court is required to be brought in
the name of the "People of the Philippines." 58 Even then, the doctrine of
estoppel does not apply as against the people in criminal prosecutions. 59
Violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, like attempted murder,
60 is a public offense. Social and public interest demand the punishment of
the offender; hence, criminal actions for public offenses can not be waived or
condoned, much less barred by the rules of estoppel. 61

The filing of the information in the Sandiganbayan did not put petitioners in
double jeopardy even though they had already pleaded "not guilty" to the
information earlier filed in the RTC. The first jeopardy never attached in the
first place, the RTC not being not being a court of competent jurisdiction.
There can be no double jeopardy where the accused entered a plea in a court
that had no jurisdiction. 62 The remedy of petitioners, therefore, was not to
move for the quashal of the information pending in the Sandiganbayan on
the ground of double jeopardy. 63 Their remedy was to move for the quashal
of the information pending in the RTC on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. 64

The contention that the filing of the information in the Sandiganbayan


violated the rule against duplicitous informations is patently unmeritorious.
That rule presupposes that there is one complaint or information charging
not one offense, but two or more offenses. Thus, Rule 110 of the Rules of
Court states:

Sec. 13. Duplicity of offense. A complaint or information must charge but


one offense, except only in those cases in which existing laws prescribe a
single punishment for various offenses.

Non-compliance with this rule is a ground for quashing the duplicitous


complaint or information under Rule 117:

Sec. 3. Grounds. The accused may move to quash the complaint or


information on any of the following grounds:

xxx xxx xxx

(e) That more than one offense is charged except in those cases in which
existing laws prescribe a single punishment for various offenses;

xxx xxx xxx

Here, petitioners are faced not with one information charging more than one
offense but with more than one information charging one offense.

The Court does not find the prosecution guilty of forum-shopping. Broadly
speaking, forum shopping exists when, as a result of an adverse opinion in
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