[Risla Mratiyya]

She who looks at the mirror has been addressing her attention to the image impressed in it,
has been occupied with that image, investigating its features, since she doesn't pay
attention to the mirror and nor to is limpidity or to its shininess, nor to the equality of its
parts and its other features. She would consider the mirror as a tool to grasp that image
and its clarity through the mirror she gazes across the image and from the mirror she
reaches it. The object of vision seen in reality in that situation is the image impressed, not
the mediating instrument, because there is no focus on the instrument. For this reason she
doesn't possess any acknowledgement of <the mirrors> condition nor capacity to perform
a judgement about it. <She who looks at the mirror> might consider the tool grasped per
se, conceived by gazing at it, not focusing on what constitutes an imperfection about the
mirror by acknowledging the excellence of its manufacture and the strength of its essence.
There is no doubt about this. In this way it is clarified the difference between knowing the
mode/the aspect and knowing the thing. Mental perception (bara) may address its
attention to a notion aiming to it, being capable of acknowledging its conditions rather than
the conditions of the notions particulars. <Mental perception> may also consider the
instrument for grasping those particulars and the mirror to observe them as a whole, so
that mental perception might acquire knowledge of the conditions of the instrument
through that.
An example of the first is our statement the notion of some thing is equal to general
possibility; and example of the second is every thing is as such; because the intellect, in
the first case, has already grasped the notion of the thing and considered the notion as the
object aimed at in itself; however, by that act of grasping the intellect does not possess the
ability to perform a judgement on the particulars of that notion. In the second case, the
intellect has already considered that notion as the instrument and the mirror to grasp the
particulars; so by that the intellect possesses the grasp of the particulars conditions and
the judgement on them. The object of knowledge in the first case is the notion that is in
turn an aspect of the notions particulars, while the object of knowledge in the second case
are the particulars comprehensively from that aspect. This is what al-Jurjn claimed. By
this he clarifies some aporiae that already emerged: that which occurs within the mind,
according to knowing the aspect, is the image of the aspect; while according to knowing the
thing from that aspect, if what occurs within the mind is also the image, then the object of
knowledge would be the only the aspect, so that there is not difference <between the two
types of knowledge>. If what occurs within the mind is another distinct image of that thing,
then it would not be knowing from that aspect. If what occurs within the mind are two
images, one the image of the aspect and the other another image of the thing, then the first
image would be knowing the aspect, while the second would be knowing another thing
from that aspect.
If you say knowing something from that aspect is a definition for knowing the whole, then
your statement would entails either that knowing something from an aspect is based upon
knowing its essence, or that <knowing something> is based on knowing it from another
aspect, so that it goes back ad infinitum or in a vicious circles, rather than a simultaneous
circle. If you maintain that this is a definition of the image of the aspect on the condition
that that image is joined with another image of the thing, we claim that this is knowing
something accompanied by knowing the aspect, so there are two acts of knowledge and
two objects of knowledge, not that this is knowing something from that aspect; and also,
your statement would entail that knowing something from an aspect would be possible
only if <that knowledge> includes knowing its essence or knowing another aspect; so it
would be impossible to know something, by a unique aspect, isolated from knowing
something else by the same aspect. This is false unanimously, rather by necessity!

[Risla arfiyya]

On the analysis of the concept of particles and verbs.

The relation of mental perception to its objects of perception is like the relation of vision to
its objects of vision. If you look at the mirror and observe an image in it, there you have two
cases, one of which is that you address your attention to that image observing it and aiming
at it, considering the mirror in that case as the instrument for observing the image; there is
no doubt that the mirror is seen in that case, but assessing to see the mirror in that way
does not allow you to make a judgement about it or to focus on its conditions. The second is
that you address your attention to the mirror itself and grasp it intentionally, so that it is
proper for you to make a judgement about it. In such a case the image would be observed
as a consequence without being focused at. It is plain that objects of visions are sometimes
object of vision per se and some other times are an instrument for seeing something else.
Make the analogy for those concepts perceived by mental perception, namely the internal
powers. This is clarified by your statements Zayd stood and the ascription of standing to
Zayd, because there is no doubt that you perceive in both the ascription of standing to
Zayd. However in the first statement the ascription is perceived insofar as it is a condition
between Zayd and the standing and an instrument to acknowledge the condition of both, as
if the ascription were a mirror by which you observe both terms, connecting one to the
other. For this reason you cannot make a judgement on that of by that as long as that
ascription is perceived in that way. In the second example, the ascription is perceived
intentionally and grasped in itself, insofar as you can make a judgement on and by it. In the
first case the ascription is a non-independently graspable concept, while in the second it is
an independently graspable concept. Just as it is necessary to express the concepts grasped
per se independently graspable, it is also necessary to express the concept grasped per
alium non-independently graspable. This being introduced, then you should know that the
beginning, for example, is a concept that is a condition for something else and attached to
something else. If the intellect grasps it intentionally and per se, then it would be a concept
independent in itself and grasped in its essence and proper to be predicated upon and by,
which would require the perception of its relatum comprehensively and consequently.
From this perspective it is the signified of the term beginning; and after you grasp it in this
way, you can qualify it by a specific relatum, so you say for example the beginning of my
trip is Basra, as this does not exclude it from being independent and being fit to be
predicated about or by. If the intellect grasps it as being a condition between the trip and
Basra and considers it as an instrument to acknowledge the state of both, then it is a
concept non-independent in itself and not being fir for being predicated about or by; from
this perspective it is the signified of the term from, and this is the meaning of the claim
that particles are posited with respect to a general concept which is a type of ascription,
such as the beginning, for each determined beginning in its specificity, while the ascription
is determined only by the subject-term, so that as long as the relatum of the particle is not
mentioned an single instantiation of that type of ascription, which is the signified of the
particle, would not obtain, neither in the intellect nor in the external world. It obtains only
by its relatum and it is intellected by its relatum. It is thus explained to you that the
mention of the relatum of the particle is necessary so that the concept of the particle
obtains within the mind, because it can only be perceived by perceiving its relatum, since
the latter is a tool to grasp the particle. Therefore, the conceptual non-independency of the
particle is due to insufficiency and lacking in the particles concept, rather than for the
claim that the positor impose the mention of the particles relatum as a condition for the
particles signification of its itemized concept. This explanation is useless, because he who
claims it, if the acknowledges that the concepts of the particles are specific ascriptions in
the same way that we have established, then there is no sense for the positors condition
there, because the mention of the relatum is a necessary thing, as the concept of the particle
is intellected only through that. If then the claimant maintains that the concept of the term
from is the concept of beginning itself except that the positor put the mention of its
relatum as a condition for the particles signification of its concept, while he didn't put that
as a condition for the signification of the term beginning for its concept -, then the term
from would become lacking of the signification of its concept, non-independently
comprehensible for a deficiency in its signification. This assumption is invalid [three
reasons why this is so].
The verb, except the defective verbs, such as araba, signifies a concept independently
comprehensible, which is the event, and a concept non-independently comprehensible,
which is the assertoric ascription (nisba ukmiyya) grasped insofar as it is a condition
between the two terms and an instrument to recognize the states of both the terms joining
one of them to the other. Since this ascription which is a part of the signified of the verb
obtains only by the agent, it is necessary to mention the agent, just as it is necessary to
mention the relatum of the particle. Now, just as the term from is posited by a general
positing for each determined beginning in its specificity , likewise the term araba is
posited by a general positing for each ascription of the event, which is signified by the
ascription, to the agent, by the ascriptions specificity. However since the term signify only
a non-independently comprehensible, it cannot be subject or predicate of an assertoric
statement, because each of these must be grasped per se, so that one would gain a
consideration of the ascription between it and the other; and the particle also needs the
mention of its relatum in regard to parallel the terms with the mental images. When the
event is taken into account about verb, and the events affiliation to something else is
included in the verb by a complete ascription insofar as this ascription is a condition
intervening between the two, then the mention of the agent is necessary in virtue of that
parallel, as well as it is necessary that the agent is affiliated with respect to the event, for
that has been already taken into account for the notion of the event (?) by a positing; and it
is not possible to consider that event as affiliated to the agent because it is contrary to its
positing. As for the sum of the verbs concept compound out of the event and the specific
ascription, it is non-independently comprehensible and it cannot be subject of predicate of
assertoric predication. As for the noun, since it is posited for an independent concept and
there is no complete ascription considered together with it, not because it is a ascribed to
something else or vice-versa, then it is possible for it to be subject or predicate of an
assertoric statement.
If you claim just as the verb signifies an event and an ascription to an agent according to
what you established, likewise the nomen agentis signifies an event and an ascription to
some essence; thus, which is it possible for the nomen agentis to be subject of a predication
but not for the verb?
I claim because what is tken into account for the nomen agentis is an essence insofar as an
event is ascribed to it, and the abstract essence is grasped per se, and likewise the event; as
for the ascription, it is grasped per se, except that it is non-perfect qualificative and non-
originally intended from the utterance, by which the abstract essence is qualified.
Therefore, the sum would become a single thing, and it would be possible to grasp in it
sometimes the aspect of the essence immediately so that it can be considered as subject
of predication , and sometimes the aspect of description, namely the event, immediately
so that it can be considered as predicate of the predication. As for the ascription within that
single thing, it cannot be subject or predicate, neither by itself alone, nor together with
something else in virtue of its non-independency.
What is taken into account for the verb is the complete ascription, which requires its
isolation together with its two terms (araf) from another one and the disconnection with
that other one. That ascription is originally intended from the utterance. Finally, it is not
conceivable that what applies to the verb should apply to the nomen agentis, rather the
verbs occurrence as a predicate is determined for verb with respect to a part of its concept
that is the event.