CONSTITUTIONAL

LAW I
Anthony Charlemagne Yu

MIDTERM REVIEWER

Carmela Fojas | Danna Ingaran

Ira Agting | Hannah Manalili

UP Law D 2018

STRUCTURE AND POWERS OF The principle of separation of powers ordains that each of
THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT the three government branches has exclusive cognizance
of and is supreme in concerns falling within its own
constitutionally allocated sphere.

X. The Separation of Powers
General Principles
1. Separation of Powers
- Intended to secure action, to forestall over-action,
to prevent despotism, and to promote efficiency
- It is ones department that another department
cannot intrude or invade
Checks and Balances
- Operating among all 3 main branches
- Net effect: not one branch can act without the
cooperation of at least one of the other
departments
Republic v. Bayao
EO 304 announced Koronadal as the regional center of
SOCCSKSARGEN.
Is EO 304 a valid executive function? YES.
The transfer of the regional center of the SOCCSKSARGEN
to Koronadal City is an executive function. The Judiciary
cannot inquire into the wisdom or expediency of the acts
of the executive.
2. Delegation of Powers
- Legislative power is vested in the Congress by the
sovereign Filipino people
General rule:
Non-delegability of Legislative Power
- Delegated power cannot be further delegated
Exceptions: (P L A)
a. Delegation to the people
b. Delegation to the local governments
c. Delegation to the administrative bodies
- Increasing complexity of the task of
government
- Lack of technical competence of Congress
- Administrative bodies may fill up details
of statute for implementation
- Legislature may pass
contingent legislation
which leaves to another body the
business of ascertaining facts
ABAKADA v. Ermita
Petitioners are assailing the constitutionality of RA 9337
or the VAT Reform Act. The challenged section of R.A. No.
9337 is the common proviso in Sections 4, 5 and 6: That
the President, upon the recommendation of the Secretary
of Finance, shall, raise the rate of value-added tax to 12%,
after any of the following conditions has been satisfied:
(i) Value-added tax collection as a percentage of Gross
Domestic Product (GDP) of the previous year

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exceeds two and four-fifth percent (2 4/5%); or (ii)
National government deficit as a percentage of GDP of the
previous year exceeds one and one-half percent (1%)
Petitioners allege that the grant of stand-by authority to
the President to increase the VAT rate is an abdication by
Congress of its exclusive power to tax because such
delegation is not covered by Section 28 (2), Article VI of
the Constitution. They argue that VAT is a tax levied on the
sale or exchange of goods and services which cannot be
included within the purview of tariffs under
the exemption delegation since this refers to customs
duties, tolls or tribute payable upon merchandise to the
government and usually imposed on imported/exported
goods. They also said that the President has powers to
cause, influence or create the conditions provided by law
to bring about the conditions precedent. Moreover, they
allege that no guiding standards are made by law as to how
the Secretary of Finance will make the recommendation.
Whether or not the RA 9337's stand-by authority to the
Executive to increase the VAT rate, especially on account
of the recommendatory power granted to the Secretary of
Finance, constitutes undue delegation of legislative power?
NO. The powers which Congress is prohibited from
delegating are those which are strictly, or inherently
and exclusively, legislative.
Purely legislative power which can never
be delegated is the authority to make a complete law -
complete as to the time when it shall take effect and as
to whom it shall be applicable, and to determine the
expediency of its enactment. It is the nature of the power
and not the liability of its use or the manner of its exercise
which determines the validity of its delegation.
The exceptions are: (P L A T E)
(a) delegation of tariff powers to President under
Constitution
(b) delegation of emergency powers to President
under Constitution
(c) delegation to the people at large
(d) delegation to local governments
(e) delegation to administrative bodies
For the delegation to be valid, it must be complete and
it must fix a standard. A sufficient standard is one which
defines legislative policy, marks its limits, maps out its
boundaries and specifies the public agency to apply it.
In this case, it is not a delegation of legislative power BUT a
delegation of ascertainment of facts upon which
enforcement and administration of the increased rate
under the law is contingent. The legislature has made the
operation of the 12% rate effective January 1, 2006,
contingent upon a specified fact or condition. It leaves the
entire operation or non-operation of the 12% rate upon
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factual matters outside of the control of the executive. No
discretion would be exercised by the President.
Highlighting the absence of discretion is the fact that the
word SHALL is used in the common proviso. The use of the
word SHALL connotes a mandatory order. Its use in a
statute denotes an imperative obligation and is
inconsistent with the idea of discretion.
Thus, it is the ministerial duty of the President to
immediately impose the 12% rate upon the existence of
any of the conditions specified by Congress. This is a duty,
which cannot be evaded by the President. It is a clear
directive to impose the 12% VAT rate when the
specified conditions are present.
Congress just granted the Secretary of Finance the
authority to ascertain the existence of a fact--- whether by
December 31, 2005, the VAT collection as a percentage of
GDP of the previous year exceeds 2 4/5 % or the national
government deficit as a percentage of GDP of the previous
year exceeds one and 1%. If either of these two instances
has occurred, the Secretary of Finance, by legislative
mandate, must submit such information to the President.
In making his recommendation to the President on the
existence of either of the two conditions, the Secretary of
Finance is not acting as the alter ego of the President or
even her subordinate. He is acting as the agent of the
legislative department, to determine and declare the event
upon which its expressed will is to take effect. The
Secretary of Finance becomes the means or tool by which
legislative policy is determined and implemented,
considering that he possesses all the facilities to gather
data and information and has a much broader perspective
to properly evaluate them. His function is to gather and
collate statistical data and other pertinent information and
verify if any of the two conditions laid out by Congress is
present.
Congress does not abdicate its functions or unduly
delegate power when it describes what job must be
done, who must do it, and what is the scope of his
authority; in our complex economy that is frequently the
only way in which the legislative process can go forward.
There is no undue delegation of legislative power but only
of the discretion as to the execution of a law. This is
constitutionally permissible. Congress did not delegate
power to tax but the mere implementation of the law.
Edu v. Ericta
The Reflector Law is constitutional and valid because it is
enacted under the police power in order to promote public
safety and order.
Standards can either be express or implied.
Implied by taking the whole law into consideration
 a. Look at the scope
b. Look at the definiteness of the measure enacted
- To avoid undue delegation of legislative power, there
must be a clear standard/criterion
Then the executive/administrative bodies will just
look at that for implementation
Chiongbian v. Orbos
Standards can be found in other statutes with the same
subject matters.
After the ARMM was organized, the President continued to
reorganize regions. The President said that provision is
still subject to the Presidents discretion who is in charge
of national supervision.
Rules and regulations created by administrative
bodies under a valid delegation will take effect as if
they were written by the legislature.
Solicitor General v. Metro Manila Authority
Confiscating license plates of motor vehicles for traffic
violations, towing, and impounding
attended/unattended/abandoned motor vehicles illegally
parked for obstructing the flow of traffic in Metro Manila is
null and void for
Requisites of delegation
a. The completeness of the statue making the
delegation
- What is delegated should be the
discretion to determine how the law shall
be enforced
b. The presence of a sufficient standard
- The boundaries of the delegates
authority should be mapped out
Tatad v. Secretary of Energy
The constitutionality of RA 8180 also known as An Act
Deregulating the Downstream Oil Industry is being
challenged for allegedly violating the prohibition on undue
delegation of power.
SC held that it is constitutional. It passes the completeness
and sufficient standard test. It lays down the standard to
guide the judgment of the President he is to time it as far
as practicable when the prices of crude oil and petroleum
products in the world market are declining and when the
exchange rate of the peso in relation to the US dollar is
stable.
People v. Dacuycuy
A law that allows a judge to decide on punishment is
invalid.
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Can administrative rules punish/be penal in
nature?
YES, only if the violation is made a crime, and
penalty is provided in the statute
The IRR just repeats it and publication is
needed
People v. Rosenthal
The accused sold their shares in O.R.O. Oil Co., Inc. without
first obtaining the needed written permit or license from
the Insular Treasurer of the Commonwealth of the
Philippines, as required by Act 2581. Respondents
contend that it is unconstitutional because it constitutes
undue delegation of legislative authority to the Insular
Treasurer, because whenever in his judgment it is in the
public interest, he may cancel certificates or permits.
SC held that it does not constitute undue delegation of
legislative power. Because it is apparent that even if the
conditions are within the power of the State to impose,
they can only be ascertained by an Executive officer. Also,
public interest is a sufficient standard for the
delegation of legislative authority.
Eastern Shipping Lines v. POEA
Tests of Valid Delegation:
a. Completeness Test
- limits are sufficient to which the delegate
must conform in performance of his
actions
- there must be no room for delegate to
legislate, only MINISTERIAL DUTY
b. Sufficiency Test
- law must state the policy that must be
carried out or implemented
- no room for delegate to legislate, nor
allow discretion on their part
1. Public interest
2. Equitable
3. Justice and equity
4. Simplicity, sufficiency, and
economy
Power of contingent/subordinate legislation
leaves details to agency being delegated to
Congress may delegate tariff powers to the
President
- Art 6, Sec 23 (2)
- Art 6, Sec 23 (8)
- Why?
Because it involves technical matters
Congress may delegate emergency powers to the
President
3. Exercise of Legislative Powers by Congress ABAKADA Guro Party-List v. Purisima

Who may exercise legislative power? Petitioners seek to enjoin the implementation and
- Legislative power is the authority to make, enforcement of RA 9335. The assailed laws purpose is to
amend, and repeal laws (cannot pass optimize the revenue-generation capabilities of the BIR
irrepealable laws) and Bureau of Customs. It provides for a system of rewards
CONGRESS and sanctions. Petitioners assert that the law is
unconstitutional insofar as it provides for a Joint
Exceptions: (P L A T E) Congressional Oversight Committee.
a. reserved to the PEOPLE
HELD: Yes, the creation of a JCOC is unconstitutional as
b. LOCAL government
it violates the doctrine of separation of powers. The Court
c. ADMINISTRATIVE bodies
however held that the JCOC has become functus oficio in
d. TARIFF
view of its approval of the IRRs of the law.
e. EMERGENCY powers
Congress may not vest itself or any of its committees
4. Classification of Congressional Power with executive or judicial power.

Congressional oversight must be limited to the

Classification of legislative power:
following:
a. Original
1. Scrutiny based on the power of appropriation, budget
- Possessed by the sovereign people
hearings, power to ask heads to appear before it; and
- People themselves make the laws
2. Investigation and monitoring of the implementation of
Initiative and referendum
lawspower to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation.
b. Delegated
- Delegated by the sovereign people to
Congress has two choiceseither it formulates the rules
legislative bodies (Congress)
itself, or it delegates the power to the Executive. If it
- Subordinate to the original power of the
chooses the latter, legislators can no longer have a say on
people
the approval of the rules. This is in keeping with the
doctrine of separation of powers.
2 types of law-making:
a. Constitutional power
- Power to amend and revise the 7. Exercise of Legislative Powers by Local
Constitution
Government
b. Ordinary power
- Power to pass ordinary statutes
Lina v. Pao

5. Limitations The Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Laguna passed

Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, prohibiting all forms of gambling. In
a. Substantive
view of such legislation, Tony Calventos application for a
- Limitations on the contents of law
permit to operate a lotto terminal in San Pedro was denied.
b. Procedural
He filed a petition for declaratory relief with the RTC.
- Limitations on the manner of passing laws
Judge Pao enjoined petitioners from implementing the
c. Congress cannot pass IRREPEALABLE laws
assailed Resolution. Is the Resolution unconstitutional?

6. Post-Enactment Congressional Measures HELD: No. The ordinance is valid. The Court opined that
based on the wording of the ordinance, it was a mere
(S A H M):
policy statement which is not self-executing. It simply
a. SCRUTINY based primarily on Congress
embodies the Sanggunians stance against gambling. Part
power of appropriation and budget hearings
of the autonomy of LGUs is the ability to air out its own
conducted in connection with it
views which may be contrary to those of the national
b. Power to ask heads of departments to
government. With the legislative power of the
APPEAR and be HEARD by either of its
Sanggunian being a delegated power, it cannot pass
Houses on any matter pertaining to their
ordinances which contravene existing statutes passed
departments and its power of investigation
by Congress.
c. MONITORING implementation of laws
pursuant to the power of Congress to conduct
inquiries in aid of legislation

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Magtajas v. Pryce
PAGCOR announced the opening of a casino in CDO. The
Sangguniang Panlungsod passed Ordinance No. 3353,
prohibiting the issuance of business permits and cancelling
existing business permits for establishments used for the
operation of casinos. Later, it passed another ordinance
prohibiting the operation of casinos and providing
penalties for violation therefor. The constitutionality of the
ordinances was challenged before the CA. Before the SC,
petitioner CDO and its mayor asked for a review
of the CAs judgment declaring the ordinances invalid. The
Court upheld the CAs decision.
Requirements of a valid ordinance:
(G C) X (C U P P U)
1. It must not CONTRAVENE the Constitution or any
statute;
2. It must not be UNFAIR or oppressive;
3. It must not be PARTIAL or discriminatory;
4. It must not PROHIBIT but may regulate trade;
5. It must not be UNREASONABLE;
6. It must be GENERAL and CONSISTENT with public
policy.
8. Exercise of Legislative Powers by Peoples
Initiative
3 types of Initiative:
a. On Constitution
- Amendments
b. On Statutes
- Proposing to enact national legislation
c. On Local Legislation
- Ordinances
Limitations on the power of local initiative
a. Can only be exercised once a year on all types
of initiatives
b. Only those that are within the legal powers of
local legislative bodies to enact
c. If the local legislative body adopts the
proposition in toto before initiative is held,
initiative must be cancelled
Referendum
- Power of electorate to approve or reject
legislation through an election
a. Registered with COMELEC (RA 6735)
b. Signed by at least 10% of total number of
registered voters (12%)
c. Legislative district must be represented
by at least 3% of registered voters
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*Lambino v. COMELEC
Through peoples initiative, citizens may only propose
amendments, not revisions, to the Constitution. The
Lambino groups proposal constitutes not an amendment
but a revision. It fails to pass both the qualitative and
quantitative tests used to determine if something partakes
of an amendment or a revision. The proposal to change
from a Bicameral-Presidential system to a Unicameral-
Parliamentary one is a revision because (1) it would
affect a lot of other provisions in the Constitution, and
(2) it changes the underlying policy embodied in the
constitution. Amendments generally do not affect
other provisions apart from the one being amended.
Moreover, the proposal submitted to the people did not
even contain the text of the actual amendment. People
should know what the effects of the amendment would be
prior to giving their imprimatur to it.
9. Historical Exercise of Legislative Power
Sanidad v. COMELEC
On 2 Sept 1976, Marcos issued PD No. 991 calling for a
national referendum on 16 Oct 1976 for the Citizens
Assemblies (barangays) to resolve, among other things,
the issues of Martial Law, the Interim Assembly, its
replacement, the powers of such replacement, the period
of its existence, the length of the period for the exercise by
the President of his present powers. Twenty days after,
the President issued another related decree, PD No. 1031,
amending the previous PD No. 991, by declaring the
provisions of PD No. 229 providing for the manner of
voting and canvass of votes in barangays applicable to
the national referendum-plebiscite of Oct 16, 1976. Quite
relevantly, PD No. 1031 repealed inter alia, Sec 4, of PD No.
991. On the same date of 22 Sept 1976, Marcos issued PD
No. 1033, stating the questions to he submitted to the
people in the referendum-plebiscite on October 16, 1976.
The Decree recites in its whereas clauses that the
peoples continued opposition to the convening of the
interim National Assembly evinces their desire to have
such body abolished and replaced thru a constitutional
amendment, providing for a new interim legislative body,
which will be submitted directly to the people in the
referendum-plebiscite of October 16.
On September 27, 1976, Sanidad filed a Prohibition with
Preliminary Injunction seeking to enjoin the Commission
on Elections from holding and conducting the Referendum
Plebiscite on October 16; to declare without force and
effect Presidential Decree Nos. 991 and 1033, insofar as
they propose amendments to the Constitution, as well as
Presidential Decree No. 1031, insofar as it directs the
Commission on Elections to supervise, control, hold, and
conduct the Referendum-Plebiscite scheduled on October
16, 1976.
Petitioners contend that under the 1935 and 1973
Constitutions there is no grant to the incumbent President
to exercise the constituent power to propose amendments
to the new Constitution. As a consequence, the
Referendum-Plebiscite on October 16 has no constitutional
or legal basis. The Soc-Gen contended that the question is
political in nature hence the court cannot take cognizance
of it.
Whether or not Marcos can validly
propose amendments to the Constitution YES
The amending process both as to proposal and ratification
raises a judicial question. This is especially true in cases
where the power of the Presidency to initiate the
amending process by proposals of amendments, a function
normally exercised by the legislature, is seriously doubted.
Under the terms of the 1973 Constitution, the power to
propose amendments to the Constitution resides in the
interim National Assembly during the period of transition
(Sec. 15, Transitory Provisions). After that period, and the
regular National Assembly in its active session, the power
to propose amendments becomes ipso facto
the prerogative of the regular National Assembly (Sec. 1,
pars. 1 and 2 of Art. XVI, 1973 Constitution). The normal
course has not been followed. Rather than calling the
interim National Assembly to constitute itself into
a constituent assembly, the incumbent President
undertook the proposal of amendments and submitted the
proposed amendments thru Presidential Decree 1033 to
the people in a Referendum-Plebiscite on October 16.
Unavoidably, the regularity of the procedure for
amendments, written in lambent words in the very
Constitution sought to be amended, raises a contestable
issue. The implementing Presidential Decree Nos. 991,
1031, and 1033, which commonly purport to have the
force and effect of legislation are assailed as invalid, thus
the issue of the validity of said Decrees is plainly a
justiciable one, within the competence of this Court to pass
upon. Section 2 (2) Article X of the new Constitution
provides: All cases involving the constitutionality of a
treaty, executive agreement, or law shall be heard and
decided by the Supreme Court en banc and no treaty,
executive agreement, or law may be declared
unconstitutional without the concurrence of at least ten
Members. . . .. The Supreme Court has the last word in
the construction not only of treaties and statutes, but
also of the Constitution itself. The amending, like all
other powers organized in the Constitution, is in form
a delegated and hence a limited power, so that the
Supreme Court is vested with that authority to
determine whether that power has been discharged
within its limits.
This petition is however dismissed. The President can
propose amendments to the Constitution and he was
able to present those proposals to the people in sufficient
time. The President at that time also sits as the
legislature.
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Municipality of San Juan v. CA
In 1978, Marcos issued Proc. No. 1716 reserving for
municipal government site purposes certain parcels of
land of the public domain located in the municipality of
San Juan. In 1987, Cory Aquino issued Proc. No. 164
amending 1716, excluding from its operation parcels of
land not being utilized for government center sites but for
residential purposes, declaring land open for disposition.
SC held that there is fundamental and gross error in
issuance of Proc. No. 164 by Cory Aquino.
Proc. No. 1716 was issued by Marcos in due exercise of
legislative power under Amendment No. 6 in 1976.
Being a valid legislation, it may only be amended by an
equally valid act of legislation.
Proc. No. 164 is not a valid act of legislation. Under the
Freedom Constitution, the legislative power of the
President shall continue until a legislature is elected
and convened. When the Congress convened on July
26, 1987, Cory Aquino also lost her legislative power
under the Freedom Constitution. Proc. No. 164 was
issued on Oct. 6, 1987.
Because of this, the unauthorized act by then president
constitutes a direct derogation of most basic principle of
separation of powers among the three branches of
government enshrined in the Constitution. The
presumption of validity cannot apply when there is a clear
usurpation of legislative power by the Executive.
Congress
1. Composition, Qualifications, and Term of
Office
Senators
Art 6, Sec 2-4
Section 2. The Senate shall be composed of twenty-four
Senators who shall be elected at large by the qualified voters
of the Philippines, as may be provided by law.
Section 3. No person shall be a Senator unless he is a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines and, on the day of the
election, is at least thirty-five years of age, able to read and
write, a registered voter, and a resident of the Philippines for
not less than two years immediately preceding the day of the
election.
Section 4. The term of office of the Senators shall be six years
and shall commence, unless otherwise provided by law, at
noon on the thirtieth day of June next following their
election. No Senator shall serve for more than two
consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for
any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption
in the continuity of his service for the full term of which he
was elected.
Art 18, Sec 2 Transitory Provisions
Section 2. The Senators, Members of the House of
Representatives, and the local officials first elected under
this Constitution shall serve until noon of June 30, 1992.
- General rule: 6 years per term
- Exceptions: Transitory Provisions
Not all Senators under 1987 served for 6 years,
some served for only 5 years from 1987-1992
Out of 24 Senators, the top 12 served for 6 years,
the bottom 12 served for only 3 years
- Can serve for only 2 consecutive terms
Shortest: 8 years (under 1987 Constitution, 5
years + 3 years)
- If a Senator resigns, what happens?
Representatives
Art 6, Sec 5
Section 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be
composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members,
unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from
legislative districts apportioned among the provinces,
cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with
the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis
of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as
provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list
system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties
or organizations.
(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per
centum of the total number of representatives including
those under the party list. For three consecutive terms after
the ratification of this Constitution, one-half of the seats
allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as
provided by law, by selection or election from the labor,
peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities,
women, youth, and such other sectors as may be provided by
law, except the religious sector.
(3) Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as
practicable, contiguous, compact, and adjacent territory.
Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty
thousand, or each province, shall have at least one
representative.
(4) Within three years following the return of every census,
the Congress shall make a reapportionment of legislative
districts based on the standards provided in this section.
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Art 6, Sec 6-8
Section 6. No person shall be a Member of the House of
Representatives unless he is a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines and, on the day of the election, is at least twenty-
five years of age, able to read and write, and, except the
party-list representatives, a registered voter in the district in
which he shall be elected, and a resident thereof for a period
of not less than one year immediately preceding the day of
the election.
Section 7. The Members of the House of Representatives shall
be elected for a term of three years which shall begin, unless
otherwise provided by law, at noon on the thirtieth day of
June next following their election. No Member of the House
of Representatives shall serve for more than three
consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for
any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption
in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he
was elected.
Section 8. Unless otherwise provided by law, the regular
election of the Senators and the Members of the House of
Representatives shall be held on the second Monday of May.
Art 9, C, Sec 6-8 Constitutional Commissions
Section 6. A free and open party system shall be allowed to
evolve according to the free choice of the people, subject to
the provisions of this Article.
Section 7. No votes cast in favor of a political party,
organization, or coalition shall be valid, except for those
registered under the party-list system as provided in this
Constitution.
Section 8. Political parties, or organizations or coalitions
registered under the party-list system, shall not be
represented in the voters registration boards, boards of
election inspectors, boards of canvassers, or other similar
bodies. However, they shall be entitled to appoint poll
watchers in accordance with law.
Art 18, Sec 7 Transitory Provisions
Section 7. Until a law is passed, the President may fill by
appointment from a list of nominees by the respective
sectors, the seats reserved for sectoral representation in
paragraph (2), Section 5 of Article VI of this Constitution.
- There can be more than 250, if fixed by law
- Current number: 290
- Term: 3 years, not more than 3 consecutive terms
- In 1987, first termers served for 5 years as well
- Longest: 11 years; Shortest: 9 years
 Legislative Districts (C C A)
- Contiguous, compact, and adjacent
- Apportioned among provinces, cities, and
municipalities
- Based on the number of inhabitants using a
uniform and progressive ratio
- Congress shall do reapportionment of
legislative districts within 3 years after every
release of census
- May a city have legislative districts?
YES, on the basis of 250,000 population
and P 20M income
- May a legislative district with 450,000
inhabitants have 2 representatives?
YES, it is left to the discretion of Congress
- Provinces: automatically constitute 1
legislative district, not included in the 250,000
population requirement
- What is counted is the number of inhabitants,
not the number of registered voters
- Why increase apportionment?
for better representation
Gerrymandering
- Formation of one legislative district out of
separate territories for the purpose of
favouring a candidate or a party
- Not allowed
- Designing a district to favour a voting pattern
- Dividing an area to give a party a majority in
many districts while concentrating the voting
strength of opposing party in one area
*Tobias v. Abalos
RA 9716 was passed increasing the number of legislative
districts in the province of Camarines Sur from four to five.
Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the law insofar as
it leaves the first district with a population of only
176,383.
HELD: Sec. 5(3), Art. VI of the Constitution requires a
population of at least 250,000 only for cities. It is clear that
for provinces, there is no population requirement.
Moreover, in Mariano v. COMELEC, the Court held that the
250,000 requirement only serves to entitle a city to its
FIRST legislative district. It need not have another
250,000 before it can be entitled to a second district.
For provinces, the Local Government Code prescribes a
minimum income, not population requirement for the
creation of a province. Clearly, the Framers of the
Constitution did not mean for the population of an area to
be the only consideration in the apportionment of
legislative districts.
*Navarro v. Executive Secretary
Petitioners seek to nullify RA 9355, otherwise known as
An Act Creating the Province of Dinagat Islands. Dinagat
Islands used to form part of the mother province of
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Surigao del Norte. The LGC of 1991 provides that a
province must have (1) annual income of at least P20
million, and (2) contiguous land area of at least 2000 sq.
km or in the alternative, a population of at least 250,000.
Dinagat complied with the income requirement but failed
to satisfy the land area requirement.
According to public respondents, Par. 2, Art. 9 of the LGC
IRRs provide that a province composed of one or more
islands is exempt from the land area requirement. As
regards the population requirement, the special census
conducted by the province (which said that Dinagat had
over 300,000 inhabitants), was never certified by the NSO.
Hence, for purposes of compliance with the LGCs
requirements for the creation of a province, Dinagat
Islands failed to satisfy the minimum population
requirement.
The Court declared RA 9355 unconstitutional. It likewise
declared Par. 2, Art. 9 of the IRR void for adding an
exemption not found in the law.
After a first motion for reconsideration proved to be
unavailing, motions for intervention were filed by officers-
elect. They were concerned with COMELEC Resolution No.
8790 which provided for the legal effects of the Courts
decision with regard to the results of the 2010 elections:
If the decision is reversed, there will be no problem,
Dinagat remains entitled to its own legislative district.
If the decision becomes final and executory before the
elections, Dinagat Islands will revert back to its previous
status as part of the First District of Surigao del Norte.
If it becomes final and executory after the elections, the
result of the elections will have to be nullified, and a
special election will be held in the province of Surigao del
Norte.
The Court reversed its earlier decision:
1. Par. 2, Art. 9 of the IRR, LGC is constitutional. The LGC
provides exemptions from the land area requirement for
the creation of municipalities and chartered cities. Why
should the same not apply in the creation of provinces?
According to the Court, such exemption was inadvertently
omitted in Section 461.
2. As a result, RA 9355 is likewise constitutional, since
island provinces are exempt from the land area
requirement.
Notes: What about the population requirement? Are
island-provinces exempt from complying with it as well?
Sec. 461, LGC requires that a province must comply
with the income requirement AND either the land area
requirement or the population requirement. In this
case, only ONE requirement was complied with.
Population Requirement
Mariano v. COMELEC
Petitioners assail the constitutionality of RA 7854
(converting the Municipality of Makati into a Highly
Urbanized City) insofar as it (1) did not identify the
territorial jurisdiction by metes and bounds, (2) attempts
to alter or restart the three-term limit, (3) increased the
legislative districts of the city by special law, (4) did not
include the additional legislative district in the title of the
law, and (5) added a legislative district despite the fact that
the population of Makati is only 450,000.
1. The law states that the City shall comprise the present
territory of the Municipality, without prejudice to the
resolution of pending disputes involving the territorial
jurisdiction of Makati and other LGUs.
Since there is a pending dispute between Makati and
Taguig over Fort Bonifacio, this was a proper move. The
requirement of metes and bounds was made in order to
provide a means by which the area of cities may be
reasonably ascertained.
2. This is premature. It assumes that Binay would run
again, win, then would run again after that. Most of the
petitioners arent even from Makati.
3. No. Tobias v. Abalos already addressed the issue. A
reapportionment can be done by special law. The
Constitution only requires that it be fixed by law, not
necessarily a general reapportionment law. If this werent
allowed, then every province or city created by special law
would not have the corresponding legislative district until
Congress provides for it in a general law.
4. 5(3), Art. VI provides that a city with at least 250,000
shall have at least one representative. Makatis legislative
district may be increased because it met the 250,000
requirement. In fact, section 3 of the Ordinance appended
to the Constitution provides that a city whose population
has increased to more than two hundred fifty thousand
(250,000) shall be entitled to at least one congressional
representative.
5. Title just has to express the general subject and the
provisions of the law have to be germane to such subject.
Aquino III v. COMELEC
RA 9716 was passed increasing the number of legislative
districts in the province of Camarines Sur from four to five.
Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the law insofar as
it leaves the first district with a population of only
176,383.
HELD: Sec. 5(3), Art. VI of the Constitution requires a
population of at least 250,000 only for cities. It is clear that
for provinces, there is no population requirement.
Moreover, in Mariano v. COMELEC, the Court held that the
9
250,000 requirement only serves to entitle a city to its
FIRST legislative district. It need not have another 250,000
before it can be entitled to a second district. For provinces,
the Local Government Code prescribes a minimum income,
not population, requirement for the creation of a province.
Clearly, the Framers of the Constitution did not mean for
the population of an area to be the only consideration in
the apportionment of legislative districts.
Bagabuyo v. COMELEC
RA 9371 increased Cagayan De Oros legislative districts
from one to two. Petitioner claims that the law cannot be
implemented until a plebiscite is conducted. Is the
reapportionment law considered one which involves the
division and conversion of an LGU, making a plebiscite a
condition sine qua non for its enforcement?
HELD: A plebiscite is not necessary. Reapportionment is
simply a realignment or change in legislative districts,
brought about by the change in population and
mandated by the Constitutional requirement of
proportional representation. In reapportionment, no
local government unit is created, divided, merged or
abolished. A new legislative district has no distinct
legal personality. In Tobias, it has already been settled
that a plebiscite is not needed for purposes of
reapportionment.
Sema v. COMELEC
The ARMM Regional Assembly enacted Mindanao
Autonomy Act No. 201 pursuant to its power to create
provinces under the ARMM Organic Act (RA 9054). They
created the province of Shariff Kabunsuan. Previously, the
municipalities which comprise the province formed part of
the first legislative district of Maguindanao. Now that
Shariff Kabunsuan is a separate province, is it likewise
entitled to its own legislative district?
The Court held that a province cannot be created
without a corresponding legislative district. For this
reason, it declared Section 19, Art. IV of RA 9054 and MMA
No. 201 unconstitutional. There was no express
prohibition nor grant to the Regional Assembly of the
power to create legislative districts.
The only logical conclusion is that only Congress can
create legislative districts. That being the case, the
power to create provinces cannot be delegated since
the creation of a province necessarily carries with it
the power to create a legislative district. The ARMM
Regional Assembly cannot create a province without a
legislative district because the Constitution mandates that
every province shall have a legislative district. Moreover,
the ARMM Regional Assembly cannot enact a law creating
a national office like the office of a district representative
of Congress because the legislative powers of the ARMM
Regional Assembly operate only within its territorial
jurisdiction as provided in Section 20, Article X of the
Constitution.
Residency Requirement
Domicile
- Every man has a domicile
- When established, remains until a new one
- Can only have one domicile
Acquisition of domicile
- Bodily presence
- Animus manendi (intent to stay)
- Animus nonrevertendi (no intent to return)
*Co v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
HRET declared private respondent a natural born Filipino
and a resident of Laoang, Northern Samar, for voting
purposes. In May 1987, the congressional election was
held, and respondent was duly elected. Petitioners
protested, saying private respondent was not a natural
born citizen, and that he is not a resident. HRET found for
private respondent. MR denied. Hence, this petition. Is Ong
a resident of Laoang, Samar?
YES. For purposes of election law, residence is
synonymous with domicile. The term refers to a fixed
permanent residence to which when absent for
business or pleasure, one intends to return. His
absence from Laoang to pursue and education and
profession cannot be considered abandonment of his
domicile. In other words, domicile is characterized by
animus revertendi. Jose Ong, Jr. never abandoned said
domicile; it remained fixed therein even up to the present.
The private respondent, in the proceedings before the
HRET sufficiently established that after the fire that gutted
their house in 1961, another one was constructed. It is not
required that a person should have a house in order to
establish his residence and domicile. It is enough that he
should live in the municipality or in a rented house or in
that of a friend or relative. To require the private
respondent to own property in order to be eligible to run
for Congress would be tantamount to a property
qualification. It has also been settled that absence from
residence to pursue studies or practice a profession or
registration as a voter other than in the place where one is
elected, does not constitute loss of residence. Private
respondent only stayed in Manila for studies and
profession, and this does not mean he has abandoned the
residence in Samar. The periodical journeys made to his
home province reveal that he always had the animus
revertendi.
*Aquino v. COMELEC
Agapito Aquino filed his CoC for Representative of the 2nd
district of Makati. He indicated that his residence in the
10
constituency was 10 months. Move Makati filed a petition
for disqualification. He amended his CoC by changing
residence to 1 year and 13 days. COMELEC dismissed the
petition. The elections were held and petitioner garnered
the highest number of votes. His proclamation was
suspended pending the outcome of Moves MR. Meanwhile,
COMELEC en banc reversed the dismissal and declared
petitioner ineligible for the position.
Does COMELEC have jurisdiction? YES. Petitioner has yet
to be proclaimed, hence the HRET is without jurisdiction to
entertain the same.
Did petitioner satisfy the residency requirement? NO. His
CoC for 1992 stated that his residence was in Tarlac.
Domicile is the same as residence in this case. He stated
that he was a resident of the same for 52 years. He was
also born there. This leads to the inescapable conclusion
that his domicile is origin is Tarlac and that he has not
changed the same.
The fact that he merely rented a condo militates against his
claim of residency in Makati. He does not intend on
permanently residing there. He has not shown intent to
abandon his domicile of origin. The lease contract is also
spurious.
Can Syjuco be proclaimed instead? No. He obviously wasnt
the choice of the electorate (Labo v. COMELEC).
Romualdez-Marcos v. COMELEC
Petitioner filed her CoC for the position of Representative
of the First District of Leyte. She indicated that her
residency in the locality was seven months. Syjuco
sought to have her disqualified, so she changed it to since
childhood. COMELEC disqualified petitioner.
Did she lose her domicile in Leyte? NO.
According to the Court, she did not. Mere absence of an
individual from his permanent residence without the
intention to abandon it does not result in a loss or change
of domicile. It is the fact of residence, not a statement in a
CoC which ought to be decisive in determining whether or
not and individual has satisfied the constitutions
residency qualification requirement. Residence is
acquired by living in place; on the other hand, domicile
can exist without actually living in the place. The
important thing for domicile is that, once residence
has been established in one place, there be an
intention to stay there permanently, even if residence
is also established in some other place.
Petitioner frequently returned to Leyte to celebrate
important milestones. Her conduct shows that she had no
intention to abandon her domicile of origin.
Perez v. COMELEC
Perez and Aguinaldo were both candidates for the position
of Representative of the 3rd District of Cagayan. Perez
sought to have Aguinaldo disqualified on the ground that
he actually resides in Gattaran, which is part of the 1st
District of Cagayan. Apparently, his voters registration in
Gattaran was transferred to Tuguegarao only in January of
1998. Aguinaldo countered that he was in fact living in
Tuguegarao, and has been doing so since 1988.
HELD: Being a registered voter in a certain locality
does not necessarily mean that the individual resides
there. The facts of the case show that from 1988-1998,
Aguinaldo served as Provincial Governor of Cagayan. Thus,
it would have been practical for him to reside in
Tuguegarao as that is the provinces seat of government.
Pundoadaya v. COMELEC
Pundaodaya filed a disqualification petition against Noble,
his wifes opponent for the post of Municipal Mayor of
Kinoguitan, Misamis Oriental. He alleged that Noble never
resided in Kinoguitan and that he lives and conducts
business in CDO. Noble asserts that he is in fact a resident
of the municipality and is a registered voter therein.
Comelec granted the petition. On MR, en banc reversed. It
held that the fact of registration as a voter and the
ownership of property are sufficient to establish residence
in the locality.
Did Noble comply with the residency requirement?
NO. For purposes of election law, residence does not
merely mean dwelling or habitation, but domicile or legal
residence. It is the place where a party actually or
constructively has his permanent home, where he, no
matter where he may be found at any given time,
eventually intends to return and remain.
Three rules on domicile:
a. a man must have a domicile somewhere;
b. once established it remains until a new one is
acquired;
c. a man can have but one residence or domicile at a
time.
How to change domicile?
Actual removal, intention of abandoning former
place and establishing a new one, and definite acts
which correspond with the purpose.
Noble presented the following: voters registration,
marriage certificate, affidavits of residents, receipts for
utility bills, deed of sale over real property. Deed of sale
was spurious. He admitted that he did not own property
there. Barangay Kagawad of CDO stated that Noble is a
resident of the barangay. Barangay Kagawad of Misamis
11
stated that Noble never resided there. Official receipts
show residence and business in Lapasan, CDO. List of Brgy.
Household Inhabitants of Mayor Narciso Go did not
include Noble or his wife.
Vice mayor to succeed as mayor.
Limbona v. COMELEC
Mohammad Limbona and his wife Norlainie both filed
CoCs for Mayor of Pantar, Lanao del Norte. Alingan filed a
disqualification case against Mohammad and against
petitioner. Petitioner withdrew. COMELEC disqualified
Mohammad for lacking the one year residency
requirement. Petitioner filed a CoC as substitute. Another
disqualification case was filed. The COMELEC disqualified
petitioner because the SC had already decided the first
disqualification petition filed by Alingan. It was decided
that her domicile of origin was Maguing, Lanao del Norte.
When she got married she followed the domicile of her
husband in Marawi City. There is no evidence to show that
she abandoned either of the two. She is not even a
registered voter in Pantar. As regards the disqualification
case against her husband, it was declared that he changed
his residence on November 11, 2006. Still less than one
year.
Court is bound by the judgment previously rendered.
Other Requirements
Social Justice Society v. Dangerous Drugs Board and
Pimentel v. COMELEC
SJS assails the constitutionality of RA 9165 insofar as it
requires mandatory drug testing for students of secondary
and tertiary schools, officers and employees of private and
public offices, all persons charged with a crime punishable
by a penalty >6 years, and all candidates for public office.
Pimentel objects to the requirement for public office.
Resolution 6486 and Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 are
unconstitutional. The Constitution imposes the
requirements for senatorial candidates. This cannot
be enlarged or expanded by Congress. By requiring a
drug test prior to approval of a CoC, it is unmistakably
an additional qualification. Since it is mandatory, it
necessarily means that one cannot be voted for or cannot
assume office if he fails to undergo the testing. Resolution
is no longer enforceable as it was only for the purposes of
the 2004 election.
Sec. 36(c) requiring drug testing in secondary and tertiary
schools is valid. While mandatory, it is random and
suspicionless. Schools stand in loco parentis with respect
to their students. Minor students have fewer rights than
adults (parental authority). Schools have a duty to
safeguard the health and well-being. Schools have the right
to impose conditions on admission that are fair, just, and
non-discriminatory.
Sec. 36(d) is likewise valid. The search is reasonable,
applying the balancing of interests standard. The states
interest in curtailing the proliferation of drugs and
protecting the well-being of its citizens outweighs the
employees privacy interests. There is a reduced
expectation of privacy on the part of employees. They are
subject to the companys rules and policies, the CBA, and
the inherent right of the management to maintain
discipline and efficiency. RA 9165 provides safeguards
against violations of privacy. The results shall be kept on a
need-to-know basis. The employer is not obliged to report
violations of RA 9165. If the private sector employees are
subject to such restrictions, more so should such
restrictions apply to their counterparts in the public sector
(accountability of public officers).
There is no undue delegation. The law expressly provides
the manner of testing. It enumerates the persons. The
testing shall be in accordance with the student handbook
and with notice to parents. Work rules are also taken into
consideration.
Term of Office
- Transitory: 5 years, both Senate and HoR
- Purpose: synchronicity of elections
Dimaporo v. Mitra
Petitioner was elected Representative of the 2nd District of
Lanao del Sur. During his term, he filed a CoC for the
position of Governor of Lanao del Sur. Section 67 BP 881
provides that Any elective official whether national or
local running for any office other than the one which he is
holding in a permanent capacity except for President and
Vice-President shall be considered ipso facto resigned
from his office upon the filing of his certificate of
candidacy. Pursuant to said provision, Mitra removed
petitioners name from the Roll of Members of the HoR. His
staff were also dismissed and his office was given to
someone else. Petitioner was NOT elected Governor. He
wanted to reassume his post as Congressman.
HELD: Petitioner cannot reassume his post.
There is no conflict between BP 881 and the 1987
Constitution. His act of filing a CoC for the position of
Governor may be considered as voluntary
renunciation of office. His term was not shortened.
Petitioners successor will be allowed to serve the
unexpired portion of his term. Only his tenure as
Congressman was cut short by his voluntary renunciation.
12
Synchronized Terms of Office
Art 18, Sec 1-2
Section 1. The first elections of Members of the Congress
under this Constitution shall be held on the second Monday
of May, 1987.
The first local elections shall be held on a date to be
determined by the President, which may be simultaneous
with the election of the Members of the Congress. It shall
include the election of all Members of the city or municipal
councils in the Metropolitan Manila area.
Section 2. The Senators, Members of the House of
Representatives, and the local officials first elected under
this Constitution shall serve until noon of June 30, 1992.
Party-List System
Intended to democratize political power, giving a
chance to political parties who could not win in
legislative district elections
Because of entrenched political families
- Why cant they win?
Because they do not have well-defined political
constituents
But the interests they promote are of national
interest, although marginalized
- Rationale:
To change the government from a government of
people to a government of principles
Refusal/Cancellation of Registration:
a. Religious sectors
b. Advocating violence or unlawful means
c. Foreign organization or party
d. Receiving aid from foreign political
parties/government
e. Violates or fails to comply
f. Declares untruthful statements in petition
g. Ceased to exist for at least 1 year
h. Fails to participate in the last 2 elections or
fails to obtain at least 2% of the votes cast
under the PLS in 2 preceding elections
RA 7941 An Act Providing for the Election of Party-List
Representatives through the Party-List System
Section 8. Nomination of Party-List Representatives. Each
registered party, organization or coalition shall submit to
the COMELEC not later than forty-five (45) days before the
election a list of names, not less than five (5), from which
party-list representatives shall be chosen in case it obtains
the required number of votes.
A person may be nominated in one (1) list only. Only persons
who have given their consent in writing may be named in
the list. The list shall not include any candidate for any
elective office or a person who has lost his bid for an elective
office in the immediately preceding election. No change of
names or alteration of the order of nominees shall be
allowed after the same shall have been submitted to the
COMELEC except in cases where the nominee dies, or
withdraws in writing his nomination, becomes incapacitated
in which case the name of the substitute nominee shall be
placed last in the list. Incumbent sectoral representatives in
the House of Representatives who are nominated in the
party-list system shall not be considered resigned.
*Veterans Federation Party v. COMELEC
Pursuant to RA 7941, COMELEC proclaimed the
representatives of 12 party lists who were able to hurdle
the 2% requirement in the 1998 elections. Various party
lists filed petitions with the COMELEC to proclaim the full
number of representatives provided by the Constitution.
They assert that COMELECs act of proclaiming only 14
representatives violates the 20% requirement provided by
the Constitution. Because of this, COMELEC proclaimed 38
more representatives, thus allocating 52 seats in total. The
Commission en banc decided that it should allocate the
seats to the 38 who were not able to hurdle the 2%
requirement.
The Court enunciated 4 inviolable parameters of a
party-list election:
First, the twenty percent allocation the combined
number of all partylist congressmen shall not exceed
twenty percent of the total membership of the House of
Representatives, including those elected under the party
list;
Second, the two percent threshold only those parties
garnering a minimum of two percent of the total valid
votes cast for the partylist system are qualified to have a
seat in the House of Representatives;
Third, the threeseat limit each qualified party,
regardless of the number of votes it actually obtained, is
entitled to a maximum of three seats; that is, one
qualifying and two additional seats;
Fourth, proportional representation the additional
seats which a qualified party is entitled to shall be
computed in proportion to their total number of votes.
Three issues were raised before the SC:
1. WoN the 20% is a mandatory allocation or a mere
ceiling;
2. WoN the 2% threshold and the 3-seat-limit are
unconstitutional; and
3. How should the additional seats be allocated?
13
The 20% allocation is a mere ceiling.
The Constitution simply says that the PL representatives
shall constitute 20% of the total number of
representatives. The mechanics were left to Congress,
which in turn enacted RA 7941. It declared the policy of
proportional representation, but likewise required
participating groups to obtain at least 2% of votes to make
sure that such groups actually represent a sufficient
number of constituents.
The 2% threshold is constitutional.
SC looked into the Senate discussion on the bill in order to
arrive at the conclusion that the 2% requirement was
imposed in order to ensure that parties have a sufficient
number of constituents deserving of representation in
Congress.
The three-seat-limit is constitutional.
This is to ensure that no single party, no matter how large
its constituency is, would dominate the party-list seats, if
not the entire House.
Method of allocating seats:
1. Rank all the parties from highest to lowest. The party
receiving the highest number of votes shall be referred to
as the First Party.
2. Divide the number of votes cast for a certain party by
the total number of votes cast for the entire party-list
system. If the quotient is at least 2%, the party is entitled
to one seat.
Additional seats for the first party:
If the percentage of the first party is at least 6%, it is
entitled to two extra seats for a total of three.
If the percentage is at least 4% but less than 6%, it is
entitled to one extra seat for a total of two.
Ang Bagong Bayani v. COMELEC (2001)
At issue in this case is the eligibility of political parties to
participate in the party-list system. The Court held that
based on the provisions of RA 7941, they are eligible to
participate provided that they comply with the laws
requirements. However, the PL system is still limited to the
marginalized and underrepresented.
The Court identified eight guidelines to aid the
COMELEC in screening party-list applicants:
1. They must represent the marginalized and
underrepresented;
2. They must comply with the declared statutory
policy of enabling Filipino citizens belonging to
 marginalized and underrepresented sectors x x x to be
elected to the House of Representatives.
3. They must not belong to the religious sector;
4. They must not be disqualified under Section 6 of RA
7941;
5. They must not be an adjunct of, or a project
organized or an entity funded or assisted by, the
government;
6. Their nominees must also comply with Section 9 of
RA 7941;
7. Their nominees must also represent the
marginalized and underrepresented sectors; and
8. While lacking a well-defined constituency, they
must be able to contribute to the formulation and
enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit
the nation as a whole.
Case remanded to the COMELEC to conduct hearings on
the qualifications of party-list participants.
Ang Bagong Bayani v. COMELEC (2003)
Pursuant to the Courts decision in the first Ang Bagong
Bayani case, the COMELEC declared some party-list groups
disqualified from participating in the 2001 elections. 4
groups and their respective nominees were proclaimed
winners. COMELEC later issued two more compliance
reports affirmed by the Court.
First issue: BUHAY and COCOFEDs qualifications
The Court declared that the COMELEC erred in
disqualifying the two parties. There is no substantial
evidence to prove that BUHAY is an adjunct of El Shaddai,
and COCOFED, of the government.
Second issue: Legal effect of the disqualifications on the
Total Votes Cast
Section 10 of RA 7941 provides that a vote cast for a
party, sectoral organization, or coalition not entitled to be
voted for shall not be counted. The language being clear
and unambiguous, there is no room for interpretation.
Third issue: Determining the winners
Court determined the winners based on the formula
enunciated in Veterans.
BANAT v. COMELEC (April 2009)
On July 9, 2007, COMELEC promulgated NBC Resolution
No. 07-60, proclaiming 13 parties as winners in the party-
list elections. Later on, it issued Resolution No. 07-72,
which declared the additional seats allocated to the
14
qualified parties. It used the 6-2-4 rule for the first party
and the Veterans formula for the other qualified parties.
First issue: Constitutionality of the Veterans formula
Veterans interprets the clause in proportion to their total
number of votes to be in proportion to the votes of the
first party. This interpretation is contrary to the express
language of R.A. No. 7941. The formula must be revisited.
Second issue: Constitutionality of the 2% threshold and
the three-seat cap
The continued operation of the 2% threshold for the
distribution of additional seats is unconstitutional. This
would make it mathematically impossible to achieve the
maximum number of party-list seats when the number of
available seats exceeds 50.
While the 20% allocation remains to be a ceiling, the Court
cannot allow the continued existence of a provision in the
law which will systematically prevent all the seats from
being filled.
The three-seat cap remains to be valid as it prevents any
party from dominating the party-list elections.
Third issue: Allocating additional seats
In computing the additional seats, the guaranteed seats
shall no longer be included because they have already
been allocated, at one seat each, to every-two percenter.
The whole integer of the product represents a partys
share in the remaining available seats.
Fractional seats will not be considered. Finally, the three-
seat cap shall be applied.
Fourth issue: Participation of major political parties in the
party-list elections
Neither the Constitution nor RA 7941 prohibits major
political parties from participating. Read together with the
deliberations of the ConCom, it can be concluded that
major political parties are allowed to form coalitions with
sectoral organizations for electoral or political purposes.
For example, the Nacionalista Party can establish a
fisherfolk wing to participate in the party-list election, and
this fisherfolk wing can field its fisherfolk nominees.
However, by a vote of 8-7, the Court resolved to disallow
the participation of major political parties in the
party-list elections.
BANAT v. COMELEC (July 2009)
Motions for reconsideration and intervention were filed in
response to the Courts April 2009 decision. The Court
revised its four parameters first enunciated in Veterans,
viz:
1. Twenty percent of the total number of the membership
of the House of Representatives is the maximum number
of seats available to partylist organizations, such that
there is automatically one partylist seat for every four
existing legislative districts.
2. Garnering two percent of the total votes cast in the
partylist elections guarantees a partylist organization
one seat. The guaranteed seats shall be distributed in a
first round of seat allocation to parties receiving at least
two percent of the total partylist votes.
3. The additional seats, that is, the remaining seats after
allocation of the guaranteed seats, shall be distributed to
the partylist organizations including those that received
less than two percent of the total votes. The continued
operation of the two percent threshold as it applies to the
allocation of the additional seats is now unconstitutional
because this threshold mathematically and physically
prevents the filling up of the available partylist seats. The
additional seats shall be distributed to the parties in a
second round of seat allocation according to the twostep
procedure laid down in the Decision of 21 April 2009 as
clarified in this Resolution.
4. The threeseat cap is constitutional. The threeseat cap
is intended by the Legislature to prevent any party from
dominating the partylist system. There is no violation of
the Constitution because the 1987 Constitution does not
require absolute proportionality for the partylist system.
The wellsettled rule is that courts will not question the
wisdom of the Legislature as long as it is not violative of
the Constitution.
Paglaum v. COMELEC
54 petitions for certiorari and prohibition were filed by 52
party-list groups assailing the COMELECs Resolutions
disqualifying them from participating in the 13 May 2013
elections.
First issue: Grave abuse of discretion by the COMELEC
The Court held that COMELEC did not commit grave abuse
of discretion in disqualifying petitioners. However, since
the Court adopted new parameters in the qualification of
national, regional, and sectoral parties, the cases were
remanded back to COMELEC.
Is the party-list system open only to sectoral parties?
NO. The unmistakable intent of the Framers is to include in
the party-list system both sectoral and non-sectoral
parties (see Sec. 5(1), Art. VI). Thus, the party-list system
is composed of three different groups:
1. National parties or organizations;
2. Regional parties or organizations;
3. Sectoral parties or organizations.
15
Does a party have to represent the marginalized and
underrepresented to be able to participate in the
party-list elections?
NO. Neither the Constitution nor RA 7941 requires it. In
fact, RA 7941 provides a definition of a political party
(advocating an ideology or platform) and a sectoral party
(principal advocacy) pertains to the special interest of
their sector). They are not the same. A political party need
not be organized as a sectoral party and need not
represent any particular sector.
The sectors mentioned in Sec. 5 of RA 7941 are not all
necessarily marginalized and underrepresented.
Moreover, Sec. 6 does not list non-representation of a
marginalized and underrepresented sector as a ground to
refuse or cancel registration under the party-list system.
Finally, the phrase marginalized and underrepresented
appears only once in RA 7941, in its declaration of policy.
Second issue: Application of Ang Bagong Bayani and
BANAT rulings
Both rulings are inapplicable. Ang Bagong Bayani listed the
8-point guidelines which specifically require that a party
represent the marginalized and underrepresented. In
BANAT, the Court specifically declared that political
parties are not allowed to participate in the party-list
system.
Thus, we remand all the present petitions to the
COMELEC. In determining who may participate in the
coming 13 May 2013 and subsequent party-list elections,
the COMELEC shall adhere to the following parameters:
1. Three different groups may participate in the party-list
system: (1) national parties or organizations, (2) regional
parties or organizations, and (3) sectoral parties or
organizations;
2. National parties or organizations and regional parties or
organizations do not need to organize along sectoral lines
and do not need to represent any marginalized and
underrepresented sector;
3. Political parties can participate in party-list elections
provided they register under the party-list system and do
not field candidates in legislative district elections. A
political party, whether major or not, that fields candidates
in legislative district elections can participate in party-list
elections only through its sectoral wing that can separately
register under the party-list system. The sectoral wing is
by itself an independent sectoral party, and is linked to a
political party through a coalition;
4. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be
marginalized and underrepresented or lacking in well-
defined political constituencies. It is enough that their
principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and
concerns of their sector. The sectors that are marginalized
and underrepresented include labor, peasant, fisherfolk,
urban poor, indigenous cultural communities,
handicapped, veterans, and overseas workers. The sectors
that lack well-defined political constituencies include
professionals, the elderly, women, and the youth;
5. A majority of the members of sectoral parties or
organizations that represent the marginalized and
underrepresented must belong to the marginalized and
underrepresented sector they represent. Similarly, a
majority of the members of sectoral parties or
organizations that lack well-defined political
constituencies must belong to the sector they represent.
The nominees of sectoral parties or organizations that
represent the marginalized and underrepresented, or
that represent those who lack well-defined political
constituencies, either must belong to their respective
sectors, or must have a track record of advocacy for their
respective sectors. The nominees of national and regional
parties or organizations must be bona-fide members of
such parties or organizations;
6. National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations
shall not be disqualified if some of their nominees are
disqualified, provided that they have at least one nominee
who remains qualified.
Amores v. HRET
Amores assails the proclamation of Emmanuel Joel
Villanueva as PL rep of CIBAC (quo warranto). HRET
dismissed on the grounds that (1) the age limit for youth
sector reps applicable only to 1st 3 terms after ratification
of the constitution ( 9), and (2) Villanuevas shift from
youth to OFW sector did not amount to a change in PL
affiliation ( 15). The petition was also filed out of time.
SC ruled that since it could not ascertain the date of
Villanuevas proclamation, it would brush aside
technicalities. On the first issue, there is no textual support
for HRETs claim that the age requirement applies only to
the first 3 terms after the ratification of the constitution or
until 1998. Since RA 7941 was enacted in March 1995, the
provision would only apply for the 1995 elections. On the
second issue, 15 applies to both a change in party
affiliation and sectoral affiliation. Villanueva was more
than 30 years old in May 07. He did not switch sectoral
affiliations 6 months prior (only did it in March).
Ang Ladlad LGBT Party v. COMELEC
Ang Ladlad filed for accreditation as a PL group with the
COMELEC. It alleged that it complied with the 8 pt.
guidelines laid down in Ang Bagong Bayani. It seeks to
represent the LGBTs who are disadvantaged because of
their sexual orientation and gender identity. COMELEC
dismissed the application on moral grounds. It held that
the group tolerated immorality because of its definition of
sexual orientation (attraction to the same sex, etc.). The
16
Commission cited CC definitions of nuisances, and
prohibitions against contractual stipulations that are
contrary to good morals, RPC definition of immoral
doctrines, etc. COMELEC en banc upheld the
disqualification as there is no showing that the interests of
petitioner are likewise the interests of the nation. It
ratiocinated that the Bill of Rights applies to both males
and females alike, hence the LGBT is not a special class.
COMELEC argues that the LGBT sector is not among the
sectors listed in the Const. and in RA 7941.
SC granted the petition. Petitioner never claimed to exist in
all provinces. No misrepresentation there. COMELEC
committed GAD when it denied petitioners application on
RELIGIOUS grounds. COMELEC has not identified any overt
immoral act performed by petitioner. Moral disapproval is
not a sufficient governmental interest to justify exclusion
of homosexuals from participating in the PL system. SC is
not ready to rule that LGBTs comprise a special class in
themselves.
V.C. Cadangen v. COMELEC
The Alliance of Civil Servants applied for registration with
the COMELEC as a sectoral party. The Commission denied
their application on the ground that they failed to prove
(1) nationwide constituency, and (2) representation of a
marginalized and underrepresented sector. The COMELEC
en banc affirmed the denial of their application not on the
basis of (1), but of (2).
The Supreme Court held that certiorari does not lie
because the writs purpose is to address issues of GAD or
lack of jurisdiction. RA 7941 empowers the COMELEC to
determine the qualifications of PL groups. The Court is not
a trier of facts. It cannot grant the prayer of petitioners for
registration as a PL group as that would require evaluation
of evidence; such function properly pertains to the
COMELEC. Petition denied without prejudice to the re-
filing of an application for registration.
Magdalo Para sa Pagbabago v. COMELEC
Magdalo filed for accreditation with the COMELEC as a
regional political party based in the NCR. COMELEC denied
its petition on the ground that its members participation
in the Oakwood Mutiny clearly showed their purpose in
employing violence and using unlawful means to achieve
their goals. Later, they filed a Manifestation of Intent to
Participate in the PL System of Representation. This
petition was likewise denied.
COMELEC did not commit GAD in taking judicial notice of
the Oakwood Mutiny, and in finding that Magdalo
advocates the use of violence. Neither was its decision a
prejudgment of the criminal case against petitioners
pending in the trial court. A different quantum of evidence
is required. The SC however, acknowledged the
subsequent amnesty granted by the President to the
members of Magdalo. This was adopted by Congress as
well as amnesty obliterates an offense as though no
offense had ever been committed. To sustain the finding of
the COMELEC would be inconsistent with the legal effects
of amnesty.
Magdalo may re-file a petition for accreditation, subject to
the execution of an affidavit denouncing the use of violence
by each of its members. Moreover, no active member of the
AFP can join the party.
Lokin v. COMELEC (2012)
Two different entities, both purporting to represent CIBAC,
filed a Manifestation of Intent to Participate in the PL
System of Representation with the COMELEC. Pia Derla
claimed to be the partys acting Sec-Gen. Cruz-Gonzales
and Jose, as the partys VP and Sec-Gen, filed the second
manifestation. COMELEC gave due course to the
Manifestation, provided it be determined which among the
2 factions is the official representative of CIBAC. Both
parties filed respective Certificates of Nomination. Herein
petitioners Lokin and Planas were Derlas nominees.
Villanueva moved to expunge the petitioners names from
the records as they were not authorized to represent the
PL.
Petitioners claim that COMELEC should not have taken
cognizance of the Petition to Expunge, as the issue therein
involved was an intra-corporate one. They likewise insist
that they be named the official representatives of CIBAC
Foundation, Inc., the SEC-registered body.
Respondents counter that the foundation only acts as
CIBACs legal and financial arm, as provided as the partys
Constitution and Bylaws.
HELD: COMELEC has jurisdiction over the case. Precedents
cited were LDP v. COMELEC (COMELEC has a duty to
protect the party and the electorate from a candidate
misrepresenting himself), Atienza v. COMELEC (among its
powers include ascertainment of the identity of the party,
determination of persons who must act on its behalf). RA
7941 gives COMELEC authority to ascertain the
qualifications of nominees. It prescribed rules that require
the presentation of documentary evidence to prove their
qualifications.
Pia Derla failed to produce evidence to show her authority
as Sec-Gen. On the other hand, Villanueva, et al., followed
the procedure detailed in the partys Const. CIBACs
National Council delegated to him the task of choosing the
partys nominees.
Lokin v. COMELEC (2010)
CIBAC submitted a list of nominees in the following order:
(1) Villanueva, (2) Lokin, (3) Cruz-Gonzales, (4) Tugna,
and (5) Galang. Pres. Villanueva later filed an amendment
and substitution of the list names of Lokin, Tugna, and
17
Galang were withdrawn, and substituted Borje. The
nominees then were Villanueva, Cruz-Gonzales, Borje.
Villanueva wrote a letter to Abalos with a petition signed
by 81% of CIBAC members confirming the withdrawal of
petitioners nominations. COMELEC approved the
withdrawal. Cruz-Gonzales was proclaimed the second
official nominee of CIBAC.
This is not an election protest, since petitioners and
respondents belong to the same party. Neither is it a quo
warranto petition, because Gonzales is not disqualified
from running.
Requisites of administrative IRRs:
1. Must be authorized by legislature;
2. Must be within the scope of authority given by the
legislature;
3. Must be promulgated in accordance with the
prescribed procedure;
4. Must be reasonable.
First requisite: COMELEC is authorized by the Constitution,
the Omnibus Election Code, and the Party List Act to
promote IRRs.
Third requisite: Resolution No. 7804 underwent the
procedural necessities of publication and dissemination.
BUT, Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 is ultra vires and
void, as it allows substitution of nominees when:
1. The nominee dies;
2. The nomination is withdrawn by the party;
3. The nominee becomes incapacitated; or
4. The nominee withdraws his acceptance to a
nomination.
Section 8 of RA 7941 allows the change of nominees only
when:
1. The nominee dies;
2. The nominee withdraws in writing his nomination;
or
3. The nominee becomes incapacitated.
None of the circumstances were present in the case at bar.
To allow changes to the list is to allow circumvention of
the voters demand for transparency. No arbitrary
withdrawal is allowed. An express enumeration of things
excludes all others not enumerated.
Lokin proclaimed as a PL representative of CIBAC.
2. Election
Art 6, Sec 8-9
Section 8. Unless otherwise provided by law, the regular
election of the Senators and the Members of the House of
Representatives shall be held on the second Monday of May.
Section 9. In case of vacancy in the Senate or in the House
of Representatives, a special election may be called to fill
such vacancy in the manner prescribed by law, but the
Senator or Member of the House of Representatives thus
elected shall serve only for the unexpired term.
RA 6645 An Act Prescribing the Manner of Filing a
Vacancy in the Congress of the Philippines
Section 1. In case a vacancy arises in the Senate at least
eighteen (18) months or in the House of Representatives at
least (1) year before the next regular election for Members
of Congress, the Commission on Elections, upon receipt of a
resolution of the Senate or the House of Representatives, as
the case may be, certifying to the existence of such vacancy
and calling for a special election, shall hold a special election
to fill such vacancy.f Congress is in recess, an official
communication on the existence of the vacancy and call for a
special election by the President of the Senate or by the
Speaker of the House of Representatives, as the case may be,
shall be sufficient for such purpose. The Senator or Member
of the House of Representatives thus elected shall serve only
for the unexpired term.
Section 2. The Commission on Elections shall fix the date of
the special election, which shall not be earlier than forty-five
(45) days not later than ninety (90) days from the date of
such resolution or communication, stating among other
things the office or offices to be voted for: provided, however,
that if within the said period a general election is scheduled
to be held, the special election shall be held simultaneously
with such general election.
Section 3. The Commission on Elections shall send copies of
the resolution, in number sufficient for due distribution and
publication, to the Provincial of City Treasurer of each
province or city concerned, who in turn shall publish it in
their respective localities by posting at least three copies
thereof in as many conspicuous places in each of their
election precincts, and a copy in each of the polling places
and public markets, and in the municipal buildings.
Section 4. This Act shall take effect upon its publication in
the Official Gazette or in at least two newspapers of general
circulation.
Art 9, C, Sec 11 Constitutional Commissions
Section 11. Funds certified by the Commission as necessary
to defray the expenses for holding regular and special
18
elections, plebiscites, initiatives, referenda, and recalls, shall
be provided in the regular or special appropriations and,
once approved, shall be released automatically upon
certification by the Chairman of the Commission.
Lozada v. COMELEC
Petitioners filed a petition for mandamus to compel the
COMELEC to hold a special election pursuant to Section
5(2), Art. VIII of the 1973 Constitution. It provides: In case
a vacancy arises in the Batasang Pambansa eighteen
months or more before a regular election, the Commission
on Election shall call a special election to be held within
sixty (60) days after the vacancy occurs to elect the
Member to serve the unexpired term. At the time, there
were 12 vacancies in the Interim Batasang Pambansa. Are
petitioners entitled to the writ?
NO. Said provision does not apply to the Interim BP
because, as passed by the Constitutional Convention, the
Interim BP was to be composed by the delegates to the
Constitutional Convention, as well as the then incumbent
President and Vice-President, and the members of the
Senate and House of Representatives of Congress under
the 1935 Constitution. With such a number of
representatives, there was no need for filing vacancies
occurring in the Interim National Assembly, considering
the uncertainty of the duration of its existence. What was
in the mind of the Constitutional Convention in providing
for special elections to fill up vacancies is the regular
National Assembly, because a province or representative
district would have only one representative in the said
National Assembly. It is also worth noting that the
provision invoked by petitioners is located in the section
pertaining to the Legislative Department, and not in the
Transitory Provisions.
3. Salaries, Privileges, and
Disqualifications
a. Salaries
Art 6, Sec 10
Section 10. The salaries of Senators and Members of the
House of Representatives shall be determined by law. No
increase in said compensation shall take effect until
after the expiration of the full term of all the Members
of the Senate and the House of Representatives
approving such increase.
Art 18, Sec 17 Transitory Provisions
Section 17. Until the Congress provides otherwise, the
President shall receive an annual salary of three hundred
thousand pesos; the Vice-President, the President of the
Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, and the
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, two hundred forty
thousand pesos each; the Senators, the Members of the
House of Representatives, the Associate Justices of the
Supreme Court, and the Chairmen of the Constitutional
Commissions, two hundred four thousand pesos each; and
the Members of the Constitutional Commissions, one
hundred eighty thousand pesos each.
PHILCONSA v. Mathay
RA 4134 was passed in 1964, providing for an increase in
the salaries of members of the Senate and of the House of
Representatives. Petitioner seeks to enjoin respondent
Auditor General from authorizing the disbursement of the
new increased amounts because such act is alleged to be
contrary to the Constitution. The 1935 Constitution
provides: No increase in said compensation shall take
effect until after the expiration of the full term of all the
Members of the Senate and of the House of
Representatives approving such, increase. The senators
who approved the law were elected in 1963, hence their
term would expire only in 1969. On the other hand, the
terms of the members of the House who participated in the
approval of the increase ended in 1965.
HELD: The use of the word term in the singular, when
combined with the following phrase all the members of
the Senate and of the House, means terms of office of all
members of the Legislature that enacted the measure must
have expired before the increase in compensation can
become operative. The intendment of the clause has been
to require expiration of the full term of all members of the
Legislature that approved the higher compensation,
whether the Legislature be unicameral or bicameral, in
order to circumvent, as far as possible, the influence of
self-interest in its adoption. The singular use of term
precisely emphasizes that the Constitution envisaged both
legislative chambers as one single unit, and this conclusion
is reinforced by the expression employed, until the
expiration of the full term of ALL the members of the
Senate and of the House of Representatives approving
such increase.
Ligot v. Mathay
Petitioners term of office ended on December 30, 1969. He
qualified for retirement benefits. He argues that these
benefits should be computed on the basis of the increased
salary rates provided in RA 4134.
HELD: Petitioner is entitled only to the salary he was
actually receiving at the time he was serving as
Congressman. If the Court were to allow the
disbursement of the increased amounts, it would be
tantamount to doing indirectly what could not be done
directly. Retirement gratuities are compensatory in nature,
which necessarily requires that the amount received by
the beneficiary is equivalent to his salary as provided by
19
law. In this case, petitioner is entitled to receive amounts
corresponding to the prevailing salary rates prior to the
enactment of RA 4134.
b. Freedom from Arrest
Art 6, Sec 11
Section 11. A Senator or Member of the House of
Representatives shall, in all offenses punishable by not more
than six years imprisonment, be privileged from arrest while
the Congress is in session. No Member shall be questioned
nor be held liable in any other place for any speech or debate
in the Congress or in any committee thereof.
Art 145 Revised Penal Code
Art. 145. Violation of Parliamentary Immunity The penalty
of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall
use force, intimidation, threats, or fraud to prevent any
member of the National Assembly (Congress of the
Philippines) from attending the meetings of the Assembly
(Congress) or of any of its committees or subcommittees,
constitutional commissions or committees or divisions
thereof, from expressing his opinions or casting his vote; and
the penalty of prision correccional shall be imposed upon
any public officer or employee who shall, while the Assembly
(Congress) is in regular or special session, arrest or search
any member thereof, except in case such member has
committed a crime punishable under this Code by a penalty
higher than prision mayor.
Martinez v. Morfe
Petitioners were delegates to the Constitutional
Convention. Martinez was charged with falsification of a
public document while Bautista was charged with certain
election offenses relating to his act of distributing free food
and cigarettes at two public meetings. Both petitioners
were arrested. They invoke immunity from suit. They also
cite Art. 145 of the RPC which punishes the arrest of
members of Congress, except when they commit offenses
punishable by a penalty of prision mayor or higher.
HELD: Petitioners cannot invoke immunity from suit. 1935
Constitution provides that immunity does not extend to
any prosecution for treason, felony, and breach of the
peace. The RPC provision cannot prevail over the
Constitution because the former took effect in 1932, and
the latter, in 1935.
People v. Jalosjos
While Jalosjos appeal of his conviction for rape was
pending with the Court of Appeals, he filed a Motion to be
Allowed to Discharge Mandate as a Member of the House
of Representatives. He contends that his continued
detention in the National Penitentiary would deprive his the member being suspended in this case is an elective and
constituents of representation. not an appointive one.

HELD: Jalosjos cannot be allowed to attend sessions. This Pobre v. Santiago

would practically make him a free man. Rape is punishable
by reclusion perpetua. The evidence of guilt is strong. NO
BAIL. There is no substantial distinction between a
Congressman and a regular citizen to warrant special
treatment. Furthermore, when the voters of the First
District of Zamboanga del Norte cast their votes in favor of
petitioner, they did so with full knowledge of the
limitations confronting petitioner. They were aware of the
charges against him.
c. Speech and Debate Clause
Sen. Santiago delivered a privileged speech concerning the
JBCs nominees for the position of Chief Justice. She made
derogatory remarks such as, but not limited to, a Supreme
Court of idiots, I spit in the face of CJ Panganiban, and I
am homicidal, I am suicidal. Pobre filed the present
administrative complaint urging the Court to look into the
possibility of disbarring Sen. Santiago. The Court dismissed
the complaint on the ground of parliamentary immunity.
Power of imposing disciplinary sanctions rests with
the Senate.

Art 6, Sec 11

Section 11. A Senator or Member of the House of

Representatives shall, in all offenses punishable by not more
than six years imprisonment, be privileged from arrest while
the Congress is in session. No Member shall be questioned
nor be held liable in any other place for any speech or debate
in the Congress or in any committee thereof.

Jimenez v. Cabangbang

Cabangbang, then a member of the House of

Representatives, caused the publication of an open letter
to the President in newspapers of general circulation. He
did so while Congress was not in session. The letter spoke
of a coup attempt, and it mentioned the names of herein
petitioners as persons under the control of the planners of
the alleged coup. Petitioners instituted an action for
damages against Cabangbang.

Is the letter covered by the Speech and Debate clause of

the Constitution? NO.

At the time, Congress was not in session. Cabangbang did

not publish the letter in the exercise of his official
functions. He was not acting as a member of the House or
any of its committees.

Osmea v. Pendatun

In a privileged speech, Osmea criticized Pres. Garcias

administration as being unpopular and corrupt. The House
resolved to suspend Osmea for 15 months. He invokes
parliamentary immunity.

HELD: The Constitution provides that speech and debate

cannot be questioned in any other place. This means that it
can be questioned in Congress. The Court will not
determine factual issues such as the existence of
disorderly conduct. That is for the House
to decide. The Resolution suspending Osmea was
unanimously approved. Alejandrino finds no application as

20
d. Disqualification
Members of the Legislature can hold a
government office other than his position if he
resigns
FORBIDDEN OFFICE vs. INCOMPATIBLE OFFICE
FORBIDDEN. Even if one resigns, he still
cant accept such position
When salary is increased during
term
One to which a member cannot
be APPOINTED. Prohibition lies
in the fiduciary nature of the
relationship involved
INCOMPATIBLE. Can be taken over once
resigned
Art. VI, Sec. 13
No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may
hold any other office or employment in the Government, or
any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof,
including government-owned or controlled corporations or
their subsidiaries, during his term without forfeiting his seat.
Neither shall he be appointed to any office which may have
been created or the emoluments thereof increased during
the term for which he was elected.
Adaza vs. Pacana Jr.
Petitioner and respondent were elected Governor and
Vice-Governor, respectively. Their terms were for 6 years,
commencing in 1980. Both filed CoCs for the Batasang
Pambansa elections in 1984. Petitioner won, and assumed
his post as Congressman. Pacaa was sworn in as the
Governor. Petitioner claims that he is entitled to serve both
in Congress and as Governor.
HELD: He cannot hold two positions simultaneously. The
Constitutions language is clear and unambiguous.
Respondent cannot be considered ipso facto resigned from
his post upon his filing of a CoC as BP 697 provides that he
is only considered to be on a forced leave of absence.
Liban vs. Gordon
Gordon was elected as Chairman of the Philippine National
Red Cross. Petitioner filed a Motion to Declare Gordon as
Having Forfeited His Seat.
Is the office of PNRC chair considered a government office?
NO. PNOC is not a government instrumentality. Neither is
it a GOCC. While it was created by special charter, it is not
subject to the ownership and control of the government.
The Court declared the PNRC charter void, without
prejudice to its reincorporation under the Corporation
Law.
PNRC was created by law under a special charter
(in my notes, it says PNRC is a GOCC :O)
21
According to the Court, PNRC should be void and
unconstitutional and must be incorporated under
Corporation Code
Art. VI, Sec. 14
No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may
personally appear as counsel before any court of justice or
before the Electoral Tribunals, or quasi- judicial and other
administrative bodies. Neither shall he, directly or indirectly,
be interested financially in any contract with, or in any
franchise or special privilege granted by the Government, or
any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof,
including any government-owned or controlled corporation,
or its subsidiary, during his term of office. He shall not
intervene in any matter before any office of the Government
for his pecuniary benefit or where he may be called upon to
act on account of his office.
Puyat vs. de Guzman, Jr.
Two opposing groups of International Pipes Industrys
(IPI) stockholders were parties to a quo warranto petition
filed with the SEC. Assemblyman Estanislao Fernandez
manifested his intent to appear as counsel for the Acero
group. Petitioner objected. Instead, Fernandez bought 10
shares of IPI, then filed a motion to intervene. Respondent
de Guzman granted the motion.
HELD: Fernandez is indirectly appearing as counsel, in
violation of the 1973 Constitution. One cannot do
indirectly what cannot be done directly.
OTHER PROHIBITIONS:
Personally appearing as counsel before
any Court of Justice, the Electoral
Tribunal, quasi-judicial bodies and other
administrative bodies
Applies to all courts
Not barred from practicing Law
though
Can even sign documents, just
dont appear personally; can give
legal advice; can continue being a
partner in a law firm
Being interested in any:
Contract with or
Franchise or special privilege
granted by the Government, its
subdivision, agency or
instrumentality, GOCC, or its
subsidiary
Intervening for his pecuniary benefit
Intervening in any matter where he may
be called upon to act or on account of his
office
All prohibitions apply during the term of office,
not just tenure
e. Duty to Disclose
Upon assumption of office, business and financial
interests must be disclosed to avoid potential
conflict of interest.
WHEN TO DISCLOSE SALN
1. Within 30 days after assuming office
2. On or before April 15 after the closing of calendar year
3. Upon expiration of term of office, resignation or
separation from office.
WHO SHOULD DISCLOSE TO THE PUBLIC
Supposedly, there should be public disclosure.
However, what happens is that a public officer
needs to file a petition before the SC and they have
to decide en banc on whether they can disclose the
SALN.
Art. XI, Sec. 17
A public officer or employee shall, upon assumption of office
and as often thereafter as may be required by law, submit a
declaration under oath of his assets, liabilities, and net
worth. In the case of the President, the Vice-President, the
Members of the Cabinet, the Congress, the Supreme Court,
the Constitutional Commissions and other constitutional
offices, and officers of the armed forces with general or flag
rank, the declaration shall be disclosed to the public in the
manner provided by law.
Art. VI, Sec. 12
All Members of the Senate and the House of Representatives
shall, upon assumption of office, make a full disclosure of
their financial and business interests. They shall notify the
House concerned of a potential conflict of interest that may
arise from the filing of a proposed legislation of which they
are authors.
Art. VI, Sec. 20
The records and books of accounts of the Congress shall be
preserved and be open to the public in accordance with law,
and such books shall be audited by the Commission on Audit
which shall publish annually an itemized list of amounts
paid to and expenses incurred for each Member.
RA 3019, Anti-Graft and Corruption Practices Acts
Rabe vs. Flores
An administrative complaint was lodged against Flores, a
court interpreter in the RTC of Davao. She was absolved
from the complaint, but the court asked her to explain why
she failed to disclose the fact that she owned a market stall
in her SALN. Court dismissed her from the service in view
of her non-disclosure of a business interest. Such
disclosure is required under RA 6713.
22
Cavite Crusade for Good Govt vs. Cajigal
SC received a letter from petitioner informing the Court of
respondents grossly immoral and illegal activities. It was
alleged that Cajigal did not declare certain assets in his
SALN. During the course of the investigation, it turned out
that he failed to file SALNs for the years 1984-1996. He
belatedly submitted them in 1997, admitting that he was
negligent and that his failure to file SALNs was due to his
unintentional inadvertence. The Court resolved to
suspend him for 6 months, without pay. No position exacts
a greater demand on moral righteousness than one in the
judiciary. RA 3019 aims to curtail and minimize
opportunities for official corruption, and to maintain a
standard of honesty in public service.
Concerned Taxpayer vs. Doblada
A letter-complaint was filed with the Ombudsman against
respondent Doblada, Sheriff IV of the RTC Pasig. He
allegedly acquired properties manifestly out of proportion
to his salary and other lawful income. NBI conducted an
investigation which yielded prima facie evidence of
unexplained wealth. Moreover, some of his SALNs could
not be located.
Can he be held liable for his failure to file TRUE and
DETAILED SALNs as required by the law?
YES. He is liable for the non-disclosures, inconsistencies,
and discrepancies. There were instances wherein
properties declared in the previous year were not listed in
succeeding years. The sources of such properties were
likewise inconsistent. Doblada was dismissed from the
service.
Ombudsman vs. Racho
DHYP Balita Action team wrote to petitioner to complain
about Rachos unexplained wealth. Respondent was the
chief of the Special Investigation Division of the BIR Cebu.
A fact- finding investigation was conducted. It was shown
that he had deposits in various banks amounting to over
PHP 5,000,000. He failed to disclose these deposits in his
SALNs. A complaint was filed against him for falsification
of public document and dishonesty. Racho was
subsequently dismissed from service. He put up various
defenses to justify the acquisition of wealth, but the Court
found these insufficient. What the law seeks to curtail is
the acquisition of unexplained wealth. If he had explained
the source of his assets in a satisfactory manner, he would
not have been dismissed. Dishonesty consists of making a
false statement in any material fact. Given such definition,
one can conclude that Rachos non-disclosures were in fact
indicative of his dishonesty, thus warranting the penalty of
dismissal.
Carabeo vs. Sandiganbayan
The Department of Finance conducted lifestyle checks on
its employees, resulting in the filing of charges against
petitioner for violation of RA 3019 and Art. 171, RPC. He
failed to disclose ownership of three cars, misdeclared the
acquisition cost of real property, and falsely declared his
net worth. He alleged that his superiors in the DoF had the
duty to inform him of errors in his SALN and that he was
entitled to correct them before charges could be filed. The
Court held that his superiors were not remiss in their
duties as they are only required to confirm that the
employees SALNs are complete and proper in form. They
are not tasked to scrutinize each and every item in the
SALN as this should be done by the employee submitting
such SALN.
4. Internal Government of Congress
a. Election of Officers
Art. VI, Sec. 16(1)
The Senate shall elect its President and the House of
Representatives, its Speaker, by a majority vote of all its
respective Members. Each House shall choose such other
officers as it may deem necessary
Art. VI, Sec. 19
The Electoral Tribunals and the Commission on
Appointments shall be constituted within thirty days after
the Senate and the House of Representatives shall have been
organized with the election of the President and the Speaker.
The Commission on Appointments shall meet only while the
Congress is in session, at the call of its Chairman or a
majority of all its Members, to discharge such powers and
functions as are herein conferred upon it.
Santiago and Tatad vs. Guingona
Senators Santiago and Tatad filed a petition for quo
warranto for the ouster of Senator Guingona as the
minority leader of Senate and proclaim Tatad in his place.
They allege that since Tatad lost in the voting for the
majority leader position and as the only member of the
minority, he automatically becomes the minority leader.
SC held that it acquired jurisdiction over the issue as there
was question of compliance with Art VI, Sec16(1) of the
Constitution. Petitioners theorize that majority referred
to those who voted for the winning senate president, while
the minority would constitute those who voted for the
losing nominee. The Court held that the interpretation of
petitioners find no clear support in the Constitution, laws,
and rules of Senate. No law states that the defeated
candidate for Senate President would automatically be
minority leader. While the method of choosing senate
president and house speaker is explicitly provided in
the Constitution, the method for filling in other
positions must be prescribed by Senate rules.
23
b. Quorum
To have a valid meeting, there has to be a quorum.
QUORUM majority of all the members of the
House
In the election of the Senate President and the
Speaker of HoR, there has to be a vote of majority
of all the members of the House
For a law to be passed, a vote of majority of the
quorum is needed.
SHIFTING MAJORITY majority shifts dependent
upon the number of people who attend.
Minimum number is + 1
Art. VI, Sec. 16(2)
A majority of each House shall constitute a quorum to do
business, but a smaller number may adjourn from day to day
and may compel the attendance of absent Members in such
manner, and under such penalties, as such House may
provide.
Avelino vs. Cuenco
This is a petition for quo warranto to declare petitioner the
rightful Senate President and oust respondent Cuenco who
was voted Senate President after petitioner and his allies
in Senate walked out. Senate President pro tempore
passed Resolution 67 declaring the seat for Senate
president vacant and designated Cuenco to it.
On the issue of WON the session of a rump senate a
continuation of the session which was initially validly
assembled with 22 members.
YES. The minority (10 members) who left cannot prevent
the remaining 12 from passing a resolution that was met
by a unanimous vote.
Was there quorum?
The Court held that the basis for counting quorum is the
total number of senators over which the senate can
have jurisdiction (basically those who are within
Philippine territory) during session. Thus, a senator
who is out of the country is not included while a
senator confined in a hospital in the country is
included. In this case, one senator was abroad at that time,
thus the total number of senators from which quorum
would be based is 23. The quorum requirement of 23
would be 12, thus the unanimous vote for Cuenca was
valid.
The afternoon session was a continuation of the
morning session where there was a quorum, so
yielding the seat to Cuenco was valid.
The existence of the quorum was not questioned
thereby making it a continuing session
Had it been questioned and found out that
there was no quorum, session would be
suspended
 QUORUM majority of the House is computed
only on the basis of members who the Court has
jurisdiction (as against majority of ALL the
members)
Senate has jurisdiction over 23 Senators
only (not counting the one who, at the
time, was in the US)
Suspension and expulsion
need to be voted by 2/3 of the House
c. Rules of Proceedings
Art. VI, Sec. 16(3)
Each House may determine the rules of its proceedings,
punish its Members for disorderly behavior, and, with the
concurrence of two-thirds of all its Members, suspend or
expel a Member. A penalty of suspension, when imposed,
shall not exceed sixty days.
Art. VI, Sec. 21
The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its
respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of
legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of
procedure. The rights of persons appearing in, or affected by,
such inquiries shall be respected.
Powers of Legislative Investigation (S P R)
Power to issue summons
Power to punish contempt
Power to determine its rules of
proceedings
Power to Issue Summons
Senate Blue Ribbon Committee vs. Majaducon
Anyone except the President and Justices of the SC may be
summoned. Court may not prevent a witness from
appearing in such hearing.
Power to Punish Contempt
Contempt in session is only for the particular
session; does not carry over to the following one.
Lopez v. De los Reyes
The House of Representatives had passed a resolution to
order the arrest of Candido Lopez who was to be
confined in Bilibid for 24 hours. Lopez had assaulted one
of the Members of the House, and because of that had been
held guilty of contempt by the House. The original
resolution had been issued on 6 Nov 1929, but Congress
adjourned on 8 Nov 1929. By the time of adjournment, the
arrest had not yet been served. Thus, during the following
24
Session, the House issued a confirmatory resolution and
issued another warrant to arrest Lopez. Lopez was taken
into custody soon after. Thus, he filed a petition to be
issued a writ of habeas corpus.
The SC decided in favor of Lopez.
1. The House of Representatives has a limited power to
punish for contempt. The nature of their power: coercive
rather than punitive. When Congress wields the power, it
does so in vindication of its own privileges. Such a power is
essential to ensure that Congress shall be able to perform
its duties without impediment.
2. The limit of imprisonment for contempt is a term not
exceeding the session of the deliberative body in which the
contempt occurred. Thus, imprisonment must cease
upon adjournment of the session. The resolution of the
previous session cannot be revived by mere approval.
There is precedent to hold imprisonment for contempt
beyond a session is allowed.
Arnault vs. Nazareno
The Senate created a special committee to investigate a
controversy surrounding the purchase of two estates by
American Citizen, Burt. The Government had ended up
paying Burt P1.5M for the purchase of said estates when
the latter had only paid P20K in total for the two, as down
payment. To aid its inquiry, the Committee called
Arnaultthe attorney of Burtto testify. Arnault said
that, of the P1.5M, he had enchased P440K, and had given
the money to another person, allegedly following the
instructions of Burt. He refused to divulge the name of the
recipient, and justified his refusal on his right against self-
incrimination. According to Arnault, if the person he ended
up identifying was a public official, then he may be held
liable for bribery; and even if the person was a private
citizen, he may be held liable for slander. Consequently, the
Senate held Arnault in contempt and committed him to the
custody of the Sergeant-at-Arms. The instructions of the
Senate were to keep Arnault imprisoned until he manes
the person who received the encashed portion in question.
Arnault petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus with the SC,
questioning the authority of the Senate to hold him in
contempt, and legality of keeping him imprisoned even
after the Senate had already adjourned.
The SC decided against Arnault.
1. The Senate may punish Arnault for contempt, for
refusing to answer questions put forward to him.
The Senates authority to make inquiries is subject to a set
of parameters:
 (i) the inquiries must not violate the Constitutional
right against self-incrimination;
(ii) they must be material to a function granted by the
Constitutionfor example, legislation and
expulsion of a member;
(iii) the questions must be pertinent to the matter
under inquiry.
In the case at bar, the Senate did not go beyond these
parameters. Arnault himself had maintained that the
transactions under question were not illegal; the inquiry
was carried out in aid of legislation; and, the question
which Arnault refused to answer the identity of the
recipient of the encashed amountwas pertinent to the
subject of the inquiry (one of the mandates of the
Committee, as contained in the Senate Resolution that
created it, was to identify the parties involved in the
controversy).
2. Because the Senate is a continuing body, the contempt
order it issued is also continuingeven beyond the period
of the session when the contempt order was issued. As in
the United States, the Senate is a continuing body. During a
particular election, only a portion of its membersnot
allvacate their seats: unlike the House of
Representatives where in every election, all of the seats in
the House are contested.
Overturned the decision of Lopez vs. delos Reyes
Senate is a continuing body
Insofar as the day-to-day session is concerned, it
ends upon the adjournment.
When adjourned, all pending cases of the Senate
are terminated upon the expiration of the session
Romero vs. Estrada
Romero was invited by the Senate Committee on Labor,
Employment, etc. to participate in an inquiry in aid of
legislationspecifically for the purpose of considering
amendments to RA 8042. Romero asked to be excused
the request was denied. Senator Estrada, the Chairperson
of the Committee issued a subpoena against Romero,
directing the latter to attend the hearings. In a petition for
Prohibition before the SC, the petitioners averred that due
to a case pending before the SC (Chavez v. NHA), the
subject matter of the Senate investigation is sub judice; the
investigation sought to determine the petitioners criminal
liabilitythus is not in aid of legislation; compelling the
petitioners appearance would amount to a violation of the
Constitutional right against self-incrimination.
The SC decided against the Romero et al.
1. The subject matter of the Senate investigation is no
longer sub judice: moot and academic. The SC had already
denied the petition of Chavez.
2. More importantly, even if Chavez were still pending
before the SCit would still not bar the Senate
25
investigation. A legislative investigation in aid of
legislation and court proceedings has different purposes.
Inquiries are tools to enable the legislative body to
gather information and, thus, legislate wisely and
effectively. As had previously been held in SCB v. Senate
Committee, on-going judicial proceedings do not preclude
congressional hearings in aid of legislation. There is no
reason to extend the applicability of the doctrine to cases
pending on appeal.
3. In any case, the termination of the investigation has
mooted the petition. Congress has not opted to take anew
the subject matter of the investigation in the current
Congressional session.
4. The right against self-incrimination can only be invoked
when an incriminating question has been asked.
Neri vs. Senate
Yu Note: The Court clarified that as an institution, the
Senate was a continuing body; however, on a day-to-day
basis, Senate sessions are different. According to Yu, in
dichotomizing, the Court merely reinforced the Garcillano
obiter.
NEDA DG, Romulo Neri, testified before the Senate on the
NBN-ZTE scandalallegedly Comelec Chairperson Abalos
had offered P200M to Neri in exchange for approval of the
project. (The President, upon hearing about the offer,
supposedly instructed Neri not to accept.) During the
inquiry, Neri invoked Executive Privilege regarding
discussions between him and the President. Ermita said
that the information may impair the diplomatic relations
of the Philippines with China. For his refusal to answer a
set of questions: (i) WON President followed up the NBN
project; (ii) WON she directed him to prioritize it; (iii)
WON she directed him to approve it. Consequently, Neri
was ordered arrested.
The SC decided in favor of Neri.
1. The SC clarified which questions were covered by
Executive Privilege:
a. Presidential Communications Privilege (relating to
core functions)
b. Deliberative Processes Privilege
i. Must refer to non-delegable Presidential Powers
ex. Authority to enter Executive Agreements with
other countries
ii. Must have been received by close advisors of the
President
iii. Must be no compelling need to limit the privilege
 Note: the case at bar does not involve criminal
proceedings
2. There was Grave Abuse of Discretion in issuing the
contempt order. There was a legitimate claim to Executive
Privilege in the case at bar. Also, the Senate did not comply
with the requirement set forth in Senate v. Ermita that the
invitation should contain the possible needed statute and
the questions needed for furtherance thereof. When the
contempt order was issued, only a minority of the
members were present (according to the Senate Rules, the
vote must be made by a majority). The Rules of Procedure
were not published. Lastly, the Committee did not even
pass on the issue of Executive Privilege.
Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability
(September 4, 2008)
1. The SC held that there is a recognized presumptive
Presidential Communication Privilege. In Senate v. Ermita,
the Court invalidated the EO because of the blanket
prohibition on a category of officials contained therein.
There is no such privilege by simple virtue of position. In
the case at bar, the President herself invoked the privilege
on a specific matter involving an Executive Agreement
between the Philippines and China.
2. There are factual and legal bases to hold that the
communication sought is covered by Executive
Privilege:
a. It involves a quintessential, non-delegable
Presidential power: the power of the President to
enter into Executive Agreements
b. There is operational proximity: Neri is a member of
the Cabinet
c. The right to information on matters of public
concern is not an absolute rightand this right is
distinct from the power of the legislature to conduct
inquiries
3. Respondents failed to show that the communication
sought was critical to the exercise of their functions. It was
supposedly necessary in considering 3 pending bills
against graft and corruptionbut the burden is on the
respondents to show why this was so. Rather than an
exercise of their power to conduct inquiries in aid of
legislation, the inquiry was more an exercise of their
power of oversight, specifically tracing bribery to the
Office of the President.
4. The SC reiterated that the Senate had been guilty of
Grave Abuse of Discretion. Instead of having full debates,
the contempt order was merely prepared and then
presented for signing
26
Bengzon vs. SBRC
Bengzon was among those said to have collaborated with
Kokoy Romualdez, a relative of the former First Lady, in
unjust enrichment at the expense of the Filipino people. At
the center of the controversy were alleged fictitious sales
of corporations to Ricardo Lopa, a relative of then-
President Corazon Aquino. After Senator Enrile delivered a
privileged speech on the matter, the same was referred to
the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee for further
investigation. The Committee called on Bengzon to testify
on what he knewBengzon declined, on the ground that
doing so would be prejudicial to a case pending before the
Sandiganbayan. Claiming that the Committee was about to
issue a subpoena, Bengzon et al. filed a petition for
prohibition before the Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court decided in favor of Bengzon, et al.
1. The Court decided that it had jurisdiction. As former CJ
Laurel had explained in Angara, the Court is duty-bound to
perform the allocation of Constitutional boundaries. It thus
took jurisdiction for the purpose of determining the scope
and extend of the power of the Senate Blue Ribbon
Committee to conduct inquiries into private affairs ir
purported aid of legislation.
2. Relying on Sec. 21, Art. VI of the 1987 Constitution, the
SC held that the power of Congress to conduct inquiries
is limited to: (i) investigations in aid of legislation, in
accordance with its duly published rules of procedure;
and, with the qualifier that (ii) the rights of persons
appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be
respected.
3. The inquiry was not in aid of legislation. The privileged
speech given by Sen. Enrile which led to the delegation
of the investigation of the Lopa controversy to the Senate
Blue Ribon Committeemerely called upon the Senate to
look into violations of the Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act. Specifically, to look into whether Lopa violated the
law. Such a determination properly pertains to the Courts.
4. The Sandiganbayan having already taken jurisdiction
over the case precluded the Senate taking cognizance of
the same.
Standard Chartered Bank v Senate Committee on
Banks
Senator Enrile gave a privileged speech against Standard
Chartered Bank (SCB), for allegedly selling unregistered
foreign securities in violation of the Securities
Deregularization Code. (SCB had been among the foreign
banks granted the privilege of doing business in the
Philippines.) Senator Angara, the Chairperson of the
Senate Committee on Banks, set an initial hearing and
invited SCB. SCB responded to inform the Committee that
there were already pending cases involving the same
issues, thus the Committee may not have jurisdiction over
the subject of the investigation. The hearings proceeded,
nonetheless, and SCB was subpoenaed. Thus, SCB filed a
petition for prohibition with the Supreme Court.
The SC decided against SCB.
1. Bengzon does not apply. Unlike in Bengzon, the inquiry
in the case at bar is in aid of legislation. The letter sent by
Mark Bocobo humbly asked that an inquiry be madenot
for the purposes of recovering, and not in aid of collecting.
And the whereas clauses found in the Resolution that
directed the inquiry reveal the purpose of conducting said
inquiry to look into regulation-related issues, with the
possibility of recommending amendatory legislation.
2. The mere filing of a criminal or an administrative
complaint before a court or a quasi- judicial body should
not automatically bar the conduct of legislative
investigation. The exercise of sovereign legislative
authority cannot be made subordinate to a criminal or
an administrative investigation.
3. The Senate is within its powers to punish for contempt.
The exercise by Congress or by any of its committees of the
power to punish contempt is based on the principle of self-
preservation: it can assert its authority and punish
contumacious acts against it. The petitioners imputation
that the investigation was in aid of collection is a direct
challenge against the authority of the Senate Committee, as
it ascribes ill motive to the latter.
4. There was no violation of the petitioners right to
privacythe inquiry was for a valid purpose, in
contemplation of foreign bank regulation. Neither was
there a violation of the right against self-incrimination:
SCB was merely invited as a resource person.
5. The petition for prohibition is moot: the Senate
Committee has already submitted its report.
SUB JUDICE under judgment -> one cannot
disclose any information or comment regarding a
case to avoid pre-judgment of a pending case
Oversight Function
Question Hour
Only members of the Congress can stay in the
room during deliberations of confidential
matters.
Art. VI, Sec. 22
The heads of departments may, upon their own initiative,
with the consent of the President, or upon the request of
either House, as the rules of each House shall provide,
appear before and be heard by such House on any matter
pertaining to their departments. Written questions shall be
submitted to the President of the Senate or the Speaker of
27
the House of Representatives at least three days before their
scheduled appearance. Interpellations shall not be limited to
written questions, but may cover matters related thereto.
When the security of the State or the public interest so
requires and the President so states in writing, the
appearance shall be conducted in executive session.
Senate vs. Ermita
Invitations were sent out to officials of the Executive and
the AFP. The Senate were to conduct inquiries regarding:
(i) the North Rail project; (ii) the Fertilizer Fund; (iii) the
Budget; and, (iv) the Hello Garci scandal, and allegations
of cheating in the 2004 Presidential elections.
Subsequently, the President issued EO 464 which decreed
that a class of people must first secure the Presidents
consent before appearing in any hearing. Thus, Executive
Secretary Ermita communicated to the Senate that the
invited officials would not be able to attend, since they had
not been able to secure the consent of the President.
The SC decided in favor of the Senate.
Insofar as EO 463 declares a blanket prohibition on
the ground of Executive Privilege, it is invalid for
contravening the Legislatures power of inquiry.
Inquiries in aid of legislation are part of the law-making
function granted to the legislature. The general rule is
that attendance therein is mandatory. A blanket
prohibition on the attendance of a category of persons,
in the guise of Executive Privilege, is a contravention
of this Constitutionally-granted power. Executive
privilege may be invokedby the President, or by others
in his name with his consentas regards a category of
information, not a category of persons.
2. At the same time, there is a violation of the right to
information on matters of public concern.
3. There was also grave abuse of discretion on the part of
Sec. Ermita in invoking EO 464 when it had not yet been
published.
Oversight Function
Right to conduct inquiry in aid of legislation and
oversight function
Right to conduct Oversight Function
inquiry in aid of
legislation
WHO MAY APPEAR
Any person Department heads only
WHO CONDUCTS INVESTIGATION
Committee Entire Body
ATTENDANCE
Can be compelled to Attendance is
attend discretionary
Executive Privilege
It is the power of the Executive Department to
withhold information from the public, Courts and
Congress
Operational Proximity Test
Gudani vs. Senga
Gudani v. Senga [ISH] Military officers prohibited by
President Arroyo from testifying in the Senate may not
invoke their right to free speech to justify their defiance of
her orders. Although the Court ruled in Senate v. Ermita
that executive privilege cannot be used to grant blanket
immunity, in this case, the President prohibited the
military officers in the exercise of her Commander-in-
Chief powers, not her Executive powers. [DODOT]
Petitioner-officers were en route to the Senate to
participate in an investigation of alleged cheating in the
2004 elections in Lanao. President Macapagal-Arroyo
ordered that no military personnel should appear before
any House or Senate hearing without her approval.
Petitioners nonetheless testified. Consequently, they were
relieved of their duties and subjected to court-martial
proceedings. The petitioners questioned the validity of
PGMAs directive. The SC decided against the petitioners.
The power behind the directive was not Executive
Privilege, but the Presidents Commander- in-Chief (CIC)
powers. Under the CIC powers, the President has full
control over the military and its personnel.
Pacete vs. Sec. of the Commission on Appointments
Pacete was appointed Municipal judge of Pigcauangan,
Cotabato during recess of Congress. His appointment was
later submitted to the Commission on Appointments
during the next session and was unanimously confirmed. 9
months later, due to an MR filed by Sen. Ganzon, Pacete
was advised to vacate the position on grounds that his
appointment had been bypassed.
Issue: WON the petitioners removal from office was valid.
NO. A mere motion for reconsideration does not have the
effect of setting aside a confirmation. A majority approval
is required before a case may be reopened. An
appointment of an official is effective until disapproved by
the Commission either by express rejection or non-action
on the MR. None of these happened. SC held that it may
look into the rules of the Senate as an exception if and only
if the right of an individual to assume his office or position
will be defeated by such rules.
Arroyo vs. de Venecia
Petitioner challenges the validity of RA 8240 on grounds
that the rules of the house were violated when the bill was
passed. He claims that he was denied the opportunity to
raise the question of quorum. The Court held what was
allegedly violated were merely internal rules of procedure
28
of the house and not constitutional requirements of
enacting a law. The rules of deliberating body are subject
to the amendment at the pleasure of the body adopting
them and will failure to comply with them will not
invalidate the act if it is duly ratified by the requisite
number of votes. Court cannot declare an act of
legislature void on account merely on noncompliance
with rules of procedure made by itself.
d. Discipline of Members
Art. VI, Sec. 16(3)
Each House may determine the rules of its proceedings,
punish its Members for disorderly behavior, and, with the
concurrence of two-thirds of all its Members, suspend or
expel a Member. A penalty of suspension, when imposed,
shall not exceed sixty days.
Alejandrino vs. Quezon
This is a petition for mandamus assailing Resolution
depriving Sen. Alejandrino of prerogatives, privileges and
emoluments of his office for 1 year due to disorderly
conduct and flagrant violation of senate privilege by
treacherously assaulting Senator Vicente de Vera who
uttered phrases against petitioners credibility.
Does the Court have jurisdiction? No. In cases where
members of the legislative have been expelled, whether or
not the expulsion is proper, Court cannot mandate his
reinstatement because of separation of powers.
Furthermore, a writ of mandamus cannot be issued against
the Senate per se as the writ should not be granted unless
it clearly appears that the person to whom it is directed
has the absolute power to execute it. By way of obiter, the
Court opines that while Senate has power to expel an
appointive member, it cannot suspend as this results
in a situation where a seat, while validly occupied, is
silenced and deprives elective district of real
representation.
Note: Censure/reprimand requires a simple majority,
while expulsion and suspension require vote of all
members of the House.
Vera vs. Avelino
The oath-taking of three senators, namely Vera, Diokno,
and Romero was suspended by the Senate pursuant to a
Resolution. Their election apparently did not reflect the
will of the electorate as the polls in Nueva Ecija, Pampanga,
Bulacan, and Tarlac were attended with fraud and
violence. The instant petition seeks to compel Respondent
Senate President to allow petitioners to assume their seats
in the Senate.
HELD: The Court has no jurisdiction over this case. The
Senate has the power to conduct exclusion
proceedings. Such power is necessarily included in the
grant of plenary legislative power accorded to the
legislature by the Constitution.
Defensor-Santiago vs. Sandiganbayan
Criminal cases against Sen. Defensor-Santiago were filed
before the Sandiganbayan. Pending the outcome of such
cases, she was preventively suspended for 90 days. In the
present petition, sh
She assails the authority of the Sandiganbayan to order
such suspension, claiming that it is only the Senate that can
do so.
HELD: Preventive suspension is not a penalty. The
authority of the Sandiganbayan to order the suspension of
an incumbent public official fins support in Sec. 13, RA
3019. If the accused is eventually acquitted, he would be
entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits
which he failed to receive during suspension. The
suspension covers all public offices the accused is holding,
not merely the office where he is alleged to have
committed the acts with which he has been charged.
Is the order of SB correct in ordering her
suspension for 90 days?
SUSPENSIONS
CONSTITUTIONAL MANDATE 60 days;
penalty
SANDIGANBAYAN 90 days; preventive
measure
Exclusion proceedings not allowed to have a
seat in the Congress; exclude the person from
having a seat in either House
as opposed to
Expulsion seated, then removed from the office
Art. VI, Sec. 17
The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have
an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of their respective Members. Each
Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three
of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be
designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall
be Members of the Senate or the House of Representatives,
as the case may be, who shall be chosen on the basis of
proportional representation from the political parties and
the parties or organizations registered under the party-list
system represented therein. The senior Justice in the
Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman.
e. Journal and Congressional Records
Art. VI, Sec. 16(4)
Each House shall keep a Journal of its proceedings, and from
time to time publish the same, excepting such parts as may,
29
in its judgment, affect national security; and the yeas and
nays on any question shall, at the request of one-fifth of the
Members present, be entered in the Journal. Each House
shall also keep a Record of its proceedings.
JOURNAL verbatim account of what happened in
a session
CONGRESSIONAL RECORDS provides the
summary of the same
ENROLLED BILL - will always prevail over the
bill signed by the Secretary General to prevent
rider
For convenience purposes, enrolled bill is
conclusive
WHICH YEAS AND NAYS MUST BE IN THE
JOURNAL (V O 3 1/5)
Veto message of the President
Override votes of the Congress for the
veto
3rd reading of a bill
Any matter deemed necessary by 1/5 of
all the Members of the Congress
US vs. Pons
Petitioner was charged with the crime of illegal
importation of opium. His counsel alleges that Act 2381
under which petitioner is to be punished was not passed
or approved on the 28th of February but on March 1 of
that year, and is therefore null and void. The legislative
journal recorded that the legislative body adjourned at
12midnight on Feb 28. The Court held that under the
principle of the probative value of the journal, such record
is binding. Sir: the court looked into the veracity of the
journal not the enrolled bill because the bill was not
presented as evidence.
Casco vs. Jimenez
The Foreign Exchange Margin Fee Law exempts the
product urea formaldehyde from margin fees. Petitioner,
engaged in the manufacture of resin glue, claimed a refund
but was denied on the basis that it imported urea AND
formaldehyde, not urea formaldehyde. Petitioner seeks the
review of the decision of the Auditor General, claiming that
Sec. 2 RA 2609 should be construed as exempting urea
AND formaldehyde. The SC affirmed the decision. Urea
Formaldehyde is clearly a finished product distinct from
urea and formaldehyde which are the principle raw
ingredients of synthetic resin glue. It is well settled that the
enrolled bill is conclusive upon the court as regards
the tenor of the measure passed by Congress. If there
was indeed a mistake in the bill, the remedy would
have to be legislative amendment, not judicial review.
Morales vs. Subido
Petitioner assails the validity of Sec.10 of the Police Act of
1996. Petitioner insists that the version of the assailed
provision as amended at the behest of Senator Rodrigo
was the version approved on 3rd reading but when the bill
emerged from the conference committee, it was different.
There was a discrepancy in the course of the engrossment
of the bill such that there was either a deliberate or
unintended omission of the phrase who has served the
police department of a city or. In upholding the validity of
the provision, the Court applied the enrolled bill theory.
The court held that it could not go behind the enrolled act
to discover what really happened as it acts upon the faith
and credit of what Congress attests as the official acts of its
departments.
Astoraga vs. Villegas
HB 9266 was passed on the 3rd reading without
amendments and was passed to a senate committee where
both Senator Roxas and Senator Tolentino proposed
amendments. Tolentinos proposals were adopted in toto
however when the bill was finally passed, it was Roxas
amendments, not Tolentinos which were incorporated.
The bill was sent to the president for his signature and the
bill became RA 4065. Upon being informed of the error,
both the Senate President and the President of the RP
withdrew their signatures from the bill. The Court held
that the authentication process of Congress for a piece of
legislation is not an approval per se. The signatures of the
presiding officers and secretaries on the printed copy of
the approved bill are just a form of attestation. If such
signatures were absent or withdrawn, the courts may
resort to journal entries and other records of proof for due
enactment of legislation. The enrolled bill theory was not
applied in this case because the senate president and
president of the RP withdrew their signatures from
the bill, no longer making it a certified bill. RA 4065
was not deemed enacted.
Journal (Constitutional mandate) may readily
prevail over enrolled bill (legislative practice)
OBITER DICTUM; ruling deviates from other
rulings
Philippine Judges Association vs. Prado
Petitioners assail the constitutionality of RA 7354 which
creates the Philippine Postal Corporation for not having
passed the required readings in both houses of Congress
and for failure to comply with the requirement of
distributing printed copies before its passage. The validity
of the repeal of franking privileges for the Judiciary was
also challenged because it was not included in the original
versions and only appeared in the conference committee
report. The Court is bound by both the enrolled bill theory
and the legislative journal certifying that RA 7354 was
duly enacted in accordance with the Constitution.
Art. VI, Sec. 26 (2)
No bill passed by either House shall become a law unless it
has passed three readings on separate days, and printed
copies thereof in its final form have been distributed to its
Members three days before its passage, except when the
30
President certifies to the necessity of its immediate
enactment to meet a public calamity or emergency. Upon
the last reading of a bill, no amendment thereto shall be
allowed, and the vote thereon shall be taken immediately
thereafter, and the yeas and nays entered in the Journal.
Art. VI, Sec. 27 (1)
Every bill passed by the Congress shall, before it becomes a
law, be presented to the President. If he approves the same
he shall sign it; otherwise, he shall veto it and return the
same with his objections to the House where it originated,
which shall enter the objections at large in its Journal and
proceed to reconsider it. If, after such reconsideration, two-
thirds of all the Members of such House shall agree to pass
the bill, it shall be sent, together with the objections, to the
other House by which it shall likewise be reconsidered, and if
approved by two-thirds of all the Members of that House, it
shall become a law. In all such cases, the votes of each House
shall be determined by yeas or nays, and the names of the
Members voting for or against shall be entered in its Journal.
The President shall communicate his veto of any bill to the
House where it originated within thirty days after the date
of receipt thereof, otherwise, it shall become a law as if he
had signed it.
Art. VI, Sec. 16 (4)
Each House shall keep a Journal of its proceedings, and from
time to time publish the same, excepting such parts as may,
in its judgment, affect national security; and the yeas and
nays on any question shall, at the request of one-fifth of the
Members present, be entered in the Journal. Each House
shall also keep a Record of its proceedings.
Art. XI, Sec. 3 (3)
A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House
shall be necessary either to affirm a favorable resolution
with the Articles of Impeachment of the Committee, or
override its contrary resolution. The vote of each Member
shall be recorded.
Marshall Field & Co. vs. Clark
Petitioners assail the validity of the Tariff Act of October 1,
1890. They allege that the law in its final form was not the
bill duly passed by Congress. They submitted documents
consisting of Congressional records, committee reports,
and other papers printed by authority of Congress to prove
their allegations.
HELD: The Court is bound by the enrolled bill doctrine.
The validity of an Act cannot be made to depend on the
manner in which the journals are kept. Clerks who keep
such journals can make mistakes. To look behind the
enrolled bill would be to undermine the authority of a co-
equal branch of government.
Clerks take care of journals so there can be errors
Enrolled bill shall prevail when theres dispute
on which shall win over
f. Sessions
House in is QC
Senate is in Pasay
Art. VI, Sec. 15
The Congress shall convene once every year on the fourth
Monday of July for its regular session, unless a different date
is fixed by law, and shall continue to be in session for such
number of days as it may determine until thirty days before
the opening of its next regular session, exclusive of
Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays. The President may
call a special session at any time.
Art. VI, Sec. 16(5)
Neither House during the sessions of the Congress shall,
without the consent of the other, adjourn for more than
three days, nor to any other place than that in which the two
Houses shall be sitting.
Art. VII, Sec. 10
The Congress shall, at ten oclock in the morning of the third
day after the vacancy in the offices of the President and Vice-
President occurs, convene in accordance with its rules
without need of a call and within seven days, enact a law
calling for a special election to elect a President and a Vice-
President to be held not earlier than forty-five days nor later
than sixty days from the time of such call. The bill calling
such special election shall be deemed certified under
paragraph 2, Section 26, Article VI of this Constitution and
shall become law upon its approval on third reading by the
Congress. Appropriations for the special election shall be
charged against any current appropriations and shall be
exempt from the requirements of paragraph 4, Section 25,
Article VI of this Constitution. The convening of the Congress
cannot be suspended nor the special election postponed. No
special election shall be called if the vacancy occurs within
eighteen months before the date of the next presidential
election.
Art. VII, Sec. 11
Whenever the President transmits to the President of the
Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives his
written declaration that he is unable to discharge the
powers and duties of his office, and until he transmits to
them a written declaration to the contrary, such powers and
duties shall be discharged by the Vice- President as Acting
President. Whenever a majority of all the Members of the
Cabinet transmit to the President of the Senate and to the
Speaker of the House of Representatives their written
declaration that the President is unable to discharge the
powers and duties of his office, the Vice- President shall
immediately assume the powers and duties of the office as
Acting President. Thereafter, when the President transmits
to the President of the Senate and to the Speaker of the
House of Representatives his written declaration that no
inability exists, he shall reassume the powers and duties of
his office. Meanwhile, should a majority of all the Members
of the Cabinet transmit within five days to the President of
the Senate and to the Speaker of the House of
31
Representatives, their written declaration that the President
is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the
Congress shall decide the issue. For that purpose, the
Congress shall convene, if it is not in session, within forty-
eight hours, in accordance with its rules and without need of
call. If the Congress, within ten days after receipt of the last
written declaration, or, if not in session, within twelve days
after it is required to assemble, determines by a two-thirds
vote of both Houses, voting separately, that the President is
unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the
Vice-President shall act as President; otherwise, the
President shall continue exercising the powers and duties of
his office.
Disability of the President to discharge function,
NOT INCAPABILITY
Art. VII, Sec. 18
The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed
forces of the Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary,
he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress
lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. In case of invasion or
rebellion, when the public safety requires it, he may, for a
period not exceeding sixty days, suspend the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part
thereof under martial law. Within forty-eight hours from the
proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, the President shall
submit a report in person or in writing to the Congress. The
Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all
its Members in regular or special session, may revoke such
proclamation or suspension, which revocation shall not be
set aside by the President. Upon the initiative of the
President, the Congress may, in the same manner, extend
such proclamation or suspension for a period to be
determined by the Congress, if the invasion or rebellion shall
persist and public safety requires it. The Congress, if not in
session, shall, within twenty-four hours following such
proclamation or suspension, convene in accordance with its
rules without need of a call. The Supreme Court may review,
in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the
sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of
martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus or the extension thereof, and must
promulgate its decision thereon within thirty days from its
filing. A state of martial law does not suspend the operation
of the Constitution, nor supplant the functioning of the civil
courts or legislative assemblies, nor authorize the
conferment of jurisdiction on military courts and agencies
over civilians where civil courts are able to function, nor
automatically suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus. The suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus shall apply only to persons judicially charged for
rebellion or offenses inherent in, or directly connected with,
invasion. During the suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus, any person thus arrested or detained shall be
judicially charged within three days, otherwise he shall be
released.
Art. VII, Sec. 4 Separate Sessions in declaration of state of war
The President and the Vice-President shall be elected by by 2/3 vote of all Members
direct vote of the people for a term of six years which shall SEPARATE SESSIONS: (C D V W)
begin at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following the While Congress is acting as a canvasser
day of the election and shall end at noon of the same date, of votes for the election of the President
six years thereafter. The President shall not be eligible for or Vice President, it has to break the tie
any re-election. No person who has succeeded as President Check the authenticity of election
and has served as such for more than four years shall be returns
qualified for election to the same office at any time. No Vice- Joint session but vote separately
President shall serve for more than two successive terms. When it decides by 2/3 vote for on the
Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time question of the disability of the
shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity President
of the service for the full term for which he was elected. Vacancy in the office of the Vice
Unless otherwise provided by law, the regular election for President, when it confirms the
President and Vice-President shall be held on the second nomination of the Vice President by the
Monday of May. The returns of every election for President President from among the members of
and Vice-President, duly certified by the board of canvassers the Congress, sit jointly but votes
of each province or city, shall be transmitted to the Congress, separately
directed to the President of the Senate. Upon receipt of the RATIONALE FOR SITTING
certificates of canvass, the President of the Senate shall, not JOINTLY: So they can convince
later than thirty days after the day of the election, open all both Houses and reach a
the certificates in the presence of the Senate and the House consensus
of Representatives in joint public session, and the Congress, RATIONALE FOR VOTING
upon determination of the authenticity and due execution SEPARATELY: Senate has only 24
thereof in the manner provided by law, canvass the votes. members (as against 240++ of
The person having the highest number of votes shall be the HoR)
proclaimed elected, but in case two or more shall have an Declaration of state of war
equal and highest number of votes, one of them shall
forthwith be chosen by the vote of a majority of all the Trillanes v. Judge Pimentel
Members of both Houses of the Congress, voting separately.
The Congress shall promulgate its rules for the canvassing of Pending the resolution of the criminal case filed against
the certificates. The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be Sen. Trillanes for coup dtat, he was detained at the
the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, Marine Barracks. He filed the instant petition to be allowed
and qualifications of the President or Vice-President, and to attend sessions in the Senate, have an office at the
may promulgate its rules for the purpose. barracks, and give interviews to the media. The RTC of
Makati denied his motion. The SC affirmed, citing People v.
Art. VII, Sec. 9 Jalosjos. Election to Congress is not a reasonable
Whenever there is a vacancy in the Office of the Vice- classification in criminal law enforcement. Petitioner
President during the term for which he was elected, the argues that his election as Senator operates as
President shall nominate a Vice-President from among the condonation by the public of the offense he has committed.
Members of the Senate and the House of Representatives Admin law doctrine: a public official cannot be removed
who shall assume office upon confirmation by a majority for administrative misconduct committed during a prior
vote of all the Members of both Houses of the Congress, term. The doctrine simply does not apply because (1) his
voting separately. misconduct was criminal and not administrative in nature,
and (2) he had no prior term to speak of.
Art. VI, Sec. 23(1)
The Congress, by a vote of two-thirds of both Houses in joint
session assembled, voting separately, shall have the sole 5. Electoral Tribunals
power to declare the existence of a state of war.
1935 Constitution: Members should be composed
Art. XVII, Sec. 1(1) of 3 representatives from majority and 3 from
Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may be minority
proposed by: (1) The Congress, upon a vote of three-fourths 1987 Constitution: Proportional representation
of all its Members of majority and minority
Joint Sessions in Congress for declaration of
Martial Law and suspension of the Writ of
Habeas Corpus

32
a. Composition
Taada v. Cuenco
During the period when the 1935 Constitution was in
effect, the senators designated as members of the electoral
tribunal were composed of 3 from the majority party and 3
from the minority party. In this case, Taada was the ONLY
member of the minority (Citizens Party) in the entire
Senate. He was thus entitled to one seat in the SET. Since
there were two remaining seats for the minority, the
Senate resolved to appoint Cuenco and Delgado to the SET,
despite being members of the Nacionalista Party.
HELD: The Court has jurisdiction. This is not a political
question as it involves a possible transgression of the
Constitution. The fundamental law states that it is the
party, and not the Senate as a whole, who shall
nominate its members to be part of the SET. Clearly, the
Senate committed grave abuse of discretion. The
nominations of Cuenco and Delgado are null and void.
Abbas v. Senate Electoral Tribunal
Petitioners filed an election contest to the SET against 22
senators-elect from the LABAN coalition. They also filed a
motion for disqualification or inhibition of the senator-
members of the SET from hearing the case on grounds that
they were all interested parties. Petitioners proposed that
where more than 4 members are disqualified, the
remaining (in this case 3 judges), shall constitute quorum,
if not less than 3 including 1 judge, and may adopt a
resolution without abstention. The court held that this
proposal was unconstitutional as it violated Art. VI, Sec.17
creating the SET.
The purpose of having a tribunal with both justices
and senators is to insure that there are judicial and
legislative components present in deciding all contests
relating to elections. The legislative component cannot
be excluded without doing violation to the spirit and intent
of the Constitution. The proposed mass disqualification of
SET members would leave the Tribunal no alternative but
to abandon a duty that no other court/body can perform.
Art. VI, Sec. 17
The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have
an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications
of their respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall
be composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be
Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief
Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of the Senate
or the House of Representatives, as the case may be, who
shall be chosen on the basis of proportional representation
from the political parties and the parties or organizations
registered under the party-list system represented therein.
The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its
Chairman.
33
Art. VI, Sec. 19
The Electoral Tribunals and the Commission on
Appointments shall be constituted within thirty days after
the Senate and the House of Representatives shall have been
organized with the election of the President and the Speaker.
The Commission on Appointments shall meet only while the
Congress is in session, at the call of its Chairman or a
majority of all its Members, to discharge such powers and
functions as are herein conferred upon it.
b. Nature of Function
*Angara v. Electoral Commission
In 1935, the National Assembly adopted a resolution that
all members- elect, with no election protest filed on or
before 3 December 1935 are deemed elected. The
Electoral Commission, a constitutional body, on the other
hand set the 9 December 1935 as the deadline for the filing
of election protest. Ynsua, who lost to Angara, filed a
motion of protest (complaint) on 8 December 1935. This
was entertained by the Electoral Commission. Angara
contended that the deadline set by the National Assembly
was controlling. The SC ruled for Ynsua, thereby upholding
the authority of the Electoral Commission, in view of the
constitutional provision granting the Electoral Commission
jurisdiction over election protests.
In justifying the power of judicial review, J. Laurel pointed
out that when the court allocated constitutional
boundaries, it neither asserts supremacy, nor annuls the
acts of the legislature. It simply carries out the obligations
imposed upon it by the constitution to determine
conflicting claims and to establish for the parties the rights
which the constitution grants to them.
Sampayan v. Daza
A petition was filed by residents of the 2nd District of
Northern Samar seeking to disqualify Raul Daza as their
representative in the House on the ground that he was a
permanent resident of the US. The SC dismissed the
petition as it was without jurisdiction to unseat Daza who
was already sitting as a member of the House. The proper
remedy of the petitioners would have been to have his CoC
cancelled, and once elected, to file an election protest with
the HRET. The issue is also moot and academic as Dazas
term has long ended.
Guerrero v. COMELEC
Guillermo Ruiz sought to perpetually disqualify Farinas
from running for the position of Congressman of Ilocos
Norte, alleging he had been campaigning despite failure to
file a COC, in violation of Sec 73, BP881. Farinas filed his
COC as substitute for candidate Chevylle Farinas who
withdrew. Ruiz filed a motion to resolve petition. Farinas
won and was sworn into office. Guerrero, LP candidate in
Ilocos Norte, filed as intervenor saying that Farinas
illegally resorted to substitution to run for office (Sec.77)
and should be disqualified. He also asked that the position
of Congressman of the 1st district of Ilocos Norte be
declared vacant and a special election be held. Both cases
were dismissed for lack of jurisdiction without prejudice to
the filing of a quo warranto case.
WON COMELEC committed GAD in holding that the
determination of the validity of Farinas COC was the
exclusive jurisdiction of the HRET.
NO. Under Article VI, Section 17 of the Constitution, the
HRET has sole and exclusive jurisdiction over all contests
relative to the election, returns, and qualifications of
members of the HOR. Thus, once a winning candidate
has been (1) proclaimed, (2) taken his oath, and (3)
assumed office as a member of the House of
Representatives, COMELECs jurisdiction over the
election contests relating to his election, returns, and
qualifications ends. The reason is to avoid duplicity of
proceedings and a clash of jurisdiction between
constitutional bodies, with due regard to the peoples
mandate. Dismissed.
*Rasul v. COMELEC
Petitioner assails the COMELEC resolution proclaiming the
12 winning senatorial candidates, particularly the 12th
placer (Tessa Aquino-Oreta) and the declaration that the
remaining uncanvassed votes would not affect the results.
Votes not cast due to suspension of special elections in
some areas and the uncanvassed votes total 419,020,
enough that there could still be a change in the 12th
ranking candidate. The Court found no merit in the
petition. Where as in the case at bar, petitioner assails the
Commissions resolution proclaiming the twelfth (12th)
winning senatorial candidate, petitioners proper recourse
was to file a regular election protest which under the
Constitution and the Omnibus Election Code exclusively
pertains to the Senate Electoral Tribunal. The Court also
defined the terms election, returns, and qualifications in
the provision. Elections referred to the conduct of the
polls, including the listing of voters, the holding of the
electoral campaign, and the casting and counting of the
votes; returns to the canvass of the returns and the
proclamation of the winners, including questions
concerning the composition of the board of canvassers
and the authenticity of the election returns; and
qualifications to matters that could be raised in a quo
warranto proceeding the proclaimed winner, such as his
disloyalty or ineligibility or the inadequacy of his
certificate of candidacy. Dismissed.
Codilla v. De Venecia
Codilla and Locsin were candidates for the position of
representative of the 4th District of Leyte. Petitioner
emerged victorious but Locsin filed a petition to suspend
his proclamation. COMELEC resolved to disqualify
petitioner, proclaiming Locsin instead. Petitioner filed a
motion for reconsideration questioning the validity of
Locsins proclamation. The latter sought an opinion for the
34
Houses Legal Counsel, who declared that the COMELEC en
banc no longer had jurisdiction to pass upon the issue of
her proclamation as such jurisdiction properly pertains to
the HRET.
HELD: Jurisdiction stays with the COMELEC. Petitioner was
denied due process. He was not served summons and
votes cast in his favor were declared stray even before the
Resolution disqualifying him attained finality. Moreover,
his MR was seasonably filed. He questioned the manner by
which respondent was proclaimed. Such matter rests with
the jurisdiction of the COMELEC. The HRET cannot assume
jurisdiction simply because Locsin had already been
proclaimed. The issue in this case does not involve her
election, returns, and qualifications.
Roces v. HRET
Roces and Ang Ping filed their respective CoCs for the
position of Representative of Manila. A disqualification
petition was filed against the latter on the ground that he
was not a natural-born citizen. He withdrew his CoC and
sought substitution of his wife. The COMELEC denied his
petition and ordered the election inspectors not to count
votes cast in his favor. Mrs. Ang Ping filed an election
protest with the HRET, alleging that the COMELEC
Resolution denied her the right to elevate the case to the
Commission en banc. Roces contends that HRET does not
have jurisdiction to pass upon the COMELEC Resolution.
HELD: HRET has jurisdiction to pass upon COMELEC
Resolutions. Mrs. Ang Ping is a proper party, as there had
been no final Resolution disqualifying Mrs. Ang Ping.
Moreover, it was Roces who offered the COMELEC
Resolution to the HRET. Thus, HRET cannot be faulted for
passing upon the validity of the Resolution.
Dimaporo v. COMELEC
Petitioner Imelda Dimaporo and private respondent
Vicente Belmonte were both candidates for Representative
of the 1st Congressional District of Lanao del Norte during
the May 14, 2007 elections. Official Partial results were:
1st Belmonte, 2nd Badelles, 3rd Dimaporo.
Canvassing was suspended because some ballot boxes and
statement of votes were destroyed and violated. The
canvassing eventually resumed to which Belmonte
objected, alleging the COCs were tampered with. SPBOC
denied but COMELEC granted his appeal, ordering the
exclusion of the election returns in question. Dimaporo
filed a motion to maintain SQ which was granted by the
Court. Belmonte filed his comment: that even before the
issuance of the status quo ante order of the Court, he had
already been proclaimed by the PBOC as the duly elected
Member of the HOR as 1st district rep of Lanao del Norte.
On that very same day, he had taken his oath before
Speaker of the House Jose de Venecia, Jr. and assumed his
duties accordingly.
SC: In light of this development, jurisdiction over this case The Court said that to further bolster the
has already been transferred to the HRET. When there independence of the Tribunals, the members term of
has already been a proclamation and a defeated office to the Tribunal should be co-extensive with their
candidate claims to be the winner, challenges to its legislative terms and may not be legally terminated
validity is already within the jurisdiction of the except by: (D R P R)
Electoral Tribunal, despite the pendency of protests of
the rival candidate. For the SC to take cognizance of the o Death
electoral protest against him would be to usurp the o Resignation
function of the House Electoral Tribunal. The COMELEC o Permanent disability
was not amiss in quickly deciding Belmontes petition to o Removal for valid cause, not including
correct manifest errors then proclaiming him the winner. political disloyalty
It has always been the policy of the election law that pre-
proclamation controversies should be summarily decided,
consistent with the laws desire that the canvass and
proclamation be delayed as little as possible. No status quo
ante order or TRO was issued at the time of Belmontes
proclamation thus remains valid and may only be
challenged before the HRET. Dismissed.

Limkaichong v. COMELEC

Petitioner Biraogo seeks a reconsideration of the Courts

decision reversing the COMELEC resolution disqualifying
Limkaichong from running as a congressional candidate in
the 1st District of Negros Oriental due to lack of citizenship
requirement (she was not natural-born). The SC already
held that it is the State, through its representatives
designated by statute, that may question the illegally or
invalidly procured certificate of naturalization in the
appropriate denaturalization proceedings. It is plainly not
a matter that may be raised by private persons in an
election case involving the naturalized citizens
descendant. It is not enough that the candidates
qualifications are questioned, it must undergo the proper
proceeding since, not being disqualified on election day,
was clearly entrusted with her office by the people who
voted for her. Due to the events transpiring after the
COMELEC joint resolution was issued, specifically that
Limkaichong was proclaimed, was sworn into and was
allowed to assume office, the SC ruled in their April 1, 2009
decision that the HRET now has exclusive jurisdiction over
the case. Denied.

Request of JJ Melencio-Herrera, Cruz and Feliciano as

Members of the HRET

JJ. Herrera, Cruz, and Feliciano were part of the HRET,

hearing the protest of Pampanga congressional candidate
Bondoc vs. winner Pineda. Bondoc was declared winner
after the reappreciation of the ballots. Members of the
tribunal concurred, including Congressman Camasura, a
party-mate of Pineda. Due to political factors,
Congressman Camasura was expelled from his party, thus
making a distressing moment for the tribunal. The justice-
members of the tribunal received a letter regarding this
development, and has requested for relief from performing
their duties in the tribunal. The justices said that the
development undermines the independence of the tribunal
and derails the orderly adjudication of electoral cases.

35
IMPORTANT ACCORDING TO SIR:
- REYES VS COMELEC
- V MENDOZA ARTICLE
- ARNAULT VS NAZARENO
- ABAKADA VS ERMITA
- ABAKADA VS PURISIMA
ANGARA VS ELECTORAL COMMISSION
Petitioner Jose Angara was proclaimed winner
and took his oath of office as member of the National
Assembly. On December 3, 1935, The National Assembly
passed a resolution confirming the election of those who
have not been subject of an election protest prior to the
adoption of the said resolution. But on December 8, 1935,
someone filed an election protest against Angara before
the Electoral Commission of the National Assembly
The following day, the Electoral Commission
adopted its own resolution providing that it will not
consider any election protest that was not submitted
on or before December 9, 1935.
Citing the resolution of the National Assembly, the
petitioner sought the dismissal of respondents protest.
The Electoral Commission denied his motion and
recognized the election protest.
HELD/DOCTRINE: The Electoral Commission did not act
without or in excess of its jurisdiction in acknowledging
the protest filed against the petitioner, despite the National
Assemblys resolution because:
- The Electoral Commission is an independent
body. It is the sole judge of all contests relating to
the election, returns, and qualifications of
members of the National Assembly, so it acted
w/in its Constitutional powers. This power is
meant to be complete and unimpaired, as if it
had remained solely in the legislature
*Electoral Tribunal is also an independent body
ART VI SEC 19
Electoral Tribunals and the Commission on
Appointments shall be constituted within 30 days
after the election of the Senate President and the
Speaker of the House.
Commission on Appointments shall meet:
- only while the Congress is in session
- at the call of its Chairman or a majority of all
its Members
VERA VS AVELINO
COMELEC submitted a report to the President and
Congress regarding the April 1946 national elections.
According to the report, voting in the provinces of
36
ART VI SECTION 17
The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each
have an Electoral Tribunal, which shall be the sole judge
of all contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of their respective Members.
Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of 9 Members,
composed of:
- 3 Justices of the Supreme Court (to be
designated by the Chief Justice)
- 6 Members of the Senate or HoR (to be chosen
on the basis of proportional representation from
the political parties and the parties or
organizations registered under the party-list
system represented therein.
Chairman = The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal
Pampanga, Nueva Ecija, Bulacan, and Tarlac did not
reflect the true and free expression of the popular will
because of acts of terrorism and violence in the in the
said region.
On the basis of these findings, protests against the
election of Petitioners Jose O. Vega, Ramon Diokno, and
Jose Romero were filed with the Electoral Tribunal.
Senate approved the Pendatun resolution which
ordered that the petitioners shall not be sworn, nor
seated as members of the chamber until the hearing
and decision on the election protests were made.
DOCTRINE:
The Senate has not exceeded its powers in
approving the Pendatun resolution because the senate
has the right to promulgate orders, as well as to inquire
into the credentials of any member and his right to
participate in its deliberations.
The senate also has the constitutional power to
adopt rules for its proceedings.
REYES VS COMELEC SUPER IMPORTANT CASE!!!!
The case is about the jurisdiction of the HRET to solely and
exclusively pass upon the qualifications of a congressional
candidate and whether COMELEC committed grave abuse
of discretion on cancelling a candidates COC
On March 27, 2013, COMELEC issued a resolution
cancelling the COC of Marinduque Congressional candidate
Regina Reyes, on grounds that it contained material
misinterpretations:
1. That she is single. She is actually married to
Congressman Herminaldo I. Mandanas of
Batangas)
2. That she is a resident of Brgy. Lupac, Boac,
Marinduque. She is actually a resident of
Bauan, Batangas (residence of her husband)
 and 135 J.P. Rizal, Brgy. Milagrosa, Quezon
City as admitted in the Directory of
Congressional Spouses of the House of
Representatives
3. That her date of birth is 3 July 1964 when
other documents show that her birthdate is
either 8 July 1959 or 3 July 1960
4. That she is not a permanent resident of
another country. She is actually a
permanent resident or an immigrant of the
US
5. That she is a Filipino citizen when she is, in
fact, an American citizen
Reyes answer:
1. She is publicly known as Mandanas wife, but
there is no valid and binding marriage between
them
2. She is not duty-bound to live with Mandamas,
therefore his residence cannot be attributed to her
3. The Certificate of Live Birth issued by the National
Statistics Office shows that it was on 3 July 1964
4. The allegation that she is a permanent resident
and/or a citizen of the United States of America is
not supported by evidence.
COMELEC First Division found that she is not a citizen of
the Philippines because of her failure to comply with the
requirements of RA No. 9225 or the Citizenship
Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003, namely:
1. To take an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines
2. To make a personal and sworn renunciation of her
American citizenship before any public officer
authorized to administer an oath.
3. She did not have the one-year residency
requirement under Section 6, Article VI of the
1987 Constitution.13 Thus, she is ineligible to run
for the position of Representative for the lone
district of Marinduque.
Reyes filed MR saying:
1. She is a natural-born Filipino citizen and she has
not lost that status by simply obtaining an
American passport
2. COMELEC First Division relied on the fact of her
marriage to an American citizen in concluding that
she is a naturalized American citizen, but such
marriage only resulted into dual citizenship,
thus there is no need for her to fulfill the twin
requirements under R.A. No. 9225
o Attached Affidavit of Renunciation of
Foreign Citizenship
3. Since she never became a naturalized citizen, she
never lost her domicile of origin, which is Boac,
Marinduque
MR DENIED on May 14, 2013! 4 days after, Reyes was
proclaimed winner. Then on June 5, 2013, COMELECs
37
decision had become final and executory because no TRO
was filed.
On the same day, Reyes took her oath of office before
Feliciano R. Belmonte Jr., Speaker of the HoR. But Reyes
has yet to assume office, the term of which officially starts
at noon of 30 June 2013.
Reyes files certiorari and TRO SC DISMISSES REYES
PETITION.
1. Petitioner argues HRET has jurisdiction, given that
ART VI, SEC 17, but COMELEC RETAINS
JURISDICTION, NOT HRET BECAUSE HRET only
acquires jurisdiction once a petition is duly
filed with it. Reyes did not file such action
2. The jurisdiction of the HRET begins only after the
candidate is considered a Member of HoR. No,
Reyes may not be considered a member of the
HOR because she has not completed the
requisites:
o Been proclaimed
o Taken her oathIt must be before the
Speaker, in an open session. There was
no indication that she made her oath in an
open session.
o Assumed office as a member of HoR
begins June 30
3. Before the proclamation of petitioner on 18
May 2013, the COMELEC decision had become
final and executory
4. COMELEC committed no grave abuse of
discretion
o Reyes assails COMELECs evidence as
hearsay (blog of Eli Obligacion, photocopy
of certificate from bureau of immigration)
o But COMELEC is not bound to strictly
adhere to the technical rules of procedure
in the presentation of evidence because
framers of the constitution intended to
place the COMELEC on a level higher than
statutory administrative organs.
COMELEC has broad powers to ascertain
the true results of the election by means
available to it.
5. No denial of due process because every
opportunity was given to her to object to the
decision
6. Reyes is an American Citizen because she has
not accomplished required acts under RA 9225
o Take the oath of allegiance to PH before
the Consul-General of the PH Consulate in
the USA
o Make a personal and sworn
renunciation of her American
citizenship before any public officer
authorized to administer an oath
7. Since she is still an American citizen, Reyes is
NOT a resident of Marinduque
 o Upon re-acquisition of Filipino citizenship
pursuant to RA 9225, she must still show
that he chose to establish his domicile
in the Philippines
o There being no proof that she had
renounced her American citizenship, it
follows that she has not abandoned her
domicile of choice in the USA.
8. COMELEC did not impose additional qualifications
on candidates who have acquired foreign
citizenship. It merely applied the qualifications
prescribed by Section 6, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution that the candidate must be a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines and must
have one-year residency prior to the date of
elections
DISMISSED!!
J BRION, Dissent
From class discussion:
- Reyes cannot withdraw because of the rule on
adherence with jurisdiction
- RA 9225 is NOT APPLICABLE to this case, so why
is the SC applying the dual citizenship
requirement?
- SC wanted to make sure that COMELEC retains
jurisdiction because the case involves J. Velascos
son. If the case is decided by the HRET, Reyes will
be unseated, but Velascos son will not take
over. Instead, there will be a new election (Sabi ni
sir!)
From dissent itself (3 other justices also dissent):
Brion brands this as an unusual case, which he dissented
to not because of the merits, but because of:
- outright and reckless denial of the minoritys
plea that the respondents be required to at least
COMMENT on the petition
- Gravity of the issues raised
- Its potential effect on jurisprudence
- Affected personal relationships within and
outside the Court
The court did not rule on the merits and it was focused on
the indirect beneficiary of the ruling. The decision
effectively upholds the disqualification of petitioner and
leaves the remaining candidate in Marinduque as an
unopposed candidate (VELASCOS SON).
The case deserves further proceedings and should not
have been dismissed outright because
1. Questions raised in the petition are NOT too
unsubstantial to warrant further proceedings
o The petition presented a threshold issue,
never before decided by the court
o Should have discussed more about
COMELECs imposition of a qualification
38
2. Unless the case is clearly and patently shown to be
without basis and out of our sense of delicadeza
(which we should have), the Court should at
least hear and consider both sides before
making a ruling that would favor the son of a
Member of the Court
3. Majoritys holding that the jurisdiction of the
HRET only begins after the candidate has assumed
the office on June 30 is contrary to prevailing
jurisprudence. In fact, it is a major
retrogressive jurisprudential development
that can emasculate the HRET
o Contrary to HRET rules
o effectively allows the filing of any election
protest or a petition for quo warranto
only after the assumption to office by the
candidate on June 30 at the earliest
o would affect all future proclamations
since they cannot be earlier than 15 days
counted from the June 30 constitutional
cut-off for the assumption to office of the
newly elected officials
4. COMELEC's appreciation and evaluation of
evidence are so grossly unreasonable
o Blog article by Eli Obligacion! (Seeking
and Finding the Truth About Regina O.
Reyes.)
o Even a law student would know that the
blog is double hearsay or hearsay
evidence that is twice removed from
being admissible as it was offered to
prove its contents (that Reyes is an
American citizen) without any other
competent and credible evidence to
corroborate them.
The proper course of action is to require the Comelec to
COMMENT on the petition and to decide matters from that
point.
PENA VS HRET
Petitioner Teodoro Q. Pea questioned the election of
Alfredo E. Abueg, Jr. as member of HoR (Palawan). Pea
and Abueg were contenders for the said Congressional
Office in the May 8, 1995 elections.
On May 12, 1995, upon canvassing the votes cast, the
Provincial Board of Canvassers of Palawan proclaimed
Abueg as the winner.
On May 22, 1995, the instant petition was filed with the
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal by Pea. He
averred that the elections encountered some
irregularities and other fraudulent acts that resulted
in the victory of Abueg.
In its Resolution on October 12, 1995, HRET ruled that
although it had jurisdiction over the petition, as the sole
judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of the members of the House of
Representatives, the said petition, however, fails to state a
cause of action, and is therefore insufficient in form and
substance, meriting its dismissal. It stated that in
Fernando v. Endencia, SC held that while the election law
does not say so directly, it is clearly inferred from its
relevant provisions that where the grounds of contest are
that legal votes were rejected and illegal votes were
received, the motion of protest should state in which
precincts such irregularities occurred. The specification in
the motion of protest of the election precinct or precincts
where the alleged irregularities occurred is required in
order to apprise the contestee of the issues which he has to
meet.
HELD/DOCTRINE: Supreme Court cannot review the
decision of the HRET
The Supreme Courts jurisdiction to review
decisions and orders of electoral tribunals operates only
upon a showing of grave abuse of discretion on the part of
the tribunal. Only where such a grave abuse of discretion is
clearly shown shall the Court interfere with the electoral
tribunals judgment. There is no such showing in the
present petition.
PETITION DISMISSED, HRET Resolution AFFIRMED.
INDEPENDENCE OF THE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL
BONDOC VS PINEDA
May 11 1987, Marciano Pineda [LDP] and Dr. Emigdio
Bondoc [NP] both ran as candidates for Representative of
the Fourth District of Pampanga
- May 19 1987, Pineda was proclaimed winner but
Bondoc filed a protest
- October 1990, decision was reached, finding
Bondoc winning by 23 votes.
The decision was delayed by another four months when
LDP members of the Tribunal asked for reappreciation and
recount of ballots. Congressman Camasura [LDP] found for
Bondoc; soon after, he was removed from Congress for
allegedly helping Danding Cojuangco to organize Partido
Pilipino, and for allegedly inviting LDP members to join
Partido Pilipino.
Chairman of the tribunal was informed that the HoR
decided to withdraw Congressman Camasuras nomination
to the House Electoral Tribunal because he was expelled
from the LDP party
RATIO/DOCTRINE:
The HoR cannot interfere with decisions on electoral
contests by the HRET
- Being the sole judge grants House Electoral
Tribunal exclusive jurisdiction of contests
39
relating to the election, returns, and qualification
of the members of the House of Representatives
- In order to exercise exclusive jurisdiction, the
Tribunal must be independent. The power to
hear and decide congressional election
contests must not be shared with Legislature
or the Courts.
Disloyalty to party and breach of party discipline are
not valid grounds for the expulsion of a member of the
Tribunal.
- Members of the tribunal should be impartial and
detached from their political party in the
discharge of their duties.
- Also, members of the HRET also enjoy security
of tenure; therefore, just cause is needed for
membership in the House Electoral Tribunal to be
terminated.
POWERS of the ELECTORAL TRIBUNALS
ABAYON VS HRET:
Electoral tribunals have rule-making powers
This is a story about the extent of Respondent HRETs
powers specifically, whether or not it can concern
itself with the nominees of party-list groups that sit in
the House of Representatives.
Petitioner Abayon, nominee of the Aangat Tayo Party-List,
won a seat in the HOR during the 2007 elections.
Registered voters Lucaban, dela Cruz, and Doroga
complained to the HRET that Abayon was not qualified to
sit in the HOR as AT's nominee because 1) she was not part
of the marginalized/underrepresented sector as the wife
of a congressional district representative, and 2) she ran
and lost as party-list representative of another
organization in the previous elections.
Abayon argued that the HRET had no jurisdiction over the
petition because the question of her eligibility (as a Party-
List nominee) was an internal concern of AT.
HRET issued an order thereafter, upholding its jurisdiction
over Abayon's eligibility.
Meanwhile, in a similar petition, Petitioner Palparan,
nominee of the Bantay Party-List, also won a seat in the
HOR during the 2007 elections. Opponents of his Party-
List, Lesaca et. al., complained to the HRET that Palparan
was not qualified to sit in the HOR as Bantay's nominee
because 1) he was not part of the
marginalized/underrepresented sector that the party
stood for (victims of communist rebels, Civilian Armed
Forces Geographical Units, former rebels and
security guards), and 2) he himself was guilty of gross
human violations.
Palparan invoked the same argument as Abayon.

HRET issued an order thereafter, likewise upholding its
jurisdiction over Palparan's eligibility.
RATIO/DOCTRINE
HRET has jurisdiction over the qualifications of Party-
List nominees that sit in the HOR
It does. While it is true that the power to determine the
qualifications of PARTY-LISTS rests with the COMELEC
(pursuant to the Party-List System Act), the HRET has
jurisdiction over the NOMINEES of the Party-List once they
sit as representatives in the HOR.
In its interpretation of Article 6, Section 5, the SC said that
these nominees not their Party-Lists are the ones
sitting in the House. As soon as they take their seats, they
are treated like the regular district representatives, and it
IS for the HRET to evaluate their qualifications as
MEMBERS OF THE HOR, pursuant to Article 6, Section 17.
If all members of Senate are contested, who will
members of the Electoral Tribunal be?
Still the Electoral Tribunal
ABBAS VS SET
Petitioners filed before SET an election contest against
22 candidates of the LABAN coalition who were
proclaimed senators-elect in the May 11, 1987
congressional elections by the COMELEC.
(Tribunal was composed of 3 Justices
(Yap, Narvasa, Gutierrez) and 6 senators (Estrada,
Gonzales, Guingona, Lina, Tamano, Ziga).
Petitioners filed with SET for Motion for Disqualification or
Inhibition of the Senators-Members from the hearing and
resolution of SET Case No. 002-87 as all of them are
interested parties. Sen. Saguisag and Paterno filed
similar cases against SET.
Petitioners argue that for considerations of public policy
and norms of fair play and due process require the
inhibition and disqualification of the Senators-elect.
Petitioners propose amendments to the Tribunals Rules
(Sec. 24), requiring concurrence of 5 members for the
adoption of resolutions of whatever nature, such that
where there are more than 4 members disqualified,
the remaining members shall constitute a quorum,
leaving the resolution of the election contest to the only 3
members who would remain in the Tribunal, who are the
Justices.
The Senate Electoral Tribunal denied the petitioners
Motion for Disqualification or Inhibition on Feb. 12, 1988
and their MR on May 27, 1988
40
RATIO/DOCTRINE
SET CANNOT legally function absent the entire
membership of Senators
- It is a clear violation of Art. VI, Sec. 17 of the
Constitution which creates the SET, ordains its
composition, and defines its jurisdiction and
powers.
o In providing that both Justices of the SC
and Members of the Senate staff the
Tribunal, the Constitution intended that
both the judicial and legislative
components commonly share the duty
and qualifications of Senators.
o Said intent is clearly signalled by the fact
that the proportion of Senators to Justices
in the prescribed membership of the SET
is 2 to 1, an unmistakable indication that
legislative component cannot be totally
excluded without doing violence to spirit
of the Consti
o Also, no amendment of its rules can
confer on the three Justices-Members
alone the power of valid adjudication of a
senatorial election contest.
DISMISSED
Can courts review the decision of the ET?
Generally, NO. The exception is when there is
grave abuse of discretion
ABC VS COMELEC
Private respondent filed petition with COMELEC for
cancellation of registration and accreditation of petitioner
ABC Party List for violating Section 6 (1) of the Party List
Law (RA 7941). He alleged that it is a religious
organization which serves as a front for Children of God
Intl also known as Ang Dating Daan.
Comelec Second Division dismissed the petition based on
procedural and substantial grounds.
Respondent filed for a Motion for Reconsideration with
Motion to Annul Proclamation and Suspend its Effects.
Petitioner filed a comment/opposition with Extremely
Urgent Motion to Dismiss; respondent submitted
Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration and additional
evidence.
Petitioner urged Comelec to dismiss the petition on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction since the Secretary General
of the House of Representatives already recognized
ABC as a proclaimed party list group.
Respondent filed an opposition saying that the petitioner
was not validly proclaimed hence Comelec still has
jurisdiction.
Comelec en banc partially granted respondents MR
with Motion to Annul Proclamation and Suspend its
Effects. Hearing date was set.
RATIO/DOCTRINE:
Comelec had jurisdiction to entertain the petition for
cancellation of registration and accreditation of ABC
Party List
- The jurisdiction of Comelec over petitions for
cancellation of registration of any political party,
organization, or coalition is derived from Section
2 (5) Article IX C of the Constitution.
- Said authority of the Comelec is also reflected in
Section 6 of RA 7941:Comelec may motu proprio
or upon verified complaint of any interested party,
refuse or cancel, after due notice and hearing, the
registration of any national, regional or sectoral
party, organization, or coalition on any of the
following grounds.
In the case of party list nominees or representatives, it
is the HRET that has jurisdiction over contests relating
to their qualifications.
- Although it is the party list organization that is
voted for, it is not the organization that sits and
becomes a member of the HOR, but the party
list nominee or representative.
- Since the representative of the elected party
list organization becomes a member of the
HOR, contests relating to their qualifications are
within the jurisdiction of HRET as Section 17
Article 6 of the Constitution provides.
DISMISSED
JUDICIAL REVIEW OF DECISIONS OF ELECTORAL
TRIBUNALS
GARCIA VS HRET
May 29, 1998, w/in prescribe 10 days period from
respondent Harry Angpings proclamation as duly elected
Representative for the 3rd petitioners all duly registered
voters of district filed for quo warranto before HRET
against Angping.
They claim Angping is not natural-born citizen, thus
ineligible to assume office. Upon filing of the petition,
petitioners paid the required P5,000 filing fee.
HRET issued a Resolution dismissing the petition for quo
warranto for failure to pay P5,000 cash deposit required
by the Rules.
41
After the petitioners received the Resolution, petitioners
paid P 5,000 cash deposit on June 26, 1998 (28 days after
the deadline) and attached the corresponding receipt to
the Motion for Reconsideration they filed with HRET on
the same day.
Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration was however,
denied in view of Rule 32 of 1998 HRET Rules which
required a P 5,000 cash deposit in addition to filing fees for
quo warranto cases.
Thus petitioners under Rule 65 of SC, filed the instant
Petition on August 14, 1998 alleging that there is a grave
abuse of discretion on the part of HRET in denying the
Motion for Reconsideration despite the actual payment by
the petitioners of the required cash deposit thereby
strictly and literally construing HRET Rules in
contravention of the Rule on liberal construction Angping
on his part says that the Rule is unambiguous thus it does
not call for a liberal interpretation.
Petitioners stress that summary dismissals may only be
ordered in case of non-payment of the required cash
deposit within the prescribed time only in election protest
cases and not in quo warranto proceedings.
RATIO/DOCTRINE
There is NO grave abuse of discretion on the part of
HRET by dismissing the case because under the
Constitution, HRET shall be the sole judges of all
contests, relating to the elections, returns and
qualifications of its members.
- This does not bar SC from entertaining
petitions, which charge HRET with grave abuse
of discretion.
In the findings of the SC, the petitioners were able to pay
the required P 5,000 cash deposit only after an
unreasonable delay of 28 days after the filing and it was
paid after the dismissal of petition. Thats why the HRET
acted judiciously, correctly and certainly within its
jurisdiction.
MORRERO VS BOCAR
Gerardo Morrero and Juan Bocar were candidates for
membership in the National Assembly (NA), for the 3rd
district of the Province of Samar. Bocar won the elections
by almost a thousand votes and thereupon took the oath of
office in Nov. 15, 1935.
Morrero files a protest with the Electoral Commission
alleging that Bocar, born sometime in May 1906, did not
reach the age requirement of being at least 30 years
old at the time of the election, nor will he be 30 at the
beginning of his term of office.
Morrero prayed that Bocar be declared ineligible to be a
member of the NA, and that he (Morrero) be declared the
duly elected member.Electoral Commission DISMISSED
the protest.
The court CANNOT review the decision of the Electoral
Commission
- Section 4 of Article VI of the Constitution
provides that ". . . The Electoral Commission shall
be the sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns, and qualifications of the
Members of the National Assembly."
- The language of this provisions is clear. It vests in
the Electoral Commission exclusive jurisdiction to
pass upon the qualifications of a member of the
national Assembly. The judgment rendered by the
commission in the exercise of such an
acknowledged power is beyond judicial
interference, except, in any event, "upon a Cclear
showing of such arbitrary and improvident use
of the power as will constitute a denial of due
process of law."
LIWAYWAY VINZONS-CHATO VS HRET
Liwayway Vinzons-Chato (Chato) renewed her bid in the
2010 elections as representative of the 2nd District of
Camarines Norte, composed of 7 municipalities.
Chato lost to Elmer E. Panotes (Panotes) who was
proclaimed the winner having garnered a plurality of
3,885 votes
Chato filed an electoral protest before the HRET, assailing
the results in all the 160 clustered precincts in 4
municipalities (Daet, Vinzons, Basud and Mercedes). No
counter-protest was interposed by Panotes.
HRET issued the assailed Resolution denying Chato's
Urgent Motion on the ground that she failed to show proof
that the CF cards used in 20 precincts in the Municipalities
of Basud and Daet were not preserved or were violated.
Significantly, the HRET declared that, although the actual
ballots used in the 2010 elections are the best evidence of
the will of the voters, the picture images of the ballots are
regarded as the equivalent of the original.
RATIO/DOCTRINE
Jurisdiction to review decisions and orders of electoral
tribunals is exercised only upon showing of grave
abuse of discretion committed by the tribunal.
- Grave abuse of discretion has been defined as the
capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment, or
the exercise of power in an arbitrary manner,
where the abuse is so patent and gross as to
amount to an evasion of positive duty."
- The acts complained of in these cases pertain to
the HRETs exercise of its discretion, an exercise
which we find to be well within the bounds of
42
ART VI, SECTION 18 Commission on Appointments
Commission on Appointments shall consist of:
- President of the Senate (ex officio Chairman)
- 12 Senators and 12 Members of HoR (elected by
each House on the basis of proportional
representation from the political parties and
parties or organizations registered under the party-
list system).
The Chairman of the Commission shall not vote, except in
case of a tie. The Commission shall act on all appointments
submitted to it within 30 session days of the Congress
from their submission.
The Commission shall rule by a majority vote of all the
Members.
its authority and, therefore, beyond our power
to restrict or curtail.
COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS
ART VI, SECTION 19
The Electoral Tribunals and the Commission on
Appointments shall be constituted within 30 days after the
Senate and the HoR shall have been organized with the
election of the President and the Speaker.
The Commission on Appointments shall meet only while
the Congress is in session, at the call of its Chairman or a
majority of all its Members, to discharge such powers and
functions as are herein conferred upon it.
DAZA VS SINGSON
After the congressional elections of May 11, 1987,
the House of Representatives proportionally apportioned
its 12 seats in the Commission on Appointments in
accordance with Article VI, Section 18 of the Constitution.
Petitioner Daza was among those chosen and was
listed as representative of the Liberal Party.
On September 16, 1988, twenty-four (24)
members of the Liberal Party formally resigned from the
party and joined the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino
(LDP), thereby increasing the LDPs number to 159 and
reducing the Liberal party to only 17.
On the basis of this development, the House
revised its representation in the Commission on
Appointments by withdrawing the seat of LPs Raul
Daza and giving this to Luis Singson of the LDP.
Petitioner claims that he cannot be removed from the
Commission on Appointments because his election there is
permanent under the doctrine espoused in Cunanan vs
Tan.
- He also claims that the reorganization of the
House representation is not based in a permanent
political realignment because LDP is not a duly
registered political party and has not yet
attained political stability.
Respondent claims that nowhere in the constitution is it
required that the political party be registered to be
entitled to proportional representation in the Commission
on Appointments.
- reorganization is valid to reflect changes in
political alignments for as long as they are
permanent. (Cunanan vs. Tan)
the House of Representatives has the authority to change
its representation in the
RATIO/DOCTRINE
The House has the authority to change its
representation in the Commission on Appointments to
reflect at any time the changes that may transpire in
the political alignments of its membership.
- such changes must be permanent and do not
include the temporary alliances or factional
divisions not involving severance of political
loyalties or formal disaffiliation and permanent
shifts of allegiance from one political party from
one political party to another.
COSETENG VS MITRA
During the 1987 Congressional elections, Coseteng was the
only candidate elected under the KAIBA party. Of the
12 elected to the Commission on Appointments, Roque
Ablan of the KBL, represented the Coalesced Minority.
When the LDP was organized a year later, the House
Committees including the House representation in the
Commission on Appointments had to be reorganized.
Coseteng requested Mitra that she be appointed a member
of the CA as a representative of KAIBA.
Ablan was however retained as the 12th member
representing the House minority. Coseteng filed a petition
to declare null and void the appointment of the members
of the CA on the theory that their election to the CA
violated the constitutional mandate of proportional re
presentation.
RATIO/DOCTRINE : The revision of the House
representation in the CA is based on proportional
representation of the political parties therein.
- The composition was based on proportional
representation of the political parties therein. The
other minority parties are bound by the majority's
43
choices. Even if KAIBA were an opposition
party, its lone member represents only .4% of the
House, thus she is not entitled to one of the 12
seats.
- The other representatives to the CA were duly
elected by the House (not by their party) as
provided in Art. VI, Sec. 18.
- The validity of their election to the CA eleven
from the Coalesced Majority and one from the
Coalesced Minority is unassailable.
Is the legality in change in representation to the
Commission on Appointments in SCs jurisdiction?
YES
GUINGONA VS GONZALES
As a result of the 1992 Senatorial elections, the LDP was
entitled to 7.5 seats in the CA, the NPC to 2.5, the
LAKASNUCD to 1.5 and the LPPDPLABAN to .5. The
problem arose as to what to do with the 1/2 to which
each of the parties is entitled.
The LDP majority converted a fractional
halfmembership to a whole membership (7.5 + .5) to
be ableto elect Senator Romulo. In so doing, one other
party's fractional representation in the CA was reduced.
- This is clearly a violation of Sec. 18, Art. VI
because it is no longer based on proportional representati
on of the political parties.
Senator Tanada claimed that he has a right to be elected as
member of the CA because of the physical
impossibility of dividing a person (need to round off .5
to one senator) and because as the sole representative of
his party, his party is entitled to representation.
RATIO/DOCTRINE:
The provision of Section 18 on proportional
representation is mandatory in character and does not
leave any discretion to the majority party in the Senate
to disobey or disregard the rule on proportional represent
ation.
No party can claim more than what it is entitled
to under such rule.
Section 18 also assures representation in the
CA of any political party who succeeds in electing
members to the Senate, provided that the number of
senators
so elected enables it to put a representative in the CA.
Therefore, in the Senate, a political party must at least
have 2 duly elected senators for every seat in the CA.
The SC does not agree that it is mandatory to elect 12
Senators to the CA.
 - What the Constitution requires is that there be at
least a majority of the entire membership.
The Constitution does not require the election and
presence of 12 senators and 12 members
of the House in order that the Commission may
function.
The election of Senator Romulo and Tanada as
members of the CA was clearly a violation of Art. VI,
SEC 18
DRILON VS DE VENECIA
For GR No 180055: Petitioners approached Speaker Jose
de Venecia, Representative Neptali Gonzales II and the
Secretary General of the HoR to request for the
reconstitution of the House Contingent in the
Commission of Appointments to include one seat for
the Liberal Party. They were repeatedly told to allow the
Legal Department to study the matter.
The Department then informed petitioners that the
department was constrained to withhold the release of its
opinion
For GR No 183055: Senator Jamby Madrigal of PDP
Laban claimed that the composition of the Senate and
HoR contingents to the Commission on Appointments
violated the proportional representation because:
FOR THE SENATE
1. PMP has 2 representatives in the CA although it
only has 2 members in the Senate and thus is
entitled only to 1 seat
2. KAMPI has only 1 member in the Senate and thus
is not entitled to a CA seat and yet it is
represented in the CA
3. PRP has only 1 member in the Senate and thus is
not entitled to a CA seat and yet it is represented
in the CA
4. If Senators Richard Gordon and Pilar Juliana
Cayetano are Independents, then Sen. Gordon
cannot be a member of the CA as Independents
cannot be represented in the CA even though
there will be three Independents in the CA
5. If Sen. Alan Peter Cayetano is now NP, he still can
sit in the CA representing NP
FOR THE HoR
1. Lakas-CMD currently has 5 members in the
Commission on Appointments although it is
entitled only to 4 representatives and thus
[is] in excess of a member
2. KAMPI currently has 3 members in the
Commission on Appointments although it is
entitled only to two (2) representatives and
thus is excess of a member
44
3. Liberal Party is not represented in the
Commission on Appointments although it is
entitled to one 1 nominee
4. Party-List CIBAC has a representative in the
Commission on Appointments although it
only has two members in the House of
Representatives and therefore is not entitled
to any seat
RATIO/DOCTRINE
Petitioners have no merit and the court has no
jurisdiction
1. GR No 180055 was held moot by the inclusion of
Alfonso Umali Jr. of the Liberal Party to the House
Contingent on the Commission of Appointments.
2. The second petition falls because the Court has no
jurisdiction over the matter.
- Senator Madrigal failed to show she will sustain direct
injury over the matter in question
- Her primary recourse, pursuant to the doctrine of
primary jurisdiction, is with Congress.
- Senator Villar had already transmitted original copies of
Senator Madrigal's letters to the Senate Secretary for
inclusion in the Order of Business of the Session of the
Senate to address her concerns.
Senator Madrigal's filing of the second petition is thus
premature.
ART VII, SECTION 16 Presidential Appointment
The President shall nominate and, with the consent of
the Commission on Appointments, appoint
- the heads of the executive departments,
ambassadors, other public ministers and
consuls, or officers of the armed forces from the
rank of colonel or naval captain, and other
officers whose appointments are vested in him
in this Constitution.
- all other officers of the Government whose
appointments are not otherwise provided for
by law, and those whom he may be
- authorized by law to appoint.
The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other
officers lower in rank in the President alone, in the
courts, or in the heads of departments, agencies,
commissions, or boards.
LEGISLATIVE POWERS AND PROCESS OF CONGRESS
Legislative Powers & Limitations
(Appropriations/Tax/Royalty/Delegation)
ART VI, SECTION 1
The legislative power shall be vested in the
Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a
Senate and a House of Representatives, except to
the extent reserved to the people by the provision
on initiative and referendum.
ART VI, SECTIONS 21 TO 32
SECTION 21.The Senate or the House of Representatives or
any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in
aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published
rules of procedure. The rights of persons appearing in or
affected by such inquiries shall be respected.
SECTION 22. The heads of departments may upon their own
initiative, with the consent of the President, or upon the
request of either House, as the rules of each House shall
provide, appear before and be heard by such House on
any matter pertaining to their departments. Written
questions shall be submitted to the President of the Senate
or the Speaker of the House of Representatives at least three
days before their scheduled appearance. Interpellations
shall not be limited to written questions, but may cover
matters related thereto. When the security of the State or
the public interest so requires and the President so states
in writing, the appearance shall be conducted in executive
session.
SECTION 23.
1. The Congress, by a vote of 2/3 of both Houses in
joint session assembled, voting separately, shall
have the sole power to declare the existence of a
state of war.
2. In times of war or other national emergency, the
Congress may, by law, authorize the President,
for a limited period and subject to such
restrictions as it may prescribe, to exercise
powers necessary and proper to carry out a
declared national policy. Unless sooner
withdrawn by resolution of the Congress, such
powers shall cease upon the next adjournment
thereof.
SECTION 24. All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills
authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of local
application, and private bills shall originate exclusively in
the House of Representatives, but the Senate may propose
or concur with amendments.
45
SECTION 25. (1) The Congress may not increase the
appropriations recommended by the President for the
operation of the Government as specified in the budget. The
form, content, and manner of preparation of the budget
shall be prescribed by law.
(2) No provision or enactment shall be embraced in the
general appropriations bill unless it relates specifically to
some particular appropriation therein. Any such provision
or enactment shall be limited in its operation to the
appropriation to which it relates.
(3) The procedure in approving appropriations for the
Congress shall strictly follow the procedure for approving
appropriations for other departments and agencies.
(4) A special appropriations bill shall specify the purpose for
which it is intended, and shall be supported by funds actually
available as certified by the National Treasurer, or to be
raised by a corresponding revenue proposed therein.
(5) No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of
appropriations; however, the President, the President of the
Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of
Constitutional Commissions may, by law, be authorized to
augment any item in the general appropriations law for
their respective offices from savings in other items of their
respective appropriations.
(6) Discretionary funds appropriated for particular officials
shall be disbursed only for public purposes to be supported
by appropriate vouchers and subject to such guidelines as
may be prescribed by law.
(7) If, by the end of any fiscal year, the Congress shall have
failed to pass the general appropriations bill for the ensuing
fiscal year, the general appropriations law for the preceding
fiscal year shall be deemed reenacted and shall remain in
force and effect until the general appropriations bill is
passed by the Congress.
SECTION 26. (1) Every bill passed by the Congress shall
embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the
title thereof.
(2) No bill passed by either House shall become a law unless
it has passed three readings on separate days, and printed
copies thereof in its final form have been distributed to its
Members three days before its passage, except when the
President certifies to the necessity of its immediate
enactment to meet a public calamity or emergency. Upon
the last reading of a bill, no amendment thereto shall be
allowed, and the vote thereon shall be taken immediately
thereafter, and the yeas and nays entered in the Journal.
SECTION 27. (1) Every bill passed by the Congress shall,
before it becomes a law, be presented to the President. If he
approves the same, he shall sign it; otherwise, he shall veto it
and return the same with his objections to the House where
it originated, which shall enter the objections at large in its
Journal and proceed to reconsider it. If, after such
reconsideration, two-thirds of all the Members of such House
shall agree to pass the bill, it shall be sent, together with the
objections, to the other House by which it shall likewise be
reconsidered, and if approved by two-thirds of all the
Members of that House, it shall become a law. In all such
cases, the votes of each House shall be determined by yeas or
nays, and the names of the Members voting for or against
shall be entered in its Journal. The President shall
communicate his veto of any bill to the House where it
originated within thirty days after the date of receipt
thereof; otherwise, it shall become a law as if he had signed
it.
(2) The President shall have the power to veto any
particular item or items in an appropriation, revenue, or
tariff bill, but the veto shall not affect the item or items to
which he does not object.
SECTION 28. (1) The rule of taxation shall be uniform and
equitable. The Congress shall evolve a progressive system of
taxation.
(2) The Congress may, by law, authorize the President
to fix within specified limits, and subject to such
limitations and restrictions as it may impose, tariff
rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage
dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework
of the national development program of the
Government.
(3) Charitable institutions, churches and parsonages or
convents appurtenant thereto, mosques, non-profit
cemeteries, and all lands, buildings, and improvements,
actually, directly, and exclusively used for religious,
charitable, or educational purposes shall be exempt
from taxation.
(4) No law granting any tax exemption shall be passed
without the concurrence of a majority of all the
Members of the Congress.
SECTION 29. (1) No money shall be paid out of the Treasury
except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law.
(2) No public money or property shall be appropriated,
applied, paid, or employed, directly or indirectly, for the use,
benefit, or support of any sect, church, denomination,
sectarian institution, or system of religion, or of any priest,
preacher, minister, or other religious teacher, or dignitary as
such, except when such priest, preacher, minister, or
dignitary is assigned to the armed forces, or to any penal
institution, or government orphanage or leprosarium.
(3) All money collected on any tax levied for a special
purpose shall be treated as a special fund and paid out for
such purpose only. If the purpose for which a special fund
46
was created has been fulfilled or abandoned, the balance, if
any, shall be transferred to the general funds of the
Government.
SECTION 30. No law shall be passed increasing the
appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court as provided
in this Constitution without its advice and concurrence.
SECTION 31. No law granting a title of royalty or
nobility shall be enacted.
SECTION 32. The Congress shall, as early as possible, provide
for a system of initiative and referendum, and the exceptions
therefrom, whereby the people can directly propose and
enact laws or approve or reject any act or law or part
thereof passed by the Congress or local legislative body after
the registration of a petition therefor signed by at least ten
per centum of the total number of registered voters, of which
every legislative district must be represented by at least
three per centum of the registered voters thereof.
Express Substantive Limitations
DEMETRIA VS ALBA
The SC struck down Sec. 44 of PD 1177, authorizing the
President to transfer funds from one department to
another, on the ground that it overextended the privilege
granted under Art. VIII, sec. 16(5) of the 1973 Constitution,
even if such provision was already abrogated by the
Freedom Constitution.
Then, citing the Javier case on the need "not only for the
vindication of an outraged right, though
gone, but also for the guidance of and as a restraint upon
the future," it lectured on how this law would open the
floodgates for the enactment of unfunded
appropriations, uncontrolled executive expenditures,
diffusion of accountability for budgetary performance,
and entrenchment of the pork barrel system, and on
how this would create temptations for
misappropriation and embezzlement.
SANCHEZ VS COA
The General Appropriations Act of 1992 set aside 75
million pesos for the DILGs Capacity Building Program
intended to benefit local governments.
Attorney Hiram Mendoza, Project Director of the Ad Hoc
Task Force for Inter-Agency Coordination to Implement
Local Autonomy, informed Deputy Executive Secretary of a
proposal to constitute and implement a task force to
design programs, strategize and prepare modules for
an effective program for local autonomy.
- The proposal was accepted by the Deputy
Executive Secretary and attested by DILG
Secretary Cesar
 - Sarino who issued a memorandum for the transfer
and remittance of Php 300,000 to the Office of the
President for operational expenses. A cash
advance of the same amount was also requested.
Upon a post-audit conducted by the Department Auditor,
the amounts were disallowed. This disallowance was later
affirmed by the Commission on Audit.
RATIO/DOCTRINE
The Commission on Audit DID NOT err in disallowing
the transfer of funds
- The general policy of the Court is to sustain
decisions of administrative authorities especially
if constitutionally-created. This is based on both
the separation of powers and their presumed
expertise in the laws they are trusted to enforce.
- The petitioners flip flop on whether a transfer of
funds took place, while the OSG unmistakably
confirmed the transfer using the disbursement
voucher and other receipts as evidence.
- Because a transfer took place, the Court has to
ascertain whether the criteria laid out in Sec. 25
(5), Art. VI of the 1987 Constitution was met.
- A valid transfer of funds in the Executive
Department can only be exercised by the
President. In this case, such cannot be held as the
transfer was exercised by the Deputy Executive
Secretary, not even the Executive Secretary
himself. Further, there is no proof the action was
not authorized by the President.
- Even the President himself could not have
authorized the transfer, as it can only be done
when (a) there are savings and (b) when it is to
augment an existing item in the budget. There
cannot possibly be any savings as the transfer
happened mere days after the passing of the GAA,
not at the end of the year. Similarly, there cannot
possibly be an augmentation of an existing item
because the task force was ad hoc and not an pre -
existing agency or program.
Art. III. Bill of Rights
Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law, nor shall any person be
denied the equal protection of the laws.
Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or
warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to
be determined personally by the judge after examination
under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the
place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
Section 3. (1) The privacy of communication and
correspondence shall be inviolable except upon lawful order
47
of the court, or when public safety or order requires
otherwise, as prescribed by law.
(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the
preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in
any proceeding.
Section 4. No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of
speech, of expression, or of the press, or the right of the
people peaceably to assemble and petition the government
for redress of grievances.
Section 5. No law shall be made respecting an establishment
of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The free
exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship,
without discrimination or preference, shall forever be
allowed. No religious test shall be required for the exercise of
civil or political rights.
Section 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same
within the limits prescribed by law shall not be impaired
except upon lawful order of the court. Neither shall the right
to travel be impaired except in the interest of national
security, public safety, or public health, as may be provided
by law.
Section 7. The right of the people to information on matters
of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official
records, and to documents and papers pertaining to official
acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government
research data used as basis for policy development, shall be
afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be
provided by law.
Section 8. The right of the people, including those employed
in the public and private sectors, to form unions,
associations, or societies for purposes not contrary to law
shall not be abridged.
Section 9. Private property shall not be taken for public use
without just compensation.
Section 10. No law impairing the obligation of contracts
shall be passed.
Section 11. Free access to the courts and quasi-judicial
bodies and adequate legal assistance shall not be denied to
any person by reason of poverty.
Section 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the
commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed
of his right to remain silent and to have competent and
independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the
person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be
provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in
writing and in the presence of counsel.
(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any
other means which vitiate the free will shall be used against
him. Secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado, or
other similar forms of detention are prohibited.
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this
or Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence
against him.
(4) The law shall provide for penal and civil sanctions for
violations of this section as well as compensation to and
rehabilitation of victims of torture or similar practices, and
their families.
Section 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses
punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is
strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient
sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided
by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive
bail shall not be required.
Section 14. (1) No person shall be held to answer for a
criminal offense without due process of law.
(2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be
presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall
enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against
him, to have a speedy, impartial, and public trial, to meet the
witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to
secure the attendance of witnesses and the production of
evidence in his behalf. However, after arraignment, trial may
proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused
provided that he has been duly notified and his failure to
appear is unjustifiable.
Section 15. The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall
not be suspended except in cases of invasion or rebellion
when the public safety requires it.
Section 16. All persons shall have the right to a speedy
disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or
administrative bodies.
Section 17. No person shall be compelled to be a witness
against himself.
Section 18. (1) No person shall be detained solely by reason
of his political beliefs and aspirations.
(2) No involuntary servitude in any form shall exist except as
a punishment for a crime whereof the party shall have been
duly convicted.
Section 19. (1) Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor
cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment inflicted. Neither
shall the death penalty be imposed, unless, for compelling
reasons involving heinous crimes, the Congress hereafter
provides for it. Any death penalty already imposed shall be
reduced to reclusion perpetua.
48
(2) The employment of physical, psychological, or degrading
punishment against any prisoner or detainee or the use of
substandard or inadequate penal facilities under subhuman
conditions shall be dealt with by law.
Section 20. No person shall be imprisoned for debt or non-
payment of a poll tax.
Section 21. No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of
punishment for the same offense. If an act is punished by a
law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either
shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same
act.
Section 22. No ex post facto law or bill of attainder shall be
enacted.
ART VI
SEC 29
1. No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except
in pursuance of an appropriation made by law.
2. No public money or property shall be appropriated,
applied, paid, or employed, directly or indirectly, for
the use, benefit, or support of any sect, church,
denomination, sectarian institution, or system of
religion, or of any priest, preacher, minister, or
other religious teacher, or dignitary as such, except
when such priest, preacher, minister, or dignitary is
assigned to the armed forces, or to any penal
institution, or government orphanage or
leprosarium.
3. All money collected on any tax levied for a special
purpose shall be treated as a special fund and paid
out for such purpose only. If the purpose for which a
special fund was created has been fulfilled or
abandoned, the balance, if any, shall be transferred
to the general funds of the Government.
ART VI, SEC 25
SECTION 25
1. The Congress may not increase the appropriations
recommended by the President for the operation of
the Government as specified in the budget. The
form, content, and manner of preparation of the
budget shall be prescribed by law.
2. No provision or enactment shall be embraced in the
general appropriations bill unless it relates
specifically to some particular appropriation
therein. Any such provision or enactment shall be
limited in its operation to the appropriation to
which it relates.
3. The procedure in approving appropriations for the
Congress shall strictly follow the procedure for
approving appropriations for other departments
and agencies.
4. A special appropriations bill shall specify the
purpose for which it is intended, and shall be
 supported by funds actually available as certified by
the National Treasurer, or to be raised by a
corresponding revenue proposed therein.
5. No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of
appropriations; however, the President, the
President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court, and the heads of Constitutional Commissions
may, by law, be authorized to augment any item in
the general appropriations law for their respective
offices from savings in other items of their
respective appropriations.
6. Discretionary funds appropriated for particular
officials shall be disbursed only for public purposes
to be supported by appropriate vouchers and
subject to such guidelines as may be prescribed by
law.
7. If, by the end of any fiscal year, the Congress shall
have failed to pass the general appropriations bill
for the ensuing fiscal year, the general
appropriations law for the preceding fiscal year
shall be deemed reenacted and shall remain in force
and effect until the general appropriations bill is
passed by the Congress.
ART VII, SEC 22
The President shall submit to the Congress, within 30 days
from the opening of every regular session as the basis of the
general appropriations bill, a budget of expenditures and
sources of financing, including receipts from existing and
proposed revenue measures.
ART VII, SECTION 4
The President and the Vice-President shall be elected by
direct vote of the people for a term of six years which shall
begin at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following the
day of the election and shall end at noon of the same date,
six years thereafter. The President shall not be eligible for
any re-election. No person who has succeeded as President
and has served as such for more than four years shall be
qualified for election to the same office at any time.
ART VII, SECTIONS 9 to 11
Section 9. Whenever there is a vacancy in the Office of the
Vice-President during the term for which he was elected, the
President shall nominate a Vice-President from among the
Members of the Senate and the House of Representatives
who shall assume office upon confirmation by a majority
vote of all the Members of both Houses of the Congress,
voting separately.
Section 10. The Congress shall, at ten oclock in the morning
of the third day after the vacancy in the offices of the
President and Vice-President occurs, convene in accordance
with its rules without need of a call and within seven days,
enact a law calling for a special election to elect a President
49
and a Vice-President to be held not earlier than forty-five
days nor later than sixty days from the time of such call. The
bill calling such special election shall be deemed certified
under paragraph 2, Section 26, Article VI of this Constitution
and shall become law upon its approval on third reading by
the Congress. Appropriations for the special election shall be
charged against any current appropriations and shall be
exempt from the requirements of paragraph 4, Section 25,
Article VI of this Constitution. The convening of the Congress
cannot be suspended nor the special election postponed. No
special election shall be called if the vacancy occurs within
eighteen months before the date of the next presidential
election.
Section 11. Whenever the President transmits to the
President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of
Representatives his written declaration that he is unable to
discharge the powers and duties of his office, and until he
transmits to them a written declaration to the contrary,
such powers and duties shall be discharged by the Vice-
President as Acting President.
Whenever a majority of all the Members of the Cabinet
transmit to the President of the Senate and to the Speaker of
the House of Representatives their written declaration that
the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of
his office, the Vice-President shall immediately assume the
powers and duties of the office as Acting President.
Thereafter, when the President transmits to the President of
the Senate and to the Speaker of the House of
Representatives his written declaration that no inability
exists, he shall reassume the powers and duties of his office.
Meanwhile, should a majority of all the Members of the
Cabinet transmit within five days to the President of the
Senate and to the Speaker of the House of Representatives,
their written declaration that the President is unable to
discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Congress
shall decide the issue. For that purpose, the Congress shall
convene, if it is not in session, within forty-eight hours, in
accordance with its rules and without need of call.
If the Congress, within ten days after receipt of the last
written declaration, or, if not in session, within twelve days
after it is required to assemble, determines by a two-thirds
vote of both Houses, voting separately, that the President is
unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the
Vice-President shall act as President; otherwise, the
President shall continue exercising the powers and duties of
his office.
ART XIV, SECTION 4 (3)
All revenues and assets of non-stock, non-profit educational
institutions used actually, directly, and exclusively for
educational purposes shall be exempt from taxes and
duties. Upon the dissolution or cessation of the corporate
existence of such institutions, their assets shall be disposed of
in the manner provided by law.

Proprietary educational institutions, including those
cooperatively owned, may likewise be entitled to such
exemptions, subject to the limitations provided by law,
including restrictions on dividends and provisions for
reinvestment.
Can legislative powers be delegated?
NO, except: PLATE
1. People (Through Initiative and
Referendum)
2. Delegation to Local Government Units
3. Delegation to Administrative bodies
4. Tariff powers to the Pres
5. Emergency powers to the Pres
Is Pocket Veto (to defer action/not act) allowed in the
PH?
NO
Is Item Veto allowed?
Generally NO, except in:
1. GAA
2. Revenue and tariff bills
(Because money is the lifeblood of the
government)
THERE IS AN EXCEPTION TO THE EXCEPTION:
DOCTRINE OF INAPPROPRIATE PROVISION
(Philconsa vs Enriquez)
o Congress cannot include in GA bill
matters that should be more properly
enacted in a separate legislature
o Inappropriate provisions in it must be
treated as an item, which CAN BE
VETOED by the Pres in exercise of item
veto power
Executive impoundment is when the president refuses to
spend appropriations
Does Congress have the right to know why executive
privilege is invoked?
YES
Can the legislature seek judicial relief?
YES, judicial relief to compel attendance if the
Commander In Chief power is used incorrectly
(Gudani vs Senga)
Did Senate use the doctrine of legislative purpose in
Neri?
YES. The court found that there was no
compelling reason to question Neri because it
was NOT DONE TO ENACT A LAW
THIS HAS BECOME PASSE!!!
50
Can congress conduct legislative investigations even
when the law is already passed?
YES, because it can propose amendments or
new legislation
Does Congress have the power to punish people who
refuse to attend/respond to summons?
- YES, Congress can arrest or hold them in
Contempt of Congress
To know whether the question is proper, the ff must be
considered:
1. Definition of inquiry formed in the authorizing
resolution or statute
2. Opening remark of the committee chair
3. Nature of proceedings
4. The question itself
5. Response of the committee to an objection
IMPLIED SUBSTANTIVE LIMITATIONS
Art. VI, Sec. 23 (2)
(2) In times of war or other national emergency, the
Congress may, by law, authorize the President, for a limited
period and subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe, to
exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a
declared national policy. Unless sooner withdrawn by
resolution of the Congress, such powers shall cease upon the
next adjournment thereof.
Art. VI, Sec. 28 (2)
(2) The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix
within specified limits, and subject to such limitations and
restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates, import and export
quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or
imposts within the framework of the national development
program of the Government.
Art. X, Sec. 5, 18
Section 5. Each local government unit shall have the power
to create its own sources of revenues and to levy taxes, fees
and charges subject to such guidelines and limitations as the
Congress may provide, consistent with the basic policy of
local autonomy. Such taxes, fees, and charges shall accrue
exclusively to the local governments.
Section 18. The Congress shall enact an organic act for each
autonomous region with the assistance and participation of
the regional consultative commission composed of
representatives appointed by the President from a list of
nominees from multisectoral bodies. The organic act shall
define the basic structure of government for the region
consisting of the executive department and legislative
assembly, both of which shall be elective and representative
of the constituent political units. The organic acts shall
likewise provide for special courts with personal, family, and
property law jurisdiction consistent with the provisions of
this Constitution and national laws.
The creation of the autonomous region shall be effective
when approved by majority of the votes cast by the
constituent units in a plebiscite called for the purpose,
provided that only provinces, cities, and geographic areas
voting favorably in such plebiscite shall be included in the
autonomous region.
PELAEZ VS AUDITOR GENERAL
Pres. Marcos issued EO 93 to 121, 124 and 126 to 129,
creating 33 municipalties.
Emmanuel Pelaez, Vice-President, files a complaint praying
for the prohibition of the Auditor General from passing in
audit any expenditure of public funds in implementation of
said executive orders and/or any disbursement by said
municipalities.
President relied on Sec. 68 of the Revised Administrative
Code to establish his powers to set-up municipalities
(The President may by executive order define the
boundary of any municipality and may change the seat of
government within any subdivision to such place therein
as the public welfare may require.).
Petitioner holds that Sec. 68 of the Revised Admin Code
has been impliedly repealed by RA 2370 and that Sec. 68
constitutes an undue delegation of legislative powers.
Petitioner holds that authority to create municipal
corporations is essentially legislative in nature and
thus cannot be delegated.
RATIO/DOCTRINE
The President NOES NOT HAVE power to create
municipalities.
- The creation of municipalities is not an
administrative function but one which is
essentially and eminently legislative in
character.
- Also, public welfare as the qualifying cause to
the exercise of the powers stated in Sec. 68 cannot
be sustained as such a qualifier vests in the
President a discretion that is virtually
unfettered authority would be a matter of
opinion
- Such grant of authority would be a virtual
abdication of the powers of Congress in favor of
the Executive, and would bring about a total
collapse of the democratic system established
by our Constitution, which it is the special duty
and privilege of this Court to uphold.
51
Art. VI, Sec. 32
SECTION 32. The Congress shall, as early as possible, provide
for a system of initiative and referendum, and the exceptions
therefrom, whereby the people can directly propose and
enact laws or approve or reject any act or law or part
thereof passed by the Congress or local legislative body after
the registration of a petition therefor signed by at least ten
per centum of the total number of registered voters, of which
every legislative district must be represented by at least
three per centum of the registered voters thereof.
Art. VI, Sec. 26 (1-2)
SECTION 26. (1) Every bill passed by the Congress shall
embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the
title thereof.
(2) No bill passed by either House shall become a law unless
it has passed three readings on separate days, and printed
copies thereof in its final form have been distributed to its
Members three days before its passage, except when the
President certifies to the necessity of its immediate
enactment to meet a public calamity or emergency. Upon
the last reading of a bill, no amendment thereto shall be
allowed, and the vote thereon shall be taken immediately
thereafter, and the yeas and nays entered in the Journal.
Art. VI, Sec. 27 (1-2)
SECTION 27. (1) Every bill passed by the Congress shall,
before it becomes a law, be presented to the President. If he
approves the same, he shall sign it; otherwise, he shall veto it
and return the same with his objections to the House where
it originated, which shall enter the objections at large in its
Journal and proceed to reconsider it. If, after such
reconsideration, two-thirds of all the Members of such House
shall agree to pass the bill, it shall be sent, together with the
objections, to the other House by which it shall likewise be
reconsidered, and if approved by two-thirds of all the
Members of that House, it shall become a law. In all such
cases, the votes of each House shall be determined by yeas or
nays, and the names of the Members voting for or against
shall be entered in its Journal. The President shall
communicate his veto of any bill to the House where it
originated within thirty days after the date of receipt
thereof; otherwise, it shall become a law as if he had signed
it.
(2) The President shall have the power to veto any
particular item or items in an appropriation, revenue, or
tariff bill, but the veto shall not affect the item or items to
which he does not object.
TIO VS VIDEOGRAM REGULATORY BOARD
Valentin Tio assails the constitutionality of PD 1987, An
Act Creating the Videogram Regulatory Board with
broad powers to regulate and supervise the videogram
industry.
- A month after the decree was promulgated, a
related act (PD 1994) amended the National
Internal Revenue Code by imposing an annual
tax of five pesos for each processed video-tape
cassette.
- The tax seeks to alleviate the dire financial
conditions of the latter, as well as regulate the
uncontrolled distribution of videograms
RATIO/DOCTRINE:
Because of cases discussing Amendment 6, resolution was
reserved re the factual or legal basis for the exercise of the
President to the vast powers conferred upon him by
Amendment No. 6
The act is NOT an undue delegation of legislative power, it
is merely a conferment of authority to the Board as to
the laws execution and implementation. The authority
of the Board is also in a fixed and limited period
Question Hour
Art. VI, Sec. 22
SECTION 22. The heads of departments may upon their own
initiative, with the consent of the President, or upon the
request of either House, as the rules of each House shall
provide, appear before and be heard by such House on any
matter pertaining to their departments. Written questions
shall be submitted to the President of the Senate or the
Speaker of the House of Representatives at least three days
before their scheduled appearance. Interpellations shall not
be limited to written questions, but may cover matters
related thereto. When the security of the State or the public
interest so requires and the President so states in writing,
the appearance shall be conducted in executive session.
Legislative Investigations
Art. VI, Sec. 21
SECTION 21. The Senate or the House of Representatives or
any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid
of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of
procedure. The rights of persons appearing in or affected by
such inquiries shall be respected.
ARNAULT VS NAZARENO
Arnault was cited for contempt for persistently
refusing, after taking the stand, to reveal the name of
the person to whom he gave the P440,000
in connection with the legislative investigation of the
Buenavista and Tambobong Real Estates whereby a
certain Bert was able to sell the land to the government
and realized P1.5 million.
52
HELD/DOCTRINE:
Once an inquiry is admitted or established to be
within the jurisdiction of a legislative body to make, the
investigating committee has the power to require a
witness to answer any question pertinent to that
inquiry, subject of course to his constitutional right
against self-incrimination.
The inquiry, to be within the jurisdiction of the
legislative body to make, must be material or necessary
to the exercise of a power in it vested by the
Constitution, such as to legislate, or to expel a Member;
and every question which the investigator is empowered
to coerce a witness to answer must be material or
pertinent to the subject of the inquiry or
investigation.
So a witness may not be coerced to answer a
question that obviously has no relation to the subject
of the inquiry.
ARNAULT VS BALAGTAS
Arnault again persisted in not giving information
this time about an affidavit which purportedly gave the
details surrounding the acquisitions of the estates by Bert
and the supposed circumstances under which he gave the
amount to a Jess Santos. The court upheld the authority of
the Senate to cite him in contempt, thus dismissed the
habeas corpus petition.
When so held in contempt, since the Senate is a
continuing body, the contempt seems to be effective
even beyond the session during which the contempt
was made THIS IS NOT FOLLOWED ANYMORE!
PHILCOMSAT VS SENATE
On February 20, 2006, in view of the losses that
the government continued to incur and in order to protect
its interests in POTC, PHILCOMSAT and PHC, Senator
Miriam Defensor Santiago introduced Proposed Senate
Resolution (PSR) No. 455 directing the conduct of an
inquiry, in aid of legislation, on the anomalous losses
incurred by POTC, PHILCOMSAT and PHC and the
mismanagement committed by their respective board of
directors.
Petitioners Locsin and Andal, both directors and
corporate officers of PHC, as well as nominees of the
government to the board of directors of both POTC and
PHILCOMSAT were invited to attend these hearings as
resource persons.
Committees found overwhelming mismanagement by the
PCGG and its nominees over POTC, PHILCOMSAT and PHC,
and that PCGG was negligent in performing its mandate to
preserve the government's interests in the said
corporations
RATIO/DOCTRINE
Senate Committees cannot be said to have acted with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of
jurisdiction when it submitted Committee Resolution No.
312, given its constitutional mandate to conduct
legislative inquiries.
As to Locsin and Andal their right to counsel was not
violated because invoking counsel can only apply to
custodial investigations. Petitioners Locsin and Andal
were invited to the public hearings as resource persons,
they cannot therefore validly invoke their right to counsel.
SABIO VS GORDON
Pres Cory Aquino created the Presidential Commission on
Good Governance (PCGG) through EO No 1. TASK: To
recover ill-gotten wealth accumulated by the Marcos
family and cronies
SEC 4(B) IS DISPUTED BECAUSE IT ALLEGEDLY
TRAMPLES UPON THE SENATES POWER TO CONDUCT
LEGISLATIVE INQUIRY: No member or staff of the
Commission shall be required to testify or produce
evidence in any judicial, legislative or administrative
proceeding concerning matters within its official
cognizance.
This section was used by the petitioners to avoid
hearings regarding their petitioners' acts committed in
the discharge of their duties as officers and directors of
POTC, PHILCOMSAT, AND PHC.
HELD/DOCTRINE
Section 4(b) is also inconsistent with the principles of
PUBLIC TRUST, PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY, and PEOPLES
ACCESS TO INFORMATION
Congress inquiry does not violate right to privacy and
right against self-incrimination
- Right to privacy is not absolute where there is an
overriding compelling state interest
- Anomalies in the said companies ranging in
millions of pesos and the conspiratorial
participation of the PCGG and its officials are
compelling reasons for the Senate to exact vital
information
- Right against self-incrimination may be invoked
by only when the incriminating question is being
asked (they have no way of knowing in advance
the nature or effect of the questions to be asked of
them). The possibly of violation is no ground
for denying respondent Senate Committees
their power of inquiry.
DELA PAZ VS SENATE
Gen. Dela Paz (One of the 8) was apprehended by local
authorities for failure to declare in written form the
53
possession of 105,000 Euros + another 45,000 Euros.
They were detained and after a few days they were
allowed to return to the Philippines but the money was
confiscated.
October 23, 2008: After the subpoena was issued, they had
their first hearing. They filed a motion to quash the
subpoena due to lack of jurisdiction. Santiago, defended
the respondents right of jurisdiction and ordered
Balajadia for their arrest.
Petitioners argue that the respondent does not have
jurisdiction since the Moscow incident DOES NOT
involve state-state relations which is part of Section 14
Rule 10(12) of Senate Rules. Furthermore, they contend
that their arrest was in violation of same rules since
their arrest was without the signatures of the
MAJORITY OF THE MEMBERS of the respondent
committee.
Moreover, these rules were not published and thus cant be
used as basis.
RATIO/DOCTRINE: "Each House shall determine the rules
of its proceedings."
- This is to be construed to give FULL
DISCRETIONARY AUTHORITY to Congress in the
formulation, adoption, and promulgation of its
own rules. This power is generally exempt from
judicial supervision and interference unless there
is a clear showing of arbitrary and improvident
use of such power that would equate to due
process.
Are all proceedings without published rules null and
void?
NO, only those violative of the right of a person
appearing before Congress
GARCILLANO VS HOR
CASE THAT ABANDONED ARNAULT
After 2005 leak of Hello Garci! tapes which resulted in
the near-collapse of the Arroyo government, became the
subject of heated legislative hearings conducted
separately by committees of both Houses of Congress.
2005, June 8 - Then Minority Floor Leader Chiz Escudero
delivered privilege speech which prompted
congressional investigations jointly conducted by the
Respondent Committees.
2005, July 5 - NBI Director Wycoco, Atty. Alan Paguia, and
Atty. Samuel Ong submitted to Respondent Committees 7
alleged original tape recordings of the supposed 3-
hour conversation -> after debates, tapes were eventually
played in the chambers of the House.
Virgilio Garcillano filed petition for prohibition and
injunction, TRO, and/or writ of preliminary injunction;
- to restrain Respondent Committees from using
the illegally obtained conversations in their
reports;
- to have the recordings and references to it be
stricken off records of inquiry
- to direct Respondent Committees to desist from
further using recordings in any of House
proceedings
After more than 2 years of quiesence, Sen. Lacson roused
the issue with his privilege speech (promised to
provide the public with the whole truth on the wiretap and
sought an inquiry into perceived willingness of telcos
to participate in such wiretapping activities
Ranada petition to prohibit and stop the conduct of the
Senate inquiry on the wiretapped conversation
COURT DISMISSED GARCILLANO PETITION, BUT GRANTS
RANADA PETITION
Senate CANNOT be allowed to continue with the conduct
of the questioned legislative inquiry w/o duly
published Rules of Procedureas it violates Sec. 21, Art. VI
of Consti
Justice Carpios Dissenting Opinion reasoning: Applying
the same reasoning in Arnault vs Nazareno, the Senate
under the 1987 Constitution is not a continuing body
because less than
majority of the Senators continue into the next
Congress.
- The consequence is that the Rules of Procedure
must be republished by the Senate after every
expiry of the term of twelve Senators.
Is senate a continuing body?
NO. Garcillano vs HOR Committies abandoned
the ruling in Arnault. In its day-to-day activity,
congress acts separately and independently
from the one before it
All pending matters not finished by the previous
senate are terminated because the new senate
will have a different composition
The succeeding senate should not be bound by
acts and deliberations of the senate of which
they had no part
Rules do not continue into the next senate
ABAKADA GURO PARTY LIST VS PURISIMA
This is a petition for prohibition against the
implementation of RA 9335 or the Attrition Act of 2005.
54
- RA 9335 is mainly for the Bureau of Internal
Revenue and Bureau of Customs officials and
employees:
- Intends to encourage them to exceed their
revenue targets by providing a system of rewards
and sanctions
- Fund is sourced from excess in the revenue
targets for the year, as determined by the DBCC.
- The Board is given the power over the fund,
criteria to follow termination and removal of
officials and employees, and the system for
evaluation.
Congressional Oversight Committee
Petitioners challenge the constitutionality of RA 9335 on
the grounds of:
- Violates equal protection clause since it is limited
to BIR and BOC
- Delegates the power to fix revenue targets to the
President
- The congressional oversight committee violates
the doctrine of separation of powers since it
permits legislative participation in the
implementation of the law
RATIO/DOCTRINE: The law allowing congress to approve
IRR AFTER it has already taken effect is
UNCONSTITUTIONAL because it allows congress to
overturn any directive by the executive
Congress has no veto power.
Power of oversight concerns post-enactment measures
by congress
1. To monitor bureaucratic compliance with
program objectives
2. To determine whether agencies are properly
administered
3. To eliminate executive waste and dishonestly
4. To prevent executive usurpation of legislative
authority
5. To access executive conformity with the
congressional perception of public interest
Categories of Congressional Oversight
1. Scrutiny: determine economic efficiency of
operation of govt activity
2. Congressional investigation: digging of facts
3. Legislative supervision: allows congress to
scrutinize the exercise of delegated law-making
authority and permits congress to remain part
of the delegated authority
Art. VI, Sec. 21, 22
SECTION 21. The Senate or the House of Representatives or
any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid
of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of
procedure. The rights of persons appearing in or affected by
such inquiries shall be respected.
SECTION 22. The heads of departments may upon their own
initiative, with the consent of the President, or upon the
request of either House, as the rules of each House shall
provide, appear before and be heard by such House on any
matter pertaining to their departments. Written questions
shall be submitted to the President of the Senate or the
Speaker of the House of Representatives at least three days
before their scheduled appearance. Interpellations shall not
be limited to written questions, but may cover matters
related thereto. When the security of the State or the public
interest so requires and the President so states in writing,
the appearance shall be conducted in executive session.
THE USE OF "LEGISLATIVE" PURPOSE" AS A
LIMITATION ON THE CONGRESSIONAL POWER
OF INVESTIGATION
Vicente V. Mendoza
Issues raised by legislative investigations are complex
because they call for an assessment of consequences in
order to accommodate the demands of the public order.
But these investigation is NOT a trial for the punishment of
wrongs, but a device to enable Congress to know what
remedial legislation is needed.
Given this right to be informed in order to legislate wisely,
Congress may use coercive power to compel disclosures.
This is problematic, because the early concept of
legislative investigation is limited to the doctrine of
legislative purpose (investigations may only be used in
law making). If the investigation is conducted outside the
legislative purpose, it may be used to harass individuals
and invade fundamental rights.
The doctrine of legislative purpose has been used as a test
to determine the extent of the congressional power of
investigation
- But it does not determine the bounds of
permissible and impermissible investigations
- Reliance on it as a te3st has left individual rights
unprotected
From Kilbourn to Gregory: The Rise and Fall of A
Doctrine: HISTORICAL ORIGIN OF THE DOCTRINE OF
LEGISLATIVE PURPOSE
1880: Start of judicial review of legislative inquiries
- Because of the separation of powers, it was
believed that legislative inquiries could only be
justified if used in creating laws
On this ground, court revised the conviction of a
recalcitrant witness for contempt of congress (Kilbourn vs
Thompson)
- Kilbourn, general manager of a real estate pool
which dealt with questionable transactions and
irregular expenditure of public funds
- Kilbourn was jailed for 45 days for refusing to
answer questions and refusing to produce certain
books and papers related to the case
- Killbourn filed an action for false imprisonment
Upheld by SC
Initial formulation of Legislative purpose (by Justice
Miller)
- Inquiry must be material to the exercise of power
vested by Consti MAKE LAWS OR EXPEL A
MEMBER
- Every question must be material to the subject of
the inquiry
Dissent of J Tuason
- The question has no relation to legislation
1972: Teapot Dome Scandal
- Senate committee on investigation alleged there
was malfeasance in the DOJ because a brother of
the attorney general refused to obey a subpoena
issued by the committee
- Brother filed for privilege of writ of HC, affirmed
by the district court
- On appeal in SC, it had attracted national
attention, so investigation had to be upheld
McGrain v Daugherty
- Distinguished Kilbourn ruling: the probe had no
legislative purpose. It was solely for exposing
corruption
- Here the court said that the purpose of the
legislative investigation is indicated by the
subject matter of the investigation
- But it is not clear why they belived Kilbourn had
no legislative purpose even if both cases had
scandal in the government as subject matter
Mcgrain and Kilbourn should not have been treated
differently
Trend during this time: where no legislative purpose is
stated, presume that it exists. Where it is stated, take it
at face value.
- US vs Josephson: declaration of legislative purpose
was held conclusive on the courts
- Departure from the trend: States vs Icardi, where a
lower court required proof of legislative purpose
because it considered more weighty the
presumption of innocence of a defendant

55
Other than Icardi, courts were unable to enforce the
requirement of legislative purpose in any meaningful
sense
- Investigating committees moved from an initial
position of doubtful and limited power to one of
virtual omnipotence
1950s: Use of Congressional investigations to expose
communists (period of the great witch hunt)
Watkins v US: Watkins, a labor union official testified freely
about his political activities, admitted he cooperated with
Communist Party.
- Refused to answer questions about individual
members of CP because they were allegedly
outside the authority of the House Committee
- Watkins convicted of contempt of Congress
- SC REVERSED, WITH J CLARK DISSENTING
o Focused on need to define the purpose
and jurisdiction of investigating
committees
Sweezy vs New Hampshire
- Authority of the investigating committee must be
clearly defined
Watkins and Sweezy decisions provoked criticism that led
to demands in Congress for curtailment of the courts
jurisdiction over cases involving validity of acts of
investigating committees, so COURT RETREATED FROM
ITS ORIGINAL POSITION
- QUESTIONS ASKED OF A WITNESS MUST BE
PERTINENT
- Beginning to question Watkins
- Barenblatt: made use of the First Amendment in
defense of not answering
o used legislative purpose to counterweight
individual rights, instead of using it as a
measure of the validity of congressional
inquiries
1963: NEW TREND - Court had dropped the use of the
presumption doctrine, was beginning to really inquire
into the nature of congressional activities
- De Gregory v Atty General of New Hampshire:
reversed contempt conviction arising from
appellants refusal to answer questions re part-
time membership in Communist Party
Use of Doctrine of Legislative purpose is subject to the
following observations
1. To say that congressional inquiries may only be
justified in terms of the need for legislation is to
assume 2 thigs:
o That the power of government can neatly
be divided into legislative, judicial and
executive (doctrinaire view)
o That the function of congress is confined
to strictly lawmaking (based on unreality)
56
2. Doctrine of legislative purpose is difficult to
enforce
o How is the court to prove otherwise if
Congress declares that its purpose is
legislation?
o Court cannot probe into the motives of
congress
o Legislative investigation need not result
in legislation
o Court cannot use legislative purpose to
strike down inquiries
3. The task of the court does not end on determining
legislative purpose. There is still the problem of
accommodating the public interest and the
individual
o Legislative purpose will have to be
weighed against the right of the witness
4. Where the purpose of investigation is otherwise,
congressional purpose must be recognized for
what it is and weighed against the interest of the
individual
Balancing individual freedoms against societys interests
Art. VIII, Sec. 1, 8 (2)
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme
Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to
settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or
not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.
Section 8. (1) A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created
under the supervision of the Supreme Court composed of the
Chief Justice as ex officio Chairman, the Secretary of Justice,
and a representative of the Congress as ex officio Members,
a representative of the Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a
retired Member of the Supreme Court, and a representative
of the private sector.
(2) The regular members of the Council shall be appointed
by the President for a term of four years with the consent of
the Commission on Appointments. Of the Members first
appointed, the representative of the Integrated Bar shall
serve for four years, the professor of law for three years, the
retired Justice for two years, and the representative of the
private sector for one year.
Act as Board Canvassers for Presidential and Vice-
Presidential Elections
Art. VII, Sec. 4
Section 4. The President and the Vice-President shall be
elected by direct vote of the people for a term of six years
which shall begin at noon on the thirtieth day of June next
following the day of the election and shall end at noon of the
same date, six years thereafter. The President shall not be
eligible for any re-election. No person who has succeeded as
President and has served as such for more than four years
shall be qualified for election to the same office at any time.
No Vice-President shall serve for more than two successive
terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of
time shall not be considered as an interruption in the
continuity of the service for the full term for which he was
elected.
Unless otherwise provided by law, the regular election for
President and Vice-President shall be held on the second
Monday of May.
The returns of every election for President and Vice-
President, duly certified by the board of canvassers of each
province or city, shall be transmitted to the Congress,
directed to the President of the Senate. Upon receipt of the
certificates of canvass, the President of the Senate shall, not
later than thirty days after the day of the election, open all
the certificates in the presence of the Senate and the House
of Representatives in joint public session, and the Congress,
upon determination of the authenticity and due execution
thereof in the manner provided by law, canvass the votes.
The person having the highest number of votes shall be
proclaimed elected, but in case two or more shall have an
equal and highest number of votes, one of them shall
forthwith be chosen by the vote of a majority of all the
Members of both Houses of the Congress, voting separately.
The Congress shall promulgate its rules for the canvassing of
the certificates.
The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of
all contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of the President or Vice-President, and may
promulgate its rules for the purpose.
RA 7166
Call a Special Election in Case of Vacancy in the Offices
of President and Vice-President
Art. VII, Sec. 10
Section 10. The Congress shall, at ten oclock in the morning
of the third day after the vacancy in the offices of the
President and Vice-President occurs, convene in accordance
with its rules without need of a call and within seven days,
enact a law calling for a special election to elect a President
and a Vice-President to be held not earlier than forty-five
days nor later than sixty days from the time of such call. The
57
bill calling such special election shall be deemed certified
under paragraph 2, Section 26, Article VI of this Constitution
and shall become law upon its approval on third reading by
the Congress. Appropriations for the special election shall be
charged against any current appropriations and shall be
exempt from the requirements of paragraph 4, Section 25,
Article VI of this Constitution. The convening of the Congress
cannot be suspended nor the special election postponed. No
special election shall be called if the vacancy occurs within
eighteen months before the date of the next presidential
election.
Revoke of Extend Suspension of Privilege of Habeas
Corpus or Declaration of Martial Law
Art. VII, Sec. 18
Section 18. The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief
of all armed forces of the Philippines and whenever it
becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to
prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion.
In case of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety
requires it, he may, for a period not exceeding sixty days,
suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place
the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law.
Within forty-eight hours from the proclamation of martial
law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus, the President shall submit a report in person or in
writing to the Congress. The Congress, voting jointly, by a
vote of at least a majority of all its Members in regular or
special session, may revoke such proclamation or
suspension, which revocation shall not be set aside by the
President. Upon the initiative of the President, the Congress
may, in the same manner, extend such proclamation or
suspension for a period to be determined by the Congress, if
the invasion or rebellion shall persist and public safety
requires it.
The Congress, if not in session, shall, within twenty-four
hours following such proclamation or suspension, convene in
accordance with its rules without need of a call.
The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate
proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual
basis of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or the extension
thereof, and must promulgate its decision thereon within
thirty days from its filing.
A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the
Constitution, nor supplant the functioning of the civil courts
or legislative assemblies, nor authorize the conferment of
jurisdiction on military courts and agencies over civilians
where civil courts are able to function, nor automatically
suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
The suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus shall apply only to persons judicially charged for
rebellion or offenses inherent in, or directly connected with,
invasion.
During the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus, any person thus arrested or detained shall be
judicially charged within three days, otherwise he shall be
released.
Approve Presidential Amnesties
Art. VII, Sec. 19
Section 19. Except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise
provided in this Constitution, the President may grant
reprieves, commutations, and pardons, and remit fines and
forfeitures, after conviction by final judgment.
He shall also have the power to grant amnesty with the
concurrence of a majority of all the Members of the
Congress.
Confirmation of Certain Appointments
Art. VII, Sec. 9, 16
Section 9. Whenever there is a vacancy in the Office of the
Vice-President during the term for which he was elected, the
President shall nominate a Vice-President from among the
Members of the Senate and the House of Representatives
who shall assume office upon confirmation by a majority
vote of all the Members of both Houses of the Congress,
voting separately.
Section 16. The President shall nominate and, with the
consent of the Commission on Appointments, appoint the
heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other
public ministers and consuls, or officers of the armed forces
from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers
whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution.
He shall also appoint all other officers of the Government
whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law,
and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint.
The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other
officers lower in rank in the President alone, in the courts, or
in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or
boards.
The President shall have the power to make appointments
during the recess of the Congress, whether voluntary or
compulsory, but such appointments shall be effective only
until disapproved by the Commission on Appointments or
until the next adjournment of the Congress.
58
Art. IX, B, C, D, 1 [2]
B. THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
Section 1. (1) The civil service shall be administered by the
Civil Service Commission composed of a Chairman and two
Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the
Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at least
thirty-five years of age, with proven capacity for public
administration, and must not have been candidates for any
elective position in the elections immediately preceding their
appointment.
(2) The Chairman and the Commissioners shall be appointed
by the President with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments for a term of seven years without
reappointment. Of those first appointed, the Chairman shall
hold office for seven years, a Commissioner for five years,
and another Commissioner for three years, without
reappointment. Appointment to any vacancy shall be only
for the unexpired term of the predecessor. In no case shall
any Member be appointed or designated in a temporary or
acting capacity.
C. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
Section 1. (1) There shall be a Commission on Elections
composed of a Chairman and six Commissioners who shall
be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of
their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age, holders of
a college degree, and must not have been candidates for any
elective positions in the immediately preceding elections.
However, a majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall
be members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in
the practice of law for at least ten years.
(2) The Chairman and the Commissioners shall be appointed
by the President with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments for a term of seven years without
reappointment. Of those first appointed, three Members
shall hold office for seven years, two Members for five years,
and the last Members for three years, without
reappointment. Appointment to any vacancy shall be only
for the unexpired term of the predecessor. In no case shall
any Member be appointed or designated in a temporary or
acting capacity.
D. THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT
Section 1. (1) There shall be a Commission on Audit
composed of a Chairman and two Commissioners, who shall
be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of
their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age, Certified
Public Accountants with not less than ten years of auditing
experience, or members of the Philippine Bar who have been
engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years, and
must not have been candidates for any elective position in
the elections immediately preceding their appointment. At
no time shall all Members of the Commission belong to the
same profession.
(2) The Chairman and the Commissioners shall be appointed
by the President with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments for a term of seven years without
reappointment. Of those first appointed, the Chairman shall
hold office for seven years, one Commissioner for five years,
and the other Commissioner for three years, without
reappointment. Appointment to any vacancy shall be only
for the unexpired portion of the term of the predecessor. In
no case shall any Member be appointed or designated in a
temporary or acting capacity.
Art. VIII, Sec. 8 [2]
Section 8. (1) A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created
under the supervision of the Supreme Court composed of the
Chief Justice as ex officio Chairman, the Secretary of Justice,
and a representative of the Congress as ex officio Members, a
representative of the Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a
retired Member of the Supreme Court, and a representative
of the private sector.
(2) The regular members of the Council shall be appointed
by the President for a term of four years with the consent of
the Commission on Appointments. Of the Members first
appointed, the representative of the Integrated Bar shall
serve for four years, the professor of law for three years, the
retired Justice for two years, and the representative of the
private sector for one year.
- clearly appointed with the consent of the COA,
and if the President approves the nomination,
he appoints them
GROUP 2: All other officers of the Government whose
appointments are not otherwise provided for by law
GROUP 3: Those whom the President may be authorized
by law to appoint
GROUP 4: Officers lower in rank whose appointments the
Congress may by law vest in the President alone
GROUPS 2, 3 and 4: contentious in the case
RATIO/DOCTRINE:
Mison MAY be appointed by the President without the
consent/confirmation of the COA
- The proceedings of the 1986 ConCom support this.
In the original text, the phrase "AND BUREAUS"
came after "heads of executive
- According to the ConCom records, Commissioner
Regalado asked for the deletion of the phrase "and
bureaus".
- However, this STILL MEANS that the President
is the one who will appoint them, but their
appointment shall no longer be subject to The
Committee
- amendment because it MAKES IT CLEAR THAT
THOSE OTHER OFFICERS MENTIONED IN
GROUPS 2, 3 and 4 DO NOT HAVE TO BE
CONFIRMED BY THE COA.

SARMIENTO VS MISON

The petitioners (Sarmiento and Arcilla) want to stop

Mison from performing his functions in the Office of the
Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs (BOC) on the
ground that Mison's appointment as COMMISSIONER of
the BOC is UNCONSTITUTIONAL because it was not
confirmed by the Commission on Apppointments
(COA).
- Mison says that his appointment by the President
is Constitutional, EVEN WITHOUT the
confirmation of the COA.

Under Article 7, Sec. 16 of the 1987 Consti, there are 4

groups of officers whom the President shall appoint:

GROUP 1: Heads of executive departments, ambassadors,

other public ministers and consuls, officers of the AFP
from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other
officers whose appointments are vested in him in this
Constitution.

59

Art. VII, Sec. 8 (2)
The Congress shall, by law, provide who shall serve as
President in case of death, permanent disability or
resignation of the Acting President. He shall serve until the
President or the Vice-President shall have been elected and
qualified, and be subject to the same restrictions of powers
and disqualifications as the Acting President.
Art. IX-B, C, D, 1 (2)
B. The Civil Service Commission (composed of a Chairman
and 2 Commissioners)
The Chairman and the Commissioners shall be appointed by
the President with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments for a term of seven years without
reappointment. Of those first appointed, the Chairman shall
hold office for 7 years, a Commissioner for 5 years, and
another Commissioner for 3 years, without reappointment.
Appointment to any vacancy shall be only for the unexpired
term of the predecessor. In no case shall any Member be
appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity.
C. The Commission on Elections (composed of a Chairman
and 6 Commissioners)
The Chairman and the Commissioners shall be appointed by
the President with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments for a term of seven years without
reappointment. Of those first appointed, 3 members shall
hold office for 7 years, 2 members for 5 years, and the last
members for 3 years, without reappointment. Appointment
to any vacancy shall be only for the unexpired term of the
predecessor. In no case shall any Member be appointed or
designated in a temporary or acting capacity.
D. The Commission on Audit (composed of a Chairman and
2 Commissioners)
The Chairman and the Commissioners shall be appointed by
the President with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments for a term of seven years without
reappointment. Of those first appointed, the Chairman shall
hold office for 7 years, a Commissioner for 5 years, and the
other Commissioner for 3 years, without reappointment.
Appointment to any vacancy shall be only for the unexpired
term of the predecessor. In no case shall any Member be
appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity.
Art. X, Sec. 18
Section 18. The Congress shall enact an organic act for each
autonomous region with the assistance and participation of
the regional consultative commission composed of
representatives appointed by the President from a list of
nominees from multi-sectoral bodies. The organic act shall
define the basic structure of government for the region
60
consisting of the executive department and legislative
assembly, both of which shall be elective and representative
of the constituent political units. The organic acts shall
likewise provide for special courts with personal, family, and
property law jurisdiction consistent with the provisions of
this Constitution and national laws. The creation of the
autonomous region shall be effective when approved by
majority of the votes cast by the constituent units in a
plebiscite called for the purpose, provided that only
provinces, cities, and geographic areas voting favorably in
such plebiscite shall be included in the autonomous region.
(j) Concur in Treaties
Compare to role of Congress in amnesties
Treaties: 2/3 vote of Senate VS Amnesties: Majority
vote of Congress
Art. VII, Sec. 21
Section 21. No treaty or international agreement shall be
valid and effective unless concurred in by at least two-thirds
of all the Members of the Senate.
(k) Declaration of the Existence of War
and Delegation of Emergency Powers
General rule: AFP Chief of Staffs term is 3 years.
Exception: President may extend term of Chief of
Staff during state of war or emergency declared by
Congress.
Art. VI, Sec. 23
1. The Congress, by a vote of two-thirds of both Houses
in joint session assembled, voting separately, shall
have the sole power to declare the existence of a
state of war.
2. In times of war or other national emergency, the
Congress may, by law, authorize the President, for a
limited period and subject to such restrictions as it
may prescribe, to exercise powers necessary and
proper to carry out a declared national policy.
Unless sooner withdrawn by resolution of the
Congress, such powers shall cease upon the next
adjournment thereof.
Art. XVI, Sec. 5 (7)
(7) The tour of duty of the Chief of Staff of the armed forces
shall not exceed three years. However, in times of war or
other national emergency declared by the Congress, the
President may extend such tour of duty.
(l) Presidents Physical Fitness
PROCESS:
1. President declares he is unable
2. Majority of Cabinet members declare that
President is unable
3. President declares that no inability exists
4. Majority of Cabinet members declare WITHIN
5 DAYS that President is unable
5. ONLY THEN will Congress take over to decide
on the issue by 2/3 of houses voting
separately
Within how many days can Cabinet members
contest? 5 DAYS. Thereafter, Congress shall decide
the issue
What if Cabinet Members are not able to contest
within 5 days? Then, Congress will not be able to
decide. The contention will be considered as a new
declaration.
Art. VII, Sec. 11
Section 11. Whenever the President transmits to the
President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of
Representatives his written declaration that he is unable to
discharge the powers and duties of his office, and until he
transmits to them a written declaration to the contrary,
such powers and duties shall be discharged by the Vice-
President as Acting President.
Whenever a majority of all the Members of the Cabinet
transmit to the President of the Senate and to the Speaker of
the House of Representatives their written declaration that
the President is
unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the
Vice-President shall immediately assume the powers and
duties of the office as Acting President.
Thereafter, when the President transmits to the President of
the Senate and to the Speaker of the House of
Representatives his written declaration that no inability
exists, he shall reassume the powers and duties of his office.
Meanwhile, should a majority of all the Members of the
Cabinet transmit within five days to the President of the
Senate and to the Speaker of the House of Representatives,
their written declaration that the President is unable to
discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Congress
shall decide the issue. For that purpose, the Congress shall
convene, if it is not in session, within forty-eight hours, in
accordance with its rules and without need of call.
If the Congress, within ten days after receipt of the last
written declaration, or, if not in session, within twelve days
after it is required to assemble, determines by a two-thirds
vote of both Houses, voting separately, that the President is
unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the
Vice-President shall act as President; otherwise, the
61
President shall continue exercising the powers and duties of
his office.
(m) Power of Impeachment
Who are subject to impeachment?
o President, Vice-President, Members of
Supreme Court,, Members of Constitutional
Commissions and Ombudsman
Grounds: culpable violation of Constitution (i.e.
treason - Art. 114 RPC)
Procedure:
1. Anyone can file a complaint but this must
be in a form of resolution endorsed by
any member of the House.
2. Must be verified, subscribed and sworn
with oath
3. Once there is a resolution, it must be
included in the Order of Business or
agenda of the House
4. Once discussed in the House, it will be
referred to a Committee: usually the
Committee of Justice
5. Committee will conduct hearing to
determine the veracity of the charges and
information
6. Committee will vote and submit a
committee report to the House
7. House needs 1/3 vote before it can be
submitted to the Senate.
8. Senate serves as the impeachment court,
needs 2/3 vote of all Senate to convict
What happens if committee votes unanimously, then
1/3 of House votes otherwise? 1/3 will prevail (this
is a rare case where majority doesnt win) Rationale:
At the initiation stage in the House, guilt is not
determined, only if there is prima facie evidence. It
is the Senate that determines guilt and convicts the
accused.
Art. XI, Sec. 2
Section 2. The President, the Vice-President, the Members of
the Supreme Court, the Members of the Constitutional
Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be removed from
office on impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable
violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and
corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust. All
other public officers and employees may be removed from
office as provided by law, but not by impeachment.
R.A. 3019 (See Annex A)
Art. XI, Sec. 3
Section 3.
1. The House of Representatives shall have the
exclusive power to initiate all cases of
impeachment.
2. A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed
by any Member of the House of Representatives or
by any citizen upon a resolution or endorsement by
any Member thereof, which shall be included in the
Order of Business within ten session days, and
referred to the proper Committee within three
session days thereafter. The Committee, after
hearing, and by a majority vote of all its Members,
shall submit its report to the House within sixty
session days from such referral, together with the
corresponding resolution. The resolution shall be
calendared for consideration by the House within
ten session days from receipt thereof.
3. A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the
House shall be necessary either to affirm a
favorable resolution with the Articles of
Impeachment of the Committee, or override its
contrary resolution. The vote of each Member shall
be recorded.
4. In case the verified complaint or resolution of
impeachment is filed by at least one-third of all the
Members of the House, the same shall constitute the
Articles of Impeachment, and trial by the Senate
shall forthwith proceed.
5. No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated
against the same official more than once within a
period of one year.
6. The Senate shall have the sole power to try and
decide all cases of impeachment. When sitting for
that purpose, the Senators shall be on oath or
affirmation. When the President of the Philippines is
on trial, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court shall
preside, but shall not vote. No person shall be
convicted without the concurrence of two-thirds of
all the Members of the Senate.
7. Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend
further than removal from office and
disqualification to hold any office under the
Republic of the Philippines, but the party convicted
shall nevertheless be liable and subject to
prosecution, trial, and punishment, according to
law.
8. The Congress shall promulgate its rules on
impeachment to effectively carry out the purpose of
this section.
Romulo vs. Yniguez (Feb 4, 1986)
Court will not mandamus speaker of Batasan to
retrieve shelved impeachment case against
Marcos
62
More than one-fifth of the Batasan filed a resolution calling
for the impeachment of President Marcos. However, the
Committee on Justice, Human Rights, and Good
Government found the complaint insufficient in form
thus, it dismissed all charges. MP Mitra filed a motion
praying for the recalling from the archives of the
impeachment complaint, however this was denied. Thus,
petitionersmembers of the Batasanfiled a petition for
prohibition and mandamus with the SC. They sought to
enjoin the enforcement of particular provisions of the
Batasan Rules on Impeachment (which mostly enumerated
the different instances when an impeachment complaint
may be dismissed) and to compel the recall from the
archives of the impeachment complaint. The petitioners
contended that the provisions of the rules were
unconstitutional for empowering a smaller body to
supplant and overrule the complaint to impeach endorsed
by the requisitive 1/5 of all the members of the Batasang
Pambansa and that said questioned provisions derail the
impeachment proceedings at various stages by
vesting the Committee on Justice, etc. the power to
impeach or not to impeach, when such prerogative belongs
solely to Batasang Pambansa as a collegiate body. (Note:
the SC had
previously dismissed outright a similar petition, on the
ground that the Batasang Pambansa had the exclusive
power to initiate, try, and decide all cases of
impeachment.)
The SC decided against the petitioners.
1. Dismissal by the majority of the Batasan made
irrelevant the issues raised. It was
mathematically impossible to get the required
! vote to support a judgment of conviction.
2. On the other hand, the Committee, by itself, cannot
recall from the archive what the BP has dismissed.
And the Court cannot compel the Batasan to
conduct impeachment proceedings.
3. The BP may adopt rules to govern
impeachment proceedingsthese are subject
to the revocation, modification, or waiver at
the pleasure of the BP.
4. Injunction will not lie: the acts sought to be
enjoined are already fait accompli.
NOW: whether the impeachment is favorable or
unfavorable, it must be held in public or plenary
session
This is UNLIKE the regular bills which need not be
discussed in public if the result is unfavorable
In impeachment cases, the aggrieved party has no
other recourse, such case is not reviewable by the
Supre,e Court
Consequences of Impeachment
o Removal from office
o Disqualification from any other office
o Convicted in criminal proceeding filed
separately AFTER being unseated from
office
 If acquitted:
o One cannot file a criminal for the same
acts on which he was acquitted from on
the impeachment proceedings
o Official remains in office
Lecaroz vs. Sandiganbayan (Mar 22, 1984)
If position is impeachable, that official must FIRST
BE IMPEACHED before criminal case is filed against
him
Petitioner was the Mayor of Sta. Cruz, Marinduque. He was
charged with grave coercionhe allegedly took over a gas
station. (Later, this information was amendedLecaroz
allegedly ordered policemen to sell the gas in the station
and padlocked the station without any legal authority.
(Note: if not mayor, police would not have followed
orders.) The information for grave coercion was filed with
the Sandiganbayan. Lecaroz filed a motion to quash the
information principally on the ground that the
Sandiganbayan lacks jurisdiction to entertain the case
that it should have instead been filed with the ordinary
courts in Marinduque where the alleged crime was
committed. When the Sandiganbayan denied the motion,
Lecaroz filed a petition for certiorari with the SC.
The SC decided against Lecaroz.
1. The Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the case.
Said court exercised jurisdiction over public
officials even for cases not related to Graft and
CorruptionPD 1486 had expanded the
Sandiganbayans jurisdiction to include offenses
committed in relation to a public officials office.
The amended complaint clearly alleges this. While
PD 1861 subsequently limited jurisdiction to
offenses punishable by imprisonment greater than
prision correccional, the same Decree had a
proviso indicating that pending cases shall remain
with the Sandiganbayan.
2. Impeachment cases are the exception to the rule
of Sandiganbayan jurisdiction. Those public
officials who are subject to impeachment, in order
to be held liable in subsequent criminal
proceedings, must first be removed from office
through impeachment.
Corona vs. Senate (July 17, 2012)
An impeachment complaint was filed against CJ Corona
alleging culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of
public trust, and graft and corruption [refer to the eight
Articles of Impeachment]. Petitioner argued against these
proceedings in that there was grave abuse of discretion
and that the petition against him was legally infirm and the
allegations, baseless. Respondents argue that subjecting
the impeachments proceedings defeats the purpose of
impeachment, but the court ruled that it has certiorari
63
jurisdiction over justiciable issues in impeachment
proceedings, particularly those tainted by GAD. However,
the issue was rendered moot, given that the impeachment
trial concluded and Corona accepted the verdict.
The Court held that the power of judicial review includes
the power of review over justiciable issues in
impeachment proceedings. Impeachment proceedings are
political in nature, but the role of the judiciary in these
cases is a matter of utmost importance to ensure the
effective functioning of the separate branches while
preserving the structure of checks and balances in our
government. Acts of any branch or instrumentality of the
government are subject to judicial review if tainted with
grave abuse of discretion.
HOWEVER, the impeachment trial had been concluded
with the conviction of petitioner by more than the
required majority vote of the Senator-Judges. Petitioner
immediately accepted the verdict and without any protest
vacated his office. In fact, the Judicial and Bar Council is
already in the process of screening applicants and
nominees, and the President of the Philippines is expected
to appoint a new Chief Justice within the prescribed 90-
day period from among those candidates shortlisted by the
JBC. Unarguably, the constitutional issue raised by
petitioner had been mooted by supervening events and his
own acts.
J del Castillos Cases (Plagiarism) Oct 12,
2010, Feb 8, 2011
On April 28, 2010, the Supreme Court issued a decision
which dismissed a petition issued by the Malaya Lolas
Organization in the case of Vinuya vs Romulo. Atty.
Herminio Harry Roque Jr., counsel for Vinuya et al,
questioned the said decision. He raised, among others, that
the ponente in said case, Justice Mariano del Castillo,
plagiarized three books when the honorable Justice
twisted the true intents of the following books to support
the assailed decision:
a. A Fiduciary Theory of Jus Cogens by Evan J. Criddle and
Evan Fox-Descent, Yale Journal of International Law
(2009);
b. Breaking the Silence: Rape as an International Crime by
Mark Ellis, Case Western Reserve Journal of
International Law (2006); and
c. Enforcing Erga Omnes Obligations by Christian J. Tams,
Cambridge University Press (2005).
As such, Justice del Castillo is guilty of plagiarism,
misconduct, and at least inexcusable negligence.
The court ruled in favor of Justice Castillo and held that he
was not guilty of plagiarism, misconduct and inexcusable
negligence.
This cannot be a case of plagiarism because as proved by
evidence, in the original drafts of the assailed decision,
there was attribution to the three authors but due to
errors made by Justice del Castillos researcher, the
attributions were inadvertently deleted. According to
the Supreme Court, the passages lifted from their works
were merely used as background facts in establishing the
state on international law at various stages of its
development. The Supreme Court went on to state that the
foreign authors works can support conflicting theories.
The Supreme Court also stated that since the attributions
to said authors were accidentally deleted, it is impossible
to conclude that Justice del Castillo twisted the advocacies
that the works espouse.
Justice del Castillo is not guilty of misconduct. The error
here is in good faith. There was no malice, fraud or
corruption.
The error of Justice del Castillos researcher is not
reflective of his gross negligence. The researcher is a
highly competent one. The researcher earned scholarly
degrees here and abroad from reputable educational
institutions. The researcher finished third in her class and
4th in the bar examinations. Her error was merely due to
the fact that the software she used, Microsoft Word, lacked
features to apprise her that certain important portions of
her drafts are being deleted inadvertently. Such error on
her part cannot be said to be constitutive of gross
negligence nor can it be said that Justice del Castillo was
grossly negligent when he assigned the case to her.
Justice Serenos Dissent: In her dissent, she presented
the portions of Castillos work and those of the original
authors work --- something that the majority did not even
look at or considered in the ruling of their decision.
Evidently from these factual data, Castillo should have
been guilty of plagiarism. Further, it was said that there
exists a judicial plagiarism because courts are bound by
precedents and stare decisis.
(n) Power with Regard to the
Utilization of Natural Resources
Art. XII, Sec. 2
Section 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals,
coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of
potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora
and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the
State. With the exception of agricultural lands, all other
natural resources shall not be alienated. The exploration,
development, and utilization of natural resources shall be
under the full control and supervision of the State. The State
may directly undertake such activities, or it may enter into
co-production, joint venture, or production-sharing
agreements with Filipino citizens, or corporations or
associations at least 60 per centum of whose capital is
64
owned by such citizens. Such agreements may be for a
period not exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not
more than twenty-five years, and under such terms and
conditions as may provided by law.
In cases of water rights for irrigation, water supply,
fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development of
waterpower, beneficial use may be the measure and limit of
the grant.
The State shall protect the nations marine wealth in its
archipelagic waters, territorial sea, and exclusive economic
zone, and reserve its use and enjoyment exclusively to
Filipino citizens.
The Congress may, by law, allow small-scale utilization of
natural resources by Filipino citizens, as well as cooperative
fish farming, with priority to subsistence fishermen and fish
workers in rivers, lakes, bays, and lagoons.
The President may enter into agreements with foreign-
owned corporations involving either technical or financial
assistance for large-scale exploration, development, and
utilization of minerals, petroleum, and other mineral oils
according to the general terms and conditions provided by
law, based on real contributions to the economic growth and
general welfare of the country. In such agreements, the State
shall promote the development and use of local scientific
and technical
resources.
The President shall notify the Congress of every contract
entered into in accordance with this provision, within thirty
days from its execution.
(o) Amendment of the Constitution
Ways of proposing amendment to the Constitution:
1. Congress by vote of all Members as Constituent
Assembly can propose amendments
2. Congress by 2/3 vote can call for Constitutional
Convention
3. Congress can ask people through electorate by
majority of vote
4. Initiative and referendum
o New/unique way of amending but cannot
be for revision
o 12% of registered voters for national
o 3% of registered voters for legislative
district
NOTE: All of these ways of proposing amendment to the
Constitution are subject to peoples ratification.
Art. XVII, Sec. 1-4
Section 1. Any amendment to, or revision of, this
Constitution may be proposed by:
1. The Congress, upon a vote of three-fourths of all its
Members; or
 2. A constitutional convention.
Section 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be
directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a
petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of
registered voters, of which every legislative district must be
represented by at least three per centum of the registered
voters therein. No amendment under this section shall be
authorized within five years following the ratification of this
Constitution nor oftener than once every five years
thereafter.
The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the
exercise of this right.
Section 3. The Congress may, by a vote of two-thirds of all its
Members, call a constitutional convention, or by a majority
vote of all its Members, submit to the electorate the question
of calling such a convention.
Section 4.Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution
under Section 1 hereof shall be valid when ratified by a
majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite which shall be held
not earlier than sixty days nor later than ninety days after
the approval of such amendment or revision.
Any amendment under Section 2 hereof shall be valid when
ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite which
shall be held not earlier than sixty days nor later than ninety
days after the certification by the Commission on Elections
of the sufficiency of the petition.
Gonzales vs. COMELEC (Nov 9, 1967)
In June 1967, Republic Act 4913 was passed. This law
provided for the COMELEC to hold a plebiscite for the
proposed amendments to the Constitution. It was provided
in the said law that the plebiscite shall be held on the same
day that the general national elections shall be held
(November 14, 1967). This was questioned by Ramon
Gonzales and other concerned groups as they argued that
this was unlawful as there would be no proper submission
of the proposals to the people who would be more
interested in the issues involved in the general election
rather than in the issues involving the plebiscite.
Gonzales also questioned the validity of the procedure
adopted by Congress when they came up with their
proposals to amend the Constitution (RA 4913). In this
regard, the COMELEC and other respondents interposed
the defense that said act of Congress cannot be reviewed
by the courts because it is a political question.
ISSUE/HELD/RATIO:
1. Whether or not the act of Congress in proposing
amendments is a political question.
No. The issue is a justiciable question. It must be noted that
the power to amend as well as the power to
propose amendments to the Constitution is not included in
65
the general grant of legislative powers to Congress. Such
powers are not constitutionally granted to Congress. On
the contrary, such powers are inherent to the people as
repository of sovereignty in a republican state. That being,
when Congress makes amendments or proposes
amendments, it is not actually doing so as Congress; but
rather, it is sitting as a constituent assembly. Such act is not
a legislative act. Since it is not a legislative act, it is
reviewable by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court has
the final say whether or not such act of the constituent
assembly is within constitutional limitations.
2. Whether or not a plebiscite may be held
simultaneously with a general election.
Yes. There is no prohibition to the effect that a plebiscite
must only be held on a special election. SC held that there
is nothing in this provision of the [1935] Constitution to
indicate that the election therein referred to is a special,
not a general election. The circumstance that the previous
amendment to the Constitution had been submitted to the
people for ratification in special elections merely shows
that Congress deemed it best to do so under the
circumstances then obtaining. It does not negate its
authority to submit proposed amendments for ratification
in general elections.
Art. XV, Sec. 1, The 1935 Constitution
ARTICLE XV AMENDMENTS
Section 1. The Congress in joint session assembled, by a vote
of three-fourths of all the Members of the Senate and of the
House of Representatives voting separately, may propose
amendments to this Constitution or call a convention for
that purpose. Such amendments shall be valid as part of this
Constitution when approved by a majority of the votes cast
at an election at which the amendments are submitted to
the people for their ratification.
8. Legislative Process
a. Requirements as to Bills
i. As to Title of Bills
One subject - One title
To prevent riders, hodge-podge, etc.
If there is a difference between the title and the text,
the body or text of the bill shall prevail.
Art. VI, Sec. 26
Section 26.
1. Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace
only one subject which shall be expressed in the title
thereof.
2. No bill passed by either House shall become a law
unless it has passed three readings on separate
days, and printed copies thereof in its final form
have been distributed to its Members three days
before its passage, except when the President
 certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment Art. VII, Sec. 22
to meet a public calamity or emergency. Upon the
last reading of a bill, no amendment thereto shall Section 22. The President shall submit to the Congress,
be allowed, and the vote thereon shall be taken within thirty days from the opening of every regular session
immediately thereafter, and the yeas and nays as the basis of the general appropriations bill, a budget of
entered in the Journal. expenditures and sources of financing, including receipts
from existing and proposed revenue measures.
De La Cruz vs. Paras (July 25, 1983)
Art. VI, Sec. 24-25
Still good law but VV Mendoza says this is a wrong
Section 24. All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills
case; Title SHOULD NOT prevail over body. The
authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of local
power of regulation includes the power of
application, and private bills, shall originate exclusively in
prohibition
the House of Representatives, but the Senate may propose or
concur with amendments.
Yu note: this case is unfortunate for holding that when
there is a difference in the title and in the text of the law,
Section 25.
the title would control. (Contrary to prior jurisprudence.)
1. The Congress may not increase the appropriations
recommended by the President for the operation of
Petitioners had been granted licenses to operate
the Government as specified in the budget. The
businesses, between 1958 and 1972: well-lit night clubs
form, content, and manner of preparation of the
with no partitions, where tables are near one another; the
budget shall be prescribed by law.
hospitality girls are not allowed to engage in immoral
2. No provision or enactment shall be embraced in the
acts and are even subjected to periodic check ups.
general appropriations bill unless it relates
However, an Ordinance prohibited the operation of
specifically to some particular appropriation
nightclubs, cabarets, and dance halls. Pursuant to the
therein. Any such provision or enactment shall be
Ordinance, the petitioners business permits were revoked.
limited in its operation to the appropriation to
Petitioners then assailed the validity of the ordinance, but
which it relates.
the CFI of Bocaue subsequently upheld its constitutionality
3. The procedure in approving appropriations for the
and dismissed the cases. The petitioners then filed a
Congress shall strictly follow the procedure for
petition for certiorari with the SC.
approving appropriations for other departments
and agencies.
The SC decided in favor of the petitioners.
1. The Ordinance was not a valid exercise of police
4. A special appropriations bill shall specify the
power. It was overbroad: it sought not merely
purpose for which it is intended, and shall be
regulation, but prohibitionit thus amounted to a
supported by funds actually available as certified by
clear invasion of personal and property rights.
the National Treasurer, or to be raised by a
2. The amendment to RA 938, which the
corresponding revenue proposal therein.
Municipality relied on for the Ordinance, did
5. No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of
not violate the One Bill-One Subject
appropriations; however, the President, the
provisionbut only through statutory
President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of
construction. Initially, and as reflected in the title,
Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme
City/Municipal Boards/Councils were only
Court, and the heads of Constitutional Commissions
granted the power to regulate certain places of
may, by law, be authorized to augment any item in
amusement. The amendment included the power
the general appropriations law for their respective
to prohibit, but this change was not reflected in
offices from savings in other items of their
the title. The SC implied that the statute was to be
respective appropriations.
interpreted as just allowing Municipal
6. Discretionary funds appropriated for particular
corporations to regulateto save the statute from
officials shall be disbursed only for public purposes
Constitutional infirmity.
to be supported by appropriate vouchers and
subject to such guidelines as may be prescribed by
BP 337, Local Government Code
law.
ii. Requirements as to Certain Laws 7. If, by the end of any fiscal year, the Congress shall
Appropriations Laws have failed to pass the general appropriations bill
for the ensuing fiscal year, the general
appropriations law for the preceding fiscal year
shall be deemed re-enacted and shall remain in
force and effect until the general appropriations bill
is passed by the Congress.

66
Alvarez vs. Guingona (Jan 31, 1996)
April 18, 1993 House Bill No. 8817, An Act
Converting the Municipality of Santiago into an
Independent Component City to be known as the City
of Santiago was filed by Rep. Antonio Abaya in the
House of Representative.
It was referred to the House Committee on Local
Government and the House Committee on
Appropriations. Then public hearings were conducted
and got a favorable report. The bill got through the
second and third reading and later on was transmitted
to the Senate on January 28, 1994.
May 19, 1993 (right after the HOR had its 2st public
hearing for HB No. 8817) A counterpart of HB No.
8817, Senate Bill 1243, An Act Converting the
Municipality of Santiago into an Independent
Component City to be known as the City of Santiago
was filed in the Senate by Sen. Vicente Sotto III.
February 23, 1994 Senate Committee on Local
Government conducted public hearings on SB No.
1243. After which a report of said bill without
amendment was approved by Alvarez. It passed
through the second and third readings and the HOR
approved the amendments proposed by the Senate.
May 5, 1994 the enrolled bill was signed by the Chief
Executive as RA. 7720. The plebiscite resulted into the
conversion of Santiago into a city.
Petitioners assail the validity of RA 7720, on the
ground that the bill creating the law did not originate
exclusively in the HOR as mandated by Article VI,
Section 24 of the 1987 Constitution.
The Court held that RA 7720 is VALID. Although a bill of
local application should originate exclusively in the HOR,
the claim of petitioners is untenable because it cannot be
denied that HB No. 8817 was filed in the HOR first before
SB No. 1243 was filed in the Senate. Also, it is
unquestionable that HB No. 8817 was already approved on
the 3rd reading prior to its hearing of its own SB No. 1243.
The filing in the Senate of a substitute bill in anticipation of
its receipt of the bill from the House, does not contravene
the constitutional requirement that a bill of local
application should originate in the House of
Representatives, for as long as the Senate does not act
thereupon until it receives the House bill.
Demetria vs. Alba (Feb 27, 1987)
Petitionersconcerned citizens, taxpayers, and members
of the National Assemblyassailed the constitutionality of
Sec. 44 of the Budget Reform Decree of 1977 (PD 1177):
The President shall have the authority to transfer any
fund, appropriated for the different departments, bureaus,
offices and agencies of the Executive Department, which
are included in the General Appropriations Act, to any
program, project oractivity of any department, bureau,
67
or office included in the General Appropriations Act or
approved after its enactment.
The SC declared the assailed section to be unconstitutional.
1. On whether the petition should be dismissed on
the grounds of being moot and academicthe SC
held that it would take cognizance of the case, in
particular because the 1987 Constitution carries
verbatim the provision of the 1973 Constitution
relevant to the case at bar.
2. The assailed provision is unconstitutional for
unduly extending the privilege granted by the
Constitution, since it empowers the President
to indiscriminately transfer funds from one
department to any program of any department
without regard as to WoN the funds to be
transferred are actually savings.
Such authority may:
a) Result in uncontrolled executive expenditures;
b) Diffuse accountability for budgetary performance;
and
c) Entrench the pork barrel system.
Guingona vs. Carague (Apr 22, 1991)
Petitioners questioned the constitutionality of:
a) automatic appropriations for debt servicing;
b) the fact that the appropriation for debt-servicing
multiple times theappropriation for public
education;
c) undue delegation of legislative powers.
The SC upheld the validity of the 1990 appropriations, and
the automatic debt servicing.
1. Congress is not hamstrung by Sec. 5, Art. XIV
which mandates the State to assign the highest
budgetary priority to educationso as to
deprive it of the power to respond to the
imperatives of the national interest and for the
attainment of other state policies or objectives.
First, the amount set aside for education is the
highest budgetary allocation among the
department budgets: this is a clear compliance of
the constitutional mandate to accord the highest
priority to education. Second, Congress is not
without power to provide an appropriation that
can service the countrys enormous debtnot
only a matter of honor, but concerns the survival
of the economy.
2. The Decrees that authorized the automatic
debt-servicing did not become functus oficio
upon the ouster of former President Marcos.
The transitory provisions of the Constitution were
adopted precisely to preserve the social order.
3. The procedural requirements for passing laws
are not meant to be applied to laws already
 existing. The general rule is that the law is
applied prospectively, unless it is so clearly stated.
4. There was no undue delegation of legislative
authority. The questioned laws are complete in
all their essential terms and conditions and
sufficient standards are indicated therein. Purpose
of the laws: to enable the government to make
prompt payments and/or advances for all loans to
protect and maintain the credit standing of the
country. Although the Decrees do not state specific
amounts to be paid, these amounts are
determinable based on legislative parameters
provided in the decrees themselvesthe
President does not have unlimited discretion: the
limit will be the exact amounts shown by the
books of the Treasury. Note the budgetary process
as described by the SolGen:
a) Budget Preparation: Executiveestimate
government revenues, determine budget
priorities and activities (constraint: available
revenues; borrowing limits); starts with budget
call by DBM;
b) Legislative Authorization: Legislativedeliberate
on budget proposals of the President, formulate
an appropriations act;
c) Budget Execution: Executiveoperational
aspects; and
d) Budget Accountability: evaluation of actual
performance.
PAL vs. Edu (Aug 15, 1988)
Under its legislative franchise, PAL is exempt from the
payment of all taxes of any kind, nature or description,
levied, established or collected by any municipal,
provincial or national authority, in view of the quarterly
payment of a 2% of gross revenue/earnings. PAL had not
paid motor vehicle registration fees since 1956. However
in 1971, pursuant to the Land Transportation and Traffic
Code, the Land Transportation Commissioner imposed
registration fees on PAL. The Commissioner justified this
by submitting that motor vehicle registration fees are
regulatory exactions, not revenue measuresThus, do not
come within the exemption granted to PAL. PAL filed a
complaint with the CFI of Rizal, but the trial Court adopted
the position of the Commissioner and dismissed the
complaint. On appeal,the CA raised the case to the
SC. Although the SC held that the motor vehicle
registration fees were in fact taxes, it nonetheless held that
PAL was not entitled to a refund.
1. The motor vehicle registration fees are taxes.
The clear legislative intent and purpose behind
the law requiring the payment of registration fees
is mainly to raise funds for the construction and
maintenance of highways, and to a lesser degree,
to pay for the operating expenses of the
administering agency. Also, fees may be properly
regarded as taxes even though they also serve as
68
an instrument of regulation: if the purpose is
primarily revenue or if revenue is at least one of
the real and substantial purposesthe exaction is
properly called a tax.
2. PAL still not entitled to refund. RA 5431, dated
27 June 1968, had repealed all earlier tax
exemptions of corporate taxpayers found in
legislative franchises. Thus, in 1971, PAL could no
longer invoke its franchise to claim being tax-
exempt.
3. New PAL franchise clear and specific: PAL now
exempt from the payment of any tax, etc.
Taxes Laws
Art. XIV, Sec. 5
Section 5.
1. All members of the armed forces shall take an oath
or affirmation to uphold and defend this
Constitution.
2. The State shall strengthen the patriotic spirit and
nationalist consciousness of the military, and
respect for people's rights in the performance of
their duty.
3. Professionalism in the armed forces and adequate
remuneration and benefits of its members shall be a
prime concern of the State. The armed forces shall
be insulated from partisan politics. No member of
the military shall engage, directly or indirectly, in
any partisan political activity, except to vote.
4. No member of the armed forces in the active service
shall, at any time, be appointed or designated in any
capacity to a civilian position in the Government,
including government-owned or controlled
corporations or any of their subsidiaries.
5. Laws on retirement of military officers shall not
allow extension of their service.
6. The officers and men of the regular force of the
armed forces shall be recruited proportionately
from all provinces and cities as far as practicable.
7. The tour of duty of the Chief of Staff of the armed
forces shall not exceed three years. However, in
times of war or other national emergency declared
by the Congress, the President may extend such tour
of duty.
Art. VI, Sec. 28
Section 28.
1. The rule of taxation shall be uniform and equitable.
The Congress shall evolve a progressive system of
taxation.
2. The Congress may, by law, authorize the President
to fix within specified limits, and subject to such
limitations and restrictions as it may impose, tariff
rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and
wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within
 the framework of the national development
program of the Government.
3. Charitable institutions, churches and personages or
convents appurtenant thereto, mosques, non-profit
cemeteries, and all lands, buildings, and
improvements, actually, directly, and exclusively
used for religious, charitable, or educational
purposes shall be exempt from taxation.
4. No law granting any tax exemption shall be passed
without the concurrence of a majority of all the
Members of the Congress
Art. XIV, Sec. 4
Section 4.
1. The State recognizes the complementary roles of
public and private institutions in the educational
system and shall exercise reasonable supervision
and regulation of all educational institutions.
2. Educational institutions, other than those
established by religious groups and mission boards,
shall be owned solely by citizens of the Philippines
or corporations or associations at least sixty per
centum of the capital of which is owned by such
citizens. The Congress may, however, require
increased Filipino equity participation in all
educational institutions.
The control and administration of educational
institutions shall be vested in citizens of the
Philippines.
No educational institution shall be established
exclusively for aliens and no group of aliens shall
comprise more than one-third of the enrollment in
any school. The provisions of this sub section shall
not apply to schools established for foreign
diplomatic personnel and their dependents and,
unless otherwise provided by law, for other foreign
temporary residents.
3. All revnues and assets of non-stock, non-profit
educational institutions used actually, directly, and
exclusively for educational purposes shall be exempt
from taxes and duties.
Upon the dissolution or cessation of the corporate
existence of such institutions, their assets shall be
disposed of in the manner provided by law.
Proprietary educational institutions, including
those cooperatively owned, may likewise be entitled
to such exemptions, subject to the limitations
provided by law, including restrictions on dividends
and provisions for reinvestment.
4. Subject to conditions prescribed by law, all grants,
endowments, donations, or contributions used
actually, directly, and exclusively for educational
purposes shall be exempt from tax.
Art. VI, Sec. 28
69
1. The rule on taxation shall be uniform and equitable.
The Congress shall evolve a progressive system of
taxation.
2. The Congress may, by law, authorize the President
to fix within specified limits, and subject to such
limitations and restrictions as it may impose, tariff
rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and
wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within
the framework of the national development
program of the Government.
3. Charitable institutions, churches and personages or
convents appurtenant thereto, mosques, non-profit
cemeteries, and all lands, buildings and
improvements ACTUALLY, DIRECTLY AND
EXCLUSIVELY used for religious, charitable or
educational purposes shall be exempt from
taxation.
4. No law granting any tax exemption shall be passed
without the concurrence of a majority of all the
Members of Congress.
Art. X, Sec. 5
Section 5. Each local government unit shall have the power
to create its own sources of revenues and to levy taxes, fees
and charges subject to such guidelines and limitations as the
Congress may provide, consistent with the basic policy of
local autonomy. Such taxes, fees, and charges shall accrue
exclusively to the local governments.
Art. VI, Sec. 23
Section 23.
1. The Congress, by a vote of two-thirds of both Houses
in joint session assembled, voting separately, shall
have the sole power to declare the existence of a
state of war.
2. In times of war or other national emergency, the
Congress may, by law, authorize the President, for a
limited period and subject to such restrictions as it
may prescribe, to exercise powers necessary and
proper to carry out a declared national policy.
Unless sooner withdrawn by resolution of the
Congress, such powers shall cease upon the next
adjournment thereof.
CIR vs. Fortune Tobacco Corp (July 21, 2008)
The Court of Tax Appeals and the CA granted Fortune a tax
refund/credit representing an erroneous collection of
specific tax from its tobacco products. Prior to 1 Jan 1997,
the different cigarette brands were subject to ad valorem
tax, pursuant to the Tax Code of 1977. Subsequently, RA
8240 took effect, and there was a shift from the VAT
system to the specific tax systemtobacco products were
taxed per unit, for example by the pack, with higher
specific taxes for the more expensive brands. The law
provided that on 1 Jan 2000, rates of excise tax on cigars
and cigarettes would increase by 12%. This was
implemented through Revenue Regulation No. 17-99but
the Regulation went further. It specified that the new
specific tax rate shall not be lower than the excise tax
actually being paid prior to 1 Jan 2000.
The SC decided in favor of Fortune.
1. The Revenue Regulation promulgated is
tantamount to administrative legislation. As
held in CIR v. CA, et al., all such issuances must
not override, but must remain consistent and in
harmony with, the law they seek to apply and
implement. Administrative rules and regulations
are intended to carry out, neither to supplant nor
to modify, the law. By adding the qualification
that the tax due after the 12% increase becomes
effective shall not be lower than the tax actually
paid prior to 1 Jan 2000, the Revenue Regulation
effectively imposes a tax which the higher amount
between the ad valorem tax being paid at the end
of the 3-yr. transition period and the specific tax
increased by 12%a situation not supported
by the plain wording of Sec. 145 of the Tax
Code.
2. Revenue generation was not the only
consideration in the passage of the Tax Code.
As borne by the legislative record, the shift from
VAT to specific tax is meant to promote fair
competition among the players in the industries
concerned, to ensure an equitable distribution of
the tax burden, and to simplify tax administration.
3. The tax refund does not partake the nature of
a tax exemption. The tax refund would partake
the nature of an exemption only if the former is
based on a tax exemption or refund statute. or
tune Fortunes claim for refund is premised on its
erroneous payment of the tax, or better still the
governments exaction in the absence of a law.
Doctrine: the rule is that tax exemptions must
be strictly construed such that the exemption
will not be held to be conferred unless the
terms under which it is granted clearly and
distinctly show that such was the intention. On
the other hand, tax refund/credit is founded on
the legal principle of solutio indebiti.
4. Controlling Doctrine: strict interpretation in
the imposition of taxes. As burdens, taxes should
not be unduly exacted nor assumed beyond the
plain meaning of the tax laws.
*Planters Products Inc. v. Fertiphil (March 14,
2008)
Guidote Lamarca Ramos:
President Marcos had issued an LOI providing for the
imposition of a capital recovery component on all
domestic sales of fertilizer. Each bag sold would be
imposed a P10 contribution, and this contribution would
be given to PPI, through the Fertilizer and Pesticide
Authority. Fertiphil ended up paying P6.69M to this fund,
70
between July 1985 and January 1986. After the EDSA
Revolution, Fertiphil sought to recover this amountit
submitted that the contributions were unlawful
impositions in favor of a private corporation.
The SC decided in favor of Fertiphil.
1. The P10/bag levy is an exercise of the power of
taxation: its primary purpose is revenue
generation (not merely regulation). If the
primary purpose of the levy is revenue generation,
or if revenue is, at least, one of the real and
substantial purposesthe exaction is properly
called a tax. The P10 levy is too excessive to serve
a mere regulatory purpose. The LOI itself
provided that the levy would be imposed until
adequate capital is raised to make PPI viable.
2. The P10 levy is unconstitutional for not being
for a public purpose. An inherent limitation on
the power of taxation is that taxes are exacted
only for a public purpose. Reason: power to tax
exists for the general welfare. The purpose of a
law is evident from its text or inferable from other
secondary sources: (i) LOI provided that the levy
be imposed to benefit PPI, a private company; (ii)
LOI provided that the imposition was conditional
upon PPI becoming financially viable; (iii) the
funds were deposited w/ Far East Bank and Trust
Companythe depositary bank of PPI; (iv) levy
used to pay the corporate debts of PPI.
3. Even assuming that the LOI was enacted under
the police powerstill unconstitutional. In
failed to comply with the test of lawful subjects
and lawful means: (1) the interest of the public
generally, as distinguished from those of
particular class, requires its exercise; and (2) the
means employed are reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly
oppressive upon individuals. The LOI was not
issued for a public purpose.
4. Doctrine of operative fact is inapplicable. The
doctrine is applicable when a declaration of
unconstitutionality will impose an undue burden
on those who have relied on the invalid law. PPI
unduly benefited from the levy. It was proven
during the trial that the levies paid were remitted
and deposited to its bank account.
Quezon City v. ABS-CBN (Oct. 6, 2008)
Cases should be resolved in favor of Congress taxing
authority over local government. Rationale: LGUs
power is delegated from Congress, it cannot
supersede that of Congress.
Yu notes:
Power of Congress to tax: inherent
Power of LGUs to tax: power not merely delegated, but
conferred (Sec. 5, Art. X)
 o Before: LGUs would have to wait for Congress to
pass a law before they could exercise their taxing
power
o Now: power of Congress vis-a-vis LGUs
To determine the exemptions
To impose limitations on the LGUs taxing
powers
A Quezon City Ordinance provided that any entity enjoying
a franchise and doing business in QCnotwithstanding
any grant of tax exemptionshall be liable to the City for a
franchise tax. ABS-CBN had been granted a franchise
through RA 7966. One of the provisions therein was that a
franchise tax on gross receipts would be paid in lieu of all
taxes on this franchise or earnings thereof. Although in
the beginning ABSCBN had paid the QC franchise tax, it
eventually developed the opinion that it was not liable to
pay the same. After the RTC decided in favor of ABS-CBN,
the CA referred the appeal of QC to the SC, as it involved
purely legal questions.
The SC decided in favor of QC.
1. [I]n lieu of all taxes does not exempt ABS-
CBN from payment of the local franchise tax.
Citing City Government of QC, et al. v. Bayan
Telecommunications: The power to tax is
primarily vested in the Congress; however, in our
jurisdiction, it may be exercised by local legislative
bodies, no longer merely be virtue of a valid
delegation as before, but pursuant to direct
authority conferred by Section 5, Article X of
the Constitution. Nonetheless, this power may
be limited by the power of Congress to grant
exemptions. Statutes granting tax exemptions are
construed stricissimi juris against the taxpayer and
liberally in favor of the taxing authority: whether
the in lieu of all taxes provision would
include exemption from local tax is not
unequivocal. ABS-CBN failed to prove that it was
in fact covered by the exemption.
2. The in lieu of all taxes clause had become
functus officio: ABS-CBN no longer subject to a
franchise taxnow liable for VAT. The passage
of VAT laws subsequent to the law that granted
the franchise to ABS-CBN changed the nature of
ABS-CBNs liability from the payment of franchise
tax to the payment of VAT. The in lieu of all taxes
clause only pertained to the payment of the
franchise tax, not to the payment of VAT or any
other tax.
MIAA vs. City of Pasay (April 2, 2009)
The Pasay City Mayor threatened to sell NAIA property
through a public auction if the delinquent real property
taxes assessed against the Manila International Airport
Authority (MIAA), amounting to P1B, were to remain
unpaid. When the CA upheld
71
the power of the City of Pasay to impose and collect realty
taxes on the NAIA Pasay properties, MIAA elevated the
case to the Supreme Court.
The SC decided in favor of MIAA.
Airport lands and buildings of MIAA are exempt from
tax. In MIAA v. CA the SC held that MIAA is not a GOCC: (i)
not under the Administrative Code because MIAA is not
organized as a stock or non-stock corporation; (ii) not
under Sec. 16, Art. XII of
the Constitution, since MIAA was not required to meet the
test of economic viability. The MIAA is a government
instrumentality vested with corporate powers and
performing essential public services: as a government
instrumentality, MIAA is not subject to any kind of tax
by LGUs.
Art. VI, Sec. 29
Section 29.
1. No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except
in pursuance of an appropriation made by law.
2. No public money or property shall be appropriated,
applied, paid, or employed, directly or indirectly, for
the use, benefit, or support of any sect, church,
denomination, sectarian institution, or system of
religion, or of any priest, preacher, minister, other
religious teacher, or dignitary as such, except when
such priest, preacher, minister, or dignitary is
assigned to the armed forces, or to any penal
institution, or government orphanage or
leprosarium.
3. All money collected on any tax levied for a special
purpose shall be treated as a special fund and paid
out for such purpose only. If the purpose for which a
special fund was created has been fulfilled or
abandoned, the balance, if any, shall be transferred
to the general funds of the Government.
Art. X, Sec. 6
Section 6. Local government units shall have a just share, as
determined by law, in the national taxes which shall be
automatically released to them.
- Taxation of Religious and
Charitable Institutions
Art. VI, Sec. 28 (3)
Section 28.
3. Charitable institutions, churches and personages or
convents appurtenant thereto, mosques, non-profit
cemeteries, and all lands, buildings, and improvements,
actually, directly, and exclusively used for religious,
charitable, or educational purposes shall be exempt from
taxation.
Abra vs. Hernando (Aug 31, 1981)
The provincial assessor of Abra assessed taxes on property
owned by the Roman Catholic Bishop of Bangued, Inc. The
CFI, on a petition for declaratory relief, ruled that the
property was exempt from taxes.
HELD: Judge Hernando committed grave abuse of
discretion when he decided the petition without hearing it
on the merits. The rule under the 1987 Constitution is
different from what the 1935 charter provides; it added
the words actually and directly in determining whether
land is exempt from taxes. It
is to be noted that tax exemptions are construed liberally
in favor of the taxing power and strictly against the
taxpayer. Futhermore, declaratory relief is not available
when there has been a violation of government regulation.
The Bishops primary recourse is to file a petition with the
Local Board of Assessment Appeals.
YMCA vs. Collector (Jan 19, 1916)
YMCA claims exemption from taxation on the ground that
its land is used for religious, charitable and educational
purposes. While its buildings can accommodate boarders
and lodgers, it does not derive profit from the same. HELD:
YMCA is exempt from taxation. The Charter of the City of
Manila does not require that the land be devoted
exclusively to any one of the purposes mentioned. YMCA is
engaged in all three (religious, charitable, and
educational).
Bishop of Nueva Segovia vs. Provincial Board
(Dec 31, 1972)
What did Justice Malcolm say? He dissented that the
land used as vegetable garden should not be covered
by the grant on tax exemption.
1935 constitution: Land EXCLUSIVELY USED for
religious purposes
1973 & 1987 constitutions: Land ACTUALLY,
DIRECTLY AND EXCLUSIVELY USED for religious
purposes
If a same case were to be decided now, dissent of
Malcolm will prevail. Rationale: Vegetable garden is
not utilized for a religious purpose.
The Provincial Board of Ilocos Norte assessed taxes on the
land of petitioner then being utilized as a convent and
vegetable farm. The Bishop filed an action for recovery,
claiming exemption from taxation.
HELD: the areas mentioned are exempt from taxation. The
convent is where the priest actually lives and the vegetable
garden adjacent thereto is for his own benefit. The convent
is likewise being used as a lodging house for people who
participate in religious activities.
72
*Apostolic Prefect vs. City Treasurer (Apr 18,
1941)
Can churches be asked to pay special assessments?
YES.
Special assessment is not tax, hence, churches are
not exempted.
Ordinance No. 137 was passed which sought to impose a
special assessment on land located within the city limits
of Baguio. The Apostolic Prefect of Mountain Province paid
the tax in protest. They brought the matter to the CFI
which affirmed the imposition of the tax. HELD: a special
assessment is not a tax for purposes of determining
exemption therefrom. It is payment for the cost of public
improvements, levied with special benefits to the property
assessed. Moreover, the property owned by petitioner was
then being used for non-religious purposes.
- Taxation of Educational
Institutions
Art. VI, Sec. 28 (3)
(3) Charitable institutions, churches and personages or
convents appurtenant thereto, mosques, non-profit
cemeteries, and all lands, buildings and improvements
ACTUALLY, DIRECTLY AND EXCLUSIVELY used for religious,
charitable or educational purposes shall be exempt from
taxation.
Art. XIV, Sec. 4
Section 4.
1. The State recognizes the complementary roles of
public and private institutions in the educational
system and shall exercise reasonable supervision
and regulation of all educational institutions.
2. Educational institutions, other than those
established by religious groups and mission boards,
shall be owned solely by citizens of the Philippines
or corporations or associations at least sixty per
centum of the capital of which is owned by such
citizens. The Congress may, however, require
increased Filipino equity participation in all
educational institutions. The control and
administration of educational institutions shall be
vested in citizens of the Philippines. No educational
institution shall be established exclusively for aliens
and no group of aliens shall comprise more than
one-third of the enrollment in any school. The
provisions of this sub section shall not apply to
schools established for foreign diplomatic
personnel and their dependents and, unless
otherwise provided by law, for other foreign
temporary residents.
 3. All revenues and assets of non-stock, non-profit
educational institutions used actually, directly, and
exclusively for educational purposes shall be exempt
from taxes and duties. Upon the dissolution or
cessation of the corporate existence of such
institutions, their assets shall be disposed of in the
manner provided by law. Proprietary educational
institutions, including those cooperatively owned,
may likewise be entitled to such exemptions, subject
to the limitations provided by law, including
restrictions on dividends and provisions for
reinvestment.
4. Subject to conditions prescribed by law, all grants,
endowments, donations, or contributions used
actually, directly, and exclusively for educational
purposes shall be exempt from tax.
*Hodges vs. Municipal Board of Iloilo City (Jan
31, 1963)
Respondents promulgated Ordinance No. 31 imposing a
sales tax of of 1% of contract price for the sale of real
estate, to be shouldered by the vendor. Petitioner was then
engaged in the business of buying and selling real
property. He filed a petition for declaratory relief. The CFI
declared the Ordinance null and void.
Is Ordinance No. 31 valid? YES. The Municipal Board is
vested with plenary power to enact ordinances. The only
requirements are that they must be for public purposes
and that the imposition of taxes must be just and uniform.
The Ordinance is valid except insofar as it poses a
condition precedent the payment of such tax before
registration of title.
b. Procedure for the Passage of Bills
KNOW THE PROCEDURES!
How a Bill Becomes a Law (when it originates from the
House of Representatives)
House Rule X: Bills, Resolutions, Messages, Memorials
and Petitions
Flowchart: Legislative Process
1. Preparation of the bill
2. First reading
3. Committee consideration / action
4. Second reading
5. Third reading
6. Transmittal of the approved bill to the Senate
7. Senate action on approved bill of the House
8. Conference committee
9. Transmittal of the bill to the President
10. Presidential action on the bill
11. Action on approved bill
12. Action on vetoed bill
73
PREPARATION OF THE BILL
The Member or the Bill Drafting Division of the Reference
and Research Bureau prepares and drafts the bill upon the
Member's request.
FIRST READING
1. The bill is filed with the Bills and Index Service and the
same is numbered and reproduced.
2. Three days after its filing, the same is included in the
Order of Business for First Reading.
3. On First Reading, the Secretary General reads the title
and number of the bill. The Speaker refers the bill to
the appropriate Committee/s.
COMMITTEE CONSIDERATION/ACTION
1. The Committee where the bill was referred to
evaluates it to determine the necessity of conducting
public hearings.
If the Committee finds it necessary to conduct public
hearings, it schedules the time thereof, issues public
notice and invites resource persons from the public
and private sectors, the academe and experts on the
proposed legislation.
If the Committee finds that no public hearing is needed,
it schedules the bill for Committee discussion/s.
2. Based on the result of the public hearings or
Committee discussions, the Committee may introduce
amendments, consolidate bills on the same subject
matter, or propose a substitute bill. It then prepares
the corresponding committee report.
3. The Committee approves the Committee Report and
formally transmits the same to the Plenary Affairs
Bureau.
SECOND READING
1. The Committee Report is registered and numbered by
the Bills and Index Service. It is included in the Order of
Business and referred to the Committee on Rules.
2. The Committee on Rules schedules the bill for
consideration on Second Reading.
3. On Second Reading, the Secretary General reads the
number, title and text of the bill and the following takes
place:
a. Period of Sponsorship and Debate
b. Period of Amendments
c. Voting which may be by:
i. viva voce
ii. count by tellers
iii. division of the House; or
iv. nominal voting
THIRD READING
1. The amendments, if any, are engrossed and printed
copies of the bill are reproduced for Third Reading.
2. The engrossed bill is included in the Calendar of Bills
for Third Reading and copies of the same are
distributed to all the Members three days before its
Third Reading.
3. On Third Reading, the Secretary General reads only the
number and title of the bill.
4. A roll call or nominal voting is called and a Member, if
he desires, is given three minutes to explain his vote.
No amendment on the bill is allowed at this stage.
a. The bill is approved by an affirmative vote of a
majority of the Members present.
b. If the bill is disapproved, the same is transmitted to
the Archives.
TRANSMITTAL OF THE APPROVED BILL TO THE
SENATE
The approved bill is transmitted to the Senate for its
concurrence.
SENATE ACTION ON APPROVED BILL OF THE HOUSE
The bill undergoes the same legislative process in the
Senate.
CONFERENCE COMMITTEE
1. A Conference Committee is constituted and is
composed of Members from each House of Congress to
settle, reconcile or thresh out differences or
disagreements on any provision of the bill.
2. The conferees are not limited to reconciling the
differences in the bill but may introduce new
provisions germane to the subject matter or may
report out an entirely new bill on the subject.
3. The Conference Committee prepares a report to be
signed by all the conferees and the Chairman.
4. The Conference Committee Report is submitted for
consideration/approval of both Houses. No
amendment is allowed.
TRANSMITTAL OF THE BILL TO THE PRESIDENT
Copies of the bill, signed by the Senate President and the
Speaker of the House of Representatives and certified by
both the Secretary of the Senate and the Secretary General
of the House, are transmitted to the President.
PRESIDENTIAL ACTION ON THE BILL
1. If the bill is approved by the President, the same is
assigned an RA number and transmitted to the House
where it originated.
2. If the bill is vetoed, the same, together with a message
citing the reason for the veto, is transmitted to the
House where the bill originated.
ACTION ON APPROVED BILL
The bill is reproduced and copies are sent to the Official
Gazette Office for publication and distribution to the
implementing agencies. It is then included in the annual
compilation of Acts and Resolutions.
ACTION ON VETOED BILL
The message is included in the Order of Business. If the
Congress decides to override the veto, the House and the
Senate shall proceed separately to reconsider the bill or
the vetoed items of the bill. If the bill or its vetoed items is
74
passed by a vote of two-thirds of the Members of each
House, such bill or items shall become a law.
Note: A joint resolution having the force and effect of a law
goes through the same process.
Art. VI, Sec. 26 (2)
Section 26.
(2) No bill passed by either House shall become a law unless
it has passed three readings on separate days, and printed
copies thereof in its final form have been distributed to its
Members three days before its passage, except when the
President certifies to the necessity of its immediate
enactment to meet a public calamity or emergency. Upon
the last reading of a bill, no amendment thereto shall be
allowed, and the vote thereon shall be taken immediately
thereafter, and the yeas and nays entered in the Journal.
Tolentino vs. Sec. of Finance (Aug. 25, 1994
and Oct 30, 1995)
LANDMARK CASE!
Bicameral conference committee can introduce
entirely new proposals under same subject of bills
from Senate and House that are being reconciled.
Several bills were introduced in the HoR seeking to amend
certain provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code,
relative to the VAT. Eventually, the House Ways and Means
Committeetaking into consideration the different bills
was able to recommend a substitute measure for approval.
This substitute measure was approved by the HoR on the
third reading and it was then sent to the Senate. The
Senate, taking into consideration the bill sent by the HoR,
approved its own bill on the 3rd reading. The HoR and
Senate Bills were referred to a Bicameral Conference
Committee. Eventually, the Conference Committee Bill was
finalized, and was eventually passed in both Houses as RA
7716. Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari and
prohibition with the SC on various grounds assailing the
Constitutionality of RA 7716.
The SC upheld the constitutionality of RA 7716.
1. RA 7716 did not violate the directive of the
Constitution that all revenue bills originate
exclusively in the HoR. Petitioners are incorrect
in stating that RA 7716 must retain the essence of
the House Billthe bill, not the law, is what is
required to originate in the HoR. Once passed onto
the Senate, the bill may undergo amendments that
will substantially change the bill from what the
House had passed. Legislative power is conferred
to both the HoR and the Senateno preference is
given to any single chamber.
 2. There is nothing wrong if a substitute bill was
passed in the Senate in anticipation of its receipt
of the bill from the House, as long as the former is
not acted upon by the Senate while waiting for the
receipt of the House Bill.
3. The requirement of passing a bill after 3
readings on separate days may be done away if
the President certifies that a particular bill is
urgent.
4. The Bicameral Conference Committee may
reconcile bills from the HoR and the Senate. It
is possible for the Conference Committee to draft
an entirely new bill: the only requirement is that
the bill should be germane to the subjects of the
HoR and the Senate Bills. Besides, the final bill put
together by the Conference Committee would still
have to be approved by both Houses.
5. RA 7716 did not violate the One Bill-One
Subject/Title provision. The title is not supposed
to be an index of the statutes contents. It is
enough that the title provides the general purpose,
and that all provisions are germane to the general
subject. The provision withdrawing the tax
exemption previously enjoyed by PAL is germane
to the general subject: widening the scope of the
VAT system.
6. Other Substantive issues:
a. Does not violate freedom of speech, press
(petitioners had assailed the withdrawal
of the exemption previously granted to
the Press);
b. Does not violate freedom of religion;
c. Claims of regressivity an academic
exercise, owing to the lack of empirical
data; and
d. The non-impairment clause has never
been thought as a limitation on the
exercise of the States power of taxation.
Abakada Guro vs. Executive Secretary (Sept 1,
2005, Oct 18, 2005)
RA 9337, also known as the E Vat law, is a consolidation
of two HoR bills and one Senate bill. Due to disagreements
between the two bodies, a Bicameral Conference
Committee was formed to polish the contentious
provisions. The Committee eventually accomplished a
consolidated version that was signed into law. On July 1
2005, the proposed date of implementation, the Court
issued a TRO enjoining respondents from enforcing the
law. This was after the petitioners assailed the
constitutionality of the statute on May 27 2005.
IMPORTANT CASE!
Petitioners are assailing the constitutionality because
theres a section that allows Executive Department to
increase the VAT based on certain conditions:
75
That the President, upon the recommendation of the
Secretary of Finance, shall, effective January 1, 2006,
raise the rate of value-added tax to twelve percent
(12%), after
any of the following conditions has been satisfied:
o Value-added tax collection as a percentage of
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the previous
year exceeds two and four-fifth percent (2 4/5%);
or
o National government deficit as a percentage of
GDP of the previous year exceeds one and one-half
percent (1 %).
Petitioners claim that there is undue delegation because
the President is given the power to increase VAT.
The Court ruled that it is valid. Those that could not be
delegated are those that are inherently legislative. In this
case, Congress merely delegated ascertainment of facts
(the conditions abovementioned) to the Secretary of
Finance. The increase in VAT is conditional based on these
factual matters. There is no discretion on the part of the
President; it is only a ministerial duty because all the
conditions have been specified by Congress. The Secretary
of Finance in recommending to the President based on the
ascertainment on whether the conditions have been met
acts as an agent of legislative and not as an alter-ego of the
President. Congress did not abdicate its functions and did
not delegate its power; it merely delegated the
implementation of the law. Clearly specified: what must be
done, who has to do it and what is the scope of authority.
Art. VI, Sec. 27
Section 27.
1. Every bill passed by the Congress shall, before it
becomes a law, be presented to the President. If he
approves the same he shall sign it; otherwise, he
shall veto it and return the same with his objections
to the House where it originated, which shall enter
the objections at large in its Journal and proceed to
reconsider it. If, after such reconsideration, two-
thirds of all the Members of such House shall agree
to pass the bill, it shall be sent, together with the
objections, to the other House by which it shall
likewise be reconsidered, and if approved by two-
thirds of all the Members of that House, it shall
become a law. In all such cases, the votes of each
House shall be determined by yeas or nays, and the
names of the Members voting for or against shall be
entered in its Journal. The President shall
communicate his veto of any bill to the House where
it originated within thirty days after the date of
receipt thereof, otherwise, it shall become a law as
if he had signed it.
2. The President shall have the power to veto any
particular item or items in an appropriation,
revenue, or tariff bill, but the veto shall not affect
the item or items to which he does not object.
c. The Presidents Veto Power
Art. 1, Sec. 7, The United States Constitution
Section 7. All Bills for raising Revenue shall originate in the
House of Representatives; but the Senate may propose or
concur with Amendments as on other Bills. Every Bill which
shall have passed the House of Representatives and the
Senate, shall, before it become a Law, be presented to the
President of the United States: If he approve he shall sign it,
but if not he shall return it, with his Objections to that House
in which it shall have originated, who shall enter the
Objections at large on their Journal, and proceed to
reconsider it. If after such Reconsideration two thirds of that
House shall agree to pass the Bill, it shall be sent, together
with the Objections, to the other House, by which it shall
likewise be reconsidered, and if approved by two thirds of
that House, it shall become a Law. But in all such Cases the
Votes of both Houses shall be determined by yeas and Nays,
and the Names of the Persons voting for and against the Bill
shall be entered on the Journal of each House respectively. If
any Bill shall not be returned by the President within ten
Days (Sundays excepted) after it shall have been presented
to him, the Same shall be a Law, in like Manner as if he had
signed it, unless the Congress by their Adjournment prevent
its Return, in which Case it shall not be a Law.
Every Order, Resolution, or Vote to which the Concurrence of
the Senate and House of Representatives may be necessary
(except on a question of Adjournment) shall be presented to
the President of the United States; and before the Same shall
take Effect, shall be approved by him, or being disapproved
by him, shall be repassed by two thirds of the Senate and
House of Representatives, according to the Rules and
Limitations prescribed in the Case of a Bill.
Art. VI, Sec. 20, The 1935 Constitution
Section 20.
(1) Every bill passed by the Congress shall, before it
becomes a law, be presented to the President. If he
approves the same, he shall sign it; but if not, he shall
return it with his objections to the House where it
originated, which shall enter the objections at large on
its Journal and proceed to reconsider it. If, after such
reconsideration, two-thirds of all the Members of such
House shall agree to pass the bill, it shall be sent
together, with the objections, to the House by which it
shall likewise be reconsidered, and if approved by
twothirds of all the Members of that House, it shall
become a law. In all such cases, the votes of each House
shall be determined by yeas and nays, and the names of
the Members voting for and against shall be entered on
its Journal. If any bill shall not be returned by the
President as herein provided within twenty days
(Sundays excepted) after it shall have been presented to
him, the same shall become a law in like manner as if he
had signed it, unless the Congress by adjournment
prevent its return, in which case it shall become a law
76
unless vetoed by the President within thirty days after
adjournment.
(2) The President shall have the power to veto any
particular item or items of an appropriation bill, but the
veto shall not affect the item or items to which he does
not object. When a provision of an appropriation bill
affects one or more items of the same, the President
cannot veto the provision without at the same time,
vetoing the particular item or items to which it relates.
The item or items objected to shall not take effect except
in the manner heretofore provided as to bills returned
to the Congress without the approval of the President. If
the veto refers to a bill or any item of an appropriation
bill which appropriates a sum in excess of ten per
centum of the total amount voted in the appropriation
bill for the general expenses of the Government for the
preceding year, or if it should refer to a bill authorizing
an increase of the public debt, the same shall not
become a law unless approved by three-fourths of all the
Members of each House.
(3) The President shall have the power to veto any separate
item or items in a revenue of tariff bill, and the item or
items shall not take effect except in the manner
provided as to bills vetoed by the President.
Bolinao Electronics Corp. vs. Valencia (June
30, 1964)
Petitionersowners and operators of radio and television
stationsfiled a petition for prohibition and mandatory
injunction against the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications and the Acting Chief of the Radio Control
Division. Petitioners had sought to renew their Stations
licenses. The Secretarythrough his Undersecretaryhad
served notice to the petitioners that a hearing would be
conducted to look into the filing of the petitioners
applications for renewal after the expiration of their
licenses, in violation of the requirement that such
applications must be submitted 2 months before the
expiration date, to determine whether there is ground to
disapprove the applications for renewal. As a defense,
petitioners submitted that the late filing was condoned or
pardoned by the respondents by the issuance of a circular
that allowed late filing of applications to allow licensees to
correct violations of radio laws and regulations.
SC decided in favor of the petitioners.
1. The Circular clearly condoned the late filing of
applications for the renewal of licenses. First, the
Secretary is empowered by specific provision of law
to reprimand and warn offenders of radio laws or
regulationswhich was what the Circular did.
Second, the circular having been issued by the
respondents, the latter cannot now claim its
illegality to evade the effect of its enforcement.
2. CBN did not renounce its right to operate
Channel 9. Although in the construction permit to
transfer its TV station from QC to Baguio City,
 Channel 10 assigned in lieu of Channel 9
appearsCBN explained that the assignment of
Channel 10 was to be effective upon the final
transfer of the station. When the plan to transfer
DZXL-TV to Baguio had to be abandoned, it did not
mean abandonment by the station of its right to
operate and broadcast on Channel 9 in Quezon City.
The fact that CBN was allowed to continue and did
continue operating on Channel 9 even after the
approval of its proposed transfer, is proof that there
was no renunciation or abandonment of that
channel upon the approval of its petition to transfer.
3. The Presidents veto of the condition attached to
the appropriation for the Philippine
Broadcasting Servicethat no portion of the
appropriation shall be used for the operation of TV
stations in Luzon or in any part of the Philippines
where there were TV stationswas not legally
permissible. The power to veto does not include
the power to strike out conditions or restrictions.
Thus, the veto produced no effect whatsoeverthe
restriction imposed remained. PBS would not have
been entitled to any reimbursement, in any case,
even if it were able to prove its right to operate
Channel 9.
Gonzales vs. Macaraig (Nov 19, 1990)
The President had vetoed Sec. 55 of the 1989 General
Appropriations Bill (GAB), which provided that items of
appropriation disapproved or reduced in the Act would
not be restored or increased by augmentation. He justified
his veto by submitting that Sec. 55 was in violation of the
Art. VI, Sec. 25
privilege granted by the Constitution to the President,
Speaker of the House, Chief Justice of the SC, and Heads of
Section 25.
the Constitutional Commissions to augment any item in
the GAA from savings. The President also vetoed Sec. 16 of
the 1990 GAB, which was worded similarly.
The SC upheld the validity of the veto.
1. The restrictive interpretation urged by petitioners
that the President may not veto a provision without
vetoing the entire bill not only disregards the basic
principle that a distinct and severable part of a bill
may be the subject of a separate veto but also
overlooks the Constitutional mandate that any
provision in the general appropriations bill shall
relate specifically to some particular appropriation
therein and that any such provision shall be limited
in its operation to the appropriation to which it
relates.
2. But even assuming arguendo that provisions are
beyond the executive power to veto, the vetoed
sections are not provisions in the budgetary sense of
the term. They are inappropriate provisions and
should be treated as items for the purpose of the
Presidents veto power. First, the vetoed
provisions do not relate to any particular or
77
distinctive appropriation. Second, the disapproved
or reduced items are nowhere to be found on the
face of the Bill. Third, the vetoed Sections are more
of an expression of Congressional policy in respect
of augmentation from savings rather than a
budgetary appropriation.
3. The President is not allowed to veto just the
restrictions or conditionsbut in an
Appropriations Bill, these restrictions or
conditions must exhibit a connection with
money items in a budgetary sense in the
schedule of expenditures. The assailed provisions
do not meet this criteria. Considering that the
vetoed provisions are not, in the budgetary sense of
the term, conditions or restrictions, the case of
Bolinao Electronics Corporation v. Valencia invoked
by petitioners, becomes inapplicable.
4. The heads of the different branches of the
Government and those of the Constitutional
Commissions are afforded considerable
flexibility in the use of public funds and
resources. When the assailed provisions prohibit
the restoration or increase by augmentation of
appropriations disapproved or reduced by Congress,
they impair the constitutional and statutory
authority of the President and other key officials to
augment any item or any appropriation from
savings in the interest of expediency and efficiency.
5. Remedy for unconstitutional veto: overriding
the same by votes of at least ! of members of
Congress. However, Congress made no attempt to
do so.
1. The Congress may not increase the appropriations
recommended by the President for the operation of
the Government as specified in the budget. The form,
content, and manner of preparation of the budget
shall be prescribed by law.
2. No provision or enactment shall be embraced in the
general appropriations bill unless it relates
specifically to some particular appropriation therein.
Any such provision or enactment shall be limited in its
operation to the appropriation to which it relates.
3. The procedure in approving appropriations for the
Congress shall strictly follow the procedure for
approving appropriations for other departments and
agencies.
4. A special appropriations bill shall specify the purpose
for which it is intended, and shall be supported by
funds actually available as certified by the National
Treasurer, or to be raised by a corresponding revenue
proposal therein.
5. No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of
appropriations; however, the President, the President
of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme
 Court, and the heads of Constitutional Commissions
may, by law, be authorized to augment any item in
the general appropriations law for their respective
offices from savings in other items of their respective
appropriations.
6. Discretionary funds appropriated for particular
officials shall be disbursed only for public purposes to
be supported by appropriate vouchers and subject to
such guidelines as may be prescribed by law.
7. If, by the end of any fiscal year, the Congress shall
have failed to pass the general appropriations bill for
the ensuing fiscal year, the general appropriations
law for the preceding fiscal year shall be deemed re-
enacted and shall remain in force and effect until the
general appropriations bill is passed by the Congress.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. Court
of Tax Appeals, (May 14, 1990)
Manila golf wants the interpretation of the veto that makes
the entire sec 42 (of HB) considered vetoed, so that sec
191-A would not be in effect, hence no tax on them.
Commissioner of ITR says the veto (as interpreted) only
referred to certain words, thus, the rest of sec 42 that was
not vetoed, hence sec 191-A, would still be in effect, thus
making Manila Golf taxable.
The Court held that the presidential veto referred only to
certain words hotels, motels, resthouses
1. It is within the power of the President to veto
particular items which means, not an entire
section, but subjects of the tax and the tax rate.
(This held true even for the 1935 constitution).
2. To interpret the term item as meaning an entire
section would be render the veto power useless
since it would tie his hands in choosing either to
approve the whole section at the expense of also
approving a provision therein which he deems
unacceptable or veto the entire section at the
expense of foregoing the collection of the kind of
tax altogether
3. Also,To interpret the veto message otherwise
would result in the exemption of entities already
subject of tax. This would be absurd. Where the
Congress wanted to exempt, it was so provided in
the bill. While the President may veto any item or
items in a revenue bill the constitution does not
give him the power to repeal an existing tax.
Henry vs. Edwards (Mar 24, 1977)
On July 16, 1976, the Louisiana Legislature passed a
General Appropriation Bill (GAB) and delivered it to
the Governor for his consideration
On the next day, the Governor signed the bill but
vetoed 12 provisions and returned it to the
legislature for further consideration.(Note: When
78
signed by the Governor, the bill became law and is
designated as Act No. 17 of the Regular Session of the
1976 Louisiana Legislature. The act contains the GA
for the fiscal year beginning July 1, 1976 and ending
June 30, 1977)
The Governor's veto message indicated that he
considered the disapproved provisions to be
substantive law improperly incorporated in the
appropriation bill in contravention of La.Const. art.
3, 16(C)*, citing as authority for his vetoes
La.Const. art. 4, 5(G)*.
Each of the Governor's vetoes was sustained by the
Senate.
Plaintiffs, believing the vetoes to be
unconstitutional, instituted this action for a
declaratory judgment.
Trial judge held that the Governor improperly
exercised the "line item" veto power conferred by
La.Const. art. 4, 5(G)1 and that 11 of the 12
provisions vetoed were unconstitutional in that they
constituted matter not properly included in a GAB,
hence this appeal
The Court ruled that If the Governor wishes to disapprove
of conditions or limitations legitimately included in an
appropriation bill, he must veto not only the conditions or
limitations but also the money "item" to which they are
connected.
Just as the Governor may not use his item-veto power to
usurp constitutional powers conferred on the legislature,
neither can the legislature deprive the Governor of the
constitutional powers conferred on him as the chief
executive officer of the state by including in a general
appropriation bill matters more properly enacted in
separate legislationThe legislature cannot by location of
a bill give it immunity from executive veto. Nor can it
circumvent the Governor's veto power over substantive
legislation by artfully drafting general law measures so
that they appear to be true conditions or limitations on an
item of appropriationwhen the legislature inserts
inappropriate provisions in a general appropriation bill,
such provisions must be treated as "items" for purposes of
the Governor's item veto power over general
appropriation bills
Bengzon vs. Drilon (Apr 15, 1992)
In accordance with the holding of the SC in an
Administrative Matterwhere the PD that removed the
automatic adjustment provision for the retirement pension
of SC and CA Justices was declared as never having taken
effect due to non-publicationCongress provided for
adjusted pensions of the Justices in the General
Appropriations Bill (GAB) for 1992. President Aquino
however vetoed the parts of the GAB that granted the
adjustment.
The SC struck down the Veto.
1. The Constitution provides that only a particular item
or items may be vetoed. The power to disapprove
any item or items in an appropriate bill does not
grant the authority to veto a part of an item and to
approve the remaining portion of the same item. (An
item is is an indivisible sum of money dedicated to a
stated purpose.) What the President vetoed was
not the itemthe General Fund Adjustment that
appropriated P500M but the methods or
systems placed by Congress to insure the
fulfilling of the obligations therein. Less than all
of an item has been vetoed. Moreover, the vetoed
portions are not items, they are provisions. For
example, the authorization to augment retirement
payments by transferring savings from other items
is a provision, not an itemthere is no specific
appropriation of money involved.
2. The veto struck something else: (i) RA 1797; (ii) the
Resolution of the SC in Administrative Matter. The
President may not veto the provisions of a law
enacted 35 years before his Term of office.
3. The assailed veto is tantamount to dictating to
the Judiciary how its funds should be utilized
clearly repugnant to fiscal autonomy. (Fiscal
autonomy contemplates a guarantee of full flexibility
to allocate and utilize their resources with the
wisdom and dispatch that their needs require.) The
Chief Justice must be given a free hand on how to
augment appropriations where augmentation is
needed.
4. The retired Justices have vested rights to the
retirement pension.
Art. VI, Sec. 27 (1)
(1) Every bill passed by the Congress shall, before it
becomes a law, be presented to the President. If he approves
the same he shall sign it; otherwise, he shall veto it and
return the same with his objections to the House where it
originated, which shall enter the objections at large in its
Journal and proceed to reconsider it. If, after such
reconsideration, two-thirds of all the Members of such House
shall agree to pass the bill, it shall be sent, together with the
objections, to the other House by which it shall likewise be
reconsidered, and if approved by two-thirds of all the
Members of that House, it shall become a law. In all such
cases, the votes of each House shall be determined by yeas or
nays, and the names of the Members voting for or against
shall be entered in its Journal. The President shall
communicate his veto of any bill to the House where it
originated within thirty days after the date of receipt
thereof, otherwise, it shall become a law as if he had signed
it.
79
d. Legislative Vetoes
Miller vs. Mardo (July 31, 1961)
The Reorganization Plan put together by the Executive had
purportedly vested jurisdiction to the Regional Offices of
the Department of Labor over money claims and violations
of labor standards. Prior to the Reorganization Plan, the
Department only had authority to mediate and in case of
refusal to submit to arbitration, the remedy was to file a
complaint in the proper court. Various petitions
concerning the jurisdiction of the Courts vs. the
Department were consolidated by the SC.
The SC invalidated the Reorganization Plan.
1. The Government Survey and Reorganization
Commission was created to carry out the reorganization of
the Executive Branchplainly, this did not include the
creation of Courts. Although the Legislature may confer on
Administrative Boards/Bodies quasijudicial powersin so
doing the Legislature must state its intention in express
terms, leaving no doubt as to the limitations of the quasi-
judicial prerogatives. As held in Corominas et al. v. Labor
Standards Commission, the Legislature may not and
cannot delegate its power to legislate or create courts
of justice to any other agency of the Government.
2. Enactment of law by legislative inaction is not
countenanced. Sec. 6 of RA 997 had provided that the
reorganization plans shall be deemed approved upon the
adjournment of the 2nd Session, or after the expiration of
70 session days following transmittal, in case the
reorganization plans were submitted after the
adjournment of the 2nd Session. The contemplated
procedure violates the constitutional provisions requiring
positive and separate action by each House of Congress; it
also dispense with the passage of any measure, as that
word is commonly used and understood; and, it does away
with the requirement of presentation to the President.
e. Effectivity of Laws
Art. 2, Civil Code
Article 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following
the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette,
unless it is otherwise provided. This Code shall take effect
one year after such publication. (1a)
Tanada vs. Tuvera, (Apr 24, 1985 and Dec 29,
1986)
Invoking the peoples right to be informed on matters of
public concern, Petitioners sought to compel the
respondent public officials to publish and/or cause the
publication in the Official
Gazette of various PDs, LOIs, General Orders,
Proclamations, EOs, Letters of Implementation, and
Administrative Orders. Respondents asserted that
publication is not a sine qua non requirement for the
effectivity of laws where the laws themselves provide for
their own effectivity dates.
SC decided in favor of the petitioners.
1. Even when the law provides it own date of
effectivity, the publication requirement is
mandatory, in order than a law may become
effective. The object of the publication requirement
is to give the general public adequate notice of the
various laws which are to regulate their actions and
conductwithout publication, there would be no
basis for the application of the maxim, ignorantia
legis non excusat. The publication requirement is a
requirement of due process. CA 638 provides the
legal documents that must be published in the
Official Gazette (There shall be published in the
Official Gazette...):
a. Legislative acts and resolutions of a public
nature
b. Executive and Administrative orders and
proclamations except those that have no general
applicability
c. Decisions or abstracts of decisions of the
Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals
d. Documents, classes of documents as may be
required by law to be published
e. Documents, classes of documents as the
President shall determine from time to time to
have general applicability and legal effect, or
which he may authorize to be published
2. The Presidential issuances of general
application, which have not been published,
shall have no force and effect. Nonetheless, the
operative fact doctrine shall apply.
People vs. Que Po Lay (Mar 29, 1954)
Que Po Lay was convicted for violating Central Bank
Circular No. 20, in Connection with Sec. 34 of RA 265. He
was in possession of foreign exchange (USD, US Checks,
and US money
orders) amounting to $7K, but failed to sell the same to the
Central Bank within one day from receipt, as required by
Circular 20. Que Po Lay appealed his conviction, claiming
that since Circular No. 20 was not published in the OG
prior to the act/omission imputed to the appellantthe
Circular has no force and effect.
The SC decided in favor of Que Po Lay.
Circular No. 20 was issued for the implementation of a
law, it has the force and effect of lawthus, the
publication requirement is mandatory for the
Circulars effectivity. Before the public is bound by its
contentsespecially its penal provisionsa law,
regulation, or circular must first be published. The Circular
was only published 3 months after Que Po Lays
conviction.
80
EO No. 200, June 18, 1987 (SEE ANNEX B)
9. Initiative and Referendum
INITIATIVE:
3 Types of Initiative
o Constitutional amendments
o On statutes: proposing to enact national legislation
o Local legislation: proposing to enact ordinances
Can only be exercised once a year on all types of
initiatives
Limitations on Power of Local Initiative:
o Only those that are within the legal powers of
local legislative bodies to enact.
o If the local legislative body adopts the proposition
in toto before initiative is held, initiative must be
cancelled.
REFERENDUM: Power of electorate to approve or reject
legislation through an election
Registered with Comelec (RA 6735)
Signed by at least 10% of the total # of registered
voters (For Constitutional amendment: 12%)
Legislative district must be represented by at least
3% of registered voters
10. Pork Barrel Funds
*PHILCONSA vs. Enriquez (Aug 19, 1994)
This is a consolidation of cases which sought to question
the veto authority of the president involving the General
Appropriations Bill of 1994 as well as
the constitutionality of the pork barrel. The Philippine
Constitution Association (PHILCONSA) questions the
countrywide development fund. PHILCONSA said that
Congress can only allocate funds but they cannot specify
the items as to which those funds would be applied for
since that is already the function of the executive.
In G.R. No. 113766, after the vetoing by the president of
some provisions of the GAB of 1994, neither house of
congress took steps to override the veto. Instead, Senators
Wigberto Taada and Alberto Romulo sought the issuance
of the writs of prohibition and mandamus against
Executive Secretary Teofisto Guingona et al. Taada et al
contest the constitutionality of: (1) the veto on four special
provisions added to items in the GAB of 1994 for the
Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the Department
of Public Works and Highways (DPWH); and (2) the
conditions imposed by the President in the
implementation of certain appropriations for the CAFGUs,
the DPWH, and the National Housing Authority (NHA).
ISSUE: Whether or not the Presidents veto is valid.
HELD: In the PHILCONSA petition, the SC ruled that
Congress acted within its power and that the CDF is
constitutional. In the Taada petitions the SC dismissed
the other petitions and granted the others.
Veto on special provisions
The president did his veto with certain conditions and
compliant to the ruling in Gonzales vs Macaraig. The
president particularly vetoed the debt reduction scheme in
the GAA of 1994 commenting that the scheme is already
taken cared of by other legislation and may be more
properly addressed by revising the debt policy. He,
however did not delete the P86,323,438,000.00
appropriation therefor. Taada et al averred that the
president cannot validly veto that provision w/o vetoing
the amount allotted therefor. The veto of the president
herein is sustained for the vetoed provision is considered
inappropriate; in fact the Sc found that such provision if
not vetoed would in effect repeal the Foreign Borrowing
Act making the legislation as a log-rolling legislation.
Veto of provisions for revolving funds of SUCs
The appropriation for State Universities and Colleges
(SUCs), the President vetoed special provisions which
authorize the use of income and the creation, operation
and maintenance of revolving funds was likewise vetoed.
The reason for the veto is that there were already funds
allotted for the same in the National expenditure Program.
Taada et al claimed this as unconstitutional. The SC ruled
that the veto is valid for it is in compliant to the One Fund
Policy it avoided double funding and redundancy.
Veto of provision on 70% (administrative)/30%
(contract) ratio for road maintenance
The President vetoed this provision on the basis that it
may result to a breach of contractual obligations. The
funds if allotted may result to abandonment of some
existing contracts. The SC ruled that this Special Provision
in question is not an inappropriate provision which can be
the subject of a veto. It is not alien to the appropriation for
road maintenance, and on the other hand, it specifies how
the said item shall be expended 70% by administrative
and 30% by contract. The 1987 Constitution allows the
addition by Congress of special provisions, conditions to
items in an expenditure bill, which cannot be vetoed
separately from the items to which they relate so long as
they are appropriate in the budgetary sense. The veto
herein is then not valid.
Veto of provision on prior approval of Congress for
purchase of military equipment
As reason for the veto, the President stated that the said
condition and prohibition violate the Constitutional
mandate of non-impairment of contractual obligations, and
if allowed, shall effectively alter the original intent of the
AFP Modernization Fund to cover all military equipment
deemed necessary to modernize the AFP. The SC affirmed
the veto. Any provision blocking an administrative action
in implementing a law or requiring legislative approval of
executive acts must be incorporated in a separate and
81
substantive bill. Therefore, being inappropriate
provisions.
Veto of provision on use of savings to augment AFP
pension funds
According to the President, the grant of retirement and
separation benefits should be covered by direct
appropriations specifically approved for the purpose
pursuant to Section 29(1) of Article VI of the Constitution.
Moreover, he stated that the authority to use savings is
lodged in the officials enumerated in Section 25(5) of
Article VI of the Constitution. The SC retained the veto per
reasons provided by the president.
Condition on the deactivation of the CAFGUs
Congress appropriated compensation for the CAFGUs
including the payment of separation benefits. The
President declared in his Veto Message that the
implementation of this Special Provision to the item on the
CAFGUs shall be subject to prior Presidential approval
pursuant to P.D. No. 1597 and R.A. No. 6758. The SC ruled
to retain the veto per reasons provided by the president.
Further, if this provision is allowed the it would only lead
to the repeal of said existing laws.
Conditions on the appropriation for the Supreme
Court, etc
In his veto message: The said condition is consistent with
the Constitutional injunction prescribed under Section 8,
Article IX-B of the Constitutional which states that no
elective or appointive public officer or employee shall
receive additional, double, or indirect compensation unless
specifically authorized by law. I am, therefore, confident
that the heads of the said offices shall maintain fidelity to
the law and faithfully adhere to the well-established
principle on compensation standardization. Taada et al
claim that the conditions imposed by the President
violated the independence and fiscal autonomy of the
Supreme court, the Ombudsman, the COA and the CHR.
The SC sustained the veto: In the first place, the conditions
questioned by petitioners were placed in the GAB by
Congress itself, not by the President. The Veto Message
merely highlighted the Constitutional mandate that
additional or indirect compensation can only be given
pursuant to law. In the second place, such statements are
mere reminders that the disbursements of appropriations
must be made in accordance with law. Such statements
may, at worse, be treated as superfluities.
Pork Barrel Constitutional
The pork barrel makes the unequal equal. The
Congressmen, being representatives of their local districts
know more about the problems in their constituents areas
than the national government or the president for that
matter. Hence, with that knowledge, the Congressmen are
in a better position to recommend as to where funds
should be allocated.
*LAMP vs. Sec of Budget, GR No. 164987, Apr
24 2012
FACTS: For consideration of the Court is an original action
for certiorari assailing the constitutionality and legality of
the implementation of the Priority Development
Assistance Fund (PDAF) as provided for in Republic Act
(R.A.) 9206 or the General Appropriations Act for 2004
(GAA of 2004).
Petitioner Lawyers Against Monopoly and Poverty(LAMP),
a group of lawyers who have banded together with a
mission of dismantling all forms of political, economic or
social monopoly in the country. According to LAMP, the
above provision is silent and, therefore, prohibits an
automatic or direct allocation of lump sums to individual
senators and congressmen for the funding of projects. It
does not empower individual Members of Congress to
propose, select and identify programs and projects to be
funded out of PDAF.
For LAMP, this situation runs afoul against the principle of
separation of powers because in receiving and, thereafter,
spending funds for their chosen projects, the Members of
Congress in effect intrude into an executive function.
Further, the authority to propose and select projects does
not pertain to legislation. It is, in fact, a non-legislative
function devoid of constitutional sanction,8 and,
therefore, impermissible and must be considered nothing
less than malfeasance.
RESPONDENTS POSITION: the perceptions of LAMP on
the implementation of PDAF must not be based on mere
speculations circulated in the news media preaching the
evils of pork barrel.
ISSUES: 1) whether or not the mandatory requisites for
the exercise of judicial review are met in this case; and 2)
whether or not the implementation of PDAF by the
Members of Congress is unconstitutional and illegal.
HELD:
A question is ripe for adjudication when the act being
challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual
challenging it. In this case, the petitioner contested the
implementation of an alleged unconstitutional statute, as
citizens and taxpayers. The petition complains of illegal
disbursement of public funds derived from taxation and
this is sufficient reason to say that there indeed exists a
definite, concrete, real or substantial controversy before
the Court.
LOCUS STANDI: The gist of the question of standing is
whether a party alleges such a personal stake in the
outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete
adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues
upon which the court so largely depends for illumination
82
of difficult constitutional questions. Here, the sufficient
interest preventing the illegal expenditure of money raised
by taxation required in taxpayers suits is established.
Thus, in the claim that PDAF funds have been illegally
disbursed and wasted through the enforcement of an
invalid or unconstitutional law, LAMP should be allowed to
sue.
Lastly, the Court is of the view that the petition poses
issues impressed with paramount public interest. The
ramification of issues involving the unconstitutional
spending of PDAF deserves the consideration of the Court,
warranting the assumption of jurisdiction over the
petition.
The Court rules in the negative.
In determining whether or not a statute is
unconstitutional, the Court does not lose sight of the
presumption of validity accorded to statutory acts of
Congress. To justify the nullification of the law or its
implementation, there must be a clear and unequivocal,
not a doubtful, breach of the Constitution. In case of doubt
in the sufficiency of proof establishing unconstitutionality,
the Court must sustain legislation because to invalidate [a
law] based on x x x baseless supposition is an affront to the
wisdom not only of the legislature that passed it but also of
the executive which approved it.
The petition is miserably wanting in this regard. No
convincing proof was presented showing that, indeed,
there were direct releases of funds to the Members of
Congress, who actually spend them according to their sole
discretion. Devoid of any pertinent evidentiary support
that illegal misuse of PDAF in the form of kickbacks has
become a common exercise of unscrupulous Members of
Congress, the Court cannot indulge the petitioners request
for rejection of a law which is outwardly legal and capable
of lawful enforcement.
PORK BARREL:
The Members of Congress are then requested by the
President to recommend projects and programs which
may be funded from the PDAF. The list submitted by the
Members of Congress is endorsed by the Speaker of the
House of Representatives to the DBM, which reviews and
determines whether such list of projects submitted are
consistent with the guidelines and the priorities set by the
Executive.33 This demonstrates the power given to the
President to execute appropriation laws and therefore, to
exercise the spending per se of the budget.
As applied to this case, the petition is seriously wanting in
establishing that individual Members of Congress receive
and thereafter spend funds out of PDAF. So long as there is
no showing of a direct participation of legislators in the
actual spending of the budget, the constitutional
boundaries between the Executive and the Legislative in
the budgetary process remain intact.
*Belgica vs. Ochoa, GR No. 208566, Nov 19,
2013 (PDAF)
FACTS:
In the Philippines, the pork barrel (a term of American-
English origin) has been commonly referred to as lump-
sum, discretionary funds of Members of the Legislature
(Congressional Pork Barrel). However, it has also come
to refer to certain funds to the Executive. The
Congressional Pork Barrel can be traced from Act 3044
(Public Works Act of 1922), the Support for Local
Development Projects during the Marcos period, the
Mindanao Development Fund and Visayas Development
Fund and later the Countrywide Development Fund (CDF)
under the Corazon Aquino presidency, and the Priority
Development Assistance Fund under the Joseph Estrada
administration, as continued by the Gloria-Macapagal
Arroyo and the present Benigno Aquino III
administrations.
The Presidential Pork Barrel questioned by the
petitioners include the Malampaya Fund and the
Presidential Social Fund. The Malampaya Fund was
created as a special fund under Section 8, Presidential
Decree (PD) 910 by then-President Ferdinand Marcos to
help intensify, strengthen, and consolidate government
efforts relating to the exploration, exploitation, and
development of indigenous energy resources vital to
economic growth. The Presidential Social Fund was
created under Section 12, Title IV, PD 1869 (1983) or the
Charter of the Philippine Amusement and Gaming
Corporation (PAGCOR), as amended by PD 1993 issued in
1985. The Presidential Social Fund has been described as a
special funding facility managed and administered by the
Presidential Management Staff through which the
President provides direct assistance to priority programs
and projects not funded under the regular budget. It is
sourced from the share of the government in the aggregate
gross earnings of PAGCOR.
Over the years, pork funds have increased tremendously.
In 1996, an anonymous source later identified as former
Marikina City Romeo Candazo revealed that huge sums of
government money went into the pockets of legislators as
kickbacks. In 2004, several citizens sought the nullification
of the PDAF as enacted in the 2004 General Appropriations
Act for being unconstitutional, but the Supreme Court
dismissed the petition. In July 2013, the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) began its probe into allegations that
the government has been defrauded of some P10 Billion
over the past 10 years by a syndicate using funds from the
83
pork barrel of lawmakers and various government
agencies for scores of ghost projects. The investigation
was spawned by sworn affidavits of six whistle-blowers
who declared that JLN Corporation JLN standing for
Janet Lim Napoles had swindled billions of pesos from
the public coffers for ghost projects using no fewer than
20 dummy non-government organizations for an entire
decade. In August 2013, the Commission on Audit (CoA)
released the results of a three-year audit investigation
covering the use of legislators PDAF from 2007 to 2009, or
during the last three (3) years of the Arroyo
administration.
As for the Presidential Pork Barrel, whistle-blowers
alleged that [a]t least P900 Million from royalties in the
operation of the Malampaya gas project intended for
agrarian reform beneficiaries has gone into a dummy
[NGO].
A. Procedural Issues
No question involving the constitutionality or validity of a
law or governmental act may be heard and decided by the
Court unless there is compliance with the legal requisites
for judicial inquiry, namely: (a) there must be an actual
case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial
power; (b) the person challenging the act must have
the standing to question the validity of the subject act or
issuance; (c) the question of constitutionality must be
raised at the earliest opportunity; and (d) the issue of
constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.
1.) YES. There exists an actual and justiciable
controversy in these cases. The
requirement of contrariety of legal rights is clearly
satisfied by the antagonistic positions of the parties on
the constitutionality of the Pork Barrel System. Also,
the questions in these consolidated cases are ripe
for adjudication since the challenged funds and the
provisions allowing for their utilization such as
the 2013 GAA for the PDAF, PD 910 for the Malampaya
Funds and PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, for
the Presidential Social Fund are currently existing and
operational; hence, there exists an immediate or
threatened injury to petitioners as a result of
the unconstitutional use of these public funds.
As for the PDAF, the Court dispelled the notion that the
issues related thereto had been rendered moot and
academic by the reforms undertaken by respondents. A
case becomes moot when there is no more actual
controversy between the parties or no useful purpose
can be served in passing upon the
merits. The respondents proposed line-item budgeting
scheme would not terminate the controversy nor diminish
the useful purpose for its resolution since said reform is
geared towards the 2014 budget, and not the 2013
PDAF Article which, being a distinct subject
matter, remains legally effective and existing. Neither
will the Presidents declaration that he had
already abolished the PDAF render the issues on PDAF
moot precisely because the Executive branch of
government has no constitutional authority to nullify
or annul its legal existence.
Even on the assumption of mootness,
nevertheless, jurisprudence dictates that the moot and
academic principle is not a magical formula that can
automatically dissuade the Court in resolving a case. The
Court will decide cases, otherwise moot, if:
i.) There is a grave violation of the Constitution: This
is clear from the fundamental posture of petitioners they
essentially allege grave violations of the Constitution
with respect to the principles of separation of powers,
non-delegability of legislative power, checks and
balances, accountability and local autonomy.
ii.) The exceptional character of the situation and
the paramount public interest is involved: This is also
apparent from the nature of the interests involved
the constitutionality of the very system within which
significant amounts of public funds have been and
continue to be utilized and expended undoubtedly
presents a situation of exceptional character as well as a
matter of paramount public interest. The present petitions,
in fact, have been lodged at a time when the systems
flaws have never before been magnified. To the Courts
mind, the coalescence of the CoA Report, the
accounts of numerous whistle-blowers, and
the governments own recognition that reforms are
needed to address the reported abuses of the
PDAF demonstrates a prima facie pattern
of abuse which only underscores the importance of the
matter.
It is also by this finding that the Court finds petitioners
claims as not merely theorized, speculative or
hypothetical. Of note is the weight accorded by the Court
to the findings made by the CoA which is the
constitutionally-mandated audit arm of the government. if
only for the purpose of validating the existence of an actual
and justiciable controversy in these cases, the Court
deems the findings under the CoA Report to be
sufficient.
iii.) When the constitutional issue raised requires
formulation of controlling principles to guide the
bench, the bar, and the public: This is applicable largely
due to the practical need for a definitive ruling on the
systems constitutionality. There is a compelling need to
formulate controlling principles relative to the issues
raised herein in order to guide the bench, the bar, and the
public, not just for the expeditious resolution of the
anticipated disallowance cases, but more importantly, so
that the government may be guided on how public funds
should be utilized in accordance with constitutional
principles.
iv.) The case is capable of repetition yet evading
review. This is called for by the recognition that the
preparation and passage of the national budget is,
by constitutional imprimatur, an affair of annual
occurrence. The myriad of issues underlying the manner
84
in which certain public funds are spent, if not resolved at
this most opportune time, are capable of repetition and
hence, must not evade judicial review.
2.) YES. The intrinsic constitutionality of the Pork
Barrel System is not an issue dependent upon the
wisdom of the political branches of government but
rather a legal one which the Constitution itself has
commanded the Court to act upon. Scrutinizing the
contours of the system along constitutional lines is a task
that the political branches of government are incapable of
rendering precisely because it is an exercise of judicial
power. More importantly, the present Constitution has not
only vested the Judiciary the right to exercise judicial
power but essentially makes it a duty to proceed therewith
(Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution).
3. YES. Petitioners have sufficient locus standi to file the
instant cases. Petitioners have come before the Court in
their respective capacities as citizen-taxpayers and
accordingly, assert that they dutifully contribute to the
coffers of the National Treasury. As taxpayers, they
possess the requisite standing to question the validity
of the existing Pork Barrel System under which the
taxes they pay have been and continue to be
utilized. They are bound to suffer from the
unconstitutional usage of public funds, if the Court so
rules. Invariably, taxpayers have been allowed to sue
where there is a claim that public funds are illegally
disbursed or that public money is being deflected to any
improper purpose, or that public funds are wasted through
the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law, as in
these cases.
Moreover, as citizens, petitioners have equally fulfilled the
standing requirement given that the issues they have
raised may be classified as matters of transcendental
importance, of overreaching significance to society, or
of paramount public interest. The CoA Chairpersons
statement during the Oral Arguments that the present
controversy involves not [merely] a systems failure but a
complete breakdown of controls amplifies the
seriousness of the issues involved. Indeed, of greater
import than the damage caused by the illegal expenditure
of public funds is the mortal wound inflicted upon the
fundamental law by the enforcement of an invalid statute.
4.) NO. On the one hand, res judicata states that a
judgment on the merits in a previous case rendered by a
court of competent jurisdiction would bind a subsequent
case if, between the first and second actions, there exists
an identity of parties, of subject matter, and of causes of
action. This required identity is not attendant hereto
since Philconsa and LAMP involved constitutional
challenges against the 1994 CDF Article and 2004 PDAF
Article respectively. However, the cases at bar call for a
broader constitutional scrutiny of the entire Pork Barrel
System. Also, the ruling in LAMP is essentially a dismissal
based on a procedural technicality and, thus, hardly a
judgment on the merits. Thus, res judicata cannot apply.
On the other hand, the doctrine of stare decisis is a bar to
any attempt to re-litigate where
the same questions relating to the same event have been
put forward by the parties similarly situated as in a
previous case litigated and decided by a ruling in Philconsa. The Court also points out that
competent court. Absent any powerful
countervailing considerations, like cases ought to be
decided alike. Philconsa was a limited response to
a separation of powers problem, specifically on the
propriety of conferring post-enactment identification
authority to Members of Congress. On the contrary, the
present cases call for a more holistic examination of
(a) the inter-relation between the CDF and PDAF Articles
with each other, formative as they are of the entire Pork
Barrel System as well as (b) the intra-relation of post-
enactment measures contained within a particular CDF or
PDAF Article, including not only those related to the area
of project identification but also to the areas of fund
release and realignment. The complexity of the issues and
the broader legal analyses herein warranted may be,
therefore, considered as a powerful countervailing
reason against a wholesale application of the stare
decisis principle.
In addition, the Court observes that the Philconsa ruling
was actually riddled with inherent constitutional
inconsistencies which similarly countervail against a
full resort to stare decisis. Since the Court now benefits
from hindsight and current findings (such as the CoA
Report), it must partially abandon its previous ruling
in Philconsa insofar as it validated the post-enactment
identification authority of Members of Congress on the
guise that the same was merely recommendatory.
Again, since LAMP was dismissed on a procedural
technicality and, hence, has not set any controlling
doctrine susceptible of current application to the
substantive issues in these cases, stare decisis would not
apply.
B. Substantive Issues on the Congressional Pork
Barrel
1.) YES. At its core, legislators have been consistently
accorded post-enactment authority to identify the
projects they desire to be funded through various
Congressional Pork Barrel allocations. Under the
2013 PDAF Article, the statutory authority of legislators to
identify projects post-GAA may be construed from Special
Provisions 1 to 3 and the second paragraph of Special
Provision 4. Legislators have also been accorded post-
enactment authority in the areas of fund
release (Special Provision 5 under the 2013 PDAF
Article) and realignment (Special Provision 4, paragraphs
1 and 2 under the 2013 PDAF Article).
Thus, legislators have been, in one form or another,
authorized to participate in the various operational
aspects of budgeting, including the evaluation of work
and financial plans for individual activities and the
regulation and release of funds, in violation of the
separation of powers principle. That the said authority
85
is treated as merely recommendatory in nature does not
alter its unconstitutional tenor since the prohibition covers
any role in the implementation or enforcement of the law.
Towards this end, the Court must therefore abandon its
respondents have failed to substantiate their position that
the identification authority of legislators is only of
recommendatory import.
In addition to declaring the 2013 PDAF Article as well as
all other provisions of law which similarly allow legislators
to wield any form of post-enactment authority in
the implementation or enforcement of the budget, the
Court also declared that informal practices, through
which legislators have effectively intruded into the
proper phases of budget execution, must be deemed as
acts of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction and, hence, accorded the
same unconstitutional treatment.
2.) YES. The 2013 PDAF Article violates the principle of
non-delegability since legislators are effectively
allowed to individually exercise the power
of appropriation, which, as settled in Philconsa, is lodged
in Congress. The power to appropriate must be exercised
only through legislation, pursuant to Section 29(1), Article
VI of the 1987 Constitution which states: No money shall
be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of
an appropriation made by law. The power of
appropriation, as held by the Court in Bengzon v.
Secretary of Justice and Insular Auditor,
involves (a) setting apart by law a certain sum from the
public revenue for (b) a specified purpose. Under the
2013 PDAF Article, individual legislators are given a
personal lump-sum fund from which they are able
to dictate (a) how much from such fund would go to (b) a
specific project or beneficiary that they themselves also
determine. Since these two acts comprise the exercise
of the power of appropriation as described
in Bengzon, and given that the 2013 PDAF Article
authorizes individual legislators to perform the same,
undoubtedly, said legislators have been conferred
the power to legislate which the Constitution does not,
however, allow.
3.) YES. Under the 2013 PDAF Article, the amount of
P24.79 Billion only appears as a collective allocation
limit since the said amount would be further divided
among individual legislators who would then
receive personal lump-sum allocations and could, after the
GAA is passed, effectively appropriate PDAF funds based
on their own discretion. As these intermediate
appropriations are made by legislators only after the
GAA is passed and hence, outside of the law, it means
that the actual items of PDAF appropriation would not
have been written into the General Appropriations Bill
and thus effectuated without veto consideration.
This kind of lump-sum/post-enactment legislative
identification budgeting system fosters the creation of a
budget within a budget which subverts the prescribed
procedure of presentment and consequently impairs
the Presidents power of item veto. As petitioners aptly
point out, the President is forced to decide between (a)
accepting the entire P24. 79 Billion PDAF allocation
without knowing the specific projects of the legislators,
which may or may not be consistent with his
national agenda and (b) rejecting the whole PDAF to the
detriment of all other legislators with legitimate projects.
Even without its post-enactment legislative identification
feature, the 2013 PDAF Article would remain
constitutionally flawed since the lump-sum amount of
P24.79 Billion would be treated as a mere funding
source allotted for multiple purposes of spending (i.e.
scholarships, medical missions, assistance to indigents,
preservation of historical materials, construction of roads,
flood control, etc). This setup connotes that
the appropriation law leaves the actual amounts
and purposes of the appropriation for further
determination and, therefore, does not readily indicate
a discernible item which may be subject to the
Presidents power of item veto.
The same lump-sum budgeting scheme has, as the CoA
Chairperson relays, limit[ed] state auditors from
obtaining relevant data and information that would aid in
more stringently auditing the utilization of said Funds.
Accordingly, she recommends the adoption of a line by
line budget or amount per proposed program, activity or
project, and per implementing agency.
4.) YES. To a certain extent, the conduct of oversight
would be tainted as said legislators, who are vested
with post-enactment authority, would, in effect, be
checking on activities in which they
themselves participate. Also, this very same concept of
post-enactment authorization runs afoul of Section 14,
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which provides that:
[A Senator or Member of the House of
Representatives] shall not intervene in any matter before
any office of the Government for his pecuniary benefit or
where he may be called upon to act on account of his
office. Allowing legislators to intervene in the various
phases of project implementation renders them
susceptible to taking undue advantage of their own office.
However, the Court cannot completely agree that the same
post-enactment authority and/or the individual legislators
control of his PDAF per se would allow him to perpetrate
himself in office. This is a matter which must be analyzed
based on particular facts and on a case-to-case basis.
Also, while the Court accounts for the possibility that the
close operational proximity between legislators and the
Executive department, through the formers post-
enactment participation, may affect the process of
impeachment, this matter largely borders on the domain
of politics and does not strictly concern the Pork Barrel
Systems intrinsic constitutionality. As such, it is an
improper subject of judicial assessment.
86
5.) NO. Section 26, Article II of the 1987 Constitution
is considered as not self-executing due to the qualifying
phrase as may be defined by law. In this respect, said
provision does not, by and of itself, provide a judicially
enforceable constitutional right but merely specifies
a guideline for legislative or executive action. Therefore,
since there appears to be no standing law which
crystallizes the policy on political dynasties for
enforcement, the Court must defer from ruling on this
issue.
In any event, the Court finds the above-stated argument on
this score to be largely speculative since it has not been
properly demonstrated how the Pork Barrel System would
be able to propagate political dynasties.
6.) YES. The Court, however, finds an inherent defect in
the system which actually belies the avowed intention
of making equal the unequal
(Philconsa, 1994). The gauge of PDAF and CDF
allocation/division is based solely on the fact of office,
without taking into account the specific interests and
peculiarities of the district the legislator
represents. As a result, a district representative of a
highly-urbanized metropolis gets the same amount of
funding as a district representative of a far-flung rural
province which would be relatively
underdeveloped compared to the former. To add, what
rouses graver scrutiny is that even Senators and Party-List
Representatives and in some years, even the Vice-
President who do not represent any locality, receive
funding from the Congressional Pork Barrel as well.
The Court also observes that this concept of legislator
control underlying the CDF and PDAF conflicts with the
functions of the various Local Development Councils
(LDCs) which are already legally mandated to assist the
corresponding sanggunian in setting the direction of
economic and social development, and coordinating
development efforts within its territorial jurisdiction.
Considering that LDCs are instrumentalities whose
functions are essentially geared towards managing local
affairs, their programs, policies and resolutions should not
be overridden nor duplicated by individual legislators,
who are national officers that have no law-making
authority except only when acting as a body.
C. Substantive Issues on the Presidential Pork Barrel
YES. Regarding the Malampaya Fund: The phrase and
for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by
the President under Section 8 of PD 910 constitutes an
undue delegation of legislative power insofar as it does
not lay down a sufficient standard to adequately
determine the limits of the Presidents authority with
respect to the purpose for which the Malampaya Funds
may be used. As it reads, the said phrase gives the
President wide latitude to use the Malampaya Funds for
any other purpose he may direct and, in effect, allows him
to unilaterally appropriate public funds beyond the
purview of the law.
That the subject phrase may be confined only to
energy resource development and exploitation
programs and projects of the government under the
principle of ejusdem generis, meaning that the general
word or phrase is to be construed to include or be
restricted to things akin to, resembling, or of the same
kind or class as those specifically mentioned, is belied by
three (3) reasons: first, the phrase energy
resource development and exploitation programs and
projects of the government states a singular and general
class and hence, cannot be treated as a statutory reference
of specific things from which the general phrase for such
other purposes may be limited; second, the said phrase
also exhausts the class it represents, namely energy
development programs of the government; and, third, the
Executive department has used the Malampaya Funds
for non-energy related purposes under the subject
phrase, thereby contradicting respondents own position
that it is limited only to energy resource development and
exploitation programs and projects of the government.
However, the rest of Section 8, insofar as it allows for the
use of the Malampaya Funds to finance energy
resource development and exploitation programs and
projects of the government, remains legally effective and
subsisting.
Nazareth vs. Villar, GR No. 188635, Jan 29,
2013
In 1997, an RA was enacted which grants Magna Carta
benefits (honorarium, share in royalties, hazard allowance,
subsistence allowance) to DOST officers and employees.
Under the RA, funds for payment of the Magna Carta
benefits are to be appropriated in the GAA the following
year, 1998.
However, there was no GAA appropriation for these Magna
Carta benefits in the 1998, 1999 and 2000 GAAs. Despite
that, the DOST Regional Office in Zamboanga city used
savings in those years to pay its employees the Magna
Carta benefits. The COA found out about the payments that
were without GAA appropriations and disallowed it.
DOST Secretary then asked the President for authority to
use DOST savings to pay the Magna Carta benefits covering
the years 1998, 1999 and 2000. The President approved
the request. The DOST Regional Office then asked COA to
render valid the payments made not only in 1998, 1999
and 2000 but also in 2001. Petitioner argues that the
Presidents approval is a continuing authorisation that
carries over to 2001.

Regarding the Presidential Social Fund: Section 12 of PD
1869, as amended by PD 1993, indicates that the
Presidential Social Fund may be used to [first,] finance the
priority infrastructure development projects and [second,]
to finance the restoration of damaged or destroyed
facilities due to calamities, as may be directed
and authorized by the Office of the President of the
Philippines.
COA partially denied the request. COA stated that the
payments of Magna Carta benefits for 1998, 1999 and
2000 are valid and legal due to the approval of the
President. Even though the 2001 budget re-enacts the
2000 budget, the Presidents approval in 2000 doesnt
carry over to 2001, which means use of savings for
payments of the benefits are still disallowed for 2001. The
President approval is not a continuing authorisation.

The Court held that COA acted with no grave of abuse in

The second indicated purpose adequately curtails the
disallowing the payment of Magna Carta benefits for 2001.
authority of the President to spend the Presidential Social
The request made by the DOST Regional Office clearly
Fund only for restoration purposes which arise from
shows that it asked for authority to use savings only for
calamities. The first indicated purpose, however, gives
1998, 1999 and 2000. The Presidents approval clearly
him carte blanche authority to use the same fund for
shows as well that the authority granted only covers 1998,
any infrastructure project he may so determine as a
1999 and 2000. The authority granted does not carry over
priority. Verily, the law does not supply a definition
to 2001. Petitioners contention that it is a continuing
of priority infrastructure development projects and
authorisation is bereft of legal basis. Since DOST acted in
hence, leaves the President without any guideline to
good faith, the benefits paid do not need to be reimbursed
construe the same. To note, the delimitation of a project
to the government.
as one of infrastructure is too broad of
a classification since the said term could pertain to any
kind of facility. Thus, the phrase to finance the priority
infrastructure development projects must be stricken
down as unconstitutional since similar to Section 8 of
PD 910 - it lies independently unfettered by any
sufficient standard of the delegating law. As they
are severable, all other provisions of Section 12 of PD
1869, as amended by PD 1993, remains legally effective
and subsisting.

87
ANNEX A: RA 3019
ANTI-GRAFT AND CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT
Section 1. Statement of policy. It is the policy of the
Philippine Government, in line with the principle that a
public office is a public trust, to repress certain acts of
public officers and private persons alike which constitute
graft or corrupt practices or which may lead thereto.
Section 2. Definition of terms. As used in this Act, that term
(a) "Government" includes the national
government, the local governments, the
government-owned and government-controlled
corporations, and all other instrumentalities or
agencies of the Republic of the Philippines and
their branches.
(b) "Public officer" includes elective and
appointive officials and employees, permanent or
temporary, whether in the classified or
unclassified or exempt service receiving
compensation, even nominal, from the
government as defined in the preceding
subparagraph.
(c) "Receiving any gift" includes the act of
accepting directly or indirectly a gift from a
person other than a member of the public officer's
immediate family, in behalf of himself or of any
member of his family or relative within the fourth
civil degree, either by consanguinity or affinity,
even on the occasion of a family celebration or
national festivity like Christmas, if the value of the
gift is under the circumstances manifestly
excessive.
(d) "Person" includes natural and juridical
persons, unless the context indicates otherwise.
Section 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. In addition to
acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by
existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt
practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to
be unlawful:
(a) Persuading, inducing or influencing another
public officer to perform an act constituting a
violation of rules and regulations duly
promulgated by competent authority or an offense
in connection with the official duties of the latter,
or allowing himself to be persuaded, induced, or
influenced to commit such violation or offense.
(b) Directly or indirectly requesting or receiving
any gift, present, share, percentage, or benefit, for
88
himself or for any other person, in connection
with any contract or transaction between the
Government and any other part, wherein the
public officer in his official capacity has to
intervene under the law.
(c) Directly or indirectly requesting or receiving
any gift, present or other pecuniary or material
benefit, for himself or for another, from any
person for whom the public officer, in any manner
or capacity, has secured or obtained, or will secure
or obtain, any Government permit or license, in
consideration for the help given or to be given,
without prejudice to Section thirteen of this Act.
(d) Accepting or having any member of his family
accept employment in a private enterprise which
has pending official business with him during the
pendency thereof or within one year after its
termination.
(e) Causing any undue injury to any party,
including the Government, or giving any private
party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or
preference in the discharge of his official
administrative or judicial functions through
manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross
inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply
to officers and employees of offices or government
corporations charged with the grant of licenses or
permits or other concessions.
(f) Neglecting or refusing, after due demand or
request, without sufficient justification, to act
within a reasonable time on any matter pending
before him for the purpose of obtaining, directly
or indirectly, from any person interested in the
matter some pecuniary or material benefit or
advantage, or for the purpose of favoring his own
interest or giving undue advantage in favor of or
discriminating against any other interested party.
(g) Entering, on behalf of the Government, into
any contract or transaction manifestly and grossly
disadvantageous to the same, whether or not the
public officer profited or will profit thereby.
(h) Director or indirectly having financing or
pecuniary interest in any business, contract or
transaction in connection with which he
intervenes or takes part in his official capacity, or
in which he is prohibited by the Constitution or by
any law from having any interest.
(i) Directly or indirectly becoming interested, for
personal gain, or having a material interest in any
transaction or act requiring the approval of a
board, panel or group of which he is a member,
 and which exercises discretion in such approval,
even if he votes against the same or does not
participate in the action of the board, committee,
panel or group.
Interest for personal gain shall be presumed
against those public officers responsible for the
approval of manifestly unlawful, inequitable, or
irregular transaction or acts by the board, panel or
group to which they belong.
(j) Knowingly approving or granting any license,
permit, privilege or benefit in favor of any person
not qualified for or not legally entitled to such
license, permit, privilege or advantage, or of a
mere representative or dummy of one who is not
so qualified or entitled.
(k) Divulging valuable information of a
confidential character, acquired by his office or by
him on account of his official position to
unauthorized persons, or releasing such
information in advance of its authorized release
date.
The person giving the gift, present, share, percentage or
benefit referred to in subparagraphs (b) and (c); or
offering or giving to the public officer the employment
mentioned in subparagraph (d); or urging the divulging or
untimely release of the confidential information referred
to in subparagraph (k) of this section shall, together with
the offending public officer, be punished under Section
nine of this Act and shall be permanently or temporarily
disqualified in the discretion of the Court, from transacting
business in any form with the Government.
Section 4. Prohibition on private individuals. (a) It shall be
unlawful for any person having family or close personal
relation with any public official to capitalize or exploit or
take advantage of such family or close personal relation by
directly or indirectly requesting or receiving any present,
gift or material or pecuniary advantage from any other
person having some business, transaction, application,
request or contract with the government, in which such
public official has to intervene. Family relation shall
include the spouse or relatives by consanguinity or affinity
in the third civil degree. The word "close personal relation"
shall include close personal friendship, social and fraternal
connections, and professional employment all giving rise
to intimacy which assures free access to such public
officer.
(b) It shall be unlawful for any person knowingly
to induce or cause any public official to commit
any of the offenses defined in Section 3 hereof.
Section 5. Prohibition on certain relatives. It shall be
unlawful for the spouse or for any relative, by
89
consanguinity or affinity, within the third civil degree, of
the President of the Philippines, the Vice-President of the
Philippines, the President of the Senate, or the Speaker of
the House of Representatives, to intervene, directly or
indirectly, in any business, transaction, contract or
application with the Government: Provided, That this
section shall not apply to any person who, prior to the
assumption of office of any of the above officials to whom
he is related, has been already dealing with the
Government along the same line of business, nor to any
transaction, contract or application already existing or
pending at the time of such assumption of public office, nor
to any application filed by him the approval of which is not
discretionary on the part of the official or officials
concerned but depends upon compliance with requisites
provided by law, or rules or regulations issued pursuant to
law, nor to any act lawfully performed in an official
capacity or in the exercise of a profession.
Section 6. Prohibition on Members of Congress. It shall be
unlawful hereafter for any Member of the Congress during
the term for which he has been elected, to acquire or
receive any personal pecuniary interest in any specific
business enterprise which will be directly and particularly
favored or benefited by any law or resolution authored by
him previously approved or adopted by the Congress
during the same term.
The provision of this section shall apply to any other public
officer who recommended the initiation in Congress of the
enactment or adoption of any law or resolution, and
acquires or receives any such interest during his
incumbency.
It shall likewise be unlawful for such member of Congress
or other public officer, who, having such interest prior to
the approval of such law or resolution authored or
recommended by him, continues for thirty days after such
approval to retain such interest.
Section 7. Statement of assets and liabilities. Every public
officer, within thirty days after the approval of this Act or
after assuming office, and within the month of January of
every other year thereafter, as well as upon the expiration
of his term of office, or upon his resignation or separation
from office, shall prepare and file with the office of the
corresponding Department Head, or in the case of a Head
of Department or chief of an independent office, with the
Office of the President, or in the case of members of the
Congress and the officials and employees thereof, with the
Office of the Secretary of the corresponding House, a true
detailed and sworn statement of assets and liabilities,
including a statement of the amounts and sources of his
income, the amounts of his personal and family expenses
and the amount of income taxes paid for the next
preceding calendar year: Provided, That public officers
assuming office less than two months before the end of the
calendar year, may file their statements in the following
months of January.
Section 8. Dismissal due to unexplained wealth. If in
accordance with the provisions of Republic Act Numbered
One thousand three hundred seventy-nine, a public official
has been found to have acquired during his incumbency,
whether in his name or in the name of other persons, an
amount of property and/or money manifestly out of
proportion to his salary and to his other lawful income,
that fact shall be a ground for dismissal or removal.
Properties in the name of the spouse and unmarried
children of such public official may be taken into
consideration, when their acquisition through legitimate
means cannot be satisfactorily shown. Bank deposits shall
be taken into consideration in the enforcement of this
section, notwithstanding any provision of law to the
contrary.
Section 9. Penalties for violations. (a) Any public officer or
private person committing any of the unlawful acts or
omissions enumerated in Sections 3, 4, 5 and 6 of this Act
shall be punished with imprisonment for not less than one
year nor more than ten years, perpetual disqualification
from public office, and confiscation or forfeiture in favor of
the Government of any prohibited interest and
unexplained wealth manifestly out of proportion to his
salary and other lawful income.
Any complaining party at whose complaint the criminal
prosecution was initiated shall, in case of conviction of the
accused, be entitled to recover in the criminal action with
priority over the forfeiture in favor of the Government, the
amount of money or the thing he may have given to the
accused, or the value of such thing.
(b) Any public officer violation any of the
provisions of Section 7 of this Act shall be
punished by a fine of not less than one hundred
pesos nor more than one thousand pesos, or by
imprisonment not exceeding one year, or by both
such fine and imprisonment, at the discretion of
the Court.
The violation of said section proven in a proper
administrative proceeding shall be sufficient cause for
removal or dismissal of a public officer, even if no criminal
prosecution is instituted against him.
Section 10. Competent court. Until otherwise provided by
law, all prosecutions under this Act shall be within the
original jurisdiction of the proper Court of First Instance.
Section 11. Prescription of offenses. All offenses punishable
under this Act shall prescribe in ten years.
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Section 12. Termination of office. No public officer shall be
allowed to resign or retire pending an investigation,
criminal or administrative, or pending a prosecution
against him, for any offense under this Act or under the
provisions of the Revised Penal Code on bribery.
Section 13. Suspension and loss of benefits. Any public
officer against whom any criminal prosecution under a
valid information under this Act or under the provisions of
the Revised Penal Code on bribery is pending in court,
shall be suspended from office. Should he be convicted by
final judgment, he shall lose all retirement or gratuity
benefits under any law, but if he is acquitted, he shall be
entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits
which he failed to receive during suspension, unless in the
meantime administrative proceedings have been filed
against him.
Section 14. Exception. Unsolicited gifts or presents of
small or insignificant value offered or given as a mere
ordinary token of gratitude or friendship according to local
customs or usage, shall be excepted from the provisions of
this Act.
Nothing in this Act shall be interpreted to prejudice or
prohibit the practice of any profession, lawful trade or
occupation by any private person or by any public officer
who under the law may legitimately practice his
profession, trade or occupation, during his incumbency,
except where the practice of such profession, trade or
occupation involves conspiracy with any other person or
public official to commit any of the violations penalized in
this Act.
Section 15. Separability clause. If any provision of this Act
or the application of such provision to any person or
circumstances is declared invalid, the remainder of the Act
or the application of such provision to other persons or
circumstances shall not be affected by such declaration.
Section 16. Effectivity. This Act shall take effect on its
approval, but for the purpose of determining unexplained
wealth, all property acquired by a public officer since he
assumed office shall be taken into consideration.
ANNEX B: EO 200 Done in the City of Manila, this 18th day of June, in the year
of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and eighty-seven.
MALACAANG
Manila (Sgd.) CORAZON C. AQUINO

EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 200

PROVIDING FOR THE PUBLICATION OF LAWS EITHER IN

THE OFFICIAL GAZETTE OR IN A NEWSPAPER OF
GENERAL CIRCULATION IN THE PHILIPPINES AS A
REQUIREMENT FOR THEIR EFFECTIVITY.

WHEREAS, Article 2 of the Civil Code partly provides that

laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the
completion of their publication in the Official Gazette,
unless it is otherwise provided x x x;

WHEREAS, the requirement that for laws to be effective

only a publication thereof in the Official Gazette will suffice
has entailed some problems, a point recognized by the
Supreme Court in Taada, et al. vs. Tuvera, et al. (G.R. No.
63915, December 29, 1986), when it observed that
[t]here is much to be said of the view that the publication
need not be made in the Official Gazette, considering its
erratic release and limited readership;

WHEREAS, it was likewise observed that [u]ndoubtedly,

newspapers of general circulation could better perform
the function of communicating the laws to the people as
such periodicals are more easily available, have a wider
readership, and come out regularly; and

WHEREAS, in view of the foregoing premises Article 2 of

the Civil Code should accordingly be amended so the laws
to be effective must be published either in the Official
Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the
country;

NOW, THEREFORE, I, CORAZON C. AQUINO, President of

the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by
the Constitution, do hereby order:

SECTION 1. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days

following the completion of their publication either in the
Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in
the Philippines, unless it is otherwise provided.

SEC. 2. Article 2 of Republic Act No. 386, otherwise known

as the Civil Code of the Philippines, and all other laws
inconsistent with this Executive Order are hereby repealed
or modified accordingly.

SEC. 3. This Executive Order shall take effect immediately

after its publication in the Official Gazette.

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