Mind Association

Die Philosophie des Als Ob. System der Theoretischen, Praktischen und Religiosen Fiktionen
der Menschheit auf Grund Eines Idealistischen Positivismus, mit einem Anhang uber Kant
und Nietzsche. by H. Vaihinger
Review by: F. C. S. Schiller
Mind, New Series, Vol. 21, No. 81 (Jan., 1912), pp. 93-104
Published by: Oxford University Press on behalf of the Mind Association
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2248912 .
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 VII.-CRITICAL NOTICES.
Die Philosophiedes Als Ob. Systemder theoretischen,
piaktischen
und religitsenFiktionender Menschheitauf Grund eines
idealistischenPositivismus,mit einem Anhang uber Kant
und Nietzsche. Herausgegebenvon H. VAIHINGER. Berlin,
Reuther& Reichard,1911. Pp. xxxv,804.

THIS impressive workhas had a remarkablehistory. The first

part(pp. 1-327),containingthe systematicdiscussionof the con-
was writtenso long ago as 1876; part2 (pp.
ceptionof' fiction,'
328-612)datesfrom1877-8and containsthespecialillustrations;
part3, a citationofpassagesfromKant,Forberg,F. A. Lange and
Nietzsche,is basedon collections madein 1875,buthas beenadded
to since,and containsalso somereferences to current
controversies.
There are,moreover, two Prefaces,one signedby Prof.Vaihinger
as the 'editor,'the other(unsigned)by the 'author,'who is not
statedto be identicalwiththe'editor'. Thiscuriousfact,together
withtheabundanceofmisprints and theabsenceofany attempt to
bringthecontentsof theworkup to date,is no doubtconnected
withthe distressingmalady of the eyes which,to every one's
regret,keptProf.Vaihingeraway fromthe Bologna Congressof
Philosophy, to whichthebookis dedicated. It was clearlya case
ofpublication now or never,and in theformin whichthe material
existedor not at all, and Prof.Vaihingeris certainlyrightin
thinking thatthe learnedworld would ratherhave so valuablea
workin an imperfect formthanlose it altogether.
The second Preface serves as an introduction to the whole
argumentby formulating as its centralquestionthe problemof
Fictionand asking'howis it possiblethatwithideas knownto be
false we can yetattain rightresults? and by explainingwhyits
publicationwas so long delayed. Prof.Vaihingerexplains,quite
frankly,thathe did notdare to publishit before,whereasnow four
influenceshavepavedthe wayforit,viz.,thegrowthofVoluntar-
ism (Paulsen,Wundt),the biologicaltheoryof knowledge(Mach,
Avenarius), thepopularity ofNietzsche,and theriseofPragmatism.
The wholepassageis mostinstructive, and throwsa strangelighton
thevauntedDenkfreiheit oftheGermanuniversities.Here we have
an extremely learned,highlyscientific
work,whichifithadappeared
thirty-fiveyearsago would indubitably have made an epochand
enormouslyacceleratedthe progressof philosophy,deliberately

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94 CRITICAL NOTICES:

suppressedby its author,not because he feareddeprivationor

officialcensure(as many Germanphilosophershave done in the
past),butbecause he shrankfromthe odiumof settingrightthe
dominantdogmatismsof his colleagues! Why, this is quite as
bad as anything we have elsewhere. But Prof.Vaihinger's avowal
shows,not merelythat courageis one of the greatintellectual
virtues(thoughhis bookis a sufficient proofthathe himself has no
lack of it), but still morethat dogmatismand intoleranceare as
deadlyenemiesto science when theyare foundin university pro-
fessorsas in state-officials and that thereis somethinggravely
wrong,froma socialpointof view,in any systemwhichproduces
thesevicesand givesthemsuchopportunities.
However,we oughtto be gladtohaveat lastgotProf.Vaihinger's
work,which is, as he says, the firstsystematictreatiseon the
epistemological functionof Fictions, and considersits subject
exhaustively in its scientific,
ethicaland religiousaspectsand with
copious,and oftenrecondite, fromphilosophic
illustrations history.
Incidentallyit involvesa new interpretation of Kant, whichis
regardedas the most radical formof Criticism, and as thesecret
doctrineof Kant himselfin his more enlightened(or bolder?)
moments, thoughProf.Vaihingerof course knows Kant and his
waysfartoo well to pretendit is the onlyinterpretation and the
onlydoctrineto be got out of his contradictory pronouncements.
For this new 'Kant,' whose genuinenessand truthto some at
least of Kant's moods Prof. Vaihinger'squotationsseem con-
vincingly to establish,Prof.Vaihinger'sgreatCommnentary and his
positionas the foremost' Kenner'of Kantianphilosophy, willno
doubtsecurea respectful hearing,and the thorougbdiscussionthe
German' Kant-philologers ' love,whileit may also be a checkon
theattempts to turnKant intoa dogmatist whichare so popularin
otherquarters. Thus hereagainthemaximholds thateverynew
philosophy involvesa new ' Kant'. But Prof.Vaihinger, though
he is proudof his Kantianinspirationand apparentlyholds that
Kant was big enoughto be allowed to contradicthimselfas he
pleasedand thatit is ' Philistine'to deny him this right(p. 639),
and thoughhe mustknowhow his Kantianloremustimpressand
overawelessermen,and how interestingly it illustratestheamount
ofvaluablethoughtwhichhistoriesof philosophy commonly leave
out, does not pose as a mere disciple. He has an eye to the
absencein Kant ofessentialmodernideas,like thoseof value and
of the teleologicalnatureof thought(p. 191), and is consciousof
goingbeyondKant. The real core of his system,and its real
merit,lie in the thesishe has raised aboutthe natureand value
of Fictionand its relationto Truth. With the resultsof this
investigation he conceiveshis philosophyas takingits seat on the
extremeLeftof the philosophicpandemonium as an " insightinto
thenecessityof consciousfictionsas indispensable foundations of
ourscientific inquiry, oursesthetic enjoyment, ourpracticalaction"

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 H. VAIHINGER, Die Philosophiedes Als Ob. 95

which" enfoldswitha commontie thedifferentials ofmathematics,

the atomsofphysics,theIdeas ofphilosophy, andeventhedogmas
ofreligion"(p. xv.).
It will be seenthatthe scope of Prof.Vaihinger'sprogramme-is
enormous,and to appreciateit it will be necessaryto consider
I. his notionof 'F iction,'IL. his listof ' fictions,'III. his relations
to Scepticism, and IV. to Pragmatism.
I. He beginsby conceiving thesoulin themodernbiologicalway
as activeand (in a way)creative. It followsthatas thinking is an
organicfunction, its aim mustbe practical,viz.,so to transform the
materialgivenby the senses that we can calculatethe courseof
eventsand act successfully(chap. i.). All thinkingtherefore is
instru-mental (Dewey'sword),and notits own end,and all thoughts
are ' Denkmittel'(pp. 95, 126, 181, etc.),and so 'fictions'. Thus
the aim of truththroughout is, not a theoreticcopying,or a
comparing withreality,but a practicaltestingof theusefulnessof
ideas,so that" fora modernepistemological standpointtherecan
no longerbe a questionof ' truth'in the ordinarysense of the
word" (pp. 5, 7). Thinking,being simplyan instrument to find
one's wayabouttheworld,whichsubstitutes -anideal worldforthe
real (pp. 22-23),has howeverto make use of dodges(Kunstgriffe)
in orderto attainits ends, and these are the Fictionswhichno
sciencecan dispensewith.
. Any departurefromthe givenis 'fictitious,'thoughit is not
necessarilya full-fledged 'Fiction'. The latteris distinguished
froma 'semi-fiction'by the factthat it not only departsfrom
realityand contradicts it, but also contradicts itself(p. 24). In-
deed self-contradiction is "the mostcertainsymptom of fictions "
(p. 94). A ' fiction'is not howeverintendedto expressreality,
and shouldbe accompaniedby this consciousness(p. 127). It
shouldnotclaimto be ' fact' (p. 173). Thus a ' fiction ' is defin-
able "as anyconscious,purposivebutfalse assumption " (p. 130),
or a "scieztificinvention forpracticalpurposes"(p. 65). It should
be sharplydistinguished froman hypothesis, thoughthey have
beenconstantly confusedso far. A hypothesis aims at represent-
ing realityand must not be contradictory; it claims theoretic
value (p. 148), and (if it succeeds) producesunderstanding or
real knowledge(p. 147),or explanation(p. 187). Hypothesesde-
mand verification, and the ruleforthemis 'take the mostprob-
able' (p. 144): forfictionsit is 'take the most suitable'. They
can neverbe verified, becausetheybeginby departingfromreality
(p. 152); what theyrequireis justificationby theirusefulness;
their value is practicaland theirfruitis successfulcalculation.
Theyare in factuseful,fruitful and salutary'errors'whichcon-
trastwithsterileandharmful' truths'. Theymaybe callederrors
legitimatedby their success (pp. 62-64, 190, of. 143), and are
heuristically indispensable. For all " thinkingis onlyreg'ulated
error" (p. 217).

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96 CRITICAL NOTICES:

How is it thenthat,despitetheirlogicallyatrociouscharacter,
theycan work? Why simplybecause theyare ' scaffolding,' des-
tinedto be takendownagain (p. 147). So theydo not affectthe
result. Also theyare corrected, and compensateeach other(chap.
xxvi.,etc.). And so perhapsin science,as in love,all's well that
ends well.
II. So we mightconclude,untilwe studythe list of ' Fictions'.
For hardlyanythingseemsto escape Prof.Vaihinger's net. Keep-
ing only to the big and fundamental notionsof his list we find
that he detectsfictionsin averages,mean-values,classifications,
abstractions,types, symbols,forces,roots, individuals,atoms,
things,qualities,faculties,universals,ideals, infinity, numbers,
measures,(empty)space and time,and all mathematicalnotions,
matter,thesoul,substance,subjectandobject,duty,God,freedom,
immortality, all 'absolutes,'all categories(whichare only 'analo-
gies'), induction,deduction,nay all judgmentas such (chaps.
xxviii.,xxxv.,especiallypp. 138, 312).
Whenall thesethingshave beenadded up, and subtracted from
reality,'what remainsof the whole philosophicstock-in-trade,'
the astonishedreadermay well ask, 'that is not a "fiction"?'
Well, it would have been simplerto start with this remnant,
or at any rate much shorter. For the only thingsthat are not
transformations
' fictitious' ofreality,accordingto Prof.Vaihinger,
are (1) the flux of sensations,which is the only thing given
(chaps. xxxv.-xxxvii.,etc.), (2) the laws of their succession
(pp. 98-99), and (3) the fundamentalFormal Law of Identity
and Contradiction(pp. 124, 159). About the last two how-
ever Prof. Vaihingerdoes not seem at all certain(or consist-
ent). On page 419 we are told that 'the law' also is in theend
onlyan auxiliaryidea comparablewiththenotionofspecies,which
has been declareda fiction. ProbablyProf.Vaihinger'smeaning
is that while the successionsof eventsare 'given' and factual,
theirexplanationby the notionof law is a 'fiction,'as indeedit
can hardlyhelp being, seeing that all the categories,including
4causality,'have beenfoundto be fictions. Similarlyon page 411
theLaw ofContradiction is expresslysaid to reston a fiction,and
the wholeofFormalLogic is calleda systemoffictions.'
III. Is whatremainsenoughto redeemProf.Vaihinger's' posi-
tivism' fromthechargeof Scepticism ? He himselfwould reject
theimputation ofsuch 'logical pessimism,'as he calls scepticism,
and insiststhathis doctrineis thepurestCriticism (pp. 294-296).
Nor ofcoursedoes he thinkthatthepresenceof contradictions in
thoughtis a reasonforscepticism(p. 229). Still he rates highly
the servicesof scepticism, and sees clearlyboth that the dogmat-
ist's demandforabsolutetheoreticknowledgeinevitably generates
it, because it demandstoo inuchfromour instrument (cf.H. G.
IAnd of formally
invalidonesat that! For the ordinary
syllogism
commitsa quaternioterminorum
(p. 214).

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 H. VAIHINGER, Die Philosophiedes Als Ob. 97

Wells' ' scepticismof the instrument'),and because thoughtis

theoretically a failure(pp. 309, 316). If howevei scepticismis
extendedto thepracticalfunction ofthought, it becomesinadmis-
sible: forit is notlegitimate to doubtthatthoughtattainsits prac-
tical end of ordering experience. Practicallymoreover scepticism
has to acknowledge the truthof our ideas (pp. 229, 232). It is
cleartherefore that Prof.Vaihinger'srejectionof scepticismrests
entirely on pragmatic grounds.
IV. So does a greatdeal oftherestof his doctrine, thoughit is
by no meanseasy to expoundhis exactrelationto theviewswhich
are moreor less accurately describedas 'pragmatism'. Thereare
indeed a large numberof coincidencesbetweenProf.Vaihinger
and the pragmatists both as regardsgeneralphilosophicattitude
(he is an empiricistand rejectsapriorism),epistemological prin-
ciples,thedetailsofhis criticism ofthe traditional views,and even
pointsofphraseology and illustration.To particularise thecapital
points,we mayreferto his acceptanceof the biologicalconception
of knowledgeand of its functionas a means to action and the
alterationof reality(pp. 93, 123, 176, 307, etc.); his conception
ofthoughtand its productsas instrumental (pp. 22-23,82, 88, 95,
126, 179, 232, 294, 310, 407, etc.); theemphasison its purposive-
ness and convenience, irrespective ofits ' truth'(pp. 132,136, 215,
298, 305, 310, 406); therejectionoftheideasthatthoughtaimsat
a theoreticcopyingofrealityand notat practicalagreement (pp. 5,
7, 93, 295), and is its own end (p. 181); therecognition ofa pro-
cess ofselectionand ofa struggle forexistenceamongideas which
is decidedby theirvalue (pp. 77, 101, 135-136); the perception
that ' truth'is a departurefrom' reality,'whichattainsits endc
althoughit apparently falsifies(pp. 288, 296); the provisothat
both' hypotheses ' and ' fictions' mustbe validatedbytheirworking
(p. 150); therecognition ofthe close connexionbetweentruthand
error,which leads him to subsumebothunderthe notionof a
meansforcalculatingthe courseofeventsand to distinguish them
as successfuland unsuccessfulmeans (pp. 193, 45, 136, 143). It
wouldbe difficult to quotefromthe most thoroughgoing pragmat-
ists any dictawhichgo furtherthane.g. these,that " the proper
purposeofthinking is notthinking itselfanditsproducts, butaction
and in thelast resortethicalaction" 1 (p. 93), that " the firstaim
of logicalthinkingis practical,logical functioning is a means to
self-preservation. Cognitionis onlya secondary purpose,in a way
onlya by-product oflogicalfunctioning " I (p. 307), that" thatidea
is TRUEwhichfulfils thepurposeofall thinking best"' (p. 136), that
" truthis merelythemostsuitabledegreeoferror"1 (p. 193), that
"cause and effectis only the abstractexpressionfor will and
action" 1(p. 317); whileprobablyno criticofFormalLogic,noteven
Hegel,has evergoneso faras to assertthat" logicallycontradictory
Italicstheauthor's.
-7

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98 CRITICAL NOTICES:

conceptions are preciselythemost valuable" (p. 92), or that uni-

versalsare " logicallyusefulbecausetheyare logica!lyimpossible"
(p. 410).
This ultra-pragmatism is not howeverthe whole story. There
is anotherside,or anothermood,to Prof.Vaihinger,whichdoes
notfitin so well withpragmatism.It beginswith what in view
ofwhatis comingseemsan unfortunate remarkin the Preface(p.
x), distinguishing between' critical'and 'uncritical'pragmatism
and condemning the latteras " an epistemologicalutilitarianism of
theworstsort" whichrendersphilosophy" once more an ancilla
theologie " or even " a meretrixtheologorum outright". It seems
likean allusionto thisviewwhenit is said (pp. 760-761)thatthe
soundKantiandoctrineof a ' double truth' has been ' corrupted'
by Americanpragmatismwhichhas entirely dissolvedthe scien-
tificnotionoftruthin therelativity ofthereligiousconceptionof
truth. What rendersthis censureparticularly puzzlingis that
accordingto Kant and Prof.Vaihingerhimselfthe doctrineofthe
doubtetruthallows,and even enjoins,a veryelaboratesystemof
theologicalmake-believe,wherebythose who do not believein
God or, freedomor immortalityare to behave as if they
did believe these " useful, and thereforelegittnate,'necessary
fictionsof mankind" (p. xv). Here the differencebetween
Prof. Vaihingerand ' uncritical'pragmatismwould seem to be
merelythat the formercalls 'false' the indispensablebeliefs
which the latter calls ' true,'and as the formeradmitsa double
sense oftruthand notinfrequently calls thepractically' true' fic-
tions truewithoutreservations(e.g. p. 136, l.c.), this difference
would hardlyseem to warrantseverelanguage. However their
real explanationwouldseemto be thatProf.Vaihinger'sdenunci-
ationof 'uncritical'pragmatismwas not intendedforany of the
pragmatist philosophers, but,as he informed me,forcertaintheo-
logians of his acquaintance,while so far fromobjectingto the
genuinepragmatism, he longhesitatedwhetherhe should not call
his own position' criticalpragmatism'ratherthan 'criticalposi-
tivism'.
Therecan be no doubtthathe comesverynearpragmatism;but
his finalchoicewas probablya rightone. For thereare stillto be
mentioneddoctrinesof his whichseem incompatiblewith prag-
matismin any strictsense. Amongtheseis theduplicity of truth
as ' theoretic'and ' practical,'whichleads himusuallyto denythe
titleof truthto any ' fiction'howevervaluableand indispensable,
and forceshim to admit the existenceof harmful'truths' and
fruitful and beneficial'errors' (p. 64), to disallowthe inference
fromsuccessfulworkingto theoretictruth,and from'subjective'
necessity to objectivereality(pp. 190, 327, 404, 603), to condemn
any alterationof or departurefromrealityin a fiction as a falsi-
I Italicsmine.

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 H. VAIHINGER, Die Philosophiedes Als Ob. 99

fication(p. 194), to deny that a 'fiction' ever attainsthe real

(p. 449), and generally thatit is possibleto unitethegood,thetrue
and thereal.
It is theparadoxofcombining theseviews withhis pragmatism
thatrendersthe psychologicalstrainof Prof.Vaihinger'sposition
so severe,and explainswhy not even an acrobatlike Kant has
beenable to takehis standconsistently on thepainfulrazor-edge of
the' philosophy oftheas-if'. IndeedifKanthad beengiftedwith
a senseofhumourhe wouldforthwith have abandonedthe ' stand-
pointof the as-if' ratherthan writedown the deliciouspassage
Prof. Vaihingerquotes fromhis Lose Bldtter(? Fliegende)," a
reasonableman,when engagedin praver,assumesmiracles;but
when engiged in business,he admitsno miracle" (p. 719). In
spiteofits paradoxeshoweverthe positionis widespread;it is, as
Prof.Vaihingershows,essentially thatof Nietzsche,who suggests
thatthevalue of all thingsconsistsin theirbeingfalse,thatone
oughtto believein God,nob because he is true but becausehe is
false (p. 789), and it underliesthepopulardistrustof thetruthas
probablypainfuland men'sloveofconsolingfalsehoods -which they
can pretendto believe.
Howeverparadoxicaland unnaturalthis beliefmay be psycho-
logically,its logical genesisis quite clear. It arises fromthe
retentionof the emptyintellecualisticnotionof truthafterthe
discovery has been made thatactual truthdoes notconform to its
model. If instead of declaringthat this 'ideal' is void and
meaningless,and that the abstractnotionof truthmust accom-
modateitselfto truth'sactual naturein theconcrete, theformer is
regardedas the higherkind of truth,and called 'theoretic,' and
thelatteris disparagedas ' onlypractical,'the doctrineofa double
truthmustfollow,withall its consequences. But it is a delusion
ofthosewhoadoptthispositiontoimaginethattheyhavediscarded
the 'copy' theoryof truth. Really they remainenslavedto it,
thoughtheyhave found out that it is useless. But for their
continuing to thinkit the business of truthto copy (or repre-
sent or reflect)reality,althoughit plainlydoes not in fact either
do or attemptthis,therewould be no reason to dub our practi-
cal procedures'fictions'. It is interesting that on one occasion
Prof.Vaihingerseems to see this. He says (p. 94 s.f.), " it was
onlyan accommodation to theordinary viewwhenwe provisionally
took up the position*thatthe ultimateaim of thinkingis the
cognition ofthereal". But if 'theoretic'cognition is nottheaim
of thinking, and if 'copying' is neitherpossiblenor attempted,
what harm is there in its ' departing'fromthe given (which
admittedly is onlya chaos),and whatsensein callingit a ' fiction'
forso doing?
The truthis thatProf.Vaihinger'singenuity, in detectingfictions
everywhere, overreaches itself. He leavesno 'facts' tobe contrasted
with his 'fictions,'and in consequencethe latterbecomefacts

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100 CRITICAL NOTICES:

optimijuris, and their procedures ' truths'. A discussion of his

notionof Fiction will speedily reveal this.
If we considerthe denotationand connotationof the termfiction
in Prof.Vaihinger's use we notice that both are very wide. On his
own showingthe only thingthat was indisputablynotfictitious was
the flux of sensations (p. 96).1 Yet nothing is more clearly an
ens rationiscreated for purposes of psychological analysis. We
never actually experience ' sensations'. Our actual experiences
come as perceptions of things and their qualities, and these are
never ' pure' fromadmixturesderivedfromour past, our knowledge
and our personality. It seems quite untrue to say even that our
organs of sense have the capacity or the functionof reproducing
undistorted' fact'. They select and theytransformin myriadways,
and are themselves the creatures of past selections, choices and
valuations. For are not the organs of everyliving being adjusted
(moreor less perfectly)to his mode of life? And was not that mode
of life selected and chosen in preferenceto others, or to non-
existence? Our very 'sense data' (if we will insist on talking
about such figments)are thereforepervaded ineradicably by past
valuations, and choices, ideas and ideals; and if such pervasion is
called corruption,all are hopelessly ' corrupt'.
Or again, how is a real 'sensation' to be discriminatedfrom
an illusion,hallucination or dream? It would puzzle Prof. Vai-
hingerto assign any othercriterionthan its superior value. But
value to him spells 'fiction,' and so his 'sensations' must stew in
the same brothwith the rest of our cognitiveprocedures.
But the very universalityof ' Fiction' throws a profound doubt
on the proprietyof the term. It no longer serves to discriminate
one thingfromanother in the epistemologicalhotch-potch.
Afterall does ' fiction' connote more than 'mental activity'?
That certainlyis all-pervasive,and the sooner all philosophers see
this the better. But do we want to do without it? If not, why
abuse it as 'fiction'? If everythingthat can be called truthcan
also be called fiction,the differencein the meaning of the two terms
has disappeared. Nothing is gained, therefore,by extending the
sphere of 'fiction' in this way. It is better to discriminate,nor
is such discriminationeither difficult or inferiorin convenience.
I should prefer,therefore,a classification which distinguishes
between methodological and categorical assertion among the mani-
festationsof human cognitive activity. Methodological assertion
implies merely a recognition of the scientificvalue and conveni-
ence of the assertion,irrespectiveof any future decision as to its
ultimatestatus. What is now asserted for methodologicalreasons
may or may not turnout to be acceptable as a statement of scien-
tific'truth,' it may or may not maintain itself eitheras a ' truth'
of 'law' he himselfadmitted,while the Laws of
'The fictitiousness
are notonly'fictions'butactuallymeaningless
Identityand Contradiction
in theirFormalversion(cf.myFormalLogic,chaps.x., xxiv.,? 5).
fictions

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 H. VAIHINGER, Die Philosophiedes Als Ob. 101

or as a ' convenience'. Methodological assertionthusdoes notex-

cludecategorical, nordoes it involve' fiction'. A 'fiction' should
be regardedas a special case of methodological assertionwhich
ariseslater,whenthelimitsofits usefulnesshave beendiscovered,
and it is seen to be impossibleto claim full' truth'forit,though
its originalusefulness stillpersists. Thus a methodological fiction
is trueand usefulforcertainpurposes,but knownnot to be either
forothers. It thusexpressesa further stageof scientific analysis
than the methodological assumptionwhich asserts merely the
immediatevalue of an idea, and leaves its finalstatusan open
question. It can hardlybe deniedthatsucha positionofa scien-
tificdoctrineis logicallyintelligible and psychologically common.
It should furtherbe noted that neitherof Prof. Vaihinger's
criteriaof 'fiction' seemsto be adequate. The mere factof our
' supposinga thingto be true' does notturnit into-a 'fiction'.
For we may ' suppose' it in quitea neutralway,and go on using
it withoutdefining it further, and evenhave no repugnance to dis-
coveringthat ' afterall it reallyis true'. I.e., thephrasecovers
'methodologicalassumptions'which are not 'fictions'. Nor
again is thestateofourconsciousnessdecisive. We maysuppose
ourselvesto be merelyentertaining 'fictions,'and yet findto our
delightthattheyweremuch more. Even the sciencessometimes
entertain angelsunawares,and, ifit be not too irreverent, allusion
mayalso be made to 'the old priestofPeru whodreamthe'd con-
verteda Jew,and awokein thenightin the deuce of a fright, and
found it was perfectly true'. In shortsome ' dreams' are ' veri-
dical,'and someprophecies' cometrue'. Even the ' atom' Prof.
Vaihingeris so contemptuous of has, since his book was written,
obtainedsome supportforits claim to be a real physicalentity
from(theinterpretation of) I radioactive' phenomena. It cannot
therefore be arguedthat because a conceptionbeginsits scientific
careeras a ' fiction'it remainsone,and ' can neverattainreality'.
DeparturefromtheI given' is not the differentia of ' fiction,'be-
cause it is essentialto all cognitive activity,and theinquirer'scon-
sciousnessoffiction is no proofof it,becauseit is primarily onlya
psychological factabouthis stateofmind.
Now theknower's stateofmindno doubtdeservesfarmorestudy
thanphilosophers have yet bestoweduponit,and Prof.Vaihinger
also mightadvantageously have carriedhis analysisof themental
attitudeofusingfictionsfurther.In particularthe notionof the
fiction'sworking mighthave been more detailed. For it does not
seem to be the factthat a fiction, consciouslyrecognisedas such,
ever' works'and is usefulas such. It is necessaryto ask as what
does it work,qua theelementin it whichis knownto be ' false' or
qua its 'practical' truth? Also,for whomdoes it work,forthose
whorecogniseit as a fiction, or forthosewhobelieveit to be true
or at least halfbelievethisor believeit at times?
Now (1) in thecase of thefictionconsciously used by a scientist

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102 CRITICAL NOTICES:

it is clearthatits value dependson its truth,whichis adequatefor

his purpose. To conceivea curveas a straight lineand toconstruct
a railwaycarriageto conveya certainnumberof menof ' average'
weightis 'true enough,'because the ' errors' committedmay be
madeinfinitely smallor assumedto compensateeach other. Thus
the term'fiction' does not mean that the conceptionis 'false'
throughout (in whichcase it wouldbe a bad,uselessand pointless
fiction),butthatits truthis knownto have limits,beyondwhich
it breaksdown. It is notan ' absolute'truthforall purposes,and
differs fromordinarytruthsin thisthatthelimitsofits applicability
are definitely known. But it is in virtueof the 'truth'in it,and
notin virtueofthe(negligible) ' error,'thatthe 'fiction'is scientific-
ally valuable. It is then an insufficient analysisfirstto call the
wholestructure a ' fiction'and a ' usefulerror,'and thenbyway of
compensation to admitthatit has 'practical' butnot 'theoretic'
truth. All truthis 'practical' in the sense of 'relative to some
humanpurpose,'and theadjectiveis pleonastic. Anderroris not
usefulqua error. The philosopherswho have difficulty in seeing
thisshouldsharpentheirwits on an analysisof thecommon lie,
which,thoughreallymorecomplicated, is analogousin that it too
is a use ofan assertionknownto be false.
(2) This case ofthe ' lie' will also bringout how essentialit is
to an understanding of theworkingof ' fictions'that the persons
fw whomtheyworkshouldnotbe ignored. For a ' lie' does not
(normally)' work' unlessit is believedto be ' true'. The detected
lie usuallyfailsto influence thosewho have recognisedit as such,
Is notthecase ofmoraland religious'fictions' similar? Is it,e.g.,
possibleto behaveas if something existed,whileone is fullyaware
that it does not? Is it possibleto prayto a God whomone be-
lieves (at the time)to be non-existent, simplybecause one recog-
nisesthatifsucha God existedit wouldbe a good thing? What
is it but self-deception to pretendthat one can? Prof.Vaihinger
mightjust as well commendthe aestheticvalue of actingas if
fairiesexisted,or theeconomicalpropriety of curingthe distresses
ofpoverty by actingas ifone were a millionaire. Yet those who
followedhis advicewouldmanifestly qualifyforlunaticasylums.
Clearlytheworkingand theusefulness ofmoraland religiousfic-
tionsmustbe understood differently. The personswhothinkthem
'fictions'mustnotbe identicalwiththosewhofindthemsalutary,
becausetheythinkthem' true'. The enlightened philosopher(or
priest)who knows that thereis no God,no freedom, and no im-
mortality, willact ' as if' therewere by continuing to teach these
doctrines as truthswithhis tonguein his cheek,becausehe judges
them salutaryfor the preservation of social orderand his own
authority.He will say,populusvultdecipi,and it is myduty(or
at anyratemyadvantage)to deceivethem. This is a moreprosaic
explanation ofthe ' working'ofmoraland religiousfictions. It is
likewisean old, old storythatthe rulersof mankindhave always

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 H. VAIHINGER, Die Philosophiedes Als Ob. 103
believed,and oftenfound,fictions' useful' in this way. It is also
the reason why intellectualistsare so firmlyconvinced that truth
(like liberty)is not a good thing, at all events for all but the very
few. But it is notpragmatism,nor an improvementon pragmat-
ism. It is a traditionalbit of immoralityin moralists,of untruth-
fulnessin truth-seekers, which pragmatismhas come into the world
to abolish. And Prof. Vaihinger should really explain himself
furtheras to how he conceives the 'usefulness' of ' fictions'.
It is to be hoped that he will adopt the course which both reason
and morality demand; i.e. that he will drop the notion of a
' double' truth,which he cannot consistentlyhold afterabandoning
the beliefthat truthis intendedto ' copy' reality,and deny that in
ultimate analysis I there can persist a discrepancy between the
true and the useful, and a conflictbetween the good and the true.
In otherwords he ought to become a Humanist; but of course he
cannot be compelled. The alternativeis that he should become a
sceptic,as all must do who have perceivedthe discrepancybetween
actual human knowledge and the ' theoretical' ideal of intellectual-
ism, and yet refuse simply to cancel the latter, as a delusion, a
misconceptionand an irrationality. But this scepticism,in which
the rationalistic clinging to an 'absolute' truth which is visible
neitherin heaven nor on earth inevitablyends, is thoroughlyarbi-
trary,superfluousand inconsistent. It is perfectlyeasy to get out
of it by accepting the humanist conception of truth which we all
use in all our thinking. The sceptic himselfis quite incapable of
disavowing it in his life; for though he professes to despise it as
'practical,' he has to use it in order to continue to live. If he
were consistenthe would speedilyeliminatehimself,by not tbinking
one thingpractically trquerthan another.
This brings us to a curious fact which despite its goodly bulk
neitherProf. Vaihinger's work nor this inordinatelylengthyreview
(which is a tribute to its merits)has so far mentioned,viz., what
is really the most puzzling case of the workingof fictions,and the
only one which presentsany difficulty to the humanist analysis of
truth. I mean the case of beliefs which are biologicallyso indis-
pensable that they prove themselves by eliminating those who
refuseto hold themtrue. A very large number of our least con-
tested ' truths' may be suspected to be of this nature,but it comes
out best in the extremecase of the belief that life is worth living.
Clearly no one can deny this belief,and act on his denial, without
eliminatinghimselfand so indirectlyestablishingthe truthof what
he believes to be untrue. Yet if he did not act on it, both he and
otherswould be led to suspect the sincerityofhis ' merelytheoretic'
pessimism. We thus get a verypuzzling antinomy,and one which
1 Of courseit is necessaryto providefirstforall the cases ofthe use of
non-truthswhichrenderthe 'simpleconversion'of 'all truthsareuseful'
impossible. See mypaperon 'Error' in the Proceedingsof the Aristo-
telian Society, 1911.

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 104 CRITICAL NOTICES:

no doctrineofan as-ifhelpsto solve. For all thetime thatpessi-

mistswerethusbeingeliminated, and so powerfula bias was being
producedin therace as to renderit incrediblethat life should not
seem worthliving,nothingthat could be regardedas a rational
argument wouldbe urgedagainstthepessimist position. The situa-
tionshouldbe thedespairofrationalism, and (as remarked)forms
a very prettyproblemeven for humanism. Withouthowever
probingdeeperintosubtletiesof whichcurrentphilosophyhardly
yetsuspectsthe existence,we mayconcludeby emphasisingthat
Prof.Vaihinger'sbook, in spite of the pointsthat seem open to
containssuch a wealthofmaterialand ofstimulusthat
criticism,
no one shouldhenceforth presumeto discusstheproblemsoflogic
and epistemologywithouthavingreadand digestedit.
F. C. S. SCHILLER.

Bodyand Mind: a Historyand a DefenceofAnimism.By WILLIAM

McDOUGALL, M.B., formerlyFellow of St. John's College,
Cambridge; Reader in Mental Philosophy in the University
of Oxford. With thirteendiagrams. London: Methuen and
Co. Pp. xix, 384.

THIS is undoubtedlya book of great interest and importanlce. So

far as I am aware, there is no otherin which the whole problem of
the relations between body and mind is so fully and carefully
treated. The fact that it is writtenby one who has specialised both
in physiologyand in psychologygives it a unique authority; and
in many respects it may be describedas masterly. Some may no
doubt be inclined to regard its sub-titleas indicatinga defect; and
I am not altogether prepared to deny that there would be some
justificationforsuch a view. It is an advocacy-and even to some
extenta popular advocacy-of a particular theory,rather than an
unprejudicedinquiry into all possible theories; and probably the
term that is used to characterise the theory that is advocated
will be apt-not entirely without reason-to provoke a certain
amount of antagonism. To any carefulreader, however,it must be
obvious that, in spite of its strenuous and spirited advocacy of a
particulardoctrine,it is thoroughlyjudicial in its tone and singu-
larly fairand comprehensivein its treatmentof opposing theories.
In the end, even those who set out with some preconceptions
against anythingthat can properlybe described as animism will be
led to admit that the theoryhere advanced is at least a reasonable
one, and that the argumentsput forwardin its supportare weighty,
well thoughtout, and not easy to refute.
The book begins with a historical sketch, showing the way in
which animisticconceptionshave grown up, the developments of
thoughtby which they have tended to be discredited,and the con-
siderationsthat have led to theirrevival in recenttimes. For this

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