Georgetown Immigration Law Journal, 13, 1 (Fall 1998): 1-24.

TERMS OF BELONGING:
ARE MODELS OF MEMBERSHIP
SELF-FULFILLING PROPHECIES?
T. ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF AND RUBN G. RUMBAUT*

If men define situations as real, they are real in their consequences.

W. I. Thomas (1928)1

We respond not only to the objective features of a situation, but also, and at times
primarily, to the meaning this situation has for us . . . Certain kinds of definitions of the
situationwe focus on the important class of public prophecies, beliefs, and
expectationsbecome an integral part of the situation and thus affect subsequent
developments . . . It is the social or public self-fulfilling prophecy that goes far toward
explaining the dynamics of ethnic and racial conflict in the America of today.
Robert K. Merton, THE SELF-FULFILLING PROPHECY (1948)2

I. INTRODUCTION

It is traditional, at least in the United States, to see immigrant adaptation as a

straight-line process in both political and social terms: non-members of a nation-state
residing outside state borders gain entry, take up residence, and (usually) seek and
(frequently) obtain full membership in the state. As a narrative of legal status, the
acquisition of full membership is the transition from alien to citizen, from stranger to
rights-holder, from foreigner to governor. As a narrative of social belonging, the story is
one of (more or less effective) integration or assimilation over time; a transition from
out-group to in-group which is expected to be completed within a span of two or three
generations. These versions of the national narrative, to be sure, fit the historical
experience of some ethnic and racial groups more than that of others, and there are
egregious exceptions to the normative tale. Different groups frames of remembrance
and retellings of their pasttheir definitions of the situationtell much about who is
included and excluded in the national narrative, and hence about the societys terms of
belonging.
We write as a lawyer and a sociologist interested in the relationship of our
disciplines perspectives on these narratives. Of course, the legal and social stories

*
Paper prepared for the Social Science Research Councils conference on Immigrant Political
Incorporation in Europe and the United States: Public Debates and Social Science, May 15-17,
1998, Berlin, Germany.
1
W ILLIAM I. THOMAS & DOROTHY SWAINE THOMAS, THE CHILD IN A MERICA 572 (1928).
2
ROBERT K. M ERTON, THE SELF-FULFILLING PROPHECY (1948), reprinted in ON SOCIAL
STRUCTURE AND SCIENCE 183, 184-86 (Piotr Sztompka ed., 1996).

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1898486

2 GEORGETOWN IMMIGRATION LAW JOURNAL Vol 13: 1999

need not follow the same script. Non-citizens regularly carry on daily life in the United
States much as citizens, irrespective of status (even illegal status); and citizenship is not
necessarily a marker of commitment, loyalty, or socialization. But there are clearly
linkages between the political and the social realms.
We seek here to explore those linkages by examining United States models of
membership. We will argue that the political model of membership that had prevailed in
the United States in the latter half of this century may be undergoing change, and we
identify the prospects and perceptions of assimilation as one of the causes. Simply put,
we argue that the way people are invited or welcomed to become members of the
society influences their joining behavior which, in turn, influences how the society invites
others to join it. It is in this self-reflexive story of belonging and incorporation that law
and sociology meet.

II. MEMBERSHIP AND ASSIMILATION: SOME HYPOTHESES

At first glance, the relationship of models of membership and assimilation may

appear straightforward. A welcoming polity that is open to immigration permits
immigrants to obtain citizenship rather easily, and it asks that immigrants undergo little
change in the process of becoming citizens. This polity is likely to foster an immigrant
population that seeks to belong. The receptive attitude among immigrants would then
provide support for continuation of the receptive attitude of the polity. From this
perspective, an inclusionary model of membership promotes assimilation which
confirms the inclusionary model. The logic of this process would also demonstrate the
logic of its converse: an unwelcoming polity that makes entry and attainment of
citizenship difficult and asks that would-be members change dramatically to conform to
the norms of their new home is likely to produce an immigrant population less willing to
choose to conform, and such behavior may then affirm for the polity its wisdom in
viewing immigrants as persons in need of reform. Here, an exclusionary model of
membership hinders assimilation which confirms the exclusionary model.
But life is not so simple. Consider some mundane but well-known examples.
First, some inclusionary practices yield relatively weak affiliations: associations that may
be joined voluntarilythe PTA, a church, a unionmay inculcate little loyalty from
members. By making membership open to many (or all), by providing little in the way
of benefits, and by not asking much of new members, these associations may attain
relatively low levels of commitment. Second, some exclusionary practices may yield
strong affiliations: membership in an exclusive clubone that is very selective, demands
a great deal from its members, but provides substantial benefitsmay promote a strong
esprit de corps among the chosen few. Thus, hypothetically, a nation-state that allows
relatively little immigration and makes citizenship difficult, but promises significant
privileges to citizens which are not granted to non-citizens, might promote a strong

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1898486

ALEINIKOFF AND RUMBAUT TERMS OF BELONGING 3

desire to belong and a willingness of newcomers to undergo significant change.

(Perhaps the analogy to some forms of religious conversion is not too far off the mark.)
It is, in short, difficult to predict the relationship of membership models and
assimilation in the abstract. The outcomes will depend on a range of historical and
ideological variables that are likely to vary state by state. We therefore turn our
attention to the American experience to see which, if any, of several alternatives provide
an adequate description.

III. MEMBERSHIP AMERICAN STYLE

The United States conceives of itself as a nation of immigrants. But it is, in

fact, largely a nation of citizens. While the percentage of foreign-born persons in the
United States population is about 10%3 and immigration constitutes more than one-third
of annual population growth, the vast majority of persons residing in the United States
are citizens who attained citizenship at birth. The rule of jus soli (citizenship of the place
where one is born) is the fundamental United States membership principle.4
For native-born citizens, acculturation or cultural assimilation, as that term is
commonly used, is not generally an issue. Nearly all native-born Americans (and for
that matter also immigrants who came to the United States as young children) speak
English as a first language, and they are fully socialized into the dominant culture.
However, such processes are segmented and take different forms depending on the
sector of American society to which one is assimilating. More precisely, segmented
assimilation processes are adaptations that take place within specifiable opportunity
structures and through the influence of differential associations, reference groups,
experiences and attachments, especially in primary social relationships stratified by race,
religion, region, and class.5
Thus, although immigration provides only a relatively small portion of new
members, it raises most of the questions about assimilation. Indeed, by membership

3
Dianne Schmidley & Herman A. Alvarado, CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP T OF COMMERCE ,
CURRENT POPULAT ION REPORTS, THE FOREIGN BORN POPULATION IN THE UNITED STATES:
M ARCH 1997 (UPDATE).
4
Of course, this was not the rule initially applied to some native-born groups. See Elk v. Wilkins,
112 U.S. 94 (1884) (holding that a child born within Indian tribe is not a citizen at birth); Dred Scott
v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1856) (holding that native-born free blacks are not citizens). But see
United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649 (1898) (holding that children born to Chinese
immigrant in United States are citizens at birth, despite the ineligibility of their parents for
naturalization).
5
See Rubn G. Rumbaut, Assimilation and Its Discontents: Between Rhetoric and Reality, 31
INT L M IGRATION REV. 923 (1997).
4 GEORGETOWN IMMIGRATION LAW JOURNAL Vol 13: 1999

model we mean a politys understanding and treatment of members vis--vis non-

members.6
The nation of immigrants slogan must be placed alongside a history of race-
based immigration and citizenship policies.7 The first naturalization statute, enacted in
1790, permitted only white persons to naturalize.8 In the aftermath of the Civil War,
the statute was broadened to include persons of African nativity, or African descent,
but still excluded immigrants who were neither white nor black.9 In addition, the original
native inhabitants of the continentdoubly misnomered American Indianswere
presumed to be loyal to their tribes and not granted United States citizenship until
1924.10 It was not until 1952 that the United States naturalization law became fully
race-neutral.11 The first major federal immigration statutes, adopted in the 1880s and
1890s, expressly excluded Chinese laborers from entering the United States,12 and a
similar Gentlemans Agreement with Japan in 1907-08 largely barred Japanese
immigration.13 The National Origins Quota system, in place from the 1920s until
1965, effectively limited immigration from Asia and southern and eastern Europe on
explicit national origin and racial grounds.14
This race-based model of membership and citizenship lasted longer than the
race-neutral model that has replaced it. The latter is largely a product of the post-

6
To be sure, persons may be nominal citizens but not full members, either because they are
denied basic membership rights (such as voting) or suffer discrimination. Thus, a complete
description of membership models would examine differential treatment among classes of citizens.
However, since that discussion would not invoke concepts of assimilation, we leave it for another
day.
7
United States citizenship and immigration policies have also included, from the start, incidents
of gender discrimination. The first citizenship statute permitted the transmission of citizenship to
children born overseas to United States fathers but not to United States mothers. This policy was
not changed until 1934. See Wauchope v. United States Dept of State, 985 F.2d 1407 (9th Cir.
1993). And in the early decades of the twentieth century federal law provided that a United States
citizen woman who married a foreigner lost her United States citizenship for the duration of the
marriage. The statute was upheld in MacKenzie v. Hare, 239 U.S. 299 (1915). See generally
CANDICE LEWIS BREDBENNER, A NATIONALITY OF HER OWN (1998). Justice Ruth Bader
Ginsburg details at length gender discrimination in United States citizenship law in her dissenting
opinion in Miller v. Albright, 118 S.Ct. 1428, 1449 (1998) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
8
See IAN F. HANEY LPEZ, W HITE BY LAW : THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF RACE 42 (1996)
(citing Act of Mar. 26, 1790, ch. 3, 1 Stat. 103).
9
Id. at 43-44, (citing Act of July 14, 1870, ch. 255, 7, 16 Stat. 254).
10
Id. at 41 (citing Act of June 2, 1924, ch. 233, 43 Stat. 253).
11
See id. at 46 (citing Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, ch. 2, 311, 66 Stat. 239 (codified
as amended at 8 U.S.C. 1422 (1988)).
12
Id. at 37-38 (citing Chinese Exclusion Act, ch. 126, 22 Stat. 58 (1882); Act of July 9, 1884, ch.
220, 23 Stat. 115; Act of May 5, 1892, ch. 60, 27 Stat. 25; Act of April 29, 1902, ch. 641, 32 Stat. 176;
Act of April 27, 1904, ch. 1630, 33 Stat. 428).
13
See Kevin R. Johnson, Race, the Immigration Laws, and Domestic Race Relations: A Magic
Mirror into the Heart of Darkness, 73 IND. L.J. 1111, 1121 (1998).
14
See HANEY LPEZ, supra note 8, at 37-38.
ALEINIKOFF AND RUMBAUT TERMS OF BELONGING 5

World War II civil rights era.15 The current United States model, which has taken form
over the past four decades, is more inclusionary. Its basic elements include:
birthright citizenship;
relatively easy (non-race based) naturalization rules;
general parity between citizens and aliens in terms of access to social
benefits;
constitutional restrictions on state discrimination against aliens (other than in
the political sphere);
few restrictions on work opportunities for permanent resident aliens;
exit and re-entry rights for permanent resident aliens (provided they do not
stay outside the United States in excess of one year);
protection for immigrants under most federal labor, health, and safety
regulations;
recognition that immigrants possess most constitutional rights afforded to
citizens (such as the right of free speech and religion, and rights provided to
criminal defendants);
protection of immigrants under federal anti-discrimination laws prohibiting
discrimination on grounds of national origin, race and citizenship status.

A decade ago, Peter Schuck pithily summarized this inclusionary model by

noting that United States citizenship was notably easy to obtain, difficult to lose, and
confer[red] few legal or economic advantages over the status of permanent resident
alien.16 To a large degree, this model still dominates, and it has been accompanied by
strong expectations of assimilation. But there appears to have been a shift in the wind in
recent years, with storm clouds on the horizon and already a non-trivial amount of rain.

IV. MEMBERSHIP MODELS AND ASSIMILATION ANXIETY

The wind comes from the West. California is home to 40% of the
undocumented population in the United States.17 Its population is about one quarter
foreign-born, 18 and it is the destination of over 20% of all permanent resident aliens
each year.19 More aliens who legalized under the amnesty programs of the 1986

15
It is not a coincidence that the statute repealing the National Origin Quota system was
enacted in 1965, the heyday of civil rights legislation.
16
Peter H. Schuck, Membership in the Liberal Polity: The Devaluation of American Citizenship,
3 GEO. IMMIGR . L.J. 1, 1 (1989).
17
Roughly two million out of five million. See I.N.S., U.S. DEP T OF JUSTICE , 1995 STAT . Y.B. 183.
18
Rubn G. Rumbaut, Origins and Destinies: Immigration to the United States Since World War
II, 9 SOCIOLOGICAL FORUM 583, 601 (1994).
19
See I.N.S., U.S. DEP T OF JUSTICE , Immigrants Admitted by State of Intended Residence Fiscal
Years 1987-95, 1995 STAT . Y.B. 65 (Mar. 1997).
6 GEORGETOWN IMMIGRATION LAW JOURNAL Vol 13: 1999

immigration law live in California than in any other state.20 Indeed, fully one-third of the
immigrant stock population of the United States resides in California, with the
concentrations being denser still within metropolitan areas.21 Three of the six top
primary metropolitan areas (or PMSAs) in the United States, ranked based on the
size of their immigrant-stock populations, are in California. In Los Angeles County in
1997, 62% of the areas 9.5 million people were of immigrant stock, as were 54% of
Orange Countys 2.8 million residents, and 43% of San Diegos population of 2.7
million.22
In 1994, the electorate of California adopted Proposition 187, the so-called
Save Our State initiative, by a wide margin.23 The purpose of Proposition 187 was to
rid California of undocumented aliens. It declared their ineligibility for state-funded
benefit programs, sought to deny undocumented children access to public schools, and
required state medical and educational facilities to verify the immigration status of their
client populations by telling persons suspected of being unlawfully in the United States to
either seek legal status or go home.24 Directed at undocumented aliens, the benefits
provisions of the Proposition were largely consistent with the prevailing membership
modelexcept for the denial of education to school-aged children, which was directly
contrary to a 1982 decision of the Supreme Court.25 But the States attempt to
effectively adopt its own immigration enforcement strategy (based on its perception of
the federal governments failure to control the borders) was a new intervention in the

20
I.N.S., U.S. DEP T OF JUSTICE , IMMIGRATION REFORM AND CONTROL A CT : REPORT ON THE
LEGALIZED A LIEN POPULATION 18 (Mar. 1992).
21
The immigrant stock of the United States today numbers about 55 million peoplethat is,
persons who are either immigrants (26.8 million) or U.S.-born children of immigrants (27.8 million).
That figureone fifth of the national totaldoes not include 2.8 million others residing in the 50
states who were born (as were their parents) in Puerto Rico or other United States territories, nor
the even larger number who reside in Puerto Rico and the other territories. If todays immigrant
stock formed a country, it would rank in the top 10% in the world in population sizeabout twice
the size of Canada, and roughly the size of the United Kingdom, France, or Italy. See Rubn G.
Rumbaut, Transformations: The Post-Immigrant Generation in an Age of Diversity 2 (Mar. 21, 1998)
(unpublished manuscript on file with the author).
22
Id. The other three largest PMSAs in the size of their immigrant stock population are New
York, Chicago, and Miami. See id. at Table 1.
23
Paul Feldman & Patrick J. McDonnell, Prop. 187 Backers ElatedChallenges Imminent, L.A.
TIMES, Nov. 9, 1994, at A1.
24
For a description of Proposition 187s sections, see League of United Latin American Citizens v.
Wilson, 908 F. Supp. 755, 764-65 (C.D. Cal. 1995), amended by 997 F. Supp. 1244 (C.D. Cal. 1997).
25
See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
ALEINIKOFF AND RUMBAUT TERMS OF BELONGING 7

immigration debate.26 A federal court enjoined implementation of the Proposition

primarily on the ground that it interfered with federal regulation of immigration.27
Proposition 187 made clear that the long-standing toleration of (and indeed
demand for) undocumented workers in California (and elsewhere) did not apply to
family members who needed medical care, attended schools, and sought other social
benefits. That is, there was a clear financial aspect to the support for the Proposition.
But it also reflected a deeper set of concerns about immigration in general. Saving the
State meant not only preserving tax dollars for citizens and lawful residents; it also
meant preserving California in racial and cultural terms.28 It was regularly noted that
shortly after the year 2000 California would become a majority minority statethat
persons of Latino, African-American and Asian descent would comprise a majority of
the states population. 29 Immigration was recognized as a crucial component in that
demographic story. 30
Demography may not be destiny, but to many Californians, it represents drift
and disunity. A state without a white majority is perceived as a multicultural state, a
state where the project of assimilation has failed. There is no a priori reason why a
majority minority state could not be culturally united; the melting of white ethnics in
the first half of this century demonstrates the possibilities of E Pluribus Unum. But
many Californians have apparently lost faith in the melting pot, and putatively are
increasingly concerned about the prospects for assimilation of the large number of
newcomers. It is hard not to suspect race and racial privilege as the motivating factors
in white majority perceptions.
These perceptions are not limited to the West Coast. A public opinion poll
conducted in the summer of 1997 asked a representative number of Americans the
following question:

How concerned are you that the growing number and nationalities of immigrants
will . . . lead to increased conflict between racial and ethnic groups: very
concerned, somewhat concerned, not too concerned, not at all concerned?

26
States controlled entry and exit in the mid-nineteenth century until such laws were struck down
by the Supreme Court. See Gerald L. Neuman, The Lost Century of American Immigration Law
(1776-1875), 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1833 (1993).
27
See League of United Latin American Citizens v. Wilson, 908 F. Supp. 755 (C.D. Cal. 1995),
amended by 997 F. Supp. 1244 (C.D. Cal. 1997).
28
Johnson, supra note 13, at 1134-37.
29
Dorothy E. Roberts, Who May Give Birth to Citizens?, in IMMIGRANTS OUT ! 205, 209 (Juan F.
Perea ed., 1997).
30
Kevin R. Johnson, An Essay on Immigration Politics, Popular Democracy, and California's
Proposition 187: The Political Relevance and Legal Irrelevance of Race, 70 W ASH. L. REV. 629,
650-51 (1995); see Roberts, supra note 29, at 205-19.
8 GEORGETOWN IMMIGRATION LAW JOURNAL Vol 13: 1999

Nearly two-thirds of the respondents answered very concerned or somewhat

concerned. These pessimistic views were shared by Whites (65% of whom were
within these two categories), Blacks (61%) and Hispanics (59%).31 The conclusion that
seems hard to resist is that immigration is perceived as contributing to multiculturalism
and adding fuel to the fires of cultural conflict.
It should not be surprising that concerns about the viability of the assimilation
project will produce demands that immigration be reduced.32 However, the point we
wish to stress here is that such concerns appear to be influencing the underlying model
of membership as well. We see evidence of this in several recent policy initiatives.
First is the suggestion that the fundamental membership principlejus soli
citizenshipbe changed so that the children of undocumented aliens not be deemed
citizens at birth in the United States. Until recently, it had always been assumed that the
Fourteenth Amendments definition of birthright citizenship (that all persons born . . . in
the United States . . . are citizens of the United States33) applied to the children born to
aliens unlawfully in the United States. But a book written by two Yale University
professors in 1985 has opened up public debate on the matter. In Citizenship Without
Consent, Peter Schuck and Rogers Smith argued that the Fourteenth Amendment
could be read as encompassing a principle of consent that endowed Congress with
the power to decide whether or not the children of undocumented aliens born in the
United States should be citizens.34 Although the authors interpretation of the
Fourteenth Amendment and reading of constitutional history have been roundly
criticized,35 the thesis of the book has occasioned a congressional hearing on the topic
and a number of statutory proposals.36

31
Columbus Day Survey: Looking For America, Question 049, Public Opinion Online, Aug. 1997,
available in LEXIS, Market Library, RPOLL file. Also high on the concern scale was the view
that increasing immigration will overburden the welfare system and raise taxes; 79% were very
concerned or somewhat concerned (including 67% of Hispanics recorded as being very
concerned and 12% as somewhat concerned). See id. at Question 052. Less concern was
expressed over whites becoming a minority: when asked the question How concerned are you
that [increased numbers and nationalities of immigrants] will lead to whites of European descent no
longer being in the majority, only 36% were very concerned or somewhat concerned. See id. at
Question 050. This result may simply reflect the (correct) view that whites will in fact remain the
majority in the United States as a whole for many years to come.
32
See PETER BRIMELOW , A LIEN NATION (1995).
33
U.S. CONST . amend. XIV, 1.
34
See generally PETER H. SCHUCK & ROGERS M. SMITH, CITIZENSHIP W ITHOUT CONSENT
(1985).
35
See Gerald L. Neuman, Back to Dred Scott?, 24 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 485 (1987) (book review);
David A. Martin, Membership and Consent: Abstract or Organic?, 11 YALE J. INT L L. 278 (1985)
(book review).
36
See, e.g., Societal and Legal Issues Surrounding Children Born in the United States to Illegal
Alien Parents, Joint Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Immigration and Claims and Subcomm. on
ALEINIKOFF AND RUMBAUT TERMS OF BELONGING 9

Second, the 1996 welfare law constituted a major shift in long-standing

premises about social membership in the United States. Since the creation of the Great
Society welfare programs, permanent resident aliens had been included in most social
benefits programs. In 1996 Congress acted to exclude immigrants from federally
funded programs and authorized states to exclude them from state-funded programs.37
Most harshly, the statute terminated aid to elderly and disabled immigrants then on the
rollsan action subsequently reversed in part.38 The motivation was financial, but the
justificatory rhetoric was membership-based: those in support of the measure argued
that Congress had the authorityif not the dutyto offer benefits first and foremost to
full members (citizens).39
Third, the 1996 immigration legislation dramatically restructured procedures for
determining the admissibility and deportability of immigrants. Proceedings were
streamlined, judicial review of administrative action was severely limited, and relief from
removal was significantly restricted.40 Much of the congressional action was predicated
on the desire to speed the removal of aliens convicted of criminal offenses and also to
prevent dilatory practices of lawyers. But the toughness of the laws ought also to be
seen as part of a redefinition of social membership. Arguably, long-term resident aliens
function virtually as citizens in the American social and economic system. Yet the
immigration lawsparticularly as amended by the 1996 legislationtreat them, in
effect, as considerably less than full members: there is no statute of limitations on
deportability grounds, and the 1996 laws rendered various avenues of relief from
removal far more difficult to obtain.
Finally, controversy over dual nationality appears to be just over the horizon.
An increasing number of foreign states have adopted rules permitting their nationals to
retain citizenship despite naturalization elsewhereand despite the United States oath
of naturalization, requiring renunciation of all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign

the Constitution, House Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. 103 (1995) (Statement of
Prof. Gerald L. Neuman, Columbia University Law School, discussing eight bills).
37
Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-33, 5301, 111 Stat 251, 597-98. The
constitutionality of these measures will have to be resolved by the courts. The Supreme Court has
recognized broad congressional authority to treat citizens and aliens differently. See Mathews v.
Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1976). However, the Court has generally struck down state laws that deny
benefits to immigrants. See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971). Whether Congress has the
power to authorize states to discriminate against aliens remains to be seen.
38
Balanced Budget Act of 1997, 5301; Agricultural Research, Extension, and Education Reform
Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-185, 504, 506, 112 Stat. 523, 578-79.
39
See Aleinikoff, The Tightening Circle of Membership, in IMMIGRANTS OUT !, supra note 29, at
324.
40
See generally Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110
Stat. 1214; Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-
208, 110 Stat. 3009.
10 GEORGETOWN IMMIGRATION LAW JOURNAL Vol 13: 1999

prince, potentate, state or sovereignty.41 In 1997 Mexico amended its constitution to

this effect, and the changes became effective in March, 1998. These amendments have
raised in some American minds the specter of divided loyalty and dual voting by
naturalized Mexican-American citizens.42 We find it likely that the trend toward
increasing recognition of dual nationality will strengthen demands that American
citizenship be unitary and meaningfuldemands that can be seen to be met by drawing
new distinctions between citizens and aliens.
Together, these elements indicate significant pressure on the inclusionary model
of membership. The United States seems to be in the process of redefining its model of
membership as more closely linked to citizenship, and that redefinition of the situation
seems driven, to a significant degree, by assimilation anxiety, to use a phrase now in
vogue in public debates.43

V. ASSIMILATION: LANGUAGE AND IDENTITY

We have argued that assimilation fears may be causing a rethinking of

American membership models. In the section, we examine whether those fears have
any basis in fact. We conclude that they do not. A review of the social science
research literature on immigration reveals that assimilationwhether considered
intergenerationally or among the most recent waves of immigrantsappears to be
progressing roughly as it always has.44 This is particularly the case with respect to
linguistic assimilation, which is frequently seen as the most important marker of
acculturation. An analysis of the 1990 United States Census, summarized in Table 1,
makes that point abundantly clear. The data are for the 19.5 million foreign-born
persons counted in the 1990 census who were five years or older, and they show a
familiar story: without exception, English proficiency increases over time in the United

41
Immigration and Nationality Act 337(a), 8 U.S.C. 1448(a) (1994).
42
See, e.g., Mark Fritz, Pledging Multiple Allegiances: A Global Blurring of Boundaries
Challenges Notions of Nationality, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 6, 1998, at A3; Sam Howe Ve rhovek, Torn
Between Nations, Mexican-Americans Can Have Both, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 14, 1998, at A1.
43
More precisely, the phrase is meant to denote anxiety about a presumed lack of assimilation
among recent immigrants. For some, the anxiety may run the other way: that rapid assimilation is
erasing cultural practices, languages, and identities. For a critique of the gap between the rhetoric
and the realities of assimilation, see Rubn G. Rumbaut, Paradoxes (and Orthodoxies) of
Assimilation, 40 SOC. PERSP . 483 (1997).
44
For intergenerational analyses of the assimilation of European-origin immigrants and their
descendants, see, e.g., Richard D. Alba, Assimilations Quiet Tide, 119 PUB. INTEREST 3 (1995);
Lisa J. Nidert & Reynolds Farley, Assimilation in the United States: An Analysis of Ethnic and
Generation Differences in Status and Achievement, 50 A M. SOC. REV. 723, 840 (1985); Andrew M.
Greeley, The Ethnic Miracle, 45 PUB. INTEREST 20 (1976). For information on the incorporation of
contemporary immigrants, see generally A LEJANDRO PORTES & RUBN G. RUMBAUT , IMMIGRANT
A MERICA: A PORTRAIT (2d ed. 1996).
ALEINIKOFF AND RUMBAUT TERMS OF BELONGING 11

Table 1.

Percent of Immigrants Who Speak English Only or Very Well,

By Age and Decade of Immigration to the United States, 1990
(N=19.5 million foreign-born persons age 5 years or older, 1990 U.S. Census)

Age in 1990
Decade of TOTAL
5-17 years 18-34 years 35-54 years 55 and older
immigration to U.S.

1980-1990 50 39 36 25 39

1970-1979 79 62 47 31 53

1960-1969 -- 87 64 42 63

Before 1960 -- 90 85 72 75

Source: 1990 U.S. Census, 5% Public Use Microdata Sample (PUMS).

Table 2.

Assimilation of Immigrants and Their Children:

Citizenship, Homeownership, Poverty, and Education
by Generation and Decade of Immigration to the United States, 1997

Generation Social and Economic Characteristics, 1997

(1st and 2nd)
and decade of Age U.S. Own Poverty College
immigration to the (mean Citizen Home Rate Graduates
1
United States years) (%) (%) (%) (%)

First Generation
2
(foreign-born):
1990-1997 27.5 9 26 33 31

1980-1989 34.7 28 44 23 25

1970-1979 42.1 53 62 15 26

1960-1969 52.1 69 73 10 25

Before 1960 66.6 84 78 9 24

Second Generation
(U.S.-born):3 35.1 100 67 16 34

1
College graduation rate for adults 25 to 64 years old.
2
Foreign-born persons residing in the U.S. (estimated at over 26 million in 1997).
3
U.S.-born persons with at least one foreign-born parent (estimated at nearly 28 million in 1997).

Source: Current Population Surveys (CPS), merged 1996 and 1997 (March) data files, U.S.
Census Bureau.
12 GEORGETOWN IMMIGRATION LAW JOURNAL Vol 13: 1999

States, and especially rapidly among younger immigrants. Overall, a majority (53%) of
all immigrants in 1990 spoke English only or very well, ranging from 25% of recently
arrived immigrants 55 years or older (those who had come in the 1980s) to 90% of
those who had immigrated as children three decades before.

Equally compelling are the broad-brush data on immigrants and their American-
born children presented in Table 2, drawn from the merged 1996 and 1997 Current
Population Surveys of the United States Census Bureau. The data are representative of
the immigrant stock population of the United States, estimated at nearly 55 million
people in 1997including nearly 27 million foreign-born persons (the first generation)
and nearly 28 million U.S.-born persons with at least one foreign-born parent (the
second generation). Over time in the United States, the proportion of immigrants who
become naturalized United States citizens grows significantly, from a tenth of those who
had come during the 1990s (most of whom were not yet eligible to apply for
citizenship), to over a fourth of those arriving in the 1980s, over half of those coming in
the 1970s, over two-thirds of the cohort of the 1960s, and 84% of those who had
immigrated before 1960. Yet another kind of stake in the society is indicated by the
proportion of immigrants who own their homes, which actually grows faster than
citizenship over time in the United States, as the immigrants are incorporated not only
culturally (as the language data indicate) but socioeconomically.

In the remainder of this section, we explore the data on assimilation in more

detail, focusing on relevant findings regarding linguistic assimilation and ethnic
identification from the Children of Immigrants Longitudinal Study (CILS), the largest
such survey to date in the United States. The study, carried out in Southern California
(San Diego) and South Florida (Miami and Fort Lauderdale), followed a large sample
of over 5,200 youths from immigrant families representing seventy-seven different
nationalities from the junior high school grades through the end of high school in the
1990s.45 In California the main nationalities were Mexicans, Filipinos, Vietnamese,
Laotians, Cambodians, and smaller groups from Asia and Latin America; in South
Florida the main groups included Cubans, Nicaraguans, Haitians, Jamaicans and others
from the Caribbean and Latin America. The initial survey was completed in the Spring
of 1992 when the students were enrolled in the eighth and ninth grades, in order to
avoid the potential bias of differential dropout rates in the later high school years. The
sample was evenly divided by sex and nativity (half of the youths were foreign-born,
and the other half were U.S.-born with at least one foreign-born parent), with a mean
age of 14.2 years. A follow-up survey which succeeded in re-interviewing 82% of the
original sample, was completed during 1995-96, and a stratified sample of their parents

45
An earlier analysis of these issues focused only on the San Diego sample in the study. See id.
We present here results from the complete CILS data set.
ALEINIKOFF AND RUMBAUT TERMS OF BELONGING 13

was also interviewed. In addition, detailed academic information was obtained from the
schools in the respective districts.46

A. Linguistic Assimilation

A perennial controversy in public debates on immigration concerns the role of

bilingual education and perceived threats to the continuing predominance of English as
the common national language. In June 1998, California voters by a 61% to 39%
margin approved Proposition 227, a popular new initiative dubbed English for the
Children, which reflects this impulse: it aims to dismantle the states bilingual programs
and require that all public school instruction be conducted in English. CILS data on
language preference and proficiency provide some illuminating information in this regard.
Over 90% of these children of immigrants reported speaking a language other
than English at home, mostly with their parents. But at the time of the first survey in
1992 (T1) already 73% of the total sample preferred to speak English instead of their
parents native tongue. This group includes 64% of the foreign-born youth and 81% of
the U.S.-born. By the follow-up survey in 1995-96 (T2), the proportion who preferred
English had swelled to 88%, including 83% of the foreign-born and 93% of the U.S.-
born. The most mother-tongue-retentive group was the Mexican-origin youth living in a
Spanish-named city on the Mexican border with a large Spanish-speaking immigrant
population and a wide range of Spanish-language radio and television stations.
However, even for this group the force of linguistic assimilation was incontrovertible:
while at T1 only 32% of the Mexico-born children preferred English, by T2 that
preference had doubled to 61%. Additionally, while just over half of the U.S.-born
Mexican-Americans in San Diego preferred English at T1, that proportion had jumped
to four-fifths three years later. Even more decisively, among Cuban-origin youth
attending both public and private schools in Miami, 95% of both the foreign-born and
the native-born preferred English by T2.
A main reason for this rapid language shift in use and preference has to do with
increasing fluency in both spoken and written English relative to the level of fluency in
the mother tongue. Respondents were asked to evaluate their ability to speak,
understand, read and write in both English and the non-English mother tongue. The
response format (identical to the item used in the United States census) ranged from
not at all and not well to well and very well. Over three-fourths of the total
sample at both T1 and T2 reported speaking English very well, compared to only
about a third who reported an equivalent level of spoken fluency in the non-English

46
For an overview of the CILS study, see THE NEW SECOND GENERATION (Alejandro Portes ed.,
1996). See also Rubn G. Rumbaut, Coming of Age in Immigrant America, RES. PERSP . ON
M IGRATION, Jan/Feb 1998, at 1.
14 GEORGETOWN IMMIGRATION LAW JOURNAL Vol 13: 1999

language. Even among the foreign-born, 69% spoke English very well whereas only
41% spoke their native language just as well.
The differences in reading fluency are much sharper still: the percentage of
respondents who can read English very well is three times the percentage of those
who can read a non-English language very well (78% to 24%). The ability to maintain a
sound level of literacy in a language is nearly impossible to achieve in the absence of
schools that teach it, and of a community that values it and in which it can be regularly
practiced.47
As a consequence, the bilingualism of these children of immigrants becomes
increasingly uneven and unstable. The CILS data vividly underscore the rapidity with
which English triumphs and foreign languages atrophy in the United Stateseven in a
border city like San Diego with the busiest international border crossing in the world, or
in Miami, the metropolitan area with the highest percentage of foreign-born in the
country. The second generation not only comes to speak, read and write English
fluently, but prefers it overwhelmingly over their parents native tongue. It bears adding
that these results have occurred while the youths were still residing as dependents in
their parents home, where the non-English mother tongue retains primacy. Once they
leave the parental fold to lead independent lives of their own, the degree of English
language dominance and non-English language atrophy is almost certain to accelerate.
This result is all the more certain among those living outside dense immigrant enclaves.
This pattern of rapid linguistic assimilation is constant across nationalities and
socioeconomic levels and suggests that, over time, the use of and fluency in foreign
languages will inevitably decline. These results both confirm the broader results from the
1990 census depicted above, and directly rebut nativist alarms about the perpetuation
of foreign-language enclaves in immigrant communities. The findings suggest that the
linguistic outcomes for the third generationthe grandchildren of the present wave of
immigrantswill be no different than what has been the age-old pattern in American
history: the grandchildren may learn a few foreign words and phrases as a quaint
vestige of their ancestry, but they will most likely grow up speaking English only. It is
for this reason that the United States has been called a language graveyard. Seen in
this light, initiatives such as English for the Children seem superfluous. They seem
aimed less at pursuing the intended goal (teaching English) than at tightening the circle of
membership.

B. Identity and the Boomerang Effect

Membership may be as much a state of minda definition of the situationas

a set of social facts. That is, people who are formally members may not perceive

47
This is particularly true for languages with entirely different alphabets and rules of syntax and
grammar, such as many of the Asian languages brought by immigrants to California.
ALEINIKOFF AND RUMBAUT TERMS OF BELONGING 15

themselves as full members (for example, citizens who are members of oppressed
minority groups); and persons formally excluded from membership may feel and act as if
they are full members (for example, long-term permanent resident aliens with a United
States citizen spouse and United States citizen children). Moreover, the question of
belonging in the United States is complicated by this nations pluralism. One can
identify with a minority group of United States citizens that both perceives itself as
distinct from the majority and is so perceived and treated by the majority. Perceptions
of belonging, then, are influenced by a host of factors, including social realities, favorable
or unfavorable reception by full members, and racial and ethnic identifications.
If a sense of belonging is important to assimilation, then one way to seek a
measure of that factor is to ask persons about their self-identifications, as was done in
the CILS surveys. The way that these young people define themselves is significant,
revealing how and where they perceive themselves to fit in the society of which they
are its newest members. Self-identities and ethnic loyalties can often influence long-term
patterns of behavior and outlook, and may also reflect social dynamics weighed with
significant long-term political implications.
The CILS surveys included an open-ended question that sought to ascertain the
respondents ethnic self-identity. Four main types of ethnic identities became apparent:
(1) a plain American identity; (2) a hyphenated-American identity (e.g., Haitian-
American, Vietnamese-American); (3) a national-origin identity (e.g., Filipino, Cuban,
Jamaican); and (4) a pan-ethnic minority group identity (e.g., Hispanic, Latino,
Chicano, Asian, Black). In 1992, the largest proportion (41%) chose a hyphenated-
American identification; 13% identified as plain American; a fourth of the sample
identified by national origin; and 16% selected pan-ethnic minority identities. Birth in the
United States made a great deal of difference in the type of identity selected. At T1, the
foreign-born were four times more likely to identify by national origin than were the
U.S.-born. Conversely, the U.S.-born were much more likely to identify as American
or hyphenated-American than were the foreign-born. Those and related findings at T1
suggested an assimilative trend from one generation to another.48
That these ethnic self-identifications are patterned along a wide range of social
characteristics is made clearer by the profile presented in Table 3. The main types of
ethnic identities chosen in the follow-up survey in 1995 (T2) are profiled via an array of
social, economic and cultural characteristics measured three years before in 1992 (T1),
thus making clear and unambiguous the temporal ordering of the effects of variables
hypothesized as potential predictors of identity choices made much later. Virtually

48
For analysis of the determinants of ethnic self-identities based on cross-sectional data from the
baseline survey, see Rubn G. Rumbaut, The Crucible Within: Ethnic Identity, Self-Esteem, and
Segmented Assimilation Among Children of Immigrants, 28 INT L M IGRATION REV. 748 (1994).
See also Alejandro Portes and Dag MacLeod, What Shall I Call Myself?: Hispanic Identity
Formation in the Second Generation, 19 ETHNIC AND RACIAL STUD ., 523 (1996).
16 GEORGETOWN IMMIGRATION LAW JOURNAL Vol 13: 1999

Table 3.

Main Types of Ethnic Self-Identity Reported by Children of Immigrants in 1995 (T2),

and their Social Characteristics Surveyed Three Years Earlier in 1992 (T1)
(CILS Longitudinal Sample in California and Florida, N=4,288)
2
Ethnic Self-Identity in 1995
1
Characteristics in 1992 [column percentages]
Hyphenated Racial- National
American American Panethnic Origin TOTAL 3

Nativity and Citizenship:

% Less than 10 years in U.S. 4 11 24 41 25
% Born in U.S. 93 69 54 25 50
% One parent born in U.S. 42 17 12 4 12
% U.S. citizen 96 78 65 44 63

Socioeconomic Status:
Parental SES Index (quintiles) 4 3.55 3.25 2.98 2.83 3.00
% Father is college graduate 30 25 23 22 24
% Own home 72 66 53 49 56

Self-reported Race:
% Non-white 17 47 66 62 57
% White 55 17 16 6 14
% Multiracial 18 15 10 5 10

Acculturation and Language:

% Prefers American ways 76 46 40 35 41
% Parents prefer American ways 59 28 24 20 25
% Prefers English 91 80 72 64 73

% Fully English proficient 84 71 66 54 64

% Parent fully English proficient 56 38 28 22 30
% Speaks English with parents 69 49 33 33 39

Discrimination and Attitudes:

% Experienced discrimination 32 42 35 46 41
% Expected discrimination 9 17 13 19 16

% agreeing that the U.S. is the

best country to live in, at:
T1 (1992) 72 66 59 57 61
T2 (1995) 80 76 71 68 72

1
Variables measured in the baseline survey in 1992 (T1), unless otherwise indicated.
2
Ethnic self-identities as reported in the follow-up survey in 1995-96 (T2). Examples of identity types:
hyphenated-American (Cuban-American, Mexican-American), racial-panethnic (Hispanic, Asian,
Black), national origin (Haitian, Filipino). The figures reported in the table are column (not row)
percentages.
3
Totals exclude other mixed identity responses given by about 4% of the sample at both T1 and T2.
4
A composite index of fathers and mothers education, occupational status, and home ownership, with
standardized scores scaled from 1 (lowest SES quintile) to 5 (highest SES quintile).
ALEINIKOFF AND RUMBAUT TERMS OF BELONGING 17

without exception, the data in Table 3 show linear progressions, from lower to higher
degrees of assimilation, along an identity continuumfrom national-origin self-
identifications to pan-ethnic, hyphenated and unhyphenated American identities.
For example, 93% of all respondents identifying themselves as American
were born in the United States, compared to 69% of the hyphenated-Americans, 54%
of the pan-ethnic identities, and only 25% of those identifying by
national origin. Respondents who had one United States-born parent significantly
increased their odds of identificational assimilation.49 Citizenship appears to matter over
and above nativity: becoming a United States citizen by naturalization adds to the
influence of birthplace, perhaps signaling a stake in the society as a full-fledged member,
legally as well as subjectively, with an accompanying shift in ones frame of reference. It
is not so much the length of time in the United States, but rather the nature of ones
sociopolitical status that seems to be more determinative of the psychology of identity.
Similarly, as Table 3 also shows, those identifying as American had the highest
socioeconomic status, followed by those choosing the hyphenated-American, pan-
ethnic, and national-origin identities (who reported the lowest SES). Race played a
major role in these self-identifications: 55% of those identifying as American self-
reported as white, compared to only 17% of the hyphenated-Americans, 16% of the
pan-ethnics, and 6% of those identifying by national origin. The most acculturated were
also the most likely to see themselves as American, while those experiencing and
expecting discrimination the most were notably less likely to identify as American.
To a considerable extent, the strong impression given by the data in Table 3 is
of a generational movement. As one becomes increasingly distant from the original
immigration experience and its ethos, one moves toward a greater identificational
Americanization. which is accompanied by upward socio-economic mobility,
increasing acculturation and linguistic assimilation, and decreasing experiences and
expectations of discrimination. The Hyphenated-American identity, in Table 3,
appears to occupy a middle position between the immigrant and the assimilative plain
American identities. This intergenerational identity bridges two worlds, but may be as
difficult to sustain as fluent bilingualism or other additive adaptations have proven to be
in American life. In turn, the pan-ethnic identities reflect a different kind of segmented
assimilationan identification with American racial minorities in contexts in which class
and race play a more determinative role than culture and language. Still, the data overall
would lead one to expect greater change over time in a generally assimilative direction:
that is, an increase in the proportion identifying as American, with or without the hyphen,
and a decrease in the proportion identifying by national origin.

Table 4 (attached at end of document)

49
The proportion identifying as "American" who had one U.S.-born parent was ten times that of
respondents identifying by national-origin, 42% to 4%.
18 GEORGETOWN IMMIGRATION LAW JOURNAL Vol 13: 1999

But the results of the 1995 survey (conducted in the months after the passage of
Proposition 187 in California) turned conventional expectations on their head, as Table
4 demonstrates. The table presents data collected at both the T1 and T2 surveys,
showing changes over time in ethnic self-identifications, experiences, and expectations
of discrimination, and perceptions of American societyfor the CILS sample as a
whole, as well as for the major national-origin groups. At T1, a combined 54%
had identified as American or hyphenated-American, while a combined 43% had
identified by national origin or with a pan-ethnic label.50 But at T2 the proportion
identifying as American plummeted from 13% to 3%, and hyphenates dropped from
41% to 31% of the totala combined loss of twenty percentage points. Meanwhile,
those identifying pan-ethnically increased from 16% to 27%, and national origin
identifications increased from 27% to 35%a combined gain of almost twenty
percentage points. This is exactly the opposite of what would have been expected.
The San Diego and Miami stories diverge here. In Southern California, the
biggest gainer by far in terms of the self-image of these youths was the foreign nationality
identity, chosen by 32% at T1 but by 48% at T2. This shift took place among both the
foreign-born and the U.S.-born, most notably among the two largest immigrant groups
in the United States: the youth of Mexican and Filipino descent. Pan-ethnic identities
remained at 16% at T2, but that figure concealed a steep decline among Mexican-origin
youth in Hispanic and Chicano self-identities, and a sharp upswing in the proportion
of youths now identifying pan-ethnically as Asian or Asian American, especially
among the smallest groups. The rapid decline of both the plain American (cut to less
than 2% in San Diego) and hyphenated-American (dropping from 43% to 30%) self-
identities points to the growth of a reactive ethnic consciousness.
In South Florida, in contrast, the biggest gains overall were in pan-ethnic
identities such as Hispanic and Black, doubling from 17% at T1 to 38% at T2,
mainly among of the Latin Americans (except the Nicaraguans) and the Jamaicans,
while the percentage identifying by national origin remained unchanged at about one-
fifth. Plain American identity dropped sharply from 19% to less than 4% overall, and
hyphenated-American identities fell to 30%. The Haitians were an interesting exception
in Florida. Resembling the California pattern, the proportion of Haitians selecting a
denationalized pan-ethnic identity decreased, while the proportions identifying as
Haitian and Haitian-American increased notably. This response is reflective of the
fact that the T2 response was given in the aftermath of the United States invasion of
Haiti in the Fall of 1994, where, for a change, the interests of the United States
government coincided with those of the Haitian migrs. This instance again suggests
the importance of the sociopolitical context in shaping ethnic self-identities. The

50
The rest, no more than 4% in either survey, offered other mixed identity responses.
ALEINIKOFF AND RUMBAUT TERMS OF BELONGING 19

Cubans, despite being a majority in Miami, by T2 were twice as likely to identify as

Hispanic (30%) than as Cuban (15%), although nearly half (46%) identified as
Cuban-American.
Change over time, in any event, has not been toward assimilative mainstream
identities (with or without a hyphen). Some groups (the Mexicans and Filipinos in
California, the Haitians and Nicaraguans in Florida) have moved toward a more proudly
nationalistic reaffirmation of the immigrant identity. Almost all others have moved
toward pan-ethnic minority group identities, as these youths become increasingly aware
of the ethnic and racial categories in which they are persistently classified by mainstream
society. Surprisingly, this is among a sample of children of immigrants, only 13% of
whom self-reported racially as white.
In both of these variants, the results point to the rise of a reactive ethnicity51
and to a growing identification with United States minority groups. That does not
mean that these youths exhibit a lack of acculturationquite to the contrary, as
the above data on language especially shows, the process of cultural and
linguistic assimilation is probably proceeding more rapidly among these young
cohorts than with any others in American immigration history. Nor does the
finding of a return to a national-origin self-identity for some groups augur a deepening of
transnational connectionswhich, were they fully developed, might prove mutually
beneficial. On the contrary, the evidence shows a decreasing knowledge of, interest in,
and attachment to the parental homeland, history and language.52 Instead, the process
of growing ethnic awareness among the children of immigrants in the CILS sample
appears to be a function of their experiences, expectations, and perceptions of racial
and ethnic discrimination in their American presentand their response to societal
messages that tell them that they are not, and may never become, full-fledged members.
In the last survey, as the middle panel of Table 4 shows, reports of being
discriminated against increased to 62% of the sample. Virtually every group reported
more experiences of rejection or unfair treatment against themselves as they grew older,
with the highest proportions found among the children of Afro-Caribbean and Asian
immigrants, followed by Mexicans and other Latin Americans, and the lowest
proportions among the Cuban youth in Miami. Among those reporting discrimination,
their own race or nationality is overwhelmingly perceived to account for what triggers
unfair treatment from others. Such experiences tend to be associated over time with a
higher incidence of depressive symptoms, and with the development of a more

51
See PORTES & RUMBAUT , supra note 44.
52
In addition to the evidence already discussed showing a rapid erosion among these youth of
the parental language and an increase in both preference for and proficiency in English, other CILS
data (not shown) document a very high degree of ignorance of basic historical and geographical
knowledge of the parental homeland, although the level of knowledge varies by national origin,
with Cubans being most knowledgeable, and Southeast Asians least knowledgeable.
20 GEORGETOWN IMMIGRATION LAW JOURNAL Vol 13: 1999

pessimistic stance about their chances to reduce discriminatory treatment through higher
educational achievement. In both surveys the students were asked to agree or disagree
with the statement, No matter how much education I get, people will still discriminate
against me. By T2, the proportion agreeing with the statement was 35%, including
substantial majorities of black immigrants from the West Indies and Haiti. Still, it is
important to underscore the fact that despite their growing awareness of the realities of
American racism and intolerance, most of the youth in the sample (almost two-thirds)
continued to affirm a confident belief in the promise of equal opportunity through
educational achievement.
Even more telling, as shown in the bottom panel of Table 4, 60% of these
youths agreed in the T1 survey that there is no better country to live in than the United
States, and that endorsement grew to 72% three years laterdespite a growing anti-
immigrant mood in the country during that period. The groups most likely to endorse
that view were the children of political exiles from Cuba and Vietnam who found a
favorable context of reception in the United States. The groups least likely to agree
with that statement were also those who have most felt the weight of racial
discrimination: the children of immigrants from Haiti, Jamaica and the West Indies.
Milton Gordons assimilation sequence, it is well to recall, ultimately required routine
social acceptance and an absence of prejudice and discrimination in the core
society.53 It takes two to tango, after alland to assimilate.54
But what goes around comes around. To the extent that a climate of intolerance
and exclusion persists, these trends may portend potentially significant political
alignments and commitments for these children in their adult years. In California, for
instance, in boomerang fashion, real or imagined immigrant-bashing may provoke long-
term opposition to politicians and political parties so perceived by the children of those
immigrants. Similarly, in Florida, the politics of race may become the most salient factor

53
In M ILTON M. GORDON, A SSIMILATION IN A MERICAN LIFE: THE ROLE OF RACE , RELIGION,
AND NATIONAL ORIGINS (1964), perhaps the most influential statement on the subject in American
social science, Milton Gordon broke down the assimilation sequence into seven stages, of which
identificational assimilation, such as the formation of a self-image as an unhyphenated American,
constituted the end of a process that began with cultural assimilation, proceeded through
structural assimilation and intermarriage, and was accompanied by an absence of prejudice and
discrimination in the core society. Once structural assimilation occurred (i.e., extensive primary-
level interaction with members of the core group), either in tandem with or subsequent to
acculturation, the remaining types of assimilation have all taken place like a row of ten pins
bowled over in rapid succession by a well placed strike. Id. at 81.
54
Of such inclusive terms of belongingand what might be called paradoxe s of acceptanceAri
Shavit has argued that as American Jews find acceptance and success under the more inclusive
model of membership, they become an endangered species: Curiously, it is precisely Americas
virtuesits generosity, freedom and tolerancethat are now softly killing the last of the great
Diasporas. It is because of its very virtues that America is in danger of becoming the most
luxurious burial ground ever of Jewish cultural existence. Ari Shavit, Vanishing, N.Y. TIMES, June
8, 1997, 6, at 52. See also M ARTIN M ARTY, THE ONE AND THE M ANY 90 (1997).
ALEINIKOFF AND RUMBAUT TERMS OF BELONGING 21

in the adult second generation. Already among first-generation adults, the past few
years have seen an unprecedented increase in the number and proportion of immigrants
who have applied for naturalization and who have registered to votewith some
notable and unexpected consequences, as in the 1996 election of a Hispanic newcomer,
Loretta Sanchez, over former California Representative Robert Dornan in one of the
nations erstwhile most conservative congressional districts, Orange County.55 Whether
and to what extent such future outcomes may be extrapolated from present trends
remain open empirical questions.

VI. PERCEPTION, RECEPTION, AND THE ROLE OF SOCIAL SCIENCE

In the preceding sections, we have suggested links between perceptions of

assimilation and models of membership. While noting that the relationship might take a
number of forms, we have tried to show that concerns about assimilationbased, at
least in part, on race and national originmay contribute to a shift to a less inclusionary
membership model, and that this shift might well produce behavior that further
complicates the integration of newcomers into American society. We have also tried to
show that concerns about assimilation are not strongly borne out by the data. We are
left then with a public policy conundrum: namely, that the formulation of public policy,
although based on highly questionable assumptions, helps to produce the conditions that
affirm the public policies. How do we break away from this misguided self-fulfilling
prophecy?
Robert Merton, in his seminal formulation of the concept, offered this advice as
to how the tragic, often vicious, circle of self-fulfilling prophecies can be broken:

The initial definition of the situation which has set the circle in motion must be
abandoned. Only when the originating assumption is questioned and a new
definition of the situation introduced, does the consequent flow of events give
the lie to the assumption. Only then does the belief no longer father the reality .
. . These changes, and others of the same kind, do not occur automatically. The

55
See Nancy Cleeland et al., Sanchez Officially the Winner, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 23, 1996, at A1.
Orange County, located between San Diego and Los Angeles, is today the fifth largest
metropolitan area in the United States in the size of its immigrant-stock population. See RUMBAUT ,
supra note 18, at Table 1. Mr. Dornan unsuccessfully challenged the results of the 1996 election,
charging that fraudulent votes by non-citizens had given Ms. Sanchez the close victory. See H.G.
Reza & Peter M. Warren, Dornan to Seek Recount Today, L.A. TIMES (Orange County), Nov. 27,
1996, at B3. He ran against her again in 1998. This time he proclaimed that he was the only true
Latino in the race because of his anti-abortion stance. See Faye Fiore, California and the West,
L.A. TIMES, Oct. 28, 1998, at A3. He again lost to Ms. Sanchez by a decisive 56% to 39% margin.
See Esther Schrader, Rout by Dornans Ex-Followers, L.A. TIMES (Orange County), Nov. 5, 1998,
at A14.
22 GEORGETOWN IMMIGRATION LAW JOURNAL Vol 13: 1999

self-fulfilling prophecy, whereby fears are translated into reality, operates only in
the absence of deliberate institutional controls. . .56

One answer to the question of how a new definition of the situation might be
introduced is to encourage policy makers to read more social science, a body of
literature that rigorously questions the assumption of growing non-assimilation. This is,
not surprisingly, a frequent suggestion from social scientists. Unfortunately, politicians
tend to use social science the way they use historyby largely searching for data to
support views that they already hold. This is not to say that academic scholarship has
no influence over debates on immigration policy. We have already mentioned the work
of Schuck and Smith which has sparked congressional reconsideration of birthright
citizenship rules. In another notable example, a study conducted in 1987 projected a
coming labor shortage57 and was relied upon to formulate immigration legislation that
significantly increased the annual number of employment-based visas.58
More typically, though, policy makers employ the prodigious study published in
1997 by the National Research Council of the National Academy of Sciences.59 The
conclusions of the panels report were careful and nuanced; yet, the conclusions were
spun by the various participants in the immigration debate to support the participants
preconceived positions. Advocates for immigration characterized the report as
demonstrating that immigration, on balance, aided the United States economy.60
Opponents of a high level of immigration cited the report for the view that immigration
imposes significant net fiscal costs on particular localities and harms low-skilled
workers.61
Ultimately, arguments about assimilation may turn more on symbols than data.
Pro-immigration advocates invoke with pride the Statue of Liberty, its torch shining over
New York harbor; nativists invoke with dismay Mexican-flag carrying opponents of

56
M ERTON, supra note 2, at 187, 200.
57
HUDSON INSTITUTE, W ORKFORCE 2000: W ORK AND W ORKERS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST
CENTURY 77-79 (1987).
58
See Immigration and Nationality Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-646, 121, 104 Stat. 4978, 4987.
Lawyers also use social science in litigation. Perhaps the best example is Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S.
202 (1982), in which the Supreme Court invalidated a Texas statute authorizing the exclusion of
undocumented children from public schools. Important to the Courts decision was data showing
that large numbers of undocumented children would remain in the United States demonstrating that
the impact of Texas policy would be to create a caste of illiterate members of United States society.
See id. at 228-29.
59
See generally THE NEW A MERICANS: ECONOMIC, DEMOGRAPHIC, AND FISCAL EFFECTS OF
IMMIGRATION (J. Smith & B. Edmonston eds., 1997).
60
See Steve Marshall, Immigration Helps Expand the Economy, Report Says, USA TODAY, May
19, 1997, at 3A; Robert Pear, Academys Report Says Immigration Benefits the U.S., N.Y. TIMES,
May 18, 1997, at A1.
61
See George Borjas & Richard B. Freeman, Findings We Never Found, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 10, 1997,
at A29.
ALEINIKOFF AND RUMBAUT TERMS OF BELONGING 23

Proposition 187 marching in the streets of Los Angeles. The invocation of symbols
draws upon a collective memory and set of narratives that inform concepts of belonging
and identity. These narratives serve as filters and classifiers, shaping current perceptions
to fit pre-existing schema.
This, of course, is not a one-way street. Narrativesdefinitions of the
situationchange as they accommodate new stories, much as immigrants shape
America even as they are shaped by America. It is here, perhaps that we can escape
the self-fulfilling prophecy. Personal and generational narratives of immigrants can
demonstrate the complicated nature of assimilation and loyalty in ways that may
resonate with the personal histories of Americans.62 That is, we may discover in
ourselves and our histories the senses of belonging that we recognize in immigrants. In
so doing, we may understand the tensionseven conflictsthat immigrants experience
do not undermine assimilation, but may inevitably accompany it.
The use of narratives, drawing on American notions of fairness and
commitment, has already achieved some important successes. Stories of elderly
immigrants rendered ineligible for federal assistance led to the reversal of parts of the
1996 welfare law, 63 and the narrative of freedom fighters and community roots in the
United States produced the Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central American Relief Act of
1997 that granted status to long-term (status-less) residents of the United States.64 In
other words, maybe we need more anthropology and literature and less sociology and
law to influence the narratives that undergird our models of membership.

62
In their canonical formulation of assimilation in American life, R.E. Park and E.W. Burgess
wrote:
Not by the suppression of old memories, but by their incorporation in his new life
is assimilation achieved. . . . Assimilation cannot be promoted directly, but only
indirectly, that is, by supplying the conditions that make for participation. There
is no process but life itself that can effectually wipe out the immigrant's memory
of his past. The inclusion of the immigrant in our common life may perhaps best
be reached, therefore, in cooperation that looks not so much to the past as to the
future. The second generation of the immigrant may share fully in our memories,
but practically all that we can ask of the foreign-born is participation in our
ideals, our wishes, and our common enterprises.
ROBERT E. PARK & ERNEST W. BURGESS, INTRODUCTION TO THE SCIENCE OF SOCIOLOGY 739-40
(2d ed. 1924).
63
See Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-33, 5301, 111 Stat. 251, 597; 143 CONG. REC.
S8493-01, S8496 (discussing the need to reverse the part of the 1996 Welfare law that denied SSI to
elderly immigrants). See also Noncitizen Benefit Clarification and Other Technical Amendments
Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-306, 112 Stat. 2926; 144 CONG. REC. H8498-01, H8501 (discussing the
need to reverse the part of the 1996 welfare law which denied food stamps to elderly immigrants).
64
See District of Columbia Appropriations Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-100, 202, 111 Stat. 2160,
2193-94; 143 CONG. REC. S10185-06, S10197 (explaining that advocates of the Act were moved by
the plight of the freedom fighters).
24 GEORGETOWN IMMIGRATION LAW JOURNAL Vol 13: 1999

On the political level, the answer seems clearer. Anti-immigrant policies are not
integrative policies. They do not further the inclusive project of assimilation, even if they
provide quasi-coercive incentives to naturalization.65 A nation concerned about and
committed to the successful integration of a large and growing resident immigrant
population ought to adopt policies that help orient and acculturate immigrants, provide
skills and access, and foster tolerance and non-discrimination. The state should model
the behavior, such as attachment, commitment and loyalty, that it seeks from its newest
members. Models of membership are not free-standing. Like other self-fulfilling
prophecies, those models seem to be influenced by the very phenomenon they purport
to be classifying. Preservation of the inclusionary model is important, then, not just on
principled grounds, but because the model produces the designed outcome and thereby
promotes the national interest. If a moral to this sociolegal story of reception and
belonging exists, it echoes an ancient admonition: that states, too, reap what they sow.

65
One of the unintended consequences of the passage of Proposition 187 in California and
legislation subsequently passed by Congress to bar medical and social services from legal
permanent residents (and bills proposed that would deny citizenship to the U.S.-born children of
illegal immigrants) was a rush by non-citizen immigrants to apply for naturalization in California,
New York, South Florida, and elsewhere, overwhelming the ability of the INS to process them. See
Mirta Ojito, A Record Backlog to Get Citizenship Stymies 2 Million: The Wait for Naturalization,
6 Months in 1996, is Now Three Times That Long, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 20, 1998, at A1.
 ALEINIKOFF AND RUMBAUT TERMS OF BELONGING 25

Table 4.
Ethnic Self-Identity, Discrimination, and Perceptions of American Society Among Children of Immigrants
in Southern California and South Florida (CILS Sample), in 1992 (T1) and 1995 (T2)

Characteristics by National Origin Other Latin Jamaica, Laos, Other

and Time of Survey Time Mexico Cuba America Haiti W. Indies Filipino Vietnam Cambodia Asia Total

Ethnic Self-Identity:
% American T1 2.3 22.1 15.9 13.3 17.9 3.3 3.9 2.1 13.8 11.3
T2 1.2 5.5 3.0 0.0 3.0 1.7 0.3 0.4 5.0 2.7

% Hyphenated-American T1 30.9 53.7 20.2 38.5 27.4 59.5 47.7 33.9 46.3 41.1
T2 28.8 46.3 13.0 43.7 8.4 36.7 31.3 21.6 22.5 30.2

% National origin T1 17.7 14.9 26.7 31.1 42.3 30.1 41.6 54.8 30.6 27.3
T2 41.3 15.0 26.4 37.8 34.9 55.1 51.9 57.6 18.8 35.3

% Racial/panethnic T1 46.7 8.4 34.2 11.9 6.5 2.2 0.3 1.8 1.3 16.6
T2 25.1 29.6 52.7 4.4 38.6 1.9 15.2 19.4 42.5 27.0

% Mixed ethnicity, other T1 2.3 0.9 3.0 5.2 6.0 4.8 6.5 7.4 8.1 3.7
T2 3.7 3.6 4.9 14.1 15.1 4.6 1.3 1.1 11.3 4.8
Discrimination:

% Experienced discrimination T1 62.5 35.3 48.0 62.7 69.5 63.9 66.3 65.0 59.7 54.3
T2 65.6 50.1 54.4 73.1 74.7 69.0 72.6 73.3 63.1 62.0

% Expects discrimination T1 34.5 19.1 24.3 48.9 58.5 38.1 35.3 42.6 30.2 31.6
T2 38.4 21.8 26.4 63.8 55.6 44.2 38.4 43.1 34.4 35.0
Perceptions of U.S.:

% U.S. is best country to live in T1 55.3 71.7 51.4 36.3 32.8 63.3 67.0 68.2 68.8 60.2
T2 64.5 80.7 69.2 53.7 49.7 75.7 79.4 68.6 66.9 71.5

% Prefers American ways T1 27.2 47.0 37.2 40.7 37.3 53.0 39.8 32.5 56.9 41.5
T2 24.9 40.5 34.7 46.7 40.3 53.9 38.4 39.2 49.4 39.7
Source: Children of Immigrants Longitudinal Study (CILS).