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PATRICK GOGGINS,
Plaintiff,
vs.
DONALD J. TRUMP, as
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES.,
Defendant.
___________________________________/
Defendant, Donald J. Trump, President of the United States, by and through the
undersigned Assistant United States Attorney and pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6), Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, moves to dismiss the Amended Complaint for Declaratory Relief filed
INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff filed this lawsuit in the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit Court in and for Broward
County, Florida. Defendant removed the action to this Court on July 26, 2017. In his Amended
Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that, while serving as President of the United States, Defendant Donald
J. Trump maintains a significant present ownership interest in the Trump Organization, a series
Florida Statues, Plaintiff brought this action seeking a declaration as to whether any monies paid
to the Trump Organization during President Trumps term in office violate Article 2, Section 1,
Case 0:17-cv-61490-RLR Document 10 Entered on FLSD Docket 09/26/2017 Page 2 of 8
Clause 7 of the United States Constitution, i.e., the Domestic Emoluments Clause. See Am. Compl.
at p. 3. The Domestic Emoluments Clause provides that the President shall . . . receive for his
Services, a Compensation . . . and he shall not receive . . . any other Emolument from the United
As explained below, the Court lacks jurisdiction over this action because Plaintiff fails to
allege any injury and, therefore, lacks Article III standing to bring suit. Similarly, by failing to
allege any actual controversy between himself and the President, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim
upon which relief may be granted. Finally, the relief Plaintiff seeks is unconstitutional. The
Supreme Court has long held that courts have no power to grant injunctive or declaratory relief
ARGUMENT
Plaintiff alleges no injury whatsoever and therefore lacks standing to bring suit. Article III
of the U.S. Constitution provides that the judicial power of federal courts extends only to actual
cases or controversies. Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S.Ct.1540, 1547 (2016) (quoting Raines v.
Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 818, 117 S.Ct. 2312, 138 L.Ed.2d 849 (1997). Standing to sue is a doctrine
constitutional minimum of standing consists of three elements. Id. (quoting Lujan v. Defenders
of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 559560, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992). The plaintiff must
have (1) suffered an injury in fact, (2) that is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct of the
defendant, and (3) that is likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision. Id. (citing Lujan
at 560561, 112 S.Ct. 2130; and Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services
Case 0:17-cv-61490-RLR Document 10 Entered on FLSD Docket 09/26/2017 Page 3 of 8
(TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 180181, 120 S.Ct. 693, 145 L.Ed.2d 610 (2000)). A plaintiff bears the
burden of establishing these elements. Id. (citing FW/PBS, Inc. v. Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 231, 110
S.Ct. 596, 107 L.Ed.2d 603 (1990). At the pleading stage, the plaintiff must clearly ... allege facts
demonstrating each element. Id. (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 518, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 45
To establish injury in fact, a plaintiff must show that he or she has suffered an invasion
of a legally protected interest that is concrete and particularized and actual or imminent, not
conjectural or hypothetical. Id. at 1548 (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560). Specifically, the injury
must affect the plaintiff in a personal and individual way and must be real not abstract. Id.
This is to ensure that the legal questions presented to the court will be resolved, not in the rarified
appreciation of the consequences of judicial action. Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United
for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982). In this case, Plaintiff does not
allege any injury whatsoever, let alone an injury that is concrete and particularized and actual
or imminent.
Although the Federal Rules pleading standard does not require detailed factual allegations,
there still must be some concrete allegations as to the nature of the harm. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 678 (2009); Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557 (2007). The Amended
Complaint is devoid of any such allegations. Instead, it raises only a question: whether the
President has violated the Domestic Emoluments Clause. Am. Compl. 5. As such, Plaintiff
has failed to establish the injury-in-fact requirement for Article III standing
Plaintiff has also failed to satisfy the second and third requirements for Article III standing,
i.e., traceability and redressability. As discussed above, Plaintiff does not allege an injury at all;
Case 0:17-cv-61490-RLR Document 10 Entered on FLSD Docket 09/26/2017 Page 4 of 8
in fact, he does not even allege that the President has violated the Domestic Emoluments Clause.
As such, there can be no reasonable inference that he has met the redressability and traceability
prongs of the standing requirements. Thus, Plaintiffs Amended Complaint is merely seeking an
advisory opinion prohibited under Article III. Church v. City of Huntsville, 30 F.3d 1332, 1335
(11th Cir.1994) (Absent a redressable injury, a judicial determination of plaintiff's claim would
amount to an advisory opinion prohibited by Article III's case and controversy requirement.).
II. Plaintiff Fails to State a Claim Under the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act
Plaintiffs sole cause of action is for a declaratory judgment under Floridas Declaratory
Judgment Act, Fla. Stat. 86.011. Florida's Declaratory Judgment Act . . . is a procedural
mechanism that confers subject matter jurisdiction on Florida's circuit and county courts; it does
not confer any substantive rights. Coccaro v. Geico General Ins. Co., 648 Fed. Appx. 876, 880
(11th Cir. 2016) (citations omitted). Consequently, federal courts construe removed claims under
the Florida Declaratory Judgment Act as though they were brought under the federal Declaratory
Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. 2201. See id. at 882. See, e.g., Incredible Investments, LLC v.
Fernandez-Rundle, 984 F.Supp.2d 1318 (S.D. Fla. 2013). Just as Plaintiff failed to establish
standing by failing to allege an injury, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim under the federal
1
Lest there be any doubt, Plaintiffs assertion that he is entitled to relief in this court because he
is a member of The Florida Bar, a resident of Broward County, Florida, [] a citizen of the United
States of America (Am. Compl. at p.2) does not establish his standing to sue. Plaintiff provides
no indication that his status as a member of the Bar or a resident of Broward County is affected in
any way by the issues in this action, and it has long been held that ones status as a taxpayer is
generally not enough to establish standing to challenge an action taken by the Federal
Government. Hein v. Freedom From Religion Foundation, 551 U.S. 587, 593 (2007).
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Declaratory Judgment Act by failing to allege any actual controversy between himself and the
President.
The federal Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. 2201, provides that [i]n a case of
actual controversy within its jurisdiction ... any court of the United States, upon the filing of an
appropriate pleading, may declare the rights and other legal relations of any interested party
seeking such declaration, whether or not further relief is or could be sought. 28 U.S.C. 2201.
The federal Declaratory Judgment Act thus echoes the case or controversy requirement of
Article III of the Constitution (discussed in I, above), and provides that a declaratory judgment
may only be issued in the case of an actual controversy. Emory v. Peeler, 756 F.2d 1547, 1551
52 (11th Cir.1985). A plaintiff seeking declaratory relief must allege facts from which it appears
there is a substantial likelihood that he will suffer injury in the future. Malowney v. Fed.
Collection Deposit Grp., 193 F.3d 1342, 1346 (11th Cir.1999) (citing City of Los Angeles v. Lyons,
461 U.S. 95, 102, 103 S.Ct. 1660, 1665, 75 L.Ed.2d 675 (1983)). More importantly, the Supreme
Court has long considered the operation of the Declaratory Judgment Act to be only
Ventures, LLC, 134 S. Ct. 843, 849, 187 L. Ed. 2d 703 (2014) (citations omitted). The
Declaratory Judgment Act does not allow federal courts to give advisory rulings . . . before a cause
of action has even accrued. MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 142 (2007).
2
Accordingly, the plaintiff cannot invoke the Declaratory Judgment Act here.
2
The outcome would be the same under Floridas Declaratory Judgment Act. To properly
invoke jurisdiction under that statute, the party seeking a declaration must show that he is in doubt
as to the existence or nonexistence of some right, status, immunity, power, or privilege and that he
is entitled to have such doubt removed. X Corp. v. Y Person, 622 So.2d 1098, 1100 Fla. 2d DCA
1993) (citing Flagship Real Estate Corp. v. Flagship Banks, Inc., 374 So.2d 1020 (Fla. 2d
DCA1979)) (emphasis added). In this regard, the plaintiff must show a bona fide, actual,
present, and practical need for the declaration. Id. (citing Platt v. General Dev. Corp., 122 So.2d
Case 0:17-cv-61490-RLR Document 10 Entered on FLSD Docket 09/26/2017 Page 6 of 8
Mississippi v. Johnson, the Supreme Court held it had no jurisdiction of a bill to enjoin the
President in the performance of his official duties. 71 U.S.475, 50001 (1866) (The Congress is
the legislative department of the government; the President is the executive department. Neither
can be restrained in its action by the judicial department.). 3 A plurality of the Court later
reiterated that principle in Franklin v. Massachusetts. See 505 U.S. at 80203 (In general, this
court has no jurisdiction of a bill to enjoin the President in the performance of his official duties.)
(quoting Mississippi, 71 U.S. at 501). Concurring in Franklin, Justice Scalia explained that, under
Mississippi, courts may impose neither injunctive nor declaratory relief against the President in his
official capacity. Id. at 82728 (noting that such principle is a functionally mandated incident of
the Presidents unique office, rooted in the constitutional tradition of the separation of powers and
50 (Fla. 2d DCA1960), cert. dismissed, 129 So.2d 143 (Fla.1961)). Plaintiff here has identified no
need whatsoever for the declaration he seeks regarding the lawfulness of the Presidents conduct
under the Domestic Emoluments Clause of the United States Constitution. Plaintiff has not
indicated any doubt he has as to the existence or non existence of any legal rights, status,
immunities, powers or privileges which would be affected in any way by the relief he seeks. Far
from demonstrating why he is entitled to the declaration he seeks, Plaintiffs Amended Complaint
merely states that he is a member of The Florida Bar, a resident of Broward County, Florida, [] a
citizen of the United States of America, and as such is entitled to relief in her Courts. Am. Compl.
at p.2. Such a conclusory statement clearly fails to satisfy the requirement of a bona fide, actual,
present, and practical need for the declaration. See id. The Supreme Court of Florida has
indicated that Floridas Declaratory Judgment Act should not be permitted to foster . . . useless
litigation to answer abstract questions, to satisfy idle curiosity, go on a fishing expedition or to
give judgments that serve no useful purpose. Ready v. Safeway Rock Co., 24 So.2d 808, 809 (Fla.
1946). Plaintiffs claim in this action would do just that.
3
The Supreme Court has left open the question whether the President might be subject to an
injunction requiring the performance of a purely ministerial duty. See Mississippi, 71 U.S. at
50001. However, the relief sought in this case cannot fairly be described as purely ministerial.
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supported by our history). Justice Scalia reasoned that just as the President is absolutely immune
from official capacity damages suits, so is he immune from suits for declaratory judgments against
him in his official capacity. Id. at 827 ([m]any of the reasons [the Court] gave in Nixon v.
Fitzgerald, [457 U.S. 731, 749 (1982)], for acknowledging an absolute Presidential immunity from
civil damages for official acts apply with equal, if not greater, force to requests for declaratory or
injunctive relief in official-capacity suits that challenge the Presidents performance of executive
functions). The lower courts have often applied this settled principle. See, e.g., Swan v. Clinton,
100 F.3d 973, 976 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (similar considerations regarding a courts power to issue
[injunctive] relief against the President himself apply to [the] request for a declaratory judgment);
Newdow v. Roberts, 603 F.3d 1002, 1013 (D.C. Cir. 2010) ([w]ith regard to the President, courts
do not have jurisdiction to enjoin him); Intl Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 857 F.3d 557,
605 (4th Cir. 2017) (we find that the district court erred in issuing an injunction against the
President himself), cert. granted, 137 S. Ct. 2080, 2089 (2017). Accordingly, this Court should
dismiss the Amended Complaint for the additional reason that it seeks a remedy the Court is
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant respectfully requests that the Court dismiss this case
BENJAMIN G. GREENBERG
ACTING UNITED STATES ATTORNEY
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on September 26, 2017, I electronically filed the foregoing
document with the Clerk of the Court using CM/ECF. I also certify that the foregoing document
s/Carlos Raurell
CARLOS RAURELL
Assistant United States Attorney