PEOPLE Vs.

UNLAGADA

FACTS:

On 27 January 1989 at around 9:00 o'clock in the evening Danilo Laurel left his house together with Edwin Selda, a visitor from Bacolod City, to
attend a public dance at Rizal St., Mag-asawang Taytay, Hinigaran, Negros Occidental. Two (2) hours later, or around 11:00 o'clock that evening,
Danilo asked Edwin to take a short break from dancing to attend to their personal necessities outside the dance hall. Once outside, they decided to
have a drink and bought two (2) bottles of Gold Eagle beer at a nearby store.

Not long after, Danilo, halfway on his first bottle, left to look for a place to relieve himself. According to Edwin, he was only about three (3) meters
from Danilo who was relieving himself when a short, dark bearded man walked past him, approached Danilo and stabbed him at the side. Danilo
retaliated by striking his assailant with a half-filled bottle of beer. Almost simultaneously, a group of men numbering about seven (7), ganged up on
Danilo and hit him with assorted weapons, i.e., bamboo poles, stones and pieces of wood. Edwin, who was petrified, could only watch helplessly as
Danilo was being mauled and overpowered by his assailants. Danilo fell to the ground and died before he could be given any medical assistance.

Edwin Selda testified that on 29 January 1989 the police invited him to the Municipal Building of Hinigaran to give his statement regarding the
killing incident and, if necessary, to confirm the identity of the suspect who was then in their custody. Thereat, he executed an affidavit and
affirmed before the police authorities that the man under detention, whom he later identified as accused Anecito Unlagada, was the same man
who stabbed his friend Danilo.

Respondent however contended that at around 10:00 o'clock in evening of 27 January 1989 while he was inside the dance hall, an altercation
ensued near the gate between the gatekeeper and a group of four (4) individuals who, despite their disruptive behavior, were eventually allowed
to get through the gate. At around 11:00 o'clock, a gunshot suddenly rang out. From the people around he learned that a rumble had taken place
and that somebody was killed. But he came to learn the victim's identity only the following morning when he and a certain Lorenzo Patos were
brought by a police officer to the Municipal Building for questioning. At the Municipal Building, he heard somebody asking who "Lapad" was and an
alleged eyewitness, who later turned out to be Edwin Selda, pointed to him as the man referred to by that name. Anecito Unlagada and Lorenzo
Patos were put in jail and a complaint was filed against them before the Municipal Trial Court of Hinigaran. Meanwhile the case against Lorenzo
was dismissed leaving Aniceto alone to face the charge of murder.

The trial court dismissed as incredible the alibi of the accused and the testimonies of the defense witnesses negating Anecito's culpability.

Accused Anecito Unlagada now assails his conviction on the ground that it was error for the trial court to give full faith and credence to the lone
and uncorroborated testimony of witness Edwin Selda, and in finding that the crime of murder was committed instead of "death caused in a
tumultuous affray" under Art. 251 of The Revised Penal Code.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the crime committed was death caused in a tumultuous affray" under Art. 251 of The Revised Penal Code.

DECISION:

WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATION: Accused-appellant ANECITO UNLAGADA y SUANQUE
a.k.a. "Lapad" is ordered to pay the heirs of the deceased Danilo Laurel P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, plus moral damages in the reduced
amount of P50,000.00. Costs against accused-appellant.

RATIO:

Art. 251. Death caused in a tumultuous affray. - When, while several persons, not composing groups organized for the common purpose of
assaulting and attacking each other reciprocally, quarrel and assault each other in a confused and tumultuous manner, and in the course of the
affray someone is killed, and it cannot be ascertained who actually killed the deceased, but the person or persons who inflicted serious physical
injuries can be identified, such person or persons shall be punished by prision mayor.

A tumultuous affray takes place when a quarrel occurs between several persons who engage in a confused and tumultuous manner, in the course
of which a person is killed or wounded and the author thereof cannot be ascertained.5 The quarrel in the instant case is between a distinct group
of individuals, one of whom was sufficiently identified as the principal author of the killing, as against a common, particular victim. It is not, as the
defense suggests, a "tumultuous affray" within the meaning of Art. 251 of The Revised Penal Code, that is, a melee or free-for-all, where several
persons not comprising definite or identifiable groups attack one another in a confused and disorganized manner, resulting in the death or injury of
one or some of them.
Verily, the attack was qualified by treachery. The deceased was relieving himself, fully unaware of any danger to his person when suddenly the
accused walked past witness Edwin Selda, approached the victim and stabbed him at the side. There was hardly any risk at all to accused-appellant;
the attack was completely without warning, the victim was caught by surprise, and given no chance to put up any defense.

Hence rime committed was murder.

Tanega vs Masakayan

Art. 158

FACTS:

Guiding Provision: Arresto menor and a fine of P100.00 constitute a light penalty. By Article 92 of the Revised Penal Code, light penalties "imposed
by final sentence" prescribe in one year. The period of prescription of penalties so the succeeding Article 93 provides "shall commence to run
from the date when the culprit should evade the service of his sentence".

Petitioner was convicted of slander by the City Court of Quezon City and appealed to the CFI but was found guilty and she was sentenced to 20
days of arresto menor, to indemnify the offended party, Pilar B. Julio, in the sum of P100.00, with the corresponding subsidiary imprisonment, and
to pay the costs. The Court of Appeals affirmed.

On January 11, 1965, the petitioner was directed that execution of the sentence be set for January 27, 1965. On petitioner's motion, execution was
deferred to February 12, 1965, at 8:30 a.m. At the appointed day and hour, petitioner failed to show up. This prompted the respondent judge, on
February 15, 1965, to issue a warrant for her arrest, and on March 23, 1965 an alias warrant of arrest. Petitioner was never arrested.

Then, on December 10, 1966, petitioner, by counsel, moved to quash the warrants of arrest of February 15, 1965 and March 23, 1965. Petitioner's
assertion is that Penalty has prescribed. On December 19, 1966, the respondent judge ruled that "the penalty imposed upon the accused has to be
served", rejected the plea of prescription of penalty and, instead, directed the issuance of another alias warrant of arrest. Hence, the present
petition.

Issue: Whether or not the petitioner is guilty of Evasion of Service of Sentence

Held: The case was dismissed. Article 157 of the Revised Penal Code furnishes the ready answer. Says Article 157:

ART. 157. Evasion of service of sentence. The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods shall be imposed upon any
convict who shall evade service of his sentence by escaping during the term of his imprisonment 6 by reason of final judgment. However, if such
evasion or escape shall have taken place by means of unlawful entry, by breaking doors, windows, gates, walls, roofs or floors, or by using
picklocks, false keys, disguise, deceit, violence or intimidation, or through connivance with other convicts or employees of the penal institution, the
penalty shall be prision correccional in its maximum period.

Elements of evasion of service of sentence are: (1) the offender is a convict by final judgment; (2) he "is serving his sentence which consists in
deprivation of liberty"; and (3) he evades service of sentence by escaping during the term of his sentence. This must be so. For, by the express
terms of the statute, a convict evades "service of his sentence", by "escaping during the term of his imprisonment by reason of final judgment."
That escape should take place while serving sentence, is emphasized by the provisions of the second sentence of Article 157 which provides for a
higher penalty if such "evasion or escape shall have taken by means of unlawful entry, by breaking doors, windows, gates, walls, roofs, or floors or
by using picklocks, false keys, disguise, deceit, violence or intimidation, or through connivance with other convicts or employees of the penal
institution, ... " Indeed, evasion of sentence is but another expression of the term "jail breaking".

Ruling: The Court ruled that for prescription of penalty of imprisonment imposed by final sentence to commence to run, the culprit should escape
during the term of such imprisonment. Adverting to the facts, the case of a convict who was sentenced to imprisonment by final judgment was
thereafter never placed in confinement. Prescription of penalty, then, does not run in her favor.

US vs Casipong and Hongoy

Topic: Art. 155- Alarms and Scandals

Facts: On March 5, 1909, Juan Casipong contracted civil marriage with Teodora Juanico before the justice of the peace of the pueblo of Dumanjug,
witnesses thereto being Telesforo Quirante and Macario Pasculado, as shown in the certificate issued by the acting municipal secretary of that
municipality. Two weeks after the ceremony Casipong left his wife and moved to the barrio of Bolocboc to live with Gregoria Hongoy. For the
purpose of assuring that her husband was really living with another woman, Teodora, the offended wife went to said barrio, where she actually
saw her husband, Casipong, maintaining marital relations with the aforesaid Gregoria Hongoy, and although she did not see them in carnal
intercourse, still she saw the two lying side by side and or several occasions going together to different places in that barrio, and that there was no
one besides them in the house where they lived.

Accordingly, the provincial fiscal on August 24, 1910, filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Cebu, charging Juan Casipong and Gregoria
Hongoy with the crime of concubinage, wherein the judge rendered decision the same day, sentencing the defendant Casipong to one year eight
months and twenty-one days of prision correccional, and the defendant Gregoria Hongoy to two years of banishment, prohibiting her during the
period of the sentence from going within a radius of 25 kilometers of the place where the crime was committed, the barrio of Bituon, pueblo of
Dumanjug; with half the costs against each party. From this judgment the defendants appealed, but later Casipong withdrew his appeal.

Issue: Whether or not Casipong and Hongoy publicly exhibited a scandalous act.

Held: From the text of this article it appears that it is an indispensable condition for convicting the husband of concubinage outside of his home
that his conduct produce scandal and set a bad example among his neighbors, and, according to a principle laid down by the supreme court of
Spain, publicity of an immoral act produces scandal, for by the bad example set it gives offense and wounds the virtuous sentiments of others.

The crime in this case is provided for and penalized by article 437 of the Penal Code, (old) as follows: The husband who shall keep a concubine in his
home, or out of it with scandal, shall be punished with the penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and medium degrees. The concubine shall
be punished with banishment. The unlawful union of a married man with a woman not his wife, when the two live within a town and in the same
house as lawful husband and wife, go together through the streets of the town, frequent places where large crowds gather, and commit acts in
plain sight of the community without caution and with effrontery, is a procedure that gives rises to criticism and general protest among the
neighbors and by its bad example offends the conscience and feelings of every moral person; and when these conditions attend the conduct of a
married persons it is indubitable that his concubinage with another woman, even though she does not live in his home, carries with it the
circumstance of scandal required by the law to make his action criminal.

It is to be noted in considering such complex actions that in order to regard them as criminal it is necessary and indispensable that they be
performed by a married man and a woman, or by both, the man being the active and the woman the passive agent, each with separate
responsibility. Therefore, notwithstanding the man's withdrawal of his appeal and the fact that the appeal taken by Gregoria Hongoy will alone be
the subject of the decision, yet the arguments bearing upon the perpetration of the crime and proof of it will necessarily affect the man who is the
alleged active agent thereof.

On this hypothesis and as a result of the hearing in this case, it is impossible to affirm that Juan Casipong, husband of Teodora Juanico, has been
living in concubinage with public scandal with another woman, Gregoria Hongoy, because of lack of conclusive proof demonstrating the reality of
the crime with the conditions the law requires for punishing the perpetrator thereof and his concubine.

Nothing would be easier than to adduce proofs of the criminal act, if said Casipong really forsook his wife and unlawfully entered into relations with
Gregoria Hongoy, for if they have lived publicly in concubinage and in sight of everybody, various witnesses, residents not only of the place of
residence of the offended wife and her husband but also of the barrio of Bolocboc, to which the unfaithful husband removed in order to live with
his paramour, could have testified. The statement of the offended wife and of the witness Hilaria Lumban, who only once saw them together, is not
sufficient to prove the aggregate of acts performed by the two accused, with the scandal produced by the bad example set in their neighborhood.

Ruling: For these reasons and from lack of proof of the facts alleged in this case, it is our opinion that the judgment appealed from should reversed
and Gregoria Hongoy, acquitted, as we hereby do, with half of the cots in each instance de oficio. As the defendant Juan Casipong, through
withdrawal of his appeal, is now serving sentence for a crime which is held in this decision to be not proven,

Case 7

Artigas Losada v. Acenas

An appeal from an order, dated July 20, 1946, justice of the peace of Puerto Princesa, Palawan, in the absence of the judge of first instance (Act
131), directed the release on habeas corpus, of Manuel Artigas Losada, Getulio Geocada, Santiago Aguda, Francisco Danao, inmates of the Davao
Penal Colony Inagawan, Palawan.

The first is undergoing a maximum sentence of 15 years, 2 months and 2 days for estafa, and estafa through falsification. Such term is due to
expire, with good conduct allowance, on July 16, 1947.

The second, Getulio Geocada, doing time for illegal possession of counterfeit money is due for release April 25, 1974.

The third, Santiago Aguda, serving a sentence of 12 years and 1 day for homicide, would be entitled to his liberty about January 7, 1948, should he
observe good conduct in the meantime.
The last, Francisco Danao, jailed for abduction with rape, will complete the service of his sentence, with good conduct allowance, about June 19,
1948.

As above stated, the court decreed in July, 1946, that these four penal colonists should forthwith be freed from restraint. Reason for the decree
was their allegation, and the courts opinion, that they had earned a special time allowance in the form of a deduction of one-fifth of their
respective sentences under articles 98 and 158 of the Revised Penal Code

Courts opinion: those prisoners who, having all the chances to escape and did not escape but remained in their prison cell during the disorder
caused by war have shown more convincingly their loyalty than those who escaped under the circumstances specifically enumerated in article 158
and give themselves up within 48 hours. After the executive proclamation for the latter, that is, the prisoner who escaped might have been
persuded to give themselves up merely because they could see but a slim chance to avoid capture inasmuch as the government then was
functioning with all its normal efficiency. And if those who arc loyal merely in times of conflagration, earthquake, explosion and other similar
catastrophe are considered loyal and are for that reason given in their favor on fifth reduction of their sentence, with more reason that those who
stayed in their places of confinement during the war.

Issue:

WON to grant them for release basing it on habeas corpus

Held:

The appealed decision is reversed and the petition for habeas corpus denied. No costs. So ordered.

There are considerations that more properly belong to the legislative department, should an amendment to the law be proposed. They are likewise
equitable pleas, which the executive department could properly entertain in connection with petitions for parole or pardon of the prisoners. but
they may not authorize the courts to read into the statute additional conditions or situations. The special allowance for loyalty authorized by
articles 98 and the Revised Penal Code refers to those convicts who, having evaded the service of their sentences by leaving the penal institution,
give themselves up within two days.

As these petitioners are not in that class, because they have not escaped, they have no claim to that allowance.

For one thing there is no showing that they ever had the opportunity to escape, or that having such opportunity they have the mettle to take
advantage of it or to brave the perils in connection with a jailbreak. And there is no assurance that had they successfully run away and regained
their precious liberty they would have, nevertheless voluntarily exchanged it later with the privations of prison life impelled by that sense of right
and loyalty to the Government, which is sought to be rewarded will the special allowance. Wherefore, it is not plain that their case comes within
the spirit of the law they have involved. must be observed in this connection that the only circumstance favorable to petitioners is the admission of
the respondent that they "remained in the penal colony and did not try to escape during the war."

Case # 6

G.R. No. L-27191

February 28, 1967

TANEGA vs. MASAKAYAN

FACTS :

Petitioner was convicted of slander by the City Court of Quezon City. He appealed once again but was found guilty again by the Court of First
Instance. She was sentenced to 20 days of arresto menor, to indemnify the offended party, Pilar B. Julio, in the sum of P100.00, with the
corresponding subsidiary imprisonment, and to pay the costs which the Court of Appeals affirmed.

On January 11, 1965, the Court of First Instance of Quezon City, directed that execution of the sentence be set for January 27, 1965. On petitioner's
motion, execution was deferred to February 12, 1965. However, the petitioner did not show up. This prompted the respondent judge, on February
15, 1965, to issue a warrant for her arrest, and on March 23, 1965 an alias warrant of arrest. Petitioner was never arrested.

On December 10, 1966, petitioner, by counsel, moved to quash the warrants of arrest of February 15, 1965 and March 23, 1965. Petitioner's
ground: Penalty has prescribed.
On December 19, 1966, the respondent judge ruled that "the penalty imposed upon the accused has to be served", rejected the plea of
prescription of penalty and, instead, directed the issuance of another alias warrant of arrest.

ISSUE : Whether or not prescription of sentence has commenced

HELD :

No.

By Article 92 of the Revised Penal Code, light penalties "imposed by final sentence" prescribe in one year. The period of prescription of penalties
so the succeeding Article 93 provides "shall commence to run from the date when the culprit should evade the service of his sentence".

What then is the concept of evasion of service of sentence Article 157 of the Revised Penal Code furnishes the ready answer. Says Article 157:

ART. 157. Evasion of service of sentence. The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods shall be imposed upon any
convict who shall evade service of his sentence by escaping during the term of his imprisonment 6 by reason of final judgment. However, if such
evasion or escape shall have taken place by means of unlawful entry, by breaking doors, windows, gates, walls, roofs or floors, or by using
picklocks, false keys, disguise, deceit, violence or intimidation, or through connivance with other convicts or employees of the penal institution, the
penalty shall be prision correccional in its maximum period.

Elements of evasion of service of sentence are:

(1) the offender is a convict by final judgment;

(2) he "is serving his sentence which consists in deprivation of liberty"; and

(3) he evades service of sentence by escaping during the term of his sentence.

This must be so. For, by the express terms of the statute, a convict evades "service of his sentence", by "escaping during the term of his
imprisonment by reason of final judgment." That escape should take place while serving sentence, is emphasized by the provisions of the second
sentence of Article 157 which provides for a higher penalty if such "evasion or escape shall have taken by means of unlawful entry, by breaking
doors, windows, gates, walls, roofs, or floors or by using picklocks, false keys, disguise, deceit, violence or intimidation, or through connivance with
other convicts or employees of the penal institution, ... " Indeed, evasion of sentence is but another expression of the term "jail breaking".

The court ruled that for prescription of penalty of imprisonment imposed by final sentence to commence to run, the culprit should escape during
the term of such imprisonment.

Adverting to the facts, we have here the case of a convict who sentenced to imprisonment by final judgment was thereafter never placed in
confinement. Prescription of penalty, then, does not run in her favor.

For the reasons given, the Court resolved to dismiss the petition for certiorari and prohibition. No costs. So ordered.