Human Rights: Amnesty International and the United Nations

Author(s): Ramesh Thakur

Source: Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 31, No. 2 (May, 1994), pp. 143-160
Published by: Sage Publications, Ltd.
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/425029
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 ?Journal of Peace Research, vol. 31, no. 2, 1994, pp. 143-160

Human Rights: Amnesty International and the

United Nations*

RAMESH THAKUR
Department of Political Studies, University of Otago

The units of analysis of this comparative article are Amnesty International (AI) and the United Nations
(UN). The purpose of comparison is to analyse the complementarity of IGOs and NGOs in the issue-
area of human rights on the three dimensions of norm-generation, monitoring, and enforcement. The
UN is a general-purpose IGO; AI is a single-purpose NGO. The international moral code is embodied
in the UN Charter. Human rights is an outgrowth of Western liberalism; the United Nations is a meeting
ground for all the world's civilizations. Human rights puts the welfare of individuals first; the UN puts
the interests of member-states first. AI is of, by, and for individuals; the United Nations is of, by, and for
governments. Arising from these differences, I argue that the United Nations as the world's preeminent
IGO and Amnesty International as the world's most prominent human rights NGO play complementary
roles. Specifically, the UN is more authoritative in a standard-setting and norm-generating role, but
weak in monitoring and enforcement of state behaviour. Amnesty International, because of Western
origins, narrowness of interest, and representational and accountability deficiencies, is not able to
function as an authoritative expositor of universal human rights values. But its freedom from
governments enables it to be an effective watchdog against human rights violations. The
intergovernmental nature of the UN makes it an authoritative archive of formal reports from member
states on human rights progress in their countries; the nongovernmental nature of Amnesty
International gives greater objectivity to its reports on state practices in human rights. The article also
challenges us to theorize NGOs: their roles, the implications for the state-based realist edifice of
International Relations scholarship, and the inviolability of sovereign territory behind which human
rights can be abused with impunity.

1. Human Rights and Peace Research and are isolated from the central question of
The award of the Nobel prize is the most its legitimation (Kolodziej, 1992b, p. 429).
prestigious recognition for services to world One example of the trend to marry nor-
peace. The list of Nobel peace laureates, mative inquiries to strategic studies is the
including Aung San Suu Kyi in 1991 and recently revived interest in the proposition
Rigoberta Menchu in 1992, reveals a clear that democracies do not go to war against
acknowledgment of the link between inter- one another (see Doyle, 1986; Gleditsch,
national peace and human rights. A wider 1993; Lake, 1992). Democracies also pro-
conception of security has received recog- mote human rights better than alternative
nition from responsible political leaders in regimes (a proposition that is less keenly
some countries, for example New Zealand contested after the Cold War because of the
(Graham 1992; Marshall, 1988). Scholar- demonstrable hypocrisies of the former
ship, too, has attempted to broaden and communist regimes and disillusionment with
deepen the definition of security. While this the results of one-party states in the Third
has always been true, it has gathered fresh World; see Gleditsch, 1993, p. 301). Putting
momentum with the end of the Cold War the two propositions together, we can con-
(Kolodziej, 1992a). Security studies which clude that increasing democratization will
ignore the normative questions associated lead simultaneously to an enhancement of
with the control, threat, and use of organ- human rights and a more peaceful world. A
ized violence rest on shallow foundations concern with human rights should be of
interest to peace researchers also because it
can lead to violent conflict in any one (or all)
* I acknowledge the constructive comments on an
of three ways. The groups whose rights are
earlier draft of this article by the three referees of the
journal who were very helpful in revising the paper for being abused can resort to arms in retali-
final publication. ation; the conflict can entangle neighbour-

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144 Ramesh Thakur

ing countries; the scale of the human rights

postulated alongside a doctrine of logical
abuses can lead to international involve- correlativity, that is, the association of the
ment and intervention. The ongoing crisis rights
in of one person with the duties of
Bosnia-Herzegovina is a perfect illustration
another. (This is different from the doctrine
of all three dangers. of moral correlativity, which holds that in
The most important intergovernmental order to enjoy rights one must be able and
organization (IGO) charged with the re- willing to perform reciprocal obligations.)
sponsibility for maintaining world peace isLegal positivists might argue that the only
the United Nations (UN). Its peace-keeping true rights are those that are set out and
forces were awarded the Nobel peace prize enforceable in law. Others would embrace
in 1988. But it does not have an exemplary as moral rights those that merit recognition
record in defending human rights. The by an enlightened conscience.
best known nongovernmental organization With these qualifications in mind, by a
(NGO) in the field of human rights is human right I mean one which is:
Amnesty International (AI), which is itself a
former recipient of the Nobel peace prize * universal, owing to every person simply
(1977). AI and the UN work together in the as a human being;
area of human rights. The complementarity * held only by human beings;
of the roles played by IGOs and NGOs * held equally by every person, since it is
remains a neglected dimension of inter- available to anyone qua person;
national relations scholarship (notable * not dependent on the holding of any
exceptions including Jacobson, 1979; Taylor office, rank, or relationship, such as
& Groom, 1989). In this article, I hope to political leader, teacher, aristocrat,
begin the process of filling this gap. The parent, or creditor;
purpose of comparing AI and the UN is to * claimable against all governments. That
analyse the complementarity of IGOs and is, if someone asserts a human right
NGOs in the issue-area of human rights on against the Government of China, then
the three dimensions of norm-generation, that right is equally assertible by that
monitoring, and enforcement. Their vari- person against the Government of New
ations in performance (the dependent vari- Zealand: or vice versa.
able) may be explained by the diverging
characteristics of the two units of analysis Such a definition is immediately contro-
(the independent variables), most import- versial. An international theory of human
antly their nongovernmental and govern- rights must confront the vexed dilemma of
mental attributes. The analysis will also cultural relativism. The existence of univer-
challenge us to theorize NGOs: their roles, sal human rights is asserted by human rights
the implications for the state-based realist advocates; its possibility is denied by cul-
edifice of international relations scholar- tural relativists. Many universalists escape
ship, and the inviolability of sovereign terri- the need for justification by assuming the
tory behind which human rights can be validity of culture-invariant rights. Con-
abused with impunity. versely, many relativists aver that because
moral standards are always culture-specific,
there can be no cross-cultural universals in
2. Universalism versus Relativism the field of human rights. Yet the second
A right is a claim, meaning that it lies in the part of the statement does not follow logi-
domain of entitlements: it may not be cally from the first. Murder is proscribed in
granted or denied by anyone else (Wasser- all moral systems; but few if any proscribe
strom, 1964, p. 632). This carries two the act of killing absolutely under all circum-
further connotations. First, as distinct from stances. The definition of murder therefore
a mere demand, a right is justified or legit- has to be understood within the confining
imate. Second, it is a claim against some coordinates of time and place. Within any
entity or person. A theory of rights can be one society at different periods of time, or

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 Amnesty International and the United Nations 145

between different societies at any given
time, such activities as war, capital punish-
ment, and abortion may or may not be mor-
ally permissible.
Human beings do not inhabit a universe
of shared moral values. Instead, we find
diverse moral communities cohabiting in
ternational society. Article 16(2) of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights
proclaims the right to marriage 'only with
the free and full consent of the intending Differences in national laws reflect the
spouses'; the clause contravenes the wide-
spread practice of arranged marriage which
many societies regard as perfectly consistent national laws.
with their moral systems. Political rights
(freedoms of speech, press and assembly;
political and legal equality) are rights held
by the individual against the state. By con-
trast, socialist regimes view human rights as
benefits secured by the state for collective
groups such as workers; individuals owe
obligations to society.
The notion of individual human rights
provides a subset of the larger dilemma of
locating justification outside particular
moral frameworks. In many societies the in-
dividual as a person is a social construct:
individual beliefs, religions, world-views,
language, gestures, mores are all shaped by
and products of society and culture.
Consider the case of a cross-clan murder in
some kinship systems. If a chiefly person has
been killed by a commoner, then the
revenge death of the original killer may not
be appropriate retribution, that of a person
of chiefly rank may. The original killer can
go scot-free, an outcome that is alien and
abhorrent to the Western concept of indi-
vidual guilt and responsibility. In most such
societies with an eye for an eye and a tooth
for a tooth philosophy, the underlying prin-
ciple of retributive justice was a means of
limiting violence: take your tooth and be
done with it. A second mechanism for con-
taining violence, which also horrified some
Europeans, was blood money or the com-
pensation principle: the kin-group which
initiated the killing could escape retribution
in kind by compensating the victim kin-
group with appropriate payment.
In Marxist ideology, rights emerge his-
torically and reflect class relations. Individ-
ual human rights are the expression of the
class interests of the bourgeoisie. By con-
trast, collective rights are the foundation of
human rights and the precondition for all
individuals to enjoy all rights and freedoms
equally. Moreover, human rights are not
just abstract ideals. They are expressed con-
in-
cretely in the specific laws of various coun-
tries. Therefore they cannot be understood
apart from a country's laws and institutions.
different conceptions of human rights: there
is no universal human right which overrides
It might be argued that holding govern-
ments to international standards that they
have voluntarily signed sidesteps the di-
lemma of cultural relativism. Not so.
Signature and ratification of international
conventions is decided on by ruling elites;
their actions may not correspond to the views
of most people in their home countries.
Equally, though, rejection of inter-
national human rights standards by a
government may be based on political ex-
pediency that does not reflect majority
views of ordinary people. We should be sus-
picious of the self-serving and spurious
claims of ruling elites that their rejection of
external criticism is based on an alternative
social consensus. The UN General
Assembly's Declaration on the Right to
Development (Resolution 41/128, 1986)
diluted and confused the human rights
agenda and could be used by governments
so inclined to legitimize violations of citi-
zens' rights. The false dichotomy between
development and human rights is designed
to mask the fact that the tradeoffs 'are con-
tingent political choices, undertaken for
largely political not technical, economic
reasons' (Donnelly, 1989, p. 306). The
dichotomy is usually a smokescreen for
corruption, cronyism, and personal ag-
grandizement.
If value relativism were to be accepted in
its extreme form, then no government of
any country - Stalin's Russia, Amin's
Uganda, Pol Pot's Cambodia, the current
government of Serbia - could be criticized
by outsiders for any of its actions. Not many
would be happy with such total value rela-

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146 Ramesh Thakur

principle we could derive the following

tivism. This is why many Western academics
abominate relativism (Barnes & Bloor, propositions:
1982, p. 21). It is dismissed because, seem-
* A government may not punish a citizen
ingly, it requires Westerners to project their
liberalism universally on everyone else: who has done no wrong.
everyone should follow the Western tra- * Before a citizen can be properly pun-
dition of tolerance because it is the best. It is ished, his or her guilt must be estab-
seen to require absolute tolerance and to lished.
negate the possibility of moral judgment. * Since a society cannot make moral judg-
The proposition that 'all moral judgments ments on guilt or innocence in ignorance,
are culture-specific' is also self-refuting in the process of establishing guilt must be
such a crude formulation. For, if true, then open and transparent.
the proposition is itself not absolute but con- * The establishment of guilt therefore
tingent on whether a particular culture sub- requires fair procedures, that is, the insti-
scribes to that belief. If it is contingent, then tutions of free and fair trial.
under certain circumstances it could be * Since retribution must follow and not
false. In a sense it is the equivalent of the precede the establishment of guilt, no
philosopher's familiar paradox about two person may be tortured into confessions
statements on either side of a page: (a) 'The of guilt.
statement on the next page is true' and (b) * Since retribution is required to be pro-
'The statement on the previous page is portionate to the crime, a citizen who has
false'. Cultural relativism entangles us in a neither preached nor practised violence
similar ethnocentric circumlocution. may not have violence done to his or her
International relations is a domain of person.
moral choice where diversity does not * No one shall be deprived of life arbi-
vitiate or preclude efforts at moral reason- trarily: summary executions and disap-
ing. There are four reasons why relativism pearances are morally impermissible in
need not necessarily lead us into the blind any society or political system.
alley of rejecting the possibility of moral * Every victim has the right to seek redress
judgment. Action by a government is open of grievance: retributive punishment
to evaluation by the moral code of its own should be imposed on officials or the state
society. as a collective entity (e.g. by way of
Second, diversity does not rule out partial financial compensation) for wrongful acts
convergence. The internal standard may in of torture or killings. Nicholas Gage, in
fact be congruent with international conven- the moving story of his mother's torture
tions. Relativism does require an acknow- and death at the hands of communists
ledgment that each culture has its own during the Greek civil war, writes of 'that
moral system. This insight directs our atten- pain which never sleeps': the pain of
tion to enculturation: the process by which unfulfilled retribution against the per-
cultural categories and standards are petrators of inhuman cruelty (Gage,
acquired and internalized by individuals. 1983, p. 447).
But the fact that moral precepts vary from
one culture to another does not mean that The third riposte to relativism is that
different peoples do not hold some values in under certain circumstances we can still
common. One attempt to reconcile relativ- criticize actions which violate our codes,
ism with universalism was organized around even if they are morally permissible by the
the proposition that all societies require domestic code of another government. This
retribution to be proportionate to the wrong can occur, for example, when the govern-
done (Renteln, 1990). The justification for ment of that country appeals to our sense of
much of the AI movement could be charity in seeking humanitarian or develop-
anchored to this apparently simple universal mental assistance. This is, if you will, a vari-
principle. For, if true, then from this single ant of moral correlativity. If our moral code

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 Amnesty International and the United Nations 147

imposes a duty on us to assist you, then the accommodation. To be viable, international

same code also permits us to impose a re- society must establish a generally accepted
ciprocal duty on you. body of procedural rules which specify the
Fourth, we can turn cultural relativism on office-holders of rule-maker, rule-inter-
its head. Precisely because moral values are preter, rule-enforcer, and rule-changer.
culture-specific, outsiders are unable to For international order to be maintained,
determine congruence of governmental certain decisions pertaining to international
actions with internal moral codes. All that behaviours must be accepted simply because
outsiders can do is to presume, however some person or body, specified by rules of
imperfectly, that adherence to international procedure, has made them.
conventions does reflect societal consensus Today, UN resolutions are the most com-
on or elite commitment to international monly cited and widely acceptable code of
community norms. And, as outsiders, all we and metric of state compliance with
conduct
can judge is the consistency of governmental internationally prescribed behaviour. The
actions with such international conventions. reconciliation of divergent interests by the
UN has procedural as well as represen-
tational legitimacy: it is authenticated by the
3. Standard-setting and Norm-generationprocedures that have been freely accepted
In general, the most appropriate forum for by the authorized representatives of world
efforts to reconcile divergent moral tra- society. Conversely, a single-issue NGO like
ditions into common public policy is the Amnesty International is an inappropriate
United Nations as a universal IGO. The in- forum for such reconciliation. A significant
ternational moral code is embodied in the illustration of Al's distance from universal-
UN Charter. Civil-political human rights are ism lies in its total opposition to the death
an outgrowth of Western liberalism; the penalty.2 While no civilization or culture
United Nations is a meeting ground for all proclaims the virtues of torture, many coun-
the world's civilizations.' Human rights puts tries have less compunction in defending
the welfare of individuals first; the UN puts the death penalty as an instrument of state
the interests of member-states first. AI is of, policy.3
by, and for individuals; the United Nations The central normative instrument of the
is of, by, and for governments. AI is a international human rights regime is the
single-purpose NGO; the UN is a general- Universal Declaration of Human Rights
purpose IGO. (1948). The 1966 International Covenants
IGOs are held to be more important than on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), and
NGOs because, in the global political on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights,
system, authoritative policies are more fre- add force and specificity. Collectively, the
quently made in and applied by govern- three products of the UN system comprise
mental than nongovernmental institutions the International Bill of Rights. (Such a
(Jacobson, 1979, p. 8). Power is the capacity labelling of the trinity imparts an American
simply to enforce a particular form of be- flavour, which is politically unfortunate in
haviour. Authority signifies the capacity to the context of the debate on relativism.)
create and enforce rights and obligations The UN has also adopted some 50 other
that are accepted as legitimate and binding legal instruments on human rights, including
by members of an all-inclusive society. In- declarations and conventions on genocide,
ternational society exists to the extent that torture, racial discrimination, and discrimi-
states observe limits on their freedom of nation against women. The 1966 covenants
action in pursuing national interests and ac- assume that human rights may need to be
knowledge the authority of these limits restricted if they begin to interfere with the
(Nardin, 1983, p. 309). It denotes, not a rights of others. And the ICCPR permits a
universal society of individuals governed by state to limit or suspend the rights in cases of
natural law, but a distinctive society of officially proclaimed public emergencies -
states that acknowledge formal rules of that is, precisely when they are most

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148 Ramesh Thakur

needed. This is a stark illustration of how,not

in blind us to its reality. Human rights acti-
vists and NGOs are able to use the Inter-
a state-based IGO, reasons of state triumph
over rights of individuals. national Bill of Rights as a concrete point of
reference against which to judge state con-
duct. The utility of the covenants lies in the
4. Monitoring and Verification requirement imposed on signatories to sub-
mit periodic reports on the human rights
4.1 United Nations situation in their countries. Therefore, rati-
Human rights activities of international fying and bringing the covenants into force
organizations can be divided into three does not simply connote acceptance of inter-
categories. The UN has been impartial and nationally proclaimed standards of human
remarkably successful in a standard-setting rights. It also entails the creation of long-
role; guilty of bias and only selectively (in term national infrastructures for the protec-
regard to both rights and regimes) successful tion and promotion of human rights.
in monitoring human rights abuses; and
4.2 Amnesty International
feeble and ineffectual in enforcement.
The UN Charter begins with the words
Governments, if they permit formal inter-
national review of state practice at all, 'Wewill
the peoples'. Unfortunately, the UN
agree to review only by IGOs. Responsi- remains a creature of member governments.
Above everything else, human rights means
bility for human rights oversight was given
to the Economic and Social Council under putting people first. AI too puts people first:
the general auspices of the General both externally, in relation to human rights,
Assembly. ECOSOC set up a Commission and internally, in relation to its own organiz-
on Human Rights in 1946. The United ation and activities. AI reports carry a ring
Nations has also set up special committees of authority, because the organization - not
to oversee implementation of the human being a voluntary association of govern-
rights covenants. ments - has not been wilfully myopic in the
Socialist and many Third World member- UN mould in investigating and judging
states were lukewarm and hostile to human rights abuses around the world with-
international human rights control and out discrimination on grounds of race, re-
monitoring mechanisms. They subordinated ligion, or ideological belief. Thus, in May
considerations of UN effectiveness to the 1992, Amnesty reported that there has been
principle of non-interference. While the harsh repression and long-standing human
United States too, with its strong tradition rights violations in Tibet (AI, 1992a, pp. 88-
of isolationism, has generally been sus- 91) - an issue from which the United
picious of expansive interpretations of UN Nations has gingerly but persistently shied
power, most Western governments sup- away.
ported the adoption of such devices as indi- The United Nations is a multipurpose or-
vidual complaints systems and enhanced ganization. This means that many consider-
monitoring procedures. International teams ations in addition to the human rights record
have little formal power to monitor or carry have to be taken into account in deciding
out independent investigations (such as what to do about the errant behaviour of a
spot-checks and on-site verifications with member-state. As a permanent member of
unfettered freedom of movement for UN the Security Council, China can veto any
inspectors) of state compliance with UN draft resolution critical of its human rights
norms. The UN 'monitoring' machinery is records. It can also veto other resolutions
little more than a system of international where its help may be urgently needed, as in
information exchange, some of which can be the Gulf War. Such broader considerations
plain farcical. The result has been character- of tradeoffs are extraneous to the decision
ized as 'normative strength and procedural calculus of a single-issue NGO like Amnesty
weakness' (Donnelly, 1986, p. 614). International.
The modesty of UN achievement should The Amnesty decision calculus involves

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 Amnesty International and the United Nations 149

an initial placement of the person concerned investigated and censured governments of

into one of three categories meriting investi- all political persuasion. Its neutral stance
gation: prisoner, disappeared, other. Its
activities have had to change to reflect the
changing nature of human rights abuses and and lobbying activities in home countries.
the changing understandings of the concept The campaign for the release of US citizens
of human rights. In the AI structure, de-
cision-making on the role of the NGO is the example, was led by Swiss members of
responsibility of the biennial International
Council Meeting. The 1991 Council meet-
ing, held in Yokohama, extended the organ- pect of AI chapters becoming the targets of
ization's mandate in several areas. One of
the most important policy shifts was the
cision to include human rights abuses
committed by armed political opposition
groups within the scope of AI monitoring,
reporting, and action. Without such exten-
sion of the AI mandate, the organization's
activities were becoming vulnerable to the
charge of imbalance. In a sense the new
policy permits AI to take some action to
protect individuals against abuses by armed
political groups (for example killings or
hostage-takings of innocent civilians) when
governments have failed to do so.
Another extension concerned the types of
human rights abuses. People who are im-
prisoned solely because of their homosexu-
ality, for example, are now considered to be
prisoners of conscience. AI has been
engaged in defending the rights of refugees
to asylum as set out in the Universal Declar-
ation on Human Rights. The Yokohama
meeting expanded Al's role by including
opposition to involuntary exile. In addition,
AI opposes any forcible relocation of a
people to a particular area of their own
country, if this is based solely on religion,
ethnic identity, language, and so on.
The strength and assets of AI are com-
plementary to those of the UN. Unlike the
latter, AI has managed to maintain a scru-
pulous neutrality with respect to inter-
national ideological conflicts. During the
Cold War, it did this by using its own
version of the principle of equitable geo-
graphical representation which permeates
the UN system. Its prisoner of conscience
campaign selected one prisoner from the in-
dustrialized, communist and Third World
group of countries for simultaneous focus by
each AI group. Amnesty International has
has been helped by the deliberate tactic of
precluding AI chapters from investigative
jailed for refusing to serve in Vietnam, for
Amnesty International.
This is most useful in reducing the pros-
hostile attention from home governments. It
also enhances detachment and objectivity
de-
and so builds up credibility over time.
Governments are notably frustrated when
they cannot dismiss allegations against them
as politically motivated. Who is going to
believe China's protestations that AI is a
tool of Western capitalism, when AI has a
long and proud record of opposing the use
of the death penalty in the United States
and investigating human rights abuses in
Northern Ireland?
Members of AI have a dual role. The
most obvious is that they work to protect
victims of human rights abuses in other
countries. But, despite being prevented by
Al rules from investigating or taking action
in respect of abuses in their own countries,
they also have an internal role. They con-
tribute to the development and promotion
of a human rights culture in their own
country. This then assists in the prevention
of human rights abuses by their govern-
ments in the future through promotion of
social commitment and enactment of appro-
priate laws reflecting the more enlightened
human rights culture.
The United Nations has been harnessed
to the cause of serving state interests and
has become a creature of member govern-
ments. Its agencies and committees - even
those dealing with human rights cases - are
staffed by civil servants, politicians, lawyers,
economists, and so on. Invariably, they owe
their jobs to national governments (or
IGOs, which in essence come to the same
thing). By contrast, AI remains a people's
movement. Its heart and soul are the mil-
lions of volunteers in addition to the 1.1 mil-
lion membership engaged in the various
campaigns to secure the release of political

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150 Ramesh Thakur

prisoners, the welfare of political refugees, collected by AI researchers, for example on

the raising of human rights consciousness prisoners of conscience, is used in four
and funds. different ways. First, it is analysed and
UN diffidence stems in part also from a digested. Second, it is used to make judg-
reluctance to become embroiled in contro- ments on the reasons for imprisonment.
versies. The periodic storms of controversy Third, it is communicated to appropriate AI
that swirl around AI show that governments chapters. And fourth, it is used to organize a
are indeed sensitive to impartial and accu- campaign on behalf of the prisoners.
rate criticisms of their human rights records. The good fight is usually worth fighting
There is another necessary consequence for itself. But it helps if it can be shown to be
of linkage to peoples and not governments. efficacious at least some of the time. Other-
AI had the foresight to reject any financial wise the army of AI campaigners and acti-
help from any government body. Financial vists could be forgiven for being so discour-
independence has in turn ensured political aged as to give up the fight. The viability of
independence of governments. It has also AI as a movement is due to the belief that its
made AI dependent on direct contributions work 'is both worthwhile in general terms
from the public. As a result AI has re- and is effective in specific cases' (Ennals,
mained close to the people: their beliefs, 1982, p. 82).
their concerns, their agendas. The intensely
personal nature of AI campaigns means that
it remains a grass-roots international move- 5. Compliance and Enforcement
ment. This too has helped to keep AI Where the goal is to set inviolate standards
honest. for the domestic conduct of governments,
The comparison with the UN is again only the United Nations as an all-embracing
striking. UN activities have been severely IGO can create new rules by such means as
affected by the fluctuations of its finances, legally binding conventions. While the UN
the refusal of major member-states to pay is better qualified to set international human
their assessed share of costs, the refusal of rights standards, Amnesty International is
some to pay for particular UN activities or better able to investigate human rights
agencies which offend their political sensi- abuses at the grass-roots level. Measuring
bilities, the insistence of others that they be success is difficult, perhaps even impossible.
given a larger say in some decisions. It is No government is going to admit having
inconceivable, for example, that the UN given in to external pressure. In many cases
could contemplate investigating human there may well be several influences at work
rights abuses by the US government, which simultaneously on a government. For the
pays 25% of its budget. UN or AI to claim success could be boastful,
Impartiality is buttressed with veracity. only partially true and possibly counter-
The long-term credibility of AI would be productive in future cases. The fact that AI
badly damaged if its reports and statements cannot demonstrate success in every in-
could be shown to be false. The entire struc- stance does not diminish the worth of its
ture of the AI movement is designed to efforts. In this instance, it is better for reach
collect, distribute, and use information that to exceed grasp, for ambitions to exceed
has been cross-checked and will withstand resources.
determined efforts by governments to dis- The doctrine of national security has been
credit it: about the identity of prisoners, doubly corrosive of human rights. It is used
cause of imprisonment, trial procedures, frequently by governments, who are
prison conditions. The chain of pressure charged with the main responsibility for the
built up in any particular instance by AI is welfare of their citizens, to diminish the
only as strong as the weakest link in the security of their peoples by subjecting them
information in that case. to gross human rights abuses. The grossest
In short, AI adopts a case-work approach violence to the proper relationship between
to the human rights campaign. Information the authorities and the citizens occurs when

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 Amnesty International and the United Nations 151

the military takes over the reins of govern-grist to the propaganda mill of repressive
ment and establishes a repressive regime. governments. The Beijing Review declared
For then the instrument to protect a people that 'the proper, rational and lawful actions
against attack from without is turned into of a sovereign nation' in Tiananmen Square
the means of coercing a people from within. were 'understood and supported by most
The second respect in which the doctrine of countries in the world' (Yi, 1989).
national security has undermined human Having said that, since the end of the
rights is its use to justify a policy of doing
Cold War governments have been more
nothing to those regimes that are guilty of prepared to impose political conditionalities
human rights abuses but which might be in granting foreign aid. The UN too has
present or prospective allies. been expanding its concerns and becoming
As the last comment suggests, human somewhat more assertive in defence of
rights have traditionally been relegated to ahuman rights. For example, the UN peace-
lowly position in the hierarchy of foreign keeping mission in El Salvador, ONUSAL,
policy objectives of governments. While was required, among other tasks, to verify
reaffirming a commitment to democratic the 1990 agreement on human rights be-
ideals, officials or politicians will invoke tween the government and the armed
geopolitical, geostrategic, or commercial opposition concluded under UN auspices.
considerations for suppressing outrage at Security Council Resolution 794 of 3
human rights atrocities (Greenfield, 1989, December 1992 authorized military action
p. 84). Consider for example how loath under enforcement Chapter 7 in order to
governments have been to condemn China establish a secure environment for humani-
for its brutality in Tiananmen Square in tarian relief operations in Somalia.
June 1989, or for its record in Tibet since the Other examples from the 1990s illustrate
1950s. Many ordinary people refuse to the twin thesis being developed here, that
accept such rationalizations and demand a AI and the UN play complementary roles,
more forceful and robust response from and the AI is more willing to investigate
their own governments. possible human rights abuses by any govern-
Perhaps governments empathize with one ment while the UN confines itself to selected
another more easily than is commonly re- governments. On 12 November 1991, Indo-
alized. Even for the major democracies, nesian security forces opened fire on a group
public opinion is a nuisance to be managed of demonstrators in Dili in East Timor, pro-
by governments, not for the voice of sweet voking an international outcry and threats
reason to be heeded. Protestors are of suspension of foreign aid. The govern-
regarded as an ill-informed and rag-tag lot ment at first claimed that 'only 19' people
who are always out to create trouble and had been killed, but then an inquiry com-
sometimes manage to jam the smooth mission concluded that about 50 had been
running of affairs of state, be these domestic killed. In August 1991, Amnesty Inter-
or international: think of Sir Humphrey in national made an oral submission to the UN
the British television series Yes Minister. Special Committee on Decolonization alleg-
Another argument invoked for a policy of ing serious human rights abuses in East
See Nothing, Hear Nothing, Do Nothing Timor, including extrajudicial executions
is that an activist concern would merely and disappearances. In November, the or-
worsen the situation of the victims. Interest- ganization appealed to the UN Secretary-
ingly, victims do not subscribe to this point General to initiate a prompt and impartial
of view. The number who have made force- international investigation into the incident
ful declarations to the contrary are legion. (AI, 1992a, pp. 141-144). As it happened,
Some even beg for open, vociferous demon- the UN Special Rapporteur on Torture was
strations of support from the outside. It in Dili during his first visit to East Timor on
seems rather important to prisoners to know the day of the shootings. On 11 March 1993,
that they have not been forgotten totally, the UN Human Rights Commission voiced
that others care. Lack of open support is concern at reports of continuing violations

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152 Ramesh Thakur

by Indonesian forces in East Timor and blitz. But human rights organizations were
criticized light sentences imposed on the instrumental in generating and sustaining
soldiers involved in a massacre of pro- the initial public interest in the tragedy. Be-
independence demonstrators in November tween October 1992 and January 1993, AI
1991. The resolution was approved by a vote issued three reports on widespread human
of 22-12, with 15 abstentions. Most West- rights abuses in Bosnia-Herzegovina. While
ern governments voted in favour; most all warring parties were guilty of abuses,
Asian governments either voted against or Amnesty International had concluded that
abstained (Otago Daily Times, 13 March most of the blame lay with the Serbs (AI,
1993). 1992c, 1993a, and 1993b).
On the second point, the UN Human One reason for the lack of progress could
Rights Commission established a Special be cynicism towards the statements made on
Rapporteur to investigate the human rights behalf of the United Nations. On 4 August
situation in Kuwait during the period of 1992, for example, the Security Council
Iraqi occupation. AI drew the attention of expressed deep concern at continuing
the Commission to reports of human rightsreports of widespread violations of inter-
violations by Kuwaiti authorities after the national humanitarian law in the former
withdrawal of Iraqi forces, but the Com- Yugoslavia, in particular regarding impris-
mission refused to extend the mandate of onment and abuse of civilians in camps,
the Special Rapporteur to investigate alle- prisons, and detention centres. The Presi-
gations of post-occupation violations (AI, dent of the Security Council condemned
1992a, pp. 34-35). such violations and abuses and demanded
The tragic crisis in ex-Yugoslavia is a that relevant international organizations
good example of how ineffectual action by should be granted immediate, unimpeded,
the United Nations leads to disillusionment and continued access to all such places (UN
about its role. The Security Council first Chronicle, December 1992, p. 23). The Serb
acted on the crisis by adopting Resolution leaders would have noted that the Council
713 on 25 September 1991. On 13-14 president was Li Daoyu of China. Such clear
August 1992, the 53-member UN Human hypocrisy and double standards do little to
Rights Commission held an extraordinary enhance the behaviour-regulating authority
session in Geneva to examine events in of the world organization.
former Yugoslavia. This was the first excep-
tional session in the Commission's history.
It adopted a resolution strongly condemning 6. Theoretical Implications
the policy of forced expulsions or 'ethnic International human rights policy is not the
cleansing' by Bosnian Serbs (UN Chronicle, exclusive domain of government officials.
December 1992, p. 22). By the end of 1992 Instead, it is what I shall call a 'pluralist
the Security Council had adopted more than resultant' of a lengthy process of interaction
20 resolutions on the crisis censuring bad and consultation between politicians,
behaviour, demanding compliance, and officials, and private transnational groups.
imposing sanctions, all to no discernible Even in a major international forum like the
effect. On 25 May 1993 the Council voted UN, Al has access to national delegates and
unanimously to set up an 11-judge war Secretariat officials, provides a range of
crimes court at The Hague to try people information from a broader cross-section of
accused of murder, rape, torture, and ethnic sources, and lobbies for its preferred solu-
cleansing. The success of this operation tions. The degree of influence exerted by AI
remains to be seen. depends partly on its internal organizational
By 1993, governments and the UN were attributes (size, funding, structure, etc.) and
being forced to be seen to be doing some- partly on the salience of human rights as an
thing in response to public pressure that had international issue. But the last in turn
built up with the crisis in Bosnia-Herzegov- depends to some extent on the success of AI
ina having become the focus of a media and other human rights NGOs, success

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 Amnesty International and the United Nations 153

which makes it correspondingly more diffi- By creating transnational coalitions that

cult for governments to deny consultative circumvent the policies of any individual
access to them. state, AI acts as an international pressure
group, publicizes the human rights prob-
6.1 Roles ofNCOs lematique and proposes solutions to them.
NGOs, like AI, can serve as focal points for The United Nations convened a World Con-
the mobilization and articulation of interests ference on Human Rights from 14 to 25
shared by many people living in different June 1993. In an oral submission to the first
countries. They play five distinct roles in in- session of the Preparatory Committee in
ternational relations: consciousness raising September 1991, AI proposed that the UN
or value promotion; agenda setting; lobby- should establish a standing mechanism of a
ing to shape the terms of the instructions coordinated, concrete, and rapid response
given to delegates at multilateral and IGO to massive human rights violations (AI,
forums, and to implement international 1992a, p. 33). Amnesty wanted the confer-
commitments; monitoring; and direct action ence's final statement to commit govern-
(for example, Greenpeace boats obstructing ments to the ratification of international
the entry of nuclear ships into New Zealandtreaties, funding of human rights pro-
ports). AI eschews direct action, but does grammes, and the adoption of annual inde-
engage in the other four types of activities. pendent reviews of human rights.
Amnesty International is a limited actor In the event, the Vienna Declaration and
in its own right. The United Nations is a Programme of Action was described as
sovereignty-bound actor; Amnesty Inter- 'anodyne' (The Times, 26 June 1993). The
national is a sovereignty-free actor.4 Theconference, attended by 180 governments,
lofty proclamations of human rights in the got off to an inauspicious start by first refus-
UN Charter suggest an expansive interest; ing permission to the Dalai Lama to address
the enabling clauses reveal a more restric- an audience. Although this refusal was later
tive authority. The powers of NGOs like rescinded, China did succeed in preventing
AI, although no more extensive, can be util- NGOs from participating in the sessions on
ized more effectively because they are free drafting the final declaration. The confer-
of some of the types of inhibitions that ence became a public squabble between
impede the functioning of IGOs which are West and East over the principle of univer-
subject to 'capture' by member govern- sality. Rejected by US Secretary of State
ments. Warren Christopher as 'the last refuge of
While IGOs and many NGOs deal with repression' (The Times, 19 June 1993), cul-
states' international behaviour, AI is con- tural relativism proved to be a successful
cerned principally with a state's internal be- rallying cry of many Asian nations (see
haviour. AI representatives can activate the Madhubani, 1993). Paragraph 26 of the final
UN human rights monitoring process by declaration seemed to make press freedom
entering the picture as complainants. So conditional on objectivity and responsibility
while the relevant UN watchdog bodies may (The Times, 26 June 1993). Far from being
exercise rule-supervisory functions, a com- an occasion to make major progress on an
plaint from AI can often initiate the exer- international human rights regime, the
cise. Furthermore, AI is less constrained Vienna Conference became a rearguard
than the UN in holding states to norms that effort to preserve the gains of the past 45
have been declared in forms other than years.?
legally binding instruments. Moreover, by NGOs can also act as systemic modifiers
such activities as participation in global con- of state behaviour. ln the late 1970s, the US
ferences, NGOs contribute towards the government, in allocating economic assist-
enfranchisement of other relevant actors in ance, began to take note of the human rights
the decision-making process on inter- pertbrmance of governments as judged by
national issues (Taylor & Groom, 1989, p. such nongovernmental groups as Freedom
295). House and Amnesty International (Jacob-

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154 Ramesh Thakur

son, 1979, p. 362). Items are raised to the 1986; Ziegler, 1990). True, state govern-
international agenda by non-state actors ments remain the focus of human rights
(Holsti, 1992, p. 70). It has been claimed activity by both the UN and AI. Both organ-
that the launching of the International izations are effective through changing
Decade of Women in 1975 by the United government policy rather than by direct
Nations was the result of NGO pressure action. But this reduces realism to a formal,
rather than an initiative of states (Harrison,juridical conception more than a substantive
1989, p. 243). one.

The process of implementing global con- The ascendancy of realism provided a

ference declarations and the review mech-
anisms usually built into them act as stimuli approach to international politics and
to the international networking of NGOs.
The enhanced networking capacity of
NGOs helps to offset the imbalance in rela-
tive capabilities of states and international agreements between governments. In this
organizations. In the 1980s, IGOs were sub- conception, only sovereign states could be
jected to severe budgetary stringencies,
while NGOs like AI and Greenpeace ex-
perienced growth in membership and sub-
scriptions. AI membership increased from
700,000 in 1987 to 1,100,000 in 1991; its
budget increased from GBP 7.4m to GBP
12.7m in the same period (Al, 1988, p. 278;
Al, 1991a, p. 311). This has helped to
redress to some extent the traditional imbal-
ance in relative IGO-NGO capabilities.
It has also produced an expansion in the
extent of Al activities. For example, the
number of 'Urgent Action' appeals jumped
from 373 in 1987 to 605 in 1991. (Al, 1988,
p. 278; Al, 1992a, p. 311). When Al learns
that someone has disappeared after being
taken into custody, it can issue a call to
Urgent Action. Al's Urgent Action network
has about 50,000 participants around the
world. Taking advantage of advances in
communications technology, in particular
faxes and electronic mail, the network can
be mobilized within hours of information
reaching the international secretariat.
Members of the Urgent Action network will
then swing into action with letters, faxes,
and telegrams on behalf of the victim.
6.2 Realism on the Retreat
The role of NGOs as 'soft' actors also poses
a challenge to the realist paradigm in
international relations. The state-centric
approach can be so dominant that NGOs
like Amnesty International do not even
merit a mention in some textbooks (e.g.
Kegley & Wittkopf, 1989; Stoessinger,
normative justification for a state-centric
security (Kolodziej, 1992a, p. 1). Even the
traditional notion of international organ-
izations viewed them as the results of
the subjects of international law, had equal
standing in international law, and wer.: on-
stitutionally self-contained (Archer, 1983,
p. 38). By contrast, the above analysis con-
firms the following consequences that were
predicted to flow from interdependence
(Keohane & Nye, 1971, pp. viii-xvii): atti-
tudinal changes among citizens, an increase
in international pluralism by the linking of
national interest groups in transnational
structures, and the emergence of auton-
omous actors with private foreign policies.
The complex interdependence model
(Keohane & Nye, 1977) helps us to under-
stand the inability of states to use their capa-
bilities to change human rights and other
international regimes: international co-
alition-forming ability becomes more im-
portant than power resources.
Similarly, the above analysis helps to
resist the elision from the state-as-actor into
state-as-unitary-actor. For it shows that the
state consists of rulers and citizens whose
interests can come into conflict. In such cir-
cumstances, the security interests of some
citizens may coincide with the goals of inter-
national organizations like AI and the
United Nations, in opposition to the secur-
ity and political interests (regime mainten-
ance) of national governments. By raising
the twin questions of security against what
(answer: inhumane governance) and for
whom (answer: a state's own citizens), AI
sensitizes us to definitions of security out-
side the realist framework of states and state
interests.6

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 Amnesty International and the United Nations 155

In the realist conception, governments a developing sense of community of fellow

pay little attention to international public human beings with common beliefs, norms,
opinion. In reality, most governments are and values: the growth of moral awareness
sensitive to the opinions of their own and a shared moral language. NGOs like
people. AI and other NGOs are helping to AI provide the cutting edge of emerging
close the gap between domestic and world community sentiments.
opinion. In 1992, for example, the Govern-
ment of India decided to investigate 415 6.3 Theory of Unjust Non-Intervention
cases of abuses by Indian authorities listed Realism rests on the sanctity of state
by Amnesty International in a special report borders. The third theoretical implication of
on India (Statesman Weekly, 4 July 1992, p.this article is the urgent need for Inter-
6). The Home Ministry set up a special cell national Relations to develop a theory of
to monitor each of the 415 cases, and wrote the unjust non-intervention. The doctrine
letters to the Chief Ministers of the states that human rights know no political fron-
concerned seeking their comments on the tiers is as pervasive as its enforcement
allegations. A year later, reports had been against sovereign states is ineffectual.
received in 230 of the 415 cases. Of these, Today's norms restrict the rights of states
while 145 allegations were rejected, the both to violate citizens' rights arbitrarily and
government concluded that in 85 cases there to use force abroad unilaterally. In the case
was prima facie material for proceeding of conflict, therefore, should human rights
further. Investigations, inquiries, and pros- violations justifying external intervention
ecutions were launched in these cases prevail over the doctrine of non-interven-
(Hindu Weekly, 24 April 1993, p. 4). Given tion?
the political reality in India, the official re- The real question is the conditions under
sponse may well be interpreted as 'explain- which force may lawfully be applied, and
ing' away 330 cases. But the Amnesty report conditions which make the use of force
and the formal probe will none the less have unlawful. The inviolability of national fron-
a beneficial impact in curbing future tiers results from treating states as auton-
excesses by the same security forces, for omous sources of ends, free from external
they will know in advance that their actions interference in their internal arrangements.
are under scrutiny. Yet state interests are relevant to the justifi-
The issue-area of human rights and the cation of international principles only to the
transnational activities of NGOs like AI also extent that they are derived from the
raise questions about a nascent communitar- interests of persons (Beitz, 1979, p. 64).
ian basis of international relations. The In the libertarian conception, the social
nature of obligations beyond national fron- good is insufficient reason to override the
tiers is neither self-evident nor uncontested. intrinsically valuable individual pursuits. In-
AI and other NGOs may be causing a move- dividuals are accorded the liberty to pursue
ment along the continuum from inter- their ends without interference as long as
national society (a pattern that exists among they do not transgress the equal liberty of
states by virtue of their common interests) others to do the same. The analogy is defec-
to international community (a pattern that tive when applied to states. One person is
exists by virtue of their common will). not a collection of persons. Every and each
Because community requires a unity of sen- state is a collection of individuals, although
timent or principle, it is more demanding not just a collection of persons. One
than a society which requires merely an person's pursuit of maximal individual
overlap of separate interests (Vincent, 1982, liberty cannot possibly violate the liberty of
p. 77). In the case of human rights, common constituent persons. Any state's pursuit of
interests in maintaining arrangements for analogous state freedom in the international
the conduct of relations according to arena can conceivably violate the liberties of
agreed-upon rules and institutions in a individuals who are citizens of that state. An
society of states are being slowly replaced by individual pursuit of liberty cannot of itself,

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156 Ramesh Thakur

without reference to other individuals,themes con- at the United Nations. The growing
tradict the principle of personal autonomy. conviction that human rights do have a place
A state's insistence on autonomy can in international relations, fed by NGOs
potentially be in contradiction of individual such as Amnesty International, has been
liberty even without reference to other deeply corrosive of the inviolate rule of
states. In fact of course the whole point of non-intervention. AI is in no position to
insistence upon state autonomy by authori- determine if, when, and how outsiders may
tarian regimes is usually to preserve maxi- intervene in the internal affairs of a country
mum freedom from restraints to suppress in order to put a halt to human rights abuses
and restrict individual liberties of citizens. by its government. Only the UN can auth-
The principal objection to injustice- orize intervention which is just or at least
remedying intervention is not logical but legitimate. But repeated AI reports of a
practical: will the cure prove worse than sustained pattern of human rights abuse in-
the illness? But even a consequentialist ethic crease pressure on some governments and
of non-intervention is double-edged. In on the world community to do something.
ex-Yugoslavia, the consequence of non- AI reports help to prepare the political
interference has been (1) at the practical atmosphere in the UN for resolutions auth-
level, there is political instability, ethnic- orizing such intervention.
religious tension, and economic damage; The tension between the intervention-
and (2) at the theoretical level, time has prescribing principle of human rights and
been bought to legitimize the forcible grab the intervention-proscribing principle of
of territory against the wishes of the dis- sovereignty is contained in the UN Charter
placed inhabitants. itself. Articles 55-56 oblige member-states
The difficulty with humanitarian interven- to take joint and separate action in cooper-
tion is that the real world is characterized by ation with the UN to facilitate the achieve-
moral ambiguity rather than clarity. Gross ment of universal human rights around the
violations of fundamental human rights are world; Article 2.7 contains an express pro-
not just contrary to international law, but hibition of interference in the domestic
may also constitute serious violations of per- affairs of any state.
emptory international law (jus cogens) In practice, intervention is not absolutely
(Rosas, 1990, p. 35). The problem is that proscribed. The degree of legitimacy
the prohibition on the unilateral use of accorded to intervention will usually turn
armed force against another country is also on the answers to such questions as the
a peremptory norm. The UN Charter does purpose, the means, the exhaustion of other
not sanction the use of unilateral force avenues of redress against grievances, the
across international frontiers to redress such proportionality of the riposte to the in-
grievances. On human rights specifically, itiating provocation and the agency of
war resulting from the use of force is itself authorization (Thakur, 1990). The most
the most serious violation of human rights immediately acceptable justification for
(Henkin, 1989, p. 61). A legalistic rejection intervention is the collectivist principle; that
of intervention does not come to grips, how- is, not why intervention was undertaken,
ever, with the underlying political problem, but who took the decision to intervene.
namely the reluctance of many people and Since 1945, the most widely accepted legiti-
governments to resign themselves to a mator of international action has been the
policy of utter helplessness in the face of United Nations. The legitimacy of its de-
persistent patterns of human rights abuses cision to intervene is enhanced if UN con-
by particular regimes. demnations of human rights practices are
Reflecting these tensions, the rights of in- underlined by Al reports of systematic,
dividual states and the international com- gross, and persistent human rights violations
munity to involve themselves in human by a regime.
rights within the jurisdiction of other states
remains one of the most keenly contested

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 Amnesty International and the United Nations 157

7. Conclusion ing masses of information from member

The AI-UN complementarity can best be
expressed as follows. Only governments can
implement changes, so NGOs need govern- enforcement. Members produce their own
mental forums for the pursuit of their single- official reports for UN committees. If the AI
interest agendas. On the other hand,
governments are unlikely to abdicate volun-
tarily their own powers in any field of
human activity. Human rights claims are
claims by citizens on governments. They canAI, then international plaudit is denied to
be abused most systematically, pervasively,
and widely by governments. That is, the re-
lationship between governments and human
rights organizations is necessarily adversar- cated on the belief that government policy
ial. This is why IGOs are so peculiarly ill-
suited to the task of being the guardians of
human rights, and why NGOs are so much
better at monitoring human rights abuses
and state compliance with international
standards of human rights treatment.
The UN can proclaim the human rights
values that we hold dear; AI can monitor
compliance of state behaviour with these
lofty proclamations. In fact there has been a
complementarity of norm-generation and
standard-setting in a different and very
interesting sense. Al's impeccable record
has helped it to establish the principle that
states are responsible for the protection of
the human rights of their citizens and inter-
nationally accountable for any failures to do
so. Conversely, AI has also set the standard
against which the UN's own efforts at cen-
suring and preventing human rights abuses
are measured. In other words, there is now
a symbiotic relationship between the United
Nations and Amnesty International in the
establishment of new human rights stan-
dards and the implementation of existing
ones.
Another respect in which the United
Nations and Amnesty International are
complementary is in annual reports on
human rights practices by states. The su-
perior administrative capacities of the UN
mean that reporting requirements are better
vested in the IGO than in an NGO. Simi-
larly, the governmental character of the UN
makes it a more substantial forum for
formal investigation of serious human rights
breaches by national governments. The
United Nations collects almost overwhelm-
governments. Increasing bureaucratization
is helpful to the reporting role but not to
report is congruent with a government's
version, then the latter stands inter-
nationally corroborated. If the govern-
ment's claims are at variance with those of
the government (Williams, 1988, p. 123).
Being apolitical, AI is hostile to no
government or political philosophy. Predi-
can be changed by appeals to reason, AI
uses the techniques of courtesy and reason-
ableness alongside firmness and persistence.
The United Nations has the power to issue
authoritative edicts to regulate state behav-
iour. AI has only the weapon of publicity
and the threat of publicity. The whole
movement rests on the simple idea that
governments respond to public opinion. The
moral authority of AI would be weakened in
proportion to political bias and factual inac-
curacies.
Between them, the United Nations and
Amnesty International have chalked up
some achievements in the field of human
rights. National laws and international
instruments have been improved, some
people who were illegally imprisoned have
been freed and some victims of human
rights violations have been compensated.
The United Nations could perhaps do better
by creating a new post of a UN High Com-
missioner for Human Rights, equivalent to
the UN High Commissioner or Refugees,
to complement the UN mechanisms and
ensure a more coordinated and swifter UN
response (Al, 1992b). An active High Com-
missioner would give the United Nations a
far more public profile in this field, give a
human face to the organization's concern
with human rights, and enable a prominent
and committed individual to monitor com-
pliance with human rights requirements
with the full authority of the world body. It
is possible that member governments have
shied away from establishing such a post for
the very same reasons, since once again the
primary focus of the High Commissioner

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158 Ramesh Thakur

would be allegations of misbehaviour by abuses as a permanent blot on the human

member governments.7
In the meantime, NGOs like AI continue
to play a more effective role than the UN inimpact on world affairs by bringing joy to
human rights monitoring. Reasons for the
relatively greater success of AI include the
more intensely personal commitment of its
members, its cost-effectiveness and flexi-
bility of management and structure. At the
same time, liaising with the United Nations
enables Amnesty International to maximize
its own impact in world affairs, to express
ideas and promote programmes to a wider
audience and on a broader platform, and to
believe that it is an integral part of a global
network of decision-making structures.
The world needs NGOs so that they can
operate outside the framework of the states-
system in order to put pressure on states on
a variety of fronts, such as human rights
(AI) or the environment (Greenpeace). It
would be difficult to dispute the claim that
the world would be a less pleasant place to
live in today had there been no NGOs hold-
ing governments to account over the past 50
years.
Finally, AI is living proof that individuals
matter in international relations both as sub-
jects and objects. Writing in The Observer
on 26 May 1961, Peter Benenson called for a
one-year campaign for the release of 'The
Forgotten Prisoners' - people imprisoned
for political or religious beliefs and then for-
gotten by the media, the public, and even
the authorities. The campaign goes on. The
first effort at neutral research into political
imprisonment, the 1961 article sowed the
seeds of an idea whose time had come.
Sceptics doubted the impact of the John and
Jane Smiths of the world writing directly to
government leaders and expected the initial
impetus to flag. Instead they have watched
Al grow from an idea to an organization to
an institution. Its continuance is made
necessary by the persistence of human rights
abuses by governments: its 1992 report
listed human rights abuses in 142 countries.
Abuses of human rights have been an
enduring feature of human history every-
where. The continuing vitality of Amnesty
International is proof that people, ordinary
people, are no longer prepared to accept the
race anywhere in the world. Just one private
citizen with a good idea can make a visible
some and hope to many.
NOTES
1. The Western-universal dichotomy, while analyti-
cally useful, should be qualified. Gunnar Fermann,
in reviewing this article, noted that the UN Charter
too is indebted both politically and philosophically
to Western civilization: politically, due to the fact
that the Western countries dominated the UN Con-
ference in San Francisco in 1945; philosophically, in
that the Charter embodies the dominant Western
values of the time.
2. The basis of AI opposition can be distilled into four
propositions: the death penalty is brutalizing to all
who are involved in the process; its deterrent effect
remains unproven and questionable; execution is
irrevocable and can be inflicted upon the innocent;
in practice it is inflicted disproportionately heavily
on the poor, the minorities, and the oppressed.
3. The difference in wordings here between cultures
and countries is deliberate, but should not be taken
to imply that national cultures and states are homol-
ogues.
4. The terminology is borrowed from James N.
Rosenau. However, Rosenau uses sovereignty-
bound to refer to state actors, and sovereignty-free
to refer to non-state actors. Thus, in his definition,
international organizations are explicitly included in
the sovereignty-free category (Rosenau, 1990, p.
36). I find his terminology useful, but not his usage.
In the sense in which I am using it, the United
Nations is constrained by the sovereignty of its
member states, but Amnesty International is not so
bound.
5. For example, Bosnia's Foreign Minister Haris
Silajdzic pricked the conscience of many delegates
with a passionate description of the horrors taking
place in his country while they were busy extolling
progress in human rights.
6. However, the writings of traditional realist thinkers
like Hans J. Morgenthau and Robert E. Osgood
were infused with broad normative concerns that
were relegated by Cold War era 'scientific' realists
and neorealists (Kolodziej, 1992b, p. 421).
7. The idea of a UN High Commissioner for Refugees
was on the agenda of the Vienna Conference in June
1993. Staunchly backed by the EC, Japan, and the
United States, the proposal was resisted by devel-
oping countries. In the end, rather than scuttle the
conference on the issue, delegates entrusted the task
to the UN General Assembly (The Times, 26 June
1993).

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RAMESH THAKUR, b. 1948, PhD in Political Studies (Queen's University, Canada, 1978); Pro-
fessor, University of Otago (1980- ); Lecturer, University of the South Pacific (1978-79); Member,
Public Advisory Committee on Disarmament & Arms Control, New Zealand (1991- ). Among other
works, author of International Peacekeeping in Lebanon (Westview, 1987) and editor of International
Conflict Resolution (Westview, 1988).

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