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EN BANC

G.R. No. L-19550 June 19, 1967

HARRY S. STONEHILL, ROBERT P. BROOKS, JOHN J. BROOKS and KARL


BECK, petitioners,
vs.
HON. JOSE W. DIOKNO, in his capacity as SECRETARY OF JUSTICE; JOSE
LUKBAN, in his capacity as Acting Director, National Bureau of Investigation;
SPECIAL PROSECUTORS PEDRO D. CENZON, EFREN I. PLANA and MANUEL
VILLAREAL, JR. and ASST. FISCAL MANASES G. REYES; JUDGE AMADO ROAN,
Municipal Court of Manila; JUDGE ROMAN CANSINO, Municipal Court of Manila;
JUDGE HERMOGENES CALUAG, Court of First Instance of Rizal-Quezon City
Branch, and JUDGE DAMIAN JIMENEZ, Municipal Court of Quezon
City, respondents.

Paredes, Poblador, Cruz and Nazareno and Meer, Meer and Meer and Juan T. David
for petitioners.
Office of the Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Assistant Solicitor General Pacifico P.
de Castro, Assistant Solicitor General Frine C. Zaballero, Solicitor Camilo D. Quiason
and Solicitor C. Padua for respondents.

CONCEPCION, C.J.:

Upon application of the officers of the government named on the margin1 hereinafter
referred to as Respondents-Prosecutors several judges2 hereinafter referred to as
Respondents-Judges issued, on different dates,3 a total of 42 search warrants
against petitioners herein4 and/or the corporations of which they were officers,5 directed
to the any peace officer, to search the persons above-named and/or the premises of
their offices, warehouses and/or residences, and to seize and take possession of the
following personal property to wit:

Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, correspondence, receipts,


ledgers, journals, portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents
and/or papers showing all business transactions including disbursements
receipts, balance sheets and profit and loss statements and Bobbins (cigarette
wrappers).

as "the subject of the offense; stolen or embezzled and proceeds or fruits of the
offense," or "used or intended to be used as the means of committing the offense,"
which is described in the applications adverted to above as "violation of Central Bank
Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and the Revised Penal
Code."
2

Alleging that the aforementioned search warrants are null and void, as contravening the
Constitution and the Rules of Court because, inter alia: (1) they do not describe with
particularity the documents, books and things to be seized; (2) cash money, not
mentioned in the warrants, were actually seized; (3) the warrants were issued to fish
evidence against the aforementioned petitioners in deportation cases filed against them;
(4) the searches and seizures were made in an illegal manner; and (5) the documents,
papers and cash money seized were not delivered to the courts that issued the
warrants, to be disposed of in accordance with law on March 20, 1962, said
petitioners filed with the Supreme Court this original action for certiorari,
prohibition, mandamus and injunction, and prayed that, pending final disposition of the
present case, a writ of preliminary injunction be issued restraining Respondents-
Prosecutors, their agents and /or representatives from using the effects seized as
aforementioned or any copies thereof, in the deportation cases already adverted to, and
that, in due course, thereafter, decision be rendered quashing the contested search
warrants and declaring the same null and void, and commanding the respondents, their
agents or representatives to return to petitioners herein, in accordance with Section 3,
Rule 67, of the Rules of Court, the documents, papers, things and cash moneys seized
or confiscated under the search warrants in question.

In their answer, respondents-prosecutors alleged, 6 (1) that the contested search


warrants are valid and have been issued in accordance with law; (2) that the defects of
said warrants, if any, were cured by petitioners' consent; and (3) that, in any event, the
effects seized are admissible in evidence against herein petitioners, regardless of the
alleged illegality of the aforementioned searches and seizures.

On March 22, 1962, this Court issued the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for in the
petition. However, by resolution dated June 29, 1962, the writ was partially lifted or
dissolved, insofar as the papers, documents and things seized from the offices of the
corporations above mentioned are concerned; but, the injunction was maintained as
regards the papers, documents and things found and seized in the residences of
petitioners herein.7

Thus, the documents, papers, and things seized under the alleged authority of the
warrants in question may be split into two (2) major groups, namely: (a) those found and
seized in the offices of the aforementioned corporations, and (b) those found and seized
in the residences of petitioners herein.

As regards the first group, we hold that petitioners herein have no cause of action to
assail the legality of the contested warrants and of the seizures made in pursuance
thereof, for the simple reason that said corporations have their respective personalities,
separate and distinct from the personality of herein petitioners, regardless of the amount
of shares of stock or of the interest of each of them in said corporations, and whatever
the offices they hold therein may be.8 Indeed, it is well settled that the legality of a
seizure can be contested only by the party whose rights have been impaired
thereby,9 and that the objection to an unlawful search and seizure is purely
personal and cannot be availed of by third parties. 10 Consequently, petitioners herein
3

may not validly object to the use in evidence against them of the documents, papers
and things seized from the offices and premises of the corporations adverted to above,
since the right to object to the admission of said papers in evidence
belongsexclusively to the corporations, to whom the seized effects belong, and may not
be invoked by the corporate officers in proceedings against them in their individual
capacity. 11 Indeed, it has been held:

. . . that the Government's action in gaining possession of papers belonging to


the corporation did not relate to nor did it affect the personal defendants. If these
papers were unlawfully seized and thereby the constitutional rights of or any one
were invaded, they were the rights of the corporation and not the rights of
the other defendants. Next, it is clear that a question of the lawfulness of a
seizure can be raised only by one whose rights have been invaded. Certainly,
such a seizure, if unlawful, could not affect the constitutional rights of
defendants whose property had not been seized or the privacy of whose homes
had not been disturbed; nor could they claim for themselves the benefits of the
Fourth Amendment, when its violation, if any, was with reference to the rights
of another. Remus vs. United States (C.C.A.)291 F. 501, 511. It follows,
therefore, that the question of the admissibility of the evidence based on an
alleged unlawful search and seizure does not extend to the personal defendants
but embraces only the corporation whose property was taken. . . . (A
Guckenheimer & Bros. Co. vs. United States, [1925] 3 F. 2d. 786, 789, Emphasis
supplied.)

With respect to the documents, papers and things seized in the residences of
petitioners herein, the aforementioned resolution of June 29, 1962, lifted the writ of
preliminary injunction previously issued by this Court,12 thereby, in effect, restraining
herein Respondents-Prosecutors from using them in evidence against petitioners
herein.

In connection with said documents, papers and things, two (2) important questions need
be settled, namely: (1) whether the search warrants in question, and the searches and
seizures made under the authority thereof, are valid or not, and (2) if the answer to the
preceding question is in the negative, whether said documents, papers and things may
be used in evidence against petitioners herein.1wph1.t

Petitioners maintain that the aforementioned search warrants are in the nature of
general warrants and that accordingly, the seizures effected upon the authority there of
are null and void. In this connection, the Constitution13 provides:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no
warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge
after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses
he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.
4

Two points must be stressed in connection with this constitutional mandate, namely: (1)
that no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge in
the manner set forth in said provision; and (2) that the warrant shall particularly describe
the things to be seized.

None of these requirements has been complied with in the contested warrants. Indeed,
the same were issued upon applications stating that the natural and juridical person
therein named had committed a "violation of Central Ban Laws, Tariff and Customs
Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code." In other words,
nospecific offense had been alleged in said applications. The averments thereof with
respect to the offense committed were abstract. As a consequence, it
was impossible for the judges who issued the warrants to have found the existence of
probable cause, for the same presupposes the introduction of competent proof that the
party against whom it is sought has performed particular acts, or
committed specific omissions, violating a given provision of our criminal laws. As a
matter of fact, the applications involved in this case do not allege any specific acts
performed by herein petitioners. It would be the legal heresy, of the highest order, to
convict anybody of a "violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal
Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code," as alleged in the aforementioned
applications without reference to any determinate provision of said laws or

To uphold the validity of the warrants in question would be to wipe out completely one of
the most fundamental rights guaranteed in our Constitution, for it would place the
sanctity of the domicile and the privacy of communication and correspondence at the
mercy of the whims caprice or passion of peace officers. This is precisely the evil
sought to be remedied by the constitutional provision above quoted to outlaw the so-
called general warrants. It is not difficult to imagine what would happen, in times of keen
political strife, when the party in power feels that the minority is likely to wrest it, even
though by legal means.

Such is the seriousness of the irregularities committed in connection with the disputed
search warrants, that this Court deemed it fit to amend Section 3 of Rule 122 of the
former Rules of Court 14 by providing in its counterpart, under the Revised Rules of
Court 15 that "a search warrant shall not issue but upon probable cause in connection
with one specific offense." Not satisfied with this qualification, the Court added thereto a
paragraph, directing that "no search warrant shall issue for more than one specific
offense."

The grave violation of the Constitution made in the application for the contested search
warrants was compounded by the description therein made of the effects to be
searched for and seized, to wit:

Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, journals, correspondence,


receipts, ledgers, portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents
and/or papers showing all business transactions including disbursement receipts,
balance sheets and related profit and loss statements.
5

Thus, the warrants authorized the search for and seizure of records pertaining to all
business transactions of petitioners herein, regardless of whether the transactions
were legal or illegal. The warrants sanctioned the seizure of all records of the petitioners
and the aforementioned corporations, whatever their nature, thus openly contravening
the explicit command of our Bill of Rights that the things to be seized
be particularly described as well as tending to defeat its major objective: the
elimination of general warrants.

Relying upon Moncado vs. People's Court (80 Phil. 1), Respondents-Prosecutors
maintain that, even if the searches and seizures under consideration were
unconstitutional, the documents, papers and things thus seized are admissible in
evidence against petitioners herein. Upon mature deliberation, however, we are
unanimously of the opinion that the position taken in the Moncado case must be
abandoned. Said position was in line with the American common law rule, that the
criminal should not be allowed to go free merely "because the constable has
blundered," 16 upon the theory that the constitutional prohibition against unreasonable
searches and seizures is protected by means other than the exclusion of evidence
unlawfully obtained, 17 such as the common-law action for damages against the
searching officer, against the party who procured the issuance of the search warrant
and against those assisting in the execution of an illegal search, their criminal
punishment, resistance, without liability to an unlawful seizure, and such other legal
remedies as may be provided by other laws.

However, most common law jurisdictions have already given up this approach and
eventually adopted the exclusionary rule, realizing that this is the only practical means
of enforcing the constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures.
In the language of Judge Learned Hand:

As we understand it, the reason for the exclusion of evidence competent as such,
which has been unlawfully acquired, is that exclusion is the only practical way of
enforcing the constitutional privilege. In earlier times the action of trespass
against the offending official may have been protection enough; but that is true
no longer. Only in case the prosecution which itself controls the seizing officials,
knows that it cannot profit by their wrong will that wrong be repressed.18

In fact, over thirty (30) years before, the Federal Supreme Court had already declared:

If letters and private documents can thus be seized and held and used in
evidence against a citizen accused of an offense, the protection of the 4th
Amendment, declaring his rights to be secure against such searches and
seizures, is of no value, and, so far as those thus placed are concerned, might as
well be stricken from the Constitution. The efforts of the courts and their officials
to bring the guilty to punishment, praiseworthy as they are, are not to be aided by
the sacrifice of those great principles established by years of endeavor and
suffering which have resulted in their embodiment in the fundamental law of the
land.19
6

This view was, not only reiterated, but, also, broadened in subsequent decisions on the
same Federal Court. 20After reviewing previous decisions thereon, said Court held,
in Mapp vs. Ohio (supra.):

. . . Today we once again examine the Wolf's constitutional documentation of the


right of privacy free from unreasonable state intrusion, and after its dozen years
on our books, are led by it to close the only courtroom door remaining open to
evidence secured by official lawlessness in flagrant abuse of that basic right,
reserved to all persons as a specific guarantee against that very same unlawful
conduct. We hold that all evidence obtained by searches and seizures in violation
of the Constitution is, by that same authority, inadmissible in a State.

Since the Fourth Amendment's right of privacy has been declared enforceable
against the States through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth, it is
enforceable against them by the same sanction of exclusion as it used against
the Federal Government. Were it otherwise, then just as without the Weeks rule
the assurance against unreasonable federal searches and seizures would be "a
form of words," valueless and underserving of mention in a perpetual charter of
inestimable human liberties, so too, without that rule the freedom from state
invasions of privacy would be so ephemeral and so neatly severed from its
conceptual nexus with the freedom from all brutish means of coercing evidence
as not to permit this Court's high regard as a freedom "implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty." At the time that the Court held in Wolf that the amendment was
applicable to the States through the Due Process Clause, the cases of this Court
as we have seen, had steadfastly held that as to federal officers the Fourth
Amendment included the exclusion of the evidence seized in violation of its
provisions. Even Wolf "stoutly adhered" to that proposition. The right to when
conceded operatively enforceable against the States, was not susceptible of
destruction by avulsion of the sanction upon which its protection and enjoyment
had always been deemed dependent under the Boyd, Weeks and Silverthorne
Cases. Therefore, in extending the substantive protections of due process to all
constitutionally unreasonable searches state or federal it was logically and
constitutionally necessarily that the exclusion doctrine an essential part of the
right to privacy be also insisted upon as an essential ingredient of the right
newly recognized by the Wolf Case. In short, the admission of the new
constitutional Right by Wolf could not tolerate denial of its most important
constitutional privilege, namely, the exclusion of the evidence which an accused
had been forced to give by reason of the unlawful seizure. To hold otherwise is to
grant the right but in reality to withhold its privilege and enjoyment. Only last year
the Court itself recognized that the purpose of the exclusionary rule to "is to deter
to compel respect for the constitutional guaranty in the only effectively
available way by removing the incentive to disregard it" . . . .

The ignoble shortcut to conviction left open to the State tends to destroy the
entire system of constitutional restraints on which the liberties of the people rest.
Having once recognized that the right to privacy embodied in the Fourth
7

Amendment is enforceable against the States, and that the right to be secure
against rude invasions of privacy by state officers is, therefore constitutional in
origin, we can no longer permit that right to remain an empty promise. Because it
is enforceable in the same manner and to like effect as other basic rights secured
by its Due Process Clause, we can no longer permit it to be revocable at the
whim of any police officer who, in the name of law enforcement itself, chooses to
suspend its enjoyment. Our decision, founded on reason and truth, gives to the
individual no more than that which the Constitution guarantees him to the police
officer no less than that to which honest law enforcement is entitled, and, to the
courts, that judicial integrity so necessary in the true administration of justice.
(emphasis ours.)

Indeed, the non-exclusionary rule is contrary, not only to the letter, but also, to the spirit
of the constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures. To be sure,
if the applicant for a search warrant has competent evidence to establish probable
cause of the commission of a given crime by the party against whom the warrant is
intended, then there is no reason why the applicant should not comply with the
requirements of the fundamental law. Upon the other hand, if he has no such competent
evidence, then it is not possible for the Judge to find that there is probable cause, and,
hence, no justification for the issuance of the warrant. The only possible explanation
(not justification) for its issuance is the necessity of fishing evidence of the commission
of a crime. But, then, this fishing expedition is indicative of the absence of evidence to
establish a probable cause.

Moreover, the theory that the criminal prosecution of those who secure an illegal search
warrant and/or make unreasonable searches or seizures would suffice to protect the
constitutional guarantee under consideration, overlooks the fact that violations thereof
are, in general, committed By agents of the party in power, for, certainly, those
belonging to the minority could not possibly abuse a power they do not have.
Regardless of the handicap under which the minority usually but, understandably
finds itself in prosecuting agents of the majority, one must not lose sight of the fact that
the psychological and moral effect of the possibility 21 of securing their conviction, is
watered down by the pardoning power of the party for whose benefit the illegality had
been committed.

In their Motion for Reconsideration and Amendment of the Resolution of this Court
dated June 29, 1962, petitioners allege that Rooms Nos. 81 and 91 of Carmen
Apartments, House No. 2008, Dewey Boulevard, House No. 1436, Colorado Street, and
Room No. 304 of the Army-Navy Club, should be included among the premises
considered in said Resolution as residences of herein petitioners, Harry S. Stonehill,
Robert P. Brook, John J. Brooks and Karl Beck, respectively, and that, furthermore, the
records, papers and other effects seized in the offices of the corporations above
referred to include personal belongings of said petitioners and other effects under their
exclusive possession and control, for the exclusion of which they have a standing under
the latest rulings of the federal courts of federal courts of the United States. 22
8

We note, however, that petitioners' theory, regarding their alleged possession of and
control over the aforementioned records, papers and effects, and the alleged "personal"
nature thereof, has Been Advanced, notin their petition or amended petition herein, but
in the Motion for Reconsideration and Amendment of the Resolution of June 29, 1962.
In other words, said theory would appear to be readjustment of that followed in said
petitions, to suit the approach intimated in the Resolution sought to be reconsidered and
amended. Then, too, some of the affidavits or copies of alleged affidavits attached to
said motion for reconsideration, or submitted in support thereof, contain either
inconsistent allegations, or allegations inconsistent with the theory now advanced by
petitioners herein.

Upon the other hand, we are not satisfied that the allegations of said petitions said
motion for reconsideration, and the contents of the aforementioned affidavits and other
papers submitted in support of said motion, have sufficiently established the facts or
conditions contemplated in the cases relied upon by the petitioners; to warrant
application of the views therein expressed, should we agree thereto. At any rate, we do
not deem it necessary to express our opinion thereon, it being best to leave the matter
open for determination in appropriate cases in the future.

We hold, therefore, that the doctrine adopted in the Moncado case must be, as it is
hereby, abandoned; that the warrants for the search of three (3) residences of herein
petitioners, as specified in the Resolution of June 29, 1962, are null and void; that the
searches and seizures therein made are illegal; that the writ of preliminary injunction
heretofore issued, in connection with the documents, papers and other effects thus
seized in said residences of herein petitioners is hereby made permanent; that the writs
prayed for are granted, insofar as the documents, papers and other effects so seized in
the aforementioned residences are concerned; that the aforementioned motion for
Reconsideration and Amendment should be, as it is hereby, denied; and that the
petition herein is dismissed and the writs prayed for denied, as regards the documents,
papers and other effects seized in the twenty-nine (29) places, offices and other
premises enumerated in the same Resolution, without special pronouncement as to
costs.

It is so ordered.

Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar and Sanchez, JJ., concur.

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-69401 June 23, 1987

RIZAL ALIH, NASIM ALIH, AISAN ALIH, MIJAL ALIH, OMAR ALIH, EDRIS
MUKSAN, MULSIDI WARADIL, BILLY ASMAD RAMSID ASALI, BANDING USMAN,
9

ANGGANG HADANI, WARMIKHAN HAPA, GABRAL JIKIRI, ALLAN TAN,


MUJAHIRIN MARAJUKI, KENNEDY GONZALES, URDUJA ALIH, MERLA ALIH, and
NURAISA ALIH VDA DE FEROLINO, petitioners,
vs.
MAJOR GENERAL DELFIN C. CASTRO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS COMMANDER
SOUTHCOM AND REGIONAL UNIFIED COMMAND, REGION IX, ZAMBOANGA
CITY, COLONEL ERNESTO CALUPIG, IN HIS CAPACITY AS COMMANDING
OFFICER OF THE SPECIAL FORCES GROUP (AIRBORNE) AND INTERNAL
DEFENSE COMMAND, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS IdC MAJOR ARNOLD BLANCO IN
HIS CAPACITY AS COMMANDING OFFICER OF THE PHILIPPINE MARINES AND
1ST LIEUTENANT DARWIN GUERRA IN HIS CAPACITY AS ACTS SUPERVISOR,
INTERNAL DEFENSE COMMAND, ARMED FORCES OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.

CRUZ, J.:

On November 25, 1984, a contingent of more than two hundred Philippine marines and
elements of the home defense forces raided the compound occupied by the petitioners
at Gov. Alvarez street, Zamboanga City, in search of loose firearms, ammunition and
other explosives. 1

The military operation was commonly known and dreaded as a "zona," which was not
unlike the feared practice of the kempeitai during the Japanese Occupation of rounding
up the people in a locality, arresting the persons fingered by a hooded informer, and
executing them outright (although the last part is not included in the modern
refinement).

The initial reaction of the people inside the compound was to resist the invasion with a
burst of gunfire. No one was hurt as presumably the purpose was merely to warn the
intruders and deter them from entering. Unfortunately, as might be expected in incidents
like this, the situation aggravated soon enough. The soldiers returned fire and a bloody
shoot-out ensued, resulting in a number of casualties. 2

The besieged compound surrendered the following morning, and sixteen male
occupants were arrested, later to be finger-printed, paraffin-tested and photographed
over their objection. The military also inventoried and confiscated nine M16 rifles, one
M14 rifle, nine rifle grenades, and several rounds of ammunition found in the
premises. 3

On December 21, 1984, the petitioners came to this Court in a petition for prohibition
and mandamus with preliminary injunction and restraining order. Their purpose was to
recover the articles seized from them, to prevent these from being used as evidence
against them, and to challenge their finger-printing, photographing and paraffin-testing
as violative of their right against self-incrimination. 4
10

The Court, treating the petition as an injunction suit with a prayer for the return of the
articles alleged to have been illegally seized, referred it for hearing to Judge Omar U.
Amin of the regional trial court, Zamboanga City. 5After receiving the testimonial and
documentary evidence of the parties, he submitted the report and recommendations on
which this opinion is based. 6

The petitioners demand the return of the arms and ammunition on the ground that they
were taken without a search warrant as required by the Bill of Rights. This is confirmed
by the said report and in fact admitted by the respondents, "but with avoidance. 7

Article IV, Section 3, of the 1973 Constitution, which was in force at the time of the
incident in question, provided as follows:

Sec. 3. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,


papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of
whatever nature and for any purpose shall not be violated, and no search
warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined by the judge, or such other responsible officer as may be
authorized by law, after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.

It was also declared in Article IV, Section 4(2) that-

Sec. 4(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding


section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.

The respondents, while admitting the absence of the required such warrant, sought to
justify their act on the ground that they were acting under superior orders. 8 There was
also the suggestion that the measure was necessary because of the aggravation of the
peace and order problem generated by the assassination of Mayor Cesar Climaco. 9

Superior orders" cannot, of course, countermand the Constitution. The fact


that the petitioners were suspected of the Climaco killing did not excuse
the constitutional short-cuts the respondents took. As eloquently affirmed
by the U.S. Supreme Court in Ex parte Milligan: 10

The Constitution is a law for rulers and people, equally in war and in
peace, and covers with the shield of its protection all classes of men, at all
times and under all circumstances. No doctrine, involving more pernicious
consequences, was ever invented by the wit of man than that any of its
provisions can be suspended during any of the great exigencies of
government.
11

The precarious state of lawlessness in Zamboanga City at the time in question certainly
did not excuse the non-observance of the constitutional guaranty against unreasonable
searches and seizures. There was no state of hostilities in the area to justify, assuming
it could, the repressions committed therein against the petitioners.

It is so easy to say that the petitioners were outlaws and deserved the arbitrary
treatment they received to take them into custody; but that is a criminal argument. It is
also fallacious. Its obvious flaw lies in the conclusion that the petitioners were
unquestionably guilty on the strength alone of unsubstantiated reports that they were
stockpiling weapons.

The record does not disclose that the petitioners were wanted criminals or fugitives from
justice. At the time of the "zona," they were merely suspected of the mayor's slaying and
had not in fact even been investigated for it. As mere suspects, they were presumed
innocent and not guilty as summarily pronounced by the military.

Indeed, even if were assumed for the sake of argument that they were guilty, they would
not have been any less entitled to the protection of the Constitution, which covers both
the innocent and the guilty. This is not to say, of course, that the Constitution coddles
criminals. What it does simply signify is that, lacking the shield of innocence, the guilty
need the armor of the Constitution, to protect them, not from a deserved sentence, but
from arbitrary punishment. Every person is entitled to due process. It is no exaggeration
that the basest criminal, ranged against the rest of the people who would condemn him
outright, is still, under the Bill of Rights, a majority of one.

If the respondents did not actually disdain the Constitution when they made their illegal
raid, they certainly gave every appearance of doing so. This is truly regrettable for it was
incumbent on them, especially during those tense and tindery times, to encourage
rather than undermine respect for the law, which it was their duty to uphold.

In acting as they did, they also defied the precept that "civilian authority is at all times
supreme over the military" so clearly proclaimed in the 1973 Constitution. 11 In the
instant case, the respondents simply by-passed the civil courts, which had the authority
to determine whether or not there was probable cause to search the petitioner's
premises. Instead, they proceeded to make the raid without a search warrant on their
own unauthorized determination of the petitioner's guilt.

The respondents cannot even plead the urgency of the raid because it was in fact not
urgent. They knew where the petitioners were. They had every opportunity to get a
search warrant before making the raid. If they were worried that the weapons inside the
compound would be spirited away, they could have surrounded the premises in the
meantime, as a preventive measure. There was absolutely no reason at all why they
should disregard the orderly processes required by the Constitution and instead insist
on arbitrarily forcing their way into the petitioner's premises with all the menace of a
military invasion.
12

Conceding that the search was truly warrantless, might not the search and seizure be
nonetheless considered valid because it was incidental to a legal arrest? Surely not. If
all the law enforcement authorities have to do is force their way into any house and then
pick up anything they see there on the ground that the occupants are resisting arrest,
then we might as well delete the Bill of Rights as a fussy redundancy.

When the respondents could have easily obtained a search warrant from any of the
TEN civil courts then open and functioning in Zamboanga City, 12 they instead simply
barged into the beleaguered premises on the verbal order of their superior officers. One
cannot just force his way into any man's house on the illegal orders of a superior,
however lofty his rank. Indeed, even the humblest hovel is protected from official
intrusion because of the ancient rule, revered in all free regimes, that a man's house is
his castle.

It may be frail; its roof may shake; the wind may enter; the rain may enter.
But the King of England may not enter. All the forces of the Crown dare
not cross the threshold of the ruined tenement. 13

If the arrest was made under Rule 113, Section 5, of the Rules of Court in connection
with a crime about to be committed, being committed, or just committed, what was that
crime? There is no allegation in the record of such a justification. Parenthetically, it may
be observed that under the Revised Rule 113, Section 5(b), the officer making the
arrest must have personal knowledge of the ground therefor as stressed in the recent
case of People v. Burgos. 14

If follows that as the search of the petitioners' premises was violative of the Constitution,
all the firearms and ammunition taken from the raided compound are inadmissible in
evidence in any of the proceedings against the petitioners. These articles are "fruits of
the poisonous tree. 15 As Judge Learned Hand observed, "Only in case the prosecution
which itself controls the seizing officials, knows that it cannot profit by their wrong, will
the wrong be repressed. 16 Pending determination of the legality of such articles,
however, they shall remain in custodia legis, subject to such appropriate disposition as
the corresponding courts may decide. 17

The objection to the photographing, fingerprinting and paraffin-testing of the petitioners


deserves slight comment. The prohibition against self-incrimination applies to
testimonial compulsion only. As Justice Holmes put it in Holt v. United States, 18 "The
prohibition of compelling a man in a criminal court to be a witness against himself is a
prohibition of the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort communications from
him, not an exclusion of his body as evidence when it may be material."

The fearful days of hamleting salvaging, "zona" and other dreaded operations should
remain in the past, banished with the secret marshals and their covert license to kill
without trial. We must be done with lawlessness in the name of law enforcement. Those
who are supposed to uphold the law must not be the first to violate it. As Chief Justice
Claudio Teehankee stressed in his concurring opinion in Lacanilao v. De Leon, 19 "It is
13

time that the martial law regime's legacy of the law of force be discarded and that there
be a return to the force and rule of law."

All of us must exert efforts to make our country truly free and democratic, where every
individual is entitled to the full protection of the Constitution and the Bill of Rights can
stand as a stolid sentinel for all, the innocent as well as the guilty, including the basest
of criminals.

WHEREFORE, the search of the petitioners' premises on November 25, 1984, is hereby
declared ILLEGAL and all the articles seized as a result thereof are inadmissible in
evidence against the petitioners in any proceedings. However, the said articles shall
remain in custodia legis pending the outcome of the criminal cases that have been or
may later be filed against the petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee, C.J., Yap, Fernan, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Paras,


Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento and Cortes, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 117487 December 12, 1995

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,


vs.
ARNEL ALICANDO y BRIONES, accused-appellant.

PUNO, J.:

The case at bar involves the imposition of the death penalty. With all our frailties, we are
asked to play the role of an infallible God by exercising the divine right to give or take
away life. We cannot err in the exercise of our judgment for our error will be irrevocable.
Worse, our error can result in the worst of crimes murder by the judiciary.

The records reveal that appellant Arnel Alicando was charged with the crime of rape
with homicide 1 in an Information which reads:

That on or about the 12th day of June 1994 in the City of Iloilo, Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of this Court, said accused, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously and by means of force, violence and
intimidation to wit: by then and there pinning down one KHAZIE MAE
PENECILLA, a minor, four years of age, choking her with his right hand,
succeeded in having carnal knowledge with her and as a result thereof
she suffered asphyxia by strangulation fractured cervical vertebra and
14

lacerations of the vaginal and rectal openings causing profuse


hemorrhages and other injuries which are necessarily fatal and which
were the direct cause of her death.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

On June 29, 1994, appellant was arraigned with the assistance of Atty. Rogelio
Antiquiera of the PAO, Department of Justice. Appellant pleaded guilty.

After appellant's plea of guilt, the trial court ordered the prosecution to present its
evidence. It also set the case for reception of evidence for the appellant, if he so
desired. 2

The prosecution evidence shows that in the afternoon of June 12, 1994, Romeo
Penecilla, father of the four year old victim Khazie Mae, was drinking liquor with Ramil
Rodriguez and Remus Gaddi in his (Penecilla's) house at Barangay Rizal, Zone 1, Pulo
Bala, Iloilo. Appellant joined them but every now and then would take leave and return.
Appellant was living in his uncle's house some five (5) arm's length from Penecilla's
house. At about 4:30 p.m., Penecilla's group stopped drinking and left.

Luisa Rebada also lives in the Penecilla neighborhood, about one and a half (1-1/2)
arm's length from the house of appellant. At about 5:30 p.m. of that day, she saw the
victim at the window of appellant's house. She offered to buy her "yemas" but appellant
closed the window. Soon she heard the victim crying. She approached appellant's
house and peeped through an opening between its floor and door. The sight shocked
her appellant was naked, on top of the victim, his left hand choking her neck. She
retreated to her house in fright. She gathered her children together and informed her
compadre, Ricardo Lagrana, then in her house, about what she saw. Lagrana was also
overcome with fear and hastily left.

Romeo Penecilla returned to his house at 8 o'clock in the evening. He did not find
Khazie Mae. He and his wife searched for her until 1 o'clock in the morning. Their effort
was fruitless. Rebada was aware that the Penecillas were looking for their daughter but
did not tell them what she knew. Instead, Relada called out appellant from her window
and asked him the time Khazie Mae left his house. Appellant replied he was drunk and
did not know.

As the sun started to rise, another neighbor, Leopoldo Santiago went down from his
house to answer the call of nature. He discovered the lifeless body of Khazie Mae under
his house. Her parents were informed and so was the police. At 9:00 a.m., Rebada
suffered a change of heart. She informed Romeo Penecilla and his wife Julie Ann, that
appellant committed the crime. Forthwith, appellant was arrested and interrogated by
PO3 Danilo Tan. He verbally confessed his guilt without the assistance of counsel. On
the basis of his uncounselled verbal confession and follow up interrogations, the police
came to know and recovered from appellant's house, Khazie Mae's green slippers, a
15

pair of gold earrings, a buri mat, a stained pillow and a stained T-shirt all of which were
presented as evidence for the prosecution.

The body of Khazie Mae was autopsied by Dr. Tito Doromal, a medico-legal officer. His
autopsy report reveals the following injuries sustained by the victim:

HEAD & NECK/THORACO-ABDOMINAL REGIONS:

1) Contusion , purple in color, 11 x 11.3 cm., in dia., from left and right
anterior neck, down to the medial portion of the left and right
infraclavicular area.

2) Contusion, bluish purple, 5.5 x 6.3 cm., in dia., antero-lateral left chest
wall.

3) Contusion, bluish in color, 3 in nos., 1, 0.5 & 1.1 cm., in dia., right
antero- inferior chest wall.

4) Contusion, purple in color, 4 x 3.2 cm., in dia., left sub-costal arch.

5) Contusion, purple in color, 4.5 x 5 cm., in dia., supero-lateral, left iliac


crest.

ON OPENING THE SKULL 7 THORACO-ABDOMINAL


CAVITIES:

a) Fractured, 2nd cervical vertebra.

b) Fractured, crecoid cartilage.

c) Both lungs, expanded with multiple petechial


hemorrhages.

d) Other internal organs, congested.

EXTREMITIES:

1) Confluent abrasion, 3 x 2.6 cm., in dia., posterior aspect,


lower 3rd, left forearm.

2) Old wound, 2 x 1.5 cm., in dia., posterior middle 3rd, left


forearm.

3) Old wound, 1.5 x 1 cm., in dia., antero-lateral aspect,


middle 3rd, right forearm.
16

VAGINAL FINDINGS/ANAL FINDINGS:

a) Lacerated wound, from the fourchette up to the dome of


the rectum..

b) Hematoma, from the fourchette up to the rectum.

c) Lacerated wound, lateral wall of the vagina up to the level


of the promontory of the sacrum with a length of 8
centimeters.

d) A cylinder with a diameter of 2 cms., easily passes the


vaginal and anal openings.

CAUSE OF DEATH:

A) ASPHYXIA BY STRANGULATION.

B) FRACTURED, 2nd CERVICAL VERTEBRA.

C) HEMORRHAGE, 2nd DEGREE TO LACERATED


VAGINAL & RECTAL OPENINGS.

Appellant adopted the autopsy report of Dr. Doromal as his documentary evidence to
prove that the proximate cause of Khazie Mae's death was asphyxia by strangulation.

On July 20, 1994, the trial court found appellant guilty and sentenced him to death, viz:

WHEREFORE, the court hereby finds the accused, Arnel Alicando,


GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt for (sic) the Crime of Rape with
Homicide penalized under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code as
amended by paragraphs 6 and 7 (No. 4) Section 11 of Republic Act No.
7659. Arnel Alicando is hereby sentenced to suffer a (sic) penalty of death
and to indemnify the heirs of the offended party, Khazie Mae D. Penecilla,
the sum of P50,000.00.

The death sentence shall be executed by putting the person under


sentence to death by electrocution (electric chair). As soon as facilities are
provided by the Bureau of Prisons, the method of carrying out his
sentence shall be changed by gas poisoning (sic).

Here ends Khazie Mae's quest for justice. Her tormentor must suffer for
the grievous offense he had committed. He deserves no mercy.

Cost against the accused.


17

SO ORDERED.

The case is before us on automatic review considering the death penalty imposed by
the trial court. A new counsel, Atty. Joel Tiongco, took the cudgel for appellant. In his
Brief, appellant assails the decision of the trial court as a travesty of justice.

We find that the Decision of the trial court sentencing the appellant to death is shot full
of errors, both substantive and procedural. The conviction is on an amalgam of
inadmissible and incredible evidence and supported by scoliotic logic.

First. The arraignment of the appellant is null and void. The trial judge failed to follow
section (1) (a) of Rule 116 on arraignment. Said section provides:

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 1. Arraignment and plea; how made.

(a) The accused must be arraigned before the court where the complaint
or information has been filed or assigned for trial. The arraignment must
be made in open court by the judge or clerk by furnishing the accused a
copy of the complaint or information with the list of witnesses, reading the
same in the language or dialect known to him and asking him whether he
pleads guilty or not guilty. The prosecutor may, however, call at the trial
witnesses other than those named in the complaint or information.

The reading of the complaint or information to the appellant in the language or


dialect known to him is a new requirement imposed by the 1985 Rules on
Criminal Procedure. It implements the constitutional right of an appellant ". . . to
be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him." 3 The new
rule also responds to the reality that the Philippines is a country divided by
dialects and Pilipino as a national language is still in the process of
evolution. 4 Judicial notice can be taken of the fact that many Filipinos have
limited understanding either of the Pilipino or English language, our official
languages for purposes of communication and instruction. 5 The importance of
reading the complaint or information to the appellant in the language or dialect
known to him cannot thus be understated.

In the case at bar, the records do not reveal that the Information against the appellant
was read in the language or dialect known to him. The Information against the appellant
is written in the English language. It is unbeknown whether the appellant knows the
English language. Neither is it known what dialect is understood by the appellant. Nor is
there any showing that the Information couched in English was translated to the
appellant in his own dialect before his plea of guilt. The scanty transcript during his
arraignment, reads: 6

xxx xxx xxx


18

Prosecutor Edwin Fama Appearing as public prosecutor

Atty. Rogelio Antiquiera For the accused, Your Honor. Ready for
arraignment.

Interpreter (Reading the information to the accused for arraignment and


pre-trial.)

Note: (After reading the information to the accused, accused pleads guilty)

One need not draw a picture to show that the arraignment of the appellant is a
nullity. It violated section 1(a) of Rule 116, the rule implementing the
constitutional right of the appellant to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him. It also denied appellant his constitutional right to due
process of law. 7 It is urged that we must presume that the arraignment of the
appellant was regularly conducted. When life is at stake, we cannot lean on this
rebuttable presumption. We cannot assume. We must be sure.

Second. The plea of guilt made by the appellant is likewise null and void. The trial court
violated section 3 of Rule 116 when it accepted the plea of guilt of the appellant. Said
section provides:

Sec. 3. Plea of guilty to capital offense; reception of evidence.

When the accused pleads guilty to a capital offense, the court shall
conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension
of the consequences of his plea and require the prosecution to prove his
guilt and the precise degree of culpability. The accused may also present
evidence in his behalf.

The records reveal how the trial judge inadequately discharged this duty of
conducting a "searching inquiry." In the hearing of June 28, 1994, the transcripts
reveal the following: 8

Note (After reading the information to the


accused, accused pleads guilty.)

Court Question (sic) of the court to the


accused.

Q Considering that this is a crime and under


the amended law is a heinous crime, because
of your plea of guilty without the consent or
even against the discretion of the court, the
court will give you a mandatory death penalty
19

because of the crime charged, do you


understand?

Accused Yes, Your Honor.

Q Did you enter a plea of guilty on your own


voluntary will or without any force or
intimidation from any one or whatever?

Accused None, Your Honor.

Q Are you sure?

Accused Yes, Your Honor.

Q Or maybe because you were manhandled or


maltreated by anyone and that will just be the
consideration for you to plead guilty?

Accused No, Your Honor.

Court Were you not manhandled, please let us


see your body?

Note (Accused raised his prison uniform or


shirt and showed to the court his body from
waist up.)

Accused No, Your Honor.

Court You were not maltreated in the jail?

Accused No, Your Honor.

Court Please let us see whether you have


bruises so that you will be examined by a
physician to the order of the court?

Accused No, Your Honor.

Court If you will plead guilty, that plea of guilty


has no use because there will be a mandatory
death penalty, do you still insist on your plea of
guilty?

Accused Yes, Your Honor.


20

Court If you plead guilty to the crime charged


there will be some effects on your civil rights
hut not until the decision will be affirmed by the
Supreme Court.

Accused Yes, Your Honor.

Note (See Order dated June 28, 1994 attached


to the records of this case.)

In the next hearing on July 11, 1994, the following verbal exchange
transpired, viz: 9

xxx xxx xxx

Fiscal Fama: Appearing as the public


prosecutor, ready, Your Honor.

Our first witness is Dr. Tito Doromal, Your


Honor.

Atty. Antiquiera: For the accused, Your Honor.

Court Before the court will proceed with the


reception of evidence by the prosecution Arnel
Alicando, please come here. (at this juncture,
Arnel Alicando, come near to the court)

The court is warning you again that this is


reception of evidence by the prosecution after
you plead guilty to the crime charged at, do
you understand?

A Yes.

Q Do you still affirm and confirm to your plea of


guilty of rape with homicide?

A Yes, Your Honor.

Q Do you still insist that your plea of guilty is


voluntary without force, intimidation or
whatsoever?

A Yes.
21

Q The court is warning you that after reception


of evidence, the imposable penalty is
mandatory death?

A Yes, Your Honor.

Q Despite of that, you still insist on your plea of


guilty?

A Yes, Your Honor.

Court Okey, proceed.

Section 3 of Rule 116 which the trial court violated is not a new rule for it merely
incorporated the decision of this Court in People vs. Apduhan, Jr., 10 and reiterated in an
unbroken line of cases. 11 The bottom line of the rule is that the plea of guilt must be
based on a free and informed judgment. Thus, the searching inquiry of the trial court
must be focused on: (1) the voluntariness of the plea, and (2) the full comprehension of
the consequences of the plea. The questions of the trial court failed to show the
voluntariness of the plea of guilt of the appellant nor did the questions demonstrate
appellant's full comprehension of the consequences of his plea. The records do not
reveal any information about the personality profileof the appellant which can serve as a
trustworthy index of his capacity to give a free and informed plea of guilt. The age,
socio-economic status, and educational background of the appellant were not plumbed
by the trial court. The questions were framed in English yet there is no inkling that
appellant has a nodding acquaintance of English. It will be noted too that the trial court
did not bother to explain to the appellant the essential elements of the crime of rape with
homicide.

A cursory examination of the questions of the trial court to establish the voluntariness of
appellant's plea of guilt will show their utter insufficiency. The trial court simply inquired
if appellant had physical marks of maltreatment. It did not ask the appellant when he
was arrested, who arrested him, how and where he was interrogated, whether he was
medically examined before and after his interrogation, etc. It limited its efforts trying to
discover late body marks of maltreatment as if involuntariness is caused by physical
abuse alone. Regretfully, it even turned a blind eye on the following damning entry on
the June 13, 1994 Record of Events of the Iloilo PNP (Exh. "M") showing that after his
arrest, the appellant was mobbed by inmates while in jail and had suffered hematoma,
viz:

c-0262-94

INFORMATION

2:50 PM, P02 Salvador Pastoloro, Jr., PNP assigned at 327th PNP
MFC, informed this office thru SPO1 W. Garcera alleging that at about
22

9:00 AM this date when the suspect ARNEL ALICANDO Y BRIONES, 24


yrs. old, residence of Rizal, Palapala Zone I, CP, been arrested and
mobbed by the irrate residents of Zone II Rizal, Palapala, GP, in
connection of the Rape with Homicide case wherein the victim KHAZIE
MAE PENECILLA Y DRILON, 4 yrs, old, residence of same place who
was discovered dead under the house thereat. Suspect when turned over
to this office and put on lock up cell was also mobbed by the angry
inmates thus causing upon him hematoma contusion on different parts of
his body.

Likewise, the trial court's effort to determine whether appellant had full comprehension
of the consequences of his plea is fatally flawed. It warned the appellant he would get
the mandatory death penalty without explaining the meaning of "mandatory" It did not
inform the appellant of the indemnity he has to pay for the death of the victim. It
cautioned appellant there ". . . will be some effects on your civil rights" without telling the
appellant what those "effects" are and what "civil rights" of his are involved.

Appellant's plea of guilt is void and the trial court erred in using it to sentence him to
death. We stress that under the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, a conviction in
capital offenses cannot rest alone on a plea of guilt. Section 3 of Rule 116 requires that
after a free and intelligent plea of guilt, the trial court must require the prosecution to
prove the guilt of the appellant and the precise degree of his culpability beyond
reasonable doubt. This rule modifies prior jurisprudence that a plea of guilt even in
capital offenses is sufficient to sustain a conviction charged in the information without
need of further proof. The change is salutary for it enhances one of the goals of the
criminal process which is to minimize erroneous conviction. We share the stance that "it
is a fundamental value determination of our system that it is far worse to convict an
innocent person than let a guilty man go free. 12

Third. Some prosecution evidence, offered independently of the plea of guilt of the
appellant, were inadmissible, yet, were considered by the trial court in convicting the
appellant.

Thus, the trial court gave full faith and credit to the physical evidence presented by the
prosecution. To quote its Decision, 13 viz:

xxx xxx xxx

Further, there are physical evidence to prove Khazie was raped. These
consists of a pillow with bloodstains in its center 14 and the T-shirt 15 of the
accused colored white with bloodstains on its bottom. These physical
evidence are evidence of the highest order. They strongly corroborate the
testimony of Luisa Rebada that the victim was raped.

These are inadmissible evidence for they were gathered by PO3 Danilo Tan of
the Iloilo City PNP as a result of custodial interrogation
23

where appellant verbally confessed to the crime without the benefit of counsel.
PO3 Tan admitted under cross-examination, viz: 16

xxx xxx xxx

CROSS-EXAMINATION
BY ATTY. ANTIQUIERA:

Q Mr. Witness, when for the first time did you


see Arnel Alicando?

A June 13, 1994, when I arrested him.

Q Previous to that you have never seen him?

A Yes, sir.

Q When for the first time did you start


investigating Arnel Alicando?

A After I finished investigating the body of the


victim, Khazie Mae Penecilla.

Q And that was also after you were informed


that Arnel Alicando was a suspect in the raping
of Khazie Mae Penecilla?

A Yes, sir

Atty. Antiquiera:

Q And who was that person who informed you


of the suspect?

A Luisa Rebada.

Q Mrs. Rebada who is the witness in this


case?

A Yes, sir.

Q And you started investigating Arnel Alicando


in the morning of June 13, 1994?

A Yes, sir.
24

Q How long did you interrogate Arnel Alicando


in the morning of June 13, 1994?

A I cannot remember the length of time I


investigated him.

Q Did it take you the whole morning of June


13, 1994 in interrogating and investigating
Arnel Alicando?

A Yes, sir.

Q And the investigation you conducted


continued in the afternoon of the same date?

A Yes, sir.

Q The following day, June 14, 1994, you still


investigated and interrogated Arnel Alicando.

A Yes, sir.

Q And when did you stop, finally, investigating


and interrogating Arnel Alicando?

A After I finished recovering all the exhibits in


relation to this case.

Q What date did you stop your investigation?

A June 14, 1994, when I finished recovering


the white T-shirt and pair of earring.

Atty. Antiquiera:

Q You testified in this case, Mr. Witness, you


never informed the court that you apprised the
accused of his constitutional rights, is that
correct?

A I apprised him.

Q My question is, during your testimony before


this court under the direct examination of the
prosecution you never informed the court that
25

you apprised the accused of his constitutional


rights?

Pros. Fama:

I did not ask him that question. How will he


answer?

Court:

Sustained.

Atty. Antiquiera:

Q When did you inform, the date when you


informed Alicando of his Constitutional rights?

A On June 13.

Q On what hour did you inform him?

A After the witness identified him.

Q What constitutional rights did you inform


Alicando of?

A The right to remain silent, and right to get his


lawyer and I have interpreted in Visayan
language.

Q And during your investigation for almost two


(2) days the accused was never represented
by counsel, is that correct?

A Yes, sir.

Atty. Antiquiera:

Q Are you aware of the law that enjoins a


public officer to inform the person of his
constitutional rights?

A Yes, sir.

That is all, Your Honor.


26

It is now familiar learning that the Constitution has stigmatized


as inadmissible evidence uncounselledconfession or admission. Section 12
paragraphs (1) and (3) of Article III of the Constitution provides:

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an
offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and
to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice.
If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided
with one.These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the
presence of counsel.

xxx xxx xxx

(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or the


preceding section shall be inadmissible against him.

In the case at bar, PO3 Tan did not even have the simple sense to reduce the all
important confession of the appellant in writing. Neither did he present any writing
showing that appellant waived his right to silence and to have competent and
independent counsel despite the blatant violation of appellant's constitutional right, the
trial court allowed his uncounselled confession to flow into the records and illicitly used it
in sentencing him to death.

It is not only the uncounselled confession that is condemned as inadmissible, but also
evidence derived therefrom. The pillow and the T-shirt with the alleged bloodstains were
evidence derived from the uncounselled confession illegally extracted by the police from
the appellant. Again, the testimony of PO3 Tan makes this all clear, viz: 17

xxx xxx xxx

Q Did the accused Arnel Alicando accompany you to the


place of the incident?

A Yes, sir.

Q When you arrived at the place of the incident what did you
do?

A He pointed to the fish basin.

Q Can you identify this fish basin which you said pointed to
you by Arnel Alicando?

A Yes, sir.
27

Q Please point?

A (Witness pointing to the fish basin already marked as


Exhibit "H".)

Q Did you ask the accused what he did with this fish basin?

A I asked the accused what he did with the fish basin and he
answered that he used the fish basin to cover Khazie Mae
Penecilla when she was already dead.

Pros. Fama:

Q You mean to say to conceal the crime?

A Yes, sir.

Q What else aside from this fish basin, what else did you
recover?

A At around 7 o'clock in the evening he further pointed to us


the old mat and the pillowwherein he layed the victim Khazie
Mae Penecilla

Q You mean to say that you returned back to the scene of


the incident that time?

A It was already night time and it was only Kagawad Rodolfo


Ignacio, my companion, who went to the place of the
incident.

Q You mean to say you were verbally instructed by the


accused?

A Yes, sir.

Q In what particular place did you recover those things?

A Inside the room where he raped the child.

Q Whose house is that?

A The house of Imelda Alicando.

Q The wife of Romeo Alicando?


28

A Yes, sir.

Q In what particular place is that situated?

A Inside the room where the accused was sleeping at Rizal-


Palapala.

Pros. Fama:

Q You mean to say inside that room the victim was raped by
the accused?

A Yes, sir.

Q Can you point that pillow which you said you recovered
inside the room of Imelda Alicando?

A Yes, sir.

Q And the mat?

A (Witness taking out from the fish basin the mat and pillow.)

Q Did you find something on the pillow?

A The pillow have bloodstain in the middle.

. . This was already marked as Exhibit "J", Your Honor and


the mat as Exhibit "I".

Q Aside from this what did you recover from the place of
incident?

A On June 14, 1994, at about 10:00 o'clock in the morning


the accused Arnel Alicando further informed me that he kept
the gold earring of the victim and her clothes inside the room
of the house of Imelda Alicando.

Q Where?

A I saw the clothes of Khazie Mae Penecilla inside the room


where the rape took place hanged on the clothes line. And I
found the pair of earring at the bamboo post of the fence.

Court:
29

Q Where is that bamboo post of the fence situated?

A Around the fence of Imelda Alicando situated at the from


gate on the right side.

Pros. Fama:

Q You mean to say you returned back on June 14, you


recovered the items accompanied by the accused?

A No more, I only followed his direction.

Q He made verbal direction to you?

A Yes, sir.

Q Can you please show us the white t-shirt?

A (Witness taking out a white t-shirt from the fish basin.)

Q Please examine that white t-shirt?

A The t-shirt have a bloodstain.

We have not only constitutionalized the Miranda warnings in our jurisdiction. We


have also adopted the libertarian exclusionary rule known as the "fruit of the
poisonous tree," a phrase minted by Mr. Justice Felix Frankfurter in the
celebrated case of Nardone v. United States. 18 According to this rule, once the
primary source (the "tree") is shown to have been unlawfully obtained,
any secondary or derivative evidence (the " fruit " ) derived from it is also
inadmissible. 19 Stated otherwise, illegally seized evidence is obtained as a direct
result of the illegal act, whereas the "fruit of the poisonous tree" is the indirect
result of the same illegal act. The "fruit of the poisonous tree" is at least once
removed from the illegally seized evidence, but it is equally inadmissible. The
rule is based on the principle that evidence illegally obtained by the State should
not be used to gain other evidence because the originally illegally obtained
evidence taints all evidence subsequently obtained. 20 We applied this
exclusionary rule in the recent case of People vs. Salanga, et al., 21 a ponencia of
Mr. Justice Regalado. Salanga was the appellant in the rape and killing of a 15-
year old barrio lass. He was, however, illegally arrested. Soldiers took him into
custody. They gave him a body search which yielded a lady's underwear. The
underwear was later identified as that of the victim. We acquitted Salanga.
Among other reasons , we ruled that "the underwear allegedly taken from the
appellant is inadmissible in evidence, being a so-called "fruit of the poisonous
tree." 22
30

But even assuming arguendo that the pillow and the t-shirt were admissible evidence,
still, the trial court erred in holding that they "strongly corroborated the testimony of
Luisa Rebada that the victim was raped." For one, there was no basis for the trial court
to conclude that the stains on the pillow and t-shirt were human bloodstains. The pillow
and the t-shirt were not examined by any expert. To hold that they were human
bloodstains is guesswork. For another, there was no testimony that the stains were
caused by either the blood of the appellant or the victim. In addition, there was no
testimony that the t-shirt was the one worn by the appellant when he allegedly
committed the crime. It must also be noted that it is not unnatural for appellant to have
bloodstains on his shirt. He is a butcher by occupation. Romeo Penecilla himself, the
father of the victim, testified he knows the appellant "because he used to accompany
me during butchering of animals." 23

The burden to prove that an accused waived his right to remain silent and the right to
counsel before making a confession under custodial interrogation rests with the
prosecution. It is also the burden of the prosecution to show that the evidence derived
from confession is not tainted as "fruit of the poisonous tree." The burden has to be
discharged by clear and convincing evidence. Indeed, par. 1 of Section 12 of Article III
of the Constitution provides only one mode of waiver the waiver must be in writing
and in the presence of counsel. In the case at bar, the records show that the
prosecution utterly failed to discharge this burden. It matters not that in the course of the
hearing, the appellant failed to make a timely objection to the introduction of these
constitutionally proscribed evidence. The lack of objection did not satisfy the heavy
burden of proof that rested on the prosecution.

There is no and there ought not to be any disagreement on basic principles. The Court
should be concerned with the heinousness of the crime at bar and its despicable
perpetration against a 4-year old girl, an impersonation of innocence itself. The Court
should also be concerned with the multiplication of malevolence in our midst for there is
no right to be evil, and there are no ifs and buts about the imposition of the death
penalty as long as it remains unchallenged as part of the laws of our land. These
concerns are permanent, norms hewn in stone, and they transcend the transitoriness of
time.

Be that as it may, our commitment to the criminal justice system is not only to convict
and punish violators of our laws. We are equally committed to the ideal that the process
of detection, apprehension, conviction and incarceration of criminals should be
accomplished with fairness, and without impinging on the dignity of the individual. In a
death penalty case, the Court cannot rush to judgment even when a lowlife is involved
for an erroneous conviction will leave a lasting stain in our escutcheon of justice.

In sum, the Court cannot send the appellant to die in the electric chair on the basis of
the procedural irregularities committed by, and the inadmissible evidence considered by
the trial court. In Binabay vs. People, et al., 24ponencia of Mr. Chief Justice R.
Concepcion, this Court held that no valid judgment can be rendered upon an invalid
arraignment. Since in the case at bar, the arraignment of the appellant is void, his
31

judgment of conviction is also void. In fairness to the appellant, and in justice to the
victim, the case has to be remanded to the trial court. for further proceedings. There is
no philosophy of punishment that allows the State to kill without any semblance of
fairness and justice.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Decision in Criminal Case No. 43663, convicting accused
Arnel Alicando of the crime of Rape with Homicide and sentencing him to suffer the
penalty of death is annulled and set aside and the case is remanded to the trial court for
further proceedings. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Melo, Vitug, Francisco and
Panganiban, JJ., concur.

SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. Nos. 133254-55. April 19, 2001]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ROBERTO SALANGUIT
y KO, accused-appellant.

DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:

This is an appeal from the decision,[1] dated January 27, 1998, of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 96, Quezon City, finding accused-appellant Roberto Salanguit y Ko guilty
of violation of 16 of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, and sentencing him
accordingly to suffer imprisonment ranging from six (6) months of arresto mayor, as
minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as maximum, and
of 8 of the same law and sentencing him for such violation to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of P700,000.00.
Charges against accused-appellant for violations of R.A. No. 6425 were filed on
December 28, 1995. In Criminal Case No. Q-95-64357, the information alleged:

That on or about the 26th day of December 1995, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said
accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly possess and/or use
11.14 grams of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride (Shabu) a regulated drug, without the
necessary license and/or prescription therefor, in violation of said law.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[2]

In Criminal Case No. Q-95-64358, the information charged:


32

That on or about the 26th day of December 1995, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said
accused not being authorized by law to possess or use any prohibited drug, did, then
and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly have in his possession and under his
custody and control 1,254 grams of Marijuana, a prohibited drug.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[3]

When arraigned on May 21, 1996, accused-appellant pleaded not


guilty,[4] whereupon he was tried.
Three witnesses were presented by the prosecution: P/Insp. Sonia S. Ludovico,
forensic chemist and chief of the Physical Science Branch of the Philippine National
Police Crime Laboratory, Senior Inspector Rodolfo Aguilar of the Narcotics Command,
Camp Crame, Quezon City, and PO3 Rolando Duazo of Station 10, Kamuning, Quezon
City, a field operative. The prosecution evidence established the following:
On December 26, 1995, Sr. Insp. Aguilar applied for a warrant [5] in the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 90, Dasmarias, Cavite, to search the residence of accused-appellant
Robert Salanguit y Ko on Binhagan St., Novaliches, Quezon City. He presented as his
witness SPO1 Edmund Badua, who testified that as a poseur-buyer, he was able to
purchase 2.12 grams of shabu from accused-appellant. The sale took place in accused-
appellants room, and Badua saw that the shabu was taken by accused-appellant from a
cabinet inside his room. The application was granted, and a search warrant was later
issued by Presiding Judge Dolores L. Espaol.
At about 10:30 p.m. of December 26, 1995, a group of about 10 policemen, along
with one civilian informer, went to the residence of accused-appellant to serve the
warrant.[6]
The police operatives knocked on accused-appellants door, but nobody opened
it. They heard people inside the house, apparently panicking. The police operatives then
forced the door open and entered the house.[7]
After showing the search warrant to the occupants of the house, Lt. Cortes and his
group started searching the house.[8] They found 12 small heat-sealed transparent
plastic bags containing a white crystalline substance, a paper clip box also containing a
white crystalline substance, and two bricks of dried leaves which appeared to be
marijuana wrapped in newsprint[9] having a total weight of approximately 1,255
grams.[10] A receipt of the items seized was prepared, but the accused-appellant refused
to sign it.[11]
After the search, the police operatives took accused-appellant with them to Station
10, EDSA, Kamuning, Quezon City, along with the items they had seized. [12]
PO3 Duazo requested a laboratory examination of the confiscated evidence.[13] The
white crystalline substance with a total weight of 2.77 grams and those contained in a
small box with a total weight of 8.37 grams were found to be positive for
methamphetamine hydrochloride. On the other hand, the two bricks of dried leaves, one
weighing 425 grams and the other 850 grams, were found to be marijuana. [14]
33

For the defense, accused-appellant testified in his own behalf. His testimony was
corroborated by his mother-in-law, Soledad Arcano.
Accused-appellant testified that on the night of December 26, 1995, as they were
about to leave their house, they heard a commotion at the gate and on the roof of their
house. Suddenly, about 20 men in civilian attire, brandishing long firearms, climbed over
the gate and descended through an opening in the roof.[15]
When accused-appellant demanded to be shown a search warrant, a piece of paper
inside a folder was waved in front of him. As accused-appellant fumbled for his glasses,
however, the paper was withdrawn and he had no chance to read it.[16]
Accused-appellant claimed that he was ordered to stay in one place of the house
while the policemen conducted a search, forcibly opening cabinets and taking his bag
containing money, a licensed .45 caliber firearm, jewelry, and canned goods. [17]
The policemen left at around 12:30 a.m. of December 27, 1995, and, after putting
handcuffs on accused-appellant, took him with them to the NARCOM on EDSA, Quezon
City, where accused-appellant was detained.[18]
Accused-appellants mother-in law, Soledad Arcano, corroborated his
testimony. Arcano testified that the policemen ransacked their house, ate their food, and
took away canned goods and other valuables.[19]
After hearing, the trial court rendered its decision, the dispositive portion of which
reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:

1. In Criminal Case No. Q-95-64357, for violation of Sec. 16, Republic Act No. 6425, as
amended, finding the accused ROBERTO SALANGUIT y KO guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime charged and he is hereby accordingly sentenced to suffer an
indeterminate sentence with a minimum of six (6) months of arresto mayor and a
maximum of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional; and,

2. In Criminal Case No. Q-95-64358, for violation of Sec. 8, Republic Act No. 6425, as
amended, finding the accused ROBERTO SALANGUIT y KO guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime charged and he is hereby accordingly sentenced to suffer reclusion
perpetua and to pay a fine of P700,000.00.

The accused shall further pay the costs of suit.

The 11.14 grams of methamphetamine hydrochloride and the 1,254 grams of marijuana
bricks are hereby confiscated and condemned for disposition according to law. The
evidence custodian of this Court is hereby directed to turn such substances over to the
National Bureau of Investigation pursuant to law.

SO ORDERED.[20]
34

Hence this appeal. Accused-appellant contends that -

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN DECLARING THE SEARCH


WARRANT VALID

THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT FOR


ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF METHAMPHETAMINE HYDRO-CHLORIDE (SHABU)

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-


APPELLANT FOR VIOLATION 8, R.A. NO. 6425

THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN ADMITTING IN EVIDENCE THE TWO (2)


BRICKS OF MARIJUANA

THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE POLICEMEN USED
EXCESSIVE FORCE IN ENFORCING THE SEARCH WARRANT.

Accused-appellant is contesting his conviction on three grounds. First, the


admissibility of the shabu allegedly recovered from his residence as evidence against
him on the ground that the warrant used in obtaining it was invalid. Second, the
admissibility in evidence of the marijuana allegedly seized from accused-appellant
pursuant to the plain view doctrine. Third, the employment of unnecessary force by the
police in the execution of the warrant.
First. Rule 126, 4 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure [21] provides that a
search warrant shall not issue except upon probable cause in connection with one
specific offense to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath
or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized which may be
anywhere in the Philippines.
In issuing a search warrant, judges must comply strictly with the requirements of the
Constitution and the Rules of Criminal Procedure. No presumption of regularity can be
invoked in aid of the process when an officer undertakes to justify its
issuance.[22] Nothing can justify the issuance of the search warrant unless all the legal
requisites are fulfilled.
In this case, the search warrant issued against accused-appellant reads:

SEARCH WARRANT NO. 160

For: Violation of RA 6425

SEARCH WARRANT

TO ANY PEACE OFFICER:

GREETINGS:
35

It appearing to the satisfaction of the undersigned after examining under oath SR. INSP.
RODOLFO V. AGUILAR, PNP and his witness SPO1 EDMUND M. BADUA, PNP that
there is probable cause to believe that ROBERT SALANGUIT has in his possession
and control in his premises Binhagan St., San Jose, Quezon City as shown in Annex A,
the properties to wit:

UNDETERMINED QUANTITY OF SHABU AND DRUG PARAPHERNALIA

which should be seized and brought to the undersigned.

You are hereby commanded to make an immediate search anytime of the day/night of
the premises above-described and forthwith seize and take possession of the above-
stated properties and bring said properties to the undersigned to be dealt with as the
law directs.

GIVEN UNDER MY HAND this 26th day of December 1995 at Imus, Cavite, Philippines.

(SGD.) DOLORES L. ESPAOL


Judge
Accused-appellant assails the validity of the warrant on three grounds: (1) that there
was no probable cause to search for drug paraphernalia; (2) that the search warrant
was issued for more than one specific offense; and (3) that the place to be searched
was not described with sufficient particularity.

Existence of Probable Cause

The warrant authorized the seizure of undetermined quantity of shabu and drug
paraphernalia. Evidence was presented showing probable cause of the existence of
methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. Accused-appellant contends, however, that
the search warrant issued is void because no evidence was presented showing the
existence of drug paraphernalia and the same should not have been ordered to be
seized by the trial court.[23]
The contention has no merit. To be sure, SPO1 Edmund Badua, the intelligence
officer who acted as a poseur-buyer, did not testify in the proceedings for the issuance
of a search warrant on anything about drug paraphernalia. He stated:
Q - Being a member of the Intelligence and Operation Section, NMDU, NARCOM, do
you remember if you were assigned into a monitoring or surveillance work?
A - Yes, sir.
Q - Of what particular assignment or area were you assigned for monitoring or
surveillance?
A - Its within the Quezon City area particularly a house without a number located at
Binhagan St., San Jose, Quezon City, sir.
36

Q - Do you know the person who occupies the specific place?


A - Yes, sir, he is ROBERT SALANGUIT @ Robert.
Q - Are you familiar with that place?
A - Yes, sir, as part of my surveillance, I was able to penetrate inside the area and
established contract with ROBERT SALANGUIT alias Robert through my friend
who introduced me to the former.
Q - In what particular occasion did you meet ROBERT SALANGUIT alias Robert?
A - When I was introduced by my friend as a good buyer and drug pusher of shabu,
sir.
Q - Were you able to buy at that time?
A - Yes, sir.
Q - How much if you can still remember the amount involved?
A - I was able to buy two point twelve (2.12) grams of shabu in the amount of Two
Thousand Seven Hundred Fifty (P2,750.00) pesos, sir.
Q - Having established contact with ROBERT SALANGUIT @ Robert, do you know
where the stuff (shabu) were being kept?
A - Yes, sir, inside a cabinet inside his room.
Q - How were you able to know the place where he kept the stuff?
A - When I first bought the 2.12 grams of shabu from him, it was done inside his room
and I saw that the shabu was taken by him inside his cabinet.
Q - Do you know who is in control of the premises?
A - Yes, sir, it was ROBERT SALANGUIT @ Robert.
Q - How sure are you, that the shabu that you bought from ROBERT SALANGUIT @
Robert is genuine shabu?
A - After I left the house of ROBERT SALANGUIT @ Robert, I proceeded back to our
office and reported the progress of my mission to our Chief and presented to him
the 2.12 grams of shabu I bought from the subject. Then afterwards, our Chief
formally requested the Chief PNP Central Crime Laboratory Services, NPDC, for
Technical Analysis which yielded positive result for shabu, a regulated drug as
shown in the attached certification of PNP CLS result No. D-414-95 dated 19
Dec. 95.
Q - Do you have anything more to add or retract from your statement?
A - Yes, sir, I was offered by him (ROBERT SALANGUIT @ Robert) that anything I
wish to buy bigger quantity of shabu, he is willing to transact to me on cash basis
at his price of One Thousand Seven Hundred Fifty (P1,750.00) pesos per gram.
Q - Are you willing to sign your statement freely and voluntarily?
37

A - Yes, sir.[24]
However, the fact that there was no probable cause to support the application for
the seizure of drug paraphernalia does not warrant the conclusion that the search
warrant is void. This fact would be material only if drug paraphernalia was in fact seized
by the police. The fact is that none was taken by virtue of the search warrant issued. If
at all, therefore, the search warrant is void only insofar as it authorized the seizure of
drug paraphernalia, but it is valid as to the seizure of methamphetamine hydrochloride
as to which evidence was presented showing probable cause as to its existence. Thus,
in Aday v. Superior Court,[25] the warrant properly described two obscene books but
improperly described other articles. It was held:
Although the warrant was defective in the respects noted, it does not follow that it
was invalid as a whole. Such a conclusion would mean that the seizure of certain
articles, even though proper if viewed separately, must be condemned merely because
the warrant was defective with respect to other articles. The invalid portions of the
warrant are severable from the authorization relating to the named books, which formed
the principal basis of the charge of obscenity. The search for and seizure of these
books, if otherwise valid, were not rendered illegal by the defects concerning other
articles. . . . In so holding we do not mean to suggest that invalid portions of a warrant
will be treated as severable under all circumstances. We recognize the danger that
warrants might be obtained which are essentially general in character but as to minor
items meet the requirement of particularity, and that wholesale seizures might be made
under them, in the expectation that the seizure would in any event be upheld as to the
property specified. Such an abuse of the warrant procedure, of course, could not be
tolerated.
It would be a drastic remedy indeed if a warrant, which was issued on probable
cause and particularly describing the items to be seized on the basis thereof, is to be
invalidated in toto because the judge erred in authorizing a search for other items not
supported by the evidence.[26] Accordingly, we hold that the first part of the search
warrant, authorizing the search of accused-appellants house for an undetermined
quantity of shabu, is valid, even though the second part, with respect to the search for
drug paraphernalia, is not.

Specificity of the Offense Charged

Accused-appellant contends that the warrant was issued for more than one specific
offense because possession or use of methamphetamine hydrochloride and possession
of drug paraphernalia are punished under two different provisions of R.A. No. 6425. [27] It
will suffice to quote what this Court said in a similar case to dispose of this contention:

While it is true that the caption of the search warrant states that it is in connection with
Violation of R.A. 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, it is
clearly recited in the text thereof that There is probable cause to believe that Adolfo
Olaes alias Debie and alias Baby of No. 628 Comia St., Filtration, Sta. Rita, Olongapo
38

City, has in their session and control and custody of marijuana dried
stalks/leaves/seeds/cigarettes and other regulated/prohibited and exempt narcotics
preparations which is the subject of the offense stated above. Although the specific
section of the Dangerous Drugs Act is not pinpointed, there is no question at all of the
specific offense alleged to have been committed as a basis for the finding of probable
cause.The search warrant also satisfies the requirement in the Bill of Rights of the
particularity of the description to be made of the place to be searched and the persons
or things to be seized. [28]

Indeed, in People v. Dichoso[29] the search warrant was also for Violation of R.A.
6425, without specifying what provisions of the law were violated, and it authorized the
search and seizure of dried marijuana leaves and methamphetamine hydrochloride
(shabu) and sets of paraphernalias (sic). This Court, however, upheld the validity of the
warrant:

Appellants contention that the search warrant in question was issued for more than (1)
offense, hence, in violation of Section 3, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, is
unpersuasive. He engages in semantic juggling by suggesting that since illegal
possession of shabu, illegal possession of marijuana and illegal possession of
paraphernalia are covered by different articles and sections of the Dangerous Drugs Act
of 1972, the search warrant is clearly for more than one (1) specific offense. In short,
following this theory, there should have been three (3) separate search warrants, one
for illegal possession of shabu, the second for illegal possession of marijuana and the
third for illegal possession of paraphernalia. This argument is pedantic. The Dangerous
Drugs Act of 1972 is a special law that deals specifically with dangerous drugs which
are subsumed into prohibited and regulated drugs and defines and penalizes categories
of offenses which are closely related or which belong to the same class or species.
Accordingly, one (1) search warrant may thus be validly issued for the said violations of
the Dangerous Drugs Act.[30]

Similarly, in another case,[31] the search warrant was captioned: For Violation of
P.D. No. 1866 (Illegal Possession of Firearms, etc.). The validity of the warrant was
questioned on the ground that it was issued without reference to any particular provision
in P.D. No. 1866, which punished several offenses. We held, however, that while illegal
possession of firearms is penalized under 1 of P.D. No. 1866 and illegal possession of
explosives is penalized under 3 thereof, the decree is a codification of the various laws
on illegal possession of firearms, ammunitions, and explosives which offenses are so
related as to be subsumed within the category of illegal possession of firearms, etc.
under P.D. No. 1866. Thus, only one warrant was necessary to cover the violations
under the various provisions of the said law.

Particularity of the Place

Accused-appellant contends that the search warrant failed to indicate the place to
be searched with sufficient particularity.
39

This contention is without merit. As the Solicitor General states:

. . . While the address stated in the warrant is merely Binhagan St., San Jose, Quezon
City, the trial court took note of the fact that the records of Search Warrant Case No.
160 contained several documents which identified the premises to be searched, to
wit: 1) the application for search warrant which stated that the premises to be searched
was located in between No. 7 and 11 at Binhagan Street, San Jose, Quezon City; 2) the
deposition of witness which described the premises as a house without a number
located at Binhagan St., San Jose, Quezon City; and 3) the pencil sketch of the location
of the premises to be searched. In fact, the police officers who raided appellants house
under the leadership of Police Senior Inspector Rodolfo Aguilar could not have been
mistaken as Inspector Aguilar resides in the same neighborhood in Binhagan where
appellant lives and in fact Aguilars place is at the end of appellants place in Binhagan.
Moreover, the house raided by Aguilars team is undeniably appellants house and it was
really appellant who was the target.The raiding team even first ascertained through their
informant that appellant was inside his residence before they actually started their
operation.[32]

The rule is that a description of the place to be searched is sufficient if the officer
with the warrant can, with reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the place intended to
be searched.[33] For example, a search warrant authorized a search of Apartment
Number 3 of a building at 83 Pleasant Street, Malborough, Massachusetts. As it turned
out, there were five apartments in the basement and six apartments on both the ground
and top floors and that there was an Apartment Number 3 on each floor. However, the
description was made determinate by a reference to the affidavit supporting the warrant
that the apartment was occupied by the accused Morris Ferrante of 83 Pleasant Street,
Malboro Mass.[34] In this case, the location of accused-appellants house being indicated
by the evidence on record, there can be no doubt that the warrant described the place
to be searched with sufficient particularity.
In sum, we hold that with respect to the seizure of shabu from accused-appellants
residence, Search Warrant No. 160 was properly issued, such warrant being founded
on probable cause personally determined by the judge under oath or affirmation of the
deposing witness and particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to
be seized.
Second. The search warrant authorized the seizure of methamphetamine
hydrochloride or shabu but not marijuana. However, seizure of the latter drug is being
justified on the ground that the drug was seized within the plain view of the searching
party. This is contested by accused-appellant.
Under the plain view doctrine, unlawful objects within the plain view of an officer
who has the right to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure and may
be presented in evidence.[35] For this doctrine to apply, there must be: (a) prior
justification; (b) inadvertent discovery of the evidence; and (c) immediate apparent
illegality of the evidence before the police.[36] The question is whether these requisites
were complied with by the authorities in seizing the marijuana in this case.
40

Prior Justification and Discovery by Inadvertence

Because the location of the shabu was indicated in the warrant and thus known to
the police operatives, it is reasonable to assume that the police found the packets of
the shabu first. Once the valid portion of the search warrant has been executed, the
plain view doctrine can no longer provide any basis for admitting the other items
subsequently found. As has been explained:

What the plain view cases have in common is that the police officer in each of them had
a prior justification for an intrusion in the course of which he came inadvertently across
a piece of evidence incriminating the accused. The doctrine serves to supplement the
prior justification whether it be a warrant for another object, hot pursuit, search incident
to lawful arrest, or some other legitimate reason for being present unconnected with a
search directed against the accused and permits the warrantless seizure. Of course, the
extension of the original justification is legitimate only where it is immediately apparent
to the police that they have evidence before them; the plain view doctrine may not be
used to extend a general exploratory search from one object to another until something
incriminating at last emerges.[37]

The only other possible justification for an intrusion by the police is the conduct of a
search pursuant to accused-appellants lawful arrest for possession of shabu. However,
a search incident to a lawful arrest is limited to the person of the one arrested and the
premises within his immediate control.[38] The rationale for permitting such a search is to
prevent the person arrested from obtaining a weapon to commit violence, or to reach for
incriminatory evidence and destroy it.
The police failed to allege in this case the time when the marijuana was
found, i.e., whether prior to, or contemporaneous with, the shabu subject of the warrant,
or whether it was recovered on accused-appellants person or in an area within his
immediate control. Its recovery, therefore, presumably during the search conducted
after the shabu had been recovered from the cabinet, as attested to by SPO1 Badua in
his depostion, was invalid.

Apparent Illegality of the Evidence

The marijuana bricks were wrapped in newsprint. There was no apparent illegality
to justify their seizure. This case is similar to People. v. Musa[39]in which we declared
inadmissible the marijuana recovered by NARCOM agents because the said drugs were
contained in a plastic bag which gave no indication of its contents. We explained:

Moreover, when the NARCOM agents saw the plastic bag hanging in one corner of the
kitchen, they had no clue as to its contents. They had to ask the appellant what the bag
contained. When the appellant refused to respond, they opened it and found the
marijuana. Unlike Ker v. California, where the marijuana was visible to the police
officers eyes, the NARCOM agents in this case could not have discovered the
41

inculpatory nature of the contents of the bag had they not forcibly opened it. Even
assuming then, that the NARCOM agents inadvertently came across the plastic bag
because it was within their plain view, what may be said to be the object in their plain
view was just the plastic bag and not the marijuana. The incriminating nature of the
contents of the plastic bag was not immediately apparent from the plain view of said
object. It cannot be claimed that the plastic bag clearly betrayed its contents, whether by
its distinctive configuration, is transparency, or otherwise, that its contents are obvious
to an observer.[40]

No presumption of regularity may be invoked by an officer in aid of the process


when he undertakes to justify an encroachment of rights secured by the
Constitution.[41] In this case, the marijuana allegedly found in the possession of
accused-appellant was in the form of two bricks wrapped in newsprint. Not being in a
transparent container, the contents wrapped in newsprint could not have been readily
discernible as marijuana. Nor was there mention of the time or manner these items
were discovered. Accordingly, for failure of the prosecution to prove that the seizure of
the marijuana without a warrant was conducted in accordance with the plain view
doctrine, we hold that the marijuana is inadmissible in evidence against accused-
appellant.However, the confiscation of the drug must be upheld.
Third. Accused-appellant claims that undue and unnecessary force was employed
by the searching party in effecting the raid.
Rule 126, 7 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure[42] provides:

Right to break door or window to effect search. The officer, if refused admittance to the
place of directed search after giving notice of his purpose and authority, may break
open any outer or inner door or window of a house or any part of a house or anything
therein to execute the warrant or liberate himself or any person lawfully aiding him when
unlawfully detained therein.

Accused-appellants claim that the policemen had clambered up the roof of his
house to gain entry and had broken doors and windows in the process is unsupported
by reliable and competent proof. No affidavit or sworn statement of disinterested
persons, like the barangay officials or neighbors, has been presented by accused-
appellant to attest to the truth of his claim.
In contrast, Aguilar and Duanos claim that they had to use some force in order to
gain entry cannot be doubted. The occupants of the house, especially accused-
appellant, refused to open the door despite the fact that the searching party knocked on
the door several times. Furthermore, the agents saw the suspicious movements of the
people inside the house. These circumstances justified the searching partys forcible
entry into the house, founded as it is on the apprehension that the execution of their
mission would be frustrated unless they do so.
WHEREFORE, in Criminal Case No. Q-95-64357, the decision of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 96, Quezon City, finding accused-appellant Roberto Salanguit y Ko guilty
of possession of illegal drugs under 16 of R.A. No. 6425, otherwise known as the
42

Dangerous Drugs Act, as amended, and sentencing him to suffer a prison term ranging
from six (6) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, and four (4) years and two (2)
months of prision correccional, as maximum, and ordering the confiscation of 11.14
grams of methamphetamine hydrochloride is AFFIRMED.
In Criminal Case No. Q-95-64358, the decision of the same court finding accused-
appellant Roberto Salanguit y Ko guilty of possession of prohibited drugs under 8 of
R.A. No. 6425, as amended, and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and to pay a fine of P700,000.00 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and
accused-appellant is ACQUITTED of the crime charged. However, the confiscation of
the 1,254 grams of marijuana, as well as the 11.14 grams of methamphetamine
hydrochloride, and its disposition as ordered by the trial court is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, (Chairman), Quisumbing, Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 129296. September 25, 2000]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ABE VALDEZ y DELA
CRUZ, accused-appellant.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:

For automatic review is the decision[1] promulgated on February 18, 1997, by the
Regional Trial Court of Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya, Branch 27, in Criminal Case No.
3105. It found appellant Abe Valdez y Dela Cruz guilty beyond reasonable doubt for
violating Section 9 of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 (R.A. No. 6425), as amended by
R.A. No. 7659. He was sentenced to suffer the penalty of death by lethal injection.
In an Information dated September 26, 1996, appellant was charged as
follows:"That on or about September 25, 1996, at Sitio Bulan, Barangay Sawmill,
Municipality of Villaverde, Province of Nueva Vizcaya, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, who was caught
in flagrante delicto and without authority of law, did then and there wilfully (sic),
unlawfully and feloniously plant, cultivate and culture seven (7) fully grown marijuana
plants known as Indian Hemp weighing 2.194 kilos, from which dangerous drugs maybe
(sic) manufactured or derived, to the damage and prejudice of the government of the
Republic of the Philippines.

"That the property where the said seven (7) fully grown marijuana plants were planted,
cultivated and cultured shall be confiscated and escheated in favor of the government.

"CONTRARY TO LAW."[2]
43

On November 15, 1996, appellant was arraigned and, with assistance of counsel,
pleaded not guilty to the charge. Trial on the merits then ensued.
The first witness for the prosecution was SPO3 Marcelo Tipay, a member of the
police force of Villaverde, Nueva Vizcaya. He testified that at around 10:15 a.m. of
September 24, 1996, he received a tip from an unnamed informer about the presence of
a marijuana plantation, allegedly owned by appellant at Sitio Bulan, Ibung, Villaverde,
Nueva Vizcaya.[3] The prohibited plants were allegedly planted close to appellant's
hut. Police Inspector Alejandro R. Parungao, Chief of Police of Villaverde, Nueva
Vizcaya then formed a reaction team from his operatives to verify the report. The team
was composed of SPO3 Marcelo M. Tipay, SPO2 Noel V. Libunao, SPO2 Pedro S.
Morales, SPO1 Romulo G. Tobias and PO2 Alfelmer I. Balut. Inspector Parungao gave
them specific instructions to "uproot said marijuana plants and arrest the cultivator of
same.[4]
At approximately 5:00 o'clock A.M. the following day, said police team,
accompanied by their informer, left for the site where the marijuana plants were
allegedly being grown. After a three-hour, uphill trek from the nearest barangay road,
the police operatives arrived at the place pinpointed by their informant. The police found
appellant alone in his nipa hut. They, then, proceeded to look around the area where
appellant had his kaingin and saw seven (7) five-foot high, flowering marijuana plants in
two rows, approximately 25 meters from appellant's hut. [5] PO2 Balut asked appellant
who owned the prohibited plants and, according to Balut, the latter admitted that they
were his.[6] The police uprooted the seven marijuana plants, which weighed 2.194
kilograms.[7] The police took photos of appellant standing beside the cannabis
plants.[8] Appellant was then arrested. One of the plants, weighing 1.090 kilograms, was
sent to the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory in Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya
for analysis.[9] Inspector Prevy Fabros Luwis, the Crime Laboratory forensic analyst,
testified that upon microscopic examination of said plant, she found cystolitic hairs
containing calcium carbonate, a positive indication for marijuana. [10] She next conducted
a chemical examination, the results of which confirmed her initial impressions. She
found as follows:

"SPECIMEN SUBMITTED: Exh "A" - 1.090 grams of uprooted suspected marijuana


plant placed inside a white sack with markings.

xxx

"FINDINGS: Qualitative examination conducted on the above stated specimen gave


POSITIVE result to the test for Marijuana, a prohibited drug."[11]

The prosecution also presented a certification from the Department of Environment


and Natural Resources that the land cultivated by appellant, on which the growing
marijuana plants were found, was Lot 3224 of Timberland Block B, which formed part of
the Integrated Social Forestry Area in Villaverde, Nueva Vizcaya. [12] This lot was part of
the public domain. Appellant was acknowledged in the certification as the occupant of
the lot, but no Certificate of Stewardship had yet been issued in his favor. [13]
44

As its sole witness, the defense presented appellant. He testified that at around
10:00 o'clock A.M., September 25, 1996, he was weeding his vegetable farm in Sitio
Bulan when he was called by a person whose identity he does not know. He was asked
to go with the latter to "see something."[14] This unknown person then brought appellant
to the place where the marijuana plants were found, approximately 100 meters away
from his nipa hut.[15] Five armed policemen were present and they made him stand in
front of the hemp plants. He was then asked if he knew anything about the marijuana
growing there. When he denied any knowledge thereof, SPO2 Libunao poked a fist at
him and told him to admit ownership of the plants.[16] Appellant was so nervous and
afraid that he admitted owning the marijuana.[17]
The police then took a photo of him standing in front of one of the marijuana
plants. He was then made to uproot five of the cannabis plants, and bring them to his
hut, where another photo was taken of him standing next to a bundle of uprooted
marijuana plants.[18] The police team then brought him to the police station at Villaverde.
On the way, a certain Kiko Pascua, a barangay peace officer of Barangay Sawmill,
accompanied the police officers. Pascua, who bore a grudge against him, because of
his refusal to participate in the former's illegal logging activities, threatened him to admit
owning the marijuana, otherwise he would "be put in a bad situation." [19] At the police
headquarters, appellant reiterated that he knew nothing about the marijuana plants
seized by the police.[20]
On cross-examination, appellant declared that there were ten other houses around
the vicinity of his kaingin, the nearest house being 100 meters away. [21] The latter house
belonged to one Carlito (Lito) Pascua, an uncle of the barangay peace officer who had a
grudge against him. The spot where the marijuana plants were found was located
between his house and Carlito Pascua's.[22]
The prosecution presented SPO3 Tipay as its rebuttal witness. His testimony was
offered to rebut appellant's claim that the marijuana plants were not planted in the lot he
was cultivating.[23] Tipay presented a sketch he made,[24] which showed the location of
marijuana plants in relation to the old and new nipa huts of appellant, as well as the
closest neighbor. According to Tipay, the marijuana plot was located 40 meters away
from the old hut of Valdez and 250 meters distant from the hut of Carlito
Pascua.[25] Tipay admitted on cross-examination that no surveyor accompanied him
when he made the measurements.[26] He further stated that his basis for claiming that
appellant was the owner or planter of the seized plants was the information given him
by the police informer and the proximity of appellant's hut to the location of said
plants.[27]
Finding appellant's defense insipid, the trial court held appellant liable as charged
for cultivation and ownership of marijuana plants as follows:

"WHEREFORE, finding the accused GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of cultivating


marijuana plants punishable under section 9 of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as
amended, accused is hereby sentenced to death by lethal injection. Costs against the
accused.
45

"SO ORDERED."[28]

Appellant assigns the following errors for our consideration:


I

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN ADMITTING AS EVIDENCE THE


SEVEN (7) MARIJUANA PLANTS DESPITE THEIR INADMISSIBILITY BEING
PRODUCTS OF AN ILLEGAL SEARCH.

II

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING APPELLANT OF


VIOLATION OF SECTION 9, REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6425 DESPITE THE
INADMISSIBILITY OF THE CORPUS DELICTI AND THE FAILURE OF THE
PROSECUTION TO PROVE HIS GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.

III

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN IMPOSING THE SUPREME PENALTY


OF DEATH UPON APPELLANT DESPITE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO
PROVE THAT THE LAND WHERE THE MARIJUANA PLANTS WERE PLANTED
IS A PUBLIC LAND ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT INDEED APPELLANT
PLANTED THE SUBJECT MARIJUANA.[29]

Simply stated, the issues are:


(1) Was the search and seizure of the marijuana plants in the present case
lawful?
(2) Were the seized plants admissible in evidence against the accused?
(3) Has the prosecution proved appellant's guilt beyond reasonable doubt?
(4) Is the sentence of death by lethal injection correct?
The first and second issues will be jointly discussed because they are interrelated.
Appellant contends that there was unlawful search. First, the records show that the
law enforcers had more than ample time to secure a search warrant. Second, that the
marijuana plants were found in an unfenced lot does not remove appellant from the
mantle of protection against unreasonable searches and seizures. He relies on the
ruling of the US Supreme Court in Terry v. Ohio, 392 US 1, 20 L. Ed 2d 898, 88 S. Ct.
1868 (1968), to the effect that the protection against unreasonable government intrusion
protects people, not places.
For the appellee, the Office of the Solicitor General argues that the records clearly
show that there was no search made by the police team, in the first place. The OSG
points out that the marijuana plants in question were grown in an unfenced lot and as
each grew about five (5) feet tall, they were visible from afar, and were, in fact,
46

immediately spotted by the police officers when they reached the site. The seized
marijuana plants were, thus, in plain view of the police officers. The instant case must,
therefore, be treated as a warrantless lawful search under the "plain view" doctrine.
The court a quo upheld the validity of the search and confiscation made by the
police team on the finding that:

"...It seems there was no need for any search warrant. The policemen went to the
plantation site merely to make a verification. When they found the said plants, it was too
much to expect them to apply for a search warrant. In view of the remoteness of the
plantation site (they had to walk for six hours back and forth) and the dangers lurking in
the area if they stayed overnight, they had a valid reason to confiscate the said plants
upon discovery without any search warrant. Moreover, the evidence shows that the lot
was not legally occupied by the accused and there was no fence which evinced the
occupant's desire to keep trespassers out. There was, therefore, no privacy to protect,
hence, no search warrant was required."[30]

The Constitution[31] lays down the general rule that a search and seizure must be
carried on the strength of a judicial warrant.Otherwise, the search and seizure is
deemed "unreasonable." Evidence procured on the occasion of an unreasonable search
and seizure is deemed tainted for being the proverbial fruit of a poisonous tree and
should be excluded.[32] Such evidence shall be inadmissible in evidence for any purpose
in any proceeding.[33]
In the instant case, there was no search warrant issued by a judge after personal
determination of the existence of probable cause.From the declarations of the police
officers themselves, it is clear that they had at least one (1) day to obtain a warrant to
search appellant's farm. Their informant had revealed his name to them. The place
where the cannabis plants were planted was pinpointed. From the information in their
possession, they could have convinced a judge that there was probable cause to justify
the issuance of a warrant. But they did not. Instead, they uprooted the plants and
apprehended the accused on the excuse that the trip was a good six hours and
inconvenient to them. We need not underscore that the protection against illegal search
and seizure is constitutionally mandated and only under specific instances are searches
allowed without warrants.[34] The mantle of protection extended by the Bill of Rights
covers both innocent and guilty alike against any form of high-handedness of law
enforcers, regardless of the praiseworthiness of their intentions.
We find no reason to subscribe to Solicitor General's contention that we apply the
"plain view" doctrine. For the doctrine to apply, the following elements must be present:
(a) a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the
police are legally present in the pursuit of their official duties;
(b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who have the right
to be where they are; and
(c) the evidence must be immediately apparent; and
(d) plain view justified mere seizure of evidence without further search.[35]
47

In the instant case, recall that PO2 Balut testified that they first located the
marijuana plants before appellant was arrested without a warrant. [36] Hence, there was
no valid warrantless arrest which preceded the search of appellant's premises. Note
further that the police team was dispatched to appellant's kaingin precisely to search for
and uproot the prohibited flora. The seizure of evidence in "plain view" applies only
where the police officer is not searching for evidence against the accused, but
inadvertently comes across an incriminating object.[37] Clearly, their discovery of the
cannabis plants was not inadvertent. We also note the testimony of SPO2 Tipay that
upon arriving at the area, they first had to "look around the area" before they could spot
the illegal plants.[38] Patently, the seized marijuana plants were not "immediately
apparent" and a "further search" was needed. In sum, the marijuana plants in question
were not in "plain view" or "open to eye and hand." The "plain view" doctrine, thus,
cannot be made to apply.
Nor can we sustain the trial court's conclusion that just because the marijuana
plants were found in an unfenced lot, appellant could not invoke the protection afforded
by the Charter against unreasonable searches by agents of the State. The right against
unreasonable searches and seizures is the immunity of one's person, which includes his
residence, his papers, and other possessions.[39] The guarantee refers to "the right of
personal security"[40] of the individual. As appellant correctly points out, what is sought
to be protected against the State's unlawful intrusion are persons, not places. [41] To
conclude otherwise would not only mean swimming against the stream, it would also
lead to the absurd logic that for a person to be immune against unreasonable searches
and seizures, he must be in his home or office, within a fenced yard or a private
place. The Bill of Rights belongs as much to the person in the street as to the individual
in the sanctuary of his bedroom.
We therefore hold, with respect to the first issue, that the confiscated plants were
evidently obtained during an illegal search and seizure. As to the second issue, which
involves the admissibility of the marijuana plants as evidence for the prosecution, we
find that said plants cannot, as products of an unlawful search and seizure, be used as
evidence against appellant. They are fruits of the proverbial poisoned tree. It was,
therefore, a reversible error on the part of the court a quo to have admitted and relied
upon the seized marijuana plants as evidence to convict appellant.
We now proceed to the third issue, which revolves around the sufficiency of the
prosecution's evidence to prove appellant's guilt. Having declared the seized marijuana
plants inadmissible in evidence against appellant, we must now address the question of
whether the remaining evidence for the prosecution suffices to convict appellant?
In convicting appellant, the trial court likewise relied on the testimony of the police
officers to the effect that appellant admitted ownership of the marijuana when he was
asked who planted them. It made the following observation:

"It may be true that the admission to the police by the accused that he planted the
marijuana plants was made in the absence of any independent and competent
counsel. But the accused was not, at the time of police verification; under custodial
investigation. His admission is, therefore, admissible in evidence and not violative of the
48

constitutional fiat that admission given during custodial investigation is not admissible if
given without any counsel."[42]

Appellant now argues that his admission of ownership of the marijuana plants in
question cannot be used against him for being violative of his right to counsel during the
police investigation. Hence, it was error for the trial court to have relied upon said
admission of ownership.He submits that the investigation conducted by the police
officers was not a general inquiry, but was meant to elicit information on the ownership
of the marijuana plants. Appellant theorizes that since the investigation had narrowed
down to him, competent and independent counsel should have assisted him, when the
police sought information from him regarding the ownership of the prohibited
plants. Appellant claims the presumption of regularity of duty of officers cannot be made
to apply to his purported voluntarily confession of ownership of the marijuana
plants. Nor can it override his constitutional right to counsel during investigation.
The Office of the Solicitor General believes otherwise. The OSG avers that
appellant was not yet under custodial investigation when he admitted to the police that
he owned the marijuana plants. His right to competent and independent counsel,
accordingly, had not yet attached. Moreover, appellants failure to impute any false
motive for the police officers to falsely accuse him indicates that the presumption of
regularity in the performance of official duties by police officers was not sufficiently
rebutted.
The Constitution plainly declares that any person under investigation for the
commission of an offense shall have the right: (1) to remain silent; (2) to have
competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice; and (3) to be
informed of such rights. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the
presence of counsel.[43] An investigation begins when it is no longer a general inquiry
but starts to focus on a particular person as a suspect, i.e., when the police investigator
starts interrogating or exacting a confession from the suspect in connection with an
alleged offense.[44] The moment the police try to elicit admissions or confessions or
even plain informationfrom a person suspected of having committed an offense, he
should at that juncture be assisted by counsel, unless he waives the right in writing and
in the presence of counsel.[45]
In the instant case we find that, from the start, a tipster had furnished the police
appellant's name as well as the location of appellant's farm, where the marijuana plants
were allegedly being grown. While the police operation was supposedly meant to
merely "verify" said information, the police chief had likewise issued instructions to
arrest appellant as a suspected marijuana cultivator. Thus, at the time the police talked
to appellant in his farm, the latter was already under investigation as a suspect. The
questioning by the police was no longer a general inquiry.[46]
Under cross-examination, PO2 Balut stated, he "did not yet admit that he is the
cultivator of that marijuana so we just asked him and I think there is no need to inform
(him of) his constitutional rights because we are just asking him..."[47] In trying to elicit
information from appellant, the police was already investigating appellant as a
suspect. At this point, he was already under custodial investigation and had a right to
49

counsel even if he had not yet been arrested. Custodial investigation is "questioning
initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or
otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way." [48] As a suspect, two
armed policemen interrogated appellant. Behind his inquisitors were a barangay peace
officer and three other armed policemen.[49] All had been dispatched to arrest
him.[50] From these circumstances, we may infer that appellant had already been
deprived of his freedom of action in a significant way, even before the actual
arrest. Note that even before he was arrested, the police made him incriminatingly pose
for photos in front of the marijuana plants.
Moreover, we find appellant's extrajudicial confession flawed with respect to its
admissibility. For a confession to be admissible, it must satisfy the following
requirements: (1) it must be voluntary; (2) it must be made with the assistance of
competent and independent counsel; (3) it must be express; and (4) it must be in
writing.[51] The records show that the admission by appellant was verbal. It was also
uncounselled. A verbal admission allegedly made by an accused during the
investigation, without the assistance of counsel at the time of his arrest and even before
his formal investigation is not only inadmissible for being violative of the right to counsel
during criminal investigations, it is also hearsay.[52] Even if the confession or admission
were "gospel truth", if it was made without assistance of counsel and without a valid
waiver of such assistance, the confession is inadmissible in evidence, regardless of the
absence of coercion or even if it had been voluntarily given. [53]
It is fundamental in criminal prosecutions that before an accused may be convicted
of a crime, the prosecution must establish by proof beyond reasonable doubt that a
crime was committed and that the accused is the author thereof. [54] The evidence
arrayed against the accused, however, must not only stand the test of reason,[55] it must
likewise be credible and competent.[56] Competent evidence is "generally admissible"
evidence.[57] Admissible evidence, in turn, is evidence "of such a character that the court
or judge is bound to receive it, that is, allow it to be introduced at trial." [58]
In the instant case, the trial court relied on two pieces of probative matter to convict
appellant of the offense charged. These were the seized marijuana plants, and
appellant's purportedly voluntary confession of ownership of said marijuana plants to the
police. Other than these proofs, there was no other evidence presented to link appellant
with the offense charged. As earlier discussed, it was error on the trial court's part to
have admitted both of these proofs against the accused and to have relied upon said
proofs to convict him. For said evidence is doubly tainted.
First, as earlier pointed out, the seized marijuana plants were obtained in violation
of appellant's constitutional rights against unreasonable searches and seizures. The
search and seizure were void ab initio for having been conducted without the requisite
judicial warrant. The prosecution's very own evidence clearly establishes that the police
had sufficient time to obtain a warrant. There was no showing of such urgency or
necessity for the warrantless search or the immediate seizure of the marijuana plants
subject of this case. To reiterate, said marijuana plants cannot be utilized to prove
appellant's guilt without running afoul of the constitutional guarantees against illegal
50

searches and the inadmissibility of evidence procured pursuant to an unlawful search


and seizure.
Second, the confession of ownership of the marijuana plants, which appellant
allegedly made to the police during investigation, is not only hearsay but also violative of
the Bill of Rights. The purported confession was made without the assistance of
competent and independent counsel, as mandated by the Charter. Thus, said
confession cannot be used to convict appellant without running afoul of the
Constitution's requirement that a suspect in a criminal investigation must have the
services of competent and independent counsel during such investigation.
In sum, both the object evidence and the testimonial evidence as to appellant's
voluntary confession of ownership of the prohibited plants relied upon to prove
appellant's guilt failed to meet the test of Constitutional competence.
The Constitution decrees that, "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be
presumed innocent until the contrary is proved..."[59] To justify the conviction of the
accused, the prosecution must adduce that quantum of evidence sufficient to overcome
the constitutional presumption of innocence. The prosecution must stand or fall on its
evidence and cannot draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the
accused.[60] Absent the required degree of proof of an accused's guilt, he is entitled
to an acquittal.[61] In this case, the seized marijuana plants linking appellant to the crime
charged are miserably tainted with constitutional infirmities, which render these
inadmissible "for any purpose in any proceeding."[62] Nor can the confession obtained
during the uncounselled investigation be used against appellant, "it being inadmissible
in evidence against him.[63] Without these proffered but proscribed materials, we find
that the prosecution's remaining evidence did not even approximate the quantum of
evidence necessary to warrant appellant's conviction. Hence, the presumption of
innocence in his favor stands. Perforce, his acquittal is in order.
In acquitting an appellant, we are not saying that he is lily-white, or pure as driven
snow. Rather, we are declaring his innocence because the prosecution's evidence failed
to show his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. For that is what the basic law
requires. Where the evidence is insufficient to overcome the presumption of innocence
in favor of the accused, then his "acquittal must follow in faithful obeisance to the
fundamental law."[64]
WHEREFORE, the decision promulgated on February 18, 1997, by the Regional
Trial Court of Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya, Branch 27, in Criminal Case No. 3105,
finding Abe Valdez y Dela Cruz, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 9 of
the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, and imposing upon him the death penalty, is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE for insufficiency of evidence. Appellant is
ACQUITTED and ordered RELEASED immediately from confinement unless held for
another lawful cause.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban,
Purisima, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
Ynares-Santiago, J., on leave.
51

EN BANC

[G.R. Nos. 130568-69. March 21, 2000]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. CHE CHUN TING alias


"DICK," accused-appellant.

DECISION

BELLOSILLO, J.: Missc

CHE CHUN TING alias "DICK," a Hong Kong national, was found guilty by the trial court
on 22 August 1997 of delivering, distributing and dispatching in transit 999.43 grams
of shabu;[1] and, having in his custody, possession and control 5,578.68 grams of the
same regulated drug.[2] He was meted two (2) death sentences, one for violation of Sec.
15 and the other for violation of Sec. 16, both of Art. III, of RA 6425 (The Dangerous
Drugs Act of 1972, as amended).[3] He was likewise ordered to pay a fine
of P1,000,000.00 in the first case, andP12,000,000.00 in the second.[4] He is now before
us on automatic review.

The antecedent facts: Following a series of buy-bust operations, the elements of the
Special Operation Unit, Narcotics Command, apprehended a suspected drug courier,
Mabel Cheung Mei Po, after she delivered a transparent plastic bag containing a white
crystalline substance to an informant, in full view of NARCOM agents. When
questioned, Mabel Cheung Mei Po cooperated with the government agents and
revealed the name of accused Che Chun Ting as the source of the drugs. Misspped

On 27 June 1996 the Narcotics Command deployed a team of agents for the
entrapment and arrest of Che Chun Ting. The team was composed of Major Marcelo
Garbo, a certain Captain Campos,[5] P/Insp. Raymond Santiago, SPO3 Renato
Campanilla, and a civilian interpreter. The members of the NARCOM team were in two
(2) vehicles: a Nissan Sentra Super Saloon driven by Mabel with P/Insp. Santiago and
SPO3 Campanilla as passengers; and the other vehicle, with Major Garbo, Captain
Campos and the civilian interpreter on board. At around 7 oclock in the morning they
proceeded to the Roxas Seafront Garden in Pasay City where Che Chun Ting was and
had the place under surveillance. Later, they moved to the McDonalds parking lot where
the civilian interpreter transferred to the Nissan car. Mabel then called Che Chun Ting
through her cellular phone and spoke to him in Chinese. According to the interpreter,
who translated to the NARCOM agents the conversation between Mabel and Che Chun
Ting, Mabel ordered one (1) kilo of shabu.

At around 10:30 oclock in the morning of the same day, Mabel received a call from the
accused that he was ready to deliver the stuff. She immediately relayed the message to
the NARCOM agents. After receiving the go-signal from Major Garbo, P/Insp. Santiago,
52

SPO3 Campanilla and Mabel proceeded to the Roxas Seafront Garden. The other
vehicle followed but trailed behind within reasonable distance to serve as a blocking
force.

Upon arriving at the Roxas Seafront Garden, Mabel honked twice and went to Unit 122.
The two (2) NARCOM agents, who waited inside the car parked two (2) meters away,
saw the door of the unit open as a man went out to hand Mabel a transparent plastic
bag containing a white crystalline substance. The NARCOM agents immediately
alighted and arrested the surprised man who was positively identified by Mabel as Che
Chun Ting. Then the agents radioed their superiors in the other car and coordinated
with the security guard on duty at the Roxas Seafront Garden to make a search of Unit
122. During the search SPO3 Campanilla seized a black bag with several plastic bags
containing a white crystalline substance in an open cabinet at the second floor. The bag
was examined in the presence of Major Garbo, the accused himself, and his girlfriend
Nimfa Ortiz. The accused together with the evidence was then brought to Camp Crame
where Forensic Chemist P/Sr. Inspector Julita T. de Villa after conducting laboratory
tests found the white crystalline substance to be positive formethylamphetamine
hydrochloride or shabu.[6] Spped

The defense has a different version. Nimfa Ortiz narrated that she sent her brother Noli
Ortiz to meet Mabel Cheung Mei Po in front of the Allied Bank at the EDSA Extension to
help the latter find a lawyer and at the same time get the laser disc she lent to Mabel.
Noli testified that when he got inside the car of Mabel a policeman sitting at the back of
the car suddenly hit him on the head. The car then proceeded to McDonalds at Roxas
Boulevard near the Roxas Seafront Garden where he was moved to another car, a
green Nissan Sentra, with Major Garbo, Captain Lukban and a certain Palma (perceived
to be the civilian interpreter) on board. Mabel stayed behind at McDonalds until she was
brought back to Camp Crame.

Noli Ortiz, Major Garbo, Captain Lukban and Palma went to the Roxas Seafront Garden
where they parked the car five (5) to seven (7) meters away from Unit 122. Noli rang the
doorbell of the unit. When Nimfa opened the door, two (2) NARCOM officers suddenly
forced their way inside and searched the premises. Noli denied having seen any black
bag seized by SPO3 Campanilla; instead, what he saw was his sister's video camera
being carted away by the NARCOM agents. He further testified that when his sister was
made to sign a certification on the conduct of the search on Unit 122 she was frightened
and crying. He claimed that accused Che Chun Ting was then asleep at the second
floor of the unit.

The defense presented documents showing that the owner of Unit 122 was Nimfa Ortiz
and not accused Che Chun Ting who lived at 1001 Domingo Poblete St., BF Homes,
Paranaque.[7] This information, according to the defense, was vital for purposes of
ascertaining the legality of the search on Unit 122 as well as the seizure therein of a
black bag containing several plastic bags of shabu. Finally, the defense assailed the
lower court for relying on the testimony of Mabel who turned hostile witness in the
course of the trial.[8]
53

Accused Che Chun Ting now contends that the trial court erred: (a) in convicting him on
the basis of the shabu seized inside Unit 122, which was constitutionally inadmissible as
evidence since it was seized without a search warrant; (b) in failing to recognize that the
testimony of Mabel Cheung Mei Po, who turned hostile witness in the course of the trial,
has discredited the prosecution case and cast doubt on the testimonies of P/Insp.
Santiago and SPO3 Campanilla; and, (c) in assuming that the entire white crystalline
substance seized is positive formethylamphetamine hydrochloride. Jospped

We resolve. The 1987 Constitution ordains that no arrest, search or seizure can be
made without a valid warrant issued by a competent judicial authority. Thus -

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature
and for any purpose, shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant
of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be
seized.[9]

It further mandates that any evidence obtained in violation thereof shall be inadmissible
for any purpose in any proceeding.[10]

The right is not absolute and admits of certain well-recognized exceptions. For instance,
a person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which
may be used as proof of the commission of the offense, without a search
warrant.[11] The search may extend beyond the person of the one arrested to include the
permissible area or surroundings within his immediate control.[12]

The issue is whether this case falls within the exception.

The accused was admittedly outside unit 22 and in the act of delivering to Mabel
Cheung Mei Po a bag of shabu when he was arrested by the NARCOM operatives.
Moreover, it is borne by the records that Unit 122 was not even his residence but that of
his girlfriend Nimfa Ortiz, and that he was merely a sojourner therein. Hence, it can
hardly be said that the inner portion of the house constituted a permissible area within
his reach or immediate control,[13] to justify a warrantless search therein. Sppedjo

The lawful arrest being the sole justification for the validity of the warrantless search
under the exception, the same must be limited to and circumscribed by the subject, time
and place of the arrest. As to subject, the warrantless search is sanctioned only with
respect to the person of the suspect, and things that may be seized from him are limited
to "dangerous weapons" or "anything which may be used as proof of the commission of
the offense." With respect to the time and place of the warrantless search, it must be
contemporaneous with the lawful arrest. Stated otherwise, to be valid, the search must
have been conducted at about the time of the arrest or immediately thereafter and only
54

at the place where the suspect was arrested,[14] or the premises or surroundings under
his immediate control.

It must be stressed that the purposes of the exception are only to protect the arresting
officer against physical harm from the person being arrested who might be armed with a
concealed weapon, and also to prevent the person arrested from destroying the
evidence within his reach.[15] The exception therefore should not be strained beyond
what is needed in order to serve its purposes, as what the Solicitor General would want
us to do.

We therefore hold that the search in Unit 122 and the seizure therein of some 5,578.68
grams of shabu do not fall within the exception, hence, were illegal for being violative of
ones basic constitutional right and guarantee against unreasonable searches and
seizures.

As a consequence of the illegal search, the things seized on the occasion thereof are
inadmissible in evidence under the exclusionary rule. They are regarded as having been
obtained from a polluted source, the "fruit of a poisonous tree." However, objects and
properties the possession of which is prohibited by law cannot be returned to their
owners notwithstanding the illegality of their seizure. Thus, the shabuseized by the
NARCOM operatives which cannot legally be possessed by the accused under the law,
can and must be retained by the government to be disposed of in accordance with law.

Be that as it may, the inadmissibility of the 5,578.68 grams of shabu in evidence does
not totally exonerate the accused. The illegal search in Unit 122 was preceded by a
valid arrest. The accused was caught in flagrante delicto as a result of an entrapment
conducted by NARCOM operatives on the basis of the information provided by Mabel
Cheung Mei Po regarding the accused's illegal trade. NARCOM agents P/Insp.
Santiago and SPO3 Campanilla saw him handing over a bag of white crystalline
substance to Mabel Cheung Mei Po. His arrest was lawful and the seized bag
of shabu weighing 999.43 grams was admissible in evidence, being the fruit of the
crime. Miso

The second assigned error hinges on the credibility of witnesses. As we have


consistently stressed in the majority of appeals in criminal cases, appellate courts give
weight, and at times even finality, to the findings of the trial judge who is in a better
position to determine the credibility of witnesses, as he can observe firsthand their
demeanor and deportment while testifying. Appellate courts have none of the judges
advantageous position; they rely merely on the cold records of the case and on the
judges discretion.

As mentioned earlier, Mabel Cheung Mei Po turned hostile witness in the course of the
trial. The defense capitalized on such fact and hammered the prosecution on this point,
arguing that Mabels testimony during her cross-examination virtually belied the
prosecutions factual theory of the case and cast doubt on the testimony of the
NARCOM agents.
55

But we are not persuaded. Mabel Cheung Mei Po turned hostile witness understandably
because of her adverse interest in the case. She was separately charged for violation of
Sec. 15, Art. III, RA 6425,[16] although she was subsequently acquitted by the trial court
on reasonable doubt.[17] It is therefore to be expected that she would be extremely
cautious in giving her testimony as it might incriminate her. At any rate, the testimony of
the police informant in an illegal drug case is not essential for the conviction of the
accused since that testimony would merely be corroborative and cumulative.[18] Hence,
even if we concede that Mabel Cheung Mei Pos testimony was discredited on account
of the dismissal of the criminal case against her, the prosecution could still rely on the
testimonies of the arresting officers and secure a conviction on the basis thereof.

Further, the attempt of the accused to downgrade the testimonies of the NARCOM
agents is bereft of substantial basis since it has not been shown that they had an
improper motive for testifying as they did. It would not be amiss to point out that
NARCOM agents are not just ordinary witnesses but are law enforcers. As compared to
the baseless disclaimers of the witnesses for the defense, the narration of the incident
of the police officers is far more worthy of belief coming as it does from law enforcers
who are presumed to have regularly performed their duty in the absence of proof to the
contrary.[19] From the evidence at hand, we find no reason to denigrate their
declarations.

Indeed, there is no doubt from the records that the accused was caught in flagrante
delicto, i.e., in the act of delivering shabu. The evidence for the prosecution is both
substantial and convincing. At its core is the testimony of P/Insp. Santiago and SPO3
Campanilla who categorically pointed to the accused as the person who handed to
Mabel a plastic bag of white crystalline substance which, upon forensic examination,
was found positive for methylamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. As can be gleaned
from the assailed decision of the trial court, the narration of events by the police officers
is positive, credible and entirely in accord with human experience. It bears all the
earmarks of truth that it is extremely difficult for a rational mind not to give credence to
it. They testified in a clear, precise and straightforward manner, and even the rigid
cross-examination by the defense could not dent the essence of their
testimonies. Nexold

As regards the third assigned error, the accused questions the accuracy of the
laboratory tests conducted by the forensic chemist on the seized articles. He contends
that the PNP Crime Laboratory should have subjected the entire 999.43 grams and
5,578.66 grams of white crystalline substance taken from him, to laboratory examination
and not merely representative samples thereof in milligrams.

The argument is untenable. Primarily, there is no law or rule of evidence requiring the
forensic chemist to test the entire quantity of seized drugs to determine whether the
whole lot is really prohibited or regulated drugs as suspected. On the contrary, it has
always been the standard procedure in the PNP Crime Laboratory to test only samples
of the drugs submitted for laboratory examination. A sample taken from a package may
be logically presumed to be representative of the whole contents of the package.[20]
56

Moreover, we held in one case that chemical analysis is not an indispensable


prerequisite to establish whether a certain substance offered in evidence is a prohibited
drug. The ability to recognize these drugs can be acquired without any knowledge of
chemistry to such an extent that the testimony of a witness on the point may be entitled
to great weight. Such technical knowledge is not required, and the degree of familiarity
of a witness with such drugs only affects the weight and not the competency of his
testimony.[21] Manikx

At any rate, it was up to the defense to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the
findings of the forensic chemist were erroneous. In the absence of such evidence, the
positive results of the tests conducted by the chemist should be accepted as conclusive.
After all, she has in her favor the presumption that she regularly performed her official
duty, which was to carry out those tests in accordance with the accepted standard
procedure.[22]

All told, this Court is satisfied that the prosecution has established the guilt of the
accused beyond reasonable doubt in Crim. Case No. 96-8932. Accordingly, he must
suffer for his serious crime of poisoning the health and future of this nation. However,
we refrain from imposing the capital punishment. As amended by RA 7659, Sec. 20, Art.
IV of The Dangerous Drugs Act now provides in part that the penalty in Sec. 15, Art. III,
shall be applied if the dangerous drug involved is, in the case
of shabu or methylampethamine hydrochloride 200 grams or more and the delivery or
distribution of regulated drugs without proper authority is penalized with reclusion
perpetua to death and a fine ranging from P500,000.00 to P10,000,000.00. Thus the
law prescribes two (2) indivisible penalties, reclusion perpetua and death. Pursuant to
Art. 63 of The Revised Penal Code, since there were neither mitigating nor aggravating
circumstances attending accused's violation of the law, the lesser penalty of reclusion
perpetua is the proper imposable penalty.

The legislature never intended that where the quantity of the dangerous drugs involved
exceeds those stated in Sec. 20, the maximum penalty of death shall automatically be
imposed. Nowhere in the amendatory law is there a provision from which such a
conclusion may be drawn. On the contrary, this Court has already concluded in People
v. Gatward[23] that RA 7659 did not amend Art. 63 of The Revised Penal Code, and the
rules therein were observed although the cocaine subject of that case was also in
excess of the quantity provided in Sec. 20.[24] Maniksx

With respect to Crim. Case No. 96-8933, since the constitutional right of the accused
against unreasonable searches and seizures was violated, which rendered the evidence
against him inadmissible, he is acquitted of the offense charged.

Finally, we take this opportunity to remonstrate the law enforcement agencies regarding
respect for the constitutional rights of persons suspected of committing crimes. As the
phalanx of our united efforts to stem the surging tide of drug-trafficking in this country,
the police force is not only expected to be well-trained and well-equipped in the
detection and apprehension of drug pushers, but more importantly, it must also be
57

aware that arrests, searches and seizures should at all times and in all instances be
done within the context of the Constitution. While we encourage an active and vigorous
law enforcement, we nevertheless defer to and uphold the sacredness of constitutional
rights. In the instant case, while the penalty of reclusion perpetua imposed by this Court
on the accused may be sufficient to put him away for good, it is nonetheless lamentable
that he will walk away unpunished in the other case of possession of more than 5,000
grams of illegal narcotics on account of a blunder which could have easily been avoided
had the NARCOM officers faithfully adhered to the requirements of the Constitution.

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the trial court in Crim. Case No. 96-8932 convicting
accused CHE CHUN TING alias "DICK" for violation of Sec. 15, Art. III, of RA 6425 (The
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended) is AFFIRMED, subject to the modification
that the penalty imposed by the trial court is reduced to reclusion perpetua. The
accused is ordered to pay a fine in the increased amount of P2,000,000.00, and the
costs.

In Crim. Case No. 96-8933, accused CHE CHUN TING alias "DICK" is ACQUITTED for
failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt the evidence
against him being inadmissible.

The 999.43 grams and 5,578.68 grams of shabu, subject of Crim. Case Nos. 96-8932
and 96-8933 are FORFEITED in favor of the government to be turned over immediately
to the Dangerous Drugs Board and the National Bureau of Investigation for proper
disposition.

SO ORDERED. Manikanx

Davide, Jr., C.J., Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing,
Purisima, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, Ynares-Santiago, and De Leon Jr.,
JJ., concur.

FIRST DIVISION
[G.R No. 134056. July 6, 2000]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ROBERT FIGUEROA
and BEATRICE VALERIO, accused. ROBERT FIGUEROA, accused-
appellant.

DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:

Accused-appellant ROBERT FIGUEROA (hereafter OBET) appeals from


the 18 May 1998 Decision[1] of the Regional Trial Court of Paraaque City,
Branch 259, in Criminal Case No. 97-306, convicting him of violation of Section
14-A[2], Article III of R.A. No. 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs
58

Act of 1972, as amended by RA. No. 7659. His co-accused Beatrice Valerio
(hereafter Betty) was acquitted.
OBET and Betty were indicted under an information, dated 2 April 1997,
whose accusatory portion reads as follows:

That on 16 February 1997 and for sometime prior thereto in Paraaque City and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused without authority of
law, conspiring, confederating and helping one another, did then and there, wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously manufacture, produce, prepare or process methamphetamine
hydrochloride or shabu, a regulated drug amounting to a 2.4 liters, directly by means of
chemical synthesis.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[3]

When arraigned OBET and Betty each entered a plea of not guilty. [4] Trial
on the merits then ensued.
The witnesses presented by the prosecution were NBI Forensic Chemist
Mary Ann T. Aranas, NBI Special Investigator III Pio M. Palencia (hereafter
PALENCIA), and NBI Intelligence Agent II Martin Soriano (hereafter
SORIANO).
PALENCIA testified that on 15 February 1997, he was in the office of
SORIANO at Project 6, Quezon City, when they received a call from their
informant, a woman, who reported that a certain OBET was allegedly engaged
in large-scale drug trafficking in Makati City. PALENCIA and SORIANO
forthwith instructed their informant to establish contact with OBET for a buy-bust
operation. After several hours, the informant reported that OBET was already
waiting for her at No. 1485 Soliman Street, Makati City, with instructions for her
to come alone as soon as she was ready with P150,000. PALENCIA then
caused the dusting of fluorescent powder over ten pieces of authentic P100 bills
as buy-bust money and gave them to the informant.[5]
On board a taxi, PALENCIA, SORIANO and their informant proceeded to
the rendezvous area. They arrived at half past twelve o'clock in the early
morning of 16 February 1997. As the gate was already open, the informant
entered the premises, while PALENCIA and SORIANO discreetly crawled and
positioned themselves near the gate of the house. Strategically positioned,
PALENCIA overheard OBET ask the informant whether she had the money.
PALENCIA then saw the informant hand over the money to OBET. While
counting the money, OBET sensed the presence of other people in the area.
OBET, who was in possession of a .45 caliber pistol, fired it twice toward the
direction of PALENCIA, while hurrying towards the house. OBET then held
hostage his mistress, Estrella Brilliantes, and her two children for the next three
hours until the arrival of one Major Roberto Reyes to whom OBET surrendered.
PALENCIA and SORIANO brought OBET, his firearm and the recovered buy-
59

bust money to the WPD Headquarters for recording purposes and, thereafter, to
the NBI Headquarters.[6]
At the NBI Headquarters, PALENCIA and SORIANO methodically
interrogated OBET about the source of his shabu. OBET eventually volunteered
that his source was a certain Betty of 263 El Grande Street, B.F. Homes,
Paraaque City. PALENCIA and SORIANO took OBET to Betty's house as a
follow-up operation. They arrived at around 6:00 a.m. of the same day, 16
February 1997. As OBET called Betty earlier to tell her that he was arriving,
Betty already had the gate opened for them. After parking, PALENCIA saw
Betty waiting for them. Upon seeing OBET in handcuffs, Betty asked what
happened. OBET replied that he was just caught in a buy-bust operation.
PALENCIA and SORIANO then tried to convince Betty to surrender the shabu
that OBET insisted was hidden inside the house. As Betty persistently denied
the existence of the shabu, PALENCIA told OBET to confer with Betty. After a
while, OBET proceeded to the kitchen of the guesthouse located outside the
main house, followed by Betty. OBET then promptly pointed to what he termed
as liquid shabu inside a white pail along with other drug paraphernalia, such as
a beaker spray. PALENCIA and SORIANO seized the items.[7]
Thereafter, PALENCIA requested a laboratory examination of all the seized
items and an ultraviolet light examination over the persons of OBET, Betty and
a certain Eva Baluyot.[8] PALENCIA claimed that based on the certification
issued by the Forensic Chemistry Division of the NBI, all the items seized from
Betty's residence were positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride except
specimen no.7; while from among the persons subjected to ultraviolet light
examination, only OBET was found positive for fluorescent powder. [9]
On cross-examination, PALENCIA admitted that he and SORIANO
conducted the search without a search warrant, but with the consent of
Betty.[10] He also admitted that he did not actually see OBET or Betty in the act
of manufacturing shabu.[11]
NBI Intelligence Agent II SORIANO corroborated PALENCIA's testimony.
He likewise admitted that the custodial investigation of OBET, during which he
divulged Betty as the source of shabu, was conducted in the absence of any
counsel. SORIANO also confirmed PALENCIA's testimony that they were not
armed with a search warrant, but that they conducted the follow-up operation at
Betty's house under the hot pursuit theory.[12] He further maintained that OBET,
after conferring with Betty, uttered, Ako na nga, ako na nga"(I will do it, I will do
it). OBET then proceeded to the dirty kitchen, pointed to the refrigerator and
had it moved. Thereafter, SORIANO saw a plastic pail containing liquid with
floating brown substances.
SORIANO admitted that he and PALENCIA neither witnessed OBET and
Betty manufacture shabu in the manner described in Section 2(j) of the
Dangerous Drugs Act[13]; nor did they possess evidence, independent of the
items they had seized, that OBET and Betty were engaged in the labeling or
manufacturing of shabu.[14]
60

Forensic Chemist Mary Ann T. Aranas testified that on 16 February 1997,


she conducted a laboratory examination for the presence of any prohibited or
regulated drug on eleven different specimens (Exhibits "B"-"L").[15] The result of
the examination disclosed that all the specimens except specimen no. 7 (Exhibit
"H") were positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride.[16] She further observed
that specimen no. 8 (Exhibit I- I-2), the brown liquid with floating solid flakes
contained in a plastic pail, was positive for epedrine, [17] a substance used in the
manufacture of methamphetamine hydrochloride. She opined that this crude
form of shabu would have to undergo chemical processes, like extraction,
crystallization, distillation, before it could be finally converted into shabu's
crystalline form. She also conducted a fluorescent powder examination over the
persons of OBET and Betty. Only OBET gave a positive result.[18]
On the other hand, OBET testified that while he was watching television on
the night of 15 February 1997, he heard the doorbell rang. Upon seeing Eva
Baluyot, his childhood friend, he opened the door for her. Inside the house, Eva
handed him a bundle of money and stated that she was buying shabu from him.
OBET emphatically told Eva that he was not engaged in such illegal trade and
returned the money. OBET then accompanied Eva out of the house. At the
garage, OBET noticed someone peeping from the dark; so he told Eva to go
back inside the house with him. Eva ignored the request. OBET thus left Eva at
the garage and got his .45 caliber gun from his house. While he was locking the
door, his handgun accidentally fired off, as he forgot that it had already been
cocked. This blast was followed by shouts of people outside claiming that they
were NBI men. Uncertain, OBET did not go out of the house but instead told the
alleged NBI men to call the Makati Police, specifically Major Reyes. The NBI
agents, however, persisted in convincing OBET to go out of the house. He did
get out of his house after three hours when he heard the voice of Major Reyes.
OBET gave to Major Reyes his gun. The Makati Police and the NBI men
thereafter conducted a joint search inside OBET's house which, however,
yielded nothing. OBET was then brought to the Makati Police Headquarters
where the incident was recorded. Thereafter, PALENCIA, SORIANO
and another NBI man brought OBET to the house of Betty, his former live-in
partner, at El Grande Street, B.F. Homes, Paraaque City, upon the insistence
and information of Eva Baluyot.[19]
Upon entering B.F. Homes, SORIANO instructed OBET to call and tell Betty
that he was already near. The gate was already opened when they arrived, and
the NBI men freely parked their car at the garage. Then, PALENCIA and
SORIANO alighted from the car and entered Betty's house. OBET was left in
the car under the charge of the third NBI man; hence, he knew nothing of what
happened inside Betty's house.[20]
For her part, Betty admitted that she was romantically involved with OBET
and had a child by him. She recalled that on 16 February 1997, OBET called at
around 6:00 a.m. and requested her to open the gate for him, as he was
already near. She ran down to the garage and opened the gate. Since her car
was parked halfway through the garage, she went to the main house to get her
61

car keys to make way for OBET's car. But as she came out of the main house,
OBET's car was already parked inside the garage. She noticed that OBET had
two companions with long firearms. The two, whom Betty later found out as NBI
men PALENCIA and SORIANO, informed her that they had just come from a
buy-bust operation and that OBET had led them to her house, as there were
illegal chemicals kept in the premises. Shocked andamazed, she then asked for
a search warrant, but the NBI men could not produce any.[21]
Betty further recalled that the NBI men claimed that they found contraband
items near the dirty kitchen at a small space behind the refrigerator where
cases of softdrinks were stored. Betty denied any knowledge that there were
illegal chemicals inside her house and that these were manufactured into
shabu. She also denied knowing Eva Baluyot.[22]
On cross-examination, Betty disclaimed her alleged consent to the search
of her house, for she specifically asked the NBI men for a search warrant. She
asserted that she did not see the NBI men find the shabu paraphernalia
because she went up to the second floor of her house. She only saw that the
NBI men were bringing several items out of her house.[23]
The trial court agreed with the prosecution's theory that the warrantless
arrests of OBET and Betty were conducted within the purview of valid
warrantless arrests enumerated in Section 5,[24] Rule 113 of the Rules of
Court. It then ruled as valid the consented warrantless search conducted at
the house of Betty. Consequently, it found that the very items seized by the
NBI agents at the kitchen of Betty's guesthouse were admissible as
the corpus delicti of the violation of Section 14-A of the Dangerous Drugs
Act. Thus, the trial court "believed" that the paraphernalia seized were
indispensable to the processing or manufacturing of shabu into crystallized
form. Although it conceded that the prosecution witnesses did not actually
see the crystallization processes, the trial court observed that the Dangerous
Drug Act does not require that there be actual manufacturing activities at the
time of the seizure.
The trial court, however, acquitted Betty for failure of the prosecution to
adduce evidence that she, in conspiracy with OBET, manufactured shabu
without the requisite authority. It did not arrive at a similar conclusion as far as
OBET was concerned, but declared that based on the evidence on record,
OBET's guilt of the crime charged was proved beyond reasonable doubt. Thus,
in the decision of 18 May 1998 the trial court decreed as follows:

WHEREFORE, finding the evidence insufficient to warrant the conviction of accused


Beatrice Valerio y del Rosario for Violation of Sec. 14-a of Article III of R.A. 6425 as
amended by R.A. 7659, this court pronounces her NOT GUILTY and considering that
she is detained at the NBI the NBI is directed to immediately release her from custody
unless there be some reasons for her detention. Finding, however, accused Robert
Figueroa GUILTY as charged [of] the same offense in the absence of any mitigating or
aggravating circumstances, this Court hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of
62

Reclusion Perpetua and to pay a fine of P500,000.00 and to suffer the accessory
penalties provided by law, specifically Art. VI [sic] of the Revised Penal Code.

The Clerk of Court is directed to prepare the Mittimus for the immediate transfer of
Robert Figueroa to the Bureau of Corrections in Muntinlupa City.

SO ORDERED.

Unsatisfied with the verdict, OBET appealed the decision to us. He


principally premises his prayer for acquittal on the failure of the State to show
by convincing evidence that shortly prior to or during custodial investigation, he
was apprised of his constitutional rights to remain silent, to have a competent
and independent counsel preferably of his own choice, and to be informed of
such rights. He asserts that he did not waive those rights. Thus, whatever
admissions were allegedly extracted from him are inadmissible in evidence.
Even assuming that his extrajudicial statements were admissible, Betty's
acquittal would work in his favor because the indictment is based on
conspiracy. In a conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all. Therefore, the acts
imputed to him were also the acts of Betty, and vice versa. Since the trial court
considered insufficient for conviction the acts of Betty, then he, too, should be
acquitted.
In the Appellee's Brief, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) maintains
that not all warrantless searches and seizures are illegal. For one, a warrantless
search and seizure is not unreasonable and offensive to the Constitution if
consent is shown. In this case, the prosecution convincingly proved that Betty
consented to the search of her house. With her consent, Betty validly waived
her constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizure.
Consequently, the items seized in her house by virtue of the consented search
are admissible in evidence against her and OBET.
The OSG also contends that the acquittal of Betty does not per se work to
absolve OBET of the crime charged. Betty's believable disavowal of the location
of the paraphernalia and other circumstances on record reasonably indicative of
her innocence cannot redound in favor of OBET. The latter apparently knew the
exact location of the hidden paraphernalia. By such disclosure, it is not far-
fetched to conclude that OBET had been actually engaged in the manufacture
of shabu.
We first resolve the question of whether Betty's acquittal would benefit
OBET.
We disagree with the theory of OBET that in an indictment based on
conspiracy, the acquittal of a conspirator likewise absolves a co-conspirator
from criminal liability. Indeed, the rule is well-settled that once a conspiracy is
established, the act of one is the act of all, and each of the conspirators is liable
for the crimes committed by the other conspirators.[25] It follows then that if the
prosecution fails to prove conspiracy, the alleged conspirators should be held
63

individually responsible for their own respective acts. Accordingly, OBET's


criminal liability in this case must be judged on the basis of his own acts as
established by the quantum of proof required in criminal cases.
We should then determine whether the prosecution was able to establish
beyond reasonable doubt OBET's guilt for unauthorized manufacture of shabu,
a regulated drug.
After a meticulous review of the records and of the evidence adduced by
the parties in this case, we find that what PALENCIA and SORIANO did left
much to be desired, thereby resulting in a bungled prosecution of the case. The
evidence for the prosecution miserably failed to prove OBET's guilt of the
offense charged.
The buy-bust operation was a failure because no shabu or other regulated
or prohibited drug was found in OBET's person and residence. No evidence
was adduced to show that OBET handed shabu over to the informant. Yet, he
was placed in custody. For what offense he was held in custody does not,
initially, appear very clear on the record.
It was established that OBET fired two shots toward the direction of
PALENCIA and SORIANO and held hostage his mistress and her two children.
Yet he was not placed under custodial investigation for such crimes as grave
threats, coercion, illegal possession of firearms, or crimes other than that with
which he was charged.
On the contrary, OBET was held in custody and investigated or interrogated
about the source of the shabu, none of which was found during the buy-bust
operation. In short he was held in custody as a consequence of the failed buy-
bust operation and as a follow-up to link him to the source and establish a
conspiracy in the illegal trade of shabu. Allegedly, he admitted that the source
was Betty. On the basis of that admission, PALENCIA and SORIANO, together
with OBET, proceeded to the residence of Betty. Needless to state, OBET
cannot be investigated for anything in relation to shabu while under custody
without informing him of his rights to remain silent and to have a competent and
independent counsel preferably of his own choice. Any waiver of such rights
should be in writing and made in the presence of a counsel pursuant to Section
12 (1)[26], Article III of the Constitution. It has been held that these rights attach
from the moment the investigation starts, i.e. when the investigating officers
begin to ask questions to elicit information and confessions or admissions from
the suspect.[27]
It is always incumbent upon the prosecution to prove at the trial that prior to
in-custody questioning, the confessant was informed of his constitutional rights.
The presumption of regularity of official acts does not prevail over the
constitutional presumption of innocence.[28] Hence, in the absence of proof that
the arresting officers complied with these constitutional safeguards, extrajudicial
statements, whether inculpatory or exculpatory, made during custodial
investigation are inadmissible and cannot be considered in the adjudication of a
64

case.[29] In other words, confessions and admissions in violation of Section 12


(1), Article III of the Constitution are inadmissible in evidence against the
declarant and more so against third persons.[30] This is so even if such
statements are gospel truth and voluntarily given.[31] Such statements are
useless except as evidence against the very police authorities who violated the
suspect's rights.[32]
SORIANO admitted that the custodial investigation of OBET was conducted
without the presence of a lawyer, and there is no proof that OBET waived said
right and the right to remain silent. No waiver in writing and in the presence of a
counsel was presented. Thus, pursuant to paragraph 3 of Section 12 of Article
III of the Constitution any admission obtained from OBET in the course of his
custodial investigation was inadmissible against him and cannot be used as a
justification for the search without a warrant.
The search conducted on Betty's house was allegedly consented to by
Betty. Indeed, a consented search is one of the exceptions to the requirement
of a search warrant. In People v. Chua Ho San @ Tsay Ho San,[33] we pointed
out that:

This interdiction against warrantless searches and seizures, however, is not absolute
and such warrantless searches and seizures have long been deemed permissible by
jurisprudence in instances of (1) search of moving vehicles, (2) seizure in plain view, (3)
customs searches, (4) waiver or consented searches, (5) stop and frisk situations (Terry
search), and (6) search incidental to a lawful arrest. The last includes a valid
warrantless search and seizure pursuant to an equally valid warrantless arrest, for,
while as a rule, an arrest is considered legitimate if effected with a valid warrant of
arrest, the Rules of Court recognize permissible warrantless arrest, to wit: (1)
arrest flagrante delicto, (2) arrest effected in hot pursuit, and (3) arrest of escaped
prisoners.

In case of consented searches or waiver of the constitutional guarantee,


against obtrusive searches, it is fundamental that to constitute, a waiver, it must
first appear that (1) the right exists; (2) that the person involved had knowledge,
either actual or constructive, of the existence of such right; and (3) the said
person had an actual intention to relinquish the right. [34] The third condition does
not exist in the instant case. The fact is, Betty asked for a search warrant, thus:
Q And of course, these NBI Special Investigators informed you of their purpose is
that correct?
A Yes sir.
Q And of course believing that there was nothing in your house you acceded?
A No sir, I was asking for a search warrant.
Q And what was their reply?
A They did not have any but that Figueroa had led them to the property. [35]
65

Neither can the search be appreciated as a search incidental to a valid


warrantless arrest of either Betty or OBET as intimated by the trial court. First,
Betty's arrest did not precede the search. Second, per the prosecution's
evidence OBET was not arrested for possession or sale of regulated or
prohibited drugs as a consequence of the buy-bust operation. He surrendered
after taking hostage Estrella and her two children, although he was thereafter
held in custody for further questioning on illegal drugs.
There is no showing that the house occupied by Betty and the articles
confiscated therefrom belong to OBET. That OBET pointed to PALENCIA and
SORIANO the places where the articles were found provides no sufficient basis
for a conclusion that they belonged to him. Even if the articles thus seized
actually belonged to him, they cannot be constitutionally and legally used
against him to establish his criminal liability therefor, since the seizure was the
fruit of an invalid custodial investigation.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the 18 May 1998 Decision of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 259, Paraaque City, convicting herein accused-
appellant Robert Figueroa of violation of Section 14-A, Article III of the
Dangerous Drugs Act, as amended, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. He
is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime charged, and ORDERED immediately
released from confinement or detention unless his continued detention is
warranted by virtue of a valid legal cause. The Director of the Bureau of
Corrections is directed to submit within five (5) days from receipt of a copy of
this decision a report on the release of accused-appellant.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, Kapunan, Pardo, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.

THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 140904. October 9, 2000]
RENE S. ONG, MAGDALENO B. ALBARRACIN, JR., PETRONIO C. AALIWIN and J.
O. NERIT, petitioners, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and COURT OF
APPEALS, respondents.

DECISION
MELO, J.:

Before us is a petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for issuance of a writ
of preliminary injunction, wherein petitioners, accused before the Metropolitan Trial
Court (MeTC) of Makati City, charge said court with having committed grave abuse of
discretion when it denied their demurrer to evidence.
The facts of the case are as follows:
66

On February 8, 1993, Zeny Alfonso purchased a paper bag-making machine for


P362,000.00 from the Solid Cement Corporation. When she went to the corporation's
Antipolo plant, however, no machine could be given to her, it appearing that the
machine sold had been earlier mortgaged to a creditor, who, unfortunately, refused to
release the mortgage. Herein petitioners offered to return the money paid by Mrs.
Alfonso but she refused and instead filed a criminal complaint with the City Prosecutor
of Makati.
The City Prosecutor dismissed the complaint on the ground that liability, if any,
would be civil and not criminal in nature. This dismissal was, however, reversed by the
Department of Justice.
On October 18, 1994, an Information for estafa and other deceit based on Article
318 of the Revised Penal Code was filed with the MeTC of Makati City. After pre-trial,
the prosecution presented as its sole witness complainant Zeny Alfonso. The
prosecution then formally offered its documentary evidence and rested its case. The
admissibility of these documents was questioned by petitioners.
The disputed documents are alleged photo copies of (1) the approval of the sale of
the paper bag-making machine supposedly signed by petitioners; (2) an official receipt
of Solid Cement Corporation evidencing payment of P362,000.00; (3) a plant gate pass
from one J.P. Valencia dated February 16, 1993 for entry into the Antipolo compound
and pull-out of the machine; (4) a letter from one Atty. Maximino Robles demanding
delivery of the machine to the complainant; (5) a letter of Solid Cement's Rene S. Ong
offering to return P362,000.00 plus interest; (6) a letter from Atty. Robles informing Solid
Cement of complainant's refusal to accept the refund of the P362,000.00; (7) a
memorandum from five officers or employees of Solid Cement Corporation
recommending the sale of the paper bag-making-machine; (8) another gate-pass dated
December 3, 1992 from one Ramon Enriquez allowing the pull out of the machine; (9) a
letter from one Lorenzo P. Ligot thanking Solid Cement, through one Peter Aaliwin, for
the former's grant of a right of first refusal; and (10) a copy of the resolution dated July
26, 1993 of the Provincial Prosecutor's Office of Rizal. The defense objected to the
admission of these pieces of evidence, claiming that the same were only
unauthenticated photocopies of the originals.
On July 12, 1996, petitioners filed a motion for leave to file demurrer to evidence,
attaching thereto their demurrer. In their pleading, petitioners stressed that all the
above-mentioned documents being uncertified photocopies bearing unidentified or
unauthenticated signatures are inadmissible in evidence. Without ruling on the motion
for leave to file demurrer, the MeTC, on August 19, 1996, held:

WHEREFORE, the instant demurrer is hereby denied and the motion to hold departure
order of all accused Granted. Let a copy of this Order be sent to the Commissioner of
Bureau of Immigration and Deportation for proper disposition and implementation
against the accused RENE ONG, MAGDALENO ALBARRACIN, JR., PETRONIO C.
AALIWIN and J.O. NERIT of Solid Cement Corporation, No. 168 Salcedo Street, 3rd
Floor, Golden Rock Building, Makati City.
67

(pp. 113-114, Rollo.)

In its Order denying the demurrer to evidence, MeTC Judge Felicidad Y. Navarro-
Quiambao summarized private complainant's testimony as follows:

The prosecutor presented the private complainant Zeny Alfonso who testified that on
February 8, 1993, she was awarded by the accused the sale of a Paper Bag Making
Machine including its spare parts. On February 16, 1993, she paid in full the purchase
price of the machine including the charges for its freight to Cebu in the amount of
P362,000.00 and as a consequence of said payment she was issued a Plant Gate Pass
for the pull out of shipment of the machine to Cebu; that the following day, she
proceeded to the plant site of the Solid Cement Corporation in Antipolo where she was
told that accused Rene S. Ong has ordered to stop and discontinue with the shipment of
the machine; that on the same day, she rushed to see Mr. Ong in Makati and she was
told to wait for a week; that on March 1, 1993, she went again to Mr. Ong who informed
her to go back to the plant site for final arrangement regarding the shipment of the
paper bag machine so she proceeded to the plant only to be told that the machine
cannot be released on order of Mr. Ong; that upon the demand of her lawyer to the
Solid Corporation for its compliance with their obligation under the transaction, Mr. Ong
offered a compromise which was turned down by her.

(pp. 112-113, Rollo.)

The MeTC, in fact, found that there was a prima facie case against petitioners on
the basis of the documents submitted by the prosecution, stating:

The Court noted from the documentary evidence on record that the machine subject of
the transaction between the complainant and the accused is mortgaged to another
creditor, who, incidentally, refused to release the mortgage on said subject
machine. Indeed, this strongly suggest (sic) the existence of a prima facie case that
would warrant a trial on the merits. Accordingly, the motion for hold departure order is
hereby Granted.

(p. 113, Rollo.)

Acting on a petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by the accused, the Regional
Trial Court of Makati, per Judge Teofilo Guadiz, Jr., reversed the above ruling in its
order dated May 19, 1997, disposing:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is hereby granted. The Order dated
August 19, 1996 denying the Demurrer to Evidence and the Order dated September 18,
1996, insofar as it declares the existence of cause to hold the petitioners for further trial,
are hereby set aside and declared null and void. The respondent judge is hereby
ordered to dismiss Criminal Case No. 157290 entitled People of the Philippines v. Rene
Ong, et al.
68

(p. 159, Rollo.)

The Guadiz resolution was raised to the Court of Appeals by the People. On April 8,
1999, the 13th Division thereof (Mabutas [P], Aquino, and Rivera, JJ.) rendered a
reversal decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby GRANTED - and the


assailed resolution (dated May 19, 1997) and order (dated October 16, 1997) of the
respondent judge SET ASIDE. The writ of preliminary injunction issued by this Court on
June 5, 1998 is made permanent. The private respondents herein are given the option
to either present their evidence (in Criminal Case No. 157290 which is reinstated)
before the trial court below (Metropolitan Trial Court) or to submit the case for decision
based solely on the prosecutor's evidence.

(p. 71, Rollo.)

Petitioners submit that the Court of Appeals acted contrary to law and jurisprudence
and committed grave abuse of discretion in:
1) finding that appeal and not certiorari was the remedy that should have been
availed of by petitioners;
2) finding that RTC Judge Teofilo Guadiz, Jr. erred in evaluating the
prosecution's evidence for sufficiency and inadmissibility;
3) not finding that the RTC resolution dated May 19, 1997 was an acquittal and
not applying double jeopardy in their favor;
The petition is meritorious.
In setting aside the regional trial court's decision which ordered the MeTC to
dismiss the criminal case filed against petitioners, the Court of Appeals held that
petitioners, after the denial by the MeTC of their demurrer to evidence, should not have
filed a petition forcertiorari with the regional trial court. In its words:

As pointed out, the Supreme Court, in the case of Joseph v. Villaluz (89 SCRA 324),
held that it would not annul an interlocutory order denying a motion to dismiss in a
criminal case. Appeal is the proper remedy of the petitioners in order to have the
findings of fact reviewed by a superior court (Manalo v. Mariano, 69 SCRA 80). Such
ruling was a reiteration of an earlier one in People v. Romero (22 Phil. 565) wherein the
Highest Tribunal stressed that the question of whether or not the evidence by the
prosecution is sufficient to convince the court that the accused is guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime charged, rests entirely within the sound judgment of the
trial court. The error, if any is committed by the denial of the demurrer to evidence, can
only be corrected by appeal (Cruz v. People, 144 SCRA 677).

Similarly, the Supreme Court held in People v. Court of Appeals (119 SCRA 162) that it
has been the long settled rule that certiorari does not lie to challenge the trial court's
interlocutory order denying the accused's motion to dismiss. "The appellate courts will
69

not review in such special civil action the prosecution's evidence and decide in advance
that such evidence has or has not yet established the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt. The orderly procedure prescribed by the Rules of Court is for the
accused to present his evidence after which the trial court, on its own assessment of the
evidence submitted by both the prosecution and defense, will then properly render its
judgment of acquittal or conviction. If the verdict is one of acquittal, the case ends
there. But if it is one of conviction, then appeal is the proper recourse (Cruz v.
People, supra).

(pp. 64-65, Rollo.)

In other words, the position of the Court of Appeals is to the effect that after the
denial of their demurrer to evidence, petitioners instead of filing a petition
for certiorari with the regional trial court, should have presented their evidence and in
case of an adverse decision, appealed the same to the regional trial court.
Likewise, the Court of Appeals brushed aside petitioners' invocation of their right
against double jeopardy, stating that the order of the regional trial court dismissing the
criminal case filed against petitioners did not amount to their acquittal. Held thus the
appellate court:

As aptly posited by the petitioner (The People) the requisites that must concur for legal
jeopardy to attach are: (a) a valid complaint or information; (b) a court of competent
jurisdiction; (c) the accused has pleaded to the charge; and (d) the accused has been
convicted or acquitted, or the case dismissed or terminated without the express consent
of the accused (People v. Gines, 197 SCRA 481, De la Rosa v. Court of Appeals, 253
SCRA 499). The fourth requisite is lacking, because respondent court's resolution of
May 19, 1997 is a "fruit" emerging from a grave abuse of discretion - thus it cannot ripen
to an acquittal of the private respondents, whose demurrer to evidence had been denied
by the trial court below. It is true that an accused is presumed innocent until his guilt is
shown beyond reasonable doubt. However, after the prosecution has adduced
evidence, the constitutional presumption of innocence must yield to what has been so
amply and persuasively demonstrated (People v. Andal, 70 SCRA 30). The respondent
judge could not decide in the special civil action before him whether or not the evidence
adduced by the prosecution had established beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of
petitioners (private respondents herein), because factual matters are not proper for
consideration in proceedings brought either as an original action for certiorari or as an
appeal by certiorari (Insular Bank of Asia and America v. Court of Appeals, 228 SCRA
420; Navarro v. Commission on Elections, 228 SCRA 596).It is, therefore, incumbent on
the part of the accused (private respondents herein) to neutralize the evidence of the
State in order to maintain the presumption of their innocence of the crime of which they
were charged. If convicted, appeal will be their (private respondents') proper remedy to
have the findings of fact by the trial judge reviewed by a superior court (Manalo v.
Mariano, et al., 69 SCRA 80).

Indeed, the rule generally prevailing is that "certiorari does not lie to review a trial
court's interlocutory order denying a motion to dismiss (or to acquit), which is equivalent
70

to a demurrer to evidence, filed after the prosecution had presented its evidence and
rested its case. An order denying a demurrer to evidence is interlocutory. It is not
appealable. Neither can it be the subject of a petition for certiorari (Tadeo v. People,
300 SCRA 744 [1998])."
However, Tadeo itself states that "[f]rom such denial (of the demurrer to evidence),
appeal in due time is the proper remedy, notcertiorari, in the absence of grave abuse of
discretion or excess of jurisdiction, or an oppressive exercise of judicial authority."
Consequently, if the denial of the demurrer to evidence is attended by grave abuse
of discretion, the denial may be assailed through a petition for certiorari. This exception
was explicitly recognized by the Court in Cruz v. People (303 SCRA 533 [1999]), where
we stated that:

The general rule that the extraordinary writ of certiorari is not available to challenge (the
denial of the demurrer to evidence) may be subject to exceptions.When the assailed
interlocutory orders are patently erroneous or issued with grave abuse of discretion, the
remedy of certiorari lies.

Likewise, in Gutib v. Court of Appeals (312 SCRA 365 [1999]), we declared that
"the rule is not absolute and admits of an exception. Thus where, as in the instant case,
the denial of the motion to dismiss by the trial court was tainted with grave abuse of
discretionamounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, the aggrieved party may assail the
order of denial on certiorari."
The present case presents one such exception warranting the resort to the remedy
of certiorari, the trial court judge having committed grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction in denying petitioners' demurrer to evidence. A demurrer
to evidence is an objection by one of the parties in an action, to the effect that the
evidence which his adversary produced is insufficient in point of law, whether true or
not, to make out a case or sustain the issue. The party demurring challenges the
sufficiency of the whole evidence to sustain a verdict. The court, in passing upon the
sufficiency of the evidence raised in a demurrer, is merely required to ascertain whether
there is competent or sufficient evidence to sustain the indictment or to support a verdict
of guilt (Gutib v. CA, supra).
In the instant case, there is no competent and sufficient evidence to sustain the
indictment or to support a verdict of guilt against petitioners. As pointed out by
petitioners, all documentary evidence submitted by the private complainant were
uncertified photocopies of certain documents, the signatures on which were either
unidentified or unauthenticated.
Section 20, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court provides that "before any
private document offered as authentic is received in evidence, its due execution and
authenticity must be proved either:
(a) by anyone who saw the document executed or written; or
(b) by evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the
maker.
71

Thus, prior to the admission in evidence of a private writing, the identity and
authenticity of the document sought to be presented must first be reasonably
established. Where there is no proof as to the authenticity of the executor's signature
appearing in a private document, such private document should be excluded (Paz v.
Santiago, 47 Phil 334 [1925]).
The documentary evidence submitted by the complaining witness are private
instruments, being instruments executed by private persons without the intervention of a
public notary or of other persons legally authorized, by which document some
disposition or agreement is proved, evidenced, or set forth (U.S. v. Orera, 11 Phil. 596
[1907]).
Being private instruments, their due and valid execution and their genuineness and
authenticity must first be established, either by the testimony of any one who saw the
writing executed or by evidence of the genuineness of the handwriting of the maker
hereof.
A painstaking perusal of the testimony of the prosecution's sole witness reveals,
however, that the due execution and authenticity of these documents were never
proved. In fact, the prosecution took no effort to prove the due execution and
authenticity of these documents during the presentation of their sole witness. Absent
such proof, these documents are incompetent as evidence. It is elementary that this
Court cannot rightly appreciate firsthand the genuineness of an unverified and
unidentified document; much less, accord it evidentiary value (People v. Sumalpong,
284 SCRA 464 [1998]). In People v. Gamiao (240 SCRA 254 [1995]), we declared,
"[p]arenthetically, appellant failed to present in evidence the originals or the xerox
copies of the documents hereinbefore discussed. The requirements for the admission of
such secondary evidence in court were not satisfied. The Rules of Court provide that
private documents require proof of their due execution and authentication before they
can be received in evidence. When there is no such proof, the substitutionary
documents may be excluded."
Moreover, the documents submitted are mere photocopies of the originals. Thus,
they are secondary evidence and as such are not admissible unless there is ample
proof of the loss of the originals (Section 3, Rule 130, Revised Rules of
Court). However, the loss of the originals have not been proved by the prosecution,
neither have they shown that the original is a public record in the custody of a public
office or is recorded in a public office, nor that the same is in the custody or under the
control of petitioners.
The due execution and authenticity of the documentary evidence presented not
having been proved, and since these are mere photocopies, the loss of the originals of
which was not previously established, the same are clearly inadmissible in
evidence. Being incompetent evidence, the only evidence the prosecution could rely on
to prove petitioners' guilt would be the sole testimony of the private
complainant. Unsupported by any other evidence, said testimony is insufficient to
sustain a finding of culpability.
72

Sufficient evidence for purposes of frustrating a demurrer thereto is such evidence


in character, weight or amount as will legally justify the judicial or official action
demanded according to the circumstances. To be considered sufficient, therefore, the
evidence must prove: (a) the commission of the crime, and (b) the precise degree of
participation therein by the accused. In the instant case, the prosecution miserably
failed to establish by sufficient evidence the existence of the crime of estafa and other
deceit.
Aside from complainant's testimony, the only evidence of petitioners' supposed
complicity in the alleged offense is the photocopy of the approval of the sale of the
paper bag-making machine, said document containing the names of petitioners Ong,
Nerit, Aaliwin, and Albarracin. As stated earlier, however, said document is inadmissible
in evidence. Thus, there is no evidence as to their participation in the crime. In fact,
among the petitioners, private complainant had personal contact only with Ong, whom
she met only after the alleged approval of the sale of the machine. Having met Ong
after the sale, Ong could not have misrepresented anything to complainant to induce
her to part with her money. As to the others, not having had personal dealings with
private complainant, it boggles one's mind to even entertain the speculation that they
could have misrepresented anything to the latter.
With our ruling that the documentary evidence submitted by the prosecution is
inadmissible in evidence, the prosecution's evidence against petitioners is grossly and
patently insufficient to support a finding of guilt. Withal, it was grave abuse of discretion
for the MeTC to consider that there was a prima facie case against petitioners
warranting a trial on the merits given the paucity of evidence against petitioners.
Had said court been more punctilious and thorough in its study and preparation of
the case, it could have fully appreciated the weakness of the state evidence against
petitioners, and that it was useless, not to say a waste of time and money, but most of
all unfair to the accused, to proceed with the tedious process of trial and direct
petitioners to adduce evidence in their defense, since it was obvious from the beginning
that petitioners could not be convicted of the crime charged.
In ruling against petitioners, the appellate court also held that petitioners could not
avail of their constitutional right against double jeopardy, allegedly because the regional
trial court's reversal of the MeTC denial of their demurrer to evidence is a "fruit"
emerging from grave abuse of discretion. It declared that Judge Guadiz could not
decide in the special civil action filed before him whether or not the evidence adduced
by the prosecution had established beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of petitioners,
factual matters not being proper for consideration in certiorari proceedings.
It is true that the prerogative writ of certiorari does not lie to correct every
controversial interlocutory order but is confined merely to questions of jurisdiction. Its
function is to keep an inferior court within its jurisdiction and to relieve persons from
arbitrary acts, meaning acts which courts or judges have no power or authority in law to
perform. It is not designed to correct procedural errors or the court's erroneous findings
and conclusions (De Vera v. Pineda, 213 SCRA 434 [1992]).
73

However, certiorari can be properly resorted to where the factual findings


complained of are not supported by the evidence on record(Congregation of the
Religious of the Virgin Mary v. CA, 291 SCRA 385 [1998]). As earlier observed, with the
inadmissibility of the prosecution's documentary evidence, the trial court's finding of
a prima facie case against petitioners is glaringly unsupported by the sole testimony of
private complainant, hence the RTC resolution reversing the MeTC's denial of the
demurrer to evidence cannot be said to be the "fruit" of grave abuse of discretion. Since
the factual findings of the MeTC are devoid of support in the evidence on record, it was
proper for the RTC to review said findings. Moreover, in order to determine whether or
not there was grave abuse of discretion in denying the demurrer to evidence, the RTC
had to inquire into the admissibility and sufficiency of the documentary and testimonial
evidence submitted by the prosecution.
With the grant by the RTC of the demurrer to evidence, the same constituted a valid
acquittal and any further prosecution of petitioners on the same charge would expose
them to being put twice in jeopardy for the same offense. A dismissal of a criminal case
by the grant of a demurrer to evidence is not appealable as the accused would thereby
be placed in double jeopardy (See Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium, p. 441).
Lastly, it has been said that a wide breadth of discretion is granted a court of justice
in certiorari proceedings. The cases in whichcertiorari will issue cannot be defined,
because to do so would be to destroy its comprehensiveness and usefulness. So wide
is the discretion of the court that authority is not wanting to show that certiorari is more
discretionary than either prohibition or mandamus. In the exercise of our superintending
control over other courts, we are to be guided by all the circumstances of each
particular case "as the ends of justice may require." So it is that the writ will be granted
where necessary to prevent a substantial wrong or to do substantial justice (Gutib v.
CA, supra).
The case at bar presents one such instance calling for this appropriate remedy. As
discussed elsewhere, petitioners have satisfactorily demonstrated in their demurrer that
the prosecution failed to prove the crime charged against them, hence, there remains
no reason to hold them for trial. Indeed, an accused is always presumed innocent until
the contrary is proved. Parenthetically, petitioners have the right to be protected against
hasty, malicious, and oppressive prosecution; to be secure from an open and public
accusation of a crime; and, from the trouble, expenses and anxiety of a public
trial. Similarly situated is the State, which must be shielded at all times from useless and
expensive litigations that only contribute to the clogging of court dockets and take a
heavy toll on its limited time and meager resources.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the
Court of Appeals dated April 8, 1999 setting aside the Regional Trial Court's resolution
dated May 19, 1997, as well as respondent appellate court's Resolution dated
November 16, 1999 denying reconsideration of its decision, are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The dismissal of Criminal Case No. 157290 entitled "People of the Philippines v.
Rene S. Ong, et al. is AFFIRMED, without prejudice to the filing of an appropriate civil
action.
SO ORDERED.
74

Vitug, Panganiban, Purisima, and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 132783. October 30, 2000]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. CARLOS LAGUERTA y
CORDERO, accused-appellant.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

For automatic review is the decision[1] of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City,
Branch 163, finding accused-appellant Carlos Laguerta y Cordero guilty of rape
pursuant to Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No.
7659, sentencing him to death and ordering him to pay the victim, Haidie Ecleo, over
whom he acts as guardian, the amount of P300,000.00 as moral damages.
In an Amended Information, dated February 12, 1997, it was alleged:

That during the period from September and October 8, 1996, in Taguig, Metro Manila,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused, with lewd designs and
by force and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have
sexual intercourse with Haidie Ecleo, an eight year old child, against her will and
consent.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[2]

Accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to the charge. During trial, the prosecution
presented the complainant victim, Haidie Ecleo, as witness, together with the PNP
Crime Laboratory Physician, Dr. Anthony Joselito Llamas, who examined Haidie. On the
other hand, the defense presented three (3) witnesses, accused-appellant included.
On November 12, 1997, the trial court rendered judgment as follows:

WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, this Court finds accused Carlos


Laguerta y Cordero guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape as principal and
imposes upon him the supreme penalty of death.

Accused is also ordered to indemnify Haidie Ecleo the sum of P300,000.00 as moral
damages.

SO ORDERED.[3]
75

In view of the penalty imposed, the records were elevated to this Court for
automatic review pursuant to Article 47 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and
Rule 122, Section 10 of the Rules of Court.
Accused-appellant seeks the reversal of his conviction on the following grounds:
I

THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY


BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME OF STATUTORY RAPE.

II

THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN ORDERING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT TO PAY


THE EXCESSIVE AMOUNT OF THREE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS
(P300,000.00) AS MORAL DAMAGES TO PRIVATE COMPLAINANT.[4]

In support of his first assigned error, accused-appellant argues that the age of the
victim has not been sufficiently established. We agree that the prosecution failed to
establish that the age of Haidie was indeed below twelve - one of the essential elements
of the crime of statutory rape. No birth or baptismal certificate was presented below to
prove the age of Haidie. Neither was there a showing that said documents were lost or
destroyed to justify their non-presentation. In view of this, appellant cannot be convicted
of statutory rape.
Moreover, the testimony of Haidie as to how the alleged rape happened was full of
inconsistencies and lacking in detail. While this was not raised as an issue by accused-
appellant, the filing of an appeal in criminal cases throws open the entire case for review
and it becomes the duty of the appellate court to correct any error, as may be found in
the appealed judgment, whether assigned as an error or not. [5]
It bears stressing that in rape cases, courts must be guided by the basic rule that
the prosecution evidence must stand or fall on its own weight and cannot draw strength
from the weakness of the defense. The prosecution must demonstrate the culpability of
the accused beyond reasonable doubt, for accusation is not synonymous with
guilt. Only when the requisite quantum of proof necessary for conviction exists that the
liberty, or even the life, of an accused may be declared forfeit. Correlatively, we must
examine with extreme caution the evidence for the state to determine its sufficiency. If
the evidence fails to live up to the moral conviction of guilt, the verdict must be one of
acquittal, for in favor of the accused stands the constitutional presumption of innocence;
so it must be in this prosecution for rape.[6]
The records show that Haidie repeatedly denied the entry of accused-appellant's
penis into her vagina. On direct testimony, Haidie testified as follows:
Q: What was that unusual thing that was done to you by Carlos Laguesta?
A: He kissed me on my lips.
Q: Other than that what else was Laguerta doing to you?
76

A: He was sucking my nipple.


Q: Other than that?
A: He held my breast.
Q: Other than holding your breast, what other portion of your body did Carlos
Laguerta touch?
A: He is kissing my sex organ.
Q: After kissing your sex organ what else did he do in your sex organ?
A: He was fingering me.
Q: What else did Carlos Laguerta place inside your sex organ other than his finger?
A: He is kissing my feet.
COURT:
Q: Aside from the finger what else has been inserted in your vagina.
A: No more, Your Honor.[7] (Emphasis added.)
This direct denial was repeated when Haidie once more testified, to wit:
Q: Do you know the meaning of rape?
A: Yes, Ma'am.
Q: What is your understanding of "rape"?
A: No answer.
COURT:
Q: Is that the act of inserting a man's penis into a woman's vagina?
A: Yes, Your Honor.
Q: Has Carlos Laguerta inserted his penis in your vagina?
A: No, Your Honor.[8] (Emphasis added.)
On cross-examination, Haidie again confirmed that she was not raped by accused-
appellant. She testified:
Q: And during this period, as you earlier testified, during your direct examination,
there was no occasion wherein you were raped by Carlos Laguesta, the accused
in this case?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: As claimed by you, you were just kissed and hugged by this person, Carlos
Laguesta, on several occasion(s)?
A: Yes, sir.[9]
77

Apart from twice denying that accused-appellant inserted his penis into her vagina,
and confirming this on cross-examination, Haidie also testified that both she and
accused-appellant had clothes on when the latter was kissing and touching her private
parts, thereby effectively ruling out any rape. Her testimony is as follows:
Q: In all these instances that Carlos Laguerta is fingering your sex organ and the
kissing of your breast, what, if any, did he tell you while he was doing that act?
A: He said "pahawak".
Q: Did he ever threaten you?
A: No, Ma'am.
Q: During all those instances, all those times that Laguerta was doing these things,
was Laguerta wearing anything at that time?
A: He had his clothes.
Q: What about you?
A: I was also with my clothes.[10]
Not only did Haidie categorically deny the entry of accused-appellant's penis into
her vagina, she also failed to narrate just how the alleged rape took place. Indeed, while
she repeatedly talked about the kissing and touching of her private parts, Haidie said
nothing at all about how accused-appellant raped her.
We have carefully gone over the transcript of stenographic notes and have found
nothing therein narrating, no matter how brief, the incident of rape. The only testimony
of Haidie on direct examination stating that accused-appellant raped her have been curt
responses to leading questions propounded by the trial court itself, to wit:
COURT:
Q: When you were in the Signal he inserted his penis?
A: Yes, Your Honor, when I was sleeping.
xxxxxxxxx
Q: Who was the first to insert his penis, your Papa or your Kuya?
A: My Papa.[11]
On cross examination, Haidie still had no story to share regarding the rape. Her
testimony pointing to accused-appellant as having raped her is merely as follows:
ATTY. VERA:
Q: So, it is very clear, Ms. Witness, that during the time you were still residing in
Mandaluyong City you were never raped by Carlos Laguesta?
A: I was raped, sir.
Q: Where were you raped?
78

A: Signal Village, sir.


xxxxxxxxx
Q: Ms. Witness, when you testified on direct examination you told the Court that the
accused inserted his penis into your vagina only once, will you tell the Court
when was that?
A: At Signal Village, Taguig.
Q: When did this happen?
A: I cannot recall anymore, sir.
Q: You also stated that it was your uncle, Carlos Laguesta, who first inserted his
penis into your vagina, is that correct?
A: Yes, sir.[12]
These generalized statements as to the rape fail to convince us of the truth of
Haidie's charge of rape against accused-appellant. While it is true that the accused may
be convicted on the basis of the lone uncorroborated testimony of the rape victim, such
testimony must be clear, positive, convincing, and otherwise consistent with human
nature and the normal course of things. Mere accusation is not enough to convict.[13]
Haidie's testimony against accused-appellant is lacking in detail. There is nothing
on record to show how the alleged rape took place.There is not even the slightest hint
as to how accused-appellant approached her, what time of day the rape occurred,
whether or not he threatened her, what he said to her, which part of the house he raped
her (if inside the house), what she was doing before she was raped, what happened
after she was raped, how she reacted while being raped, whether she saw his
penis. These are details that would validate her charge that there was sexual
intercourse.
As it is, the bare statements of Haidie that accused-appellant raped her cannot
suffice to establish a moral certainty as to the guilt of accused-appellant. Her statements
fall short of the requirement of the law on the quantum of evidence required in the
prosecution of criminal cases. Haidie's testimony is replete with inconsistencies and
lacks specific details on how the rape was committed. Her bare statements that she was
raped are clearly inadequate and grossly insufficient to establish the guilt of accused-
appellant.[14]
Rape is undoubtedly a vicious crime, and it is rendered more loathsome in this case
where the victim is a minor and the accused is a person whom she perceives as a figure
of authority. However, our sympathy for the victim and our disgust at the bestial criminal
act cannot prevail over our primordial role as interpreters of the law and dispensers of
justice.
The Constitution enshrines in the Bill of Rights the right of the accused to be
presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and to overcome the presumption,
nothing but proof beyond reasonable doubt must be established by the prosecution. If
the prosecution fails to discharge its burden, as in the instant case, then it is not only the
79

accused's right to be freed; it is, even more, the court's constitutional duty to acquit
him.[15]
Notwithstanding the prosecution's failure to establish accused-appellant's guilt for
rape, we find grounds to convict him of the lesser crime of acts of lasciviousness, based
on the evidence presented below. The records clearly show that accused-appellant
kissed Haidie on the lips; sucked her nipple; held her breast; kissed her sex organ;
inserted his finger in her genitals; and kissed her feet. From the foregoing acts, the lewd
design of petitioner is evident. Thus, although the information filed was for the crime of
rape, accused-appellant can be convicted of acts of lasciviousness because the latter is
necessarily included in rape.[16] Rule 120, Section 4 of the Rules of Court states:
When there is variance between the offense charged in the complaint or
information, and that proved or established by the evidence, and the offense as charged
is included in or necessarily includes the offense proved, the accused shall be convicted
of the offense proved included in that which is charged, or the offense charged included
in that which is proved.
Under Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty for acts of lasciviousness
is prision correccional. There being neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstances,
the penalty shall be imposed in its medium period. [17] Applying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, accused-appellant is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of five (5)
months and ten (10) days of arresto mayor, as minimum to four (4) years and two (2)
months of prision correccional, as maximum.
Finally, we find merit in accused-appellant's contention that the award of moral
damages is excessive. Conformably with our ruling inPeople v. Larin,[18] we reduce the
award of moral damages to P50,000.00.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court is MODIFIED. Accused-
appellant is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of acts of lasciviousness, as
defined in Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code, and is sentenced to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of five (5) months and ten (10) days of arresto mayor, as
minimum to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as
maximum. Further, accused-appellant is ordered to pay the victim, Haidie Ecleo, moral
damages in the sum of P50,000.00.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing,
Purisima, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
Kapunan, J., on leave.

SECOND DIVISION
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 181631
Appellee, - versus - JOSE BALINAS, JR., Appellant.
Promulgated:
September 30, 2008
80

x----------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

TINGA, J.:

Before us on appeal is the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals affirming the


judgment[2] of the Regional Trial Court[3] ofKabankalan City, Negros Occidental in
Criminal Case No. 2000-2445 finding Jose Balinas, Jr. (appellant) guilty of the crime of
murder.

Appellant was charged with murder under the following Information:

That on or about the 7th day of [January 2000], in the Municipality of Ilog,
Province of Negros Occidental, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with a bladed
weapon, with evident premeditation and treachery and with intent to kill,
did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and
stab one COLUMBAN M. SAYSON, thereby inflicting stab wounds upon
him which caused his death.[4]

The facts, as narrated by Romeo Mateo (Mateo), the prosecutions lone witness,
follow.

On 7 January 2000, Mateo was watching a cara y cruz game in Sitio Bailan, Brgy.
Dancalan, Ilog, Negros Occidental at around 2:00 a.m. He noticed appellant and the
latters father, Jose Balinas, Sr. (Balinas, Sr.), exchanging words over a bet. Mateo
overheard Balinas, Sr. that his bet was P300.00 while appellant was insisting that it was
only P200.00. Afterwards, Columban Sayson (Sayson) inquired from Balinas, Sr. about
the incident. Upon learning the cause of the argument, Sayson suggested that the
difference be taken from the collection.[5] Sensing an impending conflict, Mateo went to
a nearby store[6] while appellant went back to his house. Later, he saw Sayson,
accompanied by Tongtong Gomez, run into appellant in the store.
81

Thereat, appellant confronted Sayson about the latters intervention earlier inside the
gambling place. Sayson replied that he wanted to settle things for the sake of
peace. Thereafter, Sayson and Gomez left the store but appellant overtook the duo and
stabbed Sayson twice on the chest. Appellant immediately ran away while Sayson
shouted for help. During the entire stabbing incident, Mateo was situated four arms
length from the trio.[7]

Sayson died as a result. The death certificate shows that he died from cardio-respiratory
arrest, hypovolemic shock due to stab wounds in the chest and hemathorax and
pneumothorax.[8]

Although appellant admitted the stabbing, he invoked self-defense. He related that on 7


January 2000 at around 2:00 a.m., Sayson waylaid him by the store and started beating
him. He was hit on the chest, left cheek and other body parts. When Sayson persisted
in punching him, appellant fought back and stabbed Sayson. After stabbing him,
appellant ran towards his house, told his parents about
the incident, and surrendered to the police.[9] In support of his

testimony, appellant presented an entry in the police blotter to prove that he voluntarily
surrendered. The said entry reiterated appellants claim that he stabbed Sayson
because the latter boxed him several times.[10]

After a thorough examination of the evidence presented by the parties, the trial court
rendered a decision convicting appellant, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused Jose Balinas, Jr. y Gomez, guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder as charged qualified by
treachery and considering the mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender thereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment
of reclusion perpetua and to pay the heirs of [the] victim Columban M.
Sayson the amount of P50,000.00 by way of indemnity by reason of his
death, P15,000.00 by way of moral damages, P40,000.00 by way of
actual damages, P150,000.00 by way of loss of income and to pay the
costs.
82

It is further ordered that accused be immediately remitted to the National


Penitentiary.

SO ORDERED.[11]

The trial court relied on the testimony of the sole prosecution witness and found him to
be candid, categorical and
straightforward.Furthermore, it observed that the lack of improper motive on
the part of the witness lent greater credence to his testimony. It also

discredited appellants claim of self-defense. It held that such defense was not only
uncorroborated by any separate competent evidence but is in itself extremely
doubtful. The trial court concluded that the suddenness of the attack on the victim
constitutes treachery qualifying the crime to murder.[12]

Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal to this Court on 2 February 2004.[13]

In a Resolution dated 6 September 2004 and pursuant to our ruling in People v.


Mateo,[14] the case was transferred to the Court of Appeals. The appellate court
affirmed in toto the trial courts ruling. Undaunted, appellant filed a notice of appeal.[15]

On 2 April 2008, the parties were required to simultaneously file their respective
supplemental briefs but they opted to adopt their briefs passed upon by the Court of
Appeals.[16]

Appellant interposes two arguments to exculpate himself from criminal liability. He first
invokes self-defense by insisting that it was Sayson, the victim, who initiated the
attack. He justifies the use of a bladed weapon as he could not be expected to coolly
choose the less deadly weapon in the face of an impending danger. He also avers that
he did not give any cause for the aggression of the victim.Appellant also contends that
the lower court erred in appreciating the qualifying circumstance of treachery for lack of
concrete evidence to prove its presence.[17]
83

For the appellee, the Office of the Solicitor-General (OSG) argues that appellant
failed to corroborate his claim of self-defense. It considers appellants version of the
facts as self-serving and highly suspect. It asserts that treachery attended the
commission of the crime considering that the attack on Sayson was sudden and
unexpected. Moreover, the OSG points out, the execution of the attack made it
impossible for Sayson to defend himself.[18]

The arguments proferred by both parties can be summarized into two issues: (1)
whether appellant acted in self-defense and (2) whether the killing was attended by
treachery. Essentially, it boils down to the issue of credibility.

It is doctrinal that when the credibility of a witness is in issue, the findings of fact
of the trial court, its calibration of the testimonies of the witnesses and its assessment of
the probative weight thereof, as well as its conclusions anchored on said findings are
accorded high respect if not conclusive effect. This is because the trial court has the
unique opportunity to observe the demeanor of a witness and is in the best position to
discern whether he is telling the truth. It is likewise settled that when the trial court's
findings have been affirmed by the appellate court, said findings are generally
conclusive and binding upon this Court.[19]

There appears to be no cogent reason to deviate from the findings of the lower
courts with respect to the credibility of the lone eyewitness in the instant case.

Mateo, despite being the lone eyewitness to the crime, gave a positive and
categorical account of the incident, thus:

Q: How long if you can estimate and recall their exchanging of words of
Jose Balinas and Columban Sayson?
A: Just for a short while Jose Balinas, Jr. confronted Columban Sayson
why he intervened and then Columban Sayson answered just to
settle those things for peace.

Q: What happened after that?


A: After some sort of exchanging words Columban said many talks many
mistakes and then he went away together with Tongtong Gomez
and then Jose Balinas, Jr. went ahead of them, went around the
store and overtook them and then he stabbed Columban Sayson.

Q: Where was Columban Sayson hit?


84

xxx

A: He was hit in front of his body on the chest.

Q: What was the position of Columban Sayson when he was stabbed by


Jose Balinas, Jr.?
A: When Jose Balinas, Jr. stabbed him for the first time Columban Sayson
asked him Jr., you are going to [kill] me and then Junior answered, I
am not joking and then he stabbed him again.

xxx

Q: What happened to this Columban Sayson after he was stabbed for the
second time by Jose Balinas, Jr.?
A: He shouted for help.

Q: How about Jose Balinas, Jr.? After his second stabbed [sic] made on
Columban Sayson, what did he do, if any?
A: He ran away, sir.

xxx

Q: When Columban Sayson was stabbed by Jose Balinas, Jr., how far
were you from them?
A: Very near them.

Q: How near?
A: Four (4) arms[,] length.[20]

Time and again, this Court has ruled that the testimony of a sole eyewitness is sufficient
to support a conviction so long as it is clear, straightforward and worthy of credence by
the trial court.[21]

Mateo is considered a disinterested witness and not a whit of ill-motive was


attributed to him by appellant.

In light of the established evidence against appellant, his theory of self-defense


falters. While the cardinal rule in criminal law is that the prosecution has the burden of
85

proving the guilt of the accused, the rule is reversed where the accused admits
committing the crime, but

only in defense of one's self. In interposing self-defense, appellant admits authorship of


the killing and the burden of proof is shifted to him to establish that killing was
justified.[22]

Appellants account of the incident and his subsequent plea of self-defense hardly
deserve consideration. His testimony is not only uncorroborated but extremely
doubtful. We quote with approval the pertinent portion of the appellate courts decision,
to wit:

In the case at bench, We find that based on appellants version of


the events leading up to the killing of Columban, there is no clear and
convincing proof that he acted in defense of his life, especially since his
life was never in danger in the first place. According to appellant,
Columban box[ed] him repeatedly, causing him to almost lose
consciousness. However, appellant failed to advance or explain any
reason why Columban box[ed] him.

And if it is true that appellant almost lost consciousness because of


the beatings he suffered from Columbans fist blows, his claim that he was
able to wrest away from this situation and stabbed [sic] Columban twice
becomes doubtful. Certainly, a person who almost blacked out would be
groggy and have a hard time keeping his balance, let alone stab another
to death.

Furthermore, appellants claim is uncorroborated. He failed to


present another witness who could testify to the reasons why Columban
would attack appellant, the manner in which he attacked appellant and
how the latter was able to bounce back and defend himself by stabbing
Columban.

Since Dancalan, Ilog, Negros Occidental was then celebrating its


fiesta, there were people on the road and yet not one of them stood up
and intervened while the incident was going on. Appellant did not even
call anyone on the stand to support his claim. As such, [appellants]
version becomes self-serving and highly suspect.
86

In contrast, the prosecution had Romeo Mateo who positively


[unidentified] appellant as the one who stabbed Columban twice.Romeo is
familiar with appellant and he was only about four arms[] length away from
the two when the incident happened. During the entire course of the
proceedings in the trial court and even in his appeal brief, appellant never
once attempted to ascribe or prove ill will on the part of Romeo Mateo for
testifying as he did. The presumption that he is not actuated by any malice
or base motive and that he merely testified to help bring Columbans
assailant before the bars of justice remain unrebutted.

All told, the trial court correctly gave full weight and credit to the
[prosecutions] case which led to the conviction of appellant.[23]

The courts below correctly appreciated the circumstance of treachery. The


essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack on an unsuspecting victim by
the perpetrator of the crime, depriving the victim of any chance to defend himself or
repel the aggression, thus insuring its commission without risk to the aggressor and
without any provocation on the part of the victim. [24]While the stabbing was preceded by
a brief argument between appellant and Sayson, it cannot be gainsaid that the attack
was indeed sudden and unexpected. Moreover, the fact that appellant went around the
store in order to catch up with Sayson showed his tenacity to execute the crime.
In line with recent jurisprudence, we find the award of civil indemnity in the
amount of P50,000.00 for the death
of Saysoncorrect and proper without any need of proof other than the

commission of the crime. We increase the award of moral damages to P50,000.00 in


accordance with our ruling in People v. Sison.[25] The award of exemplary damages
of P25,000.00 is likewise warranted because of the presence of the aggravating
circumstance of treachery. Exemplary damages are awarded when the commission of
the offense is attended by an aggravating circumstance, whether ordinary or
qualifying.[26] Although the prosecution presented evidence that the heirs had incurred
expenses, no receipts were presented. The award of temperate damages, in the
amount of P25,000.00, to the heirs of the victim is justified. Temperate damages are
awarded where no documentary evidence of actual damages was presented in the trial
87

because it is reasonable to presume that, when death occurs, the family of the victim
incurred expenses for the wake and funeral.
However, we delete the award of P40,000.00 in actual damages
and P150,000.00 for loss of income granted by the trial court for it cannot simply rely on
speculation, conjecture or guesswork as to the fact and amount of damages, but is
required to depend upon competent proof that the claimant had suffered and on
evidence of the actual amount thereof.[27]

WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment is AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION.


Appellant Jose Balinas, Jr. is foundGUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of murder
qualified by treachery and sentenced to suffer reclusion perpetua.
Appellant is ordered to pay the heirs of Columban Sayson the amounts of P50,000.00
as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages, P25,000.00 as temperate
damages, and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages.
SO ORDERED.

EN BANC
G.R. No. L-35500 October 27, 1932
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
JOSE RUBIO, defendant-appellant.
Guillermo B. Guevara for appellant.
Attorney-General Jaranilla for appellee.

MALCOLM, J.:

This is an appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of Manila, Judge Moran
presiding, denying appellant's motion to declare null and void a search warrant issued
on December 26, 1930, and to have returned to him the books of account, invoices, and
records which were seized by virtue of the warrant. The case was originally assigned to
a Division of Five and was there decided, but subsequently, on representations being
88

made that the interpretation of an Act of Congress was involved, the Division ordered its
decision set aside and the transfer of the case to the court in banc.

The Administrative Code, section 1434, grants police power to internal revenue agents.
Acting pursuant to this authority, the chief secret service agent and a supervising agent
of the Bureau of Internal Revenue gave testimony under oath before Judge Revilla, in
which they specified the premises situated at No. 129 Calle Juan Luna, District of
Binondo, City of Manila, occupied by Jose Rubio, manager of the Simplex Trading
Corporation, which it was desired to search. The witnesses, among other things, stated:

It has been reported to me by a person whom I considered reliable that in said


premises there are fraudulent books, invoices and records.

I have watched personally the foregoing house for several times in company of
the complainant and I can assert positively and with a probable case that the
prohibited fraudulent books, invoices and records, exist and being conducted in
the said house, and the occupant of the same keeps in his possession effects
and devices to wit: Fraudulent books of the Simplex Trading Corporation & to
subsidiary companies Paramount Trading Corporation & New York Trading Corp.

Upon probable cause thus being shown, a search warrant was issued in the usual from,
reading as follows:

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA


PHILIPPINE ISLANDS

IN THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF THE CITY OF MANILA

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff, }

VERSUS

JOSE RUBIO, Manager of the Simplex Trading


Corporation, Paramount Corporation and
New York Trading Corporation, defendant. }

The People of the Philippine Islands, to the Internal


Revenue Agents of the City of Manila.

GREETING:

Proof by affidavit having this day been made before me, E. P. Revilla, Judge of
the Court of First Instance of the City of Manila, Philippine Islands, by the
complainant on oath of Juan Evaristo and Augusto Piccio of the City of Manila, P.
I., that the defendant Jose Rubio keeps illegally and feloniously fraudulent books,
invoices and records, and that he verily believes upon probable cause that the
89

said books, invoices and records, at No. 129, Calle Juan Luna in the City of
Manila, P. I., and the said (personal) property is now being used in the
commission of felony.

You are therefore commanded to take with you the necessary and proper
assistance and to enter, in the day time or in the night time, into the said dwelling
house and there diligently search for fraudulent books, invoices and records, and
that you seize and bring them before this court, to be disposed of according to
law.

Given under my hand this 26th day of December, 1930.

(Sgd.) E. P. REVILLA
Judge, Court of First Instance

On the same day, internal revenue agents proceeded to the place indicated in the
warrant, searched the premises, and took therefrom books, invoices, and documents
belonging to the Simplex Trading Corporation of which Jose Rubio was the manager.
Thereafter, as indicated, a motion was presented on behalf of Rubio to secure a
pronouncement of nullity of the search warrant, which motion, after receiving
memoranda in support and in opposition but without taking evidence, was denied.

The particular portions of the Act of Congress which are relied upon are found in the
Philippine Bill of Rights, being paragraphs 3 and 11 of section 3 of the Act of Congress
of August 29, 1916, commonly referred to as the Philippine Autonomy Act. These
portions of the Organic Act Provide: "That the right to be secure against unreasonable
searches and seizures shall not be violated" (sec. 3, par. 11); and "That no person shall
. . . be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself" (sec. 3, par. 3).
The applicable statutory provisions are sections 95, 96, 97, 98, and 99 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure reading as follows:

SEC. 95. A search warrant is an order in writing, issued in the name of the
People of the Philippine Islands, signed by a judge or a justice of the peace, and
directed to a peace officer, commanding him to search for personal property and
bring it before the court.

SEC. 96. It may be issued upon either of the following grounds:

1. When the property was stolen or embezzled.

2. When it was used or when the intent exists to use it as the means of
committing a felony.

SEC. 97. A search warrant shall not issue except for probable cause and upon
application supported by oath particularly describing the place to be searched
and the person or thing to be seized.
90

SEC. 98. The judge or justice must, before issuing the warrant, examine on oath
the complaint and any witnesses he may produce and take their depositions in
writing.

SEC. 99. If the judge or justice is thereupon satisfied of the existence of facts
upon which the application is based, or that there is probable cause to believe
that they exist, he must issue the warrant, which must be substantially in the
following form:

The errors assigned on appeal, connecting up with the order of the trial court, the
statement of the case, and the law as herein set forth, are the following:

1. The lower court erred in not holding that the search warrant was illegal and
void for failure to observe the constitutional and statutory provisions providing for
its issue.

2. The lower court erred in holding that even if the warrant were illegal and void
appellant's books and papers might be retained because they were proper
subjects for seizure under a search warrant.

3. The lower court erred in not holding that the seizure of appellant's books and
papers was made solely for the purpose of using them as evidence against him
in a criminal prosecution and was, therefore, unlawful.

The point made in the first error was not originally passed upon the trial court, and is
plainly without merit. The requirements of the law were substantially, and even literally,
complied with in this case. Appellant's contention that the search warrant was issued
without the complainants or any witnesses having been examined, is untenable. The
depositions speak for themselves. It is also contended that the application and the
warrant did not particularly describe the things to be seized. The verified statements of
the two internal revenue agents and the warrant issued by the Court of First Instance of
Manila all describe the property sought to be seized as "fraudulent books, invoices and
records". While it is true that the property to be seized under a warrant must be
particularly described therein and no other property can be taken thereunder, yet the
description is required to be specific only in so far as the circumstances will ordinarily
allow. It has been held that, where, by the nature of the goods to be seized, their
description must be rather general, it is not required that a technical description be
given, as this would mean that no warrant could issue. Appellant has not shown that the
internal revenue agents exceeded their powers under the warranty by seizing property
other than that described in the warrant question. The list of books, invoices, and
records seized by said officers is the best evidence to show that they strictly obeyed the
command of their warrant by seizing those things, and only those described in the
search warrant.

Under the second error, it is claimed that "the books, invoices, and records seized are
property which one may lawfully possess; they were searched and seized solely for the
91

purpose of using them as evidence to prove an offense supposed to have been


committed by appellant against the internal revenue customs laws, which search and
seizure for the purpose intended is prohibited by law." Reliance is placed on the
Philippine cases of Regidor vs. Araullo ([1904], 5 Off. Gaz., 955); Uy Kheytin vs. Villa-
Real ([1920], 42 Phil., 886); and United States vs. De los Reyes and Esguerra ([1911],
20 Phil., 467). An examination of the first two cited cases reveals that the seizures
made under the warrants issued therein were irregular and manifestly in violation of law.
In the first case, for instance, the court observed:

A causal examination of the property mentioned in the affidavit and the list of
books, papers, and documents actually seized by the said officers, as
represented by their signed statement, above quoted, will show that the officers,
in executing the said search warrant, did not limit themselves, in seizing property,
to that which was described in the affidavit or search warrant.
(Regidor vs. Araullo, supra.)

In the second case, the court said:

The important question that remains to be decided is whether, under a search


warrant for opium, the officers of the law were authorized to seize books,
personal letters, and other property having a remote or no connection with
opium. (Uy Kheytin vs. Villa-Real, supra.)

Under these circumstances, it is evident that the seizures made were in excess of the
authority given to the seizing officers. In the case at bar, however, it has been shown
that the internal revenue agents strictly obeyed the command of their warrant by seizing
no other property than that described therein.

In the third case cited by the appellant, that of United States vs. De los Reyes and
Esguerra, supra, the holding was that no public officer has the right to enter the
premises of another for the purpose of search or seizure against the will of the occupant
and without the proper search warrant. This case is entirely foreign to the point under
discussion, inasmuch as in the instant case a search warrant was issued. From the
above, it will be seen that the three Philippine cases relied upon by the appellant rest
upon different facts from those in the case at bar.

After the decision in Division had been promulgated, the opinion of the United States
Supreme Court of April 11, 1932, delivered in the case of United States of America vs.
Daniel M. Lefkowitz and Pauline Paris was received, and it is now urged that this
opinion is controlling. Of course, if the opinion, on examination, be found to support the
views of the appellant, it would become our duty, even as against any pride which one
might have in maintaining a position previously taken, to change front to conform to the
pronouncements of the higher court. Turning to the opinion just mentioned, we find it
said: "All the searches and seizures were made without a search warrant" in
contrast, the searches and seizures in the case at bar were made with a search
warrant. Further, it was said: "The only question presented is whether the searchers of
92

the desks, cabinet and baskets and the seizures of the things taken from them were
reasonable as an incident of the arrests" an entirely different state of facts from those
before us. Again, it was said: "The Fourth Amendment forbids every search that is
unreasonable and is construed liberally to safeguard the right of privacy" an
admonition which should be respected in this jurisdiction where constitutional rights are
as sacred as in the United States proper. Finally, a contrast was suggested between the
search of one's house or place of business made contemporaneously with his lawful
arrest therein upon a valid warrant of arrest and a search warrant, and it was said:

Respondents' papers were wanted by the officers solely for use as evidence of
crime of which respondents were accused or suspected. They could not lawfully
be searched for and taken even under a search warrant issued upon ample
evidence and precisely describing such things and disclosing exactly where they
were. (Gouled vs. United States, 255 U. S., 298, 310.)

xxx xxx xxx

Here, the searches were exploratory and general and made solely to find
evidence of respondents' guilt of the alleged conspiracy or some other crime.
Though intended to be used to solicit orders for liquor in violation of the Act, the
papers and other articles found and taken were in themselves unoffending. The
decisions of this court distinguish searchers of one's house, office, papers or
effects merely to get evidence to convict him of crime from searches as such as
those made to find stolen goods for return to the owner, to take property that has
been forfeited to the Government, to discover property concealed to avoid
payment of the duties for which it is liable, and from searches such as those
made for the seizure of counterfeit coins, burglars' tools, gambling paraphernalia
and illicit liquor in order to prevent the commission of crime.

We note that the opinion in the Lefkowitz case relies on previous decisions of the United
States Supreme Court in Gouled vs. United States ([1920], 255 U. S., 298), and Go-Bart
Importing Co. vs. United States ([1930], 282 U. S., 344). In the first case, it was said:

. . . search warrants . . . may not be used as a means of gaining access to a


man's house or office and papers solely for the purpose of making search to
secure evidence to be used against him in a criminal or penal proceeding, but . . .
they may be resorted to only when a primary right to such search and seizure
may be found in the interest which the public or the complaint may have in the
property to be seized, or in the right to the possession of it, or when a valid
exercise of the police power renders possession of the property by the accused
unlawful and provides that it may be taken. (Boyd Case, 116, U. S., 623, 624, L.
ed., 748; 6 Sup. Ct. Rep., 524.)

There is no special sanctity in papers, as distinguished from other forms of


property, to render them immune from search and seizure, if only they fall within
the scope of the principles of the cases in which other property may be seized,
93

and if they be adequately described in the affidavit and warrant. . . . we cannot


doubt that contracts may be so used as instruments or agencies for perpetrating
frauds upon the Government as to give the public an interest in them which
would justify the search for and seizure of them, under a properly issued search
warrant, for the purpose of preventing further frauds.

xxx xxx xxx

As to the contract with Steinthal, also a stranger to the indictment. It is not


difficult, as we have said, to imagine how an executed written contract might be
an important agency or instrumentality in the bribing of a public servant and
perpetrating frauds upon the Government so that it would have a legitimate and
important interest in seizing such a paper in order prevent further frauds, . . . .

As to the second case, it rested on the proposition that a general exploratory search of
premises, the seizure of papers therefrom, and their retention for use as evidence in a
criminal proceeding cannot be sustained where made at a time when no crime was
being committed and under a false claim of possession of a search warrant, by one
making of an arrest of persons on the premises under color of an invalid warrant, who
required one of them, by pretention of right and threat or force, to open a desk and safe.
It was further ruled that, there is no formula for the determination of the reasonableness
of a search and seizure, but each case is to be decided on its own facts and
circumstances.

This brings us in logical order to the third error and the point often made that the seizure
of appellant's books, invoices, and records was made solely for the purpose of using
them as evidence against him in a criminal prosecution. The question, in its final
analysis, is, were appellant's books, invoices, and records seized solely for use as
evidence of a crime of which the appellant was accused or suspected? or were the
books, invoices, and records seized in order to prevent the further perpetration of fraud?
In the first place, it is to be observed that the public has an interest in the proper
regulation of appellant's books. (Act No. 3292, section 4.) In the second place, the
books belonged to a corporation of which the appellant was simply the manager. And in
the third place, the search warrant only issued on a showing of probable cause to
adopt the language alike of section 96 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and the
search warrant that "fraudulent books, invoices, and records" were "now being used
in the commission of a felony."

Finally, while the assertion is oft-repeated that the books, invoices, and records were
taken solely for the purpose of being used as evidence against Rubio, we find no
support for this contention in the record. In the trial court, the assistant city fiscal said:
"As we have stated above, the search and seizure in this case were made under the
provisions of the internal-revenue laws and the authority of a search warrant, and not for
the purpose of obtaining evidence, but with a view to seize the instruments used in the
violation of said laws committed by the defendant." On appeal, the prosecution
persistently maintains its position that the seizure was made with the object of
94

preventing the use of the books of account, documents, and papers in the commission
of further offenses or fraud or against the Government. Not a scintilla of evidence is to
be found in the record to prove that the Government has used the books of account,
documents, and papers as evidence against the appellant, or that the Government ever
had the intention of so doing. All we know is, that an information was filed against
Rubio, charging him with a violation of the Customs Law, and that he compromised
another case with the Bureau of Internal Revenue on the payment of the sum of
P100,000. On this showing, we perforce cannot deduce that the books of account,
documents, and papers were wanted solely for use as evidence of a crime.

A thorough reexamination of the case, in the light of the arguments presented and the
authorities cited, leads us to the same conclusion as before, namely, that no
constitutional right of the appellant was violated; that the letter of the law was followed,
and that the order of the trial judge was correct in all particulars. Wherefore, the
judgment will be affirmed, with the costs of this instance against the appellant.

Avancea, C.J., Villamor, Ostrand, Hull, Vickers, Imperial and Butte, JJ., concur.

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-27511 November 29, 1968

IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS,


SIMON LUNA, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
HON. LORENZO M. PLAZA, as Judge of the Municipal Court of Tandag, Surigao
del Sur; HON. SANTOS B. BEBERINO as Provincial Fiscal of Surigao del Sur; and
THE PROVINCIAL WARDEN of Surigao del Sur,respondents- appellees.

Sisenando Villaluz and Juan T. David for petitioner-appellant.


Office of the Assistant Solicitor General Pacifico P. de Castro and Solicitor Augusto M.
Amores for other respondents-appellees.
Provincial Fiscal Santos B. Beberno in his own behalf as respondent-appellee.

ZALDIVAR, J.:

Appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Surigao del Sur, dated April
20, 1967, dismissing the petition for a writ of habeas corpus, filed by herein petitioner-
appellant Simon Luna hereinafter referred to simply as petitioner who was
charged with murder in Criminal Case No. 655-New of the same court.
95

The criminal action was commenced by T-Sgt. Candido Patosa, PC investigator of


Tandag, Surigao del Sur, by filing with respondent Municipal Judge Lorenzo M. Plaza,
of the Municipal Court of Tandag, criminal case No. 1138 charging the accused, herein
petitioner, with the crime of murder. Supporting the complaint were sworn statements of
the witnesses for the prosecution, in the form of questions and answers taken by T-Sgt.
Patosa, and subscribed and sworn to before the respondent Judge at the time of the
filing of the complaint. The respondent Judge examined the prosecution witnesses by
reading to them "all over again the questions and answers" in their statements in
writing, and the witnesses-affiants declared before said Judge that the questions were
propounded by T-Sgt. Candido Patosa, and that the answers were made by them. The
affiants further declared before respondent Judge that their answers were true, and
were freely and voluntarily made; that they fully understood the questions and answers,
and that they were willing to sign their respective affidavits. The affiants signed their
respective affidavits in the presence of the respondent Judge, who also signed after the
usual procedure of administering the oath.

Considering the answers of the affiants to the questions contained in their sworn
statements, together with the post-mortem and autopsy report on the dead body of the
victim Jaime Diaz Ng, the certificate of death, the sketch showing the position of the
victim and the accused, and Exhibits 6, 7, 8, 12, and 13 of herein respondents, the
respondent Judge opined that there was reasonable ground to believe that the crime of
murder had been committed and the accused was probably guilty thereof. Respondent
Judge issued the order and warrant of arrest, specifying therein that no bail should be
accepted for the provisional release of the accused. On February 20, 1967, upon motion
of petitioner that he be admitted to bail upon the ground that the evidence of guilt was
not strong, respondent Judge issued an order granting bail, fixing it at P30,000.00;
which order, however, respondent Judge later revoked, and petitioner was denied bail.

The case was subsequently remanded to the Court of First Instance of Surigao del Sur,
after petitioner filed a waiver of his right to preliminary investigation. On March 9, 1967
respondent Provincial Fiscal filed an information charging herein petitioner with the
crime of murder. The petitioner was detained in the provincial jail of Surigao del Sur
under the custody of respondent Provincial Warden.

On April 5, 1967, petitioner filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus with the Court of
First Instance of Surigao del Sur, therein docketed as Special Proceedings No. 105-
New, claiming that he was being deprived of liberty without the due process of law, on
the ground that the imprisonment and detention was the result of a warrant of arrest
issued by respondent Judge in violation of Republic Act No. 3828, and praying for the
annulment of the order for his arrest and his discharge from confinement.

Herein respondents filed their answer, alleging that Republic Act No. 3828 had been
substantially complied with; that a motion to quash, and not a petition for habeas
corpus was the proper remedy; and that petitioner's application for bail constituted a
waiver of the right to question the validity of the arrest.
96

After trial, the Court of First Instance of Surigao del Sur rendered its decision, dated
April 20, 1967, holding that respondent Municipal Judge had substantially complied with
Republic Act No. 3828, and consequently denied the application for the writ of habeas
corpus, and dismissed the case. Hence this appeal.

Petitioner, in his assignment of errors, claims that the trial court erred, as follows:

1. In giving absolute credence to the oral testimony of the respondent Judge to


the effect that he adopted and made his own the questions and answers taken by
T-Sgt. Patosa, PC Investigator, one of the prosecution witnesses, because the
records show the contrary;

2. In denying the writ of habeas corpus and in dismissing the petition.

1. In support of his first assignment of error, petitioner contends that Republic Act No.
3828 imposes on a municipal judge, before he can issue a warrant of arrest, two
specific duties, to wit: (1) personally examine the complainant and witnesses with
"searching questions and answers", which means that the judge must cross-examine
them in case their affidavits are presented; and (2) said examination must be reduced to
writing and form part of the records of the case. The record of the instant case,
according to petitioner, does not show said examination was performed by respondent
Judge. Petitioner urges that the absence of any document in the record that shows that
respondent Judge had performed the examination is positive proof that respondent
Judge did not perform his duty, notwithstanding his testimony before the Court of First
Instance of Surigao del Sur, during the hearing of this case, to the effect that he
adopted the questions propounded to each of the prosecution witnesses by T-Sgt.
Patosa. Petitioner maintains that this testimony, being self-serving intended to cover up
the failure to comply with the law, should not have been believed by the Court of First
Instance, and said court thereby committed errors when, believing said testimony, it
found that there had been substantial compliance with the requirement that the
municipal judge should personally examine the witnesses. Petitioner further maintains
that assuming that the adoption of the questions made by T-Sgt. Patosa constituted
substantial compliance with the requirement that the judge should examine the
witnesses by asking searching questions, still the second requirement, that of reducing
to writing the said procedure of adoption, has not been complied with; and so, Republic
Act No. 3828 was still violated, and the issuance of the warrant of arrest was in violation
of said Act and the Constitution and constituted denial of due process.

Petitioner contends that the trial court erred in giving absolute credence to the testimony
of respondent Municipal Judge. Regarding credibility of witnesses, this Court has
consistently held that, as a general rule, the lower court's findings as to the credibility of
witnesses will not be interfered with by appellate courts. Thus, in the case of People vs.
Sinaon1 this Court said:

Time and again, we have held that as a rule where the issue is one of credibility
of witnesses, appellate courts will not generally disturb the findings of the trial
97

court, considering that it is in a better position to decide the question, having


seen and heard the witnesses themselves and observed their deportment and
manner of testifying during the trial, unless there is a showing that it has
overlooked certain facts of substance and value, that if considered, might affect
the result of the case.

Petitioner has appealed "from the decision/order" of the trial court "to the Honorable
Supreme Court of the Philippines, on the ground that the same is contrary to law and
the Philippine Constitution" and prayed that "all the records of the proceeding and the
evidence, oral and documentary, be transmitted or forwarded to the Honorable
Supreme Court ...".2 Since petitioner appealed directly to this Court he must, therefore,
raise only questions of law and he has thereby waived the right to raise any question of
fact,3 and the findings of facts of the trial court, under the rules and precedents, must be
deemed final and binding upon this Court.4

The findings of facts of the trial court are found in the following portion of the decision
appealed from, to wit:

There is no dispute that there is a valid complaint charging the accused Simon
Luna, the herein petitioner with the crime of Murder filed with the respondent
Judge authorized to conduct the examination of the witnesses for the prosecution
for the purpose of determining the existence of probable cause before the
issuance of the corresponding warrant of arrest; that the complaint is supported
by the statements of the witnesses under oath in writing in the form of questions
and answers and other documents attached to the complaint; that before the
issuance of the corresponding warrant of arrest, the respondent judge personally
examined the witnesses for the prosecution on their statements taken by T-Sgt.
Candido Patosa by reading the questions and answers all over again to the
affiants who confirmed to the respondent Judge that the statements contained in
their sworn statements are true; that being satisfied that the questions and
answers contained in the sworn statements taken by T-Sgt Patosa partake of the
nature of his searching questions and answers as required by law, the
respondent Judge adopted them as his own personal examination of the
witnesses for the purpose of determining the existence of probable cause, the
order and the warrant of arrest were issued to take the accused into custody for
the commission of the offense charged (Exhibits "H", "H-1", "I", and "I-1"-
petitioner); and that the petitioner waived his right to the preliminary investigation
(Exhibit "12"-respondent) and applied to be admitted to bail.

Petitioner, however, claims that the failure of respondent Judge to put in writing that he
adopted the questions asked by T-Sgt. Patosa and his failure to ask "searching
questions" violated Republic Act No. 3828.

Republic Act No. 3828, approved June 22, 1963, inserted in section 87 (e) of the
Judiciary Act of 1948 the following paragraph:
98

No warrant of arrest shall be issued by any justice of the peace in any criminal
case filed with him unless he first examines the witness or witnesses personally,
and the examination shall be under oath and reduced to writing in the form of
searching questions and answers.

Before a municipal judge may issue a warrant of arrest, the following conditions must
first be fulfilled: (1) he must examine the witnesses personally; (2) the examination must
be under oath; (3) the examination must be reduced to writing in the form of searching
questions and answers. Were these conditions fulfilled in the instant case?

The first condition was fulfilled. The trial court found as a fact that "the respondent judge
personally examined the witnesses for the prosecution ...;" that respondent judge
adopted as his own personal examination the questions asked by T-Sgt. Patosa as
appearing in the written statements, which he read over again to the witnesses together
with the answers given therein, asking the witnesses whether said answers were theirs,
and whether the same answers were true, to which the witness answered in the
affirmative. Republic Act No. 3828 does not prohibit the municipal Judge from adopting
the questions asked by a previous investigator.

It appears that the sworn statements5 of the witnesses state at the beginning that the
sworn statement was "taken by T-Sgt. Candido L. Patosa", and does not state that it
was taken by the respondent municipal Judge himself. This circumstance is explained
by the fact that said written statements already taken by T-Sgt. Patosa were delivered to
respondent Municipal Judge who adopted the questions therein in his examination,
because he considered them searching questions. Respondent Judge presumably did
not consider it necessary to change the introductory remarks in each of the written
statements. But that he made the examination personally cannot be doubted; it is so
stated in the order dated February 18, 1967, which recites:

After examining the witness personally and under oath there is reasonable
ground to believe that an offense for murder has been committed and that the
accused, Simon Luna, is probably guilty thereof. (Exh. H)

The ruling in Doce vs. Branch II of the Court of First Instance of Quezon, et al.,6 wherein
this Court held that the warrant of arrest issued therein was irregularly issued is not
applicable to the case at bar for the simple reason that the facts are different. This Court
in that case said:

There is merit in the assertion that the warrant of arrest was irregularly issued.
Section 87 of the Judiciary Act as amended by Republic Act 3828 requires that
the Municipal Judge issuing the same, personallyexamine under oath the
witnesses, and by searching questions and answers which are to be reduced to
writing. Here, instead of searching questions and answers, we have only the
affidavits of respondent and her one witness. Moreover, said affidavits were
sworn to before Judge Cabungcal, not before Judge Juntereal who issued the
warrant of arrest.
99

In the instant case, as stated above, the respondent Municipal Judge personally
examined under oath the witnesses by asking questions, that were adopted from a
previous investigation, and considered by him as sufficiently searching and which
questions and the answers thereto were in writing and sworn to before him prior to his
issuance of the order of arrest.

The second condition required by Republic Act No. 3828 for the issuance of a warrant
of arrest was also fulfilled. The trial court found that the complaint was "supported by
statements of the witnesses under oath." The record also shows the following
documents to have been subscribed and sworn to before respondent Judge, namely:
Exhibit B, sworn statement of herein petitioner Simon Luna y Albay; Exhibit C, sworn
statement of Eusebio Corpuz; Exhibit D, sworn statement of Bruno M. Zafra; Exhibit E,
sworn statement of Martiliano J. Bautista; Exhibit F, sworn statement of Janedina Diaz y
Bandoy.

The third condition required by Republic Act No. 3828 was likewise fulfilled. The
examination of the witnesses was written down, in the form of searching questions and
answers. The term "searching questions and answers" means only, taking into
consideration the purpose of the preliminary examination which is to determine "whether
there is a reasonable ground to believe that an offense has been committed and the
accused is probably guilty thereof so that a warrant of arrest may be issued and the
accused held for trial",7 such questions as have tendency to show the commission of a
crime and the perpetrator thereof. What would be searching questions would depend on
what is sought to be inquired into, such as: the nature of the offense, the date, time, and
place of its commission, the possible motives for its commission; the subject, his age,
education, status, financial and social circumstances, his attitude toward the
investigation, social attitudes, opportunities to commit the offense; the victim, his age,
status, family responsibilities, financial and social circumstances, characteristics, etc.
The points that are the subject of inquiry may differ from case to case. The questions,
therefore, must to a great degree depend upon the Judge making the investigation. At
any rate, the court a quo found that respondent judge was "satisfied that the questions
and answers contained in the sworn statements taken by T-Sgt. Patosa partake of the
nature of his searching questions and answers as required by law," so the respondent
Judge adopted them.

Petitioner's further contention that the issuance of the warrant of arrest was a violation
of the constitution and of procedural due process is likewise untenable. The
Constitution, in Section 1(3), Article III, provides that no warrant shall issue but upon
probable cause, to be determined by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce. The constitutional
requirement of examination of witnesses under oath was, as shown above, fulfilled. The
existence of probable cause depended to a large degree upon the finding or opinion of
the judge conducting the examination. Respondent judge found that there was probable
cause, as stated in his order of arrest, that "after examining the witnesses personally
and under oath there is a reasonable ground to believe that an offense of murder has
been committed and that the accused, Simon Luna, is probably guilty thereof."
100

Petitioner's last contention that the warrant of arrest issued was a violation of procedural
due process because of the alleged defective preliminary examination has no leg to
stand on, in view of what we have hereinbefore stated. Moreover, this Court has held
that preliminary examination is not an essential part of due process of law.8Preliminary
examination may be conducted by the municipal judge, prior to the issuance of the
warrant of arrest, either in the presence, or in the absence, of the accused. The record
shows that herein petitioner waived the preliminary investigation before respondent
Municipal Judge, and instead, he filed a petition for bail. The petition for bail was at first
granted by respondent Judge, but later the order granting bail was revoked. This
conduct of petitioner indicates that he had waived his objection to whatever defect, if
any, in the preliminary examination conducted by respondent Judge prior to the
issuance of the warrant of arrest. Indeed, petitioner has no substantial much less
legal ground to complain that he was denied the due process of law.

We find that the trial Judge committed no error when he held that, based upon the facts
shown during the hearing of this case, respondent Municipal Judge had substantially
complied with the requirements of the law specifically Republic Act 3828 before
issuing the warrant of arrest in this case.

2. In the light of what has been said above, it appears clear that petitioner's second
assignment of error, that the trial court erred in denying the writ of habeas corpus, is
untenable. Moreover, Section 4 of Rule 102; of the Rules of Court provides in part, as
follows:

SEC. 4. When writ not allowed or discharge authorized. If it appears that the
person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under
process issued by a court or judge ... and that the court or judge had jurisdiction
to issue the process ... or make the order the writ, shall not be allowed....

All the conditions, in the afore-quoted Section 4, set forth to deny the writ, are present in
the instant case. It is shown that petitioner is detained and is in the custody of the
respondent Provincial Warden by virtue of the order of arrest dated February 18, 1967,
and the order dated February 21, 1967, of respondent Judge, to confine petitioner in the
provincial jail. It is not disputed by petitioner that respondent Judge had jurisdiction to
issue the warrant of arrest and the order of commitment under the provisions of Section
47, Republic Act No. 409, as amended by Republic Act No. 1201, although petitioner
did question the validity of the warrant of arrest for allegedly having been issued in
violation of Republic Act No. 3828 which claim We have found to be untenable.
Consequently, the trial Judge did not commit an error in denying the writ of habeas
corpus prayed for.

At any rate, we believe that, if at all, the remedy available to the petitioner herein, under
the circumstances stated in this opinion, is not a petition for a writ of habeas corpus but
a petition to quash the warrant of arrest or a petition for a reinvestigation of the case by
the respondent Municipal Judge or by the Provincial Fiscal.
101

We wish to stress, however, that what has been stated in this opinion is certainly not
intended to sanction the return to the former practice of municipal judges of simply
relying upon affidavits or sworn statements that are made to accompany the complaints
that are filed before them, in determining whether there is a probable cause for the
issuance of a warrant of arrest. That practice is precisely what is sought to be voided by
the amendment of Section 87 (c) of Republic Act 296 (Judiciary Act of 1948) which
requires that before a municipal judge issues a warrant of arrest he should first satisfy
himself that there is a probable cause by examining the witnesses personally, and that
the examination must be under oath and reduced to writing in the form of searching
questions and answers. It is obvious that the purpose of this amendment is to prevent
the issuance of a warrant of arrest against a person based simply upon affidavits of
witnesses who made, and swore to, their statements before a person or persons other
than the judge before whom the criminal complaint is filed. We wish to emphasize strict
compliance by municipal or city judges of the provision of Section 87 (c) of the Judiciary
Act of 1948, as amended by Republic Act 3828, in order to avoid malicious and/or
unfounded criminal prosecution of persons.9

In the case now before Us, while it is true that the respondent Municipal Judge did not
himself personally cause to be reduced to writing in the form of questions and answers
the examination of witnesses presented before him by the person who filed the criminal
complaint, We are satisfied that, as shown by the evidence, respondent Judge had
personally examined the witnesses under oath and that the questions asked by the
Judge and the answers of the witnesses were reflected in writings which were actually
subscribed and sworn to before him. Moreover, We are of the considered view that no
substantial right of the petitioner had been violated because, as hereinbefore adverted
to, petitioner waived his right to preliminary investigation after he was arrested, and he
took the step of applying for bail before respondent Municipal Judge. These acts of the
petitioner subsequent to his arrest, constitute an implied admission on his part that here
was a probable cause for the issuance of the warrant of arrest against him. Those acts
of the petitioner constitute a waiver of whatever irregularity, if any there was, that
attended his arrest.10

WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court dated April 20, 1967, appealed from, is
affirmed. Costs against petitioner-appellant. It is so ordered.

Concepcion, C.J., Dizon, Makalintal, Sanchez, Castro, Fernando and Capistrano,


JJ., concur.
Reyes, J.B.L., J., concurs in the result.

EN BANC

G.R. No. 82870 December 14, 1989


102

DR. NEMESIO E. PRUDENTE, petitioner,


vs.
THE HON. EXECUTIVE JUDGE ABELARDO M. DAYRIT, RTC Manila, Branch 33
and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

Francisco SB Acejas III, Oscar S. Atencio, Rodolfo M. Capocyan, Ernesto P.


Fernandez, Romulo B. Macalintal, Rodrigo H. Melchor, Rudegelio D. Tacorda Virgilio L.
Valle and Luciano D. Valencia for petitioner.

PADILLA, J.:

This is a petition for certiorari to annul and set aside the order of respondent Judge
dated 9 March 1988 which denied the petitioner's motion to quash Search Warrant No.
87-14, as well as his order dated 20 April 1988 denying petitioner's motion for
reconsideration of the earlier order.

It appears that on 31 October 1987, P/Major Alladin Dimagmaliw, Chief of the


Intelligence Special Action Division (ISAD) of the Western Police District (WPD) filed
with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 33, presided over by respondent
Judge Abelardo Dayrit, now Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals. an
application1 for the issuance of a search warrant, docketed therein as SEARCH
WARRANT NO. 87-14, for VIOLATION OF PD NO. 1866 (Illegal Possession of
Firearms, etc.) entitled "People of the Philippines, Plaintiff, versus Nemesis E. Prudente,
Defendant." In his application for search warrant, P/Major Alladin Dimagmaliw alleged,
among others, as follows:

1. That he has been informed and has good and sufficient reasons to
believe that NEMESIO PRUDENTE who may be found at the Polytechnic
University of the Philippines, Anonas St. Sta. Mesa, Sampaloc, Manila,
has in his control or possession firearms, explosives handgrenades and
ammunition which are illegally possessed or intended to be used as the
means of committing an offense which the said NEMESIO PRUDENTE is
keeping and concealing at the following premises of the Polytechnic
University of the Philippines, to wit:

a. Offices of the Department of Military Science and Tactics


at the ground floor and other rooms at the ground floor;

b. Office of the President, Dr. Nemesio Prudente at PUP,


Second Floor and other rooms at the second floor;

2. That the undersigned has verified the report and found it to be a fact,
and therefore, believes that a Search Warrant should be issued to enable
103

the undersigned or any agent of the law to take possession and bring to
this Honorable Court the following described properties:

a. M 16 Armalites with ammunitions;

b. .38 and .45 Caliber handguns and pistols;

c. explosives and handgrenades; and,

d. assorted weapons with ammunitions.

In support of the application for issuance of search warrant, P/Lt. Florenio C. Angeles,
OIC of the Intelligence Section of (ISAD) executed a "Deposition of Witness" dated 31
October 1987, subscribed and sworn to before respondent Judge. In his deposition,
P/Lt. Florenio Angeles declared, inter alia, as follows:

Q: Do you know P/Major Alladin Dimagmaliw, the applicant


for a Search Warrant?

A: Yes, sir, he is the Chief, Intelligence and Special Action


Division, Western Police District.

Q: Do you know the premises of Polytechnic University of


the Philippines at Anonas St., Sta. Mesa, Sampaloc, Manila

A: Yes, sir, the said place has been the subject of our
surveillance and observation during the past few days.

Q: Do you have personal knowledge that in the said


premises is kept the following properties subject of the
offense of violation of PD No. 1866 or intended to be used
as a means of committing an offense:

a. M 16 Armalites with ammunitions;

b. .38 and 45 Caliber handguns and pistols;

c. explosives and handgrenades; and d. Assorted weapons with


ammunitions?

A: Yes sir.

Q: Do you know who is or who are the person or persons


who has or have control of the above-described premises?
104

A: Yes sir, it is Dr. Nemesio Prudente, President of the


Polytechnic University of the Philippines.

Q: How do you know that said property is subject of the


offense of violation of Pres. Decree No. 1866 or intended to
be used as the means of committing an offense?

A: Sir, as a result of our continuous surveillance conducted


for several days, we gathered information from verified
sources that the holder of said firearms and explosives as
well as ammunitions aren't licensed to possess said firearms
and ammunition. Further, the premises is a school and the
holders of these firearms are not students who were not
supposed to possess firearms, explosives and ammunition.

On the same day, 31 October 1987, respondent Judge issued Search Warrant No. 87-
14, 3 the pertinent portions of which read as follows:

It appearing to the satisfaction of the undersigned, after examining under


oath applicant ALLADIN M. DIMAGMALIW and his witness FLORENIO C.
ANGELES that there are good and sufficient reasons to believe (probable
cause) that NEMESIO PRUDENTE has in his control in the premises of
Polytechnic University of the Philippines, Anonas St., Sta. Mesa,
Sampaloc, Manila, properties which are subject of the above offense or
intended to be used as the means of committing the said offense.

You are hereby commanded to make an immediate search at any time in


the day or night of the premises of Polytechnic University of the
Philippines, more particularly (a) offices of the Department of Military
Science and Tactics at the ground floor and other rooms at the ground
floor; (b) office of the President, Dr. Nemesio Prudente at PUP, Second
Floor and other rooms at the second floor, and forthwith seize and take
possession of the following personal properties, to wit:

a. M 16 Armalites with ammunition;

b. .38 and .45 Caliber handguns and pistols;

c. explosives and hand grenades; and

d. assorted weapons with ammunitions.

and bring the above described properties to the undersigned to be dealt


with as the law directs.
105

On 1 November 1987, a Sunday and All Saints Day, the search warrant was enforced
by some 200 WPD operatives led by P/Col. Edgar Dula Torre, Deputy Superintendent,
WPD, and P/Major Romeo Maganto, Precinct 8 Commander.

In his affidavit, 4 dated 2 November 1987, Ricardo Abando y Yusay, a member of the
searching team, alleged that he found in the drawer of a cabinet inside the wash room
of Dr. Prudente's office a bulging brown envelope with three (3) live fragmentation hand
grenades separately wrapped with old newspapers, classified by P/Sgt. J.L. Cruz as
follows (a) one (1) pc.M33 Fragmentation hand grenade (live); (b) one (11) pc.M26
Fragmentation hand grenade (live); and (c) one (1) pc.PRB423 Fragmentation
hand grenade (live).

On 6 November 1987, petitioner moved to quash the search warrant. He claimed that
(1) the complainant's lone witness, Lt. Florenio C. Angeles, had no personal knowledge
of the facts which formed the basis for the issuance of the search warrant; (2) the
examination of the said witness was not in the form of searching questions and
answers; (3) the search warrant was a general warrant, for the reason that it did not
particularly describe the place to be searched and that it failed to charge one specific
offense; and (4) the search warrant was issued in violation of Circular No. 19 of the
Supreme Court in that the complainant failed to allege under oath that the issuance of
the search warrant on a Saturday was urgent. 5

The applicant, P/Major Alladin Dimagmaliw thru the Chief, Inspectorate and Legal
Affairs Division, WPD, opposed the motion. 6 After petitioner had filed his reply 7 to the
opposition, he filed a supplemental motion to quash. 8

Thereafter, on 9 March 1988, respondent Judge issued an order, 9denying the


petitioner's motion and supplemental motion to quash. Petitioner's motion for
reconsideration 10 was likewise denied in the order 11 dated 20 April 1988.

Hence, the present recourse, petitioner alleging that respondent Judge has decided a
question of substance in a manner not in accord with law or applicable decisions of the
Supreme Court, or that the respondent Judge gravely abused his discretion tantamount
to excess of jurisdiction, in issuing the disputed orders.

For a valid search warrant to issue, there must be probable cause, which is to be
determined personally by the judge, after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to
be searched and the persons or things to be seized. 12 The probable cause must be in
connection with one specific offense 13 and the judge must, before issuing the warrant,
personally examine in the form of searching questions and answers, in writing and
under oath, the complainant and any witness he may produce, on facts personally
known to them and attach to the record their sworn statements together with any
affidavits submitted. 14
106

The "probable cause" for a valid search warrant, has been defined "as such facts and
circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet arid prudent man to believe that
an offense has been committed, and that objects sought in connection with the offense
are in the place sought to be searched." 15 This probable cause must be shown to be
within the personal knowledge of the complainant or the witnesses he may produce and
not based on mere hearsay. 16

Petitioner assails the validity of Search Warrant No. 87-14 on the ground that it was
issued on the basis of facts and circumstances which were not within the personal
knowledge of the applicant and his witness but based on hearsay evidence. In his
application for search warrant, P/Major Alladin Dimagmaliw stated that "he has been
informed" that Nemesio Prudente "has in his control and possession" the firearms and
explosives described therein, and that he "has verified the report and found it to be a
fact." On the other hand, in his supporting deposition, P/Lt. Florenio C. Angeles
declared that, as a result of their continuous surveillance for several days, they
"gathered informations from verified sources" that the holders of the said fire arms and
explosives are not licensed to possess them. In other words, the applicant and his
witness had no personal knowledge of the facts and circumstances which became the
basis for issuing the questioned search warrant, but acquired knowledge thereof only
through information from other sources or persons.

While it is true that in his application for search warrant, applicant P/Major Dimagmaliw
stated that he verified the information he had earlier received that petitioner had in his
possession and custody the t there is nothing in the record to show or indicate how and
when said applicant verified the earlier information acquired by him as to justify his
conclusion that he found such information to be a fact. He might have clarified this point
if there had been searching questions and answers, but there were none. In fact, the
records yield no questions and answers, whether searching or not, vis-a-vis the said
applicant.

What the records show is the deposition of witness, P/Lt. Angeles, as the only support
to P/Major Dimagmaliw's application, and the said deposition is based on hearsay. For,
it avers that they (presumably, the police authorities) had conducted continuous
surveillance for several days of the suspected premises and, as a result thereof, they
"gathered information from verified sources" that the holders of the subject firearms and
explosives are not licensed to possess them.

In Alvarez vs. Court of First Instance, 17 this Court laid the following test in determining
whether the allegations in an application for search warrant or in a supporting
deposition, are based on personal knowledge or not

The true test of sufficiency of a deposition or affidavit to warrant issuance


of a search warrant is whether it has been drawn in a manner that perjury
could be charged thereon and the affiant be held liable for damage
caused. The oath required must refer to the truth of the facts within the
personal knowledge of the applicant for search warrant, and/or his
107

witnesses, not of the facts merely reported by a person whom one


considers to be reliable.

Tested by the above standard, the allegations of the witness, P/Lt. Angeles, in his
deposition, do not come up to the level of facts of his personal knowledge so much so
that he cannot be held liable for perjury for such allegations in causing the issuance of
the questioned search warrant.

In the same Alvarez case, 18 the applicant stated that his purpose for applying for a
search warrant was that: "It had been reported to me by a person whom I consider to be
reliable that there are being kept in said premises books, documents, receipts, lists,
chits and other papers used by him in connection with his activities as a money lender,
challenging usurious rate of interests, in violation of law." The Court held that this was
insufficient for the purpose of issuing a search warrant.

In People vs. Sy Juco, 19 where the affidavit contained an allegation that there had been
a report to the affiant by a person whom lie considered reliable that in said premises
were "fraudulent books, correspondence and records," this was likewise held as not
sufficient for the purpose of issuing a search warrant. Evidently, the allegations
contained in the application of P/ Major Alladin Dimagmaliw and the declaration of P/Lt.
Florenio C. Angeles in his deposition were insufficient basis for the issuance of a valid
search warrant. As held in the Alvarez case:

The oath required must refer to the truth of the facts within the personal
knowledge of the petitioner or his witnesses, because the purpose thereof
is to convince the committing magistrate, not the individual making the
affidavit and seeking the issuance of the warrant, of the existence of
probable cause.

Besides, respondent Judge did not take the deposition of the applicant as required by
the Rules of Court. As held in Roan v. Gonzales, 20 "(m)ere affidavits of the complainant
and his witnesses are thus not sufficient. The examining Judge has to take depositions
in writing of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce and attach them to the
record."

Moreover, a perusal of the deposition of P/Lt. Florenio Angeles shows that it was too
brief and short. Respondent Judge did not examine him "in the form of searching
questions and answers." On the contrary, the questions asked were leading as they
called for a simple "yes" or "no" answer. As held in Quintero vs. NBI," 21 the questions
propounded by respondent Executive Judge to the applicant's witness are not
sufficiently searching to establish probable cause. Asking of leading questions to the
deponent in an application for search warrant, and conducting of examination in a
general manner, would not satisfy the requirements for issuance of a valid search
warrant."
108

Manifestly, in the case at bar, the evidence failed to show the existence of probable
cause to justify the issuance of the search warrant. The Court also notes post facto that
the search in question yielded, no armalites, handguns, pistols, assorted weapons or
ammunitions as stated in the application for search warrant, the supporting deposition,
and the search warrant the supporting hand grenades were itself Only three (3) live
fragmentation found in the searched premises of the PUP, according to the affidavit of
an alleged member of the searching party.

The Court avails of this decision to reiterate the strict requirements for determination of
"probable cause" in the valid issuance of a search warrant, as enunciated in earlier
cases. True, these requirements are stringent but the purpose is to assure that the
constitutional right of the individual against unreasonable search and seizure shall
remain both meaningful and effective.

Petitioner also assails the validity of the search warrant on the ground that it failed to
particularly describe the place to be searched, contending that there were several
rooms at the ground floor and the second floor of the PUP.

The rule is, that a description of a place to be searched is sufficient if the officer with the
warrant can, with reasonable effort, ascertain and Identify the place intended . 22 In the
case at bar, the application for search warrant and the search warrant itself described
the place to be searched as the premises of the Polytechnic University of the
Philippines, located at Anonas St., Sta. Mesa, Sampaloc, Manila more particularly, the
offices of the Department of Military Science and Tactics at the ground floor, and the
Office of the President, Dr. Nemesio Prudente, at PUP, Second Floor and other rooms
at the second floor. The designation of the places to be searched sufficiently complied
with the constitutional injunction that a search warrant must particularly describe the
place to be searched, even if there were several rooms at the ground floor and second
floor of the PUP.

Petitioner next attacks the validity of the questioned warrant, on the ground that it was
issued in violation of the rule that a search warrant can be issued only in connection
with one specific offense. The search warrant issued by respondent judge, according to
petitioner, was issued without any reference to any particular provision of PD No. 1866
that was violated when allegedly P.D. No. 1866 punishes several offenses.

In Stonehill vs. Diokno, 23 Where the warrants involved were issued upon applications
stating that the natural and juridical persons therein named had committed a "violation
of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue Code and Revised
Penal Code," the Court held that no specific offense had been alleged in the
applications for a search warrant, and that it would be a legal hearsay of the highest
order to convict anybody of a "Violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws,
Internal Revenue Code and Revised Penal Code" without reference to any determinate
provision of said laws and codes.
109

In the present case, however, the application for search warrant was captioned: "For
Violation of PD No. 1866 (Illegal Possession of Firearms, etc.) While the said decree
punishes several offenses, the alleged violation in this case was, qualified by the phrase
"illegal possession of firearms, etc." As explained by respondent Judge, the term "etc."
referred to ammunitions and explosives. In other words, the search warrant was issued
for the specific offense of illegal possession of firearms and explosives. Hence, the
failure of the search warrant to mention the particular provision of PD No. 1-866 that
was violated is not of such a gravity as to call for its invalidation on this score. Besides,
while illegal possession of firearms is penalized under Section 1 of PD No. 1866 and
illegal possession of explosives is penalized under Section 3 thereof, it cannot be
overlooked that said decree is a codification of the various laws on illegal possession of
firearms, ammunitions and explosives; such illegal possession of items destructive of
life and property are related offenses or belong to the same species, as to be subsumed
within the category of illegal possession of firearms, etc. under P.D. No. 1866. As
observed by respondent Judge: 24

The grammatical syntax of the phraseology comparative with the title of


PD 1866 can only mean that illegal possession of firearms, ammunitions
and explosives, have been codified under Section 1 of said Presidential
Decree so much so that the second and third are forthrightly species of
illegal possession of firearms under Section (1) thereof It has long been a
practice in the investigative and prosecution arm of the government, to
designate the crime of illegal possession of firearms, ammunitions and
explosives as 'illegal possession of firearms, etc.' The Constitution as well
as the Rules of Criminal Procedure does not recognize the issuance of
one search warrant for illegal possession of firearms, one warrant for
illegal possession of ammunitions, and another for illegal possession of
explosives. Neither is the filing of three different informations for each of
the above offenses sanctioned by the Rules of Court. The usual practice
adopted by the courts is to file a single information for illegal possession of
firearms and ammunitions. This practice is considered to be in accordance
with Section 13, Rule 110 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure which
provides that: 'A complaint or information must charge but one
offense, except only in those cases in which existing laws prescribe a
single punishment for various offenses. Describably, the servers did not
search for articles other than firearms, ammunitions and explosives. The
issuance of Search Warrant No. 87-14 is deemed profoundly consistent
with said rule and is therefore valid and enforceable. (Emphasis supplied)

Finally, in connection with the petitioner's contention that the failure of the applicant to
state, under oath, the urgent need for the issuance of the search warrant, his application
having been filed on a Saturday, rendered the questioned warrant invalid for being
violative of this Court's Circular No. 19, dated 14 August 1987, which reads:

3. Applications filed after office hours, during Saturdays, Sundays and


holidays shall likewise be taken cognizance of and acted upon by any
110

judge of the court having jurisdiction of the place to be searched, but in


such cases the applicant shall certify and state the facts under oath, to the
satisfaction of the judge, that the issuance is urgent.

it would suffice to state that the above section of the circular merely provides for a
guideline, departure from which would not necessarily affect the validity of an otherwise
valid search warrant.

WHEREFORE, all the foregoing considered, the petition is GRANTED. The questioned
orders dated 9 March 1988 and 20 April 1988 as well as Search Warrant No. 87-14 are
hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.

The three (3) live fragmentation hand grenades which, according to Ricardo Y. Abando,
a member of the searching team, were seized in the washroom of petitioner's office at
the PUP, are ordered delivered to the Chief, Philippine Constabulary for proper
disposition.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano,


Gancayco, Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortes, Grio-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ.,
concur.

SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 50720. March 26, 1984.]

SORIANO MATA, Petitioner, v. HON. JOSEPHINE K. BAYONA, in her capacity as


Presiding Judge of the City Court of Ormoc, BERNARDO GOLES and REYNALDO
MAYOTE, Respondents.

Valeriano R. Ocubillo for Petitioner.

The Solicitor General for Respondents.

SYLLABUS

1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; RIGHT AGAINST UNLAWFUL


SEARCH AND SEIZURE; REQUISITES FOR ISSUANCE OF SEARCH WARRANT.
Under the Constitution "no search warrant shall issue but upon probable cause to be
determined by the Judge or such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law
after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce." More emphatic and detailed is the implementing rule of the constitutional
injunction, Section 4 of Rule 126 which provides that the judge must before issuing the
111

warrant personally examine on oath or affirmation the complainant and any witnesses
he may produce and take their depositions in writing, and attach them to the record, in
addition to any affidavits presented to him.

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; INSUFFICIENCY OF AFFIDAVITS OF COMPLAINANT AND HIS


WITNESSES IN THE CASE AT BAR. Before issuing a search warrant, the
examining Judge has to take depositions in writing of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce and to attach them to the record. Such written deposition is
necessary in order that the Judge may be able to properly determine the existence or
non-existence of the probable cause, and to hold liable for perjury the person giving it if
it will be found later that his declarations are false. Mere affidavits of the complainant
and his witnesses are thus not sufficient.

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; NO "DEPOSITION IN WRITING" ATTACHED TO RECORDS OF


CASE IN CASE AT BAR. The judges insistence that she examined the complainants
under oath has become dubious by petitioners claim that at the particular time when he
examined all the relevant papers connected with the issuance of the questioned search
warrant, after he demanded the same from the lower court since they were not attached
to the records, he did not find any certification at the back of the joint affidavit of the
complainants. Before he filed his motion to quash the search warrant and for the return
of the articles seized, he was furnished, upon his request, certified true copies of the
said affidavits by the Clerk of Court but which certified true copies do not bear any
certification at the back. Petitioner likewise claims that his xerox copy of the said joint
affidavit obtained at the outset of this case does not show also the certification of
respondent judge. This doubt becomes more confirmed by respondent Judges own
admission, while insisting that she did examine thoroughly the applicants, that "she did
not take the deposition of Mayote and Goles because to have done so would be to hold
a judicial proceeding which will be open and public", such that, according to her, the
persons subject of the intended raid will just disappear and move his illegal operations
somewhere else. Could it be that the certification was made belatedly to cure the defect
of the warrant? Be that as it may, there was no "deposition in writing" attached to the
records of the case in palpable disregard of the statutory prohibition heretofore quoted.

4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; DEPOSITIONS, HOW TAKEN. The searching questions
propounded to the applicants of the search warrant and his witnesses must depend to a
large extent upon the discretion of the Judge just as long as the answers establish a
reasonable ground to believe the commission of a specific offense and that the
applicant is one authorized by law, and said answers particularly describe with certainty
the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. The examination or
investigation which must be under oath may not be in public. It may even be held in the
secrecy of his chambers. Far more important is that the examination or investigation is
not merely routinary but one that is thorough and elicit the required information. To
repeat, it must be under oath and must be in writing.

5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; MUST BE STRICTLY COMPLIED WITH; CASE AT BAR. Nothing
can justify the issuance of the search warrant but the fulfillment of the legal requisites.
112

Thus, in issuing a search warrant the Judge must strictly comply with the requirements
of the Constitution and the statutory provisions. In the case at bar, the search warrant is
tainted with illegality by the failure of the Judge to conform with essential requisites of
taking the depositions in writing and attaching them to record, rendering the search
warrant invalid.

6. ID.; ID.; ID.; ALTHOUGH ILLEGAL, THINGS SEIZED CANNOT BE RETURNED;


CASE AT BAR. While the search warrant is illegal, the return of the things seized
cannot be ordered. In Castro v. Pabalan (70 SCRA 478), it was held that the illegality of
the search warrant does not call for the return of the things seized, the possession of
which is prohibited.

DECISION

DE CASTRO, J.:

The validity of the search warrant issued by respondent Judge (not reappointed) is
challenged by petitioner for its alleged failure to comply with the requisites of the
Constitution and the Rules of Court.

Specifically, the contention is that the search warrant issued by respondent Judge was
based merely on the application for search warrant and a joint affidavit of private
respondents which were wrongfully it is alleged subscribed, and sworn to before the
Clerk of Court of respondent Judge. Furthermore, there was allegedly a failure on the
part of respondent Judge to attach the necessary papers pertinent to the issuance of
the search warrant to the records of Criminal Case No. 4298-CC wherein petitioner is
accused under PD 810, as amended by PD 1306, the information against him alleging
that Soriano Mata offered, took and arranged bets on the Jai Alai game by "selling
illegal tickets known as Masiao tickets without any authority from the Philippine Jai Alai
& Amusement Corporation or from the government authorities concerned." 1

Petitioner claims that during the hearing of the case, he discovered that nowhere from
the records of the said case could be found the search warrant and other pertinent
papers connected to the issuance of the same, so that he had to inquire from the City
Fiscal its whereabouts, and to which inquiry respondent Judge replied, "it is with the
court." The Judge then handed the records to the Fiscal who attached them to the
records.chanrobles.com : virtual law library

This led petitioner to file a motion to quash and annul the search warrant and for the
return of the articles seized, citing and invoking, among others, Section 4 of Rule 126 of
the Revised Rules of Court. The motion was denied by respondent Judge on March 1,
1979, stating that the court has made a thorough investigation and examination under
oath of Bernardo U. Goles and Reynaldo T. Mayote, members of the Intelligence
113

Section of 352nd PC Co./Police District II INP; that in fact the court made a certification
to that effect; and that the fact that documents relating to the search warrant were not
attached immediately to the record of the criminal case is of no moment, considering
that the rule does not specify when these documents are to be attached to the records.
2 Petitioners motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid order having been denied, he
came to this Court, with the instant petition, praying, among others, that this Court
declare the search warrant to be invalid and all the articles confiscated under such
warrant as inadmissible as evidence in the case, or in any proceedings on the matter.

We hold that the search warrant is tainted with illegality for being violative of the
Constitution and the Rules of Court.

Under the Constitution "no search warrant shall issue but upon probable cause to be
determined by the Judge or such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law
after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce." More emphatic and detailed is the implementing rule of the constitutional
injunction, Section 4 of Rule 126 which provides that the judge must before issuing the
warrant personally examine on oath or affirmation the complainant and any witnesses
he may produce and take their depositions in writing, and attach them to the record, in
addition to any affidavits presented to him.

Mere affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses are thus not sufficient. The
examining Judge has to take depositions in writing of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce and to attach them to the record. Such written deposition is
necessary in order that the Judge may be able to properly determine the existence or
non-existence of the probable cause, to hold liable for perjury the person giving it if it will
be found later that his declarations are false.

We, therefore, hold that the search warrant is tainted with illegality by the failure of the
Judge to conform with the essential requisites of taking the depositions in writing and
attaching them to the record, rendering the search warrant
invalid.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

The judges insistence that she examined the complainants under oath has become
dubious by petitioners claim that at the particular time when he examined all the
relevant papers connected with the issuance of the questioned search warrant, after he
demanded the same from the lower court since they were not attached to the records,
he did not find any certification at the back of the joint affidavit of the complainants. As
stated earlier, before he filed his motion to quash the search warrant and for the return
of the articles seized, he was furnished, upon his request, certified true copies of the
said affidavits by the Clerk of Court but which certified true copies do not bear any
certification at the back. Petitioner likewise claims that his xerox copy of the said joint
affidavit obtained at the outset of this case does not show also the certification of
respondent judge. This doubt becomes more confirmed by respondent Judges own
admission, while insisting that she did examine thoroughly the applicants, that "she did
not take the deposition of Mayote and Goles because to have done so would be to hold
114

a judicial proceeding which will be open and public", 3 such that, according to her, the
persons subject of the intended raid will just disappear and move his illegal operations
somewhere else.

Could it be that the certification was made belatedly to cure the defect of the warrant?
Be that as it may, there was no "deposition in writing" attached to the records of the
case in palpable disregard of the statutory prohibition heretofore quoted.

Respondent Judge impresses this Court that the urgency to stop the illegal gambling
that lures every man, woman and child, and even the lowliest laborer who could hardly
make both ends meet justifies her action. She claims that in order to abate the
proliferation of this illegal "masiao" lottery, she thought it more prudent not to conduct
the taking of deposition which is done usually and publicly in the court room.

Two points must be made clear. The term "depositions" is sometimes used in a broad
sense to describe any written statement verified by oath; but in its more technical and
appropriate sense the meaning of the word is limited to written testimony of a witness
given in the course of a judicial proceeding in advance of the trial or hearing upon oral
examination. 4 A deposition is the testimony of a witness, put or taken in writing, under
oath or affirmation before a commissioner, examiner or other judicial officer, in answer
to interlocutory and cross interlocutory, and usually subscribed by the witnesses. 5 The
searching questions propounded to the applicants of the search warrant and his
witnesses must depend to a large extent upon the discretion of the Judge just as long
as the answers establish a reasonable ground to believe the commission of a specific
offense and that the applicant is one authorized by law, and said answers particularly
describe with certainty the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
The examination or investigation which must be under oath may not be in public. It may
even be held in the secrecy of his chambers. Far more important is that the examination
or investigation is not merely routinary but one that is thorough and elicit the required
information. To repeat, it must be under oath and must be in writing.cralawnad

The other point is that nothing can justify the issuance of the search warrant but the
fulfillment of the legal requisites. It might be well to point out what has been said in
Asian Surety & Insurance Co., Inc. v. Herrera:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"It has been said that of all the rights of a citizen, few are of greater importance or more
essential to his peace and happiness than the right of personal security, and that
involves the exemption of his private affairs, books, and papers from inspection and
scrutiny of others. While the power to search and seize is necessary to the public
welfare, still it must be exercised and the law enforced without transgressing the
constitutional rights of the citizens, for the enforcement of no statute is of sufficient
importance to justify indifference to the basic principles of government." 6

Thus, in issuing a search warrant the Judge must strictly comply with the requirements
of the Constitution and the statutory provisions. A liberal construction should be given in
favor of the individual to prevent stealthy encroachment upon, or gradual depreciation of
115

the rights secured by the Constitution. 7 No presumption of regularity are to be invoked


in aid of the process when an officer undertakes to justify it. 8

While We hold that the search warrant is illegal, the return of the things seized cannot
be ordered. In Castro v. Pabalan, 9 it was held that the illegality of the search warrant
does not call for the return of the things seized, the possession of which is prohibited.

WHEREFORE, the writ of certiorari is granted and the order of March 1, 1979 denying
the motion to annul the search warrant as well as the order of March 21, 1979 denying
the motion for reconsideration are hereby reversed, the search warrant, being declared
herein as illegal. Notwithstanding such illegality, the things seized under such warrant,
such as stock of "masiao" tickets; "masiao" issue tickets; bet money; control pad or
"masiao" numbers; stamping pad with rubber stamp marked Ormoc City Jai-Alai,"
cannot be returned as sought by petitioner. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Makasiar, Concepcion, Jr. and Guerrero, JJ., concur.

Aquino and Escolin, JJ., concur in the result.

Abad Santos, J., took no part.

THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 140243. December 14, 2000]

MARILYN C. PASCUA, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, THE PEOPLE


OF THE PHILIPPINES,respondents.

DECISION
MELO, J.:

What constitutes a valid promulgation in absentia? In case of such promulgation,


when does the accused's right to appeal accrue?
Before us is a petition that calls for a ruling on the aforestated issues, particularly
seeking the reversal of the decision of the Court of Appeals dated June 17, 1999 and its
order dated September 28, 1999 denying reconsideration. The Court of Appeals
dismissed the petition for certiorari under Rule 65 filed by petitioner which questioned
the legality of the orders dated June 22, 1998 and October 8, 1998 issued by Branch
116

153 of the Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Judicial Region stationed in Pasig
City.
The antecedent facts may be briefly chronicled as follows:
Petitioner was charged under 26 Informations for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg.
22. The Informations alleged that in 1989, petitioner issued 26 Philippine National Bank
(PNB) checks to apply on account or for value in favor of Lucita Lopez with the
knowledge that at the time of issue, petitioner did not have sufficient funds in or credit
with the drawee bank for the payment of the face value of the checks in full.Upon
presentment of the subject checks, they were dishonored by the drawee bank for having
been drawn against insufficient funds and against a closed account.
After trial, a judgment of conviction was rendered on February 17, 1998, disposing:

WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused, MARILYN C. PASCUA, GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of twenty six (26) counts of Violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22,
and hereby sentences her to suffer ONE (1) YEAR imprisonment in each case and to
pay the private complainant, LUCITA LOPEZ in the sum of SIX HUNDRED FIVE
THOUSAND PESOS (P605,000.00), Philippine Currency without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency.

SO ORDERED.

(p. 41, Rollo.)

The judgment was initially scheduled for promulgation on March 31, 1998. However,
considering that the presiding judge was on leave, the promulgation was reset to May 5,
1998.
When the case was called on May 5, 1998, Public Prosecutor Rogelio C. Sescon
and defense counsel Atty. Marcelino Arias appeared and manifested their readiness for
the promulgation of judgment, although the latter intimated that petitioner would be
late. Hence, the case was set for second call. After the lapse of two hours, petitioner still
had not appeared. The trial court again asked the public prosecutor and the defense
counsel if they were ready for the promulgation of judgment. Both responded in the
affirmative. The dispositive portion of the decision was thus read in open
court. Afterwards, the public prosecutor, the defense counsel, and private complainant
Lucita Lopez, acknowledged receipt of their respective copies of the subject decision by
signing at the back of the original copy of the decision on file with the record of the case.
Forthwith, the public prosecutor moved for the forfeiture of the cash bond posted by
petitioner as well as for the issuance of a warrant for her arrest. Acting on the motion,
the trial court issued, also on May 5, 1998, the following order:

When this case was called for the promulgation of judgment, the accused failed to
appear despite due notice. Upon motion of the Public Prosecutor, that the cash bond
posted for her provisional liberty be forfeited in favor of the government, being well-
117

taken, the same is hereby granted. Likewise, let a warrant of arrest be issued against
her.

SO ORDERED.

(p. 42, Rollo.)

No motion for reconsideration or notice of appeal was filed by petitioner within 15


days from May 5, 1998.
On June 8, 1998, a notice of change of address was filed by petitioner with the trial
court, sent through a private messengerial firm. On the same date, without terminating
the services of her counsel of record, Atty. Marcelino Arias, the one who received the
copy of the judgment of conviction, petitioner, assisted by another counsel, Atty.
Rolando Bernardo, filed an urgent omnibus motion to lift warrant of arrest and
confiscation of bail bond, as well as to set anew the promulgation of the subject decision
on the following allegations: that petitioner failed to appear before the trial court on the
scheduled date of promulgation (May 5, 1998) because she failed to get the notices
sent to her former address at No. 21 La Felonila St., Quezon City; that she had no
intention of evading the processes of the trial court; that in February 1998, she
transferred residence to Olongapo City by reason of an ejectment case filed against her
by her landlord concerning her former residence in Quezon City; and that due to the
abrupt dislocation of their family life as a result of the transfer of their residence to
Olongapo City, there were important matters that she overlooked such as the filing of a
notice of change of address to inform the trial court of her new place of residence.
The motion was set for hearing on June 11, 1998 but on said date, neither petitioner
nor assisting counsel was present. On June 22, 1998, petitioner filed a notice of
appeal. The Office of the City Prosecutor of Pasig filed its comment on the motion for
reconsideration arguing that: the promulgation of the subject decision was made by the
trial court on May 5, 1998 in the presence of the accused's (herein petitioner's) counsel;
that the subject decision is already final and executory, there having been no appeal
interposed by the accused within the reglementary period; that there is no such thing as
repromulgation of a decision; that before the accused could ask for relief from the trial
court, she, being a convict, should submit herself first to the lawful order thereof, that is,
to surrender to the police authorities.
On June 22, 1998, the trial court issued an order denying petitioner's urgent
omnibus motion and notice of appeal for lack of merit, mentioning that its February 17,
1998 decision had already become final and executory. Petitioner moved for
reconsideration, this time assisted by another lawyer, Atty. Romulo San Juan. The
motion was set for hearing on July 8, 1998 but on said hearing date, neither petitioner
nor Atty. San Juan appeared. Instead, Atty. Porfirio Bautista appeared as collaborating
counsel of Atty. San Juan. When asked if he knew petitioner's counsel of record, Atty.
Bautista could not answer.
On July 17, 1998, Attys. San Juan and Bautista as counsel for petitioner, filed a
motion for inhibition of the presiding judge. The motion was set for hearing on July 28,
118

1998. Once again, petitioner failed to appear although Atty. Bautista did. On October 8,
1998, the trial court denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration and inhibition.
On December 14, 1998, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure with the Court of Appeals praying for the nullification of
the June 22, 1998 and October 8, 1998 orders of the trial court. At first, the Court of
Appeals issued a resolution dated December 29, 1998 dismissing the petition
for certiorari, for failure to contain an explanation why the respondent therein was not
personally served a copy of the petition. However, upon reconsideration, said petition
was reinstated.
After an exchange of pleadings, on June 17, 1999, the Court of Appeals issued the
decision assailed herein. Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but to no avail.
Hence, the instant petition on the basis of the following grounds: (1) that petitioner
was not properly notified of the date of promulgation and therefore, there was no valid
promulgation; hence petitioner's period to appeal has not commenced; (2) that the
promulgation in absentia of the judgment against petitioner was not made in the manner
set out in the last paragraph of Section 6, Rule 120 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure which then provided that promulgation in absentia shall consist in the
recording of the judgment in the criminal docket and a copy thereof shall be served
upon the accused or counsel; (3) that the decision of the trial court is contrary to
applicable laws and that it disregarded factual evidence and instead resorted to make a
conclusion based on conjectures, presumptions, and misapprehension of facts.
The resolution of the instant petition is dependent on the proper interpretation of
Section 6, Rule 120 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, which provides:

Section 6. Promulgation of judgment --The judgment is promulgated by reading the


same in the presence of the accused and any judge of the court in which it was
rendered. However, if the conviction is for a light offense, the judgment may be
pronounced in the presence of his counsel or representative. When the judge is absent
or outside of the province or city, the judgment may be promulgated by the clerk of
court.

If the accused is confined or detained in another province or city, the judgment may be
promulgated by the executive judge of the Regional Trial Court having jurisdiction over
the place of confinement or detention upon request of the court that rendered the
judgment. The court promulgating the judgment shall have authority to accept the notice
of appeal and to approve the bail bond pending appeal.

The proper clerk of court shall give notice to the accused personally or through his
bondsman or warden and counsel, requiring him to be present at the promulgation of
the decision. In case the accused fails to appear thereat the promulgation shall consist
in the recording of the judgment in the criminal docket and a copy thereof shall be
served upon the accused or counsel. If the judgment is for conviction and the accuseds
failure to appear was without justifiable cause, the court shall further order the arrest of
119

the accused, who may appeal within fifteen (15) days from notice of the decision to him
or his counsel. (Italics supplied)

Incidentally, Section 6, Rule 120 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure which
took effect December 1, 2000 adds more requirements but retains the essence of the
former Section 6, to wit:

Section 6. Promulgation of judgment. The judgment is promulgated by reading it in the


presence of the accused and any judge of the court in which it was rendered. However,
if the conviction is for a light offense the judgment may be pronounced in the presence
of his counsel or representative. When the judge is absent or outside the province or
city, the judgment may be promulgated by the clerk of court.

If the accused is confined or detained in another province or city the judgment may be
promulgated by the executive judge of the Regional Trial Court having jurisdiction over
the place of confinement or detention upon request of the court which rendered the
judgment. The court promulgating the judgment shall have authority to accept the notice
of appeal and to approve the bail bond pending appeal; provided, that if the decision of
the trial court convicting the accused changed the nature of the offense from non-
bailable to bailable, the application for bail can only be filed and resolved by the
appellate court.

The proper clerk of court shall give notice to the accused personally or through his
bondsman or warden and counsel, requiring him to be present at the promulgation of
the decision. If the accused was tried in absentia because he jumped bail or escaped
from prison, the notice to him shall be served at his last known address.

In case the accused fails to appear at the scheduled date of promulgation of judgment
despite notice, the promulgation shall be made by recording the judgment in the criminal
docket and serving him a copy thereof at his last known address or thru his counsel.

If the judgment is for conviction and the failure of the accused to appear was without
justifiable cause, he shall lose the remedies available in these Rules against the
judgment and the court shall order his arrest. Within fifteen (15) days from promulgation
of judgment however, the accused may surrender and file a motion for leave of court to
avail of these remedies. He shall state the reasons for his absence at the scheduled
promulgation and if he proves that his absence was for a justifiable cause, he shall be
allowed to avail of said remedies within fifteen (15) days from notice. (Italics supplied)

Promulgation of judgment is an official proclamation or announcement of the


decision of the court (Jacinto, Sr., Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Revised
Rules of Court [Criminal Procedure], 1994 ed., p. 521). In a criminal case, promulgation
of the decision cannot take place until after the clerk receives it and enters it into the
criminal docket. It follows that when the judge mails a decision through the clerk of
court, it is not promulgated on the date of mailing but after the clerk of court enters the
120

same in the criminal docket (Ibid., citingPeople v. Court of Appeals, 52 O.G. 5825
[1956]).
According to the first paragraph of Section 6 of the aforesaid Rule (of both the 1985
and 2000 versions), the presence in person of the accused at the promulgation of
judgment is mandatory in all cases except where the conviction is for a light offense, in
which case the accused may appear through counsel or representative. Under the third
paragraph of the former and present Section 6, any accused, regardless of the gravity
of the offense charged against him, must be given notice of the promulgation of
judgment and the requirement of his presence. He must appear in person or in the case
of one facing a conviction for a light offense, through counsel or representative. The
present Section 6 adds that if the accused was tried in absentia because he jumped bail
or escaped from prison, notice of promulgation shall be served at his last known
address.
Significantly, both versions of said section set forth the rules that become operative
if the accused fails to appear at the promulgation despite due notice: (a) promulgation
shall consist in the recording of the judgment in the criminal docket and a copy thereof
shall be served upon the accused at his last known address or through his counsel; and
(b) if the judgment is for conviction, and the accused's failure to appear was without
justifiable cause, the court shall further order the arrest of the accused.
Here lies the difference in the two versions of the section. The old rule automatically
gives the accused 15 days from notice (of the decision) to him or his counsel within
which to appeal. In the new rule, the accused who failed to appear without justifiable
cause shall lose the remedies available in the Rules against the judgment. However,
within 15 days from promulgation of judgment, the accused may surrender and file a
motion for leave of court to avail of these remedies. He shall state in his motion the
reasons for his absence at the scheduled promulgation and if he proves that his
absence was for a justifiable cause, he shall be allowed to avail of said remedies within
15 days from notice.
It thus appears that the judgment in a criminal case must be promulgated in the
presence of the accused, except where it is for a light offense, in which case it may be
pronounced in the presence of his counsel or representative (Dimson v. Elepao, 99 Phil.
733 [1956]), and except where the judgment is for acquittal, in which case the presence
of the accused is not necessary (Cea, etc., et al. v. Cinco, et al., 96 Phil. 31
[1954]). Notably, one of the conditions of the bail given for the provisional liberty of an
accused in a criminal case is that he shall surrender himself (or the bondsman shall
surrender the accused) for execution of the final judgment (Section 2[d], Rule 114,
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure). Thus, it follows that it is the responsibility of the
accused to make himself available to the court upon promulgation of a judgment of
conviction, and such presence is secured by his bail bond. This amplifies the need for
the presence of the accused during the promulgation of a judgment of conviction,
especially if it is for a grave offense. Obviously, a judgment of conviction cannot be
executed --and the sentence meted to the accused cannot be served --without his
presence. Besides, where there is no promulgation of the judgment, the right to appeal
does not accrue (People v. ]aranilla, 55 SCRA 565 [1974]).
121

Jurisprudence further dictates that the absence of counsel during the promulgation
will not result in a violation of any substantial right of the accused, and will not affect the
validity of the promulgation of the judgment (Bernardo v. Abeto, CA-G. R. No. 6076, 31
January 1940;Gonzales v. Judge, 186 SCRA 101 [1990]).
In the vintage case of Cea, etc., et al. v. Cinco, et al (supra), the Court citing U. S. v.
Beecham, (28 Phil. 258 [1914]), stated the reasons for requiring the attendance of the
accused in case of conviction for a grave or less grave offense, to wit:

...The common law required, when any corporal punishment was to be inflicted on
the defendant, that he should be personally present before the court at the time of
pronouncing the sentence. (1 Chitty's Crim. Law [5th Am. ed.], 693, 696.) Reasons
given for this are, that the defendant may be identified by the court as the real party
adjudged to be punished (Holt, 399); that the defendant may have a chance to
plead or move in arrest of judgment (King vs. Speke, 3 Salk., 358); that he may
have an opportunity to say what he can say why judgment should not be given
against him (2 Hale's Pleas of the Crown, 401, 402); and that the example of the
defendants, who have been guilty of misdemeanors of a gross and public kind,
being brought up for the animadversion of the court and the open denunciation of
punishment, may tend to deter others from the commission of similar offenses
(Chitty's Crim. Law [5th ed.], 693, 696) ***.

Nevertheless, as mentioned above, regardless of the gravity of the offense,


promulgation of judgment in absentia is allowed under theRules. The only essential
elements for its validity are: (a) that the judgment be recorded in the criminal docket;
and (b) that a copy thereof shall be served upon the accused or counsel.
Let us examine the validity of the May 5, 1998 promulgation which took place in the
case at bar. The dispositive portion of the decision convicting petitioner was read in
open court, after which the public prosecutor, the defense counsel Atty. Marcelino Arias,
and private complainant Lucita Lopez, acknowledged receipt of their respective copies
of the decision by affixing their signatures at the back of the original of the decision on
file with the record of the case. Atty. Arias failed to file a notice of appeal within fifteen
days from receipt of the decision. Is it proper to rule that the period within which to file
an appeal has lapsed?
In Florendo v. Court of Appeals (239 SCRA 325 [1994]), the facts are parallel to
those of the instant case. We held -

In the case at bench, a copy of the judgment was served to the counsel of petitioner on
June 15, 1992; therefore, he had only up to June 30, 1992 within which to appeal. The
notice of appeal filed on July 6, 1992 was clearly out of time.

It is presumed that official duties are regularly performed and that the proceedings are
made of record. This serves as a substantial compliance with the procedural
requirement of the recording of the judgment in the criminal docket of the court. At any
rate, petitioner does not question non-compliance of the requirement of the recording of
the judgment in the criminal docket.
122

(At p. 329.)

Petitioner's first argument is devoid of merit. In the first place, her non- receipt of the
notice of promulgation was due to her own failure to immediately file a notice of change
of address with the trial court, which she clearly admitted. Besides, promulgation could
be properly done even in her absence, subject to the service of a copy of the decision
upon her or her counsel and the recording of the judgment in the criminal docket.
However, in line with petitioner's second argument, petitioner has presented
evidence sufficient to controvert the presumption of regularity of performance of official
duty as regards the procedural requirement of the recording of the judgment in the
criminal docket of the court. Attached to the petition is a piece of evidence that cannot
be ignored by this Court -- a certification dated October 26, 1998 signed by the Clerk of
Court of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, which reads:

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:

THIS IS TO CERTIFY that this Office has not yet been furnished, as of this date, with
copies of the decisions in Criminal Cases Nos. 85283-306 and 86064-65, entitled
People of the Philippines versus Marilyn C. Pascua, which were assigned to Branch 153
of this Court.

This certification is issued upon request of Romulo D. San Juan and Porfirio Bautista,
both counsels for the accused.

City of Pasig, October 26, 1998, 1:30 p.m.

(Sgd.) GREGORIO P. SUBONG, JR.

Administrative Officer I In-Charge

Criminal Cases Unit

(Sgd.) GRACE S. BELVIS

Clerk of Court

(p. 61, Record.)

We take judicial notice of said certification and hold that in view thereof, we cannot
presume substantial compliance with the requirement of recording a judgment in the
criminal docket. And in the absence of such compliance, there can be no valid
promulgation.Without the same, the February 17, 1998 decision could not attain finality
and become executory. This means that the 15-day period within which to interpose an
appeal did not even commence.
123

What is the significance of the recording of the judgment with the criminal docket of
the court? By analogy, let us apply the principles of civil law on registration.
To register is to record or annotate. American and Spanish authorities are
unanimous on the meaning of the term to register as "to enter in a register; to record
formally and distinctly; to enroll; to enter in a list" (Po Sun Tun vs. Prize and Provincial
Government of Leyte, 54 Phil. 192 [1929]). In general, registration refers to any entry
made in the books of the registry, including both registration in its ordinary and strict
sense, and cancellation, annotation, and even the marginal notes. In strict acceptation,
it pertains to the entry made in the registry which records solemnly and permanently the
right of ownership and other real rights (Ibid.). Simply stated, registration is made for the
purpose ofnotification (Paras, Civil Code of the Philippines, Vol. II, 1989 ed., p. 653,
citing Bautista vs. Dy Bun Chin, 49 O.G. 179 [1952]).
Registration is a mere ministerial act by which a deed, contract, or instrument is
sought to be inscribed in the records of the Office of the Register of Deeds and
annotated at the back of the certificate of title covering the land subject of the deed,
contract, or instrument. Being a ministerial act, it must be performed in any case and, if
it is not done, it may be ordered performed by a court of justice (Cruz, The Law of Public
Officers, 1997 ed., p. 102). In fact, the public officer having this ministerial duty has no
choice but to perform the specific action which is the particular duty imposed by law. Its
purpose is to give notice thereof to all persons. It operates as a notice of the deed,
contract, or instrument to others, but neither adds to its validity nor converts an invalid
instrument into a valid one between the parties. If the purpose of registration is merely
to give notice, then questions regarding the effects or invalidity of instruments are
expected to be decided after, not before, registration. It must follow as a necessary
consequence that registration must first be allowed, and validity or effect of the
instruments litigated afterwards (Seron vs. Hon. Rodriguez, etc., and Seron, 110 Phil..
548 [1960]; Gurbax Singh Pabla & Co., et al. vs. Reyes, et al., 92 Phil. 177
[1952]; Register of Deeds of Manila vs. Tinoco Vda. De Cruz, 95 Phil. 818
[1954]; Samanilla vs. Cajucom, et al.,107 Phil. 432 [1960]).
Applying the above-mentioned principles to the instant case, we are prompted to
further examine the provisions on promulgation in absentia.
As held in Florendo vs. Court of Appeals (supra), the rules allow promulgation of
judgment in absentia to obviate the situation where juridical process could be subverted
by the accused jumping bail. But the Rules also provide measures to make
promulgation in absentia a formal and solemn act so that the absent accused, wherever
he may be, can be notified of the judgment rendered against him. As discussed earlier,
the sentence imposed by the trial court cannot be served in the absence of the
accused. Hence, all means of notification must be done to let the absent accused know
of the judgment of the court. And the means provided by the Rules are: (1) the act of
giving notice to all persons or the act of recording or registering the judgment in the
criminal docket (which Section 6 incidentally mentions first showing its
importance; and (2) the act of serving a copy thereof upon the accused (at his last
known address) or his counsel. In a scenario where the whereabouts of the accused are
124

unknown (as when he is at large), the recording satisfies the requirement of notifying
the accused of the decision wherever he may be.
Thus, on May 5, 1998, although the second kind of notification was satisfied when
defense counsel Atty. Arias received a copy of the February 17, 1998 decision, the
solemn and operative act of recording was not done, making the promulgation in
absentia invalid. This being so, the period to appeal did not begin to run.
The next matter we have to consider is the effect of the service of a copy of the
judgment upon petitioner, who admits having received a copy thereof on June 17,
1998. Did the 15-day period to appeal begin to run on said date of receipt?
We rule in the negative. Petitioner's later receipt of the copy of the decision does
not in any way cure an invalid promulgation. And even if said decision be recorded in
the criminal docket later, such piece-meal compliance with the Rules will still not
validate the May 5, 1998 promulgation which was invalid at the time it was
conducted. The express mention in the provision of both requirements for a valid
promulgation in absentia clearly means that they indeed must concur.
Finally, as regards the third argument, we agree with the Solicitor General that
matters of sufficiency of evidence may not be passed upon in the herein
proceedings. The instant petition assails the Court of Appeals' decision dated June 17,
1999 and its order dated September 28, 1999 both of which concern the orders of the
trial court dated June 22, 1998 and October 8, 1998, in essence ruling that petitioner's
notice of appeal dated June 19, 1998 was filed out of time. The petition is not directed
against February 17, 1998 decision of the trial court which convicted petitioner on 26
counts of violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22. Hence, this is not the proper time to rule
on the merits of Criminal Cases No. 85283-306/86064-65. There is, rather, a need to
remand the matter to the trial court for proper promulgation of its decision. Significantly,
it is not what petitioner describes as "repromulgation" since promulgation was not validly
made, and hence, as if not conducted. The requisites of the remedy of appeal shall then
apply from that point.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The June 17, 1999
decision and the September 28, 1999 order of the Court of Appeals are hereby set
aside. The instant case is hereby remanded to the trial court for proper promulgation of
its decision in accordance with Section 6, Rule 120 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure.
SO ORDERED.
Vitug, Panganiban, and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 89139. August 2, 1990.]

ROMEO POSADAS y ZAMORA, Petitioner, v. THE HONORABLE COURT OF


APPEALS and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
125

Rudy G. Agravante for Petitioner.

SYLLABUS

1. REMEDIAL LAW; REVISED RULES ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; ARREST


WITHOUT WARRANT; SEC. 5, RULE 113 THEREOF. From the foregoing provision
of law it is clear that an arrest without a warrant may be effected by a peace officer or
private person, among others, when in his presence the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; or when an
offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of the facts
indicating that the person arrested has committed it.

2. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; WARRANTLESS SEARCH AND


SEIZURE; NOT INCIDENTAL TO A LAWFUL ARREST IN THE CASE AT BAR. The
Solicitor General, in justifying the warrantless search and seizure of the buri bag then
carried by the petitioner, argued that when the two policemen approached the petitioner,
he was actually committing or had just committed the offense of illegal possession of
firearms and ammunitions in the presence of the police officers and consequently the
search and seizure of the contraband was incidental to the lawful arrest in accordance
with Section 12, Rule 126 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure. We disagree. At
the time the peace officers in this case identified themselves and apprehended the
petitioner as he attempted to flee they did not know that he had committed, or was
actually committing the offense of illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions. They
just suspected that he was hiding something in the buri bag. They did now know what
its contents were. The said circumstances did not justify an arrest without a warrant.

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; CAN BE VALIDLY EFFECTED WITHOUT BEING PRECEDED BY AN


ARREST; CASE AT BAR. However, there are many instances where a warrant and
seizure can be effected without necessarily being preceded by an arrest, foremost of
which is the "stop and search" without a search warrant at military or police checkpoints,
the constitutionality or validity of which has been upheld by this Court in Valmonte v. de
Villa. As between a warrantless search and seizure conducted at military or police
checkpoints and the search thereat in the case at bar, there is no question that, indeed,
the latter is more reasonable considering that unlike in the former, it was effected on the
basis of a probable cause. The probable cause is that when the petitioner acted
suspiciously and attempted to flee with the buri bag there was a probable cause that he
was concealing something illegal in the bag and it was the right and duty of the police
officers to inspect the same. It is too much indeed to require the police officers to search
the bag in the possession of the petitioner only after they shall have obtained a search
warrant for the purpose. Such an exercise may prove to be useless, futile and much too
late.
126

DECISION

GANCAYCO, J.:

The validity of a warrantless search on the person of petitioner is put into issue in this
case.

On October 16, 1986 at about 10:00 oclock in the morning Pat. Ursicio Ungab and Pat.
Umbra Umpar, both members of the Integrated National Police (INP) of the Davao
Metrodiscom assigned with the Intelligence Task Force, were conducting a surveillance
along Magallanes Street, Davao City. While they were within the premises of the Rizal
Memorial Colleges they spotted petitioner carrying a "buri" bag and they noticed him to
be acting suspiciously.

They approached the petitioner and identified themselves as members of the INP.
Petitioner attempted to flee but his attempt to get away was thwarted by the two
notwithstanding his resistance.

They then checked the "buri" bag of the petitioner where they found one (1) caliber .38
Smith & Wesson revolver with Serial No. 770196 1 two (2) rounds of live ammunition for
a .38 caliber gun, 2 a smoke (tear gas) grenade 3 a and two (2) live ammunitions for a
.22 caliber gun. 4 They brought the petitioner to the police station for further
investigation. In the course of the same, the petitioner was asked to show the necessary
license or authority to possess firearms and ammunitions found in his possession but he
failed to do so. He was then taken to the Davao Metrodiscom office and the prohibited
articles recovered from him were indorsed to M/Sgt. Didoy, the officer then on duty. He
was prosecuted for illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions in the Regional Trial
Court of Davao City wherein after a plea of not guilty and trial on the merits a decision
was rendered on October 8, 1987 finding petitioner guilty of the offense charged as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, this Court finds the accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the offense charged.

It appearing that the accused was below eighteen (18) years old at the time of the
commission of the offense (Art. 68, par. 2), he is hereby sentenced to an indeterminate
penalty ranging from TEN (10) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of prison mayor to TWELVE
(12) Years, FIVE (5) months and Eleven (11) days of Reclusion Temporal, and to pay
the costs.

The firearm, ammunitions and smoke grenade are forfeited in favor of the government
and the Branch Clerk of Court is hereby directed to turn over said items to the Chief,
Davao Metrodiscom, Davao City." 5
127

Not satisfied therewith the petitioner interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals
wherein in due course a decision was rendered on February 23, 1989 affirming in toto
the appealed decision with costs against the petitioner. 6

Hence, the herein petition for review, the main thrust of which is that there being no
lawful arrest or search and seizure, the items which were confiscated from the
possession of the petitioner are inadmissible in evidence against him.cralawnad

The Solicitor General, in justifying the warrantless search of the buri bag then carried by
the petitioner, argues that under Section 12, Rule 136 of the Rules of Court a person
lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything used as proof of
a commission of an offense without a search warrant. It is further alleged that the arrest
without a warrant of the petitioner was lawful under the circumstances.

Section 5, Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure provides as


follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"SEC. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a private person
may, without a warrant, arrest a person:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

(a) When in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;

(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of
facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while
his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to
another.

In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the person arrested without a
warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail, and he shall be
proceeded against in accordance with Rule 112, Section 7. (6a, 17a)"

From the foregoing provision of law it is clear that an arrest without a warrant may be
effected by a peace officer or private person, among others, when in his presence the
person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit
an offense; or when an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal
knowledge of the facts indicating that the person arrested has committed it.

The Solicitor General argues that when the two policemen approached the petitioner, he
was actually committing or had just committed the offense of illegal possession of
firearms and ammunitions in the presence of the police officers and consequently the
search and seizure of the contraband was incidental to the lawful arrest in accordance
with Section 12, Rule 126 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure. We disagree.
128

At the time the peace officers in this case identified themselves and apprehended the
petitioner as he attempted to flee they did not know that he had committed, or was
actually committing the offense of illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions. They
just suspected that he was hiding something in the buri bag. They did now know what
its contents were. The said circumstances did not justify an arrest without a
warrant.chanrobles lawlibrary : rednad

However, there are many instances where a warrant and seizure can be effected
without necessarily being preceded by an arrest, foremost of which is the "stop and
search" without a search warrant at military or police checkpoints, the constitutionality or
validity of which has been upheld by this Court in Valmonte v. de Villa, 7 as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Petitioner Valmontes general allegation to the effect that he had been stopped and
searched without a search warrant by the military manning the checkpoints, without
more, i.e., without stating the details of the incidents which amount to a violation of his
right against unlawful search and seizure, is not sufficient to enable the Court to
determine whether there was a violation of Valmontes right against unlawful search and
seizure. Not all searches and seizures are prohibited. Those which are reasonable are
not forbidden. A reasonable search is not to be determined by any fixed formula but is
to be resolved according to the facts of each case.

Where, for example, the officer merely draws aside the curtain of a vacant vehicle which
is parked on the public fair grounds, or simply looks into a vehicle or flashes a light
therein, these do not constitute unreasonable search.

The setting up of the questioned checkpoints in Valenzuela (and probably in other


areas) may be considered as a security measure to enable the NCRDC to pursue its
mission of establishing effective territorial defense and maintaining peace and order for
the benefit of the public. Checkpoints may also be regarded as measures to thwart plots
to destabilize the government in the interest of public security. In this connection, the
Court may take judicial notice of the shift to urban centers and their suburbs of the
insurgency movement, so clearly reflected in the increased killings in cities of police and
military men by NPA "sparrow units," not to mention the abundance of unlicensed
firearms and the alarming rise in lawlessness and violence in such urban centers, not all
of which are reported in media, most likely brought about by deteriorating economic
conditions - which all sum up to what one can rightly consider, at the very least, as
abnormal times. Between the inherent right of the state to protect its existence and
promote public welfare and an individuals right against a warrantless search which is
however reasonably conducted, the former should prevail.

True, the manning of checkpoints by the military is susceptible of abuse by the men in
uniform in the same manner that all governmental power is susceptible of abuse. But, at
the cost of occasional inconvenience, discomfort and even irritation to the citizen, the
checkpoints during these abnormal times, when conducted within reasonable limits, are
129

part of the price we pay for an orderly society and a peaceful community. (Emphasis
supplied)."cralaw virtua1aw library

Thus, as between a warrantless search and seizure conducted at military or police


checkpoints and the search thereat in the case at bar, there is no question that, indeed,
the latter is more reasonable considering that unlike in the former, it was effected on the
basis of a probable cause. The probable cause is that when the petitioner acted
suspiciously and attempted to flee with the buri bag there was a probable cause that he
was concealing something illegal in the bag and it was the right and duty of the police
officers to inspect the same.

It is too much indeed to require the police officers to search the bag in the possession of
the petitioner only after they shall have obtained a search warrant for the purpose. Such
an exercise may prove to be useless, futile and much too late.

In People v. CFI of Rizal, 8 this Court held as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

". . . In the ordinary cases where warrant is indispensably necessary, the mechanics
prescribed by the Constitution and reiterated in the Rules of Court must be followed and
satisfied. But We need not argue that there are exceptions. Thus in the extraordinary
events where warrant is not necessary to effect a valid search or seizure, or when the
latter cannot be performed except without warrant, what constitutes a reasonable or
unreasonable search or seizure becomes purely a judicial question, determinable from
the uniqueness of the circumstances involved, including the purpose of the search or
seizure, the presence or absence of probable cause, the manner in which the search
and seizure was made, the place or thing searched and the character of the articles
procured."cralaw virtua1aw library

The Court reproduces with approval the following disquisition of the Solicitor
General:chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

"The assailed search and seizure may still be justified as akin to a "stop and frisk"
situation whose object is either to determine the identity of a suspicious individual or to
maintain the status quo momentarily while the police officer seeks to obtain more
information. This is illustrated in the case of Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). In this
case, two men repeatedly walked past a store window and returned to a spot where
they apparently conferred with a third man. This aroused the suspicion of a police
officer. To the experienced officer, the behavior of the men indicated that they were
sizing up the store for an armed robbery. When the police officer approached the men
and asked them for their names, they mumbled a reply. Whereupon, the officer grabbed
one of them, spun him around and frisked him. Finding a concealed weapon in one, he
did the same to the other two and found another weapon. In the prosecution for the
offense of carrying a concealed weapon, the defense of illegal search and seizure was
put up. The United States Supreme Court held that "a police officer may in appropriate
circumstances and in an appropriate manner approach a person for the purpose of
investigating possible criminal behavior even though there is no probable cause to
130

make an arrest." In such a situation, it is reasonable for an officer rather than simply to
shrug his shoulder and allow a crime to occur, to stop a suspicious individual briefly in
order to determine his identity or maintain the status quo while obtaining more
information. . . .

Clearly, the search in the case at bar can be sustained under the exceptions heretofore
discussed, and hence, the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches and
seizures has not been violated." 9

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED with costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, Cruz, Grio-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.

392 U.S. 1

Terry v. Ohio (No. 67)

Argued: December 12, 1967

Decided: June 10, 1968

Syllabus

A Cleveland detective (McFadden), on a downtown beat which he had been patrolling


for many years, observed two strangers (petitioner and another man, Chilton) on a
street corner. He saw them proceed alternately back and forth along an identical route,
pausing to stare in the same store window, which they did for a total of about 24 times.
Each completion of the route was followed by a conference between the two on a
corner, at one of which they were joined by a third man (Katz) who left swiftly.
Suspecting the two men of "casing a job, a stick-up," the officer followed them and saw
them rejoin the third man a couple of blocks away in front of a store. The officer
approached the three, identified himself as a policeman, and asked their names. The
men "mumbled something," whereupon McFadden spun petitioner around, patted down
his outside clothing, and found in his overcoat pocket, but was unable to remove, a
pistol. The officer ordered the three into the store. He removed petitioner's overcoat,
took out a revolver, and ordered the three to face the wall with their hands raised. He
patted down the outer clothing of Chilton and Katz and seized a revolver from Chilton's
131

outside overcoat pocket. He did not put his hands under the outer garments of Katz
(since he discovered nothing in his pat-down which might have been a weapon), or
under petitioner's or Chilton's outer garments until he felt the guns. The three were
taken to the police station. Petitioner and Chilton were charged with
carrying [p2] concealed weapons. The defense moved to suppress the weapons.
Though the trial court rejected the prosecution theory that the guns had been seized
during a search incident to a lawful arrest, the court denied the motion to suppress and
admitted the weapons into evidence on the ground that the officer had cause to believe
that petitioner and Chilton were acting suspiciously, that their interrogation was
warranted, and that the officer, for his own protection, had the right to pat down their
outer clothing having reasonable cause to believe that they might be armed. The court
distinguished between an investigatory "stop" and an arrest, and between a "frisk" of the
outer clothing for weapons and a full-blown search for evidence of crime. Petitioner and
Chilton were found guilty, an intermediate appellate court affirmed, and the State
Supreme Court dismissed the appeal on the ground that "no substantial constitutional
question" was involved.

Held:

1. The Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable searches and seizures, made
applicable to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment, "protects people, not places,"
and therefore applies as much to the citizen on the streets as well as at home or
elsewhere. Pp. 8-9.

2. The issue in this case is not the abstract propriety of the police conduct, but the
admissibility against petitioner of the evidence uncovered by the search and seizure. P.
12.

3. The exclusionary rule cannot properly be invoked to exclude the products of


legitimate and restrained police investigative techniques, and this Court's approval of
such techniques should not discourage remedies other than the exclusionary rule to
curtail police abuses for which that is not an effective sanction. Pp. 13-15.

4. The Fourth Amendment applies to "stop and frisk" procedures such as those followed
here. Pp. 16-20.

(a) Whenever a police officer accosts an individual and restrains his freedom to walk
away, he has "seized" that person within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. P. 16.
132

(b) A careful exploration of the outer surfaces of a person's clothing in an attempt to find
weapons is a "search" under that Amendment. P. 16.

5. Where a reasonably prudent officer is warranted in the circumstances of a given case


in believing that his safety or that of others is endangered, he may make a reasonable
search for weapons of the person believed by him to be armed and
dangerous [p3] regardless of whether he has probable cause to arrest that individual for
crime or the absolute certainty that the individual is armed. Pp. 20-27.

(a) Though the police must, whenever practicable, secure a warrant to make a search
and seizure, that procedure cannot be followed where swift action based upon on-the-
spot observations of the officer on the beat is required. P. 20.

(b) The reasonableness of any particular search and seizure must be assessed in light
of the particular circumstances against the standard of whether a man of reasonable
caution is warranted in believing that the action taken was appropriate. Pp. 21-22.

(c) The officer here was performing a legitimate function of investigating suspicious
conduct when he decided to approach petitioner and his companions. P. 22.

(d) An officer justified in believing that an individual whose suspicious behavior he is


investigating at close range is armed may, to neutralize the threat of physical harm, take
necessary measures to determine whether that person is carrying a weapon. P. 24.

(e) A search for weapons in the absence of probable cause to arrest must be strictly
circumscribed by the exigencies of the situation. Pp. 25-26.

(f) An officer may make an intrusion short of arrest where he has reasonable
apprehension of danger before being possessed of information justifying arrest. Pp. 26-
27.

6. The officer's protective seizure of petitioner and his companions and the limited
search which he made were reasonable, both at their inception and as conducted. Pp.
27-30.

(a) The actions of petitioner and his companions were consistent with the officer's
hypothesis that they were contemplating a daylight robbery and were armed. P. 28.

(b) The officer's search was confined to what was minimally necessary to determine
whether the men were armed, and the intrusion, which was made for the sole purpose
133

of protecting himself and others nearby, was confined to ascertaining the presence of
weapons. Pp. 29-30.

7. The revolver seized from petitioner was properly admitted into evidence against him,
since the search which led to its seizure was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.
Pp. 30-31.

Affirmed. [p4]

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