PEDRO ELCANO and PATRICIA ELCANO, in their capacity as Ascendants of criminal or delito and mere culpa or fault, with
mere culpa or fault, with pertinent citation of decisions of the
Agapito Elcano, deceased, plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
REGINALD HILL, minor, and MARVIN HILL, as father and Natural Guardian of
said minor, defendants-appellees.
Reginald Hill, a minor, caused the death of Agapito (son of
Elcano). Elcano filed a criminal case against Reginald but Reginald
was acquitted for lack of intent coupled with mistake. Elcano then
filed a civil action against Reginald and his dad (Marvin Hill) for
damages based on Article 2180 of the Civil Code. Hill argued that
the civil action is barred by his sons acquittal in the criminal case;
and that if ever, his civil liability as a parent has been extinguished
by the fact that his son is already an emancipated minor by reason
of his marriage.
Actually, the motion to dismiss based on the following grounds: 1. The present action
is not only against but a violation of section 1, Rule 107, which is now Rule III, of the
Revised Rules of Court; 2. The action is barred by a prior judgment which is now final
and or in res-adjudicata; 3. The complaint had no cause of action against defendant
Marvin Hill, because he was relieved as guardian of the other defendant through
emancipation by marriage. was first denied by the trial court.
Hence, this appeal.
It appears that for the killing of the son, Agapito, of plaintiffs-appellants, defendant-
appellee Reginald Hill was prosecuted criminally. After due trial, he was acquitted on
the ground that his act was not criminal because of "lack of intent to kill, coupled with
mistake."
As We view the foregoing background of this case, the two decisive issues presented
for Our resolution are:
1. Is the present civil action for damages barred by the acquittal of Reginald in the
criminal case wherein the action for civil liability, was not reversed?
2. May Article 2180 (2nd and last paragraphs) of the Civil Code he applied against
Atty. Hill, notwithstanding the undisputed fact that at the time of the occurrence
complained of. Reginald, though a minor, living with and getting subsistenee from his
father, was already legally married?
The first issue presents no more problem than the need for a reiteration and further
clarification of the dual character, criminal and civil, of fault or negligence as a source
of obligation which was firmly established in this jurisdiction in Barredo vs. Garcia, 73
Phil. 607. In that case, this Court postulated, on the basis of a scholarly dissertation
by Justice Bocobo on the nature of culpa aquiliana in relation to culpa
Supreme Court of Spain, the works of recognized civilians, and earlier jurisprudence
of our own, that the same given act can result in civil liability not only under the Penal
Code but also under the Civil Code. Thus, the opinion holds:
The, above case is pertinent because it shows that the same act machinist. come
under both the Penal Code and the Civil Code. In that case, the action of the agent
killeth unjustified and fraudulent and therefore could have been the subject of a
criminal action. And yet, it was held to be also a proper subject of a civil action under
article 1902 of the Civil Code. It is also to be noted that it was the employer and not
the employee who was being sued. (pp. 615-616, 73 Phil.). 1
It will be noticed that the defendant in the above case could have been prosecuted in
a criminal case because his negligence causing the death of the child was punishable
by the Penal Code. Here is therefore a clear instance of the same act of negligence
being a proper subject matter either of a criminal action with its consequent civil
liability arising from a crime or of an entirely separate and independent civil action for
fault or negligence under article 1902 of the Civil Code. Thus, in this jurisdiction, the
separate individuality of a cuasi-delito or culpa aquiliana, under the Civil Code has
been fully and clearly recognized, even with regard to a negligent act for which the
wrongdoer could have been prosecuted and convicted in a criminal case and for
which, after such a conviction, he could have been sued for this civil liability arising
from his crime. (p. 617, 73 Phil.) 2
It is most significant that in the case just cited, this Court specifically applied article
1902 of the Civil Code. It is thus that although J. V. House could have been criminally
prosecuted for reckless or simple negligence and not only punished but also made
civilly liable because of his criminal negligence, nevertheless this Court awarded
damages in an independent civil action for fault or negligence under article 1902 of
the Civil Code. (p. 618, 73 Phil.) 3
The legal provisions, authors, and cases already invoked should ordinarily be
sufficient to dispose of this case. But inasmuch as we are announcing doctrines that
have been little understood, in the past, it might not he inappropriate to indicate their
foundations.
Firstly, the Revised Penal Code in articles 365 punishes not only reckless but also
simple negligence. If we were to hold that articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code refer
only to fault or negligence not punished by law, accordingly to the literal import of
article 1093 of the Civil Code, the legal institution of culpa aquiliana would have very
little scope and application in actual life. Death or injury to persons and damage to
property- through any degree of negligence - even the slightest - would have to be
Idemnified only through the principle of civil liability arising from a crime. In such a
state of affairs, what sphere would remain for cuasi-delito or culpa aquiliana? We are
loath to impute to the lawmaker any intention to bring about a situation so absurd and
anomalous. Nor are we, in the interpretation of the laws, disposed to uphold the letter
that killeth rather than the spirit that giveth life. We will not use the literal meaning of
the law to smother and render almost lifeless a principle of such ancient origin and
such full-grown development as culpa aquiliana or cuasi-delito, which is conserved
and made enduring in articles 1902 to 1910 of the Spanish Civil Code.
Secondary, to find the accused guilty in a criminal case, proof of guilt beyond
reasonable doubt is required, while in a civil case, preponderance of evidence is
sufficient to make the defendant pay in damages. There are numerous cases of
criminal negligence which can not be shown beyond reasonable doubt, but can be
proved by a preponderance of evidence. In such cases, the defendant can and should
be made responsible in a civil action under articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code.
Otherwise. there would be many instances of unvindicated civil wrongs. "Ubi jus
Idemnified remedium." (p. 620,73 Phil.)
Fourthly, because of the broad sweep of the provisions of both the Penal Code and
the Civil Code on this subject, which has given rise to the overlapping or concurrence
of spheres already discussed, and for lack of understanding of the character and
efficacy of the action for culpa aquiliana, there has grown up a common practice to
seek damages only by virtue of the civil responsibility arising from a crime, forgetting
that there is another remedy, which is by invoking articles 1902-1910 of the Civil
Code. Although this habitual method is allowed by, our laws, it has nevertheless
rendered practically useless and nugatory the more expeditious and effective remedy
based on culpa aquiliana or culpa extra-contractual. In the present case, we are
asked to help perpetuate this usual course. But we believe it is high time we pointed
out to the harms done by such practice and to restore the principle of responsibility for
fault or negligence under articles 1902 et seq. of the Civil Code to its full rigor. It is
high time we caused the stream of quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana to flow on its own
natural channel, so that its waters may no longer be diverted into that of a crime
under the Penal Code. This will, it is believed, make for the better safeguarding or
private rights because it realtor, an ancient and additional remedy, and for the further
reason that an independent civil action, not depending on the issues, limitations and
results of a criminal prosecution, and entirely directed by the party wronged or his
counsel, is more likely to secure adequate and efficacious redress. (p. 621, 73 Phil.)
Contrary to an immediate impression one might get upon a reading of the foregoing
excerpts from the opinion in Garcia that the concurrence of the Penal Code and the
Civil Code therein referred to contemplate only acts of negligence and not intentional
voluntary acts - deeper reflection would reveal that the thrust of the pronouncements
therein is not so limited, but that in fact it actually extends to fault or culpa. This can
be seen in the reference made therein to the Sentence of the Supreme Court of Spain
of February 14, 1919, supra, which involved a case of fraud or estafa, not a negligent
act. Indeed, Article 1093 of the Civil Code of Spain, in force here at the time of Garcia,
provided textually that obligations "which are derived from acts or omissions in which
fault or negligence, not punishable by law, intervene shall be the subject of Chapter II,
Title XV of this book (which refers to quasi-delicts.)" And it is precisely the underline
qualification, "not punishable by law", that Justice Bocobo emphasized could lead to
an ultimo construction or interpretation of the letter of the law that "killeth, rather than
the spirit that giveth lift- hence, the ruling that "(W)e will not use the literal meaning of
the law to smother and render almost lifeless a principle of such ancient origin and
such full-grown development as culpa aquiliana or quasi-delito, which is conserved
and made enduring in articles 1902 to 1910 of the Spanish Civil Code." And so,
because Justice Bacobo was Chairman of the Code Commission that drafted the
original text of the new Civil Code, it is to be noted that the said Code, which was
enacted after the Garcia doctrine, no longer uses the term, 11 not punishable by law,"
thereby making it clear that the concept of culpa aquiliana includes acts which are
criminal in character or in violation of the penal law, whether voluntary or matter.
Thus, the corresponding provisions to said Article 1093 in the new code, which is
Article 1162, simply says, "Obligations derived from quasi-delicto shall be governed
by the provisions of Chapter 2, Title XVII of this Book, (on quasi-delicts) and by
special laws." More precisely, a new provision, Article 2177 of the new code provides:
ART. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely
separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal
Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of
the defendant.
According to the Code Commission: "The foregoing provision (Article 2177) through
at first sight startling, is not so novel or extraordinary when we consider the exact
nature of criminal and civil negligence. The former is a violation of the criminal law,
while the latter is a "culpa aquiliana" or quasi-delict, of ancient origin, having always
had its own foundation and individuality, separate from criminal negligence. Such
distinction between criminal negligence and "culpa extracontractual" or "cuasi-delito"
has been sustained by decision of the Supreme Court of Spain and maintained as
clear, sound and perfectly tenable by Maura, an outstanding Spanish jurist. Therefore,
under the proposed Article 2177, acquittal from an accusation of criminal negligence,
whether on reasonable doubt or not, shall not be a bar to a subsequent civil action,
not for civil liability arising from criminal negligence, but for damages due to a quasi-
delict or 'culpa aquiliana'. But said article forestalls a double recovery.", (Report of the
Code) Commission, p. 162.)
Although, again, this Article 2177 does seem to literally refer to only acts of
negligence, the same argument of Justice Bacobo about construction that upholds
"the spirit that giveth lift- rather than that which is literal that killeth the intent of the
lawmaker should be observed in applying the same. And considering that the
preliminary chapter on human relations of the new Civil Code definitely establishes
the separability and independence of liability in a civil action for acts criminal in
character (under Articles 29 to 32) from the civil responsibility arising from crime fixed
by Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, and, in a sense, the Rules of Court, under
Sections 2 and 3 (c), Rule 111, contemplate also the same separability, it is "more
congruent with the spirit of law, equity and justice, and more in harmony with modern
progress"- to borrow the felicitous relevant language in Rakes vs. Atlantic. Gulf and
Pacific Co., 7 Phil. 359, to hold, as We do hold, that Article 2176, where it refers to
"fault or negligencia covers not only acts "not punishable by law" but also acts
criminal in character, whether intentional and voluntary or negligent. Consequently, a
separate civil action lies against the offender in a criminal act, whether or not he is
criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended party is
not allowed, if he is actually charged also criminally, to recover damages on both
scores, and would be entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger award of the two,
assuming the awards made in the two cases vary. In other words, the extinction of
civil liability referred to in Par. (e) of Section 3, Rule 111, refers exclusively to civil
liability founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, whereas the civil liability
for the same act considered as a quasi-delict only and not as a crime is not
estinguished even by a declaration in the criminal case that the criminal act charged
has not happened or has not been committed by the accused. Briefly stated, We here
hold, in reiteration of Garcia, that culpa aquiliana includes voluntary and negligent
acts which may be punishable by law.4
It results, therefore, that the acquittal of Reginal Hill in the criminal case has not
extinguished his liability for quasi-delict, hence that acquittal is not a bar to the instant
action against him.

Coming now to the second issue about the effect of Reginald's emancipation by
marriage on the possible civil liability of Atty. Hill, his father, it is also Our considered
opinion that the conclusion of appellees that Atty. Hill is already free from
responsibility cannot be upheld.

While it is true that parental authority is terminated upon emancipation of the child
(Article 327, Civil Code), and under Article 397, emancipation takes place "by the
marriage of the minor (child)", it is, however, also clear that pursuant to Article 399,
emancipation by marriage of the minor is not really full or absolute. Thus
"(E)mancipation by marriage or by voluntary concession shall terminate parental
authority over the child's person. It shall enable the minor to administer his property
as though he were of age, but he cannot borrow money or alienate or encumber real
property without the consent of his father or mother, or guardian. He can sue and be
sued in court only with the assistance of his father, mother or guardian."

Now under Article 2180, "(T)he obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not
only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is
responsible. The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are
responsible. The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are
responsible for the damages caused by the minor children who live in their company."
In the instant case, it is not controverted that Reginald, although married, was living
with his father and getting subsistence from him at the time of the occurrence in
question. Factually, therefore, Reginald was still subservient to and dependent on his
father, a situation which is not unusual.

It must be borne in mind that, according to Manresa, the reason behind the joint and
solidary liability of presuncion with their offending child under Article 2180 is that is the
obligation of the parent to supervise their minor children in order to prevent them from
causing damage to third persons. 5 On the other hand, the clear implication of Article
399, in providing that a minor emancipated by marriage may not, nevertheless, sue or
be sued without the assistance of the parents, is that such emancipation does not
carry with it freedom to enter into transactions or do any act that can give rise to
judicial litigation. (See Manresa, Id., Vol. II, pp. 766-767, 776.) And surely, killing
someone else invites judicial action. Otherwise stated, the marriage of a minor child
does not relieve the parents of the duty to see to it that the child, while still a minor,
does not give answerable for the borrowings of money and alienation or encumbering
of real property which cannot be done by their minor married child without their
consent. (Art. 399; Manresa, supra.)

Accordingly, in Our considered view, Article 2180 applies to Atty. Hill notwithstanding
the emancipation by marriage of Reginald. However, inasmuch as it is evident that
Reginald is now of age, as a matter of equity, the liability of Atty. Hill has become
milling, subsidiary to that of his son.

WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is reversed and the trial court is ordered to
proceed in accordance with the foregoing opinion. Costs against appellees.
 GARCIA VS. FLORIDO
PARTIES:
PERITIONERS: GERMAN GARCIA, (Chief of the Misamis Occidental Hospital),
his wife, LUMINOSA GARCIA, and ESTER FRANCISCO, bookkeeper of said
hospital.
RESPONDENTS:
THE HONORABLE MARIANO M. FLORIDO OF THE CFI OF MISAMIS
OCCIDENTAL, MARCELINO INESIN, RICARDO VAYSON, MACTAN TRANSIT
CO., INC., and PEDRO TUMALA Y DIGAL
FACTS:
Petitioners hired and boarded a PU car (G Ozamis) owned and operated by
respondent Marcelino and driven by Vayson, for a round-trip from Oroquieta
City to Zamboanga City, for the purpose of attending a conference.
At about 9:30 a.m., while the PU car was negotiating a slight curve on the
national highway in Barrio Guisukan, ZDN said car collided with an
oncoming passenger bus (No. 25) owned and operated by the Mactan
Transit Co., Inc. and driven by Tumala.
As a result of the aforesaid collision, petitioners sustained physical injuries
which compelled their medical treatment and hospitalization.
PETITIONERS: filed an action for damages against the private respondents, owners
and drivers of the PU car and the passenger bus. Alleging that both drivers of the PU
car and the passenger bus were grossly negligent without due regard to the safety of
the passengers aboard the PU car.
MARCELINO AND VAYSON: (Respondents) admitted the contract of carriage with
petitioners but alleged, that the accident was due to the negligence and reckless
imprudence of the bus driver, as when Vayson, driver of the PU car, saw the
oncoming passenger bus coming from the opposite direction, he had to stop the PU
car in order to give way to the passenger bus, but, in spite of such precaution, the
passenger bus bumped the PU car, thus causing the accident in question, and,
therefore, said private respondents could not be held liable for the damages caused
on petitioners.
MACTAN TRANSIT CO., INC. AND PEDRO TUMALA: (Respondents) filed a MTD
alleging that Mactan Transit and its driver had operated said passenger bus with
maximum care and prudence.
The principal argument of the MTD was that the petitioners had no cause of
action of the present action for damages, respondent Tumala was charged in
Criminal Case for "double serious and less serious physical injuries through
reckless imprudence", and that, with the filing of the aforesaid criminal case,
no civil action could be filed subsequent thereto unless the criminal case has
been finally adjudicated, pursuant to Sec. 3 of Rule 111 of the ROC, and,
therefore, the filing of the instant civil action is premature, because the
liability of the employer is merely subsidiary and does not arise until after
final judgment has been rendered finding the driver, Pedro Tumala guilty of
negligence; that Art. 33 of the NCC, is not applicable because Art. 33 applied
only to the crimes of physical injuries or homicide, not to the negligent act or
imprudence of the driver.
PETITIONERS: filed an opposition, alleging that the action for damages was
instituted not to enforce the civil liability of the respondents under Art. 100 of the RPC
but for their civil liability on quasi-delicts, as the same negligent act causing damages
may produce civil liability arising from a crime under the RPC or create an action for
quasi-delict or culpa extra-contractual under the Civil Code, and the party seeking
recovery is free to choose which remedy to enforce.
LOWER COURT: sustained the arguments of respondents, Mactan Transit Co., Inc.
and Pedro Tumala, and declared that whether or not "the action for damages is based
on criminal negligence or civil negligence known as culpa aquiliana in the Civil Code
or tort under American law" there "should be a showing that the offended party
expressly waived the civil action or reserved his right to institute it separately" and
that "the allegations of the complaint in culpa aquiliana must not be tainted by any
assertion of violation of law or traffic rules or regulations" and because of the prayer in
the complaint asking the Court to declare the defendants jointly and severally liable
for moral, compensatory and exemplary damages, the Court is of the opinion that
the action was not based on "culpa aquiliana or quasi-delict."
Petitioners' MR was denied by the trial court. Hence, this appeal
on certiorari.
ISSUE:
RULING:
There is no question that the essential for a quasi-delictual action under Articles 2176-
2194 of the NCC are present, namely: a) act or omission of the private respondents;
b) presence of fault or negligence or the lack of due care in the operation of the
passenger bus No. 25 by respondent Pedro Tumala resulting in the collision of the
bus with the passenger car; c) physical injuries and other damages sustained by
petitioners as a result of the collision; d) existence of direct causal connection
between the damage or prejudice and the fault or negligence of private respondents;
and e) the absence of pre-existing contractual relations between the parties.
The circumstance that the complaint alleged that respondents violated traffic rules in
that the driver drove the vehicle "at a fast clip in a reckless, grossly negligent and
imprudent manner in violation of traffic rules and without due regard to the safety of
the passengers aboard the PU car" does not detract from the nature and character of
the action, as one based on culpa aquiliana.
The violation of traffic rules is merely descriptive of the failure of said driver to observe
for the protection of the interests of others, that degree of care, precaution and
vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, which failure resulted in the injury
on petitioners. Certainly excessive speed in violation of traffic rules is a clear
indication of negligence. Since the same negligent act resulted in the filing of the
criminal action and the civil action by petitioners, it is inevitable that the averments on
the drivers' negligence in both complaints would substantially be the same. It should
be emphasized that the same negligent act causing damages may produce a civil
liability arising from a crime under Art. 100 of the RPC or create an action for quasi-
delict or culpa extra-contractual under Arts. 2176-2194 of the New Civil Code. This
distinction has been amply explained in Barredo vs. Garcia, et al.
It is true that under Sec. 2 in relation to Sec. 1 of Rule 111 of the Revised ROC which
became effective on January 1, 1964, in the cases provided for by Articles 31, 33, 39
and 2177 of the Civil Code, an independent civil action entirely separate and distinct
from the civil action, may be instituted by the injured party during the pendency of the
criminal case, provided said party has reserved his right to institute it separately, but it
should be noted, however, that neither Section 1 nor Section 2 of Rule 111 fixes a
time limit when such reservation shall be made.
In Tactaquin v. Palileo,2 where the reservation was made after the tort-feasor had
already pleaded guilty and after the private prosecutor had entered his appearance
jointly with the prosecuting attorney in the course of the criminal proceedings, and the
tort-feasor was convicted and sentenced to pay damages to the offended party by
final judgment in said criminal case, We ruled that such reservation is legally
ineffective because the offended party cannot recover damages twice for the same
act or omission of the defendant.
We explained in Meneses vs. Luat3that when the criminal action for physical injuries
against the defendant did not proceed to trial as he pleaded guilty upon arraignment
and the Court made no pronouncement on the matter or damages suffered by the
injured party, the mere appearance of private counsel in representation of the
offended party in said criminal case does not constitute such active intervention as
could impart an intention to press a claim for damages in the same action, and,
therefore, cannot bar a separate civil action for damages subsequently instituted on
the same ground under Article 33 of the New Civil Code.
In the case at bar, there is no question that petitioners never intervened in
the criminal action instituted by the Chief of Police against respondent Pedro
Tumala, much less has the said criminal action been terminated either by
conviction or acquittal of said accused.
It is, therefore, evident that by the institution of the present civil action for
damages, petitioners have in effect abandoned their right to press recovery
for damages in the criminal case, and have opted instead to recover them in
the present civil case.
As a result of this action of petitioners the civil liability of private respondents to the
former has ceased to be involved in the criminal action. Undoubtedly an offended
party loses his right to intervene in the prosecution of a criminal case, not only when
he has waived the civil action or expressly reserved his right to institute, but also
when he has actually instituted the civil action. For by either of such actions his
interest in the criminal case has disappeared.
As we have stated at the outset, the same negligent act causing damages may
produce a civil liability arising from crime or create an action for quasi-delict or culpa
extra-contractual.
The former is a violation of the criminal law, while the latter is a distinct and
independent negligence, having always had its own foundation and individuality.
Some legal writers are of the view that in accordance with Article 31, the civil action
based upon quasi-delict may proceed independently of the criminal proceeding for
criminal negligence and regardless of the result of the latter. Hence, "the proviso in
Section 2 of Rule 111 with reference to ... Articles 32, 33 and 34 of the Civil Code is
contrary to the letter and spirit of the said articles, for these articles were drafted ...
and are intended to constitute as exceptions to the general rule stated in what is now
Section 1 of Rule 111.
The proviso which is procedural, may also be regarded as an unauthorized
amendment of substantive law, Articles 32, 33 and 34 of the Civil Code, which do not
provide for the reservation required in the proviso."4 But in whatever way We view the
institution of the civil action for recovery of damages under quasi-delict by petitioners,
whether as one that should be governed by the provisions of Section 2 of Rule 111 of
the Rules which require reservation by the injured party considering that by the
institution of the civil action even before the commencement of the trial of the criminal
case, petitioners have thereby foreclosed their right to intervene therein, or one where
reservation to file the civil action need not be made, for the reason that the law itself
(Article 33 of the Civil Code) already makes the reservation and the failure of the
offended party to do so does not bar him from bringing the action, under the peculiar
circumstances of the case, We find no legal justification for respondent court's order
of dismissal.
WHEREFORE, the decision and order appealed from are hereby reversed and set
aside, and the court a quo is directed to proceed with the trial of the case. Costs
against private respondents.
G.R. No. L-32599 June 29, 1979
EDGARDO E. MENDOZA, petitioner
vs.
HON. ABUNDIO Z. ARRIETA, Presiding Judge of Branch VIII, Court of First
Instance of Manila, FELINO TIMBOL, and RODOLFO SALAZAR, respondents.
At about 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon, a three- way vehicular accident
occurred along Mac-Arthur Highway, Marilao, Bulacan, involving a Mercedes
Benz owned and driven by petitioner; a private jeep owned and driven by
respondent Rodolfo Salazar; and a gravel and sand truck owned by
respondent Felipino Timbol and driven by Freddie Montoya.
As a consequence of said mishap, two separate Informations for Reckless
Imprudence Causing Damage to Property were filed against Salazar and
Freddie Montoya.
The race against truck-driver Montoya, docketed as Criminal Case No. SM-
227 was for causing damage to the jeep owned by Salazar, in the amount of
Pl,604.00, by hitting it at the right rear portion thereby causing said jeep to hit
and bump an oncoming car, which happened to be petitioner's Mercedes
Benz. The case against jeep-owner-driver Salazar, docketed as Criminal
Case No. SM 228, was for causing damage to the Mercedes Benz of
petitioner in the amount of P8,890.00
PETITIONER testified that jeep-owner- driver Salazar overtook the truck driven by
Montoya, swerved to the left going towards the poblacion of Marilao, and hit his car
which was bound for Manila; that before the impact, Salazar had jumped from the
jeep and that he was not aware that Salazar's jeep was bumped from behind by the
truck driven by Montoya. Petitioner's version of the accident was adopted by truck
driver Montoya. Jeep-owner-driver Salazar, on the other hand, after overtaking the
truck driven by Montoya, he flashed a signal indicating his intention to turn left
towards the poblacion of Marilao but was stopped at the intersection by a policeman
who was directing traffic; that while he was at a stop position, his jeep was bumped at
the rear by the truck driven by Montova causing him to be thrown out of the jeep,
which then swerved to the left and hit petitioner's car, which was coming from the
opposite direction.
CFI: finds the accused Freddie Montoya GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of damage to property thru reckless imprudence in Crime and hereby sentence
him to pay a fine of P972.50 and to indemnify Rodolfo Salazar in the same amount of
P972.50 as actual damages, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, both
as to fine and indemnity, with costs.
Accused Rodolfo Salazar is hereby ACQUITTED from the offense charged in Crime.
Case No. SM-228.
Thus, the trial Court absolved jeep-owner-driver Salazar of any liability, civil and
criminal, in view of its findings that the collision between Salazar's jeep and
petitioner's car was the result of the former having been bumped from behind by the
truck driven by Montoya. Neither was petitioner awarded damages as he was not a
complainant against truck-driver Montoya but only against jeep-owner-driver Salazar.
After the termination of the criminal cases, petitioner filed Civil Case No.
80803 against respondents jeep-owner-driver Salazar and Felino Timbol, the
latter being the owner of the gravel and sand truck driven by Montoya, for
indentification for the damages sustained by his car as a result of the
collision involving their vehicles. Jeep-owner-driver Salazar and truck-owner
Timbol were joined as defendants, either in the alternative or in
solidum allegedly for the reason that petitioner was uncertain as to whether
he was entitled to relief against both on only one of them.
Truck-owner Timbol filed a MTD, Civil Case No. 80803 on the grounds that
the Complaint is barred by a prior judgment in the criminal cases and that it
fails to state a cause of action. An Opposition thereto was filed by petitioner.
RESPONDENT JUDGE dismissed the Complaint against truck-owner Timbol. Upon
motion of jeep-owner-driver Salazar, respondent Judge also dismissed the case as
against the former. Respondent Judge reasoned out that "while it is true that an
independent civil action for liability under Article 2177 of the Civil Code could be
prosecuted independently of the criminal action for the offense from which it arose,
the New Rules of Court, which took effect on January 1, 1964, requires an express
reservation of the civil action to be made in the criminal action; otherwise, the same
would be barred pursuant to Section 2, Rule 111.
Petitioner's MR was denied
ISSUE
RULING:
The Complaint against truck-owner Timbol
We shall first discuss the validity of the Order dismissing petitioner's Complaint
against truck-owner Timbol.
In dismissing the Complaint against the truck-owner, respondent Judge sustained
Timbol's allegations that the civil suit is barred by the prior joint judgment in Criminal
Cases Nos. SM-227 and SM-228, wherein no reservation to file a separate civil case
was made by petitioner and where the latter actively participated in the trial and tried
to prove damages against jeep-driver-Salazar only; and that the Complaint does not
state a cause of action against truck-owner Timbol inasmuch as petitioner prosecuted
jeep-owner-driver Salazar as the one solely responsible for the damage suffered by
his car.
Well-settled is the rule that for a prior judgment to constitute a bar to a subsequent
case, the following requisites must concur: (1) it must be a final judgment; (2) it must
have been rendered by a Court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and over
the parties; (3) it must be a judgment on the merits; and (4) there must be, between
the first and second actions, Identity of parties, Identity of subject matter and Identity
of cause of action.
It is conceded that the first three requisites of res judicata are present. However, we
agree with petitioner that there is no Identity of cause of action between Criminal
Case No. SM-227 and Civil Case No. 80803. Obvious is the fact that in said criminal
case truck-driver Montoya was not prosecuted for damage to petitioner's car but for
damage to the jeep. Neither was truck-owner Timbol a party in said case. In fact as
the trial Court had put it "the owner of the Mercedes Benz cannot recover any
damages from the accused Freddie Montoya, he (Mendoza) being a complainant only
against Rodolfo Salazar in Criminal Case No. SM-228. 4 And more importantly, in the
criminal cases, the cause of action was the enforcement of the civil liability arising
from criminal negligence under Article l of the Revised Penal Code, whereas Civil
Case No. 80803 is based on quasi-delict under Article 2180, in relation to Article 2176
of the Civil Code As held in Barredo vs. Garcia, et al. 5
The foregoing authorities clearly demonstrate the separate in. individuality of cuasi-
delitos or culpa aquiliana under the Civil Code. Specifically they show that there is a
distinction between civil liability arising from criminal negligence (governed by the
Penal Code) and responsibility for fault or negligence under articles 1902 to 1910 of
the Civil Code, and that the same negligent act may produce either a civil liability
arising from a crime under the Penal Code, or a separate responsibility for fault or
negligence under articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code. Still more concretely, the
authorities above cited render it inescapable to conclude that the employer in this
case the defendant- petitioner is primarily and directly liable under article 1903 of the
Civil Code.
That petitioner's cause of action against Timbol in the civil case is based on quasi-
delict is evident from the recitals in the complaint to wit: that while petitioner was
driving his car along MacArthur Highway at Marilao, Bulacan, a jeep owned and
driven by Salazar suddenly swerved to his (petitioner's) lane and collided with his car
That the sudden swerving of Salazar's jeep was caused either by the negligence and
lack of skill of Freddie Montoya, Timbol's employee, who was then driving a gravel
and sand truck iii the same direction as Salazar's jeep; and that as a consequence of
the collision, petitioner's car suffered extensive damage amounting to P12,248.20 and
that he likewise incurred actual and moral damages, litigation expenses and
attorney's fees. Clearly, therefore, the two factors that a cause of action must consist
of, namely: (1) plaintiff's primary right, i.e., that he is the owner of a Mercedes Benz,
and (2) defendant's delict or wrongful act or omission which violated plaintiff's primary
right, i.e., the negligence or lack of skill either of jeep-owner Salazar or of Timbol's
employee, Montoya, in driving the truck, causing Salazar's jeep to swerve and collide
with petitioner's car, were alleged in the Complaint. 6
Consequently, petitioner's cause of action being based on quasi-delict, respondent
Judge committed reversible error when he dismissed the civil suit against the truck-
owner, as said case may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and
regardless of the result of the latter.
Art. 31. When the civil action is based on an obligation not arising from the act or
omission complained of as a felony, such civil action may proceed independently of
the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter.
But it is truck-owner Timbol's submission (as well as that of jeep-owner-driver
Salazar) that petitioner's failure to make a reservation in the criminal action of his right
to file an independent civil action bars the institution of such separate civil action,
invoking section 2, Rule 111, Rules of Court, which says:
Section 2. Independent civil action. In the cases provided for in Articles 31, 32,
33, 34 and 2177 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, an independent civil action
entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action may be brought by the injured
party during the pendency of the criminal case, provided the right is reserved as
required in the preceding section. Such civil action shau proceed independently of the
criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence.
Interpreting the above provision, this Court, in Garcia vs. Florida 7 said: As we have
stated at the outset, the same negligent act causing damages may produce a civil
liability arising from crime or create an action for quasi-delict or culpa extra-
contractual. The former is a violation of the criminal law, while the latter is a distinct
and independent negligence, having always had its own foundation and individuality.
Some legal writers are of the view that in accordance with Article 31, the civil action
based upon quasi-delict may proceed independently of the criminal proceeding for
criminal negligence and regardless of the result of the latter. Hence, 'the proviso in
Section 2 of Rule 111 with reference to ... Articles 32, 33 and 34 of the Civil Code is
contrary to the letter and spirit of the said articles, for these articles were drafted ...
and are intended to constitute as exceptions to the general rule stated in what is now
Section 1 of Rule 111. The proviso, which is procedural, may also be regarded as an
unauthorized amendment of substantive law, Articles 32, 33 and 34 of the Civil Code,
which do not provide for the reservation required in the proviso ... .
In his concurring opinion in the above case, Mr. Justice Antonio Barredo further
observed that inasmuch as Articles 2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code create a civil
liability distinct and different from the civil action arising from the offense of negligence
under the Revised Penal Code, no reservation, therefore, need be made in the
criminal case; that Section 2 of Rule 111 is inoperative, "it being substantive in
character and is not within the power of the Supreme Court to promulgate; and even if
it were not substantive but adjective, it cannot stand because of its inconsistency with
Article 2177, an enactment of the legislature superseding the Rules of 1940."
We declare, therefore, that in so far as truck-owner Timbol is concerned, Civil Case
No. 80803 is not barred by the fact that petitioner failed to reserve, in the criminal
action, his right to file an independent civil action based on quasi-delict.
The suit against jeep-owner-driver Salazar
The case as against jeep-owner-driver Salazar, who was acquitted in Criminal Case
No. SM-228, presents a different picture altogether.
At the outset it should be clarified that inasmuch as civil liability co-exists with criminal
responsibility in negligence cases, the offended party has the option between an
action for enforcement of civil liability based on culpa criminalunder Article 100 of the
Revised Penal Code, and an action for recovery of damages based on culpa
aquiliana under Article 2177 of the Civil Code. The action for enforcement of civil
liability based on culpa criminal under section 1 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court is
deemed simultaneously instituted with the criminal action, unless expressly waived or
reserved for separate application by the offended party. 8
The circumstances attendant to the criminal case yields the conclusion that petitioner
had opted to base his cause of action against jeep-owner-driver Salazar on culpa
criminal and not on culpa aquiliana as evidenced by his active participation and
intervention in the prosecution of the criminal suit against said Salazar. The latter's
civil liability continued to be involved in the criminal action until its termination. Such
being the case, there was no need for petitioner to have reserved his right to file a
separate civil action as his action for civil liability was deemed impliedly instituted in
Criminal Case No. SM-228.
Neither would an independent civil action he. Noteworthy is the basis of the acquittal
of jeep-owner-driver Salazar in the criminal case, expounded by the trial Court in this
wise:
consequently, a civil action for damages can no longer be instituted. This is explicitly
provided for in Article 29 of the Civil Code quoted here under:
Art. 29. When the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted on the ground that
his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt, a civil action for damages for
the same act or omission may be instituted. Such action requires only a
preponderance of evidence ...
If in a criminal case the judgment of acquittal is based upon reasonable doubt, the
court shall so declare. In the absence of any declaration to that effect, it may be
inferred from the text of the decision whether or not the acquittal is due to that ground.
In so far as the suit against jeep-owner-driver Salazar is concerned, therefore, we
sustain respondent Judge's Order dismissing the complaint, albeit on different
grounds.
WHEREFORE, 1) the Order dismissing Civil Case against private respondent Felino
Timbol is set aside, and respondent Judge, or his successor, hereby ordered to
proceed with the hearing on the merits; 2) but the Orders dismissing the Complaint
against respondent Rodolfo Salazar are hereby upheld.

In view of what has been proven and established during the trial, accused Freddie
Montoya would be held able for having bumped and hit the rear portion of the jeep
driven by the accused Rodolfo Salazar,

Considering that the collision between the jeep driven by Rodolfo Salazar and the car
owned and driven by Edgardo Mendoza was the result of the hitting on the rear of the
jeep by the truck driven by Freddie Montoya, this Court behaves that accused Rodolfo
Salazar cannot be held able for the damages sustained by Edgardo Mendoza's car. 9

Crystal clear is the trial Court's pronouncement that under the facts of the case, jeep-
owner-driver Salazar cannot be held liable for the damages sustained by petitioner's
car. In other words, "the fact from which the civil might arise did not exist. "
Accordingly, inasmuch as petitioner's cause of action as against jeep-owner-driver
Salazar is ex- delictu, founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, the civil
action must be held to have been extinguished in consonance with Section 3(c), Rule
111 of the Rules of Court 10 which provides:

Sec. 3. Other civil actions arising from offenses. In all cases not included in the
preceding section the following rules shall be observed:

c) Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil, unless the
extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the
civil night arise did not exist. ...

And even if petitioner's cause of action as against jeep-owner-driver Salazar were

not ex-delictu, the end result would be the same, it being clear from the judgment in
the criminal case that Salazar's acquittal was not based upon reasonable doubt,
L.G. FOODS CORPORATION and VICTORINO GABOR, Vice-President and
General Manager, petitioners,
vs.
HON. PHILADELFA B. PAGAPONG-AGRAVIADOR, in her capacity as Presiding
Judge of Regional Trial Court, Branch 43, Bacolod City, and SPS. FLORENTINO
and THERESA VALLEJERA, respondents.
Charles Vallereja, a 7-year old son of the spouses Florentino Vallejera and
Theresa Vallejera, was hit by a Ford Fiera van owned by the petitioners and
driven at the time by their employee, Vincent Norman Yeneza. Charles died
as a result of the accident.
In time, an Information for Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Homicide was
filed against the driver.
Unfortunately, before the trial could be concluded, the accused driver
committed suicide, evidently bothered by conscience and remorse.
On account thereof, the MTCC, dismissed the criminal case.
SPOUSES VALLEJERA filed a complaint for damages against the petitioners as
employers of the deceased driver, basically alleging that as such employers, they
failed to exercise due diligence in the selection and supervision of their employees.
PETITIONERS as defendants denied liability for the death of the Vallejeras' 7-year
old son, claiming that they had exercised the required due diligence in the selection
and supervision of their employees, including the deceased driver. They thus prayed
for the dismissal of the complaint for lack of cause of action.
Instead of the required memorandum of authorities, the defendant petitioners filed
a MTD principally arguing that the complaint is basically a "claim for subsidiary liability
against an employer" under the provision of Article 103 of the RPC. They contend that
there must first be a judgment of conviction against their driver as a condition sine
qua non to hold them liable. Ergo, since the driver died during the pendency of the
criminal action, the sine qua non condition for their subsidiary liability was not fulfilled,
hence the lack of cause of action on the part of the plaintiffs. They further argue that
since the plaintiffs did not make a reservation to institute a separate action for
damages when the criminal case was filed, the damage suit in question is thereby
deemed instituted with the criminal action. which was already dismissed.
TRIAL COURT denied the MTD for lack of merit and set the case for pre-trial.
CA denied the petition and upheld the trial court.
It is clear that the complaint neither represents nor implies that the responsibility
charged was the petitioner's subsidiary liability under Art. 103, RPC. As pointed out
by the trial court, the complaint does not even allege the basic elements for such a
liability, like the conviction of the accused employee and his insolvency. Truly enough,
a civil action to enforce subsidiary liability separate and distinct from the criminal
action is even unnecessary.
Specifically, Civil Case No. 99-10845 exacts responsibility for fault or negligence
under Art. 2176, Civil Code, which is entirely separate and distinct from the civil
liability arising from negligence under the Revised Penal Code. Verily, therefore, the
liability under Art. 2180, Civil Code, is direct and immediate, and not conditioned upon
prior recourse against the negligent employee or prior showing of the latter's
insolvency. (Underscoring in the original.)
ISSUE:
RULING:
As the Court sees it, the sole issue for resolution is whether the spouses Vallejeras'
cause of action in Civil Case is founded on Article 103 of the RPC, as maintained by
the petitioners, or derived from Article 2180 of the Civil Code, as ruled by the two
courts below.
It thus behooves us to examine the allegations of the complaint for damages in Civil
Case No. 99-10845. That complaint alleged, inter alia, as follows:
3. That defendant [LG Food Corporation] is the registered owner of a Ford Fiera Van
with Plate No. NMS 881 and employer sometime February of 1996 of one Vincent
Norman Yeneza y Ferrer, a salesman of said corporation;
4. That sometime February 26, 1996 at around 2:00 P.M. at Rosario St., Bacolod City,
the minor son of said plaintiffs [now respondents], Charles Vallejera, 7 years old, was
hit and bumped by above-described vehicle then driven by said employee, Vincent
Norman Yeneza y Ferrer;
5. That the mishap was due to the gross fault and negligence of defendant's
employee, who drove said vehicle, recklessly, negligently and at a high speed without
regard to traffic condition and safety of other road users and likewise to the fault and
negligence of the owner employer, herein defendants LG Food Corporation who failed
to exercise due diligence in the selection and supervision of his employee, Vincent
Norman Yeneza y Ferrer;
6. That as a result of said incident, plaintiffs' son suffered multiple body injuries which
led to his untimely demise on that very day;
7. That a criminal case was filed against the defendant's employee, docketed as
Criminal Case No. 67787, (earlier filed as Crim. Case No. 96-17570 before RTC)
before MTC-Branch III, entitled "People v. Yeneza" for "Reckless Imprudence
resulting to Homicide," but the same was dismissed because pending litigation, then
remorse-stricken [accused] committed suicide;
8. That the injuries and complications as well as the resultant death suffered by the
late minor Charles Vallejera were due to the negligence and imprudence of
defendant's employee;
9. That defendant LG Foods Corporation is civilly liable for the
negligence/imprudence of its employee since it failed to exercise the necessary
diligence required of a good father of the family in the selection and
supervision of his employee, Vincent Norman Yeneza y Ferrer which diligence if
exercised, would have prevented said incident. (Bracketed words and emphasis
ours.)
Nothing in the foregoing allegations suggests, even remotely, that the herein
petitioners are being made to account for their subsidiary liability under Article 103 of
the Revised Penal Code. As correctly pointed out by the trial court in its order of
September 4, 2001 denying the petitioners' Motion to Dismiss, the complaint did not
even aver the basic elements for the subsidiary liability of an employer under Article
103 of the Revised Penal Code, such as the prior conviction of the driver in the
criminal case filed against him nor his insolvency.
Admittedly, the complaint did not explicitly state that plaintiff Vallejeras were suing the
defendant petitioners for damages based on quasi-delict. Clear it is, however, from
the allegations of the complaint that quasi-delict was their choice of remedy against
the petitioners. To stress, the plaintiff spouses alleged in their complaint gross fault
and negligence on the part of the driver and the failure of the petitioners, as
employers, to exercise due diligence in the selection and supervision of their
employees. The spouses further alleged that the petitioners are civilly liable for the
negligence/imprudence of their driver since they failed to exercise the necessary
diligence required of a good father of the family in the selection and supervision of
their employees, which diligence, if exercised, could have prevented the vehicular
accident that resulted to the death of their 7-year old son.
Section 2, Rule 2, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure defines cause of action as the
"act or omission by which a party violates the right of another." Such act or omission
gives rise to an obligation which may come from law, contracts, quasi contracts,
delicts or quasi-delicts.11
Corollarily, an act or omission causing damage to another may give rise to two
separate civil liabilities on the part of the offender, i.e., 1) civil liability ex delicto;12 and
2) independent civil liabilities, such as those (a) not arising from an act or omission
complained of as felony (e.g., culpa contractual or obligations arising from law;13 the
intentional torts;14 and culpa aquiliana15); or (b) where the injured party is granted a
right to file an action independent and distinct from the criminal action.16 Either of
these two possible liabilities may be enforced against the offender.17
Stated otherwise, victims of negligence or their heirs have a choice between an action
to enforce the civil liability arising from culpa criminal under Article 100 of the Revised
Penal Code, and an action for quasi-delict (culpa aquiliana) under Articles 2176 to
2194 of the Civil Code. If, as here, the action chosen is for quasi-delict, the plaintiff
may hold the employer liable for the negligent act of its employee, subject to the
employer's defense of exercise of the diligence of a good father of the family. On the
other hand, if the action chosen is for culpa criminal, the plaintiff can hold the
employer subsidiarily liable only upon proof of prior conviction of its employee. 18
Article 116119 of the Civil Code provides that civil obligation arising from criminal
offenses shall be governed by penal laws subject to the provision of Article
217720 and of the pertinent provision of Chapter 2, Preliminary Title on Human
Relation, and of Title XVIII of this Book, regulating damages. Plainly, Article 2177
provides for the alternative remedies the plaintiff may choose from in case the
obligation has the possibility of arising indirectly from the delict/crime or directly
from quasi-delict/tort. The choice is with the plaintiff who makes known his cause of
action in his initiatory pleading or complaint,21 and not with the defendant who can not
ask for the dismissal of the plaintiff's cause of action or lack of it based on the
defendant's perception that the plaintiff should have opted to file a claim under Article
103 of the Revised Penal Code.
Under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, the liability of the employer is direct or
immediate. It is not conditioned upon prior recourse against the negligent employee
and a prior showing of insolvency of such employee. 22
Here, the complaint sufficiently alleged that the death of the couple's minor son was
caused by the negligent act of the petitioners' driver; and that the petitioners
themselves were civilly liable for the negligence of their driver for failing "to exercise
the necessary diligence required of a good father of the family in the selection and
supervision of [their] employee, the driver, which diligence, if exercised, would have
prevented said accident."
Had the respondent spouses elected to sue the petitioners based on Article 103 of the
Revised Penal Code, they would have alleged that the guilt of the driver had been
proven beyond reasonable doubt; that such accused driver is insolvent; that it is the
subsidiary liability of the defendant petitioners as employers to pay for the damage
done by their employee (driver) based on the principle that every person criminally
liable is also civilly liable.23 Since there was no conviction in the criminal case against
the driver, precisely because death intervened prior to the termination of the criminal
proceedings, the spouses' recourse was, therefore, to sue the petitioners for their
direct and primary liability based on quasi-delict.
Besides, it is worthy to note that the petitioners, in their Answer with Compulsory
Counter-Claim,24 repeatedly made mention of Article 2180 of the Civil Code and
anchored their defense on their allegation that "they had exercised due diligence in
the selection and supervision of [their] employees." The Court views this defense as
an admission that indeed the petitioners acknowledged the private respondents'
cause of action as one for quasi-delict under Article 2180 of the Civil Code.
All told, Civil Case No. 99-10845 is a negligence suit brought under Article 2176 - Civil
Code to recover damages primarily from the petitioners as employers responsible for
their negligent driver pursuant to Article 2180 of the Civil Code. The obligation
imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions, but
also for those of persons for whom one is responsible. Thus, the employer is liable for
damages caused by his employees and household helpers acting within the scope of
their assigned tasks, even though the former is not engaged in any business or
industry.

Citing Maniago v. CA,25 petitioner would argue that Civil Case No. 99-10845 should
have been dismissed for failure of the respondent spouses to make a reservation to
institute a separate civil action for damages when the criminal case against the driver
was filed.

The argument is specious.

To start with, the petitioners' reliance on Maniago is obviously misplaced. There, the
civil case was filed while the criminal case against the employee was still pending.
Here, the criminal case against the employee driver was prematurely terminated due
to his death. Precisely, Civil Case No. 99-10845 was filed by the respondent spouses
because no remedy can be obtained by them against the petitioners with the
dismissal of the criminal case against their driver during the pendency thereof.

The circumstance that no reservation to institute a separate civil action for damages
was made when the criminal case was filed is of no moment for the simple reason
that the criminal case was dismissed without any pronouncement having been made
therein. In reality, therefor, it is as if there was no criminal case to speak of in the first
place. And for the petitioners to insist for the conviction of their driver as a
condition sine qua non to hold them liable for damages is to ask for the impossible.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit.

Costs against the petitioners.